2010_van de vegt et al_power asymmetry and learning in teams- the moderating role of performance...

7/30/2019 2010_Van de Vegt Et Al_Power Asymmetry and Learning in Teams- The Moderating Role of Performance Feedback

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OrganizationScienceVol. 21, No. 2, MarchApril 2010, pp. 347361

issn 1047-7039 eissn 1526-5455 10 2102 0347

informs

doi 10.1287/orsc.1090.0452

2010 INFORMS

Power Asymmetry and Learning in Teams:The Moderating Role of Performance Feedback

Gerben S. Van der Vegt, Simon B. de JongDepartment of Human Resource Management and Organizational Behavior, University of Groningen, 9700 AV Groningen, The Netherlands

{[email protected], [email protected]}

J. Stuart BundersonJohn M. Olin School of Business, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri 63130,

[email protected]

Eric MollemanDepartment of Human Resource Management and Organizational Behavior, University of Groningen, 9700 AV Groningen, The Netherlands,

[email protected]

Past research suggests that power asymmetry within teams can have a stifling effect on team learning and performance.We argue here that this effect is contingent on whether power advantages within a team are used to advance individualor collective interests. This study considers the moderating role of one factor that can influence the individual or collectiveorientation of team membersthe type of performance feedback that a team receives. We propose that whereas individ-ual feedback reinforces the negative effects of power asymmetry on team learning, group feedback fosters a collectiveorientation within a team that transforms power differences into a stimulus for team learning. Analysis of multisource,multimethod data obtained from 218 individuals in 46 teams provided support for these hypotheses. Results also suggestedthat team learning mediated the relationship between power asymmetry and team performance. These findings suggest thatpower asymmetry can be a resource for and not just an obstacle to team learning in power-asymmetric teams.

Key words: power asymmetry; learning; teams; performance feedback; task dependence; field studyHistory : Published online in Articles in Advance July 2, 2009.

A growing body of research evidence in the organi-zation and management literatures suggests that workteams can differ considerably in the extent to whichthey pursue activities related to learning and continu-ous improvement and that these differences have impor-tant implications for team performance (Bunderson andSutcliffe 2002, 2003; Edmondson 1999, 2002; Gibsonand Vermeulen 2003; Schippers et al. 2003; Van derVegt and Bunderson 2005; see also Argote et al. 2001).In todays market environment, where a firms successis contingent on its ability to improve and adapt morequickly than its competitors, teams with the capacity tocontinually improve processes and approaches to operatemore quickly, efficiently, and intelligently have becomea critical competitive advantage. Understanding the fac-tors that promote or inhibit these interactive learningprocesses within teams has therefore become an impor-tant research agenda for management scholars (Argote1999, Edmondson 1999).

One key factor that may be important for teamlearning is the configuration of power within a team.A number of researchers have suggested that power dif-ferences within a team may stifle team learning behav-iors. For example, Brooks (1994) found that group

reflection and process improvement did not occur wheneven one team member had significant power over oth-ers. Similarly, Edmondson (2002) conducted a qual-itative study of learning behavior in 12 teams andfound that power differences were negatively associ-ated with team learning. Other research has suggestedthat in teams where there is stratification or inequal-ity in power relations, team members do not learn frommember differences (Bunderson 2003a, 2003b; Pitcherand Smith 2001). And Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988)found that power inequality heightens intragroup politicsand undermines team self-improvement. Together, thesestudies suggest that power differences can significantlyinterfere with team learning and that real learning mayonly occur in teams where members have equal levelsof power.

This conclusion is problematic for a number of rea-sons. First, power differences exist in virtually all teams.In classic formulations, power is defined as a function ofdependence (Emerson 1962). A has power over B (i.e.,dyadic asymmetry in power exists) when B is depen-dent on A for valued or needed resources (physical, emo-tional, informational) (Blau 1964). In work teams, wheremultiple individuals coordinate differentiated efforts to

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Van der Vegt et al.: Power Asymmetry and Learning in Teams348 Organization Science 21(2), pp. 347361, 2010 INFORMS

complete some task, resource dependence among groupmembers is simply a fact of life. Furthermore, althoughthere may be cases where the power-dependence rela-tions that exist between task group members will balanceout (i.e., As dependence on B is balanced by Bs depen-dence on A such that neither has a power advantage), it

is unreasonable to assume that perfect balance among allgroup members will be the normal or even a commonstate of affairs. In most teams, asymmetries in power-dependence relations will exist because of differencesin the formal or informal resources controlled by teammembers as a function of different roles, tenures, or nat-ural endowments (e.g., intelligence or charisma; Raginsand Sundstrom 1989).

Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that powerdifferences do not inevitably stifle team learning andthat they may even play a facilitating role. For exam-ple, Edmondson (2002) found that the effect of powerdifferences on team learning depended on how these

differences were handled and, specifically, on whetherhigh-power members adopted a participative approach(see also Nembhard and Edmondson 2006). Van derVegt et al. (2006) also found that teams varied in theextent to which high-power members helped lower-power members and that these differences were associ-ated with performance. Work by Larson and colleagues(1998) suggests that high-power members can play a keyrole in encouraging the discussion of unique memberinformation.

We therefore suggest that a negative main effectsmodel of the relationship between power differences andteam learning may be too simplistic and that the time

has come to articulate and investigate moderating factors(Chen et al. 2001), i.e., factors that mitigate the nega-tive effects of power differences or that transform powerdifferences into a resource for learning within teams.This paper considers one such factorthe type of per-formance feedback a team receives.

Performance feedback plays a critical role in virtu-ally all theories of experiential learning (e.g., Ilgen et al.1979, Nadler 1979) because it provides the mechanismby which an actor assesses the efficacy of past effortsand identifies areas of needed improvement (Vroom1964). Moreover, past research has suggested that thetype of feedback a group receives and, more specif-

ically, whether a group receives feedback about indi-vidual and/or group performance, can affect a groupsorientation toward individual or collective improvement(Hinsz et al. 1997). Building on this literature, we pro-pose that performance feedback may influence the rela-tionship between power asymmetry and team learn-ing by influencing whether team members are orientedtoward individual or collective goals. More specifically,we will suggest that whereas individual performancefeedback reinforces the negative effects of power dif-ferences, feedback on group performance transforms

power differences into an asset for both team learningand performance improvement. We tested hypothesesbased on these general propositions in a sample of 218employees from 46 work teams. Our results underscorethe importance of a collective orientation for a teamsability to leverage member differences for team learn-

ing and improvement (as suggested by Van der Vegt andBunderson 2005).

Theory and Hypotheses

Power Asymmetry and Team Learning

We conceptualize team learning in this paper using agroup process lens (Edmondson et al. 2007). That is,we define team learning as activities by which teammembers seek to acquire, share, refine, or combinetask-relevant knowledge through interaction with oneanother (Van der Vegt and Bunderson 2005, p. 534).Examples of team learning behaviors include experi-menting with new approaches or ideas, reflecting onpast actions and action-outcome relationships, seek-ing different perspectives, and evaluating alternatives(e.g., Edmondson 1999, 2002; Gibson and Vermeulen2003; Schippers et al. 2007; West 1996). These teamlearning behaviors are a specific class of interactionprocesses in teams processes involving interactionsbetween team members that play a key role in transform-ing input factors into performance outcomes (Hackmanand Morris 1975). We therefore view team learningas conceptually distinct from the outcomes that mightresult from an engagement in learning-related activi-

ties, outcomes such as more adaptive decisions andactions, improved performance, or, perhaps in somecases, decreased efficiency resulting from a misallo-cation of effort (see Bunderson and Sutcliffe 2003).Past research has confirmed that team learning behav-iors are distinct from other team interaction processes(Drach-Zahavy and Somech 2001) and that variance inthis specific interaction process across teams explainsunique variance in team innovation and improvement(Drach-Zahavy and Somech 2001, Edmondson 1999,Van der Vegt and Bunderson 2005).

We conceptualize power asymmetry within a teamas imbalance in the dyadic power-dependence relations

between and among group members as they performtheir separate but interdependent tasks. So a given dyadictask relation between two members is power-imbalancedwhen member A depends more on member B than Bdepends on A for resources (e.g., information, exper-tise, materials) needed to perform his or her work (seeEmerson 1962, Blau 1964). The overall level of powerasymmetry within a team is a simple additive functionof these dyadic power-dependence imbalances. Powerasymmetry is therefore distinct from the construct ofpower centralization. Although it is true that a team in


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Van der Vegt et al.: Power Asymmetry and Learning in TeamsOrganization Science 21(2), pp. 347361, 2010 INFORMS 349

which power is centralized will have at least some asym-metric power relations, a team with asymmetric powerrelations need not be at all centralized (e.g., each mem-ber may be powerful in some relations but dependent inothers). Moreover, whereas power asymmetry will oftenresult from member differences in knowledge, skill, and

experience (i.e., expertise diversity; Van der Vegt andBunderson 2005), expertise diversity does not alwayslead to power asymmetry, because members may beexpert in complementary domains, resulting in balancedpower relations.

Past research suggests several compelling reasons whywe might expect power asymmetry to dampen teamlearning efforts. Lower-power members may be con-cerned about negative evaluations from those on whomthey depend for resources and may therefore becometentative and inhibited in offering opinions and sharinginformation (see Ridgeway 2001, Keltner et al. 2003). Atthe same time, higher-power members may simply pay

less attention to lower-power members (Kipnis 1972,Fiske 1993, de Jong et al. 2007) or may be unwill-ing to acknowledge any dependence on the insights orknowledge of lower-power members because they fearthat doing so will undermine their privileged power rela-tion (Lee 1997). These well-documented reactions todyadic power differences would all seem to work againstthe goal of open dialogue among group members abouthow to improve processes and better coordinate memberefforts.

In contrast, we would argue that there are alsogood reasons to expect that power asymmetry may notalways dampen team learning and that it can, in fact,

stimulate learning behaviors. Research by Chen et al.(2001) suggests that although exchange-oriented individ-uals may respond to power advantages in self-servingways and therefore reinforce the negative effects justdescribed, individuals with a communal orientation actu-ally respond to power advantages by attending morecarefully to the needs and interests of dependent oth-ers. They explain this effect by suggesting that theeffect of power on interpersonal behavior is contin-gent on whether an individual associates power withself- or other-interested goals. Those who associatepower with other-interested goals respond to power byassuming greater responsibility for the needs and wel-

fare of dependent others; those who associate powerwith self-interested goals respond by treating others ininstrumental ways (which often means ignoring them,because they have little perceived instrumental value).This argument is reminiscent of work by McClelland(1975), who first distinguished between the personalized(self-interested, uninhibited) versus socialized (other-interested, restrained) exercise of power.

We would suggest that when power advantages areleveraged in other-interested ways, power asymmetrywithin a group can become a powerful stimulus for

learning behavior. Specifically, we suggest that power-advantaged members who adopt a collective and devel-opmental orientation in their interactions with dependentothers are able to focus attention, stimulate reflec-tion, and encourage information exchange in ways thatdo not occur as naturally or easily in situations of

balanced power. This argument is supported by pastresearch examining the effects of power on groups anddyads. For example, research by Larson and colleagues(e.g., Larson et al. 1998) suggests that power-advantagedgroup members who adopt a participative (i.e., other-oriented) style encourage more open discussion andintegration of both shared and unshared informationduring group discussion than would otherwise occur.This is consistent with recent research by Nembhard andEdmondson (2006), who found that higher-power groupmembers can prompt learning by inviting and showingappreciation for the input of others. Developmental feed-back and questions from power-advantaged members are

also more likely to focus attention or stimulate reflec-tion among dependent members, because individuals aremore attentive and committed to those on whom they aredependent for valued resources (Rusbult and Van Lange2003, Wieselquist et al. 1999). Moreover, past researchsuggests that member differences within a group canstimulate learning as different perspectives and prefer-ences interact and recombine (Bantel and Jackson 1989,Milliken and Martins 1996, Van der Vegt and Bunderson2005). Power asymmetry signals substantive differencesbetween members on dimensions that are truly salientto group members, because these differences affect bothtask performance and social standing within the group.

These very differences could, therefore, be a stimulusfor learning if, once again, team members with a poweradvantage help create an environment in which thosedifferences are not seen in threatening ways.

In other words, power asymmetry within teams caneither stifle or stimulate team learning, depending onhow members respond to intra-team power differencesparticularly when they find themselves in positions ofhigher power. If members leverage power advantagesto advance and defend their own interests and status(an individualistic response pattern), power asymmetryis likely to stifle team learning. But if members leveragepower advantages to invite reflection and the expression

and integration of insights from all members (a collec-tivistic response pattern), power asymmetry may actuallystimulate team learning. This conclusion is consistentwith Blaus (1964) analysis of why a power-advantaged(i.e., more knowledgeable) member would choose toshare knowledge with a more dependent colleague. Blauargued that this choice will be based on the slope ofthe power-advantaged members indifference curve, i.e,her marginal rate of substitution of the rewards associ-ated with assisting by the rewards associated with pur-suing her own interests. And this slope, Blau continues,


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is determined by the degree to which [she] is orientedto colleagues as a reference group [i.e., a collectivisticorientation] rather than to [her] instrumental tasks andto the superiors who evaluate [her] performance [i.e., anindividualistic orientation] (Blau 1964, p. 173).

But what factors might influence whether a team mem-

ber adopts an individualistic or collectivistic response topower differences? The next section explores one possi-ble factor that figures prominently in theories of experi-ential learningthe nature of the feedback that membersreceive about their performance.

The Moderating Effects of Performance Feedback

Feedback can be defined as information about the effectsof ones actions or efforts on some criterion of inter-est (see Herold and Greller 1977, Taylor et al. 1984).In its original cybernetic formulation (Wiener 1948),the concept of feedback was used to describe the pro-cess by which systems (human or machine) self-regulate.

Feedback about system performance allows a system toreflect, adapt, and self-correct until desired performancestandards are achieved. Feedback scholars have referredto this function of feedback as a cueing function (seeNadler 1979, Vroom 1964). In human systems, feedbackalso serves a motivational function by reinforcing thepromise of a reward and by reinforcing behavior-rewardinstrumentalities (Annett 1969; Ilgen et al. 1979, p. 361;Vroom 1964). Given these key functions, feedback haslong played a central role in theories of learning, con-tinuous improvement, and performance achievement.

Although different types of feedback can be distin-guished (Nadler 1979), for the purpose of this study

we focus on the important distinction between feed-back that provides information about the performanceof individuals within a group (individual feedback) andfeedback that provides information about the perfor-mance of a group as a whole (group feedback) (seeBarr and Conlon 1994, Nadler 1979, Hinsz et al. 1997,DeShon et al. 2004). Consider a group of salespeoplein which each team member covers a different districtwithin a broader region. In managing and motivatingthese team members, team leaders might choose to pro-vide (a) feedback to each salesperson about his or hersales for the year (individual feedback),1 (b) feedbackto the entire team about its aggregate sales (group feed-

back), or (c) both forms of feedback. Several studieshave examined the independent and combined effectsof individual and group feedback on performance ingroups. Although findings from these studies have beeninconsistent, some important patterns have emerged. Forexample, DeShon et al. (2004) found that the effects offeedback on effort and performance were homologousacross group and individual levels such that group orindividual feedback increased attention and effort towardgroup or individual goals, which led to higher group orindividual performance.

A possible explanation for the effects of group feed-back on group attention and effort observed by DeShonet al. (2004) and others (e.g., Barr and Conlon 1994) canbe found in the work of Hinsz et al. (1997). They suggestthat group feedback may change the self-attributionalfocus from the individual to the group (p. 53). That is,

when feedback is received at the individual level of anal-ysis, it directs attention toward the individual as the rele-vant actor and therefore motivates the individual to thinkabout things that he or she could do to improve his or herindividual performance. But when feedback is receivedat the group level of analysis, attention is directed towardthe group as the relevant actor and the individual as onepiece of that larger collective. As a result, individualgroup members are motivated to think about things thatthey can do as a group to improve performance, e.g., bet-ter coordination, greater information sharing, etc. Thisargument is consistent with a study by Zander and Wolfe(1964), in which it was found that group feedback led

to more cooperation and less interpersonal strain withina group than individual feedback did. This argument isalso consistent with the broader literature on social cat-egorization, which has suggested that a shared groupidentity increases intragroup cooperation and mitigatesintra-group conflict, even when group members are verydifferent from one another (Brewer and Miller 1984,Gaertner et al. 1996, Van der Vegt and Bunderson 2005).

In other words, past research on group and individ-ual performance feedback would suggest that feedbackabout group performance promotes a collective improve-ment orientation within a group (i.e., how are we doing;what can we do to improve our performance), whereas

individual performance feedback promotes an individ-ual improvement orientation (i.e., how am I doing; whatcan I do to improve my performance). Given our ear-lier argument, this would imply that members of groupsin which feedback is received about group performancewill be more likely to use their power advantages inways designed to help the group improve. Power advan-tages then become very useful for learning, becausepower-advantaged members can direct attention to areasof needed improvement, invite and encourage the shar-ing of diverse perspectives, and initiate or facilitate dis-cussions about how to manage member differences andinterdependencies (Larson et al. 1998, Nembhard and

Edmondson 2006). In contrast, members of groups inwhich feedback is received about individual performancewill be more likely to use their power advantages toleverage or improve their own performance (cf. De Jonget al. 2007). Power advantages then become an obsta-cle to reflective learning, as power-advantaged membersfocus on improving their own status or resource position,regardless of how this involves or affects their depen-dent colleagueswho are likely to respond by becom-ing more defensive, guarded, and inhibited (Keltneret al. 2003).


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Van der Vegt et al.: Power Asymmetry and Learning in TeamsOrganization Science 21(2), pp. 347361, 2010 INFORMS 351

When power asymmetry is low, however, group mem-bers do not have power advantages with which to eitheradvance their own interests or assist others. As a result,we would not expect power-balanced groups that receivegroup feedback to necessarily be more engaged learnersthan power-balanced groups that receive individual feed-

back. In fact, when power relationships are balanced,it may be difficult for group members to learn fromfeedback about group performance, because there areno power-advantaged members to feel responsible forinitiating a learning-oriented response. Power-balancedgroups may therefore benefit more from individual feed-back, because individual feedback at least implies clearaccountability (Goncalo and Duguid 2008).

Together, these arguments suggest that power asym-metry will be positively related to team learning ingroups that receive group performance feedback but neg-atively related to team learning in groups that receiveindividual performance feedback. Stated formally:

Hypothesis 1. Group performance feedback moder-

ates the relationship between power asymmetry within

a team and team learning; power asymmetry is posi-

tively related to team learning when group performance

feedback is high.

Hypothesis 2. Individual performance feedback mod-

erates the relationship between power asymmetry within

a team and team learning; power asymmetry is nega-

tively related to team learning when individual perfor-

mance feedback is high.

These hypotheses treat individual and group perfor-mance feedback separately. But what about cases inwhich groups receive both individual and group feed-back? We suggest that the combination of high indi-vidual and high group feedback creates an ambiguousfeedback situation in which it is not obvious to memberswhether power advantages should be used for individ-ual or collective interests; both goals are equally possi-ble (see DeShon et al. 2004, Mitchell and Silver 1990,Saavedra et al. 1993). In such a situation, we wouldexpect that whether a given member adopts an individu-alistic or collectivistic response to power advantage will

be influenced by other factors, including, for example,the stability of power relations or personality differences(Keltner et al. 2003). It is not our purpose here to the-orize about how these other variables might affect therelationship between power asymmetry and team learn-ing in ambiguous feedback situations. Rather, we sug-gest only that in cases of ambiguous performance feed-back, we would not expect to observe any consistenteffects of power asymmetry on team learning and may,in fact, observe no relationship. We can therefore offerno hypothesis on this issue.

Power Asymmetry, Learning, and

Team Performance

Finally, we would expect that the above effects of powerasymmetry on team learning behavior will have impor-tant implications for team performance. The argumentfor a relationship between team learning behaviors and

team performance rests on the assumption that adap-tation and continuous improvement are critical perfor-mance capabilities in all teams, regardless of what theydo or how much innovation is required in their context.Teams that engage in learning behaviors are more likelyto learn from their mistakes, integrate new informationabout their environment, benefit from member expe-rience, effectively utilize member diversity, and bettercoordinate their efforts. Consistent with this reason-ing, positive relationships between team learning behav-iors and supervisor ratings of team effectiveness havebeen reported in the pharmaceutical and medical prod-ucts industry (156 teams; Gibson and Vermeulen 2003),

the oil and gas industry (57 teams; Van der Vegt andBunderson 2005), and the furniture manufacturing in-dustry (51 teams; Edmondson 1999). Furthermore,Bunderson and Sutcliffe (2003) found that learningbehaviors in 44 management teams were significantlyassociated with business unit performance (unit prof-itability), although the relationship was curvilinear(teams could engage in too much learning behavior) andmoderated by past performance (team learning was morebeneficial for lower-performing teams). On the whole,these results provide robust support for learning behav-iors as an important performance capability in teams.

It follows that by influencing team learning, the com-bination of power asymmetry and different types of per-formance feedback can have important implications forteam performance. Specifically, we would expect thatpower asymmetry will be positively related to team per-formance when group performance feedback is high andthat this effect will be mediated by team learning behav-ior. Similarly, we would expect that power asymmetrywill be negatively related to team performance whenindividual performance feedback is high and that thiseffect will also be mediated by team learning behaviors.In other words, we would argue that power asymmetrycan have either positive or negative implications for team

performance, depending on the type of feedback that agroup receives; we would also argue that this effect iscaused by the contingent effect of power asymmetry onteam learning under different types of performance feed-back. Stated formally:

Hypothesis 3. Team learning behavior mediates the

relationship between power asymmetry combined with

group performance feedback and team performance;

power asymmetry is positively related to team perfor-

mance when group feedback is high, because this com-

bination results in higher team learning behavior.


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Hypothesis 4. Team learning behavior mediates the

relationship between power asymmetry combined withindividual performance feedback and team perfor-

mance; power asymmetry is negatively related to

team performance when individual feedback is high,because this combination results in lower team learning

behavior.

Method

Sample and ProcedureThe above hypotheses are explicitly concerned withteam-level relationships and were therefore tested at theteam level of analysis using data obtained from 268employees in 46 teams. These teams worked in a vari-ety of settings, ranging from the banking sector to themedical sector and consisted of at least three team mem-bers (M = 583, SD = 368). In most of these teamsat least some hierarchical differences and/or differencesin degree of specialization between team members werepresent. For example, teams from the banking sectorincluded a product advisor and an assistant; the med-ical teams consisted of different types of nurses withdifferent specializations and/or different levels of author-ity within the team; and the technical, management, andconsultancy teams consisted of both senior team mem-bers and more junior professionals. We reasoned thatthese intrateam differences, which are characteristic ofthe types of member differences that exist in many workteams, should result in considerable power-dependenceasymmetries within these teams.

We approached teams via personal contacts with anda presentation to managers about the research projectduring a postgraduate MBA course. When a manageragreed to participate, she or he informed the team andprovided the researchers with information including thenames of team members. Two different types of ques-tionnaires were subsequently sent to the team: a supervi-sor questionnaire and a team member questionnaire. Thesupervisor questionnaire was primarily used to collectteam performance data, whereas the team member ques-tionnaire was used to collect power asymmetry, feed-back, and learning data.2 We approached 50 supervisorsand received 46 usable supervisor questionnaires (92%),and 218 team members (of a possible 268) returned theirquestionnaire (81%). Of these respondents, 146 werefemale (67%) and the mean age of the respondents was36.9 years (SD = 104). Twenty percent of these respon-dents had a high school degree, 44% a vocational degree,29% a bachelor degree, and 7% a masters degree orhigher. Educational background also varied within oursample: 31% of the respondents had a degree relatedto economics, 21% had a degree related to the medicalfield, 12% had a degree related to engineering, and 10%had a degree related to business. Degrees in other fields(e.g., law, linguistics, social, or natural sciences) wereheld by less than 10% of the sample.

Measures

Power Asymmetry. This variable was measured usinga peer-rating approach. Consistent with our conceptual-ization of power asymmetry, we used the following twoitems to measure the task dependence of a team mem-ber (A) on another team member (B) based on Van der

Vegt et al. (1998): How dependent are you on B formaterials, means, information, etc. in order to carry outyour work adequately? and How dependent is B on

you for materials, means, information, etc. in order tocarry out his or her work adequately? (1 = not depen-dent, 7 = completely dependent). In all items, B wasreplaced by the name of a specific fellow team member(from the list provided by team supervisors).

Because we measured As dependence on B as wellas Bs dependence on A from both their perspectives,we were able to examine the relationship between Asperception of his or her dependence on B and Bs per-ception of As dependence on him or her. This correla-tion was 0.31 (p < 0001). The magnitude of this cor-relation is in line with prior research involving dyads(e.g., Kenny and Acitelli 2001; see p. 443, Table 3, thecorrelations they reported ranged from 0.20 to 0.47).Additionally, a univariate analysis of variance indicatedthat within-dyad variance was significantly smaller thanbetween-dyad variance (F 1402 1096 = 181, p

2010_van de vegt et al_power asymmetry and learning in teams- the moderating role of performance...

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