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The Ambivalence of the Marxist Concept of IdeologyAuthor(s): Gustav A. WetterSource: Studies in Soviet Thought, Vol. 9, No. 3 (1969), pp. 177-183Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20098372.

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GUSTAV

A. WETTER

THE

AMBIVALENCE

OF

THE

MARXIST CONCEPT

OF IDEOLOGY*

Marxism-Leninism

defines

'ideology'

as

the

system

of

social

(political,

philosophic,

religious,

artistic,

etc.)

ideas which

are

determined

by

and

in

turn

reflect

the

current

material base

of

society .1

A

certain

ambivalence

is

given

already

at this

point.

If, as is the case in class

society,

social

being

is

ill,

social consciousness

will reflect

reality

in

a

distorted

way.

On

the

other

hand,

a

healthy

social

being

will

produce

a

healthy

social

con

sciousness.

'Ideology',

therefore,

can

designate

true

and false

conscious

ness.

On

the

contemporary

scene

it

is

bourgeois

consciousness which

is

false and

socialist

consciousness

which

is

true.

In

addition

to

this ambivalence

of

the Marxist

concept

of

ideology

there

is another which

will be

our

main

concern

here.

Certain

forms

of

social

consciousness

-

like

morality, philosophy,

art,

etc.

-

are

false conscious

ness only in class society. The removal of class divisions under socialism

means

the

lifting

of

their

illusory

character.

Other

forms

of social

con

sciousness

-

religion,

above

all

-

have

truth value

neither

in

class

society

nor

under socialism.

Here the demarcation line

between

true

and

false

consciousness

is

no

longer

horizontal

but rather

vertical.

Therefore,

some

forms

rank

as

'essentially'

false while others

are

false

only

under

certain

circumstances,

namely

in

class

society. Why

is

there this

ambivalence?

Was

it the

case

for Marx?

If

not,

is

it

nonetheless

a

consistent

development

of

his

thought?

One can find an answer to this question only through a short analysis

of Marx'

original

line

of

thought.

The relation between

thought

and

being

is

to

be

seen

against

the

background

of

the different forms

of

dialectic

in the

early

works

of Marx. We

can

here

distinguish

three

stages

in

the

development

of

the

thought

of

the

young

Marx:

(1)

The works

before

1844;

(2)

The

Economic-Philosophic

Manuscripts

of 1844 and

The

Holy

Family,

(3)

The

works

of 1845

to

1848.

In

the first

period

Marx

has

completed

the

basic

break with

Hegel

but

has

not

yet

come

fully

into his

own

historical-materialist

position.

It is

no longer the idea but history itself which will establish the truth of this

Studies

in

Soviet

Thought

9

(1969) 177-183;

?

D.

Reidel,

Dordrecht-Holland

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THE MARXIST CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY

179

tures

of

alienated consciousness.

All

the

relevant

assertions

are

based

on

the

conception

of the

immediate

unity

of

consciousness and

being.

Generic

consciousness

is

designated

by

Marx

as

the

repetition,

confirmation and

being-for-itself

of

real social

being.9

Communism

'is'

and

'knows itself

as

the

interpreted

mystery

of

history.10

This

consciousness

attains

its

corresponding

form in

a new

type

of

science,

where

natural

science and

the

science of

man

coincide.11

Alongside

this

conception

of the relation between consciousness and

being

one

finds

other assertions which sound

like the

earlier

conception

of

the

independent

role

of

theory

in

the

development

of

reality.

Even

in

alienation

a

greater

role

is

attributed

to

consciousness than that

of

reflec

tion of

being.

In

his

Paris

manuscripts

Marx

says

of

political

economy

that,

on

the

one

hand,

it is

to

be

considered

a

product

of

industry

as

it

on the

other

hand,

expedites

the

energy

and

development

of

this

industry

and

has turned it into

a

force of

consciousness .12

In the famous

passage

on

proletariat

and

wealth

of The

Holy Family,

where Marx

says

that the

proletariat

is driven to revolution

by

becoming

conscious of its inhuman

condition13,

the

conception

of

consciousness

as

knowledge

about its

being

is

doubly

sprung.

The consciousness of

the

proletarian

reflects

not

only

his

being;

it

compares

this

factually

given being

to

a

being

which

is

not

yet

given

but

ought

to

be.

Moreover,

the

consciousness

of the

proletarian

who

is still

living

in

alienation

ceases

to

be

false and becomes 'true'

con

sciousness,

even

though

his

being

still

lies in

the domain of

alienation.

The

writings

of

the

third

period

contain

a

basically

similar

view

on

the

relation

between

being

and

consciousness.

But

what is

more

important

for the further development of the concept of ideology in later Marxist

philosophy

is the fact that

the

philosophical

background

has

essentially

changed.

A

new

factor

begins

to

play

a

decisive

role

in Marx'

historical

dialectic,

the

forces

of

production.

In this context

the contradiction

which

drives

history

on

also

takes

on

a

new

form

:

this

is the

periodically

recurring

contradiction between

relations

of

production

(which

are

usually desig

nated in

The German

Ideology

as

'intercourse'

between

men)

and

forces

of

production.

A

further transformation of

the historical dialectic

involves

revolution. While

it

was

the

proletarian

revolution

as

leading

to

the

Aufhebung of human self-alienation which was absolutely central toMarx'

earlier

thought,

Marx

now

talks

about

revolutionary upheavals

which

periodically

recur

in

history.

The dialectical

triadicity,

which

earlier

ap


8/9/2019 20098372

5/8

180

GUSTAV A. WETTER

peared

in

the form

of

alienation

and

return

from alienation

as a

uniquely

occurring

rhythmic

movement

in

history,

is

now

located within

the

distinct

historical

periods

and

thereby

becomes

a

periodically

recurrent

phenome

non.

In

every

historical

period

there

arises

a

contradiction between

forces

and relations of

production,

which is resolved

in

revolution. The result

would

have been

a

form

of the dialectic

which could

and

should

extend

ad

infinitum

had Marx

not

introduced

the

idea

-

which

issues from

the

above notions - of the 'historical mission' of the working class, a mission

which consists in

putting

an

end

once

and

for

all

to

class

divisions and

conflicts.

The

resulting problem

of

a

dialectical

development

within

Com

munist

society

is

not

our

business here.

Now

to

the

question

of

the

relation between

being

and

consciousness.

Here

again

the

conception

of consciousness

as

knowledge

of its

being

is

pertinent.

We find

an

unhoped-for precision:

Consciousness

can

be

nothing

other

than

conscious

being. 14 Being

once

again

has

primacy:

It is

not

consciousness

which

determines

life

but life

which

determines

consciousness 15 is the passage in The German Ideology which is almost

identical

with the classic formulation

of 1859.

Although

the

concept

of

'alienation'

no

longer

plays

a

role

in

these

writings,

we

still find

the

conception

of

a

'false' consciousness which is

conditioned

by

social conditions.

Such

are

all

'pure'

theories:

theology,

philosophy, morality

-

once

again

the

list ends with

an

'etc.'.

Marx

sees

the condition of

possibility

for the

coming

to

be of false

consciousness

in

the division

of

work,

especially

in the division

into

physical

and mental

work.16

This

possibility

always

becomes

reality

if

there

arises

a

contra

diction between the existing social relations and the forces of production

at

hand.17

Concerning

the form of 'true'

consciousness,

Marx

opposes

to

ideology history

as

the

'only

science'

which

includes

nature

and

man.

In his work

against

Proudhon he calls it

a

conscious

product

of

historical

motion 18;

in

a

certain

sense,

therefore,

it

is the

very

historical

process

which

is

reflected

in the science

of

history.

Even

in

this

period

one can

detect

an

influence

of

the

earlier

conception

of

theory

as a

positive

historical

force.

Once

in The

German

Ideology

Marx

asserts

that

consciousness

can

occasionally outstrip empirical

rela

tions.19 In the Theses on Feuerbach Marx reproaches previous philosophy

with

having simply

explained

reality

while the

real

task is

to

change

it.

In The

Misery

of

Philosophy

and The Communist

Manifesto,

Communists


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THE MARXIST CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY

181

as

the

theoreticians

of the

proletariat

are

said

to

have

a

'true'

conscious

ness even

in

the

time before

the

revolution.

They

are

able

correctly

to

see

what

goes

on

in

front of them

and

to

make themselves

executors

of

the

movement 20;

they

have over

the

rest

of

the

proletariat

the

advantage

of

an

insight

into

the

conditions,

course

and

general

results

of the

prole

tarian

movement .21

This

all

assumes,

however,

that within

alienated

being

there

can

be

a

true

consciousness,

that

this

enjoys

a

certain

independ

ence vis-?-vis being; i.e., it has a certain anticipatory character which

makes

it

able

to

recognize

the

direction

in

current

developments

and the

goal

which

is

not

yet

given

in

reality.

Since the works of

this

third

period

contain all

the

fundamental

notions

of

what

counts

as

the

classical

formulation of

the Marxian

materialist

conception

of

history,

we can

break off

our

analysis

at

this

point.

Later Marxist

philosophy

goes

beyond

the Marxian

position

in

two

respects.

First,

it does

not

limit the

ability

to

have

a

true

consciousness,

even before the overcoming of human self-alienation, to the theoreticians

of the

proletariat.

The

forms

of

social

consciousness of

earlier social

for

mations

have,

under certain

circumstances,

a

relative

-

if

not

absolute

-

validity.

Recent

Marxist-Leninist doctrine

admits that

there

were

in the

superstructural

forms of

earlier social formations

certain

elements of

generally

human

validity,

i.e.,

forms of

true

consciousness.

Is this

a

deviation

from Marx?

It

seems

to

me

that

it is

rather

a

consistent

further

development

of

the

Marxian

line

of

thought.

For,

in The

German

Ideology

Marx

notes

that

a

contradiction between social

consciousness

and social being, i.e., a 'false' consciousness, arises when there occurs a

contradiction between social

relations and the forces of

production.

It

logically

follows, then,

that the

overcoming

of

the latter

contradiction

removes

the

illusory

character of social

consciousness.

One thus

has

the

possibility

of

justifying

the

appearance

of

true

consciousness,

after

revolu

tion has eliminated

the contradiction

between

social

relations and

forces

of

production

and

before

a

new

contradiction

has

arisen

(i.e.,

at

the

be

ginning

of

a

new

social

formation).

The

second

point,

where later

Marxist

philosophy

has

gone

beyond

Marx involves the character of the demarcation line between true and

false consciousness. Does

it

run

horizontally,

through

all

the

different

forms

of social

consciousness

(morality,

philosophy, religion, etc.)?

or


8/9/2019 20098372

7/8

182

GUSTAV A. WETTER

vertically

between them

so

that

some

forms

-

at

least under

certain

con

ditions and

at

certain

times

-

are

true

and

others

essentially

false? Marx

himself

conceived

it

vertically,

thus

consistently

considering

not

only

reli

gion

but

also

philosophy,

morality,

law,

etc.,

as

forms of

false

conscious

ness.

In

later

Marxist

philosophy

this

demarcation

line

was

also

drawn

vertically,

but

not

in

the

same

place

as

by

Marx.

Here

only

religion

is

regarded

as

an

essentially

false

form of social

consciousness,

while

philos

ophy, morality and the other superstructural domains are false only in

class

society

as

the

expression

of the

consciousness of the

ruling

class.

Can

this

adjustment

of Marx also

be

seen

as

a

logical

consequence

of

his

own

line of

thought?

It

seems

to

me

that it

can.

For if

his

new

view

of the

historical dialectic

in

the

third

period,

with

its

periodically

recurring

revolutions,

offers

the

possibility

-

as

we

have

seen

-

of

justifying

the

occurrence

of

true

consciousness

even

in

earlier

social

formations,

there

is

no

reason

why

this should be limited

to

one

form of

consciousness.

Marx

himself

distinguished

the forms

of

consciousness

not

according

to

the criterion of true and false but according to the specific character of

each.22

Even

he

distinguishes

within

the

only

form of

consciousness

he

recognized

as

true

(i.e.,

the science of

nature

and

man)

what still

belongs

to

alienation

(e.g., bourgeois

national

economy)

and

what

is true.

It

is

impossible

to

see

why

the

same

would

not

be

true

of the

other forms of

social

consciousness.

In

any

case,

the later Marxist

philosophy

was

not

consistent

enough

in

its

rehabilitation of the various forms of social

consciousness

when it did

not

include

religion

in

this rehabilitation and when

it

did

not

distinguish

in itwhat is true and what is ideological, i.e., deformed by class interests.

If

one

recognizes

religion

as a

specific

form of social

consciousness,

one

has

to

attribute

to

it

a

specific

relation

to

reality:

it

cannot

then

be

con

sidered

an

'essentially'

false

form of

consciousness.

The

different forms

of social consciousness

are

to

be

distinguished

not

according

to true

and

false

but

according

to

the

specific

character of their

relation

to

reality.

What

is

more,

it is

a

contradictio

in

adjecto

to

speak

of

an

essentially

false

reflection

of

reality

in

human

consciousness. A

totally

false reflection

is

precisely

no

reflection

at

all.

It is apparent, then, that modern Marxism has the possibility

-

without

betraying

itself

or

its

theoretical

foundations

-

of

putting

itself into

a

positive

relation

to

religion.

This

seems

to

me

to

be

of

tremendous

im


8/9/2019 20098372

8/8

THE MARXIST CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY 183

portance

for

the

dialogue

between

Christians and

Marxists,

which remains

one

of

the

main

challenges.

REFERENCES

*

Translation

of

a

paper

read

at

the XIVth

International

Congress

of

Philosophy,

Vienna, September

1968.

1

Philosophisches

W?rterbuch

(ed.

by

Georg

Klaus and Manfred

Buhr),

2nd

revised

ed.,

Leipzig 1965, p. 251.

2

Karl

Marx

:

'Kritik

der

Hegeischen

Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung',

in Fr?he

Schriften,

Vol.

I

(ed.

by

Hans-Joachim

Lieber and

Peter

Furth),

Cotta-Verlag,

Stuttgart,

1962,

p.

504.

3

Ibid.,

p.

497.

4

Ibid.,

p.

495.

5

Karl Marx:

'?konomisch-philosophische

Manuskripte',

in Fr?he

Schriften,

p.

821.

6

Ibid.,

p.

567.

7

See,

for

example,

'Die deutsche

Ideologie',

in

Fr?he

Schriften,

p.

821.

8

'?konomisch-philosophische

Manuskripte',

pp.

594ff.

9

Ibid.,

p.

597.

i?

Ibid.,

p.

594.

11 Cf. ibid., p. 604.

12

Ibid.,

p.

585.

13

The

Holy

Family,

pp.

703-705.

14

Karl

Marx,

Friedrich

Engels:

'Die deutsche

Ideologie',

in:

Karl

Marx,

Friedrich

Engels:

Werke,

vol.

III,

Dietz

Verlag, Berlin,

1958,

p.

26.

15

Ibid.,

p.

26f.

16

Ibid.,

x>.

31.

17

Ibid.,

p.

31f.

18

Karl

Marx:

Das Elend der

Philosophie,

in Karl

Marx,

Friedrich

Engels: Werke,

vol.

IV,

Dietz

Verlag,

Berlin,

1959,

p.

143.

19

Die

deutsche

Ideologie,

p.

73.

20

Cf. Das

Elend

der

Philosophie,

p.

143.

21

Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels: Das Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, in Werke,

vol.

IV,

Dietz

Verlag, Berlin,

1959,

p.

474f.

22

Cf.

?konomisch-philosophische

Manuskripte,

p.

598.

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