2004 second preliminary report (eng.)

8/14/2019 2004 Second Preliminary Report (Eng.)

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The Second Preliminary Report

by

The Ad Hoc Commissionon the Depayin Massacre(Burma)

“Let’s join hands together in promoting global justice by facilitating the efforts of the people in Burma to seek justice for the Depayin Massacre.”



Contact us at:e-mail address: [email protected]

mailing address: PO Box 29, Hua Mark Post Office 10243 Bangkok Thailand

This publication has been funded by the Euro-Burma office.

Published by

The Ad hoc Commission on the Depayin Massacre

May 2004



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Contents

Words of gratitude

Introduction

Chapter (1)Examples of serious violent actions and repressive measures committedby the State authorities against Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD members

before the Depayin ambush

Chapter (2)Disturbances and harassments during the trip to Kachin State – the last trip before the Depayin Massacre

Chapter (3)The Depayin Massacre

Chapter (4)The preliminary analysis of the Ad hoc Commission on the Depayin Massacre

Chapter (5)Testimonies of eyewitnesses:

1. Khin Oo

2. Wunna Maung3. Nyunt Nyunt4. Min Thein5. Phoe Zaw (a.k.a. Maung Zaw)6. Aung Aung (a.k.a. Aung San Win)7. Naing Naing (a.k.a. Thein Naing)

8. Khin Aye Myint

Chapter (6)Domestic and international responses to the Depayin Massacre

Chapter (7)Pleas from the Ad hoc Commission

Chapter (8) Authorities involvement in the massacre

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Appendixes

(1) List of the wounded, missing, and dead and list of vehiclesinvolved in the massacre

(2) Statement from the NLD

(3) Excerpt of Aung San Suu Kyi’s press conference on Apr 23,2003

(4) Aung San Suu Kyi’s speech delivered in Monywa on the nightof 29 May 2003

(5) Press conferences of the Burmese military junta

(6) Interview with Zaw Zaw Aung

(7) Testimony of Soe Than, an NLD member from KamayutTownship, Rangoon

(8) Burma resolution from the 57th UNGA on 18 November 2003

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Aung San Sui Kyi with NLD members speaks to the public.



Words of Gratitude

The Ad hoc Commission on Depayin Massacre would like to expressour heart-felt gratitude to the following organizations and individualsthat have assisted us in receiving eyewitnesses from inside Burma,

collecting evidence, opening the commission office, taking care of thevictims/eyewitness, dissemination of collected information regarding themassacre to the media at home and abroad, translation of the entire reportinto English, the layout and design and all other assistance for the report.Without their unwavering and crucial support for timely publication of thereport, it would not have been possible for the Commission to accomplish

the task.

1. Victims and eyewitness who courageously testified or providedaffidavits regarding the Depayin Massacre.

2. Organizations, leaders and all other responsible personnel from theNational Coalition Government of the Union of Burma and theNational Council of the Union of Burma.

3. Legal experts and lawyers from the Burma Lawyer’s Council,

international legal experts and human rights organization who haveadvised the Commission in regard to matters relating to legal andhuman rights issues and assisted or cooperated with the Commissionin its endeavor to expose the truth about the Depayin Massacre.

4. The Political Defiance Committee of the National Council of theUnion of Burma.

5. Members of Parliament from inside Burma, the United NationalitiesLeague for Democracy and the National League for Democracy (NLD)who wrote letters to the UN and have assisted the Commission by

collecting information and evidence regarding the massacre andleaders and all other political forces, including the Youth Wing of the NLD, that have constantly demanded for an investigation intothe massacre so that justice may be served.

6. The Network for Democracy and Development in Burma thatprovided the Commission with information and photographs, the

Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) that compiledthe list of victims of the massacre, and all other organizations and



individuals from inside Burma whose name cannot be divulged,due to concerns that they may be persecuted, for their invaluablesupport which has made this report possible.

7. U Aung Naing Oo from the Burma Fund who translated the reportinto English, Tracy who assisted us in the editing and layout of the

report, the volunteers from Burma Volunteer Program (BVP) whoalso helped with some editing, office staff members Zarny, TunHla, and Bo Nyein who assited with logistics and Maung Tauk forthe report’s cover design.

-The Ad hoc Commission on Depayin Massacre May 2004



Introduction

Amassacre took place on 30 May 2003, near a village called

‘Kyi’ in Depayin Township, which is located in Shwebo District,Sagaing Division, of Upper Burma. The massacre was

orchestrated by the Burmese military junta, known as the State Peace andDevelopment Council (SPDC). The victims were members of the NationalLeague for Democracy (NLD) and innocent villagers.

The SPDC is entirely responsible for the ambush that is now knownas the ‘Depayin Massacre’. Officially 4 people were killed and 48 wereinjured. Following the ambush, the SPDC shut down all NLD offices anddetained all of the top party leadership, including its General Secretaryand 1991 Nobel Peace Laureate, Aung San Suu Kyi. An unknown numberof NLD and other political activists have also been jailed. However, theSPDC has avoided taking any responsibility in the matter and has refusedto investigate the massacre. Furthermore, it has ignored all calls for anindependent inquiry.

Therefore, the National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB), the

largest pro-democracy and ethnic alliance, whose members includeorganizations such as; the Members of Parliamentary Union (Burma), theNational Democratic Front, the Democratic Alliance of Burma and theNational League for Democracy (Liberated Area), in conjunction with theBurma Lawyers Council (BLC), formed a commission known as the Ad hocCommission on Depayin Massacre on 25 June 2003, in order to investigatethe events surrounding the Depayin Massacre.

Members of the Commission

NCUB

1. U Khin Kyaw Han, member of the NCUB Presidium and electedNLD representative from Yeinanchaung Constituency 2

2. U Kyaw Kyaw, team leader of the Political Defiance Committeeand the Chairman of the Network for Democracy andDevelopment in Burma



BLC

1. U Aung Htoo, M.A. (Human Rights), R.L. and General Secretaryof the BLC

2. U Min Lwin Oo, L.L.B, Legal Aid section of the BLC

The Commission has the total political support and guarantee of the NCUB and the legal expertise and assistance of the BLC. Based onthese credentials, the Commission has the freedom to decide and carryout the necessary tasks and procedures.

The Role of the Commission

The Ad hoc Commission on Depayin Massacre is not an organizationthat has the discretion to travel inside Burma to the spot where the massacretook place. Nor is it an organization that has the power to question boththe State authorities and witnesses, as well as collect all of the information

and evidence concerning the massacre. It is simply a temporary commissionto reveal the facts regarding the events surrounding the massacre and themassacre itself, whereby a situation may emerge in which justice can bebrought upon those responsible for the massacre.

Collecting Testimonies from the Witnesses

In the process of collecting and accepting testimonies from witnesses,the Commission first contacted various reliable sources inside Burma forthe verification of the authenticity of witnesses, their identities, backgroundsand involvement in the massacre and other political activities. Then by

studying their testimonies, the Commission determined if they were infact bone fide witnesses.

The Commission experienced many difficulties in carrying out thistask. Before interviewing the witnesses on a one-on-one basis for theirtestimonies, the Commission was obliged to request each witness to takean oath swearing that they were in fact present at the massacre. Only afterinitial screening and investigation was complete, were their testimoniestaken.

The Commission tried its best to be as objective and accurate aspossible in its task. However, the Commission is mindful of the fact thatthere may be flaws or incomplete data in the report. The Commission stillhas a number of testimonies that have not yet been utilized, due to thefact that they may be controversial and they still require confirmationdespite repeated analysis and verification. These testimonies have notbeen included in this report.



The Second Preliminary Report

The Commission published an urgent preliminary report in Englishon 4 July 2003. This was done following the collection of testimoniesfrom four people who were deemed reliable witnesses. The reason forpublishing the report in this manner, without waiting until ample evidencewas collected, was because the Commission wanted to disclose the findingsof the massacre to the people of Burma and the international community.The Commission had the aim to publish a full report at a later date oncemore information and testimonies had been gathered. At present, it hascollected testimonies from eight witnesses that have been thoroughlychecked and analyzed. Based on these testimonies, this report is the fruitof the work that the Commission has accomplished thus far. Further, theCommission continues to collect information and evidence with the hopesof disclosing additional findings, if there are any, in the future.

Crimes Committed by the Military and Impunities

Burma has been suffering from lawlessness for more than 40 years.During this time, the military authorities have committed a multitude of crimes. They began with the 7 July event in 1962, three months after themilitary coup in March, in which numerous students from RangoonUniversity were killed. However, the military junta reported that only 15people were killed and 27 were injured. In the same manner, the currentregime announced that only 4 political activists were killed and 48 werewounded in the Depayin Massacre. Hundreds of unarmed civilians weregunned down in another shooting incident on 9 August 1988 that took place in front of the Sagaing Police Station. Similarly, the military regime

understated that death toll with 31 deaths and 31 wounded. No one hasever been brought to justice for these brutal crimes.

Furthermore, a sham commission was formed on 13 March 1988,in order to investigate the death of Phone Maw, a student from the RangoonInstitute of Technology. However, the junta did not bring charges againstanyone. Likewise, the junta failed to bring justice in the case of 41 peoplewho were suffocated to death on 18 March of the same year during theirtransport to prison in a police van. Neither the victims nor their familiesever saw legal justice done. There was no public report from the police.

Nor did the police give any explanation to the general population regardingthis case. In addition, the Burmese junta continues to blatantly denyresponsibility for the rapes and other crimes committed against the Shanand other ethnic women during military offensives in ethnic areas. Despiterepeated documentation and damning evidence, no one has ever beenbrought to justice. In short, the Burmese military junta and the Burmese



Army have enjoyed impunity from the crimes they have committed sincethe 1962 military takeover.

The Significance of the Depayin Massacre

The Depayin Massacre is different from many other abuses that theBurmese junta has committed in the past. It is significant in that it wasexecuted - unlike previous crimes - in cold blood and without anyprovocation. Previous shootings were always a response to demonstrationsor uprisings, such as the State sponsored shootings during the 1988uprising. It was also significant in that the crime was not committed in aremote area where the Burmese Army wages war against the country’sethnic groups; the massacre took place in the presence of hundreds of witnesses and while Burma was at the focus of the international community.

Furthermore, the crime was not directed against ordinary citizens.It was committed against a Nobel Peace Prize Laureate and leaders of a

legal political party that might have been the legitimate government, hadit not been for the repudiation of the results of the election that it won in1990.

If military impunity continues, as it has thus far in other crimes, justice will be lost not only for the victims of the massacre, but also for thewhole of Burmese society. It will be like bestowing a legitimate “license tokill” on the military junta. Fear will be instilled in the minds of the Burmesepeople, even more so than at present, and the populace’s passivity willbecome even greater. Under these circumstances, any opportunity forgenuine reconciliation will be lost forever. It may also not be possible for

the nation to achieve peace that is complete both in essence and deed.

The Commission, therefore, will strive its best to at least uncoverthe truth concerning the massacre, following its thorough investigation. Itwill cooperate and work together, within its power, with individuals andorganizations that have worked to promote the personal safety of Burmesecitizens, the disappearance of lawless violence and the rule of law in Burma.

The Forte and Weakness of the Commission

The Commission admits that there are difficulties, limits and flawsin its ability to care out its task. The Commission cannot travel to the areawhere the massacre took place and meet all witnesses. Nor are we able tocollect all of the evidence. However, it is fair to say that the Commissionhas received cooperation from the Burmese people to a certain extent. Ithas also received encouragement and cooperation from various politicalorganizations and leaders inside and outside of Burma. In addition, itwould be fair to say that the location of the Commission, which has openaccess to the outside world, is a strength.



Testimonies

The Commission has published six testimonies that have been verifiedin the preliminary report. Analysis and verification of the remainingtestimonies is continuing. In addition, the Commission has obtained thetestimonies of two other witnesses through reliable sources from inside

Burma. The testimonies of these eight witnesses form the core of thisreport. Corroborating and supporting evidence has also been recorded,including proof that NLD leaders had meetings with these witnesses, fromrelatives who visited the victims in hospitals or prisons and their interviewswith foreign radio stations regarding the conditions of the victims. Thisreport is based on all of these pieces of evidence, along with the above-mentioned testimonies.

The Recommended Policy Concerning the Massacre

The Depayin Massacre is not an incident that concerns just one

individual, group or political party. It concerns with the whole of Burmesesociety and the nation. It can be construed as a declaration to the peopleof Burma and beyond that the Burmese junta will utilize state terrorism tosuppress any dissidence that is deemed a danger to its power structure.

As long as those who are responsible for the planning, organizing,directing and execution of the massacre within the junta remain unpunishedand unaccounted for, justice for those who were killed, injured, imprisonedor still missing will remain lost. The lives of their loved ones will also haveto be lived in uncertainty, having lost hope for any justice. Likewise, theefforts towards the restoration of democracy in Burma and self-determination for Burma’s ethnic nationalities will be certainly weakened.The efforts of the people who fight against oppression will also beundermined. Similarly, the prospects for the rule of law prevailing willforever be lost and state terrorism will remain the only dominant force inthe country. In addition, the hope that national reconciliation can be built,following political negotiation with the military junta, will disappear likewater poured into sand. Eventually the resulting consequences from thenon-realization of justice regarding the massacre will deprive both presentand future generations of Burmese citizens of their personal safety, freedomand peace. For these reasons, uncovering the truth about the Depayin

Massacre and bringing about justice has become the ultimate responsibilityof each and everyone of Burma’s peoples.

Prosecution of Crimes and the Cycle of Violence

The task of bringing about justice with regards to the DepayinMassacre is paramount. It will be a failure unless everyone – the people of Burma, political parties and activists, lawyers and other judicial expertsfrom within Burma and abroad who wish to see the return of the rule of



law in Burma and truth-loving people the world over – effectively cooperatesand participates in these efforts. There is a genuine possibility that thesignificance and urgency of the massacre meeting justice will slowly fadeaway, just as the previous crimes committed by the military have. Therefore,no matter what sort of dialogue is held with the opposition groups, theBurmese regime will surely not hesitate to commit such heinous crimes inthe future, perhaps even worse than the Depayin Massacre, especially if and when it feels threatened by a group or groups in the oppositionmovement. This will then be a formula for the recurrence of violence inBurma.

Efforts of the Commission

The Commission, despite limitations in its power, human resources,expertise and other physical resources, has accomplished a number of important things within the 11 months since its inception on 25 June2003.

1. The Commission has and will continue to gather information,evidence and testimonies with the help of various political entitiesand human rights activists inside Burma. It has continued tosupport financially, within its power, and provided protection tothe witnesses.

2. The Commission has and will continue to approach internationalhuman rights organizations and legal experts to solicit their helpand cooperation and seek their advice. It has called upon exiledpolitical communities, leaders and citizens of Burma who love

democracy and human rights to participate in the formation of the “Depayin Campaign Committee” to specially focus on theDepayin Massacre.

3. With the assistance of the NCUB and the National CoalitionGovernment of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), the Commissionhas sent witnesses to testify in front of the Senate in Thailandand the Congress of the United States of America, in order toraise international awareness about the Depayin Massacre.

4. The Commission published its first preliminary report in Englishon 4 July and its second preliminary report in Burmese on 30November 2003 – six months after the massacre took place.

5. The Commission has submitted a full report, complete witheyewitness reports and evidence, to the office of Mr. Paulo SergioPinheiro, the UN Special Human Rights Investigator for Burma.During his Burma Human Rights Report to the 58th UN General

Assembly on 12 November 2003, Mr. Pinheiro mentioned the



Depayin Massacre as one of the major transgressions againsthuman rights in Burma. Mr. Pinheiro stated, “I can say thatthere is prima facie evidence that the Depayin incident could nothave happened without the connivance of State agents.”

Pleas from the Commission

To uncover the truth and bring about justice with regards to themassacre, the Commission sincerely asks for the effective cooperationfrom the people of Burma, political organizations, political activists, internaland external legal experts who wish to see the rule of law in Burma andindividuals and organizations that have worked for the promotion of humanrights in Burma. Otherwise, it will not be possible for such an enormoustask to be successful.

In fact, at present, not much to speak of has been achieved interms of cooperation on either the domestic or international fronts, if

compared with the enormity of the case. The Commission has workedcontinuously for this to become a success. It considers the fruits of itsefforts born on 18 November 2003 during the 58th UN General Assembly,in which the UN called on the Burmese junta “to cooperate with theinternational community in launching a full independent inquiry into the30 May incident.”

Bringing about justice with regards to the massacre, in accordancewith this call, will depend upon the concerted efforts of all politicalorganizations. Therefore, the Commission calls upon the victims of themassacre, their families, various political organizations, elected

representatives of the 1990 election, leaders of the NLD and ethnic groupsand all those from within and outside of the country who wish to see the

justice done, to effectively cooperate with each other in order to make thiseffort a reality.

The Commission has published this report partly because it wantsto see increased cooperation, and partly because it wishes to expose thefacts and evidence, though they may be incomplete, concerning themassacre.

-The Ad hoc Commission on the Depayin Massacre



Chapter (1)

Examples of serious violent actions andrepressive measures committed by theState authorities against Aung San Suu Kyiand NLD members before the Depayin ambush

A

ung San Suu Kyi began her various trips across the nationfollowing her release from 19 months under house arrest on6 May 2002. Her release at this time was unconditional; the

Burmese junta had agreed to her freedom of movement.

Listed below are the dates and places of her trips. She visited:

1. Shwepyitha Township NLD office, Northern Rangoon District,17 May 2002.

2. Dawpon Township NLD office, Eastern Rangoon District, 22 May2002.

3. Kamayut Township NLD office, Western Rangoon District, 24May 2002.

4. Kyimyindine Township NLD office, Western Rangoon District,31 May 2002.

Aung San Suu Kyi in Arakan State, December 2002.



5. Thaketa Township NLD office, Eastern Rangoon District, 12 June2002.

6. Mingaladone and Hlegu Townships NLD offices, NorthernRangoon District, 16 July 2002.

7. NLD offices of Dala, Kawhmu and Kwangyangone Townships,Southern Rangoon District, 30 August 2002.

8. Tamwe Township NLD office, Eastern Rangoon District, 19September 2002.

9. Thingangyun Township NLD office, Eastern Rangoon District, 4October 2002.

She received enormous support and a warm welcome from her supportersduring these trips.

She also traveled to the following states and divisions:

1. Mon State and Thamanya Taung, 14-15 June 2002. (She paid

homage to the reverend monk Thamanya Taung Sayataw).2. Mandalay and Magwe Divisions (tour of 16 townships in Magwe

Division), 22-29 June 2002.3. Tour of fourteen townships in Pegu Division, 14-17 July 2002.4. Tour of twelve townships in Mon and Karen States, 20-23 July

2002.5. Tour of seventeen townships in Shan State, 13-27 November

2002.6. Tour of fifteen townships in Arakan State, Magwe and Irrawaddy

Divisions, 16-24 December 2002.7. Tour of twenty-one townships in Magwe Division and Chin State,

3-13 April 2003.8. Tour of twenty-eight townships in Mandalay and Sagaing Divisions

and Kachin and Shan States, 6-30 May 2003.

She traveled to a total of 125 townships in 12 states and divisions,out of the total of 14 states and divisions in Burma. She garnered incrementalsupport during these trips. At the same time, harassment of a multifariousnature by the authorities increased as she traveled across the country.

In fact, the history of harassment and repression perpetrated by

the military authorities against Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD goesall the way back to 1988. The Burmese military junta which came intopower after gunning down thousands of unarmed civilians in 1988 hascontinuously suppressed all political activities, despite the fact that it hasallowed for the formation of political parties. The regime has done all thatit can to prevent political parties from meeting the public during theircampaigns. Political parties have been coerced, restricted and targeted bythe junta in order to prevent them from conducting their political activities.

“The junta cameto power aftergunning down

thousands of unarmed

civi l l ians.”



1988

The State authorities harassed and restricted Aung San Suu Kyi and theNLD during their trip to various destinations in states and divisions, afterthe foundation of the NLD on 27 September 1988. The NLD, however,was greeted by thousands of people during its campaign trips in MonState from 14-18 December 1988. The military authorities did not preventthe NLD’s campaign trips during this time, but as soon as Aung San SuuKyi wrapped up her Mon trips, the military began arresting NLD membersin Mon State accusing them of violating Order 2/88.1

1989

The worst restrictions were imposed during the NLD’s campaigntrips to the Irrawaddy (Delta) Division. Aung San Suu Kyi made two tripsto the region between 14-25 January and 4-6 April 1989. Before shearrived in the Delta, the authorities had issued warnings to the public in

the various areas she intended to visit. The restrictions were as follows:

1. They must not greet her.2. They must stay in their homes when she arrived.3. They must not wave.4. They must not shout, “Long Live Aung San Suu Kyi ”

or “May Aung San Suu Kyi be in good health ”.

Aung San Suu Kyi in Bassein City, 1989. Three soldiers were chasing

after her, and a military vehicle with loudspeakers followed behind .

The public did not dare to approach her.



In some places the authorities warned people that they were notpermitted to even smile in her direction when she turned up.

Furthermore, there is evidence that the Chairman of the IrrawaddyDivision Law and Order Restoration Council, Major General Myint Aung,mobilized soldiers from the Burmese Army to eliminate Aung San Suu Kyiand intimidate her party members during their Irrawaddy Delta campaigntrips. He cited security concerns as the justification for suppressing thepro-democracy supporters and their aspirations for democracy and humanrights in Burma.

The situation reached a boiling point on 5 April, when the armyplanned to shoot Aung San Suu Kyi and her entourage in DanuphyuTownship.

The event occurred as Aung San Sui Kyi was on her way back froma tour of villages in Danuphyu and Nyaung Don Townships on that day. At

about 9:30 in the morning, after Aung San Suu Kyi had met her partymembers and organizers at the Danuphyu Township NLD office, she madeher way toward the boat landing named ‘Yan Myo Aung,’ located near thetownship NLD office. She was in the process of continuing her trip onwardsto Ahphyauk Township.

She was walking towards the boat landing and had a large crowdfollowing her. When the NLD entourage arrived at a junction near ‘KhitLight’ Guest House, local Law and Order officials and soldiers, who hadbeen following the crowd in their car, began issuing warnings using loudspeakers to the NLD and its party supporters. They warned people not to

demonstrate or walk in a procession aimed at “instigating riots”. “Otherwise,” they shouted, “we will shoot to crush the procession.”

People heard an army officer commanding his troops to “load” their guns. The officer then shouted, “This is the first warning.” Soonafterwards came the second and third warnings. Then the officer proceededto order his troops to kneel down on the road and aim their guns at AungSan Suu Kyi and her supporters. However, no shooting occurred and herlife was miraculously spared.

The second encounter with the army occurred on that same day, 5 April, upon her return to Danuphyu. She had finished visiting the villagesof Sagagyi and Latpan Pin in Ahpyyauk Township. She arrived back inDanuphyu at about 6:00 pm. Aung San Suu Kyi and her entourage walkedback towards the NLD office and arrived at a market called ‘Bandola,’ which was closed at the time. All was quiet and peaceful.

Then Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD members arrived at the junction of Bandola and Post Office Road and continued walking. When

“We’ll shootto crush the

procession.”



they were about 300 feet from the junction, a military jeep suddenlypulled up and blocked the road. There were six soldiers and a captaininside. They dismounted from the jeep. Immediately, four of the soldiersknelt down on the road, ready to shoot, while two others stood with theirguns aimed at Aung San Suu Kyi and her entourage.

The captain shouted, “Don’t walk as if you are demonstrating anddon’t block the road.” Then he continued shouting, “I am giving you thefirst warning.”

Aung San Suu Kyi told her supporters and party officials to part andwalk on either side of the road. They did as they were told, and beganwalking on both sides of the road. But the captain said, “Even if you walk on the sidewalks, we’ll have to shoot.” Then Aung San Suu Kyi walkedback into the middle of the road and passed between the four soldierswho had knelt down on the road.

Just then two army majors turned up behind the NLD Youth membersand shouted as they ran towards the spot of confrontation, “Don’t do it,Captain Myint Oo.” The majors immediately ordered the solders to unloadtheir guns. For the second time in one day, her life was again spared.

Captain Myint Oo was visibly angry. He ripped the stars off hisshoulders, which showed his army rank. Then he retorted to his superiorofficers while displaying the stars, “Then what are these for?” One of themajors said, “You will be reprimanded for this.” But Captain Myint Ooreplied, “I don’t care. Do whatever you want.”

1996

The 47th anniversary of Burma’s Independence Day was celebratedwithin the premises of Aung San Suu Kyi’s home on 4 January 1996.Following the celebrations, comedians Pa Pa Lay, Lu Zaw, Htway and

Aung Soe, who had performed at the celebrations, were arrested upontheir return to Mandalay. In order to testify in this case, Aung San Suu Kyiand a group of NLD officers planned to go to Mandalay. However, whenthe train departed from the Central Train Station in Rangoon, the authoritiesleft behind the carriage that Aung San Suu Kyi and her party was riding in,

citing engine trouble.

Win Sein, the Minister of Rail Transportation at the time, was alsothe secretary of the political wing of the Burmese Army, the Union Solidarityand Development Association (USDA). Win Sein called for the death of

Aung San Suu Kyi in speeches made during his organizing trips for theUSDA on 1-3 November.

“Soldiersstood withtheir guns

aimed at

Suu Kyi.”



Following this incident, the NLD sent a letter to Senior GeneralThan Shwe, who was also the patron of the USDA, on 20 December 1996.Below are excerpts from the NLD’s letter to General Than Shwe:

At 2:00 pm on 1 November 1996, U Win Sein delivered a speech at a ceremony to present applications from the was held at Lel Pyin Primary School, about one mile from the town of Indaw and 5,000 villagers were in attendance. U Win Sein verbally attacked Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in his speech, using strong, rude and inappropriate language. The participants were so surprised that they could not believe what they were hearing. Here are some excerpts from his speech, as reported by participants and witnesses.

“We must get rid of Aung San Suu Kyiwho is creating political unrest. Do youunderstand what it means to ‘get rid of’? It

means we’ll have to kill her. Have you got theguts to kill her?”

He asked the audience the same question five or six times in an angry manner. No one responded to him. “We must kill her,” he continued. Because his speech was broadcast over the loudspeakers, it was heard not only by the villagers in the audience but by monks from a nearby monastery.2

Furthermore, Win Sein called for her death in another town during thatsame trip. Below is another excerpt from the letter the NLD sent to GeneralThan Shwe regarding this incident.

U Win Sein arrived in the town of Katha on the evening of 2 November 1996 and held a didactic meeting that night with the USDA and local government officials at the USDA building. The following morning another ceremony to present applications for USDA membership was held in the village of Thain Enn, in Katha Township. Officials from the village LORC [Law and Order Restoration Council] were instructed to force the inhabitants of the six villages within the township to

participate in the presentation of applications to U Win Sein.The villagers, including farmers, villager elders and community leaders were required to attend the ceremony.In his speech, U Win Sein told lies about and slandered Daw

Aung San Suu Kyi’s personal life. Furthermore, he shouted to the audience, “Do you dare kill Aung San Suu Kyi?” He asked this questions three times.3

Win Sein

“We’ll have

to kill her.Have yougot the

guts?”



Win Sein repeated his call for opposition against Aung San Suu Kyiin another ceremony at Enn Ywa, in front of 3,000 villagers, by encouragingthe people to turn against her.4

Likewise, according to the same NLD letter to General Than Shwe,Win Sein told the audience at a ceremony in 1995 to ‘light Katha Township24 hours a day’ that, “the SLORC [State Law and Order Restoration Council]would fight man to man, baton to baton and sword to sword” with theNLD if necessary.5

Although Win Sein was a minister, he attacked and defamed AungSan Suu Kyi blatantly – in addition to the daily barrage of personal attacksagainst her through the state-owned media. Win Sein’s speeches werevery forceful, and as mentioned earlier, even called for her death.

In another case, on 9 November 1996, a group of about 200 hiredthugs attacked in a well-organized manner an NLD motorcade carrying

Aung San Suu Kyi and two NLD Vice-Chairmen, Tin Oo and Kyi Maung.

The assault took place in Rangoon during broad daylight before the veryeyes of police and military personnel. The thugs used batons and knivesand threw stones at the cars. The violent attack damaged the cars, but theleaders of the NLD escaped unscathed.6

1998

On 25 June 1998, security officials did notallow entry to NLD Youth members onto Aung SanSuu Kyi’s premises, who had come to attend a

reading circle session that was held fortnightly ather home. The youth members had given theirnames in advance to the security officers, as theywere required, but were still detained at the gate.Therefore, Tin Oo and Aung San Suu Kyi came out of the house to receivethe youth. When all of them arrived in front of a primary school near AungSan Suu Kyi’s house, and as they were walking back from the gate, securityofficials shouted, “What kind of a leader is she anyway? Strike! We don’tcare!” They began to beat everyone in sight with sticks and tree braches.

At a result, four youth members sustained serious injuries on their heads

and other parts of their bodies. Aung San Suu Kyi herself sustained minorinjuries. Clearly, the attack was intended to harm Aung San Suu Kyi.

NLD Chairman, Aung Shwe, and Aung San Suu Kyi went to see HlaHla Moe, the NLD representative from Min Hla Township Constituency-2,on 7 July 1998. But at about 9:30 am, their vehicle was stopped at theHtauk Kyant Check Point on the Rangoon-Mandalay Highway. Securityofficers let them go after about 10 minutes. They were stopped for asecond time in Hmawbe. Again they were allowed to proceed. However,

“SLORCwould

fight manto man,

sword

to sword.”

Car damaged

in attack on

9 Nov. 1996.



when they reached Shwe Myaya Village at about 10:20 am, they werecompletely blocked by security officials as a police regiment had beenstationed there.

Aung San Suu Kyi and her party were unable continue their journey.They were forced to stay inside their cars the entire night. The next morning,at about 7:30 am, the authorities brought Hla Hla Moe to see Daw AungSan Suu Kyi. The authorities agreed to send Hla Hla Moe to the NLDHeadquarters no later than 3:00 pm on 10 July. Only then, did the NLDleaders return to Rangoon in the evening.

In a similar manner, the authorities blocked Aung San Suu Kyi’smotorcade at 11:55 am on 20 July 1998, near the villages of Ah Nyar Suand Pan Dine, about 15 miles from Nyaung Don, as Aung San Suu Kyi andNLD Irrawaddy Division Chairman, Hla Pe were on their way to Pantanaw.Later in the day, the authorities brought, Dr. Tin Min Htut, NLD representativefrom Pantanaw Constituency-1, to see Aung San Suu Kyi. As agreed upon

with the authorities, the NLD leaders returned to Rangoon along with Dr.Tin Min Htut.

On 24 July 1998, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, along with NLD IrrawaddyDivision Chairman, Hla Pe, went toBassein City in order to see NLDrepresentatives in the Delta and lendencouragement to them and theirfamilies, as the regime had usedcriminal procedures to restrict themovements of NLD representatives.

Again, the authorities, on the bridgeof Ah Nyar Su Village, at a locationabout 15 miles from the town of Nyaung Don, blocked Aung SanSuu Kyi and her motorcade. Theyblocked the road by laying downspikes and barricades. The standoff lasted six days.

On 29 July, Major Thura, from Military Intelligence Unit 12 (army

serial no. 18242), who was also in-charge of security around Aung SanSuu Kyi’s house and the surrounding areas, arrived with a group of 50soldiers. By then Aung San Suu Kyi was frail and tired, due to lack of proper food and water. The security officials forced Aung San Suu Kyi outof her car and involuntarily sent her home.

Again, on 12 August 1998, Aung San Suu Kyi and Hla Pe tried toreturn to the Delta because their mission there had yet to be accomplished.They were blocked near the place where they had been forced to stop and

Suu Kyi

blocked by

authorities.



stay during their second visit to the area. The situation was much worseon this occasion. Aung San Suu Kyi and the group did not have sufficientwater and food, and her health deteriorated. This time, the standoff lasted13 days. Therefore, on 21 August, the authorities allowed her familyphysician to visit her. He declared that her physical condition wasdeteriorating. The doctor again visited Aung San Suu Kyi on 24 August.By this point, her situation had not improved. Therefore, the publicurged Aung San Suu Kyi to return home. She could not afford to loseher life. Finally, she returned home on 24 August.

2000

Aung San Suu Kyi and her entourage (including NLD Vice-Chairman, Tin Oo, Rangoon Division Organizing Committee members,Soe Myint and Dr. Myo Aung, two drivers and 16 Youth Wingmembers) attempted to travel to Kyunchangon and Kawhmu Townshipsthrough the Dala Township across Rangoon on 24 August 2000. As

usual, the authorities prevented Aung San Suu Kyi and her party fromboarding the ferry. The standoff lasted about an hour and a half.

Once on the other side of the river, the NLD vehicles continued their journey. However, they were stopped by police officer Myo Lwin and otherofficials at a location called Kyan Sittha, about 3 miles outside of Dala. TheNLD was instructed to return to Rangoon. Aung San San Suu Kyi and herparty did not budge. Consequently, security officials pushed the NLDvehicles into the rice paddy fields beside the road.

The NLD party entourage set up tents there and waited for an

opportunity to continue their journey to their destinations. Nine days afterthe standoff began, on 1 September 2000, police and military reinforcementsarrived, headed by Police Chiefs, Aung Nwe and Myo Lwin, MilitaryIntelligence Major Thura, a.k.a. Nay Soe (army serial no. 18242) andMajor Tayza. The reinforcement was comprised of about 200-400 securitypersonnel who arrived in the middle of the night at 11:00 pm. The securityforces raided the NLD tents and sent everyone back to Rangoon.

During the raid, several youth members were beaten. Six femalesecurity officers forced Aung San Suu Kyi out of her tent and into a car.

She was sent straight home. Tin Oo was dragged out of a car upon arrivalat his home.

Furthermore, on the same night, security officers raided the NLDheadquarters. The following day, all NLD senior leaders were place underhouse arrest.

Sui Kyi wounded and suffering from

extreme fatigue



On 2 September, a group of security officials headed byColonel Than Tun from Military Intelligence (army serial no.12013) entered the NLD headquarters. They broke the padlocksand doors down and confiscated all papers and documents foundon the premises.

On the morning of 14 September, Secretary-1 of theState Peace and Development Council (SPDC) invited NLDChairman, Aung Shwe, to speak with him and informed thechairman that they had been freed and were permitted to reopenthe NLD offices.

On 21 September, Aung San Suu Kyi and Tin Oo plannedto go to Mandalay by train to investigate if any restrictions hadbeen placed upon the activities of their party members, whetherthe party offices were actually able to reopen and if party signs

torn down by the authorities had been resurrected.

Once they had arrived at Rangoon Central Station, Aung San SuuKyi and her group were told that the train tickets had all been sold out.

Although this claim was untrue, they were powerless to do anything aboutit. So they waited until the train left, tono avail. The following morning, NLDofficials went to the train station againand waited for the train. But this timethey were all forcibly detained. The youth

members were arrested and senior NLDleaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi,were sent home by the authorities. On22 September, all NLD leadership wasordered not to leave their homes.

Given these actions, the speechesand behavior of the state authorities, itis evident that the military authoritiesharassed, restricted and blocked political

parties and their leadership, particularly that of the NLD and Aung SanSuu Kyi. It is also evident that in carrying out these repressive policies, theBurma junta even intended to harm Aung San Suu Kyi’s life.

broken lock

on safe at NLD HQ

documents seized

by authorities at

NLD HQ



Endnotes

1 According to Order 2/88, people are not permitted to gather in groups of five people ormore in public. It was issued on 18 September 1988, the day the current military regimeforcibly seized state power.2 Correspondence from NLD Chairperson to the SPDC Chairperson, Ref 179/See (Nyein)/96, 20 Dec 1996.3 Ibid. P. 130-131.4 Ibid.5 Ibid. P. 132.6 Ibid. P. 112-115.

documents

were seized

by authorities

from NLD HQ



NLD harassed by

USDA on 11 May at Katha

Chapter (2)

Disturbances & harassment duringthe trip to Kachin State – the last trip

before the Depayin Massacre

Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD experienced the followingharassment during their trip to Kachin State, which began on6 May 2003.

The authorities prohibited the erecting of the NLD sign at the ShweboTownship NLD office on 8 May, citing the location as strictly a rice paddyfield zone. In addition, restrictions were imposed upon the people of thetownship and surrounding areas against offering support to or welcoming

Aung San Suu Kyi and her entourage. However, the NLD received aresounding welcome from the public.

When the state authorities realized the extent of the support AungSan Suu Kyi was enjoying, they began to organize counter demonstrationson 9 May. The counter protests began in the town of Kawlin.

At about 6:00 pm on 9 May, members of the USDA organized anoisy counter protest in front of theKawlin High School. They put up signsdeclaring, “Oppose all axe handles [meaning traitors] who rely on foreign stooges .” 7

On the following morning of 10May, Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLDarrived at Nam Tel village, near the

entrance to Indaw Town, where some70 USDA members were awaiting theirarrival. Led by Monywa District USDASecretary, Htay Aung, the USDA hadorganized a protest against the NLD andDaw Aung San Suu Kyi, displaying a huge

sign with green letters written on white cloth which read, “Oppose all axe handles who rely on foreign stooges and cynics.” 8 The protestnearly reached a riotous level when USDA members instigated scuffles



more

USDA

protesters

on 15 May

USDA protesters

on 12 May

while Aung San Suu Kyi was delivering a speech to her supporters and thelocal public. Although there were security police present, they ignored thetensions building up and did nothing to prevent a possible openconfrontation.9

At about 12:00 pm on 11May, the NLD was greeted withharassment from a USDA protestnumbering around 150 people atthe entrance of Katha Town.10 Theprotesters had blocked the entranceto town. But the Chairman of KathaDistrict Peace and DevelopmentCouncil, Lt. Colonel Myint Naing,arrived at the scene of the protestand told Aung San Suu Kyi that hewould call off the protest only if she

promised not to repeat theslanderous attacks she had madeagainst the USDA at Wuntho in thefuture.11 Aung San Suu Kyi replied to the colonel that what she had said inWuntho was the recounting of true events involving the USDA, that shehad informed or consulted with state authorities regarding her trips andthat the colonel and his group should make way for the NLD entourage.She also recommended that the colonel tell his followers to use utmostconstraint, and that she would do the same with her NLD members.12 Theauthorities should have intervened in a constructive way in the harassmentand blocking of the roads by the USDA members. Instead, they demanded

that Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLDentourage return home.13

In another incident on 12 May,some 100 USDA members staged aprotest at the entrance to Man Ywet

Village, in Mogaung Township at about8:30 am. On the following day of 13May, the USDA held yet another protestat the entrance of Nantmasit Village,

in Pharkant Township. This timehowever, it was a silence protest, butthe protesters still held small placardsthat read, “Oppose all axe handles [meaning traitors] who rely on foreign stooges and cynics .” 14

On 15 May, at the arrival of Kaung Village on the Nammatee Highway,the NLD was greeted with another protest at 4:30 in the morning. The



USDA protesters

on 18 May

protesters shouted slogans and held up signs such as: “We don’t want the axe handle who relies on foreign stooges ,” “We don’t want cynics ,” “We don’t want destructionists of the (country’s development) ,” and “We don’t want those who destroy peace and stability .” 15

Despite continuous protests and disturbances instigated by USDAmembers and state officials, the NLD continuedtheir journey to Myitkyina City at about 6:00am on 16 May. The NLD entourage arrived atthe Nangwae Bridge near Myitkyina atapproximately 8:00 am. Protesters who hadtaken over both sides of the road greeted them.The roughly 300 protesting USDA memberswore headbands and held placards declaring,

“Oppose axe handles who rely on the foreigners,those who disturb the tranquility of our state .” In addition, the protesters had blocked the

road.16 The NLD members noticed that therewere also security police present, not far fromthe bridge, armed with shields and batons.17

The protesters were armed with slingshots,knives, bicycle ball bearings used as slingshots and pellets, but the securitypolice did nothing to intervene.18

The NLD continued its journey onwards to Waingmaw Township on18 May. When the NLD entourage arrived at Naung Tarlay spirit house,near Waingmaw, it was greeted again by a USDA protest comprised of

roughly 200 members. On 19 May, the

NLD entourage traveled on to BamawTownship. Afterwards they arrived atLeljaryam Village, in Momauk Township,located just on the China-Burma border.However, the NLD’s planned journeyonward to Laiza, the headquarters of theKachin Independence Organization(KIO), did not materialize as Major Tin

Aung Kyi from Military Intelligence Unit8 and Major Min Lwin Oo from MIS

(Military Intelligence Service)-21prevented the NLD from continuing. TheNLD was then forced to return toBanmaw.

The NLD entourage arrived at Thonemine Village, near Bamaw, atabout 3:00 am on 20 May, where an early morning protest was awaitingthe NLD. Approximately 300 USDA members were seen carrying swordsand batons and came to the protest location in cars and on motorbikes

Suu Kyi’s car

warmly greeted

by locals in

Mogok



with no license plates. Some USDAmembers even tried to snatch the videocamera that Tun Zaw Zaw of the NLDwas carrying. At the same time, theauthorities had restricted the movementof people in the area around themunicipal market so that no large crowdcould gather to see Aung San Suu Kyi.19

Again, the authorities did nothing tointervene in the harassment of the NLDby USDA members armed withweapons.20

The NLD left Shwegu for Momaik at about 8:00 am and arrived in Momaik Township at roughly 8:00 pm on21 May. They had planned to go to Mabein Township, which is located onthe Shweli riverbank, across from Momaik. However, Momaik Police Chief,

Win Htay, and Chief of Immigration, Sai Myint Thein, had ordered, throughthe local Chairman of the Peace and Development Council, the boat ownersat the boat landing located at the confluence of the river to take the enginesoff their boats.21 Consequently, the NLD was unable travel to MabeinTownship.22

The NLD party arrived in Mogok at about 4:30 in the afternoon on22 May. It continued its journey, and arrived in Kyatpyin Myoma on 25May. When the entourage reached Kathae Oaksu-Bogone, a group of about400 USDA members staged a protest. The NLD learnt that the local USDAleader had threatened the people in the area by ordering one person per

household to attend the protest, and failing to do so would result in beingconscripted as force laborers for the Letpanhla Highway.23 Many of theforced draftees for the protest included ethnic minorities who could notread Burmese. The USDA had told these ethnic peoples that the signs theywere holding up when the NLD appeared were signs to welcome andsupport the NLD. Some of signs they were holding and which denouncedthe NLD were in fact held upside down.24 They realized what they weredoing only when Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD members explained to themwhat the signs said. They then demonstrated their support for Aung SanSuu Kyi by discarding their signs denouncing NLD.25

The NLD again was greeted at 3:00 pm by a noisy protest of approximately 1,000 USDA members, comprised of both men and women,at a location known as Seven Mile Village near Thabeikkyin Township.26

The NLD motorcade experienced all kinds of harassment, not only fromUSDA members, but also from traffic police who were assisting the USDA.

Aung San Suu Kyi gave a speech for about 15 minutes in front of hersupporters as well as the protesters. She was interrupted repeatedly duringher speech. Many protesters, who had been part of the protest due to

Thousands

welcoming

Suu Kyi

in front of

Ba Ho Cinema,

in Mogok



The verbal and often physical intervention by USDA members thistime lasted more than three hours. The USDA members threw stones at

Aung San Suu Kyi’s car. A stone hit the head of Maung Tun Tun Win, fromthe Mandalay NLD Youth Wing, and blood gushed forth from his head.35

Aung San Suu Kyi recounted the USDA onslaught at Kyi Tauk Pauk Village to the people in Monywa City. She said,

“The authorities have failed to take action against theUSDA, despite the fact that they have carried out lawlessacts. The authorities behave as if we are in their hands andknow that we are not going to retaliate. That only makes theUSDA bolder. At Kyi Tauk Pauk Village, on the way

from Singu and Madaya,the USDA attacked oursupporters with sticks,swords and slingshots.”

The NLD entouragearrived in Madaya Township on26 May. At about 5:00 pm, theNLD experienced another protest

from about 500 USDA membersat Pathein Lay, in Pathein GyiTownship. The NLD thenreturned to the Mandalay NLDoffice at about 6:15 pm withoutany problems. However, between 7:30-8:00 pm that night a Dynavehicle (license plate 5A/8175) tried to drive into the crowd, with thehelp of traffic police,

Lt. Col. Than Han

closely supervising

protesters on

25 May. He also

supervised the

30 May massacre

and reportedly

arrested

Suu Kyi on themorning of 31 May.

Crowd gathered at

Mandalay Division

NLD branch office, in

order to hear

Suu Kyi’s speech

“ Authorities

failed totake action

against

the USDA.”



while peoplewere gathered tolisten to Aung San SuuKyi near the junctionof 78th-79th Streets.People threw stones atthe car and as a resultits windshield wasshattered.36

The Commission’s findings of USDA harassmentduring the Kachin trip

The Commission found the following forms and instances of harassment against the NLD by the USDA during the NLD’s campaign tripsto Kachin State.

The involvement of the USDA in the harassments

The USDA harassment of the NLD during the Kachin State tripbegan in Kawlin Township. The NLD, at that point, had previouslymentioned malevolent interference by the USDA in its statements. Lwin,the spokesperson for the NLD, had also continually cited the involvementof the USDA in the harassment of and attacks on the NLD and its supportersduring his interviews on foreign radio broadcasts.

So far, the USDA has not made any public statements regardingtheir fundamental involvement in the campaign to disrupt the NLD duringits trips. Nor have the SPDC authorities denied or responded to Aung SanSuu Kyi’s accusation of governmental collusion with and the aiding of USDA members. Thus, they are able to continue to conduct their campaign

of disturbances and harassment freely.

The nature of USDA protests

While protesting against the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi, theprotesters wore headbands and put up signs that denounced the NLD and

Aung San Suu Kyi at the entrance of towns and villages, in front of schools,etc. These acts could not have been carried out without the unequivocalhelp of the State and various authorities. Since the protests had the

Dyna truck

(license

# 5A/8175)

with shattered

windsheild



complete backing of the authorities, the protesters appeared to have nofear of any consequences for their actions. This is clearly evident in thefact that they often used violence against the NLD and its supporters. TheCommission has found that the authorities not only contributed theharassment and violence, but also helped to organize and supervised theUSDA in their actions. The following are some examples:

1. Members of the police and traffic police aided and controlled themotorcades of the protestors, both in their transportation andin their intervention against the NLD and its supporters. Theyassisted the USDA protesters in their attempts to disturb theformation of the NLD motorcade.37

2. The police and other security personnel never once tried tointervene in the scuffles between the NLD and USDA membersduring the protests, although they were present at all times.

3. The protest sites were carefully chosen. The protests wereorganized mostly outside of towns and villages – away from alarge number of public eyes. The authorities transported theprotesters to the protest locations.

4. Major Tin Aung Kyi, from MIS-8, and Major Min Lwin Oo, fromMIS-21, prevented Aung San Suu Kyi from visiting theheadquarters of the KIO, which had entered into a truce withthe Burmese military junta.

5. The USDA leaders and officials from various Peace and

Development Councils threatened the public with variouspenalties if they turned up to welcome Aung San Suu Kyi.

6. The authorities, along with USDA officials, had forced people invarious areas to contribute one person per household to theprotests against the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi.

7. In some townships in Kachin State, the protesters awaited thearrival of the NLD well into the night. For instance,

a) On 10 May at about 9:00 pm, the USDA staged a protestin Nanthae Village, at the entrance of Indaw Township.b) On 12 May at about 8:30 pm, the NLD experienced

harassment by approximately 100 USDA members onthe road to Manywet Village, in Mokaung Township.

c) On 15 May at about 4:30 am, the USDA staged a protestagainst the NLD at the village of Kaung on the NamateeHighway.

“ Authorities

organized andsupervised

the USDA

protesters.”



d) On 16 May at about 8:00 am, approximately 300 USDAmembers greeted the NLD with a protest near NangweBridge.

e) On 20 May at 3:00 am, a group of about 300 USDAmembers, carrying weapons and driving vehicles andmotorbikes without license plates, harassed the NLD nearThree Mile Village.

f) On 25 May at about 7:00 pm, the NLD, while driving in30 vehicles, experienced a raucous protest and harassmentby a group of 500 USDA members at the villages calledKyi Tauk Pauk and Nwe Yone, in Singu Township.

It is evident that the USDA protesters had ulterior motives becausethey waited for the NLD well into the wee hours of the night in

numerous places during this time.Furthermore, the Commission, based onthe evidence cited above, found that

various strata of the State and localauthorities organized and aided the USDAin their protests, disturbances andinitiation of violent acts against the NLD.Only in one single town – Shwebo – didthe NLD experience no acts of violencethroughout their entire trip.

8. The traffic policemen cooperated withthe protestors in disturbances against

Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade. The

policemen stayed close to the vehicles of the people whodemonstrated against Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

The above mentioned evidence clearly illustrates that traffic policemen,policemen, riot policemen, and military leaders supervised USDA protestsin Kachin State against Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD members.

Armed with

bamboo

sticks,USDA

memebers

harrassing

NLD in

KyiTauk

Pauk.

Endnotes

7 The New Light of Myanmar. 1 June 2003. P-9.8 Ibid. (See also the testimony of Khin Oo.)9 NLD Statement No. 6 (5/03), 27 May 2003.10 Article by Maung Yin Hmine, “Daw Suu Kyi, the NLD Party and Our Ray of Hope – 6” The New Light of Myanmar . 10 July 2003.11 Ibid.



Buddhist monks

accompanying

NLD convoy

from Mogok

to Mandalay.

12 See testimony of Khin Oo.13 NLD Statement No. 6(5/03)14 Article by Maung Yin Hmine and testimony of Khin Oo15 Article by Maung Yin Hmine.16 Ibid.17 Testimony of Khin Oo.18 NLD Statement No.6 (5/03).19 Testimony of Khin Oo.20 NLD Statement No. 6 (5/03).21 Ibid.22 Testimony of Ko Khin Oo.23 NLD Statement No. 6 (5/03).24 Testimony of Nyunt Nyunt.25 Ibid and foreign radio interview with an NLD member.26 NLD Statement No. 6 (5/03).27 Testimony of Nyunt Nyunt.28 NLD Statement No.6 (5/03).29 Name of the Burmese currency. (500 kyat = 45.5 US cents)30 Foreign radio interview with an NLD member.31 It refers to Aung San Suu Kyi’s marriage to Oxford Don, the late Dr. Michael Aris. While

Kala directly translated means a person coming from India, since the British used Indiansoldiers to invade Burma, Burmese people have referred to the British as Kala or Kala Phyu (white Indian). Kala is used as a derogatory insult.

32

Foreign radio interview with an NLD member.33 This tactic was often used to solicit a physical response from NLD members. The ideais that if the NLD members responded with violence, the State authorities could readilyaccuse the NLD of using confrontational and violent methods. The NLD’s policy is non-violence.

34 Unwanted and meddling foreigners.35 Testimonies of Nyunt Nyunt and the NLD Statement No. 6 (5/03).36 Ibid and The New Light of Myanmar . 1 June 2003.37 Testimonies of Nyunt Nyunt and Min Thein.



those who do not support the USDA! ” The protesters were all shouting thesame slogan. Luckily, nothing untoward happened at this protest site.However, the people from Sagaing City warmly welcomed the NLD upontheir arrival in the town. Approximately 2,000 NLD supporters were seenshouting slogans such as, “Daw Aung San Suu Kyi may you be in good health! ” and “Ba Ba 38 U Tin Oo may you be in good health! ” 39

The NLD continued its journey on to Myinmu from Sagaing. Theyarrived in Myinmu Town at about 12:00 pm. NLD members noticed trafficpolice trailing behind their motorcade and MIS personnel taking videorecordings and pictures of the NLD.40

At Myinmu the NLD party sign was erected. The NLD Youth Wingfor the township party branch was assembled, with NLD electedrepresentative from Lewe Constituency-1, Tin Htut Oo, leading theceremony. At the time, there were fivevehicles outside the township NLD office

carrying police, reserve firefighters, membersof the Pyithu Swan-ar Shin Organization,41

local Peace and Development Councilofficials and USDA members. On one of the vehicles was a sign on which, “Pyithu Swan-ar Shin ” was written in green on awhite cloth. The five vehicles followed theNLD until Yeposar Village, between Myinmuand Chaung U, after it left Myinmu.42

It was about 3:00 pm when the NLD

left Myinmu. At this time Aung Aung andNaing Naing in the NLD vanguard vehiclenoticed the first signs of preparation for an attack on the NLD in Yeposar

Village – but that was to come later. A protest was awaiting the NLD inwhich USDA protesters held up signs and shouted the following slogans:43

· “Oppose all axe handles and cynics who rely on foreign stooges.”

· “Consider both domestic and international destructionists as common enemies.”

· “We don’t’ want those who have blocked international assistance to Myanmar (Burma).” · “We want peace and stability.” · “We don’t want those who initiated the tourism boycott.” · “We don’t want those who have blocked

foreign investment in Myanmar.” · “We don’t want ‘discretional’ democracy.”

protesters

against the NLD



midnight until two in the morning, concerning the formation of the NLD Youth Wing in town. The meeting was organized at the residence of former Army Major, Kyi Soe (Sein Hmya Store), who is now an NLD electedrepresentative from Monywa Constituency-1. Aung San Suu Kyi stayed athis home that night.

On the morning of 30 May, Aung San Suu Kyi and Tin Oo paidhomage to the abbot of Zawtika Monastery. Their plan to attend meditationOkkan Taw Ya Monastery was deferred, and the NLD left Monywa forBudalin using the ring road at about 10:00 am. When the NLD reachedthe headquarters of the Army’s North-Western Region Command, which islocated near a village called Zetaw, soldiers stopped the NLD motorcade.Then they ordered the vehicles and motorbikes from Monywa that hadaccompanied the NLD motorcade to return to Monywa after reachingBudalin. When Aung San Suu Kyi and company reached Budalin, theyconducted the usual functions, such as the reopening of their party office,erecting their party sign and the formation of the township Youth Wing.

NLD supporters from Monywa returned home, as ordered by the authorities,once they reached Budalin. But police were waiting for their return fromBudalin, and when they had reached the Army’s North-Western Commandthey were physically assaulted. As soon as Aung San Suu Kyi learned of the beatings, she asked Budalin NLD Chairman, Aung San, and Tun Myaing,the elected NLD representative forWetlet Constituency-1 andmember of the NLD SagaingDivision Organizing Committee,to go and resolve the matter. Sheasked them to go in Bar Bar’s car,

the NLD Chairman for SagaingDivision.

The NLD began to noticea large number of monks,members of the USDA andmembers of Pyithu Swan-ar Shinupon their departure fromBudalin. The NLD observed themsitting in vehicles near gas

stations toward the town’sentrance.46 The NLD leaderstherefore warned Aung Aung, Naing Naing and Myo Min to take extra carewhile driving in the front of the NLD motorcade. They were also told toconsult and cooperate with Saw Hlaing, the NLD’s elected representativefor Indaw Constituency. Tin Htut Oo 47 also asked Kyaw Aung to use amotorbike for communication in case of an emergency, or in case motorvehicles could not be used.

More protesters



The NLD left Budalin at about 4:30 in the afternoon for Depayin.On the way, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi dropped by Saipyin Village to visit thehome of Win Myint Aung, an elected NLD representative in militarydetention, in order to encourage his family members, as well as NLDmembers and supporters.

On 30 May, the Depayin police had detained the son of Win Myint Aung, who had left for Depayin that morning to investigate the safetyconditions of the road to Depayin.48 At Sai Pyin Gyi, before Depayin, theNLD again sent several people on motorbikes to investigate the security of the road, as the car that had been sent in advance to carry out thereconnaissance had not yet returned. However, the motorbikes did notreturn either. The NLD later learnt that all of these NLD members andsupporters had been detained on the premises of the Department of Irrigation, located near a village called ‘Kyi,’ by the USDA who later thatnight were to commit violence against the NLD.

The NLD, nonetheless, continued on its journey and arrived at Kyiat about 8:00 pm. The village of Kyi is about two miles from Depayin. Thevillagers from ‘Kyi’ came out to welcome Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.

At the time of the massacre, the NLD vehicle (Townace 7A/5661)carrying Vice-Chairman Tin Oo was at the front of the NLD motorcade.Following directly behind was a car (Toyota Hilux) driven by U Ko Ko Layfrom Mandalay, followed by the car in which Aung San Suu Kyi was riding.Its license plate number was A/5415. Tun Win and Khin Maung Thaung,from Zegyo Market in Mandalay, drove their car immediately behind AungSan Suu Kyi’s vehicle. A green Toyota Hilux car followed carrying NLD

Youth Wing members from Mandalay, who were on emergency securityduty for the NLD. Behind them was Dr. Hla Soe Nyunt, the NLD’s electedrepresentative from Singaing Constituency-2, in his white Sunny sedan.Following the motorcade of NLD leaders were NLD members and theirsupporters in various vehicles.

Two Buddhist monks blocked the road in front of the vehicle carrying Aung San Suu Kyi and directed the driver to stop the car. The NLD had justpassed the village of Kyi and was already about 100 yards outside of thevillage. Tun Zaw Zaw, who was in-charge of NLD security and from the

NLD Central Youth Wing, got out of the car and asked the monks their justification for blocking the road. One of the monks replied, “We havebeen waiting for a long time. Ask Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to give us aspeech.” Tun Zaw Zaw told them that she would not be able to complybecause the NLD did not have sufficient time.49

Due to the blockade by the monks, the NLD motorcade came to ahalt. While Tun Zaw Zaw was busy talking with the monks, the peoplewho were following the NLD and its supporters got out of their Dyna



vehicles and buses. They shouted, “We don’t want axe handles and cynics who rely on foreign stooges ” repeatedly while existing their vehicles. Thevillagers from Kyi, who had come to welcome Aung San Suu Kyi and theNLD, returned words by shouting, “We the people don’t want you either .” 50

Immediately the USDA members, imposter monks and other hiredthugs shouted, “What did you say? ” Then they got out of their vehiclescarrying iron spikes and rods, bamboo batons and wooden sticks. Withsystematic brute force, they began beating every one in sight - the villagers,

Aung San Suu Kyi along with NLD members and leaders, as well as innocentbystanders.51 Consequently, the villagers from Kyi and those who hadcome to welcome Aung San Suu Kyi ran in all directions to avoid beingbeaten with savage force. As it was a sudden and unprovoked attack frombehind, those who had followed the NLD towards the end of the motorcadewere struck the most violently.

Sham Buddhist monks with armbands and civilians with white

armbands beat the unarmed NLD members and civilians relentlessly. Whilestriking, they also screamed abusive and derogatory language such as,

“Those of you women who have destroyed our race! Those who want to make Kala their husbands! Come and make us your husbands before you choose the Kala as your husbands! ” The NLD women, who wore matchinguniforms of pinny and yawhtami,52 had their shirts and sarong stripped off by the attackers. The attackers grasped the women’s hair and bashed theirheads against the road. It was an evil act, brutal beyond belief, and theattackers acted with intent to kill.53 In addition, the attackers forciblysnatched gold chains, earrings, and money from the wounded.54

The attackers concentrated on attacking Aung San Suu Kyi’s vehiclefrom the left side. Therefore, those who had protected Aung San Suu Kyi,using their own bodies as human shields by interlocking their hands, werebeaten and as a result sustained serious injuries. They included NLD YouthWing members from the NLD Rangoon Headquarters, those from Mandalaywho had come along with the NLD motorcade, youth members from NLDMonywa and students from the Institute of Economics who were responsiblefor the security of Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD leadership.55 Due to theseverity of the assault, Thein Toe Aye, the NLD organizer for MandalayNorth-Western Township, photographer Tin Maung Oo and driver San

Myint (a.k.a. Raju) died on the spot.56

Fortuitously, Aung San Suu Kyi’s driver was able to drive the carthrough carnage, and bring her to relative safety. Immediately after hercar drove off, some 4,000 people, who were laying in wait for the NLD onboth sides of the road near the Department of Irrigation, came runningout and began charging the villagers and the NLD who had escaped fromthe mayhem.57 At that very moment, an order was shouted with, “Get outand strike!” Instantly, two Dyna trucks drove out from the Irrigation

“The womenwere stripped

of theirclothes and

the attackersbashed their

heads against

the road.”



Department premises, where they had been ready waiting, and tried toram the car carrying Aung San Suu Kyi head-on. Her car was able to avoidthe head-on collision with the two Dyna trucks, and as a result was forcedto drive over three barbed wire barricades. In no time, just as her carcrashed past the barricades, another order was heard, “Fire!” It was anorder to shoot and approximately 10-15 rounds of bullets were rapidlyfired.58 However, vehicles carrying Aung San Suu Kyi and Dr. Hla SoeNyunt were able to drive through the charging mob and the two Dynatrucks, amid gun-fire, and narrowly escaped. Following this, Aung SanSuu Kyi’s vehicle reached Ye Oo and Dr. Hla Soe Nyunt’s car arrived atDepayin Hospital.

Win Mya Mya, the Mandalay Division NLD organizer, was not solucky. Her car drove off the road and hit a tree along the side of the roadwhile trying to avoid the head-on coalition with the two Dyna trucks. As aresult, both of her arms were broken.

As Aung San Suu Kyi’s car had already escaped, the attackersconcentrated their attack on Tin Oo’s vehicle. At the same spot, policearrested Tin Oo and Tin Aung Aung, along with five other NLD members,and took them to the Depayin Police Station that night. Tin Htut Oo, TezaNaing and Hla Oo were detained the following morning of 31 May, nearthe village of Kyi, by security forces led by the Shwebo District Peace andDevelopment Council Chairman.59 They were subsequently sent to theDepayin police station, and transferred to Shwebo Prison on 1 June.

There were roughly 5,000 people from various areas involved inthe attack.60 The USDA paid them to participate in the attack against the

NLD and other innocent villagers.61 The attack lasted more than threehours and was well planned, well organized and intended to cause graveand serious harm to Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD officials.

Shortly after 11:00 pm that night, about 80 riot police, armed withshields and batons, and members of the Pyithu Swan-ar Shin62 organizationarrived at the scene of the attack. Subsequently, two cars that appeared tobe Mitsubishi Pajeros arrived. Two officious looking people got out of thecars and inspected the scene. The police and the Pyithu Swan-ar Shinmembers carted off the dead bodies in their Dyna trucks, as if they were

throwing rubbish onto a garbage pile, and left the scene.

The two Toyota Hilux vehicles that had been damaged and left atthe scene were pushed off the side of the road – into the rice paddy fields.They were rearranged in such a way that they appeared as if they had overturned after being involved in traffic incident. Two other Hiluxes wererearranged to appear as if they had been involved in a head-on collision.The rearranged scenes were then photographed and videotaped.63

“The policecarted off the deadbodies, asif they werethrowingrubbish ontoa garbage

pile.”



Eyewitnesses also saw some of the destroyed cars being taken away toward Ye Oo.64

It is clear that the attack was planned, organized and systematicallyexecuted by Shwebo District USDA Secretary Htay Aung65 and ShweboDistrict Peace and Development Council Chairman, Lt. Col Than Han,66

with the help of local authorities. Due to vital assistance from variousauthorities, the attackers launched a violent assault on unarmed civiliansand NLD members, including Aung San Suu Kyi, with impunity. This alsoemboldened the attackers, even to the point of robbing the wounded of their valuables and tearing and stripping off clothes of the injured andunconscious women. Villagers from Kyi, NLD Youth Wing members andstudents from the Institute of Economics were severely beaten. Several of them died during the course of their beatings. Some had their facesdisfigured and body parts broken.

The attack was brutal and without mercy. It was an attempt by

authorities to break up the support for Aung San Suu Kyi that was gainingmomentum. The attack can be construed as a display of brutality that isbeing used as a deterrent to intimidate others not to participate in the pro-democracy movement. In other words, it is a signal that the regime willnot hesitate to use brute force against anyone who attempts to replace itsrule with democracy.

Endnotes

38 Burmese honorific title for great uncle or grandpa.39 Testimonies of Wunna Maung, Nyunt Nyunt, Min Thein, and Phoe Zaw.40 Testimonies of Nyunt Nyunt and Naing Naing.41 Pyithu Swan-ar Shin means “force of the people” or “People Power” and is a people’s

militia. Although it’s not an official organization, it does deal with local authorities. Itsmembers and USDA members reportedly cooperate in confronting NLD members. Itsmembers do not have any uniform; rather, they wear a piece of cloth on their arm withthe organization’s name on it.

42 Testimonies Nyunt Nyunt, Naing Naing, Aung Aung, Khin Oo, Phoe Zaw.43 Ibid and testimony of Phoe Zaw.44

Monywa District USDA Secretary. See also Chapter 2.45 Testimonies of Khin Oo, Naing Naing and Aung Aung.46 Testimonies of Naing Naing and Aung Aung.47 Elected NLD representative from Lewe Constituency-1.48 Testimony of Khin Oo.49 Testimonies of Wunna Maung, Khin Oo, Min Thein and Nyunt Nyunt.50 Testimonies of Wunna Maung, Min Thein and Nyunt Nyunt.51 Testimonies of Wunna Maung, Min Thein, Khin Oo and Nyunt Nyunt.52 Pink NLD uniform of traditional Burmese dress and sarong.53 Testimonies of Wunna Maung, Nyunt Nyunt and Min Thein.54 Testimonies of Wunna Maung and Khin Oo.



55 Testimonies of Wunna Maung, Khin Oo and Min Thein.56 Testimonies of Nyunt Nyunt and Min Thein.57 Testimonies of Nyunt Nyunt and Min Thein.58 Testimonies of Naing Naing and Aung Aung.59 As the Commission continued its investigation, it found that the Shwebo District Peace

and Development Council Chairman is Lt. Col. Than Han.60 Testimony of Wunna Maung and NLD members interview with foreign radio stations.61 The New Light of Myanmar on 1 June and the SPDC press conference on 31 May.62 Interview with Zaw Zaw Aung.63 Ibid.64 Interview with Zaw Zaw Aung, NLD members’ interviews with foreign radio stations

and information sent from inside Burma directly to the Commission.65 Testimony of Khin Oo.66 Foreign radio interviews and information sent directly to the Commission from insideBurma.



Chapter (4)

The preliminary analysis of the Ad hoc Commission onthe Depayin Massacre

The Commission found that the 30 May Depayin Massacre wasa premeditated crime committed by state and local authoritiesin Burma against Aung San Suu Kyi, NLD members, their

supporters and unarmed villagers. The Commission has the followingevidence.

1. Training of attackers prior to the massacre

USDA secretaries from 8 townships in Shwebo District, and othertownships in Monywa District, were responsible for the recruitment of people necessary for the protests against the NLD. The majority of therecruitments or conscriptions were carried out in these areas.67 The USDAand authorities used bribery, as well as threats of forced labor and othermeans, to secure the number of protesters needed.68

The recruits were taken to respective areas in Sagaing Division.Some were housed at Sagaing High School No. 2, and Monywa HighSchools No. 2 and 3. Others were sent to the compound of the North-Western Region Command Headquarters and the Depayin High School inDepayin. They all were given systematic training on how to attack anddisintegrate crowds.69

The state authorities have given similar training to USDA membersbefore. Soe Than, who is the NLD Youth leader for the Kamayut Townshipin Rangoon, recounted his experience:

“Beginning 1 November 1996, the authorities have conducted specialmob control trainings for USDA members in a new building behind theState Cooperative Showroom, which is located across the road from theMinistry of Home Affairs. The USDA members were trained on how toattack a larger number of people and vehicles. The USDA members selectedfor the training were given meals and 200 kyat per day.”



2. The w eapons used in the assault

The Commission found that the weapons used to attack the NLD atKyi Village near Depayin - bamboo sticks, sharpened bamboo sticks, two-and-half-inch-thick wooden sticks, etc - were the same as those the USDAprotesters had used throughout their protests in the past. The methods of striking with the weapons were also found to be the same. For instance,the attackers chose heads and waists as their targets. The Commissionfound that respective USDA secretaries in the Sagaing Division orderedthe public to make such weapons.

3. Timing of the attack and choice of the kil l ing field

The Depayin Massacre began at about 8:00 pm on 30 May, andfinished around midnight.70 The night of the attack, the 30th of May, fellon the waning moon in the month of Kason, meaning that it was a moonlessnight. Visibility therefore was limited and very poor.

At a bend in the road before the village of Kyi, the authoritiesdevised their plan in such a way that the NLD motorcade had no otherchoice but to stop. The authorities had also laid down three layers of barbed wire barricades on the road near the Department of Irrigation inDepayin. The police and soldiers had taken position on the departmentpremises and the would-be attackers were placed strategically on bothsides of the highway. Floodlights were used and aimed at the NLDmotorcade so that the attackers could see their targets clearly. The vehiclesfollowing the NLD vehicles systematically lined up and aimed their frontlights at the NLD members, so that the attackers could clearly see.71

Moreover, the involvement of the authorities is evident in that theywere able to assemble the attackers in one place in a very systematicmanner and disassemble them quickly, in fact as soon as the attack wasover. This could not have been done without the collusion of the authoritiesin the attack. There were more than 5,000 attackers and protesters, butthe populations of the villages near the location of the attack, namely thevillages of Kyi and Ywa Thit and those living in the Irrigation premises, donot exceed more than 1,000.

Aung Aung and Naing Naing - both from the Democratic Party fora New Society (DPNS) - who acted as vanguards for the NLD motorcade inorder to investigate the safety conditions of the road, had been detainedalong with their vehicle (license plate R/801) on the Irrigation premises.

As the time of their arrests was about 5:30 in the evening, or just beforedusk, they were able to clearly see the situation surrounding the massacresite and nearby areas.72



4. The methods used in the attack

As mentioned earlier, the attackers chose the head as their primarytarget. Those dying, moaning in pain, having fallen down on the road, yetwho had remained conscious, were beaten repeatedly. A group of four tofive attackers at a time systematically struck an injured individual.73 Theattackers wore white armbands so that they could differentiate betweenthe NLD and their fellow attackers.74 The attackers threatened the occupantsof NLD vehicles to get out of their cars. The USDA shouted that theywould set the cars on fire if the NLD members did not get out. As soon asthe NLD members had gotten out of their cars, the waiting attackers beatthem incessantly.75 Those who failed or refused to get out of their cars,seeing others being beaten, were dragged out of their vehicles and thenbeaten.76 The attackers forcibly took the uniforms off NLD members androbbed them of their valuables.77

5. Direct involvement of the authorities

Concerning the involvement of state officials in the Depayin Massacre,the Commission found the following:

a) The authorities prevented the regular bus services betweenMonywa and Mandalay on the day of the massacre.78

b) The police and soldiers detained some 70-80 motorbikes, alongwith NLD riders and supporters from Monywa, who were thenforced to return home by the authorities. They were detained atZetaw Village, on the Monywa-Budalin Highway, where the

Headquarters of the North-Western Region Command is located.79

Those who came from Monywa to resolve the detention of NLDmembers and supporters were also detained at the same place.

As a result, unrest broke out in Monywa at about 4:30 in theafternoon that day. When Aung San Suu Kyi, who was alreadyin Budalin at the time, learnt of the incident, she sent BudalinNLD Chairman Aung San and Sagaing Division NLD SecretaryTun Myaing to resolve the matter. These two were also detained,in the same manner as the others before them. The Commissionbelieves that the authorities detained all of these NLD activists

and leaders to ensure that there were fewer NLD memberspresent at the time of the attack, and that the attack could beconcentrated on NLD leaders Aung San Suu Kyi and Tin Oo.

c) On 30 May, Myo Naing (in-charge of Mandalay DivisionOrganization Committee), Thet Tun (Tin Oo’s car driver) andNaing Naing (DPNS) went to the Budalin telecommunicationoffice in order to phone NLD Headquarters in Rangoon regardingthe safety conditions of the road. However, an employee told



them that all phone lines had been cut and that he could notmake any phone calls. It is clear that state officials cut thephone lines on the day of the massacre so that no one, includingthe NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi, could communicate outsideBudalin by phone in the case of an emergency. It is also veryclear to the Commission that this was part of the overall planleading up to the massacre.

d) Local officials had ordered the monasteries in and around thevillage of Kyi in advance not to welcome or aid the NLD in anyway. They were instructed not to assist the NLD, even in thecase of some emergency. The monks were also told to stay put,if something did in fact happen. Officials provided some of themonasteries with donations and materials so that they wouldcomply with the demand. Consequently, the monks could notassist the NLD when something happened, even if the monkshad wanted to, because the roads were closed and travel or

communication to outside the area was not possible.80 TheCommission believes that it was part of the systematic plan todeny any possible outside help to the NLD during the mayhemand that the authorities did not want any witnesses around whenthe massacre occurred.

e) All NLD members who went ahead of the motorcade asvanguards were detained by police and soldiers on the IrrigationDepartment premises. “I saw nine sets of barbed wires on theroad, which were used to construct three barricades to block theroad. All passing vehicles and motorbikes had to slow down

due to the roadblocks. There were about 30 riot police, completewith their combat gear, behind the barricades. A man in whiteshirt approached our car and asked us where we were going.We replied that we were part of the motorcade carrying AungSan Suu Kyi and the NLD. Then the man reported to anotherman about 50 years of age, who was wearing military trousersand a white tank top (undergarment), ‘Major, it is a car that hascome along with Aung San Suu Kyi.’ ‘Yeah, get them inside thepremises,’ replied the major. The older man who was addressedas an army major was fat, but his rank could not be verified

because he wasn’t wearing a uniform shirt.” 81

There werefloodlights installed in advance and cars systematically parkedbehind the attackers so that they could shine their headlights onthe chosen spot for the attack.82 The two officials who wereclosely supervising the attackers were an army major83 andDepayin Township Police Chief Sein Win.84

f) The Commission also learnt that the police officer in-chargeholed up in the Irrigation Department was Sein Win himself.



Among those detained on the department premises was BoMoung, the NLD’s elected representative from DepayinConstituency.85 During the assault, Aung San Suu Kyi’s vehiclewas able to drive through the barricades. After seeing her getaway, Sein Win told all of the detainees sarcastically, includingBo Moung, “Listen all of you, including U Bo Moung. As youhave just seen, remember that you all are quite lucky. I wishyou good luck in the future.” 86

g) The evidence that all of the buses used to transport the USDAprotesters and attackers were seen parked inside the premisesof the North-Western Region Command, and that it was an armycaptain who was in-charge of clearing the dead bodies, all pointto the fact that the authorities were behind the attack. Confirmingthis information, Kyaw Lwin, a truck conductor,87 told thefollowing during a Burmese language foreign radio broadcast,

“I am the assistant of a Nissan-UD (license plateno. 2B/1962). The gate (truck station) is in Rangoonand its phone number is 681 229. We transport goodsbetween Rangoon and Monywa. We have been forciblytaken for state duty since 28 May.88 It was the North-Western Command who had detained us for the useof our vehicle. There were 10 trucks in total. We hadto stay on the command premises. On 30 May, weleft the premises. A captain sat in the front seat, buthe wore civilian clothes. I saw walkie-talkies in thetruck. About 50 people got into the truck. Some of

them had monk’s robes on. We were asked to coverthe back of the truck (where the people were) withgreen tarpaulin before we left. We left the commandat about 7:00 pm. The captain ordered us to drivetoward Depayin and Ye Oo. Before we arrived inDepayin, by about 2 or 3 miles, we saw a great scuffleon the road. The captain in the front seat asked thedriver to shine the truck’s headlights onto the carnage.He also ordered the people in the back of the truck toget out and join in the scuffle. There were only three

of us – myself, Ko Nyo (believed to be the driver) andthe captain - left in the truck. What I saw wasunbelievable. I saw that tremendous force and violencewas being used, as some one with a large grudgewould use. It was extremely frightening. I have neverseen or experienced such mayhem. It was as if thescuffle was one-sided. People were being brutallybeaten. There were many people lying on the road,people running away from the carnage, people

“The captainordered the

people inthe truck toget out and join in the

scuffle.”



shouting out in pain as if they were in a frenzy. Thoselying unconscious or dead were carried and piled upnear our truck. I don’t know the people who werecarrying the unconscious, but I think they were fromour truck. The captain in the front seat was talking onhis phone the entire time, saying ‘Yes, General, yes,General.’ In a short while, the captain ordered me toput the dead onto the truck. At the same time, I sawthe captain shoot into the crowd three or four timeswith his revolver. I don’t know if the bodies weredead or unconscious, but they were soaked in blood.I carried all of them into the back of the truck. Therewere exactly seventeen bodies. As soon as it wascompleted, we were ordered to reverse the vehicleand drive off. Our passengers, among whom weremonks, did not come back with us. I saw other trucksthat had been commandeered like us driving toward

the carnage. I don’t know what they had to do though.When we reached Ahlone Village, we were ordered tostop and unload the bodies. We piled them up on theside of the road. It was the captain who ordered us.Then we were told to drive back to the commandpremises. I saw a feast that was ready to be eatenthere. We were invited to dine. Then we were given30,000 kyat each. While we were having dinner wesaw someone taking our truck away, but the captainassured us that it was only going to a place nearby.He said, ‘Don’t worry.’ The truck arrived back the next

day, on 31 May, in the evening. We were only able towash the truck and make some offerings (for the dead)on 1 June. I don’t know what happened to theseventeen bodies that we left piled up by the side of the road. I heard that they were cremated. We areback in Rangoon now at the truck station and back inbusiness again.” 89

6. The methods of comm and and control

During the mayhem, radio communication sets (walkie-talkies)were used to give direct orders. According to eyewitnesses,below are some examples:

· “Deva, Tin Hla, We’ve got it! ” · “Block the entrances to Taze and Ye Oo! ” · “Setkhalay (medium light automatic machine

gun), make it ready! Fire if necessary! ”

“We w ere orderedto unload thebodies and wepiled them on the

side of the road.”



· “ Aung Khin, Aung Naing, what is the situation? Commission, what is the status! Have you sent it yet? ” 90

To ensure that the attackers would attack systematically, orderssuch as “Water Group! Strike! ” and “Fire Group! Strike! ” were given. Whenthe attack was over, orders such as “Water Group! Let’s go home! ” and

“Fire Group! Let’s return! ” were called out. Only the military and the policeuse these types of orders. The words used for the orders were encoded.

7. The arrangement of 5,000 attackers and protesters for themassacre

The Burmese military junta told the world, in the press conferenceheld on 31 May, that the scuffle was the result of a protest against the NLDby some 5,000 people who do not support the party.91 The Commissionlearnt from eyewitnesses that there were about 1,000 people - 500 USDA

and Pyithu Swan-ar Shin in the buses, which followed the NLD motorcadewhen it left Budalin, and another 500 attackers in 10 ten-wheel trucks (50passengers in each truck), which were from the Command premises.92

The Commission also learnt from eyewitnesses that there were about4,000 people laying in wait for the NLD in front of the Irrigation Departmentnear the village of Kyi.93

Throughout the NLD’s trip to Kachin State, there were both maleand female protesters. However, it was notable that those involved in themassacre were all men. The state authorities excluded women becausethey were not just protesting against the NLD, but had premeditated plans

to launch an attack against the NLD.

8. Destruction and creation of evidence

Immediately following the massacre, police and soldiers took awaythe vehicles, motorbikes, the injured and dead from the spot where theambush was staged. The evidence of the massacre was thus destroyed.Further, in order to create the appearance of a scuffle, the authoritiesthemselves destroyed some of the vehicles that were used to transport theattackers.94

When the massacre was over, at about 11:30 pm, a team of policeand military officers arrived at the crime scene.95 They changed the positionsof four vehicles that were left at the scene and then videotaped the newlycreated crime scene.96

Until today, the authorities have either hidden or not returned anyof the vehicles belonging to the NLD and its supporters, which wereconfiscated when the massacre occurred on 30 May.

“Police andsoldiers

destroyedthe

evidence.”



9. Detention of eyew itnesses and the injured

The junta detained eyewitnesses and the wounded from themassacre. It continued to detain those who escaped from the massacre.Those who sustained serious injuries were sent to Army Medical Unit (7),and those who had minor injuries were sent to Shwebo Prison. A total of 44 people, who were arrested in front of the Irrigation Department, weresent to Shwebo Prison on the morning of 31 May. Political activists, whohad been detained at the massacre, were interrogated by a team, led byCaptain Lin Zaw Kan from MIS-20.97 After being illegally detained for 12days, those who were not NLD members were released. When they werereleased an official, said to be the Commander of the MIS-20, instructedthem to meet at the entrance of Shwebo Prison. He warned them not torecount any of the details about the massacre to anyone. He told thenewly released that the foreign media would use the information, if theysaid anything to anyone. He threatened that his MIS would take actionsagainst anyone found to be spreading information.98

The authorities continued to detain the injured and witnesses, butonly the MIS, without the police, carried out the interrogations. Laterwhen some eyewitnesses were released, excluding the most importantones, they were forced to sign pledges not to recount the events of 30 Mayto anyone. They were released only after they signed these documents.These were the steps taken by the authorities in order to cover up theDepayin Massacre. So far, the Burmese military junta has not disclosedany information regarding the legality of the detention of those detainedin Shwebo, Kale and Hkamti Prisons following the massacre. Neither has itmade public if detainees have been charged under any criminal procedures.

Most importantly, the Burmese junta has not taken any action againstany of 5,000 protesters and attackers who were responsible for the attack,in the year following the massacre. Nor has it arrested or brought legalactions against any officials who were directly responsible for the planning,organizing and executing of the massacre. The Commission thereforebelieves that the state authorities are anxious about the uncovering of thetruth about the massacre, and that they have done all in their power tokeep the true facts about the massacre hidden.

Final Conclusion

The Depayin Massacre took place on 30 May. The carnage began atabout 8:00 pm and finished sometime between 11:30 pm and midnight.Sixteen hours later, at 4:00 pm on 31 May, the SPDC organized a pressconference. It told the world that the massacre was a scuffle between theNLD and anti-NLD protesters. The Commission believes that it was notpossible for anyone to investigate the massacre within this limited period

– even if the investigation included the best and experienced investigators.



Furthermore, it was also a time of confusion among the injured, dead anddetained, etc. A conclusion could not have been drawn without the priororganization of so-called ‘facts’ in its hands. One major discrepancy is thatthe MIS could not begin the photographing of 146 detainees until 1 June.The interrogation could then logically only have begun at 9:00 am on 2June.99 By this time, the junta had already held the press conference a dayand half earlier.

What is more blatant is that the authorities have made no attemptsat investigation in the whole year following the massacre. In addition,they have not published any new conclusions about the massacre. This isbecause, as the Burmese saying goes- ‘The thief who stole the royal scepter!’-it was the Burmese military junta itself who perpetrated the heinous crimeand thus there was no need for the junta to look into the massacre. Basedon the evidence mentioned earlier in this chapter, and the preliminaryanalysis and investigation of the Commission, it is more than clear that theBurmese junta itself committed the crime against the NLD, Aung San Suu

Kyi and other unarmed NLD supporters.

Why did the Burmese junta commit such a heinous crime? Whatmotive did it have in committing these crimes? Why were the attacksbrutal beyond belief? What motivated the regime to commit a crime againsta well-known Noble Laureate in the presence of many eyewitnesses? Thesequestions need to be examined.

The Commission has avoided making any unfounded accusationstowards the Burmese junta. It has tried not to tamper the findings withmalicious intent or sworn grudge. The Commission has searched for an

objective answer based on the available evidence.

The Commission has reached the following two conclusions:

First, that the junta might have just wanted to scare the NLD, sothat it stopped or scaled back the party’s political campaigns amongst thepeople. In doing so, however, the actions of the regime might have gottenout of control, and unexpectedly resulted in the deaths of many people.Second, it is probable that the junta wanted to end the lives of Aung SanSuu Kyi and Tin Oo, and eliminate the NLD once and for all.

The Commission will analyze the first assumption. If the regimehad just wanted to coerce the NLD, in order to put an end to NLD’s politicalcampaigns:

1. The junta did not need that much manpower. Theobjective would have been easily accomplished if it hadused some 1,000 people – perhaps twice the size of NLDentourage and supporters.



2. The attackers did not need to use lethal weapons. Themission would have been easily accomplished if theattackers had used the stones and sticks found by theroadside to threaten the NLD.

3. The junta did not require the use of armbands, codedmessages and radio communication sets. Neither did itrequire the training of attackers and ordering them whento attack and when to retreat. All it had to do was let thecrowd loose, and assail themselves by provoking the NLDphysically.

4. There was no need for the conspicuous involvement of the state authorities, such as the police and soldiers, inthe attack. The USDA could have single-handedly carriedout the deed and initiated the incident.

5. The massacre need not be covered up, if the stateauthorities had not planned the attack and been involved.The junta could have allowed for an independent inquiryor international investigation into the massacre. Further,had the junta’s campaign merely been one of coercionand harassment, it could have taken actions against thosewho inflicted fatalities (on the NLD and its supporters)for breach of duty.

Indeed, the Commission has found that the above-mentioned

hypothesizes on the actions of the state authorities are contradictory to thefollowing evidence:

1. Systematic training was given prior to the massacre,specifically on how to attack.

2. Weapons, of whose size and length were potentially lethal,were prepared in advance and used in the attack.

3. The strategy and tactics of the attack, the time and killing

field were all carefully chosen. Radio communication setswere used. Excessive force was used, with the help of floodlights and headlights from vehicles to support theattack.

4. The attack was executed as if it was a battle, commandedby army officers as high-ranking as colonel, by other

junior officer ranking captains, as well as police chiefs.



5. There was the recruitment of around 5,000 hired thugsfrom Sagaing Division and their assembly and dispersalwas executed systematically, as if in a battle.

6. The regime was able to keep the plan for the attack hidden,prior to the attack. The evidence, including the dead bodiesof the victims, was destroyed after the crime wascommitted. Witnesses were intimidated, threatened or

jailed so that they would not speak out. These are allattempts by the state authorities to keep even a shred of evidence of the crime from being exposed to the public.

7. The regime came out with a readily prepared statementafter the attack, declaring the incident a scuffle betweenthe supporters of Aung San Suu Kyi and her opponents.Further, the regime explained away the deaths as theresults of a scuffle gone wrong.

Given these findings, the Commission therefore cannot accept, evenat this stage of a preliminary report upon the massacre, that the regimemerely intended to frighten the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi in order tocoerce them into ending their political activities. The Commission hascome to the conclusion that the Depayin Massacre was a premeditatedcrime, and that the regime actually intended to kill Aung San Suu Kyi andTin Oo.

Furthermore, the Commission has come to the conclusion that Aung SanSuu Kyi was the primary target of the attack. It has the following evidence:

1. Many of the youth who linked their hands in a chain andsurrounded Aung San Suu Kyi’s vehicle during the attack were beaten severely and fell onto the road. The attackerswere able to smash the rear windshield of the backseat,where she was sitting. Her car was only able to speed off from the first killing field because her driver took his owninitiative and broke through the line of attack.

2. Aung San Suu Kyi’s vehicle was able to escape the second

killing field because it was able to drive through thebarricades and two Dyna vehicles that tried to ram hercar head-on.

3. An army major was giving orders from the IrrigationCompound to stop and detain all vehicles that had beenable to break through the attack. The order was given tofire at vehicles if necessary. There are witnesses whoheard the orders, as well as gunshots, at the same time



as the vehicle carrying Aung San Suu Kyi drove throughthe barricades. Therefore, it can be assumed that shewas luckily able to escape amid gunfire.

This leads the Commission to examine the motives as to why theregime considered and executed a plan to eliminate Aung San Suu Kyi. Itseems plausible to the Commission that the regime came to the conclusionthat the situation was no longer viable, as she could no longer be controlled.She posed a great danger to its plans to hold onto to power, if she wasalive and continued her political activities.

The regime became overly anxious. The basis of that great anxietywas that the regime faced all kinds of problems in managing the country.It could not resolve the social and economic problems that the countryfaced. Daily hardships choked the people more and more each day.Furthermore, the regime has been unable to turn the economy around,despite the fact that it has received considerable assistance from neighboring

Thailand, India and China. Although the economy did not completelycollapsed after the failure of the banking system in 1992 due to large scalemoney laundering, the lack of prevalence of due process of law, itself aresult of the banking crisis, has forced many a foreign companies towithdraw from Burma. This contributed to a growing economic crisis.

Moreover, the ethnic problem loomed large on the horizon andpolitical settlement with ethnic groups was nowhere in sight, despite theregime’s claim that it had secured peace with various armed ethnic groups.There still remained a number of armed ethnic groups whom had yet toenter into a truce with the regime. The political activities of political forces,

activists and people working inside the country had gathered momentumover the preceding year. It is evident in that these groups have been ableto articulate their calls for political reforms. Through the efforts of variousexiled groups, the misrule of the Burmese regime had been increasinglyexposed to the international community. Pressure from foreign countries,such as the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, Canada,Japan, etc. had grown steadily.

All of these factors made it extremely difficult for the Burmeseregime in its quest for a way out. The Burmese generals became genuinely

worried about their continued hold on power. The majority of the problemsthey perceived were the result of the political deadlock between the juntaand Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. She had called for international sanctionsagainst the regime and had asked the UN and other international playersto rebuke the junta. From their point of view, she had to be gotten rid of.

To intensify the mounting concerns of the junta, Aung San SuuKyi’s trips across the nation were a phenomenal success. She garneredincreasing support as she traveled throughout Burma. Despite various

“The generalsbecameworriedabout theircontinuedhold on

power.”



attempts to contain the movement of and intimidate the public againstdemonstrating support for her, thousands of people turned up to welcomeher and hear her speak.

Among her trips, Aung San Suu Kyi’s campaign trail in Upper Burmawas the most successful. During this time, seas of people turned up,cheering and applauding for her while filling the streets. A clear messageof defiance was spreading throughout the entire country and it shook thefoundation of the regime’s rule. The tide was about to turn.

Under these circumstances, the regime resorted to using the tacticsit knows best. In other words, the regime decided to use state terrorism toeliminate Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD once and for all, and in doing soinstill greater fear in the people’s minds in the hope that they would becomeeven more passive. The regime believed that if it could create such enormousfear, it could continue to control the country’s national agenda.

Therefore, the Commission concludes that this was the key motiveas to why the Burmese junta committed the Depayin Massacre.

The Commission, at the same time, must admit that there are stillnumerous facts and information regarding the massacre that it has beenunable obtain. The Commission, for instance, still cannot establish whoexactly in the junta’s leadership directly ordered the massacre, how thestrategy to commit the crime was conceptualized and realized and how thedivision of labor was organized among various state organs in order tocommit the crime. Further, the Commission still cannot establish how andwhere exactly the dead bodies were destroyed and later vanished to.

It is, however, crystal clear that the Burmese regime is primarilyresponsible for the massacre, given the testimonies of eyewitnesses,evidence around the killing fields and other information. But for theCommission to be able to present its finding in a more convincing manner,it needs to be able to travel to the area where the massacre took place,speak to witnesses and victims, as well as to local and state authorities. Tomake the Commission’s work more meaningful, an independent internationalcommission needs to be formed. Only when such a commission takes thetime to carry out its task, without any hampering or harassment from

state authorities, will such findings be complete and can a formal conclusionbe drawn.

“Seas of people

turned upto see

Suu Kyi

speak.”



Endnotes

67 Information sent directly to the Commission from inside Burma.68 Ibid., NLD Statement No. 6 (5/03) and foreign radio broadcasts.69 Testimonies of Wunna Maung and Phoe Zaw and foreign radio interviews.70 SPDC press conference on 31 May and testimonies of eyewitnesses.71 Testimonies of Aung Aung and Naing Naing.72 Ibid.73 Testimonies of Nyunt Nyunt and Min Thein and foreign radio interviews.74 Tetimonies of Zaw Zaw Aung, Wunna Maung, Min Thein, Nyunt Nyunt and Khin Oo.75 Testimonies of Nyunt Nyunt and Min Thein.76 Testimonies of Nyunt Nyunt and foreign radio interviews.77 Testimonies of Wunn Maung, Nyunt Nyunt and Min Thein.78 Testimonies of Naing Naing, Aung Aung and Phoe Zaw.79 Testimony of Naing Naing.80 Testimonies of Maung Po Zaw and Ko Min Thein .81 Testimonies of Ko Naing Naing and Ko Aung Aung.82 Ibid. and foreign radio interviews.83 According to information sent to the Commission from inside Burma, one of the

officers in charge of the attackers was Shwebo Peace and Development CouncilChairman, Col. Than Han. The Commission has continued its investigation to verify thefacts it has so far gathered.

84 Testimonies of Naing Naing and Aung Aung.85 Testimony of Naing Naing.86 Ibid.87 An assistant to the truck driver.88 Known as ‘Chaw Swae’, all kinds of private and company vehicles are often enlisted or

commandeered for governmental duty, mostly in emergency and military matterswithout warning and without pay, regardless of time and place of the vehicle.

89 Kyaw Lwin’s interview with Burmese language foreign radio interviews.90 Testimonies of Naing Naing and Aung Aung.91 SPDC press conference at 4pm on 31 May and The New Light of Myanmar on 1 June.92

Kyaw Lwin’s interview with Burmese language foreign radiobroadcast.93 Testimonies of Naing Naing, Aung Aung, Phoe Zaw and Wunna Maung.94 Testimonies of Nyunt Nyunt and Min Thein.95 Testimonies of Min Thein and Zaw Zaw Aung’s interview with foreign radio stations.96 Zaw Zaw Aung’s interview with foreign radio stations.97 Testimonies of Naing Naing and Aung Aung and Zaw Zaw Aung’s interview.98 Testimonies of Naing Naing and Aung Aung.99 Testimony of Naing Naing.



Chapter (5)

Affidavits/Testimonies of theDepayin Massacre Witnesses

1. Khin Oo2. Wunna Maung3. Nyunt Nyunt4. Min Thein5. Phoe Zaw (a.k.a. Maung Zaw)6. Aung Aung (a.k.a. Aung San Win)7. Naing Naing (a.k.a. Thein Naing)8. Khin Aye Myint



Affidavit of Khin OoMember of the Mayangone Township

NLD Organizing Committee

Personal Data

Name: Khin OoGender: Male

Age: 37 yearsDate of Birth: 3 September 1966Father’s Name: U Hla HtunMother’s Name: Daw Khin Suu

ID Number: MYG 163 815Nationality: BurmanReligion: BuddhistEducation: 8th Standard

Address: No. 71, Thura Street, Ward 9, MayangoneTownship, Rangoon Division

Place of Birth: Letyetma Village, Myaing Township in Magwe Division



I, Khin Oo, hereby declare the following regarding the DepayinMassacre under oath.

1. My name is Khin Oo. I was born in Letyetma Village of Myaing Townshipin Magwe Division on 3 September 1966. My parents are U Hla Htun andDaw Khin Suu.

I was arrested on 18 March 1988, after participating in a demonstration infront of Section C of the Theingyi Market in Rangoon. As a result, I wasforced to serve three months in Insein Prison. I was released on 1 June1988.

I joined the NLD on the day of its establishment, on 27 September 1988.My NLD membership number is 2401247. I worked as treasurer in the

Youth Wing of the NLD. During the 1990 election, I took on other partyduties, such as participating in the Information and Security Committee of the Mayangon NLD election campaign.

2. Following the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest on 10 July1995, I was given the duty of In-Charge (3) of the party Youth WingWorking Group in my township NLD chapter. Under party instruction, Icarried out duties concerning the Youth Wing such as political campaigns,organizing, security, etc. On 9 September 1998, I was detained at LightInfantry Division 215 under the command of Division 11, based at YemonGarrison, as I had participated in activities for the formation of theCommittee Representing Peoples’ Parliament.

I was released again on 21 December 1998 and was promoted to the

position of Joint-Secretary for the Township NLD Organizing Committee. Icontinued in that position until 2002. Afterwards, I continued my work with the party as a member of the township Organizing Committee.

On 24 August 2000, I accompanied AungSan Suu Kyi, as part of her securityarrangement, during her trip to TwanteTownship in Rangoon Division in order toform a township Youth Wing WorkingGroup there. State authorities halted the

trip. Police Chief Aung Nwe and Deputy-Police Chief Myo Lwin detained all of us inthe rice paddy field near Kyansittha Ward,in Dala Township, until 1 September 2000.

At about 11:45 in the morning on that day,the authorities plunged us into water,handcuffed us and forcibly returned us to

Aung San Suu Kyi’s house on University Avenue. We were all put under house arrest. Aung San

NLD detained in rice field.



Suu Kyi was released from house arrest on 14 September 2000. Therestrictions placed upon us were also lifted.

3. On 21 September 2000, Aung San Suu Kyi planned to travel. I took security duty for Aung San Suu Kyi, as part of the party’s plans to traveland form the Youth Wing in Mandalay Division. I traveled with Ko AyeHtun, from the NLD Central Youth Supporting Group, in a vehicle (license7A/5661) on 19 September 2000. At about midnight that night, both of us were detained at the Htauk Kyant Checkpoint, outside of Rangoon.

We were temporarily detained at the Central Military IntelligenceHeadquarters, located at Yekyi Ai. We were freed when the NLD CentralExecutive Committee members were freed. I then continued the duties of the party. Following the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest on6 May 2002, I carried out my security duty for Aung San Suu Kyi asfollows:

1. Thamanya trip 14-15 June 20022. Trips to Madalay and Magwe Divisions 20-29 June 20023. Mon State trip 20-23 July 20024. Western Pegu (Bago) Region trip 13-17 July 20025. Shan State trip 13-27 Nov. 20026. Arakan State and Irrawaddy Division trips 16-24 Dec. 20027. Chin State trip 3-13 April 20038. Donation trip to Pegu

(Panditayama Monastic School) 18 Jan. 20039. Trips to Kachin State, Sagaing

and Mandalay Divisions 6-30 May 2003

Furthermore, I continued to carry out my security duties, such as providingsecurity for Aung San Suu Kyi’s residence and during her outings inRangoon.

4. We left Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s residence at about five in the morning,on 6 May 2003, in order to begin our Kachin State trip. In the front seat of

Aung San Suu Kyi’s vehicle sat Ko Myo Nyunt (driver) and Tun Zaw Zaw.In the back seat sat Aung San Suu Kyi. I sat at the back of the car with MinLwin, Moe Zaw, Than Tun, Myo Nyunt, Thet Tun and Toe Lwin. We arrived

in Mandalay at about midnight on that same day.

Accompanying Tin Oo in a Townace car sat Aung Soe (the driver fromMandalay), and Thein Soe and Myint Kyaw, members of the NLD InformationDepartment of the Central Youth Working Group.

In a Dyna car driven by Sein Win, a member of the Pegu Division’s InntakawTownship Organizing Committee, sat Hla Min, Tun Myint, Aung Htoo andKyaw Zin Win.



5. The NLD were harassed throughout their Kachin State trip. The followingis my testimony:

At about 9:00 pm on 10 May 2003, we arrived at Intaw in Sagaing Division. At the entrance to Intaw, USDA members numbering between 70-100and led by Monywa District Secretary for the USDA, Htay Aung, shoutedslogans against the NLD. Beside them was a pile of homemade weapons,such as sharpened wooden sticks, batons and stones. A member of theNLD Information Department videotaped and photographed what we sawat the demonstration, as part of the record.

We left Intaw for Katha on 11 May 2003. At a location about two milesfrom Katha, we saw Htay Aung and his USDA protesters, along with thosewho were hired to join in the protest. As in Intaw, we observed weaponssuch as wooden sticks and stones piled up beside the demonstrators.There were about 500 protesters.

We also witnessed the Monywa District USDA Secretary, Htay Aung,disrespect Colonel Myint Naing, who is the Chairman of the District Peaceand Development Council, and that he ignored the colonel’s orders. Thecolonel told Htay Aung, “Htay Aung! Do what you have to do, but let Daw

Aung San Suu Kyi who is a visitor continue on her journey.” We witnessedthe colonel apologizing to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi himself. I myself heardHtay Aung exchanging words with the colonel. He told the colonel, “We’llleave only when they (NLD entourage) go first.”

In Katha, we met with township NLD members and officials. When we left,at about 8:00 pm, we saw Htay Aung and his people waiting for us in

front of the Katha High School. There was a bonfire in the school compoundand we saw approximately 1,000 people insidethe school. As our convoy passed the school,we heard USDA members shout, “We have won! We have won! ” All of us in the convoywitnessed the USDA proclamations. Again, theUSDA members were armed with thehomemade weapons that we had seen in theprevious demonstrations. They were shoutingthe victory proclamation while raising their

weapons in the air with every chant.

On 13 May, we were greeted with a silentprotest at Namasit Village, near PhakantTownship. USDA members held small placardsthat read, “Oppose all axe handles (meaning traitors)who are cynics and rely on foreign stooges.”

Eye witness

Khin Oo seen at left

of photo taken

on 25 May.



We continued our journey to Myitkyina Township at about six in the morningon 16 May. At about 8:00 am, we saw a protest by USDA membersnumbering around 300 near the Nangwae Bridge. They wore headbandsand held up placards saying, “Oppose axe handles who rely on foreigners,those who disturb the tranquility of our State ” and “Oppose and destroy those who steal our race and religion.” The protesters blocked the road.Not very far from where the protest was taking place was the presence of riot police, complete with shields and batons.

We arrived at Thonemine Village, near Bamaw Township, on 20 May 2003.It was about 3:00 am. There were some 300 USDA members waiting forus. They had homemade weapons in their hands. They were in vehiclesand on motorbikes that had no license plates. The USDA protesters eventried to snatch the video camera that Tun Zaw Zaw was carrying.

6. We had no weapons in our convoy. We only had a 16-gallon gasolinecan with us, so that we would have no problems when traveling long

distances. It was so heavy that none of us on security detail could lift it.So, we improvised a loop on a one-inch wooden stick to lift the gasolinecan. All of us in the security unit knew about the stick.

During our trips to Kachin State, Mandalay andSagaing Divisions, we experienced attacks similarto the Depayin Massacre. At Kyi Tauk Pauk andNweyon Villages in Singu Township, MandalayDivision, we were violently harassed by the USDAand state authorities. That night between 8:30and 9:00, seven vehicles (3 Dyna trucks and 4

Hilux pickup trucks) harassed our entourage, andin particular squeezed the car carrying Aung SanSuu Kyi and myself from both sides of the road.The occupants of the USDA vehicles alsopretended that they were about to attack us withtheir homemade weapons, in order to frightenus. As we entered Singu Town, the USDA fired a

slingshot into our convoy. As a result, a pellet hit a Youth Wing memberfrom Mandalay and injured him. Tin Oo, therefore, reported the case tothe Singu Police Station.

7. On 29 May 2003, we began our Monywa trip. We arrived in SagaingCity at about 10:30 am. We saw approximately 150 USDA members, ledby Htay Aung, protesting near the entrance of the Sagaing Bridge. Theyheld up signs and shouted slogans. We did not respond to theirdemonstration. At that time, I was in the back seat of Aung San Suu Kyi’scar. We arrived in Myinmu Township at about 12:30 in the afternoon.Tin Htut Oo, who is the NLD elected representative from Lewe Constituency-1 and in-charge of reorganizing the party Youth Wing for the Upper Burma

Protesters on

25 May near NLD

convoy. Eye witness

Khin Oo at left

of photo.



chapter, led the youth organizing activities. Tayza Naing acted as master of ceremonies at that function. During the ceremony, we saw five vehiclesleave the Myinmu Township NLD office. We saw members of the police,reserve fire brigade, Pyithu Swan-ar Shin100 and local Peace andDevelopment Council. I observed a banner that said, “Pyithu Swan-ar Shin ” in green writing upon a white piece of cloth.

When we left Myinmu Township, we noticed those same vehicles followingus. We arrived at Yeposar Village at about three in the afternoon. At

Yeposar, we saw vehicles belonging to theauthorities partially hidden behind tropicalbushes and margosa (neem) trees on thesides of the road. They were riot policevehicles, military vehicles, and vehiclesbelonging to the military police and trafficpolice. We saw USDA demonstrators onboth sides of the highway. The USDA had

used buses that normally plied betweenthe cities of Monywa and Mandalay, knownas ‘Monywa-Man’ and ‘Chindwin-Thar,’ totransport the protesters. We countedroughly 30 vehicles at the protest site.

There were about 500 USDA members andothers at that location. Stones and batons were piled up near the protesters,as if they were going to start a fight. The person who was supervising theprotesters closely was none other than Htay Aung, who had harassed usearlier all throughout our Kachin State trip. When we encountered the

protesters and vehicles belonging to state officials, Ko Thein Soe, who wasin-charge of the News and Information Unit, took photographs, while TunZaw Zaw videotaped and Ko Myint Kyaw took audio recordings of thescene of the protest.

As we passed Yeposar, there were three NLD vehicles in front of us, includingthe one carrying NLD Vice-Chairperson Tin Oo. (When I look back), fromthe way the protest at that village had been arranged and the presence of a number of state authorities, I could say that had we arrived in Yeposar atnight, the authorities would have staged an attack, just as they later did at

Depayin. I think the would-be attackers were deterred by the presence of a huge crowd near Yeposar Village, who were there to welcome us. Besides,it was broad daylight when we arrived in Yeposar. (I think) all of thisdeprived the attackers of an opportunity to attack us here.

We left Chaungoo and arrived in Monywa at about 9:30 pm. At the ceremonyto re-hoist the NLD sign at the township party office, NLD Chairman TinOo recited the sutra called ‘Victory’ and Aung San Suu Kyi spoke to the

Authorities’ car

partially

hidden in bushes

& stones piled up

at side of road.



crowd. We then continued with the meeting, in order to form a township Youth Wing, until two in the morning on 30 May.

8. At 10:00 am on 30 May, we went to pay respect to the abbot of ZawtikaMonastery. Aung San Suu Kyi spoke to the public briefly and bid themfarewell. We then left for Budalin Township. We witnessed cars andmotorbikes from Monywa accompanying us to Budalin. We arrived in Budalinat about noon. We put the NLD sign back up and met with township NLDofficials. We gave greetings to the local people and took a short rest. Weleft Butalin for Sai Pyin Gyi Village at about three in the afternoon. Wearrived at Sai Pyin Gyi around 5:00 pm. At Sai Pyin Gyi, we went to seethe family of Win Myint Aung, who is being held under detention. Tin Ooand Aung San Suu Kyi gave encouragement to his family. Afterwards,

Aung San Suu Kyi spoke to the local people. We continued to Depayinfrom Sai Pyin Gyi at about 7:00 pm that evening.

9. We arrived at the village of Kyi at about 7:30pm. We began to see

people who were out to welcome Aung San Suu Kyi. She accepted flowersand garlands from the well-wishers. We continued on our journey slowly.We noticed two monks with red armbands on their right arms in thecrowd. They followed us. Then the monk who was fatter than the otherblocked the road and told the driver, “You are ignoring us even though weare asking you to stop!” The monk asked Aung San Suu Kyi to give a brief speech to the people. Tun Zaw Zaw apologized and replied that the NLDcould not comply with the request because we still had a long way to go.Then Aung San Suu Kyi said, “U Zin (the Reverend Monk), please assemblethe people, and I will give a greeting for about 10 minutes.” Just then ayouth security detail from Mandalay arrived and informed us that the

USDA members who were right behind us had begun to attack the villagers.We went to inform Aung San Suu Kyi of this. At the same time, Tun ZawZaw said to the two monks, “We are being attacked. Can you please stopthe attackers?” The monks disappeared immediately. We did not see themagain, while we were under attack.

10. After the villagers were beaten severely, we witnessed the attackersbegin to charge the NLD vehicles from Mandalay and Monywa. I observedthe mayhem clearly, as the USDA cars’ headlights were shown directly oncarnage. There were so many attackers that I could not say exactly how

many of them were involved in the attack. First they threw stones to ourvehicles, after which they charged us with batons, hard bamboo sticks,bamboo sticks with hard joints, wooden sticks and sharpened bamboopoles. Some NLD members were able to get out of their vehicles andescape. Those who could not escape were violently attacked. The lastvehicles were attacked first without warning. That’s why the number of fatalities in those vehicles was far higher than in others. I saw before myvery eyes women being beaten. Those who were severely and savagelybeaten were from the Mandalay NLD Youth Wing, as well as others who

“USDA

membersbehind usbegan toattack the

vil lagers.”



were part of the security detail and were student members of the MonywaNLD. The attackers screamed, “You who want to be the wife of a Kala! ” The attackers used abusive language as they charged forward. When theattackers started to surge forward to attack Aung San Suu Kyi’s car, it wasnot possible for any of the vehicles behind to overtake her car. They weresandwiched and trapped between the attackers. Therefore, the people inthose vehicles sustained a lot of injuries and incurred the most deaths.

11. Tin Oo, whose car was in front of Aung San Suu Kyi’s vehicle, got outfrom his car and came to ask her to leave the carnage. Previously, whenspeaking to Aung San Suu Kyi, Tin Oo used the honorific title, “Daw AungSan Suu Kyi.” But this time, Tin Oo pleaded with her to leave saying, “Mydaughter! The situation does not seem very good. Please leave.” He spoketo her with such kindness, I can still hear his words in my ears to this day.

Aung San Suu Kyi replied, “Baba! The villagers, public and our NLD membersare being beaten, I cannot possibly leave.” When he could no longer plead

with her, Tin Oo returned to his car.

12. No sooner had Tin Oo left, when our car (carrying Aung San Suu Kyi)was attacked from the rear. Our security team members – Moe Thaw, MinLwin, Than Tun, Toe Lwin, Myo Nyunt, Thet Tun and myself – blockedand surrounded the each side of the front seat. I positioned myself near the engine, towards her rightand in front of her. The attackersbegan to attack the left flank of our vehicle. They first beat the

youth security memberssurrounding the vehicle whostood on the left side. I saw thewindshield to Aung San Suu Kyi’sleft smashed. I also saw Aung SanSuu Kyi sustain an injury on herleft arm. I could see it clearlybecause the light in the front seatwas switched on. At the sametime, the attackers began to

charge Kyaw Soe Lin, who was ourdriver. I was on the right side of the car and the closest to Kyaw Soe Lin.Blood spurt out from his right arm. When an attacker hit me, I tried toblock the blow with my left hand. The stick hit my watch on my left handand it was smashed. Just then, Kyaw Soe Lin shouted, “Aunty (Aung SanSuu Kyi) is hit! Aunty is hit!” The broken windshield had hit Aung San SuuKyi’s left shoulder and she was wounded. Thiha, from the Mandalay NLD

Youth Wing, was struck on the head and as a result blood gushed forthfrom it. Toe Lwin and Moe Thaw from Rangoon, who were both part of

NLD YouthWing members

surrounded

Suu Kyi’s car

before the attack.



the security team, were beaten on their backs and heads. Than Tunsustained a serious wound. This was because when the attackers attackedthe back seat of the car, they used pointed bamboo sticks. Than Tun waswith us all throughout the trips and had never left the car. This was becausehis duty was to watch over all of our belongings in the car. I also sawblood running down the face of Toe Lwin, as he had been severely beatenon the head.

To tell you the honest truth, I became terrified as the violent attack progressed. If Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of Burma’s architect of theindependence struggle and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, was beingbeaten like this, I knew the attackers would not spare someone like me – anonentity. They would beat me to death. So I moved away from Aung SanSuu Kyi’s vehicle and shouted, “Aunty! Run! Drive the car out of here! KoKyaw Soe Lin! Drive away! Get out of here!” I shouted the warning at thetop of my lungs.

The rest of the youth security members shouted along with me to get thecar out of the carnage. A little while later, Kyaw Soe Lin drove the car outof the mayhem. He did not do it because Aung San San Suu Kyi hadordered him to. If someone asked me why Aung San Suu Kyi was able toescape from the violent attack at Depayin, I would have to answer that itwas Kyaw Soe Lin who saved her life.

When Aung San Suu Kyi’s vehicle broke through the attackers and spedoff, I jumped into the Hilux truck in front of us, which was driven by Ko KoLay from the Mandalay NLD. His car was able to break through the attackers.But before long, a group of motorbikes, which had escaped before us,

came charging back towards us. They shouted, “The attackers have blocked the road! They are beating us! They are killing us! Don’t go any further! ” Ko Ko Lay stopped the truck right at that spot. If I continued to runforward, I would be beaten to death and if I ran back, I was sure to bebeaten to death. Therefore, I ran into the rice paddy fields on my right.

13. The Depayin Massacre on 30 May was extremely terrifying andfrightening. I saw before my very eyes people lying in pools of blood.Whenever they tried to get up, they were beaten back down onto the road.It was shocking, horrifying and traumatic beyond belief. Some of the NLD

women were stripped of their clothes. The attackers called people namesand used abusive languages. They shouted, “Those of you who want to make a Kala your husbands! It’s good that you are dead! ” I am notexaggerating. I am recounting what I saw with my own eyes. The attack was so violent that there were numerous deaths. I believe there wereabout one hundred - who were dead, injured, unconscious and lying onthe road. No less than 100 victims. After I ran off from the Hilux truck andinto the rice paddy field, I saw seven NLD Youth members from Monywa,including Ko Ko Lwin, who is No. 2 in the township NLD Youth Wing. I

“They arekil l ing us!Don’t goany

further!”



also came across a Youth Wing member from the Mandalay NLD SouthwestTownship chapter. All nine of us ran across the rice paddy fields for aboutan hour. We witnessed floodlights from the direction of Depayin while wewere resting from our escape. Then we saw military vehicles driving awayfrom what we believed to be the ambush spot. We also heard anannouncement over loudspeakers that Article 144 (dusk to dawn curfew)had been imposed in the area. At the same time, we heard about 8 to 10gunshots fired.

14. We hid ourselves in the rice paddy fields near Budalin during the nightof the attack. At about four in the morning on 31 May, we asked for helpfrom some people living in a small hut. One of them accompanied us toNabae Hla Village. From Nabae Hla we continued on to Pyankya Village.We then arrived at the village monastery. About twelve people who werewounded in the attack were already there. Only four of them were able tospeak, and the condition of the rest did not look good. Two people fromMyaing Township, Sagaing Division had sustained serious injuries. They

were in very bad shape. They could no longer speak. They were vomitingand had many wounds on their heads, as well as on their backs.

We heard that the authorities would come and check for the woundedthere. So we left Pyankya for Sai Pyin Gyi, after resting at the monasteryfor a short while. At about noon, we (Ko Ko Lwin and myself) arrived atthe place where Aung San Suu Kyi had last stopped the night before.

The son of Win Myint Aung (who is in prison) told us that he had beendetained along with his motorbike on the morning of 30 May at the DepayinPolice Station, while he was on his way to check the security conditions of

the road before Aung San Suu Kyi and her entourage traveled. He thentook me to Butalin. Ko Ko Lwin got off earlier at Saipyin Gyi, stating thathe would go and check for wounded at the monastery in Pyankya. I sleptin the rice paddy field near Budalin. From 1-4 June, I stayed at a monasterynear Budalin, as I was forced to continue hiding. The roads were closedup until 4 June, so I could not travel. When the roads were re-opened on4 June, I went to Mandalay. I hid myself the whole time, without returningto my home. I left for the Thai-Burma border on 28 October 2003.

I certify that in giving all of my testimony from No 1 to 14, I was not

unjustly influenced, threatened or misled by anyone. Nor have I lied aboutthe Depayin Massacre. The testimony is of my own free will. I certify thatthe testimony recounts the true events that I saw, experienced and knewof during the ambush on 30 May near the village of Kyi in Depayin Town-ship.

-Khin Oo 24 November 2003Bangkok, Thailand

“ It’s goodthat you

are

dead!”



Affidavit of Wunna Maung

Personal Data

Name: Wunna MaungGender: Male

Age: 26 yearsDate of Birth: 16 March 1977Father’s Name: U Kyaw MaungMother’s Name: Daw Tin Win

ID Number: No-9/MCS- (N) 003840Nationality: BurmanReligion: BuddhistEducation: Middle school

Address: Htundone Myo Thit, Chan Mya Thar Zi Township,Mandalay Division

Place of Birth: Mandalay



I, Wunna M aung, hearby swear under oath that:

1. I am a citizen of Burma, holding national identification card no-9/ MCS-(N) 003840. I was born on 16 March 1977. My parents are U Kyaw Maungand Daw Tin Win. I live in Htundone Myo Thit, Chan Mya Thar Zi Township,Mandalay Division. I make this affidavit in support of my statement on theDepayin Massacre in Burma, which took place on 30 May 2003.

2. I had applied for membership to the Mandalay National League forDemocracy (NLD) Youth Wing. The NLD Vice-Chairman, Tin Oo himself,said that we had been accepted as members. He continued to say thatmembership cards had not yet been issued to anyone due to the prevailingsituation and told us to continue to implement the party’s programs anyway.

As I had been elected by youth from the Htundone Ward, I served as theHtundone Township youth organizer.

3. For the organizing trip by Aung San Suu Kyi to Upper Burma, I had to

serve as a youth security officer, according to the duty entrusted to me bythe Mandalay Division NLD. By security duty, it is meant that those holdingthat duty had to take responsibility for keeping a close watch on the travelingparty during the entire journey, in order to guard against any danger thatmight befall us. Daw Suu101 entrusted security duty for the organizing tripswithin Mandalay Division to Dr. Hla Soe Nyunt, an elected MP from SagaingTownship Constituency No. 2 in Mandalay Division.

Accordingly, Dr. Hla Soe Nyunt, in turn, entrusted to the youth fromMandalay Northeast, Northwest, Southeast and Southwest Townships, theduty to serve as reserve security units. Providing security for Daw Suu

were 17 members from the Central Headquarters Youth Wing, who hadaccompanied Daw Suu from Rangoon. Whenever there was a break in the

journey for rest, the Central Youth members took up position in the innertier of security, while Mandalay Township Youth members took up positionin the outer tier.

4. Even before we started on the journey, we had learned that bambooclub wielding troop units had been formed at township USDA offices andtraining was being given, with Ya-Ya-Ka102 chairmen serving as battalioncommanders. We also learned that villagers were ordered, under a different

pretext, to furnish meal packets for these trainees. For that reason, beforedeparting on our journey, Daw Suu advised us to absolutely avoid anywords or behavior that might lead to confrontation with the authorities.

5. On 29 May, at about 9:00 am, the long line of cars and motorcyclesstarted out in a convoy from the back of 38th Street and drove along to84th Street. In the car I was riding in, were Dr. Hla Soe Nyunt, Aye Win,Wunna, Mandalay Northwest Township Secretary Hla Than, Aung Ko, Khin

Aye Myint, Nyunt Nyunt, and Thein Zaw. In order to serve as a scout, a car



drove at a distance ahead of the main party. The party arrived in SagaingCity at about 10:30 am.

6. At a bend in the road, before entering Sagaing City and after passingover Sagaing Bridge, we saw on both sides of the road a group of about600 people holding placards with slogans saying, “We don’t want people who don’t support the USDA ”. They were also chanting this slogan. At amoderate distance behind the group was a large crowd of people whowere welcoming Daw Suu. When we saw people en masse welcoming andsupporting us enthusiastically, we also joyously responded to their greetings.To the shouts of, “Long live Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and Ba Ba U Tin Oo ,” we shouted in return, “Long live the people ,” and so on. The party did nottake the time to enter Sagaing and went straight on to Myinmu Town. Theparty reached Myinmu at about noon and Daw Suu presided over theceremony for installing the signboard and the opening of the MyinmuTownship NLD office. After that, the Upper Burma youth organizer, TinHtut Oo, presided over the formation of the Myinmu Township NLD Youth

Wing.

7. At about 3:00 pm, the party started to leave for Monywa City. On theway we encountered more and more people in cars and on motorcyclescoming to meet us. The party drove on in an orderly fashion and began toreach the entrance to Monywa at about 6:00 pm. As the crowd of peoplecoming to meet Daw Suu in the town was so big, we were unable to reachthe clock tower in the center of town until 9:30 pm. In Monywa, Daw Suuaddressed the town elders and public for about 45 minutes, and then theparty retired for the night in Monywa Town. Daw Suu slept in the house of one of the MP elects and the rest of the party found other places to retire.

8. On 30 May, the party began to leave Monywa for Budalin Township at10:30 am. At the exit of Monywa, our group, including vice Chairman TinOo and Daw Suu, went into the Zawti-ka Monastery of Monywa in order topay respect to the abbot. However, the abbot was away and we continuedour journey on to Budalin. At the beginning of the journey, 10 +cars andabout 150 motorcycles from Monywa escorted the party. Upon reachingBudalin, the ceremony for installing the signboard and the opening of theBudalin NLD Township office was held and the Budalin NLD Youth Wingwas formed. At about 4:30 pm, the party started to leave Butalin for

Depayin Township. On the way, at Saing-pyin Village, Daw Suu stopped tomeet with local NLD members and the family members of U Win Myint Aung, an MP-elect who is being held in prison, to give words of encouragement and comfort. Before reaching Depayin, as the scout cargoing ahead of the party had failed to return, motorcycle riders were sentto find out about the situation. However, the motorcycle riders also failedto return.

“The scout

car failed

to return.”



9. As we were continuing our journey, it was about 8:00 pm when wereached the place near Kyi Village between Saingpyin and Depayin, wherethe incident took place.

At that time, there were only two cars between the car we were in andDaw Suu’s car. The car of NLD Vice Chairman Tin Oo was at the head of the convoy. Daw Suu’s car was at the forefront and in the middle was thecar in which Tun Win (from Zaygyo) and Khin Maung Thaung were riding.Our car was fourth-in-line (Hilux model, green in color). Behind our carwas that carrying MP-elect Dr. Hla Soe Nyunt (Sunny model, white incolor). Behind that was the car carrying the Central Youth (Hilux model,white color), and then the cars of NLD members, all in a line. After passingKyi Village by about 100 feet, two Buddhist monks blocked the way andstopped the vehicle in which Daw Suu was riding.

At that moment, Tun Zaw Zaw got out of the car, and when he inquiredabout the reason for the blockade the two monks replied, “We have been

waiting for a long time. Ask Daw Suu to give us a speech.” In response,Tun Zaw Zaw explained that the request could not be complied with, asthere was no time. While he was still explaining, two Dyna and two Torlagi(tractor with a trailer) trucks, making altogether four trucks full of people,came towards us from the Monywa side. The people in the trucks, shoutingover and over again the slogan, “Oppose those relying on external forces,act as stooges, holders of negative views,” alighted from their vehicles. Atthat moment, villagers from Kyi shouted, “We, the people, in return don’t want you! ” To that, the USDA members and their cohorts from the trucksshouted, “What are you saying? ” And with that, they started to attack thevillagers with irons spikes, iron bars, bamboo clubs and wooden clubs,

which they had brought with them. We were forced to witness the incidenthelplessly, with pain in our hearts. At that time, a Dyna truck was alsotrying to run over anyone in sight, and the Kyi villagers who had come toreceive us were forced to run away in disorder. When the two monks whohad blocked Daw Suu’s car demanding a speech were asked to halt whatwas happening, they said, “We won’t be able to do anything,” and “Youmay also drive on.” Just at that moment, our cars started to come underattack.

10. I took responsibility for security on the right side of Daw Suu’s car. The

position of security was such that I was close to the right side of the bodyof Daw Suu’s car. There was no one behind me. We were standing in aline, side by side. As the cars were parked close to the right side of theroad, there were only one or two of us on that side. Two monks, with redcloth wrapped around their arms down to the elbow, were standing closeto us. They were not the initial two monks who had blocked the way. Atthat moment, we saw that all of the cars behind us were being battered bypacks of attackers. The members of the security unit were standing in twoto three tiers on the left side to protect Daw Suu’s car. All of the USDA

“Theyattacked

the villagersw ith iron

bars,bamboo

andwooden

clubs.”



members and their hired hands attacking our cars were drunk. We learnedlater that from the time of departure from Monywa, a half-drum full of liquor was put in their car and anyone in that car was allowed to drink asmuch liquor as he wished. For that reason, when they attacked our carsthey did it inhumanly and they also shouted, “ Are you the death-defying force for Kalama? 103 If that is so, die! ” Shouting in this manner, they brutallystruck down the youth. As there were few people on the right side of thecar, the attackers concentrated their attack on the left side, and thus Iescaped from being beating. When people on the other side of Daw Suu’scar fell, the attackers smashed the glass windows of her car. When thewindows were broken, they jabbed into the car with the rods they werecarrying. At that time those of us who remained shouted, “Daw Suu, do run, run! ” Inside the car were the driver, Kyaw Soe Lin, Tun Zaw Zaw andDaw Suu, only three. At the rear, also in a pack, they attacked Tin Oo’s carand I saw them seizing and taking away Tin Oo. At that time, Tin Oo waswounded on the head. Daw Suu narrowly escaped from being beatenbecause she did not get out of the car. If she had, the attackers would have

beaten her to death because the attackers were completely drunk. Theydid not look like they were drunk on liquor, but they looked as if they werehigh on drugs. While the situation was in mass confusion, the attackersarrived near our car and in a pack they rushed to attack Daw Suu’s car.They knew that we would not resist and I think, for that reason, they beatwith greater force and killed extensively.

They also beat up women riding in the third car (Hilux, green in color),after pulling off their blouses and sarongs. When the victims covered inblood fell to the ground, I saw the attackers jump on them, grab thewomen’s hair in their hands and pound their heads against the stone

surface of the road, all with immense force. I saw them behaving mostinhumanly. I saw with my own eyes, earrings being forcibly taken from awoman who had fallen to the ground (Thanda Soe, second year student).

The attackers uttered such base and sordid words like, “You woman, wanting to be Kalas’ wives, go ahead die! Before a Kala, we will make you our wives. We have to build roads, repair roads, repair bridges and you want to be wives of a Kala - die, die! ” They went on brutally beating and attackinguntil the victims were dead. As the cars in the back kept their full headlightson, we witnessed all that happened. I still cannot get out of my mind the

sight of people, covered in blood, being beaten mercilessly and inhumanly.

11. After Daw Suu’s car left, we also ran away. There were people fleeingon motorcycles. The three of us, including a young monk, were on foot.

After running for a considerable distance, we could no longer continue torun. At that time, we saw a car coming up from behind and flagged itdown. It happened to be a car from our group. All three of us climbedonto the bonnet of the car. Before we drove for long, we encountered agroup of USDA members and their henchmen waiting for us on the way.

“Theattackerslooked likethey werehigh ondrugs.”



We also saw about 40-50 motorcycle drivers being beaten. Hence, wewere forced to turn around and run back. It was only about a 10-minutedrive from the place we were first beaten to the place where they werelying in wait. We also saw traffic policemen from a distance. As there wasno escape for us going either forward or backward, we wheeled down tothe side of the road at a place that seemed to be a fork in the road.However, it turned out to be a ditch. The car then got stuck in the mud.

All the people got out and pushed. At first, the car moved slightly. Aftermoving forward for a while, the car got entirely stuck in the ditch. Noamount of pushing moved the car. As we had not had our meal and wepreviously had to run from the killing, we became completely exhaustedand could no longer push the car. There were about 18 of us, who had allbeen in our car. We were members of the Youth Wing from Mandalay whohad taken responsibility for security, including Tin Htut Oo, in-charge of reorganizing the party Youth Wing for the Upper Burma chapter, DeputyIn-charge Myo Naing, Joint In-charge Hla Oo, Central Youth Wing member

Thein Soe and Youth Wing members from Mandalay. We could no longerworry about the car and all of us tried to flee, away from the danger.Fortunately, the place we came to turned out to be a big bush. In ourflight, Tin Htut Oo and Myo Naing had failed to come with us. We met atthat place the people who had fled before us. We counted ourselves to bea total of 97 persons and 49 motorcycles. The people we met were femaleand male students from Monywa and Sagaing, who had accompanied ourconvoy. The counting was conducted, of course, only the next morning.

Two among the group turned out to be members of the gang that hadattacked us, supposedly on the bidding of the USDA. They told us about

themselves freely, not because we had asked them to. They revealed theiridentities of their own volition. They explained, “We have never beforedone such a thing in our lives and since we could not bear to do such athing, we fled with you.”

12. After counting all of the people and motorcycles, on the morning of 31 May, we all ventured towards the main road at 5:00 am. At first, themotorcycles were forbidden from getting onto the main road, butunsuccessfully. They stubbornly went onto the main road anyway. Chit

Yin and I remained behind. Among those who went onto the road was Hla

Oo. His head was fractured and his hand was broken. From their car, thepolice fired guns to stop the motorcycles that had made it onto the road.We could see from a distance the motorcycles that were on the road. Atthat time, we heard 7 gunshots. The person who saw everything wasThanda Soe, as she had been in a tree near the road since the previousnight, in flight from the danger. From her place in the tree, she was able tosee all that happened that morning.



Three novice monks and Thanda Soe were about to get onto the road, butas I called out to them, they turned around and returned to us. ThandaSoe was from Mandalay and we had been riding in the same car. She wasa second-year student from Mandalay University. There were about 20women who came all the way from Mandalay. At the time of reassembly,we found that the car in which Poant Poant and Khin Ma Ma Tun wereriding, was missing. We did not know the whereabouts of the rest of thewomen.

13. As we did not get on the road and instead walked across the ricepaddy fields, we reached a village called Yin-Dwai. The villagers fed usthere, so we ate and took rest for a while. Then, a child who had returnedfrom outside told us that the village headman was asking about us, so westarted to leave the village. After leaving the village and walking in thefields for about 30 minutes, we met six other villagers. Those people took us to their field huts and looked after us for the night.

14. On 1 June, at 5:00 am, we started out from the villagers’ field. I puton the clothes of farmers I had met along the way, with whom I exchangedmy Kachin sarong and white shirt. A villager showed us the way until wereached Hsin Inn Village in Shwebo Township.

That villager had guided us for about 15 miles, and until we got to HsinInn, we had to walk through other villages. We rode in a car from Hsin Innto Shwebo. At Shwebo, I was temporarily put up at a friend’s house. Whilein Shwebo, I met eight other people who had come back from the Depayinattack. They said, “While we were looking for jobs, a person took us to theUSDA office. We were told that we would get 800 kyat as daily wages,

meals and liquor, and the job was to gang up on and beat up a group of people.” “As we were afraid of the officers in that office, we said ‘Yes,’ andgave our promise,” explained the participants in the attack. With regardsto the furnishing of liquor, we looked into it at the time we got to Saingpyin.I left Shwebo at about 1:00 pm by bus to Mandalay, and reached Mandalayat about 3:30 pm.

I certify that in giving all of my testimony from No 1 to 14, I was notunjustly influenced, threatened or misled by anyone. Nor have I lied aboutthe Depayin Massacre. The testimony is of my own free will. I certify that

the testimony recounts the true events that I saw, experienced and knewof during the ambush on 30 May near the village of Kyi in Depayin Township.

-Wunna Maung 4 July 2003

Bangkok, Thailand

“ We weretold we’dget 800 kyatto beat up agroup of

peple.”



Affidavit of Nyunt Nyunt

Personal Data

Name: Nyunt NyuntGender: Female

Age: 51 yearsDate of Birth: 19 September 1951Father’s Name: U WinMother’s Name: Daw Seinn Shwe

ID Number: Ma-Na-Ma (Naing) 077 051Nationality: BurmeseReligion: BuddhistEducation: 8th standard

Address: 75/1, Ah Nate Taw ward, Sa Kyin Wa, Mandalay CityPlace of Birth: Maymyo, Mandalay DivisionSpouse: U Aung Naing Oo



I, Nyunt Nyunt, hereby swear under oath that:

1. I joined the National League for Democracy (NLD) in 1989 and workedas an organizer in North East Township, Mandalay Division. I was in thegroup that went to Mogok Township to welcome Aung San Suu Kyi afterher Upper Burma trip. I was not on duty at the time. During the 1990election campaign I walked 180 miles for 50 days to Ya Mae Thin and Pya

Si. This was the reason why I was allowed toaccompany the North East Township group onthis trip.

2. On the journey to Mogok, there were AungThu, Chit Tin, Htay, Mar Mar Cho and somenew youth members in our car. Near Kyi Tauk Pauk Village the demonstrations against Aung

San Suu Kyi were worse than before. There weredemonstrators in 13 or 14 Dyna trucks. Theywere holding bamboo rods. They beat us andcried out, “We don’t want a Kalar’s (an Indianor foreigner’s) wife! We don’t want those relying on external forces, axe handles and those with

negative views! ” With the help of police and traffic police, their cars rushedinto the crowd and our motorcade. When they were next to our car, theytried to beat us and intimidate us by using rude words. Concerning AungSan Suu Kyi, they said, “Do you want to rely on a Kalar’s wife? ” Weexperienced this for three hours. The local people also approached Aung

San Suu Kyi’s car. The demonstrators forcibly stayed between Aung SanSuu Kyi and the crowd. Two youth members were attacked and wounded,

I don’t know why. According to myknowledge, Aung San Suu Kyi reported thiscase to the police station.

“Remove yourselves from the road, cars are coming. Otherwise, you all will die! ” said thedemonstrators. Our Youth Wing members inuniform tried to control the crowd by holding

hands in order to form a barrier, so that thecrowd couldn’t approach the cars that werewelcoming us peacefully.

At that time, using a loudspeaker, they (thedemonstrators) cried loudly to respect the

traffic rules and to move back from the road. In her speech, Aung San SuuKyi said, “There were no cars coming. It was merely an insult, as theyknew that I was going to give a speech. It’s better to respect each other.

Traffic policeman

aiding protesters.

Protester screaming

rude insults.



Yesterday, one of our young men was wounded. I complained about it (atthe police department) and I had to pay 50 kyat for the complaint. Pleasewait and see how the authorities judge that case”.

3. We continued our trip and we reached Madaya Township. Aung SanSuu Kyi joined a founding ceremony for anew Youth Wing. A Dyna truck came andpestered us with a loudspeaker. At that time,a young betel nut vendor informed us thatdemonstrators wielding bamboo rods andswords were waiting for our motorcade. Ipassed this information on to two Membersof Parliament: Mg Mg Than (Ya Mae ThinConstituency) and Tin Htut Oo (LeweConstituency-1).

Tin Htut Oo reported this to the NLD

Mandalay Division branch and asked themto send some more members, as thesecurity condition was not good. Somemonks also worried about our security andcame along with us until we reached Mandalay. From Mogok to Mandalay,our security condition was not good. Aung San Suu Kyi had already toldthe members, “Do not attack, there is no need to be hostile, just take itwhen we are attacked.” So, we were not allowed to react against them. Wewere even warned not to look at them in hostile way.

More members came to us for security protection. It was about 6:30 or

7:00 pm when we reached the NLD Mandalay Division branch office, after Aung San Suu Kyi had visited around Mandalay city. She gave a speech tothe local people waiting at the branch office. I saw that police and trafficpolice ordered two cars to enter into the crowd.

On 28 May, I went to the branch office and I met Bo Zan (Chairperson of the Mandalay Division branch), Kan Tun, Ko Gyi, Tin Aung and Mg MgThan. They agreed to my plan to participate in the motorcade. I went back home to arrange the final details of my traveling arrangements, such asthe renting of a private car and the purchasing of beverages for along the

way. To be able to rent a car, we had to share it. I needed to manage otherdetails. We had to rely on ourselves for beverages and sometimes wewouldn’t have anything to eat. My spouse also agreed with my trip.

4. On 29 May, I joined Aung San Suu Kyi’s trip to Monywa. There wereabout eleven cars in our motorcade when we left Mandalay City. When wereached Sagaing Bridge, at the entrance of Sagaing City, there weredemonstrators holding up placards, but they were quiet. Afterwards, wewent on to Myinmu Township. We held some activities there, such as the

Protesters

with loudspeaker.



founding of the Youth Wing and the installation of an NLD sign at thebranch office. The trucks carrying demonstrators continued to follow,however we did not receive any disturbances when we left Myinmu.

At Yeposar Village, before Monywa, therewere many Dyna trucks filled with trafficpolice. There were 200 or 300demonstrators, including women, withplacards in roughly 13 trucks that botheredus extensively. We reached Monywa at 6:00pm. It was about 9:00 pm when reachedthe downtown area.

There were plenty of motorbikes when welooked ahead and behind. The local peoplewelcomed us warmly. Some older peoplesaid, “Where is the general’s daughter

(Aung San Suu Kyi)? Show us and stop the car! ” They also welcomed herby giving her some flowers. We reached Monywa branch office at about10:00 pm. We learned later that the crowd had been waiting for us sinceearly morning. Then we carried out the founding ceremony of a new

Youth Wing. We didn’t rest until midnight.

5. On 30 May, we prepared to start our trip around 6:00 am. At about9:00 am, Aung San Suu Kyi greeted the local people and left. On the way,we went to pay respects to the monks at the Zawtica Monastery.

There were 15 others in my car when we left Monywa. They included

Aung Ko, Tin Maung Lay, Thwe, Chit Tin, Thein Aung Lay and WunnaMaung from Htundone, Mandalay. Khin Aye Myint, Ah Thay Lay (aliasThanda Soe) and I were the only females. In the other car were 13 monksand young novices. After leaving Budalin, there were no other vehiclesalong the way. Then we reached Sai Pyin Village and rested for a while atthe residence of an MP-elect. Aung San Suu Kyi encouraged us and talkedto the villagers and NLD members there.

6. We left Sai Pyin at about 7:00 pm and there were no disturbances. Ittook about 20 minutes to reach Kyi Village. There were many people from

Kyi and neighboring villages waiting to welcome us. Aung San Suu Kyi’s car was at the head of the motorcade. There were onlytwo cars behind my car. A motorcyclist told us that the villagers werebeing beaten. Our car stopped and we asked Wunna Maung and someothers to go to Aung San Suu Kyi’s car, as they were also responsible forher security. So then only five Youth Wing members remained in my car.When I looked back, I could see the villagers being beaten under theheadlights from Dyna trucks. The Dyna trucks were facing north, towards

Protester armed

with bamboo rod at leftof photo.



the village. At this time, Tin Oo went with two Youth Wing members to Aung San Suu Kyi’s car. This is the last time I saw him.

7. When the demonstrators who were coming from behind the motorcadereached us, we all laid face down on the car floor. They beat us. Chit Tinlay down over the three women to cover us from the beatings. He wasbeaten whenever the women were beaten. Chit Tin was then pulled off of us. My blouse was pulled and torn off. My back was pounded with a brick.Men usually wear jackets, so they were left still wearing a shirt when thedemonstrators pulled off their clothes, while women however usually wearonly a blouse. Some men weren’t wearing jackets and their shirts werealso pulled off and torn. While I was being pounded with a brick, ademonstrator beat me twice using a bamboo rod. Then, they entered thecar and stole our traveling bags and necklaces.

8. We were pulled out of the car and some of us had our blouses removed. All of the women’s blouses were torn at the back, at least. We had to wrap

and cover our chests with our own sarongs. At first, my blouse was tornonly at the back. Two monks and a young thin man attacked me. Theyoung man was in a white shirt and wore his hat backwards. He waswearing his sarong over his shoulder and was in shorts. All of us werepulled out of the car. Those who were pulled out by their legs were thendropped on their faces. Attackers were waiting for us next to the car inorder to beat us. I was pulled by my hair and I fell down to ground. Asthey pulled me along the road, all of the skin from the left side of my back was scrapped off.

The attackers grabbed my hair and pounded my head against the tar road.

While beating me, one of the attackers asked me, “Do you want to be a Kala’s wife? Do you rely on the Kala’s wife? We have built many bridges and roads - haven’t you stepped on them? Don’t you drive on them? Don’t you know this? ” Then, I was attacked with a bamboo rod with asharpened point.

However, my face and eyes were not hurt. Then, they said that I just lovedthe ‘pinny’ dress (NLD uniform). So, my blouse was totally removed and Ihad to pull my sarong up quickly. While I was doing this, they tried to pulldown my sarong, but they couldn’t remove it as it was glued with the

others’ blood. I also used my arms to keep it up. I was beaten again witha bamboo rod. Before I passed out, I saw a car with dead people inside of it. I also heard that the attackers beat Thanda Soe, the girl in my car. Herblouse was removed because the attackers were unsure whether she wasmale or female, as her hair is very short. I saw them attack and beat upother people. They looted money and necklaces. While they were doingthat, a person came back and started issuing the order, “Water groups, fire groups! ” “Water groups, fire groups! ” Following this, they left in their cars.I stayed quiet for about 30 minutes after they had gone. Then a monk and

“My blousewas pulledoff and my

back w aspounded

w ith a

brick.”



about five men from the village came to us. I requested that they take mewith them. When they started to carry me I passed out, so they didn’t takeme any farther, as they thought I had died.

9. I woke up when I heard the voices of Min Thein and Kyi Kyi Myint. Itook a blouse from the car and put it on. I shouted that I wanted to gowith them. A villager carried me from the car. I saw our driver San Myint.He was dead and his left eye was poked out. He was not one of ourmembers; we had just hired him to drive the car. When I looked around,many people were in the rice paddy field. Some were murmuring andsome were quiet.

Kyi Kyi Myint, who ran away with me said, “Let’s go, otherwise we will diewhen the attackers come back again.” We then walked to the village. Idon’t remember how I reached the monastery, as I was half unconscious.The monk said that he had just sat there, as he didn’t have anyone to help,although he called a driver and a traditional doctor. Kyi Kyi Myint, Maung

Min Thein, a student from Monywa, and I were treated warmly there. Themonastery was about one mile from the place where the incident occurred.

At 3:30 am, the monk asked us to leave, as he was frightened for us tostay. He gave us 1700 kyat each. We didn’t have any money, as it had beenlooted in the attack.

10. We left for the nearest railway station at 3:30 am and we reached it at5:30 am. According to the young monk who accompanied us to the station,we had walked for three-and-a-half miles. At 8:00 am, we took a train.The two NLD members, the young student from Monywa and I went back

together. The train reached Monywa City at 12:30 pm. I wasn’t able tomove, as my knees and legs were beaten, so we took a trishaw and wentto the monastery. The young student left for his village when we reachedMonywa. Maung Min Thein, Kyi Kyi Myint and I stayed at the monastery.

We requested that the monks give us some clothes, as we didn’t haveanything to change into. Three days later, Hla Than and Khin Aye Myintalso came to the monastery. I recovered there, as a medical doctor hadgiven me some treatment. Later, I reached the Thai-Burma border on 19

August.

I hereby declare that the above experiences are those that I have seen andexperienced, and that I was not threatened, tricked or cheated into tellingmy story- I expressed it according to my own desire.

-Nyunt Nyunt 20 August 2003

Bangkok, Thailand

“Let’s go,otherwisewe w il l al ldie whenthe attckerscome back

again.”



Endnote:

Statement No 6 (5/ 03) of the National League

for Democracy (NLD) on 27 May 2003

Before (Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD members) left Mogok, Mandalay Divisionthe NLD branch reported the following information: Some 300 USDAmembers had reached Sint Guu. They were in 11 sedans, 4 Dyna trucksand 15 Hilux pickups. They were reportedly from Amarapura, Madaya,Kyauk Se and Mandalay. The report also stated, “(Local people) were coercedinto gathering, otherwise they would be forced to work on the Let Pan HlaRoad building project for two days.” The leaders asked them to shout anddemonstrate for one hour because they thought that Daw Aung San SuuKyi was about to come from Mogok. However, they did not see anyone.They left because they thought that they were being exploited.

In Kyee Dauk Pauk Village, Sint Guu Township, Swe Win and Myint Ngwesupervised the (USDA) demonstration. They had 30 pairs of imitationNLD uniforms. They reportedly planed to give Daw Aung San Suu Kyi aflower before having the demonstration. In Kyee Dauk Pauk, Myint Lwinand Aung Myint, both part of the Village Peace and Development Council,reportedly collected some 20 thugs to attack Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade.On the way, (she and the NLD members) faced the following obstacles:

In Chan Tha Village, Thabeikkyin Township, there were some 100 USDAmembers holding placards with slogans like, “Oppose those relying on external forces, axe handles and those with negative views.” When NLDmembers from Chan Tha Village and some 300 young motorists sang theformer national anthem together, the USDA members dropped theirplacards and left. At about 7:00 pm, in Kyee Dauk Pauk, there were threeDyna trucks, (license plate numbers: 2 Kha 4363, 5 Ka 1899, 2 Ka 3726)and two Hilux pickups (license plate numbers: 7 Ka 6643, Ba 7358) withloudspeakers. The cars drove quickly into the crowd of local people thatwelcomed Aung San Suu Kyi. They cried out, “Go away, otherwise you will have to collect your own corpses! ” The local people lining the roadsideran away in order to avoid being hit by the cars. The people in the cars

were thugs with swords, clubs and catapults. They also banged iron platestogether and threw stones at Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s car. Tun Tun Win,an NLD Youth member from Mandalay, was injured on his head when hewas hit by one of the stones. The USDA members drove beside themotorcade for about two miles. Sometimes, they drove in front of the carsin the motorcade. They moved away when they were asked to do so. Astone (from a catapult) hit a woman’s hand. She was from Mogok. TheUSDA members caused problems until (they reached) the NLD branch



office in Singu Township. Some stones hit the houses along the roadside. A camera was also slightly broken when USDA members attempted tosteal it.

Reports anticipated that there would be attacks in Let Pan Hla and KyeeDauk Pauk Villages. Later, the attacks occurred. Quarters Peace andDevelopment Council members (local authorities) threatened the local peoplewith seven years imprisonment if they welcomed Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.Some 200 (hooligans) were reportedly collected. They received money orsome drink.

Because of the above-mentioned events, the NLD Vice-Chairperson madethe following requests at the police department in Singu Township:

1. To take action against the USDA members responsible for theattack on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade,

2. To take action (against those responsible) for throwing stonesat Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s car,

3. To take action (against those responsible) for the throwing stonesat the head of an NLD Youth member.



Affidavit of Min Thein

Personal Data

Name: Min TheinGender: Male

Age: 33 yearsDate of Birth: 2 April 1970Father’s Name: U Tin Aung

Mother’s Name: Daw Ah Mar KyiID Number: 9/Ma-Ta-La (Naing) 018 041Nationality: BurmeseReligion: BuddhistEducation: 5th standard

Address: Mandalay Southwest Township, MandalayDivision

Place of Birth: Maha Aung Myay Township, Mandalay Division



I, Min Thein, hereby swear under oath, with regards to the DepayinMassacre on 30 May 2003, that:

1. My name is Min Thein and my ID card no is 9/Ma-Ta-La (Naing) 018041. My parents are U Tin Aung and Daw Ah Mar Kyi. I was born on 2

April 1970. I worked as a sculptor and a gem trader while I was livingwith my parents in Mandalay Southwest Township.

In the National League for Democracy, I have worked as third in-charge of the Youth Wing in Mandalay Southwest Township branch since April 2000.I was detained in Mandalay Prison between 19 May 2000 and 31 March2001 because of my activities in founding our Youth Wing.

2. I was responsible for the security (of the motorcade) on the trip thatstarted from Mandalay. On the trip, I was in charge of the security teamfrom the Mandalay Southwest Township branch.

After we passed the Sagaing Bridge, we saw a group of USDA memberswaiting there. They held placards that read, “(We) don’t want those relying on external forces, axe handles, (we) don’t want undisciplined democracy.”

When we reached Myin Mu, a founding ceremony was held for the new Youth Wing of the Myin Mu Township NLD branch. A Dyna truck carryingUSDA members was outside the NLD branch office. The truck had twoloudspeakers and was full of USDA members; they were even sitting onthe roof.

3. Military Intelligence personnel in cars also followed our motorcade.

There were also vans and Publica pick-up trucks. Three people were in acar in front of the NLD office. One of them put a video camera on theother’s shoulder. Some people were also busy with still cameras and videocameras in other cars.

When we reached Monywa, it was getting dark. At about 6:00 pm, wereached the billboard saying, “Welcome to Monywa City .” We reached theMonywa NLD branch office after 9:00 pm. People holding candles warmlywelcomed us, as the electricity had been cut off in Monywa. The peopleshouted, “Long live Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, long live the National League

for Democracy .” The road was filled with roughly 100,000 well-wishersand a lot of motorbikes.

After the ceremony for installing an NLD sign at the branch office, therewas a founding ceremony for the local NLD Youth Wing in the Sein Myarmini-market that night.

4. On 30 May, we left Monywa for Budalin Township. In Budalin, we held aceremony for the founding of the Budalin NLD Youth Wing. I saw other

“Peoplewelcomed uswith candles,as theelectricity had

been cut.”



vehicles close to our motorcade the entire time. These vehicles belongedto Military Intelligence (MI) personnel and members of the USDA. We leftBudalin for Sai Pyin Village in the early evening. Aung San Suu Kyi gave aspeech to the local well-wishers waiting for her at the Sai Pyin NLD officebranch. Then our motorcade continued on our trip.

5. We reached Kyi Village about 8:00 pm. The villagers welcomed ourmotorcade. Our car stayed at the head of the motorcade during the trip.There were three cars between Aung San Suu Kyi and us. Some 300 yardsafter we reached Kyi Village, the group of villagers was broken up. Her carpassed ours.

At that time, her car came to a halt because two monks and two or threemen had stopped it. A monk requested, “Give a speech (here), you canleave after it.” Then, Tun Zaw Zaw in Aung San Suu Kyi’s car got out of thecar. He said, “Let us move on as we don’t have time. We need to continueour trip.”

The monk replied, “You are not allowed to go. We cannot permit you. Youcan go after the speech.” Two men said in a hostile manner, “Hey guy! Goafter the speech.” A monk interrupted them with, “Hey you guys stayquiet. I will ask them by myself.” He again asked, “Our men are cominghere. Wait for them and give a speech. You can go after the speech. Giveus a speech here.”

NLD Youth Wing members reached her car. We got back into our car, aswe heard that our cars were leaving. As soon as we were in the cars, thedemonstrators’ cars, with their headlights on, reached the back of our

motorcade.

6. Many demonstrators got out of their cars and started to attack whomeverthey saw. The villagers were still there. As the cars had turned on their

Artist’s rendering

of the massacre

based on

eyewitness’

testimonies.



headlights, we witnessed the villagers being beaten. We also heard cries of pain. Even old people and children were attacked. I saw the villagers runback into their village.

7. Then, the motorbikes and cars in the motorcade were attacked. Sincewe had left Budalin Township, the attackers had followed behind ourmotorcade in their trucks. A USDA car with two loudspeakers on it led thetrucks. Their motorcade was quite long. I didn’t know exactly how manycars were in their motorcade. The monks led the attackers; all of them hadwhite cloths wrapped around their right arms. They said, “You want to be an Indian’s wife! ” They used rude words when they started to attack.

When they got near our car, I just sat down in the car. My friends standingnext to me were beaten and their heads were targeted. During the attack wooden bats, bamboo sticks, and iron rods with sharp points were used.

Because of the attack, my friends fell over me. Blood from their wounds

flowed over me and it even flowed into my mouth. It was difficult to spit itout because of my friends’ weight.

At that time, one of the attackers commanded, “Go to the car of the Indian woman (Aung San Suu Kyi). Beat her up! Kill her. She must die .” Myfriends in the car cried out in pain. They cried, “Oh, I’m afraid, I’m going to die !” When the attackers heard this, there were even more attacks. Theysaid, “Hey, this one is not dead yet, beat him up, beat him up! ” Later, noone dared to cry out or move. Some seemed to pass out unconscious.Others appeared to die.

8. There were about fifteen people in our car. The driver was Tun Win, amember of the NLD Social Supporting Committee, of the Zay Gyo marketarea in Mandalay city. Next to him were Khin Maung Thaung (a member of the NLD Executive Committee, Mandalay Southwest (MSW) Township) andToe (an NLD member). The others were:

· Ye Min Zaw (joint-in-charge (1) of the NLDYouth Wing, MSW Township),

· Zaw Zaw Aung (joint-in-charge (2) of the NLDYouth Wing, MSW Township),

· Kyaw Myo Thu,· Myo Tint,· Wanna Aung,· Tin Maung Oo (photographer who died during

the attack),· Tin Myint,· Thein Toe Aye, (member of the NLD Executive

Committee, MSW Township, who diedduring the attack),

“Beat her

up. Kill her.She must

die.”



· Tin Myint (member of the NLD Women’s Wing andExecutive Committee, MSW Township),

· Kyi Kyi Myint (member of the NLD Women’s Wingand Executive Committee, MSW Township),

· Khin Mya Win (member of the NLD Women’s Wingand Executive Committee, MSW Township).

· There were two members from the NLD YouthWing, MSWT, but I have forgotten their names.

9. While they attacked us, car headlights shone from behind them theentire time. They used rude words during the attack. They tore off thedresses of the women. They also looted necklaces, travel bags, purses,etc. Moreover, they said, “We build roads and bridges. Aren’t you optimistic about that? What did your Aung San Suu Kyi do? What did the Indian woman [Aung San Suu Kyi] do? You only know how to be an Indian’s wife like her. Apart from that, what do you know? ” Then repeated beatingsfollowed. Some women said that they would undress by themselves. But it

was all in vain. The attackers forcefully undressed them. I witnessed andheard what was happening to them from our car.

10. There were many wounded people in cars and on the road. Somewere pulled from their cars. The attackers beat them. The attackers alsopounded their heads against the road. During the attack, monks pushed awhite car into the ditch. The car belonged to NLD members from MSWTownship. They prepared to push our car into a ditch. At the time, ourcar’s gears didn’t work. They asked Tun Win, the driver, to fix it. He said, “Iam not the driver. The driver already left and took the keys with him. Idon’t even know how to drive a car.” He was also brutally beaten.

11. They later went and looked around the motorcade. We were all silent.Then, one of them ordered, “Water Group! Let’s go home! ” “Fire Group! Let’s return! ” Finally, all of them left.

Before they left, they burned a Dyna truck. It was the car that had carriedthe USDA members and followed our motorcade the entire way. It wasaffixed with two loudspeakers. They destroyed their own vehicle. We didn’trespond at all during the attack. The villagers also ran away for the sake of their lives.

12. In our car, at least ten people were seriously injured, and some evendied. I am sure that Thein Toe Aye and Tin Maung Oo died. Some didn’trespond or move anymore when we talked to them and touched them.

At about 10:00 pm, the attackers left. We tried our best to rescue thewounded people. We didn’t have any medical supplies. We placed thembeside the road to recover. Tun Win was crying because of his broken

“Theydestroyedtheir own

vehicle.”



hand. He felt great pain whenever we touched his hand. We used ourclothes as a sling for him.

Some were crying loudly on the roadside. We couldn’t see them, as it wasdark. Some pleaded, “Help me, come and help me! ”

13. After the attackers left the scene, some villagers appeared. I begged, “Please help our friends. Send them to a clinic. Help them.” I also noticeda monk among the villagers. I asked, “Your Holiness, please help us.Please send our friends to the hospital.” Then he said, “Hey, your friendsare already dead”. He pointed at someone. I saw Raju, also known as SanMyint, who drove the car belonging to NLD members of Mandalay NorthwestTownship. One of his eyes was missing. He was lying on his back and hisneck seemed to be broken. I said, “You are right your Holiness, this is adead person. However there are many people still alive; please help them.”

14. Villagers dared not to approach and help us. Some people in the rice

paddy field cried out, “Help me, I am still alive, help me! ” I asked thevillagers to help them. Two villagers carried a person to the side of theroad. Then the monk said, “There’s a tractor with a trailer in the village. Iwill go there to hire it.” Some villagers followed him, as they did not darehelp us.

I encouraged the injured to move from that place. I said, “Cross the ditchand go to the rice paddy field.” All of them, except those who had died orpassed out unconscious, went to the rice paddy field.

15. Kyi Kyi Myint, Nyunt Nyunt, a young man from Monywa City, and I left

the injured and went into the village to find a physician. The villagers wemet along the way said, “The physician will not dare to come here.” Weasked them to take us to the monastery. In the monastery was the monk we had recently met. I told him that we were seeking treatment for ourfriends.

There was no medicine in the monastery. The monk said, “The situationdoesn’t favor you. I tried to hire a tractor with a trailer in the village. But,I didn’t get one and so I stayed at the monastery.” Then I said, “I amleaving to help my friends.” He replied, “Don’t go there alone. It will not

work.” I said, “If I don’t go, I will betray them.” He then instructed me togo through the rice paddy field.

16. In the area where we had been attacked, a car was in a ditch and aDyna truck was on fire. Destroyed motorbikes were everywhere. SomeNLD members were lying on the ground. I went back to the monastery.

17. At 11:00 pm, I heard about ten or eleven gunshots. They were not farfrom that area. At 12:45 pm, soldiers, policemen, firemen, members of

“Thephysicianw il l notdare tocome

here.”



USDA, and Pyithu Swan Arr Shin (People Power) arrived. The USDAmembers were in civilian uniform. They went to four vehicles on the road.They moved two vehicles to the side of the road. The white car belongedto NLD members from the Mandalay Southeast Township and the otherbelonged to the Mandalay Northwest Township. They made it appear as if the two cars had been damaged in a traffic accident. They recorded thescene of the incident using still and video cameras. They left at 1:45 am.

At 2:05 am, they moved a yellow car onto the road on the way to DepayinTownship. It belonged to Hla Myint, Chairperson of the AmarapuraTownship NLD branch. Later I heard the sound of car parts being removedfrom the car.

At the scene of the attack, only three vehicles were left. We quietly stayedin the rice paddy field close to the monastery. A second-year student fromMonywa University was with me. I looked at my watch using a torch andwrote down the time.

18. On 31 May, at about 5:00 am, we left the village before the villagerswoke up. The abbot gave us 1700 kyat each. We took the 8:05 am train,in order to reach Monywa. We stayed there for three or four days. On thesecond day, Hla Than and Khin Aye Myint of Mandalay Northeast Townshiparrived.

I hereby declare that the above experiences in paragraphs (1) to (18) arethose, which I have seen and know, and that I was not threatened, tricked,or cheated into writing my story. I expressed it according to my owndesire.

-Min Thein 12 August 2003

Bangkok, Thailand



Affidavit of Phoe Zaw(a.k.a. Maung Zaw)

Personal Data

Name: Phoe ZawGender: Male

Age: 23 yearsDate of Birth: July 24, 1980

Father’s Name: U Than MaungMother’s Name: Daw Mya KyinID Number: Ma Ma Na (Naing) 139877Nationality: BurmeseReligion: BuddhistEducation: 4th standard

Address: Ba Ba Lay Ward, Mya-yi-nanda Myothit Town,Mandalay Division

Place of Birth: Myaing Township, Magwe Division



I, Phoe Zaw, hearby swear under oath that:

1. I, son of U Than Maung and Daw Mya Kyin, am a citizen of Burma,holding national identification card no. Ma Ma Na (Naing) 139877. I am 23years old residing at Ba Ba Lay Ward, Mya-yi-nanda Myothit Town, MandalayDivision, Burma.

2. I have never been involved in politics. I applied for membership to theNLD only two weeks before Aung San Suu Kyi’s trip to Mandalay. WhileDaw Suu104 was staying in Mandalay, I was given nighttime security dutyfor two nights. Daw Suu came to Mandalay on 26 May. On the next day of 27 May, she went to Tada-U. During the Tada-U trip, the persons who took security duty with me included Win Kyi, Phone Myint Zaw, Wunna Maung,

Aye Win, Yeh Min San, Myint and Soe. I went together with Zaw Zaw Aung, Tin Aung Myint and Thay from the Southwest Township on 29 Mayfor the Mandalay-Monywa trip. On that trip, I did not take security duty for

Daw Suu. Due to a shortage of vehicles,only two from each township were allowedto come for security duty. However,responsible persons explained that someothers could come along at their ownexpense. Accordingly, some went alongwith the traveling party on their ownarrangements. On the Mandalay-Monywatrip, members from the NLD Central Youthtook the main responsibility for Daw Suu’ssecurity.

3. The Mandalay NLD members and otherpeople who went with Daw Suu on hertrip were transported in a total of roughly20-30 cars and motorcycles. The car I rode in was a Sunny model pickuptruck. On the journey from Mandalay to Sagaing City, initially nothingeventful occurred in particular. However, after passing the Sagaing Bridge,we began to see a crowd of about 100 people and heard them shouting,

“We don’t want Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.” We continued to travel on fromSagaing to Myinmu Township. We reached Myinmu after noon. In Myinmu,

the activities of installing the signboard and opening of the MyinmuTownship NLD office, and formation of the Youth Wing were made. Wecontinued our journey from Myinmu at about 3:00 p.m. Before reachingChaung U, we saw a crowd of about 170 to 180 people holding placards,near Yeposar Village. That crowd started to hurl abuses and provoke us bypoking placards into our cars. On the placards were slogans saying, “Relying on external elements, acting as stooges, we don’t want the NLD ”, etc.Consequently, the people from Myinmu, who had come along with theparty, and the sanghas105 from Monywa, who had come to welcome us,

At Yeposar, before

Monywa, 200-300

demonstrators,

including women,

with placards

in roughly 13

trucks harassed

NLD members.



asked them not to behave in that manner. However, the placard bearersdid not listen. They even started to increase their provocative behavior. Atthat time, there were police cars present and authorities were in the busheson the left side of the road. They did not try to settle the squabble betweenthe sanghas and the placard bearers, and just kept on watching. When the

sanghas could not prevent the acts of provocation, they started punching theplacard bearers, who then turnedaround and departed. At the scene of that incident, there were no villagersor other people. As we continued onour journey, the noisy protestersfollowed behind us in their own cars.

At a village (name unknown) on theway between Myinmu and Monywa, welearned from the villagers that theauthorities had ordered the local

population not to go out and welcomeDaw Suu when she arrived. At thatvillage, we saw a number of people whowere systematically lined up for aprotest against Daw Suu. Behind theline of people, there were two

policemen in uniform keeping watch. On the village entrance road, wesaw a number of traffic policemen. Although the villagers were orderednot to come out to the road and welcome Daw Suu, they ignored thisorder and the entire village came out to welcome her. At that time, whenthe protesters saw the villagers and sanghas in force, they remained silent,

put down their placards and kept their heads bowed. I noticed that thepeople in the cars tailing behind our convoy were taking, with video andstill cameras, pictures of the villagers clapping their hands and greetingus.

4. From Chaung U to the entrance of Monywa, I saw people on 200-300motorcycles from Monywa coming out to welcome Daw Suu. Those carsand motorcycles drove systematically keeping to their own lanes. InMonywa, as the authorities had cut off power to the whole town, thepeople gave our party a candle-lit welcome. We reached Monywa at about

6:00 pm. At about 10:30 or 11:00 pm, the ceremony for installing thesignboard and the opening of the Monywa Township NLD office wasperformed. At about 9:00 am on 30 May, the party went to the ZawtikaMonastery of Monywa to pay respect to the abbot, but as the abbot wasaway and we failed to see him. Therefore, we left for Butalin Town. Beforeour cars left Monywa, I saw to the left of our car a police inspector andpeople with meal packs in a Mandalay-Monywa bus (converted Dyna truck),who were going to hold a protest against Daw Suu. According to aschoolteacher from Monywa, people who agreed to participate in the protest

More demonstrators

at Yeposar.



against Daw Suu were given three free meals and 500 kyat per day. At thetime of departure from Monywa, there were about 12 cars carrying DawSuu and NLD members. Behind our car was the car in which the femaleNLD members were riding, and in the front seat was Win Mya Mya, andabout 12 men and women were in the back. Monks and novices wereriding in the last car.

5. When we left Monywa, there was still nothing unusual. On arrival inBudalin, the ceremonies for installing the signboard, the opening of theBudalin Township NLD office and formation of NLD Youth Wing wereperformed. From there, we left for Sai Pyin at about 6:00 pm. In Sai Pyin,Daw Suu gave a speech for approximately 30 minutes. Then we left forDepayin. At that time, there were nine cars in front of our car and twobehind. When we arrived near Pyankya Village, I saw about 20 buses,each of which was capable of carrying 40 persons, trailing at a moderatedistance behind our convoy. When we arrived near Kyi Village, two monksstopped the car in which Daw Suu was riding and advised Daw Suu to give

a speech. Then I saw the Central Youth security detail leader appealing fora pardon, as no speech could be given due to lack of time. Then the carsmoved on a little. At that time, the protesters trailing at a distance behindus got out of their cars and started to attack the local people with thewooden bats, pointed iron rods, iron bars and bamboo sticks they hadbrought with them. Daw Suu told our cars to stop. While the attack was inprogress, three or four villagers shouted, “Daw Suu please help us! ” andcame to the place where our cars were stopped. When Dr. Hla Soe Nyuntasked for help from the two monks, they replied that it was impossible.On that day, the local authorities had come in advance and forbid, withthreats and promises of offerings, all monks from the monasteries near

Kyi Village from going out and welcoming Daw Suu and NLD memberswhen they arrived, and from giving them assistance or coming out even if a problem arose. The monk explained that as they were forbidden, helpcould not be obtained and that all communication lines had been sealed.

6. In order to document the beating of the villagers on video, an attemptwas made to line up the motorcycles and light up the area with theirheadlights. In the light from the motorcycles’ headlights, we saw theattackers shouting and holding up wooden bats, iron bars, pointed ironrods and bamboo sticks. At that moment the sound of a whistle was

heard, and while being led by monks wearing red armbands, they shoutedand charged towards us. While we were still dumbstruck on seeing thecharge, they started attacking the last pickup truck in which the monksand novices were traveling.

7. After that, I saw them almost simultaneously attack the car in whichWin Mya Mya and the women were riding. As such things were happening,some got out of their cars and fled into the fields, while others took off down the road. As people were running in all directions, our convoy of

“ Authoritiesforbid

monks fromwelcoming

or aiding

the NLD.”



cars, including the car carrying Daw Suu, remained behind. At the sametime, there was shouting that Daw Suu’s car was under attack, and thecrowd of people that were in front turned around and came back. Whenthe crowd reached near Daw Suu’s car, I saw a car dash out from the pack and attack it. From my car I saw eight or nine members from the Central

Youth Wing standing on the steps on the sides of the car, face one anotherwith linked hands in order to provide protection. As others’ cars started toimmediately follow Daw Suu’s car, those running jumped on to the nearestcar. As my car was full, I climbed on to the roof. After we drove on forabout 10 minutes, because of the sound of our cars, our cars systematicallyparked in the fields on the left and right sides of the roads and turned ontheir headlights simultaneously. As I was on the roof of the car, I could seein the light from the headlights people with bats, iron bars, bamboo sticksand pointed iron rods waiting, ready for us. When Daw Suu’s car reachedthe waiting attackers, they flung themselves at her car with the sticks,bricks, bats and iron bars they were holding in their hands and shot at itwith catapults. In the pack, the ones in range also hit the car.

8. At the time when Daw Suu’s car was passing through the attackingcrowd, our car started to enter it. Just as our car tried to rush through thecrowd, a Dyna truck parked on the side of the road for the purpose of blocking charged into and hit our car. While trying to avoid the collision,our car drove off the side of the road and arrived at the front of the crowd.While our car was veering, I jumped off the roof and down to the ground.While our car veered round to get back on the road, I managed to get in atthe back of the car, after catching the rails on the sides. While I was tryingto get back into the car, a stick thrown at me hit me on my back. Thecanvas tarps covering the sides of the car were taken down while the car

was driving on. The attacking crowd beat us for about two minutes. Asthe people in the back of our car were lying flat on the floor, the people ontop took most of the beating. After driving for a few minutes, we reachedthe Depayin Hospital. The members of the NLD Youth Wing did not respondviolently to the terrorist attack made by the crowd lying in wait. Daw Suuhad told us that if we were wearing the NLD uniform of a white shirt andKachin sarong, we had to bear with a bowed head whatever was done tous, and must not retaliate under any circumstances.

9. When we arrived at Depayin Hospital, our group included: Soe (who’s

arm, knee, foot was injured), Myint Oo (head fractured), a student fromMonywa, name unknown, (head fractured), Rev. Ashinpyinnya Depa, amonk from Yankin Monastery (fractured head and elbow), two femaleNLD members from Monywa, names unknown (wounds on their heads),Myint Soe of Saingpyin Village, who had run away from the incident, anda person from Mandalay Southwest Township. All had to be treated as in-patients as their injuries were serious, except the one from MandalaySouthwest Township, whose injuries were light. On the second day of receiving treatment at the hospital, 31 May, two traffic policemen came

“NLD Youthdid notrespondviolently to

the attack.”



and took away our car’s driver. Then a police inspector and a policemanarrived on a motorcycle. They came to get a list of the names of the in-patients at the hospital from the township hospital doctor. The patientswere checked against the list and addresses of the patients were noted.

10. After the list of patients was taken, Soe said to me, “They’ve taken thepatient list, but your name is not on it. So you’d better leave and informresponsible persons.” At about 5:00 pm, the police inspector and fivepolicemen came back to the hospital in a car. All of the people on the listwere arrested and taken for detention. After staying two nights and threedays, on 1 June at three in the morning, I left the hospital with a friend forthe Depayin railway station. Upon arrival at the station, my friend and Ibought train tickets and took the train to Monywa City. We arrived atMonywa at 10:00 am. After arriving in Monywa, I went round and inquiredabout the bus going to Mandalay. I found out that buses were prohibitedfor 10 days from going to Mandalay, starting on 30 May, and that therewas a nighttime curfew imposed in Monywa. I arrived back in Mandalay

on 2 June at 6:00 pm.

I hereby declare that the above experiences are those that I have seen andexperienced, and that I was not threatened, tricked or cheated into tellingmy story- I expressed it according to my own desire.

-Phoe Zaw 4 July 2003

Bangkok, Thailand



Affidavit of Aung Aung (a.k.a. Aung San Win)

A Member of the DemocraticParty for a New Society

Personal Data

Name: Aung Aung (a.k.a. Aung San Win)Gender: Male

Age: 38 yearsDate of Birth: 19 July 1965Father’s Name: U Maung Ko

Mother’s Name: Daw Tin OoID Number: Ma Na Ma (Naing) 049 658Nationality: BurmeseReligion: BuddhistEducation: University

Address: 19th Street, Aung Myay Tha Zan Township,Mandalay Division

Place of Birth: Mandalay Northwest Township



I, Aung Aung, hereby swear under oath that, in reference to the DepayinMassacre of 30 May 2003:

1. I, Aung Aung, son of U Maung Ko and Daw Tin Oo, was born on 19July 1965. I am now 38 years old. I graduated from Mandalay University,where I majored in Burmese. My address is 19th Street, Aung Myay ThaZan or Northeast Township, Mandalay Division.

2. I joined Aung San Suu Kyi’s Upper Burma trip in Madaya and wasresponsible for checking the security conditions in advance of her motorcade.On the evening of 28 May, I went to the Mandalay Division branch office of the National League for Democracy (NLD) and met with Tin Htut Oo, MyoNaing, and Tin Aung Aung. There, Tin Htut Oo (elected Member of Parliament, Lewe Constituency No. 1) requested that we participate in thetrip to Depayin. He wanted us to go in advance of the motorcade in aseparate vehicle. He didn’t want any NLD members in our car. He alsowanted us to wear civilian clothes. We agreed to follow these procedures

and joined the trip.

3. In the car, a friend of ours and I sat next to Naing Naing, the driver. Atabout 8:00 am on 29 May we left Mandalay. We reached Sagaing Citywithout encountering any disturbances. After Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcadereached Myinmu Township, a ceremony for the founding of the MyinmuNLD Youth Wing was held. When we left Myinmu, we saw a large group of people in Yeposar Village. There were three or four Dyna trucks and busesnearby.

They had been waiting for Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade, in order to

demonstrate against it. When they met our car, they prepared todemonstrate because they thought the motorcade was coming. They movedback upon realizing that there were no cars behind us. Almost immediately,we saw three or four people in uniform next to the group. There was aperson in a colonel’s uniform, a person in a police uniform and a person ina traffic police uniform.

They appeared to be blocking the way. We passed that place and stoppednot far from them. At that moment I said, “A terrorist attack could happenhere. The road is curvy and it would be easy for attackers to trap the

motorcade here. How can we report back to the motorcade before theyreach here?”

4. At that time, ten or fifteen motorbikes came the other direction fromMonywa City and met us. They had come to greet the motorcade. Westopped them and said, “There is a big group waiting to demonstrateagainst Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade. They are holding placards in theirhands. The road is blocked and we wonder if we will be able to pass.” Wewaited for more motorbikes. I asked them how many motorbikes would



follow. They replied that many cars and motorbikes had already left Monywa.We stayed there for fifteen more minutes, as they had asked us to wait.During that time, more motorbikes reached us. We encouraged them togo on, as there was a big group here waiting to demonstrate. About 100motorbikes left and the authorities didn’t stop them. They passed theplace where the demonstrators were waiting. As more motorbikes arrived,I left the car and followed on a motorbike. When we reached Yeposar

Village, the motorcade (NLD members) sang the national anthem. Wedidn’t hear anything about the demonstrators anymore.

5. I returned with the others on a motorbike and reached my car. Wecontinued on our trip. There were many vehicles from Monywa. Our carhad to slow down. The people from the villages along the way to Monywawarmly welcomed the motorcade.

We reached Monywa after 6:00 pm. It was amazing to see the peoplewelcome Aung San Suu Kyi. I think that Monywa’s reception of NLD leaders

was the greatest. In Burmese history no one has ever been greeted likeshe was. The motorcade received a candle-lit welcome because the electricityhad been cut off. A motorbike dealer’s showroom lit up the road usingmotorbikes’ headlights. Aung San Suu Kyi moved into a small pickup truck and greeted people. We reached Monywa’s NLD branch office after 9:00p.m. and held a ceremony for the installation of the NLD sign at the office.

Aung San Suu Kyi gave a speech to the people in front of the office.Monywa’s NLD Youth Wing was founded that night. We later went to amonastery to rest.

6. On the morning of 30 May, we left Monywa. Aung San Suu Kyi visited

the abbot of Zawtika Monastery in order to pay respect. The motorcadedidn’t go on to Oat Kan Taw Yaa Monastery, although it had planned to.The girls from the Monywa NLD Youth Wing had joined us in our car inorder to go to the monastery. However, we drove on directly to BudalinTownship, and the girls had to stay with us until we reached Budalin.

We reached Budalin at about 2:00 pm and set up a township NLD YouthWing. We finished at about 4:00 pm. Tin Htut Oo asked us to follow Kyaw

Aung, Secretary of the Mandalay Northwest Township, who had alreadyleft on his motorbike. We left Budalin at about 4:00 pm.

In Sai Pyin Gyi Village, the local people were preparing a warm welcome(for the motorcade). We had heard that there were no disturbances alongthe way, so we continued our trip. There were no private buses comingfrom the other direction. I told Naing Naing that it was unusual.

We continued our trip. We reached a large group of people waiting todemonstrate. There were more people in this group than in the group we

“No onehas everbeengreetedlike (SuuKyi)

was.”



had met at Yeposar Village. Some of them held up placards. After wepassed them, we reached the Irrigation Department compound.

7. There were nine barbed wire barricades (on the road). The barricadeswere placed in three rows to block the way. Each row contained threebarricades. Our car was forced to slow down. Then, we encountered somethirty policemen with batons and shields near the barricades. A man in awhite shirt asked, “Where you are going?” We replied that we were with

Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade. Then, he went to a man wearing militarypants and a white t-shirt and reported, “Major, this car is with Aung SanSuu Kyi’s motorcade.” The man replied, “Put them inside (the building).” The so-called major was a little bit fat. We didn’t see his rank because hewas only wearing his white t-shirt.

To our right, we saw some monks on plastic chairs. The major said to themonks, “We are going to unblock the road when Aung San Suu Kyi andher motorcade arrives. The people waiting here are going to have a

demonstration against her.”

Policemen with batons asked us to drive into the compound. Naing Naing,the driver, steered away from the compound and the police raised theirbatons in order to beat him. He backed the car into the compound, wherethere were some buildings. When we stopped, the policemen with batonsran to our car. They circled around our car and we did not dare get out of our car. We got out of the car only when they ordered us to do so. Theyasked us to raise our hands in the air, in order to search our bodies. Thenthey searched our car. Finally, they took us near a building at the back of the compound.

There were some local female travelers near the building. We met a policeofficer on the grass in front of the building. He had stars on each of hisshoulders. Later that night, we found out that he is in charge of the DepayinTownship police department. We were asked for our names and addresses.They also recorded the license plate number of our car. Then we were putinto a room where we met six or seven people, including elected membersof parliament such as, Bo Maung of the Depayin Constituency, Myint Kyi of the Katha Constituency, and Saw Hlaing of the Indaw Constituency. Theywere all in handcuffs. We learnt that local travelers were detained in the

next room.

8. Soon after we met Kyaw Aung, who was driving his bike into thecompound. He was tied up with rope immediately. At the same time, wewere tied up with him. After he had arrived there, we started to talk withother detainees.

“We weretied up

wi th

rope.”



When night started to fall, we were moved into a Dyna truck. It wasaround 7:00 pm. Policemen were standing guard next to the truck wewere detained in.

9. Around 8:00 pm, we saw the lights from Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade.The cars in the compound turned on their headlights in order to light upthe road. The lights in the trees outside the compound also lit up the road.I heard the sound of many people. At that time, the motorcade arrivedsome 300 feet away from us. We could see very clearly, as there wasalmost nothing between the motorcade and the truck we were put inside.

10. I think that Aung San Suu Kyi’s car was at the head of the motorcadebecause the headlights of her four-wheel-drive vehicle were higher thanthe lights belonging to others’ cars. “(Aung San Suu Kyi’s) car stopped there. But, why is it stopping like that? ” was whispered among the detaineesin the truck. Some of us assumed that (the NLD members in the motorcade)were solving some problem.

At the same time, there were some commands in the group waiting at theroadside. I heard someone say, “Don’t go to the road! Come back from the road! ” I could also hear that they were not calm. But, there was no shouting.I guessed the motorcade had been there for about fifteen minutes.

Then we thought that the motorcade began to move because the lightswere moving. At that time we heard, “Strike, Strike, Strike! Fire! Kill, Kill! ”

11. We saw Aung San Suu Kyi’s car speedily drive ahead. Then, we heardthat the barricades on the road were hit. I think that there were about ten

gunshots fired.

Suu Kyi’s driver

managed to

drive at high

speed over

barricades laid

down on the road.



At that time, the officer in charge of the Depayin Township police departmentcame to the truck. He was familiar with Bo Maung (elected MP of theDepayin Constituency). He said, “So, U Bo Maung, you all have seen andheard (what has happened outside the compound). You all are luckyenough, fortunate enough.” At the same time, there was some reportingon the walkie-talkie next to our truck.

“Dava Tin Hla, we’ve got it. Dava San Shar escaped.” I didn’t understand itat the time. Later, Naing Naing explained to me, “Dava Tin Hla means TinOo; Dava San Shar means Aung San Suu Kyi.”

12. After a while, we witnessed many detainees coming into the compound.They were moaning. Soon I saw some girls and wounded men. One wasthe daughter of Aung Soe, my friend. We tried our best to take care of thewounded people. We managed to fan them, as the weather was very hot.

Aung Thu Win’s head incurred terrible damage. It was covered in blood.

Then a girl came into our truck. She was the daughter of Monywa AungShin, a poet. “(They are) very cruel! (They) beat our heads!” she said. Shewas terrified. The girls didn’t receive injuries on their heads very much,but instead on their waists and backs. They were moaning because of thepain.

13. Before dawn came, the injured people in our truck were moved intothe truck next to us. We heard that they were going to be sent to thehospital. The truck left early in the morning. Our truck left the IrrigationDepartment compound at about 6:00 am. Rev. Zawtica, Saw Hlaing, BoMaung, Kyaw Aung, Myint Kyi, Zaw Tun, Zaw Myint, Naing Naing, Myo

Min, Sein Hlaing, Than Tun Oo, Toe Toe Win (a girl from Monywa), thedaughter of Monywa Aung Shin, and Thet Tun Oo (a student) were in ourtruck. I didn’t recognize all of their names.

When we got outside of the compound, we saw about 50 crowded Dynatrucks. Kyaw Aung stared at them in an obvious manner. One of them in atruck shouted, “You guys, don’t you recognize the excellent attack we made? What are you looking at? Do you want to die? ”

I thought that they were going to leave, as their activities were finished.

14. We were sent to Shwe Bo Prison and passed through Ye Oo Townshipon the way. We were in the very first group that reached the prison. Twogirls, the daughter of poet Monywa Aung Shin (currently in prison) andToe Toe Win, were in our truck. At the gate, I saw Phyo Mya Mya Soe andan unknown woman in the other truck. The majority of the detainees werefrom Monywa City. All of us were taken downstairs inside the prison. Inthe afternoon, we were moved upstairs. Both times we were put amongthe criminals.

“DavaSan Shar

escaped.”



On 1 June, I met with NLD Youth Wing members, including Nyi Nyi Aung.However, I didn’t meet Tin Htut Oo.

15. Ten days later, Hla Myint, Chairperson of the Amarapura TownshipNLD branch, and Thein Aung Lay, of the Mandalay Northwest Township,arrived at the prison. Thein Aung Lay had three serious injures on hishead. One injury had six stitches and the other had four stitches. An injuryon his forehead didn’t contain any stitches and was still open. They camefrom the hospital of the Northwestern Military Command. At first, theyhad thought that they were being freed when they and some other patientswere moved into a vehicle. When the vehicle was outside the hospital

compound some other patients got out. Then, policemen joined the attack victims and they all went to Shwe Bo Prison.

16. On 2 June, some young men who were in Aung San Suu Kyi’s car(during the attack) arrived at Shwe Bo Prison. They included Tun ZawZaw, Kyaw Soe Lin (the driver), Tun Myint, Thet Tun, Min Lwin, TayzaNaing, and others. I asked Tin Htut Oo about what had happened to AungSan Suu Kyi. He told me that the car’s windshield wasn’t broken. Instead,the glass windows were broken. Two clubs were thrown into the car.Some pieces of glass cut her neck and she was slightly injured.

17. On 1 June, we were interrogated by Military Intelligence (MI) personnel.The officer in charge was Captain Lin Zaw Kan. We were asked about ourpersonal details and our activities in the attack. On 8 June, four or fivedays before we were freed, a person came to us. He didn’t tell us that hewas an MI officer. He just said that (the authorities from) Rangoon hadsent him. He said, “I came here to free you guys - fifty persons.”

Photograph

taken by officials

from US Embassy

in Rangoon of

the location of

the attack.



He prohibited us from telling others, even our family members, aboutwhat had happened near Kyi Village. He also prohibited us from talkingabout our experience inside Shwe Bo Prison. He said, “If others ask you,

just say simply that you traveled around.”

In prison, there were about 120 people, including Thet Tun Oo, a 14-year-old student from Monywa City, five novices and three monks. Themonks and novices were disrobed and they received prisoner’s clothes.

18. On 9 June twenty-five persons, including students from high schoolsand universities in Monywa, were released. On 12 June twenty-one personswere released, including ourselves, because we were not NLD members.

We each received a sheet of paper. It briefly warned us not to let othersknow about the event because it was a state secret. It also stated thataction would be taken against anyone who spoke of the event. The sheetwas in front of the commander of MI Unit 20 and had been typed up in

advance. We were forced to sign it.

19. At the prison gate we were told that we were freed because the superiorshad sympathized with us. Moreover, we were not found guilty, but if wereported anything to the media, they warned us that we would be exploitedby the media.

Thaung Nyunt (driver of the car in which Dr. Hla Soe Nyunt traveled in),Sein Yee (driver of the car in which Win Mya Mya traveled in), Myo Min,Naing Naing, and I were put into a Dyna bus. The bus was forced intoservice by the authorities.

20. Capt. Lin Zaw Kan and an MI officer sat next to the driver. There werealso six or seven policemen with weapons. We reached an MI office inSagaing City, where we stayed there for a while. They reported to MI Unit1. We were then transferred into the custody of five MI officers from MIUnit 1. One of them was a captain. I don’t know their names.

We went to MI Unit 1 and we were told to write down our personal detailsthere. Then we had to sign a sheet of paper. The paper said that we wouldnot talk to anyone about what we had experienced. Then, they took

photographs of me. They contacted the authorities in my township andthe Peace and Development Council ward authorities. Later, I wastransferred to local MI personnel in my township. They (local authoritiesand MI personnel) took me to my home in the early evening. In my housethe authorities, my family members, and I were photographed together asa group. My sister and I had to sit on chairs while they stood behind uswhen the pictures were taken. My sister had to sign (a paper) stating thatshe knew the authorities had returned me to my family in good condition.46 persons in two groups were released from Shwe Bo Prison. Therefore,

“We werewarned not

to let othersknow about

the event.”



there were some 60 or 70 people who remained there. At present, Kyaw Aung, Win Khaing, and Thein Aung Lay have reportedly been freed.

I hereby declare that the above experiences in paragraphs (1) to (20) arethose that I have seen and known, and that I was not threatened, trickedor cheated into writing my story. I expressed it according to my owndesire.

- Aung Aung 28 July 2003

Bangkok, Thailand



Affidavit of Naing Naing(a.k.a. Thein Naing)

Personal Data

Name: Naing Naing (a.k.a. Thein Naing)Gender: Male

Age: 34 yearsDate of Birth: 16 May 1969

Father’s Name: U Khin KoMother’s Name: Daw ThanID Number: Ma-Na-Ma (Naing) 051 359Nationality: BurmanReligion: BuddhistEducation: University

Address: Aung Myay Tha Zan Township, Mandalay DivisionPlace of Birth: Aung Myay Tha Zan Township, Mandalay Division



I, Naing Na ing, hereby swear under oath, referring to the DepayinMassacre on 30 M ay 2003 that:

1. I, Naing Naing (ID card no- Ma-Na-Ma (Naing) 051 359), son of U KhinKo and Daw Than, was born on 16 May 1969. I graduated from MandalayUniversity, majoring in Geography. I lived in Aung Myay Tha Zan Township,Mandalay Division, and worked as a businessman. During the 1988 People’sUprising, I joined the student union along with other students. I became amember of the Democratic Party for a New Society (DPNS) when it wasfounded in 1989. I also worked in the Student and Youth Committee of the DPNS. After the DPNS was abolished, other colleagues and I supportedthe National League for Democracy (NLD).

2. A friend of mine, Aung Aung, and I joined Aung San Suu Kyi’s trip fromMadaya to Mandalay on 26 May. We drove a motorbike, staying at thefront of the motorcade, so we could be the first to find out about theconditions ahead. When we were next to her she said, “You need to remind

the other motorbikes not to press the horn. No need to turn on theheadlights. You all have discipline.” I replied to her that I would comply. Ialso passed on her words to the others I met. We didn’t press the horn oruse the headlights. When we reached Kyar Ni Kan Village, eleven NLD

Youth Wing members responsible for her security started to sing the nationalanthem. From Patheinlay to Mandalay, we sang the national anthem. Whenwe were near Oo Bo Prison, we all sang the national anthem together inorder to give mental support to the political prisoners. When we reachedMandalay, the local people warmly welcomed us.

3. We stayed in Mandalay for one day and organized a public warm welcome

for Aung San Suu Kyi, who was visiting the NLD branch in Aung Myay ThaZan Township, as well as the Yadana Mizzu Pagoda. She was warmlywelcomed, as the people there admire her. At the branch office, she talkedto the public a little bit. We left for Tada-U Township after she hadworshipped at the pagoda. Aung Aung and I joined some other NLDmembers in a car. When we were in Amarapura Township, Daw Yuu YuuMay (the wife of political prisoner Dr. Zaw Myint Mg) welcomed us andthen joined the motorcade until we reached Tada-U. We left after AungSan Suu Kyi and Tin Htut Oo supervised the founding of a Youth Wingthere. Ko Lay Inn Waa Gon Yay and U Kyi Aung, two well-known poets in

the area, greeted her as she exited Tada-U. We noticed that the localpeople also warmly welcomed her, as they supported her almost hundredpercent.

4. On 28 May, the day after we had arrived in Mandalay, she asked me tocome to the NLD Mandalay Division branch office after taking some rest inthe evening. I went upstairs from the office to outside the room where shewas staying. Here, Tun Zaw Zaw, Tin Htut Oo, Aung San Suu Kyi and Idiscussed the next trip. She said to me, “I want you to join the trip” so that

“Remindothers notto pressthe horn. You allhave

discipl ine.”



I could inform the rest of the group if I found any disturbances waiting forus. Tin Htut Oo also asked for my co-operation. In addition, Aung SanSuu Kyi said, “Talk with Tin Htut Oo and Tun Zaw Zaw about the policieswe’ve made.” Tin Htut Oo explained to me that we might encounterdisturbances during the trip, and that according to the NLD policy; wewould have to accept any beatings or killings, irrespective of who wasresponsible for the disturbance or attack.

NLD Youth Wing members from four townships in the city of Mandalayhad already learnt about the NLD policy of not fighting back. I was alsotold to follow the rules whilst on the trip. She also said, “As you are notNLD members, you don’t need to wear our uniform. Help us.” I replied toher that we would join in the trip, as we hadn’t participated in her trip toKachin State. Tin Htut Oo said to me, “Ko Naing, come here tomorrowmorning.”

5. On the morning of 29 May, I parked my car on the corner of 38th Street

and 80th Road and went to the division branch office. Aung Aung stayedin the car. When I met Tin Htut Oo, he told me to leave at 8:30 am, andthat they would follow at 9:00 am. The three of us, along with anotherNLD member (also a friend of ours), left Mandalay in our car so that wecould warn of any disturbances in advance.

When we reached the reception camp in Sagaing City, we informed themthat we had arrived half an hour in advance and that Aung San Suu Kyiwould be there one hour later. On the way out of Sagaing, we saw NLDmembers and local people in the reception camp with a signboard to theright of the road. The board said, “(We) warmly welcome the National

League for Democracy and Aung San Suu Kyi.” We continued our trip ontoMyinmu Township.

6. We stopped at Own Taw Village, before Myinmu, to buy cigarettes andbetel nuts. We found some intelligence personnel busy with communicationmaterial in a Hilux pickup truck (Na Gyi/6456). We then realized that thosepeople were following along with the NLD motorcade. However, we didn’treceive any disturbances. We noticed that they followed us until we reachedthe entrance of Myinmu. Some demonstrators against Aung San Suu Kyiwere making loud noises in front of the NLD branch office in Myinmu.

They were shouting into loudspeakers that were fixed to the Dyna truck.When she went into the office, the local people shouted, “Long live Daw

Aung San Suu Kyi and U Tin Oo (Vice-Chairperson of NLD).” The noisefrom the Dyna truck could not overpower the people’s shouting. The Dynatruck drove around the office and continued to make loud noises. Thenthe Myinmu NLD Youth Wing was formed. We waited outside the office forone hour and 45 minutes, and then left.

“ According toNLD policy,

we w ouldhave to

accept anybeatings

or kil l ings.”



“We saw4-5,000people onboth sides

of the road.”

7. When we reached Yeposar Village, located between Myinmu and ChaungOo Township, we saw some 1,000 people next to 15 or 20 piles of stone(one pile fits inside a three tonne truck). In their hands were placards thatsaid, “(We) don’t want those relying on external elements acting as stooges.” They (the demonstrators against Aung San Suu Kyi) usually hold placards.When we passed that big group, we saw an army major and a trafficpoliceman. They were stopping all the vehicles that had come fromMandalay to Monywa. We were not able to turn back. So we drove to thefront. We met some 100 people on some 40 or 50 motorbikes comingfrom Chaung Oo to welcome Aung San Suu Kyi. Later, some monks followedthe group. We informed them that the motorcade and Aung San Suu Kyiwould be there in the next hour and that they were in danger. We describedto them what we had seen on the way. Then four or five motorbikes triedto go ahead. However, they had to turn back as the road was still blocked.While we were waiting there, some 1,000 motorbikes followed us. So, weall continued together and the major and traffic policeman allowed us topass.

8. First, we learnt that the people and their motorbikes from Monywa werealso blocked in and not allowed to leave Monywa City. University studentsin Monywa with 200 or 300 motorbikes were gathering in front of theiruniversity and college. It was difficult to block them in. Finally, they wereable to come to us. The number of people reached the thousands. As itwas so crowded with well-wishers (i.e. the local people), we were not ableto drive at first. I hadn’t experienced that kind of greeting for a politicalleader in all my life. We were at the front of the group. We had to drivevery slowly along with their motorbikes. There were people of differentages, including senior citizens who lived very far away from Monywa. At

the entrance, the local people shouted, “Long live Aung San Suu Kyi! Long live U Tin Oo! ”

Normally, it takes 20 or 25 minutes to reach the Monywa NLD branch. Atthat time, it took almost four hours, from 5:00 pm to 9:00 pm. In Monywa,the electricity had been cut off. The local people warmly welcomed us bythe light of their candles. Aung San Suu Kyi also felt pleased. As shewanted to respond to the well-wishers, she moved into a pickup truck andgreeted the people. She also accepted flower garlands. Some people criedtears of happiness. Some asked, “Where’s the daughter of our general? We

want to see! ” I hadn’t experienced any event like that before. According tomy knowledge, no one has ever received a greeting like that before. If themilitary junta wants to punish the people, they will have to simply putprison walls around the town of Monywa. In the NLD office, Tin Oo and

Aung San Suu Kyi gave a speech to the public. Afterwards we went to SeinMyar mini-mart, which is also the residence of retired Col. Kyi Soe, a localMP. Aung San Suu Kyi stayed and slept there after the formation of thelocal NLD Youth Wing. Then we went to Phone So Monastery with TunWin.



9. The next morning, Tin Hutu Oo said that we were going to ZawticaMonastery. He also told me that I needed to go in advance, as the crowdof people could possibility block our car. After she paid her respects in themonastery, we planned to go on to Oat Kan Taw Yaa, another monastery.

At that time, some NLD Youth members from Monywa joined our car.However, we didn’t go to the monastery as we later learnt that the abbotwasn’t present. We continued our trip onto Budalin Township.

Zaw Lay’s car had engine trouble between Budalin and Monywa. Therewere youth members responsible for Aung San Suu Kyi’s security in hiscar. Two of them joined my car. When we reached the well-wishers atBudalin, they left my car and went beside her car in order to protect herand provide security. Wherever we went, Myo Naing and I went aroundtown to check the entrance and exit of the town. So, when we were inBudalin, we checked the conditions of the entrance and exit that we wouldhave to use. At the petrol station at the entrance of Budalin, we saw some

people with white cloth wrapped around their arms. They were with some16 vehicles. Moreover, there was a group of monks with white cloth wrappedaround their arms. We went to report back to her (Aung San Suu Kyi). Agirl informed us that their group, consisting of some 70 or 80 motorbikes,was blocked in by barbed wire barricades at Zee Taw Village. They hadaccompanied the motorcade from Monywa to Budalin. The girl wanted usto report this to Aung San Suu Kyi. Therefore, we reported to her, TunZaw Zaw and Tin Htut Oo whilst they were having lunch in the upstairsroom of the Budalin NLD branch office. She felt remorseful and asked

Aung San, Chairperson of the Budalin NLD branch, to go there and solvethe problem. He went there using the car belonging to Bar Bar, Chairperson

of the Sagaing Division NLD branch. We also reported to her what we hadseen at the entrance of Butalin. Tin Htut Oo warned me, “Ko Naing, all of you keep an eye on the security conditions. Report to us when there isanything unusual.” He also told me that he would arrange to havecommunications between Saw Hlaing and us. They (Aung San Suu Kyiand NLD members) had formed the NLD Youth Wing in Budalin. On theway, we stayed at the tomb of Thein Phay Myint (a well-known politicianand writer) and we had our car repaired. NLD members from Monywa andmotorists came to the tomb with other NLD members. They stayed thereso they could be informed of and see the security conditions, because they

had heard that the authorities had blocked the road in Zee Taw Village.

Later, Tin Htut Oo came to us. He said, “Kyaw Aung, someone without anNLD uniform will follow you on his motorbike. You go first and contacthim if you have any problems. Saw Hlaing will be in Depayin and youneed to meet him.”

10. We reached Saipyin Gyi, the residence of elected MP, Win Myint Aung,who is currently in prison. His residence was also the reception camp for

“Theauthorities

had blocked

the road.”



Aung San Suu Kyi. The villagers between Sai Pyin Gyi Village and BudalinTownship were waiting there to welcome Aung San Suu Kyi. We stayedthere for one hour, knowing that Saw Hlaing had already left for Depayin.

As it was necessary for us to contact him, we left Sai Pyin Gyi.

When we reached the (killing) field, we saw some 4,000 or 5,000 peopleon both sides of the road. We observed three rolls of barbed wire barricadeson the road. After we passed the crowd, we reached the barricades. Wealso noticed that there were more people on the left side than on the rightside of the road. Like the people at the entrance to Budalin, they all hadwhite cloth wrapped around their left arm. Some held a placard in theirhands. It was strange that all of those in the crowd were male. We proceededforward. I thought that I could meet with U Saw Hlaing to discuss the nextstep of the plan, if I was able to pass through the barricades. But I wasforced to stop there. Three men in mufti approached our car and one of them asked me where we were going. I told him that we were going toDepayin. At the same time, however, Aung Aung replied that we were

with Aung San Suu Kyi’s entourage. Then I got out of the car.

11. At that time, a man was talking to some monks sitting on chairs. Hewas a little bit fat, with big eyebrows and a hard face. He was wearing awhite t-shirt, green military pants and shoes. He said, “Daw Suu Kyi andher group will use this way. The crowd waiting here will demonstrateagainst them. If there is any problem between the crowd and the monkswith Daw Suu Kyi, you need to let them know that you are here.” I heardeverything he said as they were standing next to my car. The man I metfirst reported to him, “Major, this car is included in Aung San Suu Kyi’smotorcade.” The major just ordered him, “Detain them and put them in

(the building).”

I was asked to drive into the Irrigation Department compound on the leftside of the road. The policemen, who held batons and shields, first searchedour bodies and then searched inside of our car. After they had asked us forour personal details, they sent the three of us into a building. In thebuilding, we saw five NLD members who were under arrest. They were:Saw Hlaing, Myint Kyi, U Bo Maung, Zaw Tun and Sein Tin. They all werein full NLD uniform. I also saw two other NLD members, who were notwearing uniforms, and Sein Lin, who is not an NLD member. I asked, “Is U

Saw Hlaing here?” They didn’t dare reply. Finally, Zaw Tun pointed outSaw Hlaing. I asked him what we were going to do, as Tin Htut Oo hadasked me to contact him. He just replied, “I’m not able to do anything.” Later, Kyaw Aung, Secretary of the Mandalay Northwest Township NLDbranch, entered the building. He had followed us on his motorbike, as hewanted to talk to us about the security conditions.

12. After he was asked for his personal details, his hands were tied withrope. Our hands were also tied. He told them that it wasn’t necessary, but



his request was in vain. Whendarkness came, they took us outof the building. We were thenmoved into a Dyna truck that was30 feet away from the building.In a tree next to the compound,there were two searchlights thatlit up the road. We saw some 15Dyna trucks queuing at the back of the crowd. The trucks gavelighting to the crowd waiting toattack Aung San Suu Kyi and hergroup.

About one-and-a-half hours afterour arrest, we saw lights from carsabout 400 feet away from us, and

it was Daw Suu’s motorcade. It stopped near the crowd and Kyi Village. Atthat time, the monk U Zawtika and a student from Monywa, who were ona motorbike, drove out in front of the crowd. They came to find out aboutthe security conditions and were arrested. They were sent into our carafter the student was beaten. The monk, however, was not beaten. Thenwe noticed that Daw Suu’s car and two other cars had driven forward.When they reached the compound in which we were being detained, thecrowd began the attack crying, “Kill the woman who betrays and destroys the race, kill the woman who destroys the race! ” The NLD Youth memberscried out and warned each other, “Protect mother, protect mother! Don’t let her get hurt! ” After the command, “Get out! Fight! ” two Dyna trucks

drove out of the compound towards Daw Suu’s car. However, her cardrove away through three lines of barbed wire barricades. At that time,somebody shouted the command, “Fire! ” and some 10 or 15 gunshotsfollowed. However, her car didn’t stop.

At that time, a police officer came and said, “So, Bo Maung and all of you,as you have seen, you have narrowly escaped. You must understand thatyou were lucky.” According to Bo Maung (elected MP in Depayin Township),the police officer was Sein Win, in charge of the police department inDepayin Township. He seemed to have known about the attack in advance.

13. There was shouting outside the compound, “Strike! ” “Beat! ” and “Kill! ” A man next to the truck we were put in reported on his walkie-talkie. Hesaid, “Is train, is train? ” The other side replied, “Train, train .” His reportfollowed: “Deva Tin Hla, Dava Tin Hla, We’ve got it. Dava San Shar escaped,Dava San Sha escaped. Setkalay (medium light automatic machine gun) ,make it ready! Fire if necessary!”

At the location

of the attck,

barricades were

placed in advance

and attackers

were lying in wait.



I heard that the people in the motorcade were being beaten outside of thecompound. I also heard, “Kill! ” “Kill until they die! ” “Kill those who want to be an Indian’s wife! ” At the same time, I heard the voice on the walkie-talkie. The other side asked, “Is train, is train? ” The man next to our carreplied, “Train, train .” “ Aung Khaing, Aung Naing, what is the situation? ” the other side asked. The man answered, “Beating and killing is not finished yet! Beating and killing is not finished yet! ” The other side asked,

“Commission, what is the status! Commission, what is the status! Have you sent it yet? ” The man answered, “Still managing, still doing.”

Then the policemen brought some people into the compound while theywere beating them. They kicked females in the back. They beat malesusing batons, including some monks. Young novices were kicked. Theywere put inside two Dyna trucks next to us. There were more than twentypeople in each truck. So, the number of the people arrested would amountto about 70.

At that time, I heard the voice on the walkie-talkie again. “ Aung Khaing, Aung Naing, what is the situation? ” The man near our truck replied, “ Aung Khaing, Aung Naing, ice.” Then the other side said, “Commission, what is the status! Have send it yet? ” “Still managing, still doing,” the man replied.

14. At about midnight, there was shouting from the nearby villages, “Our course! ” There were also gunshots. I heard it until 3:00 am the nextmorning. Injured persons were among the detainees in the three trucks.They were separated from each other at 1:00 am. There were over 20people per truck. The uninjured persons were in two trucks. At about5:00 am, the two trucks we had been put inside started to move. The

attackers were in Dyna trucks and buses on the sides of the road. Somebuses didn’t have chairs so the passengers had to stand. There wereapproximately 100 trucks and buses. We reached Shwe Bo Prison at about9:00 am. In our first group, there were 44 people including four women:16-year-old Pyo Mya Mya Soe, the daughter of Monywa Aung Shin (a poetcurrently in prison), Toe Toe Win and an unknown woman. All of themwere from Monywa. Among the 40 men were some monks: Rev. Zawticaof Alone Monastery, Rev. Nya Nain Da of Yan Kin Monastery, and fourother novices. The left hand of Rev. Nya Nain Da had been injured duringthe attack.

15. On 1 June, Kyaw Soe Linn, Daw Suu’s driver, and some seven otheryoung people were moved downstairs. His right hand had been injured inthe attack. When I went to take a shower, I had the chance to talk to him.I asked him what had happened to Daw Suu. According to him, her rightshoulder was injured as a result of the beatings. The glass from the back door and door on the right hand side had been broken. The right side of her neck had been cut by the pieces of glass. The left side of her neck alsohurt her slightly.



He explained to me what had happened to them on 30 May. At about10:30 pm, after they had driven through the lines of barbed wire barricades,they reached Ye Oo Township. There were some 20 youth members withDaw Suu’s car. There were two rods and a stone thrown into the car as aresult of the attack. The entrance to Ye Oo was blocked. About tenpolicemen aimed their guns at them. The next morning at about 3:00 am,the soldiers arrived there and took them to the military area in Ye Oo.

16. On 2 June, nine members of the NLD Central Youth Wing arrived atShwe Bo Prison. Their names were: Tun Zaw Zaw, Tun Myint, Thet Tun,Min Lwin, Than Tun, Myint Kyaw, Toe Lwin, Pauk Pauk and Myo Nyunt.Toe Lwin was suffering from a head injury. At 10:00 am, we all had ourphotographs taken. At about 4:00 pm, some 10 people from MilitaryIntelligence (MI) Unit-20, led by Capt. Lin Zaw Kan, started to interrogateall of the detainees.

After the interrogation, we were each sent to different places. I was sentinto a room where Tin Htut Oo and other NLD Youth members were beingdetained. Tin Htut Oo said that at about 7:00 am on 31 May, they had re-visited the place where they had been attacked. Soldiers and policemenwaiting near the Irrigation Department compound arrested them. Thenthey were sent to the police station in Depayin.

At the police station, he met NLD Vice-Chairperson Tin Oo, who had beenarrested when the attack started. Tin Oo repeatedly told the policemen

“Kill me until I die. Otherwise, I will send you to court.” When the NLD Youth members were about to be sent to Shwe Bo Prison, he said, “Where

are you going to take them? Let them stay with me, or I will follow them.” He was left at the police station.

Tin Htut Oo also told me what Tun Zaw Zaw had said to him in anotherroom of Shwe Bo Prison. Daw Suu wasn’t concerned about her wound.She was only concerned and worried all through the night about the otherinjured members. When the Central Youth members were taken awayfrom her, Daw Suu didn’t agree with the authorities at all. At about 10:00am, nine members were about to be removed from her presence. Whenshe disagreed, the colonel rudely said, “Take two for yourself, who do you

like?” She chose Tun Zaw Zaw and Tun Myint. The next day at about 2:00 am, Tun Zaw Zaw and Tun Myint were alsoremoved. They were told that it would only take about 15 minutes. However,they were all sent to us. We didn’t see Kyaw Soe Lin and the NLD Central

Youth members anymore, after their first two days in Shwebo Prison.

17. In prison, there were some 30 students from universities and highschools in Monywa. Some of them had been injured. A novice had been

“Two rodsand a stone

were throwninto Suu

Kyi’s car.”



stabbed in his left hand, and we could see the bone. Another novice’s lefthand was in a plaster cast.

Some NLD members from No. 7 Military Hospital in Monywa were sent tous. They had been injured. The members included: Hla Myint, Chairpersonfrom Amarapura Township, Tauk Tun Oo, member from Butalin Township,Thein Zaw, member from Htundone Township, Mandalay Division, Thein

Aung Lay, member from Northwest Township, Mandalay Division andThwal, member from Northwest Township, Mandalay Division.

According to them, some members were still in the hospital, as they hadincurred serious injuries. They were: Win Mya Mya, member from MandalayDivision branch, U Chit Tin and Zaw Lay (a.k.a. Ko Zaw Khin), son of UHla Myint of Amarapura.

18. On 9 June, a total of 25 high school and university students werereleased in the first group. On 12 June, 21 of us were released. Thus, a

total of 46 people were released. I assumed that we were released becausewe were not NLD members. All of us received a sheet of paper with typedprint. It said: “Don’t let others know about the important State secret,otherwise action will be taken again…” and so on. We were forced to sign itin front of the MI in charge of Unit 20. At the gate of the Shwe Bo Prison,he said that we had been freed because the state leaders sympathized withus. They didn’t want us to talk to anyone about the arrests, otherwise wewould be exploited by the press.

19. Five of us were taken to the MI Unit 20 office in Sagaing City: ThaungNyunt, who drove the car in which Dr. Hla Soe Nyunt traveled in during

the trip, Sein Yee, driver of the car in which Win Mya Mya traveled, MyoMin, Aung Aung and I. We were taken by Capt. Lin Zaw Kan, an MIpersonnel member, and six policemen who were heavily armed. The Dynatruck we were taken in was owned a private bus company, however theauthorities used it forcibly. MI Unit 16 took Thaung Nyunt and Sein Yee.We had to stay in the office while they contacted MI Unit (1) in Mandalay.Captain Aung Zaw and four other MI personnel from Unit 1, all dressed inmufti, came and took three of us in a four-wheel drive vehicle. Theyphotographed us and recorded our personal details. I had to sign a paperstating that I would not talk to anyone about what had happened. The

chairperson of the Amarathani quarter USDA took Myo Min. Our townshipand quarter Peace and Development Council were called and informed of us. Then MI personnel, led by Lwin Oo, took us to our homes.

When I reached my house, they photographed my family. Then they took two photos of my parents and myself sitting, with three of them standingbehind us. After that, my father had to sign a paper that said heacknowledged that they had returned me to my family.



When the 46 of us were released, there were still some 80 people remainingin Shwe Bo Prison. I hereby declare that the above experiences are those, which I have seenand known, and that I was not threatened, tricked or cheated into writingmy story- I expressed it according to my own desire.

-Naing Naing 7 August 2003

Bangkok, Thailand

Endnotes

100 People’s militia known as “People Power”.101 Short for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.102 Village and Quarter Peace and Development Council.103 Kalama means female Indian. It refers to Aung San Suu Kyi.104 Short for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.105 Pali word for Buddhist monks.



Affidavit of Khin Aye Myint

Personal Data

Name: Khin Aye MyintGender: Female

Age: 43 yearsDate of Birth: 19 January 1961

Father’s Name: U TuuMother’s Name: Daw Khin KyiID Number: Ma-Na-Ma (Naing) 049 642Nationality: BurmeseReligion: BuddhistEducation: Graduated (Bsc. Physic)

Address: 19 (d) street, between 86 & 87 Rd, Mandalay CityPlace of Birth: Mandalay Division



I, Khin Aye Myint, hereby swear under oath that:

1. I lived in 19 (d) street, between 86 & 87 Rd, Mandalay City. I joined theNational League for Democracy (NLD) in 1989. Later, I was appointed toperform many duties in NLD as follows:

1- In charge, Women’s Wing, Mandalay North-West Township2- Member, Women’s Wing, Mandalay Division

3- In charge, Committee for Finance, Mandalay DivisionWhile I was working for NLD, Myint Soe of Military Intelligence (MI) unit(1) and some local policemen came to my house and arrested me on May20, 1999. They didn’t charge me (under any act) but I was put in Owe Bo(Mandalay) prison for about one year. The authorities detained severalNLD members around the country before the ninth anniversary of the1990 general election.

2. I joined Aung San Suu Kyi’s Mandalay-Monywa trip because I wasresponsible for the security team in Mandalay North-West Township. Inmy car, the following persons were with me:

- Chit Tin- Aung Ko- Hla Than- Twel- Thein Aung Lay- Tun Tun Aung- Tin Maung Aye- Thanda Soe- Nyunt Nyunt- Wunna Maung and- a young member from Hton Done, Mandalay.

The driver was San Myint (also known as) Raju. Our car was a green Hiluxpick up.

3. On the morning of May 29th, 2003 at 10 am, we left the NLD MandalayDivision branch office. MI’s gray-color car (1B/8090) followed at the endof the NLD motorcade. When we reached Sagaing Bridge, we metprotestors. They held up signs which said “oppose axe handles who relyon foreigners” and so on. We reached the NLD Myinmu Township branchoffice at 11:15 am. Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD officials supervisedthe founding of the Township Youth Wing and the installation of the NLDTownship sign ceremonies. We left Myinmu at 2:45 pm. MI’s white colorSunny pick up (4A/5799) followed our motorcade. When we reached

Yeposar village, we met about 2000 motorbikes waiting to welcome us.

4. We reached the entrance of Monywa City at 3:15 pm. As our cars slowlymoved forward, we reached Monywa NLD branch late at night, at 9:30pm. Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD officials supervised the founding of the Township level Organizing Committee and the Youth Wing.The next day, May 30th, at 10:20 am, our motorcade assembled in front of Sein Mya mini mart and started to leave Monywa. MI’s cars such as a Hilux



pick up (1B/9458), a Parjaro van (Ma/4607), an Isuzu pick up (2B/2472)and a jeep (7138) followed the motorcade. The motorcade reached Zawticamonastery to pay respects to the monks. Then we continued our trip toOakkan Taw Ywa, another monastery. The NLD vice chairperson and generalsecretary reportedly donated robes to the abbot of Oakkan Taw Ywa.We reached Ah Lon Township at 11:15 am. MI personnel chased after themotorcade in a Hilux pick up (Da/9458) and another pick up (Has/4103).

At 1:05 pm, we reached Budalin Township. There was a ceremony foundingthe Township level NLD Youth Wing in Budalin. We left Budalin at 5:15pm. We reached Sai Pyin village at 6:15 pm. The motorcade stayed thereabout one hour while Aung San Suu Kyi spoke to the public for about half an hour. At 7:00 pm, we left Sai Pyin village.

5. At 7:30 pm, we reached Kyi village and villagers in waiting welcomedthe motorcade. At that time, another motorcade suddenly arrived at theback of our motorcade. The motorcade carried demonstrators (againstNLD). Their cars’ headlights gave lighting to the villagers and our motorcade.When their cars stopped, demonstrators immediately rushed towards usand started to attack the villagers.Some male NLD members warned the female NLD members to stay in thecar. Some NLD leaders from Mandalay Division tried to leave the car inorder to stop the attack. By that time, the demonstrators were next to ourmotorcade and start to attack us. They used batons and iron spikes. Theyalso threw stones at us. They carried the stones in bags. There were nostones nearby because there were only paddy fields at the road side.People pretending to be monks were among the attackers. Those shammonks covered their noses and mouths using yellow cloths. There werewhite strings on their hands.

The attackers had brown skin and they were short. They rudely shouted atus and they used rude words. At the same time, they continuously attackedus. The women in the car lay (and faced) down on the floor. We didn’thave any weapons. Our heads were targeted while they attacked us.I was attacked five times. Three times my head was hit. As a result, I havebeen having treatment until now. The other people in my car were beatenat least about five times. During the attack, an old woman was beatenseveral times because she looked at the area surrounding the attack.The jewelry we wore was looted while we were under attack. Bags, moneyand even slippers we wore were also looted. Each of us had about fiftythousand kyat to use during the trip.

6. Then, the attackers ordered us to move from our cars. They shouted, “Get out of the cars, otherwise, we will burn your cars!” They also removedthe NLD uniforms we wore. We all had to get out of our car. I wrapped mychest with the sarong I wore and moved out of the car. We all were beatenone time on our head while we moved from the car. That was why I felldown to the ground. I wasn’t able to open my eyes for a moment. I feltdizzy. Blood was covering my body.



We were lying down on the ground because we were wounded. Some of us were moaning. The attackers moved our cars to the road side towardsthe paddy fields. Then they collected their people. They shouted, “Wasthere anybody left? Let’s go!” They shouted to us, “Don’t try to look at us. Otherwise, you will be killed.” They destroyed the white Dyna truck, which was used by the Buddhistmonks accompanying the motorcade. The attackers burned down the truck but they shouted, “NLD burned down the truck!” The car which belonged to NLD members of Yay Oo and Tantse townshipswas also burned down. Then, the attackers went in the direction of ChaungOo and Monywa City driving their cars.

7. After they left, a man in our car gave us three or four shirts. We worethem. He was looted during the attack and he lost his camera, photos andmoney.I gave some treatment to some other wounded persons. I put tooth pasteon some wounds. I passed some water to them. I used Chinese toothpaste and two bottles of water. We planned to leave the place because wewere afraid the attackers would come back. I and some other NLD memberswent into the paddy field to hide.

8. At 11:00 pm, the attackers came back to that area. Some of us in thepaddy field secretly looked at them. The attackers had batons, shields andguns. They took the wounded people to their cars while they were shoutingrudely.Then, they moved the NLD member’s vehicles into different positions tocreate the impression that NLD members had been in car accidents, orlogs had fallen down on NLD member’s cars or NLD member’s cars had hittrees. Then, they photographed their creations. The NLD members wholooked at the attackers told us what they saw. We also saw the flasheswhen they took photographs. Later, they left in the direction of DepayinTownship.

At the same time, we heard gun shots. We thought that the gun shotswere coming from Depayin Township. We heard them until 4:00 am thenext morning. We came out of hiding at about 6:00 am. We met somevillagers looking at the area surrounding the attack. There were some carsand motorbikes destroyed.

9. I tried to get treatment for the wounds I received in the attack while Iwas hiding for ten months in Burma. On April 29th, 2004, I left Burma forthe Thai-Burma border.

I hereby declare that the above experiences from paragraphs 1 to 9 arethose which I have seen and known, and that I was not threatened,tricked or cheated to write my story - I expressed it of my own desire.

-Khin Aye Myint May 2, 2004

Bangkok, Thailand



Chapter (6)

Responses from internal political organizationsand leaders from around the world

In response to the 30 May Depayin Massacre, the re-arrestof Aung San Suu Kyi and all NLD leadership and theclosing of party offices, numerous statements have been

issued. They come from various internal and internationalorganizations, leaders and NGOs. They include the United Nations,the United States, as well as internal political parties such as ceasefiregroups and various political and ethnic organizations based all alongthe borders, the NCUB and the NCGUB.

Below are some of the selected statements:

Thakin Thein Pe

In his interviews with various foreign Burmese language radio

broadcasts, political veteran, Thakin Thein Pe, claimed that theDepayin Massacre was the second political assassination (referringto the assassination of Aung San Suu Kyi’s father General Aung Sanin 1947) and that State authorities were behind the massacre.106

Writer/ Journalist Ludu Daw Ahmar

Well-known writer and journalist, Ludu Daw Ahmar,commented that the case of the Depayin Massacre should be discussedin search of a resolution at the UN Security Council.107

Former Editor-in-Chief U Htein Lin

U Htein Lin, who is the former chief editor of the BotataungNewspaper, stated that an independent commission should be formedto investigate the Depayin Massacre and that all those who hadbeen detained following the massacre would have to be released.108



‘Thirty Comrades’ Member M ajor General Kyaw Zaw

In an interview with Radio Free Asia (RFA) on 10 June 2003,with regards to the May massacre and his outlook on theTatmadaw, ‘Thirty Comrades’ Member, Major General Kyaw Zaw,commented the following:

“Based on the information I have and theanalysis I have made, I believe that the DepayinMassacre was a pre-mediated assassination attempton Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s life. The army appears tohave assumed that once she was gone there would beno one left to defy them. The massacre was ugly andevil. I deplore it in the strongest possible terms. Thisis because, firstly, the NLD is a political organizationthat has worked for democracy peacefully. Secondly,she is the daughter of our Independence hero and the

leader of the armed forces, General Aung San. Sheherself is a national leader, and has remained at theforefront of the democratic movement and steadfastlyand bravely strived for the return of democracy inBurma. Furthermore, U Tin Oo is a former leader of the Tatmadaw, who won the “Thura” Award for hisbravery. He won the award when he fought alongsideme during our fight against the KMT,109 which was abattle to defend our nation. Therefore, he is also anational hero. He is also a national leader who hasstruggled for democracy alongside Daw Aung San Suu

Kyi. That is why I deplore the scheme to eliminatesuch personages and their organization in the strongestpossible terms. I am really worried about both Daw

Aung San Suu Kyi and U Tin Oo. This is my opinion.

When we established the Burmese Army in1941, under the leadership of General Aung San, weintended it to be used for the independence struggleas well as for the greater good of the country. Westuck to these objectives in the ensuing years. But the

lasting situation in Burma - the assassination attemptson the leaders of the people and the people themselves- has proven that the army has oppressed the peopleall along and that it has resorted to myriad of wickedmethods. If the situation continues in this way, thearmy will become like the ‘Lanmataw Phoe Toke Gang’,which the British created in order to suppress thepeople from outside of the law. And the country willfall into the abyss. All patriotic officers in the army

“ I deplorethe scheme

to eliminate(Suu Kyi)and (her)

organizationin the

strongestpossible

terms.”



should not let the situation further deteriorateindifferently. They should work to get the situationback to negotiations. That’s all I want to urge.

Our country is at a critical juncture. The firstpath is the continued monopoly of power by the armyand continuation of repression. If the army continuesto go down this road, it will be discarded into thehistorical dustbin for defying the will of the people. Itis the people who will suffer. Our national unity willbe affected and the situation may revert back to civilwar. The other path is for the army to make a retreatand follow the road to negotiations in accordance withthe UN resolutions. This is the road that will benefitthe country and the people. But it is the army that willhave to make the decision about which path it wantsto choose. That’s why I would like to urge the

Tatmadaw to bring about national unity thoughnegotiations which are beneficial to the people. Thepeople should also spur the Burmese Army so that itembarks on the road to negotiations. That’s all I wantto say.”

Furthermore, internal political parties, armed ethnic groups whomhave exchanged arms for peace, as well as those who have entered intoceasefire agreements with the Burmese Army, issued various statementsin regards to the Depayin Massacre.

Seventy Members of Parliament

Members of the NLD, as well as seventy Members of Parliament electedin the 1990 election, sent a letter to Senior General Than Shwe, the headof the military regime at that time, demanding the following:

1. To release all NLD members who accompanied NLD Vice-Chairman U Tin Oo and General Secretary Daw

Aung San Suu Kyi and have been detained followingthe Depayin Massacre.

2. To release all NLD Central Executive Committee members,including NLD Chairman U Aung Shwe, who have beenplaced under house arrest.

3. To allow the reopening all NLD offices that have beenforced to close in the wake of the massacre.



“There habeen groshumanrightsviolationsunder theBurmesemil itary

regime.”

4. To form an investigation commission so that it can makea list of and disclose the actual number of deaths, thewounded, detained and missing during and after themassacre.

5. To carry out the resolutions of the UN and to conveneParliament in accordance with the provisions of the 1990Election Law.110

Women Members of the NLD

Women members of the NLD sent letters to the SPDC urging theimmediate release of all NLD leaders, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi,and the reopening of all NLD offices across the nation.111

Members of the NLD from 6 Irraw addy Delta Townsh ips

Members and officials of the township organizing committees of the NLDfrom 6 Irrawaddy Delta townships sent a signed letter demanding that theUN Security Council take immediate action regarding the DepayinMassacre. The demands are as follows:

1. To release all political prisoners, including the nationalleader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, unconditionally and

immediately and to cease unlawful arrests.

2. To immediately reopen all NLD offices that have beenclosed following the massacre, to allow freedom of movement and activities and to allow such freedoms toother political parties.

3. To carry out the results of the 1990 election that, accordingto numerous UN resolutions, is the demonstration of thegenuine will of the people.

4. To form an independent and impartial commission toinvestigate the Depayin Massacre on 30 May and publishthe subsequent findings.

A total of 2,976 members of the NLD from six townships signedthe letter. The townships’ names and the number of signatures are asfollows:



· Kyon Pyaw 941· Kyaung Gon 977· Bogalay 508· Pantanaw 66· Malamyaing Kyun 198· Nga Thaing Chaung 286

This letter was sent to the office of the UN Secretary General so thattruth can be brought to light and justice served.112

NLD Youth Wing

The Youth Wing of the NLD sent a letter to UN Secretary GeneralKofi Anan on 8 July 2003 urging him to take appropriate actions regardingthe Depayin Massacre. In the letter, the Youth Wing members wrote:

“Recently NLD General Secretary Daw Aung San SuuKyi made a trip to Upper Burma with the agreement of theBurmese military junta, in order to carry out party functionsas well as the reopening of NLD offices. She was welcomedby thousands of people throughout her journey.

(However), more than 70 people were killed and over100 people were wounded during an ambush near a villagecalled Kyi in Depayin Township, Shwebo District in SagaingDivision on 30 May 2003. Although the party Vice-Chairman,U Tin Oo, and General Secretary Daw Aung San Suu Kyi

were able to escape narrowly, the Burmese military juntahas detained scores of NLD members in various prisons.Therefore, the Depayin incident will remain in history as amassacre orchestrated by the dictatorial government.

There is absolutely no doubt that there have beengross human rights violations under the rule of the Burmesemilitary regime. Therefore we, the members of the NLD

Youth Wing, would like to urge you to carry out the followingmeasures immediately:”

1. To request that the Burmese junta report tothe UN immediately regarding the May massacreor form an independent commission toinvestigate the killings.

2. To request that the Burmese junta releaseunconditionally and immediately all students,



monks and political prisoners who have beenpunished (following the massacre).

3. To request that the Burmese junta reopen allNLD offices and declare a clear and conciseprogram to the world in order to carry out theresults of the 1990 election within six months.

4. To take up Burma’s case at the UN SecurityCouncil so that appropriate measures, includingfurther sanctions, can be taken and to removethe representation of the Burmese junta fromthe UN.113

Seven Ceasefire Groups

Regarding the May massacre, seven ethnic groups that have enteredinto ceasefire agreements with the Burmese junta issued a statement on 1July 2003. The seven groups include the Kachin Independence Organization,Kayan New Land Party, Karenni Nationalities’ People Liberation Front,Palaung State Liberation Army, Shan State Peace Council, New Mon StateParty and Shan Nationalities’ People Liberation Organization.

Nine Ethnic Polit ical Parties inside Burma

“We are greatly saddened by the deaths and wounding of

the people, which was the result of violence among fellowcountrymen on 30 May 2003. We also feel saddened because (theambush) has even led to interventions by the UN and theinternational community.”

The nine ethnic political parties are:

1. Mara People’s Party2. Zomi National Congress3. Mon National Democratic Front

4. Chin National League for Democracy5. Shan Nationalities League for Democracy6. Karen National Congress for Democracy7. Kayah State Nationalities League for Democracy8. Kachin State Nationalities Democracy Conference9. Kayan Nationalities Unity League

In their statement on 7 July 2003, with regards to the prevailingpolitical situation in Burma, the nine groups stated:



“We urge the cessation of all kinds of violenceimmediately in the name of the nation and its people. Wealso deplore those who created the violence in the strongestpossible terms. We urge (all parties concerned) to find politicalsolutions through political negotiations.” 114

United Nationalit ies League for Democracy

The United Nationalities League for Democracy (UNLD) issued a statementon 29 September 2003, with regards to the current political situation inBurma. The statement includes the UNLD’s five-point policy and politicalroadmap. The first point of the policy concerns the Depayin Massacre.

1. “Just and equitable investigation into the Depayinepisode.”

“It is unmistakably clear that the 30th May 2003

occurrence near the town of Depayin, Sagaing Division wasa grave political killing ‘fest’ of enormous significance. Theauthorities say that it was the result of the National Leaguefor Democracy’s (NLD) unruly behavior, but the NLD claimsthat it was a well-organized premeditated attack by the otherside.

No matter what they say, there is no dispute aboutthe fact that the clash was between followers of the NLD on

one side and Union Solidarity and Development Association(USDA) members on the other side, with over 1,000 personsarmed with swords, clubs, bamboo spears and catapults.The authorities announced that there were 4 deaths, but theNLD claims that the number of missing and dead exceeded100. This event is not a mere “internal affair”. It is a regionaland international issue, which has aroused global interest.

A government that claims “law and order” is itsprimary concern should not trivially brush aside a people-

killing orgy of such grave proportions. It is necessary thatthe matter be immediately investigated and with the utmostconcern for justice. It is most astonishing and inequitablefor NLD leaders, including U Tin Oo and Daw Aung San SuuKyi, to be arrested and imprisoned, for all NLD offices to beshut down, and for other NLD leaders to be placed underhouse arrest while no action whatsoever has been takenagainst the military government’s sponsored USDA.



No one can deny that such a serious event – the killingand destruction of human lives – requires investigation. SinceUSDA members are involved, it is not proper that theinvestigation be performed by anyone who is under themilitary government’s authority. In order for the truth to berevealed, the investigation should be conducted by the UnitedNations. We think that after such an investigation a TruthCommission (similar to that in South Africa) should be formedso that the process of forgiveness and reconciliation cancommence. Once the truth is revealed, political hatred willbe reduced and both sides can begin building a climate of trust. We believe this is the first step. To pretend thatnothing happened would only build up suspicion in bothcamps and this is not the road that should be taken.

We request members of the military and members of the NLD who love their country and their fellowmen to give

this message serious consideration.”

National Council of the Union of Burma

The National Council of the Union of Burma demanded in astatement, issued on 2 June 2003, that the junta cease all violence, includingthe provocation of and attacks upon the NLD and the public, release allpolitical detainees including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD members,reopen NLD offices, investigate the deaths, wounded and other lossesincurred during the Depayin Massacre, and that the NLD and Daw Aung

San Suu Kyi be allowed to engage in political activities freely.115

ABFSU (FAC) / ABSDF / DPN S / NDD

The All Burma Federation of Students Unions (Foreign AffairsCommittee), the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front, the DemocraticParty for a New Society and the Network for Democracy and Developmentissued a joint statement regarding the Depayin Massacre in which theywrote:

“We deplore the Burmese military clique in thestrongest possible terms for the detention of all NLD leaders,including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and the closing of all NLDoffices throughout the country. It is clear and undeniablethat the military-backed USDA disturbed and harassed theNLD throughout Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s organizing trips.There is also evidence that the USDA continuously disturbedand harassed the NLD during her previous trips and these

“Once truthis revealed,

political hatredw ill be reducedand both sides

can beginbuilding aclimate of

trust.”



acts of harassment worsened during her trip to Kachin State.The Burmese junta, which obtained power illegally, must beheld responsible for the deaths and injuries inflicted uponNLD members, students, monks and the public throughviolent acts. These acts also demonstrate and reveal thegenuine nature of the Burmese junta by prioritizing thecontinuation of their rule before the interests of the people.Furthermore, (the Depayin Massacre) is an insult andchallenge to the whole nation, pro-democracy groups, ethnicnationalities and all other organizations and countries wishingto see the return of democracy in Burma.” 116

Communist Party of Burma

Regarding the Depayin Massacre, a spokesman for the CentralOrganizing Committee of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) said the

following in a statement (No. 7/2003) issued on 6 June 2003:

“We the CPB demand the immediate formation of acommission comprised of respectable monks and individualsregarding the violence that occurred near Monywa. Wedemand the speedy publication of a report (by thecommission). We also demand that those who are responsiblefor the violence be prosecuted.” 117

NLD Statement on National Day

To mark the National Day, the NLD issued a statement on 18November 2003. In the statement, the NLD called for the following to bepromptly implemented:

“As a first step, all NLD leaders, including Daw AungSan Suu Kyi and U Tin Oo, must be released immediatelyand unconditionally. All political prisoners must be releasedin the same manner. All NLD offices, which have beentemporarily closed since 31 May 2003, must be reopened as

soon as possible. All political parties must be allowed freedomof assembly and allowed to carry out their activities.Furthermore, in order to demonstrate to the people of Burmaand the international community that the prevalence of lawthroughout the nation is respected and that everyone is equalin the presence of the law, it is the sole responsibility of theSPDC to form an independent commission comprised of members who enjoy trust and acceptance by the people andallow that commission to investigate the massacre freely.” 118



US Secretary of State Colin Powell

The following is an article written by Collin Powell,which was published in the Wall Street Journal on 12 June 2003:

It’s Time to Turn the Tables On Burma’s Thugs

By COLIN L. POWELL

WASHINGTON — United Nations Special Envoy Razali Ismail has just visited Burma

and was able to bring us news that Aung San Suu Kyi, a Nobel Peace Prize winner and

the leader of a peaceful democratic party known as the National League for Democracy,

is well and unharmed. The thoughts and prayers of free people everywhere have been

with her these past two weeks. Our fears for her current state of health are now somewhat

lessened.

On May 30, her motorcade was attacked by thugs, and then the thugs who run the

Burmese government placed her under “protective custody.” We can take comfort inthe fact that she is well. Unfortunately, the larger process that Ambassador Razali and

Aung San Suu Kyi have been pursuing – to restore democracy in Burma — is failing

despite their good will and sincere efforts. It is time to reassess our policy toward a

military dictatorship that has repeatedly attacked democracy and jailed its heroes.

There is little doubt on the facts. Aung San Suu Kyi’s party won an election in 1990 and

since then has been denied its place in Burmese politics. Her party has continued to

pursue a peaceful path, despite personal hardships and lengthy periods of house arrest

or imprisonment for her and her followers. Hundreds of her supporters remain in prison,

despite some initial releases and promises by the junta to release more. The party’s

Offices have been closed and their supporters persecuted. Ambassador Razali haspursued every possible opening and worked earnestly to help Burma make a peaceful

transition to democracy. Despite initial statements last year, the junta — which shamelessly

calls itself the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) — has now refused his

efforts and betrayed its own promises.

At the end of last month, this rejection manifested itself in violence. After the May 30

attack on Aung San Suu Kyi’s convoy, we sent U.S. Embassy officers to the scene to

gather information. They reported back that the attack was planned in advance. A series

of trucks followed her convoy to a remote location, blocked it and then unloaded thugs

to swarm with fury over the cars of democracy supporters. The attackers were brutaland organized; the victims were peaceful and defenseless. The explanation by the Burmese

military junta of what happened doesn’t hold water. The SPDC has not made a credible

report of how many people were killed and injured. It was clear to our embassy officers

that the members of the junta were responsible for directing and producing this staged

riot.

We have called for a full accounting of what happened that day. We have called for Aung

San Suu Kyi to be released from confinement of any kind. We have called for the

“The attackerswere bruta

and organizedthe victims

werepeaceful and

defenceless.”



release of the other leaders of the National League for Democracy who were jailed by

the SPDC before and after the attack. We have called for the offices of the National

League for Democracy to be allowed to reopen. We are in touch with other governments

who are Concerned about the fate of democracy’s leader and the fate of democracy in

Burma to encourage them, too, to pressure the SPDC.

The Bush administration agrees with members of Congress, including Sen. Mitch

McConnell, who has been a leading advocate of democracy in Burma, that the time has

come to turn up the pressure on the SPDC.

Here’s what we’ve done so far. The State Department has already extended our visa

restrictions to include all officials of an organization related to the junta — the Union

Solidarity and Development Association – and the managers of state-run enterprises so

that they and their families can be banned as well.

The United States already uses our voice and our vote against loans to Burma from the

World Bank and other international financial institutions. The State Department reports

honestly and frankly on the crimes of the SPDC in our reports on Human Rights, Traffickingin Persons, Drugs, andInternational Religious Freedom. In all these areas, the junta gets

a failing grade. We also speak out frequently and strongly in favor of the National League

for Democracy, and against the SPDC. I will press the case in Cambodia next week

when I meet with the leaders of Southeast Asia, despite their traditional reticence to

confront a member and neighbor of their association, known as Asean.

Mr. McConnell has introduced the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act in the Senate;

Reps. Henry Hyde and Tom Lantos have introduced a similar bill in the House. We

support the goals and intent of the bills and are working with the sponsors on an

appropriate set of new steps. Those who follow this issue will know that our support for

legislation is in fact a change in the position of this administration and previous ones as

well. Simply put, the attack on Ms. Suu Kyi’s convoy and the utter failure of the junta to

accept efforts at peaceful change cannot be the last word on the matter. The junta that

oppresses democracy inside Burma must find that its actions will not be allowed to

stand.

There are a number of measures that should now be taken, many of them in the proposed

legislation. It’s time to freeze the financial assets of the SPDC. It’s time to ban remittances

to Burma so that the SPDC cannot benefit from the foreign exchange. With legislation,

we can, and should, place restrictions on travel-related transactions that benefit the

SPDC and its supporters. We also should further limit commerce with Burma that enrichesthe junta’s generals. Of course, we would need to ensure consistency with our World

Trade Organization and other international obligations. Any legislation will need to be

carefully crafted to take into account our WTO obligations and the president’s need for

waiver authority, but we should act now.

By attacking Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters, the Burmese junta has finally and

definitively rejected the efforts of the outside world to bring Burma back into the

international community. Indeed, their refusal of the work of Ambassador Razali and of



the rights of Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters could not be clearer. Our response

must be equally clear if the thugs who now rule Burma are to understand that their failure

to restore democracy will only bring more and more pressure against them and their

supporters.

Mr. Powell is Secretary of State of the United States.

US State Department

The State Department released a statement on the birthday of Burmesedemocracy activist Aung San Suu Kyi on June 19 calling for her immediaterelease and urging the military junta to provide “a full accounting of thedead, injured, and missing from the attack of May 30” on Suu Kyi andmany of her supporters.

“The continued detention of Aung San Suu Kyi, members of her politicalparty and others who have peacefully expressed their political views, is

without cause and unacceptable,” the statement reads. “They should bereleased immediately and the offices of the National League for Democracyshould be reopened without delay. We call on Burma’s military rulers tobegin work immediately with the National League of Democracy to formulatea concrete plan to restore democracy in Burma.”

The following is the text of the statement:

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Office of the Spokesman, 19 June2003STATEMENT BY PHILIP T. REEKER, DEPUTY SPOKESMAN

Burma - Birthday of Aung San Suu KyiToday is the birthday of the leader of the democratic opposition in Burma,

Aung San Suu Kyi. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell has sent his personalgreetings, but our embassy has been unable to deliver them to her thisyear because, sadly, this is the seventh birthday since 1989 that she hasspent under detention by her country’s military rulers. A Nobel Peace Prizelaureate who stands for nonviolent change to improve the lives of thepeople of her nation, Aung San Suu Kyi is a symbol for those who supportdemocracy and freedom around the world. Her struggle on behalf of thepeople of Burma is now in its 15th year.

Last year at this time Aung San Suu Kyi had recently been released fromhouse arrest and was working toward a political dialogue which wouldlead to national reconciliation. The ruling military junta, the “State Peaceand Development Council,” has now dashed these hopes and dreams of the Burmese people.

The continued detention of Aung San Suu Kyi, members of her politicalparty and others who have peacefully expressed their political views, iswithout cause and unacceptable. They should be released immediately



and the offices of the National League for Democracy should be reopenedwithout delay. We call on Burma’s military rulers to begin work immediatelywith the National League of Democracy to formulate a concrete plan torestore democracy in Burma.

We also call on the junta for a full accounting of the dead, injured, andmissing from the attack of May 30, now known to Burmese as “Black

Friday.”

The situation in Burma is of grave concern not just for the United States.Secretary Powell met with Burma’s neighbors this week to emphasize thatthe international community must work together for reform. We welcomethe statement of the ASEAN member states on Burma and support ASEAN’splans to send a troika delegation to Rangoon.

We salute Aung San Suu Kyi and hope that future birthdays find her livingfree in a free Burma.

U.S. Reports Signs of Deliberate Attack on Bu rmese Activist’sMotorcade

(5 June State Department new s release)

U.S. officials have found indications that a motorcade carrying Burmesedemocracy activist Aung San Suu Kyi on May 30 was hit in a “premeditatedambush,” and that the individuals carrying out the assault on her groupwere affiliated with Burma’s ruling authority, according to a June 5 statementby Deputy State Department Spokesman, Philip Reeker.

“We call on the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in

Burma to provide a full accounting of the dead, injured, and missing,” Reeker said.

He termed as “outrageous and unacceptable” the continued detention inisolation of Aung San Suu Kyi and other members of her political party.

“We call on the SPDC to release them immediately, and to provide allnecessary medical attention to those who have been injured, includingassistance from international specialists,” Reeker said.

Following is the text of Reeker’s June 5 statement on the May 30 ambushof Aung San Suu Kyi:

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Office of the Spokesman, 5 June 2003

STATEMENT BY PHILIP T. REEKER, DEPUTY SPOKESMAN

Burma - Ambush on Aung San Suu Kyi

Officials from the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon have returned from a visitto the site of the May 30 violent attack on Aung San Suu Kyi and her



traveling party. Their findings indicate that there was a premeditatedambush on Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade. Circumstances and reportsfrom individuals in the region indicate that the attack was conducted bygovernment-affiliated thugs. The debris remaining at the scene suggestsa major clash, which could easily have resulted in serious injuries tolarge numbers of people.

We call on the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) inBurma to provide a full accounting of the dead, injured, and missing.

The continued detention in isolation of Aung San Suu Kyi and othermembers of her political party is outrageous and unacceptable. We callon the SPDC to release them immediately, and to provide all necessarymedical attention to those who have been injured, including assistancefrom international specialists. The offices of the National League forDemocracy closed by the SPDC should be reopened without delay andtheir activities no longer proscribed.

United Nations Special Envoy Razali Ismail will be visiting Burma onJune 6. The U.S. fully supports his efforts. He must be allowed to see

Aung San Suu Kyi and other opposition leaders. If Amb. Razali is notable to meet privately with Aung San Suu Kyi, the U.S. will need toevaluate the utility of this U.N.-sponsored effort to support nationalreconciliation in Burma.

U.S. Condemns Burmese Government’s Detention of Suu Kyi(State Department 2 June statement)

Following is the text of a statement released by the Department of Stateon June 2 on the detention of Aung San Suu Kyi and the closing of theNational League for Democracy’s offices in Burma:

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Office of the Spokesman, 2 June 2003

STATEMENT BY PHILIP T. REEKER, DEPUTY SPOKESMAN

Burma - Detention of Aung San Suu Kyi

The United States condemns placing National League for Democracyleader Aung San Suu Kyi in any sort of custody. The recent detention of

Aung San Suu Kyi and other senior leaders of her party marks asignificant step back for the military regime in Rangoon and for thepeople of Burma. The closing of the offices of the National League forDemocracy across the country hinders national reconciliation and apeaceful transition to democracy and is inconsistent with the will andrights of the Burmese people.

We call on the regime for the immediate release of these officials and thereopening of their offices. A government that does not allow peaceful



political expression or an atmosphere in which citizens can peacefullyexpress their views cannot be counted as a responsible member of theinternational community. The United States, in coordination with otherconcerned members of the international community, including membersof the United Nations Security Council, is considering all measuresavailable in our efforts to foster this transition to democracy.

We also continue to support the efforts of United Nations Special EnvoyTan Sri Razali Ismail to meet with all parties in Burma to encouragenational reconciliation. We urge the regime to provide the conditions thatwill allow for a successful visit this week. Officials at the highest levels of the military regime should meet with him and take advantage of thisvisit to reverse this recent setback and make substantial progress on theroad to a better future for the people of Burma.

Endnotes

106 Unofficial translation of Thakin Thein Pe’s interview with RFA on 21 June 2003.107 Unofficial translation of Ludu Daw Ahmar’s interview with RFA on 25 June 2003.108 Unofficial translation of U Htein Lin’s interview with RFA on 9 June 2003.109 KMT stands for Kuomintang, the Nationalist Chinese army that invaded Burma and

remained until a Burmese army offensive drove them out in 1961.110 Unofficial translation.111 Ibid.112 Ibid.113 Ibid.114 Ibid.115 Ibid.

116 Ibid.117 Ibid.118 Ibid.



Chapter (7)

Statements and Pleas fromthe Ad hoc Commission onthe Depayin Massacre

The Comm ission’s Explanation and Plea to the People of Burma and the In ternational Community on the Three-Month

Anniversary of the Depayin M assacre:

1. Today marks the three-month anniversary of the Depayin Massacre.During the time since the formation of the Ad hoc Commission on theDepayin Massacre on 25 June 2003, we have been able to smuggle outeight eyewitnesses, who themselves were victims present at the massacre,to the liberated areas of Burma. Subsequently, the Commission hassystematically recorded their testimonies. The Commission has also receivedtwo more affidavits that were sent directly from witnesses inside Burma.

The Commission has exposed the scheme and events of the massacre

to the world through the Senate of Thailand. Similar activities are beingorganized so that witnesses can testify in the parliaments and congressesof other countries.

Likewise, the Commission has been in contact with internationalhuman rights organizations and tried to solicit cooperation from them inits endeavors to expose the events of the May massacre. The Commissionhas also been garnering support and sympathy from academics and groupsthat have been instrumental in establishing an international court for trying

war crimes.

2. In its endeavors to convince the UN Security Council to take upthe Depayin case, on the grounds that the Depayin Massacre is a crimeagainst humanity and that the nature of the massacre transcends nationalborders, the Commission has continually submitted letters and appeals tothe UN Secretary General. Letters were also sent to the leaders of thevarious countries to achieve this end.



clear that the SPDC was behind the planning and execution of the attack against the NLD motorcade.

5. Based on the testimonies of the majority of eyewitnesses, theCommission has had the opportunity to study the attempts and activitiesconducted by the SPDC in order to cover up the crime, seemingly soimpossible to conceal. Following is some of the evidence of such activities:

· Cleaning up and removal of blood that hadstained the road, as a result of the massacre,overnight.

· Removal and destruction of the victims’ corpses,overnight.

· Rearrangement of the crime scene. Vehicles thathad been destroyed in the melee were re-

arranged and photographs were then taken insuch a way that they backed up the SPDC’sassertions.

· Victims who were unable to escape, due toinjuries, were sent to prisons instead of hospitalsfor treatment.

· Potential eyewitnesses from and around thevillage of Kyi were forcibly relocated to othervillages following the incident

· Prisoners were released only after they hadsigned a legal agreement stating that they wouldnot discuss the events surrounding themassacre.

· Burma’s Foreign Minister, U Win Aung, was sentto Asean countries with photographs of the re-arranged crime scene in order to support theSPDC’s claim that nothing of importance had

happened.

· SPDC summoned the ceasefire groups and gavea similar explanation to them.

Meanwhile, the junta acted as though it would initiate some sort of political reform and cooperate with the international community, due tomounting international pressure. However, these were merely part of the

junta’s ruses to re-direct the attention of the country, as well as that of the



international community, so that over time the Depayin Massacre wouldbe forgotten, without a proper investigation into the incident and therevealing of subsequent evidence.

6. The Depayin Massacre was a brutal crime perpetrated againstthe leaders of the political party that won the elections in May 1990 andtheir supporters. Reconciliation between the Burmese junta and the NLDwill remain a mere fantasy, as long as the truth surrounding the events of the massacre and the prosecution of those responsible for the attack remains unresolved.

In order for the SPDC to continue its project to eliminate Daw AungSan Suu Kyi and the NLD and to suppress information regarding the DepayinMassacre, the junta has been trying to persuade ethnic groups into itsfold. By giving political incentives and claiming that it would open upnegotiations, through discussions with ethnic groups and their leaders,the junta is using delay tactics so that demands for uncovering the truth

surrounding the massacre fade away. The Commission has previouslyobserved the Burmese junta’s general tendency to use such tactics.

7. The Depayin Massacre is no longer a case that concerns the NLDand Daw Aung San Suu Kyi alone. It has become a brutal act that concernsthe entire nation. If innocent people, including an internationally-acclaimedperson such as the Nobel Laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, were blatantlyattacked, and if no existing organization in the world is able to take actionagainst the junta and it continues to be exempt from persecution, theBurmese junta will be even more emboldened in the future to commit anycrime against anyone at any given time and place. Therefore, uncovering

the truth about the events surrounding the massacre has become a pre-condition to the process of negotiations between the SPDC and the NLD,which may pave the way for eventual reconciliation and democratizationin Burma.

8. The Commission has tried its level best to solicit cooperationfrom pro-democracy activists, human rights groups and news organizations.However, the success of such actions has not yet been satisfactory. TheCommission needs further cooperation from the public, overseas Burmese,pro-democracy groups and ethnic nationalities. The work of the Commission

will be more meaningful and complete in its attempts at uncovering thetruth concerning the Depayin Massacre only when it receives moreinformation, evidence and testimonies from eyewitnesses. Only then maythe Commission be able to find ways to convince the internationalcommunity to take action, including the possible adoption of a Depayinagenda at the UN Security Council.

9. The Commission would like to call on the people of Burma and theinternational community to carry out the following:



brutally suppress anyone who defies its rule or disrupts its plans to holdonto power. This certainty will remain the case, so long as the authoritiesrefuse to take appropriate actions against those who are responsible forthe murders at Depayin. Therefore, it has become the duty of each andeveryone one of us to let the world know the truth concerning the massacreand bring the culprits to justice, so that no similar massacre is repeated inhuman society.

3. The Commission has recorded evidence with the thanks of theUNLD, Members of Parliament, NLD members and leaders who have calledfor the formation of an independent commission under the auspices of theUN. However, at the same time, the Commission would like to point outthe more needs to be done. Although the massacre involved roughly5,000 people and is considered to be of a particularly heinous naturebecause of the loss of so many lives, the Commission has found that theresponse from the public, as well as political parties and human rightsorganizations, regarding the massacre has not been adequate.

Therefore, we would like to call on you, the people of Burma, tocarry out the following during the weeklong visit of Professor Pinheiro toBurma to investigate the human rights situation in the country.

a) Send all information you may have to ProfessorPinheiro by using all available methods, so that hecan report his complete findings concerning themassacre to the UN General Assembly on 12November.

b) Write, via Professor Pinheiro, to the UN SecretaryGeneral so that the UN Security Council can sendan independent investigation commission to Burmaby using the powers of the council.

c) Write or speak to the media, especially the radio,so that you may tell the people of Burma aboutyourself and your organization’s efforts to uncoverthe truth concerning the massacre.

-The Ad hoc Commission on the Depayin Massacre 1 November 2003

For more information please contact U Aung Htoo, Coordinator.



Explanation and Plea of the Ad hoc Commission onthe Depayin Massacre to the People of Burma on the

Sixth-Month Anniversary of the Massacre:

1. Upon his return from his investigative mission to Burma, UNSpecial Rapporteur for Human Rights in Burma, Professor Pinheiro,

submitted his report to the Third Committee of the 58 th UN General Assembly on 12 November 2003. In the report, he called for a need toconduct an independent inquiry regarding the Depayin Massacre. In hisconcluding remarks, he said, “I can say that there is prima facie evidencethat the Depayin incident could not have happened without the convenienceof the State agents.”

2. The Commission’s investigation has revealed that, “The DepayinMassacre is a pre-mediated crime against Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and NLDmembers and other officials who accompanied with intent to kill andeliminate the party once and for all.” This is evident due to the followingfacts:

· Militia training sessions were given to prior tothe massacre.

· Careful selection of weapons (in order toconceal the fact that it was pre-mediated).

· Systematic and careful selection of time andplace to commit the crime.

· The use of a command and control system thatis only used by armed forces.

· Systematic mobilization of some 5,000 peopleto commit the crime.

· Detention of the wounded and witnesses afterthe massacre.

· Re-arrangement of the crime scene and

destruction of evidential materials.

· Supervision of the attacks by an army majorand a policy chief at a location closest to thekilling field.

These are the analyses of the Commission after careful examinationof news, information and testimonies given by witnesses. In addition, the



Commission will publish a second preliminary report in order to providemore information and analyses to the people of Burma and beyond.

3. Although the number of deaths and injuries sustained by thepeople at the Depayin Massacre did not reach the magnitude of those inRwanda or Yugoslavia, the Commission finds that the Depayin Massacre isa “crime against humanity” due to the following facts:

a) The pre-meditated violence was unnecessary andgross violations of human rights during peacetimeare as criminal, if not more so, as those committedduring armed conflict.

b) The second distinguishing feature of a crimeagainst humanity is that it is committed in aplanned, systematic manner, insofar as it is directedagainst a specific ‘civilian population’ and not

merely random individuals.

c) For it to be considered a crime against humanity,it must be demonstrated that the perpetratortargeted the victims specifically based on theirsocial, political, racial, religious or other affiliation.

d) The incident was executed in order to intimidatethe entire ‘civilian population.’

4. No matter how much is agreed upon politically between dictatorial

regimes and pro-democracy groups in countries that transform fromdictatorship to democracy through negotiated settlement, and regardlessif the culprits are pardoned domestically, those who commit the followingcrimes, according to international law, can never be absolved of responsibility; they must be held accountable for their crimes.

· Genocide

· Convention against torture

· Crimes against humanity

· War crimes

Recent instructions that the UN has given to Sierra Leone (regardingcrimes committed during the civil war) attest to the fact that criminals whocommit the above-mentioned crimes can in fact be tried internationally.



5. All efforts to bring justice to the victims of the Depayin Massacreand prosecute those who are responsible for the crime are being exertedin order to:

· Prevent further heinous crimes,

· Seek justice for the victims, and

· Seek institutional reform so that Burmamay adopt a governance mechanismthat guarantees peace, stability, freedomand justice in the future.

6. Based on the above-mentioned points, the Ad hoc Commissionon the Depayin Massacre would like to call on the people of Burma and theinternational community to carry out the following:

a) All political and ethnic leaders, and theirorganizations along with various political forces,are urged to work toward the formation of anindependent commission under the auspices of theUN Security Council.

b) Collect more information and evidential materialsand search for eyewitnesses whose testimonies willprovide better verification, so that all of thisinformation can be submitted to the UNsystematically. In order to achieve this end the

victims, witnesses, people present at the time of the crime, NLD leaders at all levels, Members of Parliament, international law experts andinternational organizations based within andoutside the country and those who are activelyparticipating in the efforts to bring about justiceconcerning the massacre are urged to work together with news organizations and disseminateinformation pertaining to the Depayin Massacre.

c) Efforts should be made within national andinternational networks to form a “DepayinCampaign Committee” which will work until theUN forms an independent commission toinvestigate the massacre and prosecute those whoare responsible for the crime.

-The Ad hoc Commission on Depayin Massacre 30 November 2003



Chapter (8)

Authorities’ involvement in the massacre

Please Note: This chapter contains new information and has been added to the English

version. the orginal Burmese version of this publication did not include Chapter (8)

The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) held a press conferenceat 4:00 pm on 31 May 2003, regarding the attack on 30 May near DepayinTownship. The press conference took place merely 16 hours after theattack.

At the press conference, Tin Winn, Minister for Labor and Chairperson of the Public Relations and Information Committee, claimed the incident wasa clash between supporters and opponents of Aung San Suu Kyi and theNational League for Democracy (NLD). He explained that the two sidesstarted to clash after the cars in Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade rushedfrom the crowd.

His explanation included details about Aung San Suu Kyi’s trips around

Burma. He said that Aung San Suu Kyi visited Thamanya Hill, Mon State,from 11 June to 15 June in 2002. In truth, she visited there to pay respectto Badanta Wenia, the monk at Thamanya Hill, on 14 June 2002 and leftthe next day. Tin Win said that the trip took five days. His facts andexplanations are therefore unreliable.

On 3 June 2003, Khin Maung Win, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, invited foreign diplomats in order to explain the events of 30 Mayto them.

On 26 March 2004, U Mya Than, Burma’s Permanent

Representative to United Nations, presented a statement at the 60th sessionof the Commission on Human Rights. He presented the followinginformation:

· The 30 May event was an accident.

· “Government security officials advised NLD members thatDaw Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD members should notventure on a trip to the area near Depayin, as there was



no police or military presence and that their safety couldnot be assured. Against this advice, Daw Aung San SuuKyi and the NLD members went to that particular area.” Therefore, claiming that it is was an ‘accident’ thegovernment had tried to prevent.

· There was no premeditat ion on the part of thegovernment.

· The event occurred when Aung San Suu Kyi made asecond trip to the Shwebo region, after her visit to thesame area a few days earlier.

The Commission (AHCDM) claims responsibility for the explanationof what actually occurreded on 30 May, based on the affidavits of eyewitnesses, data, and documents the Commission had received and isin its possession.

According to the true facts and evidence:

On the morning of 30 May 2003, the chairperson of the 1990Multi-party Democracy General Election Commission at Depayin Township,gave permission to the NLD to install an NLD sign at the township NLDoffice and found a township NLD Youth Wing.

At about 2:00 am, the chairperson of the Depayin Township Peaceand Development Council issued a curfew that stated that villagers fromthe village of Ywa Thit could not leave their homes (Ywa Thit is close to

the massacre area).

After the massacre on 1 June, authorities sealed off the house of Maung Maung in Depayin Township. As a result, he and his family membershad to rent a house to stay at. The NLD had had a plan to install an NLDsign in his house, in order to run the township NLD branch office.

On 30 May at about 5:00 pm, a few hours before the massacre,the phone lines of the following places and persons were cut off:

· NLD Headquarters in Rangoon

· NLD leaders including U Lwin, spokesperson of NLD

· Officers from the NLD Headquarters in Rangoon

The massacre took place in the area of Paya Htwet Village (locatedin Kyi Village group) and Ywa Thit Village (located in Yin Tway Village



group) in Depayin Township, an area under the control of MilitaryIntelligence Unit 20.

The Irrigation Department compound, in front of Ywa Thit Village,was created as a base camp and control camp for the attack. During themassacre, the following persons were present at the compound:

· Lt. Col Than Han, chairperson of the Shwe Bo

District Peace and Development Council

· Tin Ohn, chairperson of the Depayin TownshipPeace and Development Council

· Thaung Win, Township Police Commander, DepayinTownship Police Department

· Sein Win, police officer, Depayin Township PoliceDepartment

Four NLD members on two motorbikes left the NLD motorcade inorder to check security conditions. They were: Bo Maung (elected MP of Depayin Constituency-1), Than Zaw Win (Ta Nel Village), Than Tun (TaungPyin Quarter) and San Myint (Pincy Village).

Tin Ohn, chairperson of the Depayin Township Peace andDevelopment Council, stopped them as they neared Ywa Thit Village.Township Police Commander, Thaung Win, then detained them.

A white Sunny pick up (license # Da/801) that had left the NLDmotorcade in order to check the security conditions was forced to stop asit reached the three rolls of barbed wire barricades in front of the IrrigationDepartment. Lt. Col. Than Han, chairperson of the Shwe Bo District Peaceand Development Council, ordered security personnel to detain the threepeople inside of the car. They were: Aung Aung, Naing Naing and MyoMin. When they were sent into the Irrigation Department compound, theymet about 15 persons who had been detained earlier. Villagers from TaNel Village and policemen, led by police officer Sein Win, guarded detainees.

Those villagers were holding sticks, and brandishing them as weapons. As Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade headed towards Ywa Thit Village, thedetainees were put into a Dyna truck in the Irrigation Departmentcompound. They were then handcuffed and fastened two by two.

On 25 May 2003, Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade was disturbedwhen it reached Kyi Tauk Pauk Village, Singu Township, in Pyin Oo LwinDistrict. Swe Win and Myint Ngwe, of the local USDA, and Myint Lwin and

Aung Myint, of the Village and Quarters Peace and Development Council,

Lt. Col Than Han



led the disturbances. The protestors forcefully drove into the peoplewelcoming Aung San Suu Kyi and her entourage, using loud speakersfixed to Dyna trucks (license # 2 Kha/4363, 5 Ka/1899, and 2 Ka/3726)and Hilux pickup trucks (license # 7 Ka/6643 and Ba/7358). Lt. Col. ThanHan, chairperson of the Shwe Bo District Peace and Development Council,closely supervised the protestors.

The head of Shwe Bo District, Sagaing Division traveled to Pyin OoLwin District, Mandalay Division in order to participate in the disturbancesagainst Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD members. It’s clear that he could nothave done this without orders from his superiors.

Compared to the above-mentioned facts, the words of U Mya Than,Burma’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, ring hollow. On26 March 2004, at the 60th session of the Commission on Human Rights,he claimed that there were no police or military in the area of the 30 Mayevent.

Before Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade had reached Ywa Thit Village,the authorities, led by Tin Ohn, chairperson of Depayin Township Peaceand Development Council, blocked the road in advance. They blocked theroad using barbed wire and Dyna trucks.

The authorities also used numerous people in order to block theroad.

Policemen, USDA members, and members of Pyithu Swan-ar Shingathered in Shwe Bo district. Policemen, firemen, USDA members,

members of Pyithu Swan-ar Shin, Cooperative Department staff,Immigration Department staff and Public Relations and InformationDepartment staff were collected and placed on the side of the road inorder to block the road and attack Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade.

Criminals facing long term imprisonment, imposter monks, USDAmembers and members of Pyithu Swan-ar Shin were also gathered inMonywa District. They travelled in vehicles behind Aung San Suu Kyi’smotorcade. When they reached Kyi Village, they brutally attacked a monk among the villagers waiting for the motorcade. The monk was injured and

fell down. The clash then followed between local villagers and the thugs.One of their vehicles was burnt and destroyed.

After the massacre, Rev. Weamala and Rev. Zawana, two monksfrom Kyi Village, were arrested and sentenced to 9 years and 3 monthsimprisonment each after was accused of burning the vehicles. Villagersfrom Kyi, such as Kyi Nyo, Set Ngwe, Khin Maung Lwin and Htike Min wereaccused of assisting the destruction of the vehicles. As a result, the authoritiesgave them 7 years imprisonment each.



While the car was burning, Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade continuedto move toward Ywa Thit Village. There is a small bridge between YwaThit Village and Kyi Village. The roadside attackers were lying in wait forthe motorcade between a small village and Ywa Thit Village. Policemensupervised them. When the motorcade reached the bridge, the lightsinstalled in advance were turned on and the thugs started to attack atapproximately 7:00 pm. The following persons ordered the thugs to attack:

· Tin Ohn, chairperson of the Depayin TownshipPeace and Development Council

· Mya Win, member No. 1 of the Myoma QuarterPeace and Development Council, DepayinTownship

· Soe Tint, of the Taung Pyin Quarter, DepayinTownship

· Phoe Swe, member of the USDA, DepayinTownship branch

Thaung Win, Township Police Commander,spiked liquor and soft drinks given to the attackerswith illicit drugs, namely methamphetamines. Heasked Mya Win, member No. 1 of the MyomaQuarter Peace and Development Council, to providethe illicit drugs.

While Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade wasunder attack, over 100 people from Mae The Villagewere demonstrating against the brutal attack onthe NLD motorcade. The demonstration took placefour furlongs (1/2 mile) away from Ywa Thit Village.They demonstrated all night long, shouting, “Long live Aung San Suu Kyi! ” “Long live Tin Oo! ” and

“We don’t want USDA! ” The authorities shot in the direction of thedemonstration, however no one was injured.

No. 2 police check point is currently being run out of theIrrigationDepartment compound, which was used as a base camp for themassacre.

On the afternoon of 30 May, soldiers stopped monks, studentsand local people who were trying to follow the NLD motorcade in MonywaCity. As a result, there was unrest between the soldiers and NLDsympathizers at the Obo Taung Area. During the unrest, a novice and Min

Photograph tak

of attackers, 5 da

earlier on 25 Ma

who appeextrem

intoxicate



Zaw Oo, a student from Monywa Technology College, were killed. Monkscarried the dead body of the student to the downtown area. When theyreached the General Aung San Memorial Statue at about 7:00 pm, thesoldiers looted the dead body, broke up the crowd, and warned the publicto stay away from that area. Chan Tha Kyaw, a 16-year old student whowitnessed the conflict, was also arrested. He was sent to Nget Aul SanJuvenile Camp, as he is a minor. He was released on 26 February 2004because the international community demanded his freedom. However,18 other people arrested during the struggle are facing long-termimprisonment.

It’s clear that the authorities blocked NLD sympathizers in MonywaCity because they had already planned to assassinate Aung San Suu Kyiand NLD members.

Aung San Suu Kyi was stopped at the entrance of Ye Oo Township. Authorities then took her to the Ye Oo Police Department. She was detained

there until female police officers forcefully placed her in a car at 1:00 amon 31 May. After the car left the police department, it stopped twice alongthe way; once at the ‘No. 6’ guesthouse of the Tank Brigade compound,and also at the guesthouse in the military compound of Min Bu Township.

On 21 June at 8:20 pm, Aung San Suu Kyi reached Insein Prison inRangoon. She was put into a small building in the Insein Prison compounduntil June 24. She was then moved to ‘Ye Khaung’ guesthouse, Ye Mongarrison. On 16 September, she was sent to Royal Asia private hospital, asshe required medical treatment. She left the hospital on 26 Septemberand has been held under house arrest ever since.

Until now, the authorities haven’t taken any action against theperpetrators of the 30 May Massacre. Instead, those victims who werebrutally attacked have been blamed. Tin Oo, vice chairperson of the NLD,

Aung San Suu Kyi, general secretary of NLD, NLD members, monks,students and local people were all attacked and arrested. It’s evident thatthe authorities themselves participated in the massacre, although theydeny this assertion. Were their claim to be true, they would not haverefused the founding of an independence investigative commission on themassacre.

(Remark: The list of Union Solidarity and Development Association Central ExecutiveCommittee members is attached as follows. They are responsible for the local

authorities and USDA members’ participation in the massacre.)



Members of USDA Central Executive Committee andauthorities responsible for security in the area of the massacreon 30 M ay 2003 , Depayin Township, Shwe Bo District, Sagaing

Division

(Remark : The positions of military leaders and authoritieswere changed soon after the massacre)

UNION SOLIDARITY AND Development ASSOCIATION(Central Executive Committee)

Patron

Senior General Than Shwe (BC No. 6710), Chairperson of the State Peace andDevelopment Council (SPDC), Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services

Members of the Panel of the Patrons

Vice-Senior General Maung Aye (BC No. 7875) Vice Chairperson of SPDC, Deputy Commander in Chief of Defence

Services, Commander-in-Chief (Army)

General Khin Nyunt (BC No. 8468)Secretary-1 of SPDC

Lt-Gen Soe Win (BC No. 1171500)Secretary-2 of SPDC

Lt-Gen Thein Sein (BC No. 11252) Adjutant-General

Lt-Gen Thiha Thura Tin Aung Myint Oo (BC No. 11701)Quartermaster-General

Lt-Gen Kyaw Win (BC No. 10194)Chief of Armed Forces Training

Lt-Gen Thura Shwe Mann (BC No. 11534)Member of SPDC

Lt-Gen Maung Bo (BC No. 10337)Member of SPDC

Lt-Gen Khin Maung Than (BC No.10320)Member of SPDC

Lt-Gen Ye Myint (BC No.10310)Member of SPDC



Lt-Gen Aung Htwe(BC No.9752)

Member of SPDC

Lt-Gen Tin Aye (BC No.11236)Member of SPDC

Vice-Admiral Kyi Min

Commander-in-Chief (Navy)

Maj-Gen Myat HeinCommander-in-Chief (Air)

Maj-Gen Soe NaingChairperson, Sagaing Division Peace and Development Council,Commander, North West Command

Maj-Gen Thura Myint AungChairperson, Mon State Peace and Development Council,Commander, South-East Command

Maj-Gen Htay OoChairperson, Irrawaddy Division Peace and Development Council,Commander, South-West Command

Maj-Gen Ye Myint (BC No. 12607)Chairperson, Mandalay Division Peace and Development Council,Commander, Central Command

Maj-Gen Maung Maung Swe (BC No. 12829)Chairperson, Kachin State Peace and Development Council,

Commander, Northern Command

Maj-Gen Myint SweChairperson, Rangoon Division Peace and Development Council,Commander, Rangoon Command

Maj-Gen Maung OoChairperson, Arakan State Peace and Development Council,Commander, Western Command

Maj-Gen Tha AyeChairperson, Tennasserim Division Peace and Development Council,Commander, Coastal Region Command

Maj-Gen Ko KoChairperson, Pegu Division Peace and Development Council,Commander, Southern Command

Maj-Gen Khin Maung MyintChairperson, Shan State Peace and Development Council,Commander, Eastern Command



Maj-Gen Khin Zaw (BC No. 13242)Chairperson, Shan State (East) Peace and Development Council,Commander, Triangle Region Command

Maj-Gen Myint HlaingChairperson, Shan State (North) Peace and Development Council,

Commander, North-East Command

General SecretaryThan AungMinister, Ministry of Education

SecretariesBrig-Gen Kyaw Hsan (BC No. 11536)Minister, Ministry of Information

Brig-Gen Thein Zaw (BC No. 12308)Minister, Ministry of Telecommunications, Post and Telegraphs

Aung Thaung (BC No. 10307)Minister, Ministry of Industry-1

Central Executive Comm ittee Members

Brig-Gen Ohn Myint (BC No.11031)Minister, Ministry of Mines

Col. Thein Nyunt (BC No. 11700)Minister, Ministry of Progress of Border Areas and National Races andDevelopment Affairs

Col. Maung Pa Vice Chairperson, Rangoon City Development Committee(In Charge, Rangoon Division area, USDA)

Brig-Pyi SoneMinister, Ministry of Commerce

Pann Aung (BC No. 7482)Minister, Ministry of Office of Prime Minister

Col. Tin Hlaing (BC No. 11073)Minister, Ministry of Home Affairs

Than Sein (BC No. 7617)Deputy Minister, Ministry of Information



Col. Theik TunDeputy Minister, Ministry of Forestry

Col. Thura Aye Myint (BC No. 11248)Deputy Minister, Ministry of Sports(In Charge, Sagaing Division area, USDA)

Col. Khin Maung (BC No. 10499)Deputy Minister, Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation

Col. Aung Thein (BC No. 11364)Deputy Minister, Ministry of Energy

Soe ThaMinister, Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development

Brig-Gen Myint MaungDeputy Minister, Ministry of Home Affairs

Brig-Gen Kyaw WinDeputy Minister, Ministry of Industry-1

Brig-Gen Aung Thein LinDeputy Minister, Ministry of Industry-2

Brig-Gen Thura Aung KoDeputy Minister, Ministry of Religious Affairs

Brig-Gen Maung Maung TheinDeputy Minister, Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries

Aung KhinMinister, Ministry of Religious Affairs

Khin Maung TheinMinister, Ministry of Finance and Revenue

ThaungMinister, Ministry of Science and Technology

Ko LayChairperson, Rangoon City Development Committee

Mayor of Rangoon City

Maj-Gen Tin HtutMinister, Ministry of Electric Power



SAGAING DIVISION USDA

In Charge, Sagaing Division areaCol. Thura Aye Myint (BC No. 11248)Deputy Minister, Ministry of Sports

PatronMaj-Gen Soe NaingChairperson, Sagaing Division Peace and Development Council,Commander, North West Command

SecretaryMoe Moe Tun

SAGAING DI VISION PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL

ChairpersonMaj-Gen Soe NaingChairperson, Sagaing Division Peace and Development Council,Commander, North West Command

SecretaryLt-Col. Ye Htut

NORTH WEST COMM AND

CommanderMaj-Gen Soe Naing

Deputy CommanderBrig-Gen Soe Myint

SAGAING DIVISION POLICE FORCE

Division CommanderPolice Col. Aung Htut



SHWE BO DISTRICT PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL

ChairpersonLt-Col Than Han

Secretary

Col. Thein Htut

MONYW A DI STRICT PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL

ChairpersonLt-Col Win Naung

SecretaryCol. Kyaw Yin

DEPAYIN TOWNSHI P P EACE AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL

ChairpersonTin Ohn

SecretaryThet Htar Maung

DEPAYIN TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT

Township Pol ice CommanderThaung Win

Police Department OfficerSein Win



EIGHT TOWNSHIP S IN SHWE BO DISTIRCT, SAGAING DIVISION

1- Shwe Bo2- Wet Let3- Depayin4- Tant Se5- Ye Oo

6- Khin Oo7- Kant Ba Lu8- Kyung Hla

EIGHT TOWNSHI PS IN M ONYWA DISTIRCT, SAGAING DIVI SION

1- Monywa2- Chaung Oo3- Ka Ne

4- Budalin5- Sar Lin Gyi6- Yin Mar Pin7- Pa Lae8- Ah Yar Daw



List of Appendixes

(1) List of the wounded, missing, and dead

(2) Statements from the NLD

(3) Excerpt of Aung San Suu Kyi’s press conference onApr 23, 2003

(4) Aung San Suu Kyi’s press conference and thespeech she delivered in Monywa on thenight of 29 May 2003

(5) Press conferences of the Burmese military junta

(6) Interview with Zaw Zaw Aung

(7) Testimony of Soe Than, an NLD member from

Kamayut Township, Rangoon

(8) Burma resolution from the 57th UNGA on18 November 2003

162

178

180

193

197

204

209

218



Appendix (1)

Ko Aung Aung (Mandalay, South-West) Ko Aung Htoo

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi U Aye Win

U Chit Tin Ko Chit Yin



Ko Hla Moe Win U Hla Oo (Mandalay, Norht-West)

U Hla Soe Nyunt (MP) U Hla Than

Ma Khin Ma Ma TunU Khin Mg Thaung

(Mandalay, South-West)



U Khin Oo Ma Khin Aye Myint

U Ko Lay Ko Kyaw Kyaw

Ko Kyaw Myo Thu(Mandalay, South-East)

Ko Kyaw Zin Win (DPNS)



Daw Kyi Kyi Myint Ko Maung Soe

Ko Min Lwin Ko Min Thein (photo by AHCDM)

Ko Moe Thaw @ Pauk Pauk U Myint Kyaw



Ko Myint Maw (Mandalay, South-East) U Myint Oo

U Myo Naing (Mandalay) Ko Myo Tint

Daw Nyunt Nyunt (photo by AHCDM) Ko Pho Zaw



Ko Than Tun (Kamaryut) Ma Thander Soe

Ko Thein Aung U Thein Soe

Ko Thein Toe Aye (Died on the spot) Ko Thet Tun (South Okkalapa)



U Thiha (Mandalay) U Tin Aung Aung

U Tin Htut Oo (MP-Leway) U Tin Myint

Daw Tin Myint(Mandalay, South-West)

UTin Oo (NLD, Vice Chairman)



Daw Win Mya Mya Ko Wunna Aung

Ko Zaw Lay @ Ko Zaw KhinKo Zaw Win Tun

(Mandalay, West-South)

Ko Zaw Zaw Aung Ko Zayar Tun (Mandalay, West-South)



N o

N a m e

O c c u p a t i o n

A d d r e s s

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a r k

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P h o t o g r a p h e r

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T h e a b o v e - m e n t i o n e d p

e r s o n s j o i n e d t h e m o t o r c a d e a t M a n d a l a y .

M a n y p e o p l e r e p o r t e d l y

d i e d i n t h e m a s s a c r e .

T h e y i n c l u d

e t h e p e r s o n s w h o j o i n e d t h e m o t o r c a d e d u r i n g t h e t r i p a n d t h e

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T h e d a t a w i l l b e r e l e a s e d w h e n t h e C o m m i s s i o n r e c e i v e s i t .



1 3

M a K h i n M y

a W i n

F e m a l e

T o w n s h i p E C

m e m b e r

M a n d a l a y S o u t h w e s

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S h w e B o P r i s o n

o n 1 8 J u l y 2 0 0 3 .

1 4

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i n t

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m e m b e r

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o n 1 8 J u l y 2 0 0 3 .

1 5

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K o N a i n g N a i n g

M a l e

D P N S m e m b e r




o n 1 2 J u n e 2 0 0 3 a n

d l a t e r f l e d

B u r m a

1 7

K o M y o M i n

M a l e

Y o u t h W

i n g

m e m b e r

M a n d a l a y N o r t h w e s t e r n

T o w n s h i p



o n 1 2 J u n e 2 0 0 3 .

1 8

D a w W i n M

y a M y a

F e m a l e

D i v i s i o n E C m e m b e r M a n d a l a y D i v i s i o n



o n 1 6 J a n .

2 0 0 4 .

1 9

U S e i n Y e

M a l e

D r i v e r




o n 1 2 J u n e 2 0 0 3 .

2 0

U H l a O o

M a l e

T o w n s h i p E C ,

s e c r e t a r y

M a n d a l a y N o r t h e a s t

e r n

T o w n s h i p



o n 9 N o v .

2 0 0 3 .

H e

w a s

a r r e s t e d a g a i n a t t h

e e n d o f

D e c .

2 0 0 3 .

2 1

K o T h a n T u

n O o

M a l e

Y o u t h W

i n g

m e m b e r


e r n

T o w n s h i p



o n 1 8 J u l y 2 0 0 3 .

2 2

K o A u n g N a

i n g

M a l e

Y o u t h W

i n g

m e m b e r


e r n

T o w n s h i p



o n 1 8 J u l y 2 0 0 3 .

2 3

K o T u n T u n

W i n

M a l e

Y o u t h W

i n g

m e m b e r


e r n

T o w n s h i p



o n 1 8 J u l y 2 0 0 3 .

2 4

M a K h i n M a

M a T u n

F e m a l e

Y o u t h W

i n g

m e m b e r


e r n

T o w n s h i p



o n 2 J u l y 2 0 0 3 .

2 5

M a W i n E i P

h y u

F e m a l e

Y o u t h W

i n g

m e m b e r


e r n

T o w n s h i p



o n 1 8 J u l y 2 0 0 3 .



2 6

U H l a M y i n t

M a l e

T o w n s h i p

E C ,

c h a i r m a n

A m a r a p u r a


S h w e

B o P r i s o n

o n 1 6 J a n .

2 0 0 4 .

2 7

K o W i n K h a i n g

M a l e

Y o u t h W i n g

m e m b e r


T o w n s h i p


S h w e

B o P r i s o n

o n 1 8 J u l y 2 0 0 3 .

2 8

K o N y i N y i A

u n g

M a l e

Y o u t h W i n g

m e m b e r

M a n d a l a y N o r t h e a s t e r n

T o w n s h i p


S h w e

B o P r i s o n

o n 1 8 J u l y 2 0 0 3 .

2 9

K o Z a y a r T u

n

M a l e

Y o u t h W i n g

m e m b e r

M a n d a l a y S o u t h w e s t e r n

T o w n s h i p


S h w e

B o P r i s o n

o n 1 8 J u l y 2 0 0 3 .

3 0

U Y e M y i n t A u n g

M a l e

T o w n s h i p

E C ,

c h a i r m a n

M a n d a l a y N o r t h e a s t e r n

T o w n s h i p


S h w e

B o P r i s o n

o n 1 6 J a n .

2 0 0 4 .

3 1

U B a r h B a r h

M a l e

D i v i s i o n E

C ,

c h a i r m a n

S a g a i n g D i v i s i o n


S h w e

B o P r i s o n

o n 1 6 J a n .

2 0 0 4 .

3 2

U T u n M y a i n

g

M a l e

D i v i s i o n E

C ,

s e c r e t a r y

S a g a i n g D i v i s i o n


S h w e

B o P r i s o n

o n 2 6 J a n .

2 0 0 4 .

3 3

U S a w H l a i n

g

M a l e

E l e c t e d M

P

I n d a w T o w n s h i p


S h w e

B o P r i s o n

o n 2 6 J a n .

2 0 0 4 .

3 4

U M y i n t K y i

M a l e

E l e c t e d M

P

K a t h a T o w n s h i p


S h w e

B o P r i s o n

o n 2 6 J a n .

2 0 0 4 .

3 5

U T u n S h a w

n

M a l e

T o w n s h i p

E C

m e m b e r

M o n y w a C i t y


S h w e

B o P r i s o n

o n 2 J u l y 2 0 0 3 .

3 6

U A u n g S a n

M a l e

T o w n s h i p

E C ,

c h a i r m a n

B u d a l i n T o w n s h i p


S h w e

B o P r i s o n

o n 1 6 J a n .

2 0 0 4 .

3 7

U T h a u n g N

y u n t

M a l e

D r i v e r

M a n d a l a y S o u t h e a s t

e r n

T o w n s h i p


S h w e

B o P r i s o n

o n 1 2 J u n e 2 0 0 3 .

3 8

U M y i n t O o

M a l e

T o w n s h i p

E C

m e m b e r


e r n

T o w n s h i p


S h w e

B o P r i s o n

o n 2 J u l y 2 0 0 3 .

3 9

U T h a n H t a y

M a l e

T o w n s h i p

E C

m e m b e r


e r n

T o w n s h i p


S h w e

B o P r i s o n

o n 1 8 J u l y 2 0 0 3 .

4 0

U T i n H t u t O

o

M a l e

E l e c t e d M

P

L a w e T o w n s h i p


S h w e

B o P r i s o n

o n 1 6 J a n .

2 0 0 4 .



4 1

K o T i n L i n

M a l e

Y o u t h W i n g

m e m b e r


T o w n s h i p


S h w e B o

P r i s o n

o n 1 8 J u l y 2 0 0 3 .

4 2

K o K y a w Z i n W

i n

M a l e

Y o u t h W i n g

m e m b e r

R a n g o o n


S h w e B o

P r i s o n

o n 1 6 J a n .

2 0 0 4 .

4 3

K o T a z a N a i n g

M a l e

Y o u t h W i n g

m e m b e r

M a n d a l a y D i v i s i o n


S h w e B o

P r i s o n

o n 9 N o v .

2 0 0 3 .

4 4

U A u n g S o e

M a l e

D i v i s i o n E C m e m b e r M a n d a l a y D i v i s i o n


S h w e B o

P r i s o n

o n 1 2 J u n e 2 0 0 3 .

4 5

U T i n O o

M a l e

N L D v i c e

c h a i r p e r s o n

R a n g o o n

D e t a i n e d i n K a l a y P r i s o n ,

t h e n

p u t u n d e r h o u s e a r r e s t

o n 1 4

F e b .

2 0 0 4 .

4 6

U P a w K h i n

M a l e

E l e c t e d M P

M y i n g g y a n ,

M a n d a l a y D

i v i s i o n


K a l a y P r i s o n o n

1 8 J a n .

2 0 0 4 .

4 7

U T i n A u n g A u n

g

M a l e

E l e c t e d M P

M a n d a l a y



1 8 J a n .

2 0 0 4 .

4 8

D r . W i n A u n g

M a l e

T o w n s h i p E C

,

c h a i r m a n

K h i n O o T o w n s h i p



1 8 J a n .

2 0 0 4 .

4 9

K o T u n Z a w Z a

w

M a l e

i n c h a r g e , Y o u t h

W i n g

R a n g o o n


K a n t h i P

r i s o n o n

1 3 N o v .

2 0 0 3 .

5 0

K o T u n M y i n t

M a l e

T o w n s h i p E C

,

s e c r e t a r y

R a n g o o n


K a n t h i P

r i s o n o n

2 D e c .

2 0 0 3 .

5 1

K o T o e L w i n

M a l e

C e n t r a l Y o u t

h W i n g R a n g o o n


K a n t h i P

r i s o n o n

2 D e c .

2 0 0 3 .

5 2

K o Z a w W i n T u

n

M a l e

Y o u t h W i n g

m e m b e r

M a n d a l a y


K a n t h i P

r i s o n o n

2 D e c .

2 0 0 3 .

5 3

K o Z a w M y o A u

n g

M a l e

Y o u t h W i n g

m e m b e r

K a w L i n T o w n s h i p ,

S a g a i n g

D i v i s i o n


K a n t h i P

r i s o n o n

2 D e c .

2 0 0 3 .

5 4

K o M i n L w i n

M a l e

Y o u t h W i n g

m e m b e r

R a n g o o n


K a n t h i P

r i s o n o n

2 D e c .

2 0 0 3 .

5 5

K o M y i n t N g w e

M a l e

Y o u t h W i n g

m e m b e r

Y a y N a n C h a u n g T o w n s h i p


K a n t h i P

r i s o n o n

2 D e c .

2 0 0 3 .



5 6

K o T h a n T u n

M a l e

Y o u t h W i n g

m e m b e r

R a n g o o n


K a n t h i P r i s o n o n

2 D e c . 2 0 0 3 .

5 7

K o M o e Z a w ( a . k . a . )

P a u k P a u k

M a l e

Y o u t h W i n g

m e m b e r

R a n g o o n



2 D e c . 2 0 0 3 .

5 8

K o M y o M i n ( a . k . a . ) T i n

M y o M i n

M a l e

Y o u t h W i n g

m e m b e r

M a n d a l a y



2 D e c . 2 0 0 3 .

5 9

K o T h i h a

M a l e

Y o u t h W i n g

m e m b e r

M a n d a l a y



2 D e c . 2 0 0 3 .

6 0

K o M y i n t K y a w

M a l e

Y o u t h W i n g

m e m b e r

R a n g o o n



2 D e c . 2 0 0 3 .

6 1

K o K y a w S o e L i n

M a l e

Y o u t h W i n g

m e m b e r

M a n d a l a y



2 D e c . 2 0 0 3 .

6 2

K o A u n g K y a w M y i n t

M a l e

Y o u t h W i n g

m e m b e r

M a n d a l a y



2 D e c . 2 0 0 3 .

6 3

K o M y o N y u n t

M a l e

Y o u t h W i n g

m e m b e r

R a n g o o n



2

D e c . 2 0 0 3 .

6 4

K o T h e t T u n ( a . k . a . )

K a l a r

M a l e

Y o u t h W i n g

m e m b e r




2

D e c . 2 0 0 3 .

A c r o n y m s :

E C : E x e c u t i v e C o m m

i t t e e

D P N S : D e m o c r a t i c P

a r t y f o r a N e w S o c i e t y

M P : M e m b e r o f P a r l i a m e n t



Appendix 2

[Unofficial translation]

National League for Democracy

No. 97/b, West Shwe Gontaing Road,

Bhan Township, Rangoon

©

(1) The NLD is a legal, registered political party. Therefore, NLD activities related

to national politics are legal actions. Conducting a study session is also legal activity.

(2) A bi-weekly study session was arranged for youth education on June 29, 1998.

Intelligence personnel in Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s compound were notified of thenames of those involved, including four elected representatives and forty young men.

(3) The authority’s security forces at the gate, who usually monitor the entrance way of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s compound, blocked those people who were heading

in an orderly manner into the compound. Security forces pushed these NLD members,so the NLD members retreated to a traffic light at the junction of Kaba Aye SatiRoad and University Avenue.

(4) When they were informed of the incident, U Tin Oo (NLD Vice-Chairman) and

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (NLD General Secretary) went to the junction and broughtthose NLD members coming to the study session back to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’scompound in an orderly manner.

(5) After blocking the NLD members at various points, a person directed the security forces to strike the NLD members, using abusive language, such as “leader or noleader — hit her!” and “I don’t care, leader or whatever, hit that leader!” Thosepresent described the person issuing the commands as tall, fair-skinned, and in ayellow civilian shirt. They could identify him if they saw him again.



Aung San Sui Kyi

(6) During the incident, the security forces forcefully struck the NLD members with police batons and tree branches from nearby. Eight NLD youth memberssuffered injuries to the head and other parts of the body as a result of the attack. The location of the incident was a restricted area, so no one else was present.

(7) Upon being informed of the incident, the NLD Chairman and three other NLD

Executive Committee members went to the scene immediately, but the authoritiesblocked their entry.

(8) Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was slightly injured. The security forces stayed positionedin the same location at the gate, and U Tin Oo and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi wereforced to stay outside the compound in the wind and rain from 14:00 p.m. (6/25/98) to 01:00 a.m. (6/26/98).

(9) The political, economic, and social crisis in the country will indeed not be solvedby such hitting, arresting, and confining methods.

-Central Executive Committee(National League for Democracy)

Rangoon26 June 1998



Appendix 3

[Unofficial translation]

“Excerpt of Aung San Suu Kyi’s press conference on Apr 23, 2003”

During this press conference, I will analyze the events of the past 12 months. I willalso discuss my own travels, including my trip to Chin State. I will discuss ChinState first, because the authorities assertions are different from what we know asfact.

I guess you’ve seen the photos on the wall. Some photos show disturbances to ourtrip. Some photos relate to the authorities’ assertions (on my trips). The otherphotos show that USDA members blocked the road we used with logs. Local peopleinformed us that they were USDA members, and there were flags in their cars. Asfar as I know, the authorities asserted that there was no blocking the road and there were only timber planks near a bridge under construction. We had passed severalbridges under construction. However, those bridges were different from (the bridges)between Htee Linn and Kyauk Htu.

As you journalists can see from the photos, logs were placed intentionally in twoplaces. Fortunately, we had enough manpower to move the logs (to the roadside.) The authorities argued about how the logs were moved onto the road. We had many people with us on our trip. If we had only one or two people, we couldn’t havemoved the logs. I want you to be fully aware that those logs were intentionally placed on the road in order to put a stop to our trip. In Saw Township, we again raninto people who would block the road. You might know that authorities releasedstatements concerned with blocking the road.

By examining those photos, you can be aware of just what had happened (in ourtrip). They (protestors) had been waiting to start trouble with us. They claimed thatthey made problems because we didn’t give them back the videotapes we took fromthem. Our policy was that they could take pictures of our activities freely. They could take video if they stayed away from us. However, they had to inform us when

they wanted to take video of our meetings and meetings with local people. We toldthem this all along. It’s a basic right of each of us to be asked if we want to bephotographed. We usually seized the film and videotape if they failed to inform us,and we compensated them monetarily for the tapes we took.

The protestors in Kyauk Htu village were hostile. We tried to meet the authoritiesto explain about the tapes and to give compensation, but they failed to come andmeet us. A person in their group threatened us, saying that they would do something against us in Saw Township if we didn’t return their cassette tape. So disturbances



against us in Saw Township were planned in advance. We had never given in to any threats. However, we are always ready to solve a problem by discussion in order toreach a fair agreement accepted by both sides. It’s clear that they didn’t want tosolve the problem, only create one. If they were willing to solve the problem, they would have met with Han Zaw and Myint Thein. We sent (those NLD officials) tosolve the problem.

We didn’t do anything dishonest. We do not hesitate to mention their names.However, they were not ready to say who their leader was or what organization they

belonged to. They only mentioned that they were from an observation team. When we reached Saw Township, we asked the chairperson of Township Peace andDevelopment Council to investigate the matter. We already knew who they wereand which organization they belonged to. We asked because we wanted an officialanswer. It’s clear that the chairperson was biased. He said that the protestors wereBurmese people. Of course, we are also Burmese people.

They were not from Saw Township. They came from Gan Gaw Township to causeproblems. I think that they put the logs on the road we used.

The authority claimed that some NLD youth wing members responsible for my security searched the house we stayed at for a while in Matupe Township and met Aung Aung, a university student majoring in Physics. They then forcefully took himto police department. We don’t know anything about what the authorities claimed.None of us went around searching the houses. We didn’t have the time. Besides, we would not enter anyone’s house without permission. Some people might do it butnot us. Why exactly did the authorities mention that Aung Aung was a student? Didthey want to see problems between the students and us? The students in Burma are

not naïve. There are different kinds of students. Students know that. They wouldnot think that a person is honest because he or she is a student. Not all students

support the democracy movement. However, we can’t say that a person doesn’thave intelligence activities for some organizations because he or she is a student.

Q: You said that people were threatened. How they were threatened?

A : It’s simple. The people were told that they would face punishment in any way if they welcomed us or showed their support for us. A place in Chin State, the people

were told that they would see the “bullet” if they welcome us. I was informed thatthe chairperson of the District Peace and Development Council tried to prohibitlocal peoples’ support for us in Gan Gaw Township. He even attacked some young women, driving towards them in a threatening manner while he was driving his car.His name is Htay Oo.

Disturbances in we encountered in Chin State were not the same with disturbancesin Arakan State. In Chin State, police officers didn’t openly participate in thedisturbances.

In Arakan State, however, traffic police and policemen in uniform openly participatedin the disturbances. Members of the Township Peace and Development Counciltook part in every one. Firemen and members of Red Cross Association in uniform were also involved.



In Chin State, we sometimes saw firemen and their vehicles. Generally, persons inuniform were not used. However, their actions were similar to the actions weexperienced in Arakan State. They played songs very loudly, cited the Buddhistsermon, and educated the people about how to prevent fire accidents.

In Gan Gaw Township, a car rigged with a loudspeaker came and tried to harass us while we talked to the local people who welcomed us. However, the car left after a

while.

The local people received several threats. They were told that they would be punishedif they welcomed us or showed support. As you see in the photo, however, thepeople confidently showed their support to the democracy movement despite thethreats.

In Chin State, Christians were indirectly harassed. It was a sad sight. I am a Buddhistand proud of being a Buddhist. However, it’s totally shameful to disturb anyone who belongs to other religions. In our country, we shouldn’t harass people withdifferent religious beliefs. The people in Chin State should have total freedom of

religion completely.

When I was in Chin State, I was told that the local people are seriously concernedabout transportation and education conditions. It is difficult to travel in Chin Stateand people struggle to earn a living. Between 10 and 15 percent of students finishhigh school. Education quality is very poor. I am also concerned about it.

Like the people in Arakan and Shan State, the people in Chin State obviously showedthat they have strong union spirit. The other ethnic people do not begrudge theBurmans (Bamar). However, they suspect Burman’s behavior. The Burman, the

ethnic majority needs to acknowledge it. The Burman also have to understand thatthe ethnic minorities suspect us because of our activities in the past.

Union spirit is still active among the ethnic people. The spirit should be matched by a suitable political system and constitution that guarantees the rights of all of ourpeople.

I was not surprised by the disturbances (in Chin State). Since I started my trips May 6 of last year, I encountered them frequently. Some members of USDA and local

authorities tried to threaten the people. They also harassed people who support us. When we reached Arakan State, their behaviors were becoming increasingly egregious.

It was obvious that the authorities supervised disturbances against our trip to Arakan

State. We have no doubt that authority created them some place in Chin State, likeGan Gaw Township. In several locations, USDA members and local authoritiesbothered and threatened the people.

A government minister went around and installed USDA signs. We ned to ask why

he put up the signs such as Pyi Khaing Phyo ( synonym of USDA ) Village , Pyi Khaing Phyo Township. What is USDA? Does it belong to the State? Which organizationcan say that this town belongs to us, this is our own town, this town is under ourcontrol? What sort of authority does the USDA have to put such signs in place?



While the USDA engages in such activities, why are the authorities worried aboutreopening of NLD offices and installing NLD signs? NLD offices have been running since 1988 and 1989. Back then, USDA had not even been created yet.

Recently, USDA members reportedly joined government staff trainings in Rangoon. What is the connection between USDA members and government staff? How is theUSDA related to the government? How is USDA related to SPDC? These questions

need clear answers. We don’t believe that USDA is only a social welfare association.It doesn’t seem to be a social welfare association. We don’t see it working for the

State’s social activities.

Based on my experience on my trips during last twelve months, I think that authoritiesuse the USDA to harass the NLD and NLD sympathizers. If that’s not the case, theauthorities need to prove that they no longer support the USDA’s activities. Theauthorities have to prove beyond all doubt that they were not behind local USDAmembers’ actions against us.

Q: Where did they threaten the local people with “bullet”?

A : In Matupe and Min Tup Townships, Southern Chin State.

Q: Who did it?

A : My understanding is the chairperson of District Peace and Development Council.

Q: Did the local people care about the threats?

A : No, they didn’t.

The next two weeks will be the first anniversary of my release from house arrest.

When I was released, the process of confidence building (between the authoritiesand NLD) was over. The authorities and I had already agreed that we needed to

take the next step. However, I don’t think that the process has improved. In reality, we can’t say that the process is improving. We have to question the SPDC’s good will. I wonder whether they (authorities) really want to reach an agreement with usor not.

Whether NLD as well as SPDC are interested in national reconciliation or not is notimportant. This is what I want to mention. The important thing is what the country

needs now. Our country needs national reconciliation. SPDC should understandthis. It is time they understand.

As you journalists are here, (I want to advise you) that it’s important to ask: Why does the SPDC maintain that they don’t have contact with NLD? Why do they

target only diplomats and international media? Why do they hesitate to communicateto the people if they have sincere good will for the national reconciliation and truly want to reach an agreement for the democracy that they’ve promised to restoresince they seized the State power.

We do not hesitate to officially express our wish to achieve national reconciliation. We respect the agreement we had with the authorities. We are ready to expressanything officially and openly.



As you know, the authorities stated for the first time at the end of 2000 that we hadcontact each other. They told diplomats and journalists but said nothing to thepeople.

We also didn’t mention it, because both sides had agreed to hide the first step inorder to build friendship and confidence.

However, Win Aung, Foreign Minister revealed that there was contact betweenNLD and SPDC. He revealed it without dealing with us. However, it still didn’t

hurt the confidence building process.

We want to raise a question. Why did (the SPDC) want to make this widely knownto diplomats, media and the international community, while the people in this country were kept in the dark? Aren’t the people in this country more important? Aren’t thepeople in this country more important for those leading the country?

I have more questions to raise. Burma’s national reconciliation process is related toMr. Razali Ismail, the United Nations Secretary General’s envoy. He has an optimisticpoint of view in this process and tries to narrow the gap between NLD and SPDC.

I have no doubt that he wants Burma to achieve peace and development in theeconomic, social and political sectors. NLD thanks Mr. Razali. NLD also trustshim.

We are surprised at SPDC’s behavior to Mr. Razali. As the special envoy of the UNSecretary General’s working for national reconciliation in Burma, he should beallowed to visit any time he wants, go anywhere he pleases and talk with anybody. As you know, he was prohibited to meet me in Taungyi City (Shan State) last year.He has the right to check the conditions of my trips around the country. He is even

responsible for checking it in order to know the status of the confidence building and reconciliation processes. If we respect the United Nations and trust the UN

Secretary General’s wish for national reconciliation in Burma, we should treat withMr. Razali with trust, honor and respect. He deserves to receive it.

He should have the right to decide when he should come here. If SPDC really wants national reconciliation, they shouldn’t prohibit him. It is for Mr. Razali todecide when he should come and not have to wait for an invitation letter.

When I was released on May 6 last year, we tried a lot for better political conditionsin our country. As we were in the confidence building process, we tried to reach theother stages such as cooperation, dialogue and reconciliation.

For humanitarian aid issues, we tried to cooperate with the authorities through

some people and organizations. As a result, we came to know clearly that SPDC isnot keen to cooperate with us in humanitarian aid matters.

Now, we want to mention sanctions, aid and tourism. After I was released on May 6(2002), I had a press conference and I claimed that NLD’s policies would not change

without dialogue beginning. It means NLD’s policies on tourists, economic sanctionsand aid will not be changed.

Some claims that NLD doesn’t want reconciliation because NLD asks for sanctionsagainst Burma. We want to respond to that person that we have never called for



time, we will get a result opposite to what we want.

Q: Do you think it is time to change NLD’s technique?

A : We always use various techniques at the same time. We have more than onetechnique. We are ready to use various techniques to start the national reconciliationprocess. There will be reconciliation. However, for the sake of the people and the

country, we need to come to reconciliation quickly.Economic conditions are deteriorating, and are sure to get worse. Moreover, we

have other issues (to solve) such as education and health. Now, we have to mentionHIV/AIDS if we talk about health issues in our country. It’s widely spreading in ourcountry. I understand that World Health Organization is also rather concerned aboutit. Without strong action, it cannot be controlled in the near future.

We were ready to cooperate with the authorities on matters of humanitarian aidincluding the HIV/AIDS issue. However, the authorities didn’t want to cooperate with us even in the issue of HIV/AIDS. So, we need to raise questions about theirgood will.

Q: How was the condition of collecting new members in the last twelve months? The young

people I talked to stay away from NLD and are sick of (the political situation). Young people

will be satisfied with the political conditions as long as the government can put the money into

their pocket.

A : My view is the opposite (of your views). We have been receiving plenty of support from young people. Therefore, I would like you to explain to us about thefact you just mentioned. On what do you base on your remark, that young people

are interested in making money rather than NLD?

Q: When I asked some young people I met, they are satisfied with their life if they have money

and music. They did not seem to be aware of NLD’s activities.

A : Those young people, especially some of those who can speak English fluently,are not interested in politics. They want to be having fun all the time and they justneed money and disco.

It’s not a surprising situation. Young people anywhere want to be having fun. Onthe last twelve months, we were surprised with their support to us. Compared to theyouth in Rangoon, the youths outside Rangoon were more aware of the (political)conditions. They are aware of the current problems (of the country) while there are

less attractive things to their mind in their surroundings. I am a bit surprised at yourquestion. The selfish youths will care only for themselves whatever political conditionsthey have.

Q: Mr. Pinheiro, United Nations human rights envoy to Burma discovered a concealed microphone

while interviewing political prisoners in Insein prison. Did it affect the international community?

Do you think it (discovering a microphone) changed (the international communities’ policy to

Burma) a lot?



A : If their policy to Burma changed because of it, we will be disappointed in them. Actually, it was not a surprise. It’s just another question to raise about the authorities’goodwill.

Q: Do you know why the authorities do not want national reconciliation?

A : I think, they do not want change. National reconciliation is change, but change is

inevitable. Therefore, we need to find the solution together about what changes aresuitable for the country.

Q: You said that NLD is ready to cooperate with SPDC on the issue of humanitarian aid. Is

it because of NLD’s policies such as accountability, transparency and independent monitoring

on those issues?

A : As I said before, our basic principle on economic sanctions, assistance andtourism issues doesn’t change. Cooperation on humanitarian aid issues doesn’tchange our basic principles. Because, we have always said that there should beaccountability, transparency and responsibility concerned with humanitarian aid. Without destroying the basic principle, we can fully and freely cooperate. Moreover,

we can find a solution for reconciliation by having cooperation.

By cooperating, we can know how to deal with each other for emerging real nationalreconciliation. Cooperation doesn’t mean observing to know whether it will work or not. It means finding a solution to know whether it will work or not. For the sakeof the country, we have to try to be tolerable.

Edited by Melanie Werner and Dan



9 July 2003

Mr. Kofi AnnanSecretary General The United Nations

New York, N.Y U.S.A.

Subject: The Disgraceful Situation in Burma after the Crisis at Da-Ba-Yin Township

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

On the evening of May 30, 2003, some members of the National Leaguefor Democracy (NLD), including Vice Chairman U Tin Oo and General Secretary Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, while traveling on an organizational tour were savagely

attacked by a group of thugs between Kyi village and Da Ba Yin town in Sagaing Division, resulting in several deaths and injuring hundreds of NLD members. Thegovernment has not clarified nor provided details of the above event.

Moreover, it has been learnt that U Tin Oo, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, andthe youth who accompanied them on their journey were seriously harmed and arealso being held under detention, without legal grounds.

Hence the undersigned, the representatives who were duly elected at theMultiparty Elections held in 1990, on behalf of the people of Burma, have sent aletter of protest to Senior General Than Shwe, Chairman of State Peace andDevelopment Council, calling for the:

(1) Immediate release of U Tin Oo, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and all others who were arrested at the site of the crisis.

(2) Unconditional release of Chairman U Aung Shwe and other CentralExecutive Members of the NLD who have been kept under house arrest

since May 31, 2003.(3) Reopening of all NLD offices sealed by the government and resuming

of legal political party functions.(4) Official independent investigation and statement of facts regarding the

event, including the number of deaths, wounded, missing and detainedpersons.(5) Compliance and implementation of the Resolutions and

Recommendations of the General Assembly, the Security Council and

other agencies of the United Nations.

The above demands are made for the people of Burma, as well asfor the whole community of the world. We firmly believe that the current



impasse in this country is not only a disgrace to the Nation, but is alsobecoming a threat to the peace and security of the whole region. Attached herewith a copy of the above-mentioned letter translated from

Burmese, with a humble request that the case be brought to the notice of the Security Council for necessary action.

Yours sincerely,

Elected Representatives:

The List of Undersigned Parliamentary Members of 1990 General Election

No. Name State/ Division Constituency

1 Dr. Sein Myint Ayerwaddy Bogalay(2)2 U Aung Khin Myaungmya (2)3 U Hla Kyi Pathein East (2)

4 U Nyunt Hlaing Pathein East (1)5 U Nyunt Win Yekyi6 U Tin Chaw Pathein West (2)7 Dr. Zaw Myint Henzada8 U Mint Thein Myanaung (2)9 U Tin Oo Myanaung 10 Dr. Tin Min Htut Pantanaw 11 U Mahn Nyunt Thein Pantanaw

12 U Tin Kyonepyaw 13 U Mann Gyaw Ni Kyonepyaw 14 Dr. Hla Win Kyaungkone15 U Saw Lwin Kyaungkone16 U Hla Myint Maubin17 U Myint Thein Magwe Chauk 18 U Chit Tin Minhla19 U Soe Win Seikphyu20 Thakhin Khin Nyunt Yenachaung

21 U Aung San Myint Myaing (1)22 U Kan Oo Salin (2)23 U Tar Salin (1)24 U Kyaw Shin Pwintphyu (1)

25 Dr. Aung Moe Nyo Pwintphyu (2)26 U Kyaw Myint Magwe27 U Chit Htwe Myothit (2)28 U Aung Soe Magwe (2)

29 U Bo Htwe Natmauk (1)30 U Han Zaw Sinbaungwe31 U Myint Aung Myaing (2)32 U Dr. Kyi Min Pakokku (1)33 U Hlaing Aye Pakokku (2)



34 U Thar Maung Natmauk 35 U Nyunt Hlaing Aung Lan36 U Htun Kywe Bago Nyaunglaybin37 U Maung Aye Tharawaddy 38 U Paik Chone Shwedaung 39 Dr. Myo Win Kawa

40 U Tin Shwe Waw 41 U San Win Tharawaddy

42 U Aung Soe Myint Taunggoo43 U Tun Aung Yetarshe44 U Thaung Sein Pyi45 Daw Hla Hla Moe Min Hla46 U Thar Maung Okkpho47 U Tin Oo Okkpho48 U Nyunt Aye Letpadan49 Daw May Hnin Kyi Mandalay Moegoke50 Daw San San Yangon Seikkan

51 U Thein Myint Tamwe (2)52 U Maung Maung Latt Thaketa53 U Soe (a) U Soe Tin Hmawbi54 U Kyaw Thwin Khayan (1)55 U Hla Tun Kyimyindaing 56 Nan Khin Htwe Myint Kayin State Hpa-an (3)57 U Min Htun Chit Hpa-an58 U Kyin Thein Kyar-Seikkyi (2)

59 U Hla Maung Kyar-in-Seikkyi (1)60 Dr. Sein Win Yangon Seikkyi Khanaungto61 U Saw Aung Saggaing Monywa62 U Hanthar Myint Budalin63 U Min Thwin Myaung 64 U Thein Pe Kanbalu65 Daw Khin San Hlaing Wet Let66 U Soe Win Bago Bago (1)67 U Nyi Pu Rakhine Gwa

68 U Kyaw Khine Taung Goke69 U Mya Maung Yan Bye70 U Kyaw Maung Buthee Daung

(Translation of above-mentioned letter to Than Shwe)9 July 2003

ChairmanState Peace and Development CouncilRangoon

Burma



Subject – Burma’s horrible plight in the aftermath of the Depayin Episode and

solutions.

1. We have heard that there were many dead and wounded as the result of a violent

attack by thugs staged against the National League for Democracy (NLD) membersand supporters including Deputy Chairman U Tin Oo and General Secretary Daw Aung San Suu Kyi at dusk on the 30th of May 2003 at a spot between the town of

Depayin and Kyi village. The local authorities have been vague in their explanationand information concerning the true facts and have not given details about theexact number of dead and injured.

2. We then heard that following this attack, NLD leaders, Youth Wing Members andsupporters were arrested and currently remain incarcerated. For the people whoare longing for democracy, this is like applying salt to a festering wound. On behalf of the masses, we, the People’s Representatives elected in 1990 General Elections,

make this submission and call on you to:

(1) Immediately release Deputy Chairman U Tin Oo and General Secretary Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and all NLD members from imprisonment and incarceration.

(2) Release U Aung Shwe and all Central Executive Committee members of theNLD who have been placed under house arrest since the 31st of May and allother imprisoned democracy activists.

(3) Remove the seals placed on the NLD head office and all branch offices in all theDivisions, Townships and States throughout the country.

(4) Constitute an independent Enquiry Commission to compile a correct list of those who died, those who were injured, and those who are missing as a result

of the Depayin episode.(5) SPDC convene the Parliament in accordance with SLORC’s 1990 Elections

Law and strictly adhere to the resolutions passed by the United Nations General

Assembly with regards to Burma.

3. We do not seek to benefit just one individual, just one group or just one party. Weare convinced and sincerely believe that our demands, if met, will work towards

national reconciliation and will be for the good and benefit of the entire country and its masses and that this will make the road to democracy smooth and successful.

4. Just as it is the present government’s responsibility to forestall and prevent any

dangerous situation that might occur, we the People’s Representatives, feel the sameresponsibility to speak out and speak our mind. We again reiterate that we aredriven by a deep desire for national reconciliation, unity and solidarity among all

ethnic groups and the achievement of a new modern democratic system withstability and prosperity.

With respect,

People’s Representatives elected in 1990 General Elections

(Names and signatures of the Elected People’s Representatives attached above)



Appendix (4)

Aung San Suu Kyi’s Speech at Monywa

-Translated by Democratic Voice of Burma (www.dvb.no)

In 1947 when my father (General Aung San) wasrallying people in Upper Burma, he visited Monywa.

As he was quite tired from the rallying trip,the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) arranged for

him to rest at Monywa. He said that the people inMonywa are very ‘leinma’ (law-abiding and obedient). Ihave to say that Monywa is strong and firm, rather than

law-abiding and obedient. [applause]

The reason is – in 1988, Monywa was very extraordinarilyfirm and I feel that it is now even stronger. [applause]

The reason for this is, in my opinion, people here do notlike injustice. They don’t like bullying. I am rallying our

people in the NLD. I went to Kachin State to rally people inKachin State in this trip.

During the Chin trip, we decided to go to some townshipsin Sagaing, Magwe and Mangwe Divisions. The membersof the USDA tried every method to destroy our works bymeans of bullying. We had to be very patient. We believe

that everyone has the right to demonstrate.

The authorities should give people the right todemonstrate if they themselves believe so. [applause]

We don’t want to say particularly why they allowed theUSDA members to do so, as special rights. But they aren

not staging true demonstrations. They forced some peopleto join them. [applause]

Moreover, we do not react to them. We don’t. We onlyreport to the authorities. Nevertheless, the authorities are



not taking action against members of the USDA becausethey argue that they are doing things within legal

boundaries. As the authorities are taking no action,members of the USDA are becoming more daring and far

worse. When at Kyitaukpauk Village, in the Madaya andSingua area, they threatened our supporters with sticks,

machetes and catapults. But we didn’t react to them. Weonly reported the case to the police station. Thereason is that we want to know properly

whether there is still law and order inthis country. If not so, we want the

proof. [applause]

The next day, they increased theharassments. Our people were inside theNLD compound at Madaya to conductmatters concerning youth. It was a big

compound. The audience was inside thecompound. Some were also inside anearby compound beyond the street.Then, members of the USDA came totaunt us with loudspeakers. We didn’t reactto them. Only when some monks who were unableto watch us being taunted, shot them with catapults didtheir (USDA’s) cars departed. [applause]

The monks did that because they could not stand thebullying. [applause]

They did that because they could not accept the injustice. Another thing, they did that because they pitied the NLD.When we came to Monywa, we heard about the one-sidedbullying. We heard about how the USDA was mobilizing itsmembers in Sagaing. We also saw them do it along theway. There were cars with many demonstrators. Otherpeople are banned from using cars. Other people are notallowed to hire cars, but they had many cars. [applause]

From Chaung-U to Monywa the people have beensupporting us in massive numbers. I believe that theysupport us because they can’t standbullying and injustice.

When we entered Monywa, the people of Chaung- Uwelcomed us enthusiastically despite the difficulties. Iassume that they support us because there is rampantinjustice. [applause]

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For this, I am very satisfied because our people basicallydo not like injustice. They don’t like bullying. It is good

that they still feel pity despite their sufferings. Therefore,we need to found a democratic country based on this

attitude. We need to found our democratic countryon the belief that truth is strength and strength is not the

truth. The reason we are saying democracy, democracymeans we want our country to be law-abiding. We wantour country to be just and fair. We don’t want

people to be bullying and dominating without being lawful.To be able todo this we need a system that gives peopleguarantees. The system isvery important. We often ask

what is more important; people or policy. In my opinion,however good the people if the system is not good, the

people, no matter how good and clever they are, will belike people stuck in the mud. [applause]

But if you look at it the other way, however good thesystem, if people are not good, the country will never

progress either. So, the system has to be good and thepeople have to be good and hardworking. When I

examined if our people have those qualities, I found thatthey are indeed so. There are two reasons for this;historically, before independence we were the most

advanced people in Asia. Once upon a time, our peoplewere pioneers and if so, if we have a good system we

won’t have problems. And now, when things are not wellin the country, our people have to leave their country and

work abroad for their families’ survival. There, people whowork in other countries tend to succeed. The majority of

them succeed.

For example, the Burmese sailors; on one hand I have topity them and on the other, I have to be proud of them.

The reason is that Burmese people are reliable and foreigncompanies depend on them. Burmese sailors are quitepitiable because you can ask them to do anything youwant. They accept their duties. Burmese sailors do not

defend their fellow countrymen and the employers takeadvantage of them. It doesn’t apply to only sailors,

but also other professionals. [applause]

There is no reason that our people should not beadvancing. We need to set up a system that gives peoplechances. We need to set up a system that gives peoplechances. I am not talking about a system that makes ourpeople rich. It is sure that our country could be rich if we



used that chance properly and diligently. It is veryimportant that our country is peaceful. Our country is aunion made up of many ethnic nationalities. Therefore, itneeds to be very peaceful. From the time of independence, there have been many armed struggles.Now, even though there are ceasefires, these ceasefires do

not mean peace. There is no agreement for peace.

In order to attain a peace guarantee, we can do it withpolitical means in our country. We will be able to say thatour country is peaceful only when all of the ethnic groupsdecide to set up a union with mutual agreements. Onlythen will our country be truly peaceful and will our peoplehave full rights and the right to make ourselves and ourcountry rich. Democracy is a system for rights, safety andfreedom. We have to improve our country with thesethings. We have to have the desire for improvements. We

need the abilities to do it. In order to do that the country[government] has to help the people. What I mean is thatthe government has to create a high quality educationsystem. Without a good higher education system, ourcountry will not be able to rise.[applause]

As far as I understand, the students are not satisfied withthe current education system. [applause]. As it is, it is verysad to look at on the one hand. Our youth are not satisfiedwith the education system. If you look from anotherperspective, it is a good sign. The ability to see that abad system is a bad system is a good thing. [applause]

If we admired a poor education system, how could weprogress? Our youth are quite open eyed and eared. Someyouth only think about themselves. They want to get onwith their own lives. They want to use the latesttechnology. They want to eat, drink and be merry. Thereare some people like that. They are not only in ourcountry. Every country has them. But I have seen that

many of our youth have political feelings. They werenot encouraged.

These days nobody wants them to have political feelings.During the time of the struggles for independence, we hada saying; ‘The Thakhins are worth six months in prison’.But today, six months is a laughing matter. [applause]



Appendix (5)

Press conferences of the Burmese military junta

Source: “Press conference clarifies instigations to cause unrest launched by Daw Suu Kyiof NLD and followers including U Tin Oo.” The New Light of Myanmar . 1 June 2003.

<http://www.myanmar.gov.mm/NLM-2003/enlm/Jun01_h3.html>

Press conference clarifies instigations to cause unrest launched by

Daw Suu Kyi of NLD and followers including U Tin Oo

YANGON, 31 May- A press conference to clarify the instigations to causeunrest launched by Daw Suu Kyi of National League for Democracy andfollowers including U Tin Oo during their tour of towns and villages wherepeace and tranquility prevailed was held at the Tatmadaw Guest House onInya Road here at 4 pm today.

Present on the occasion were Chairman of Public Relations and InformationCommittee of the State Peace and Development Council Minister for LabourU Tin Winn, Minister for Information Brig-Gen Kyaw Hsan, Vice-Chief of MilitaryIntelligence Maj-Gen Kyaw Win, Deputy Minister for Home Affairs Brig-Gen

Thura Myint Maung, Deputy Minster for Information Brig-Gen Aung Thein, seniormilitary officers of the Ministry of Defence, officials of the Ministry of Information,U Sein Win of Kyodo News Agency, Patron of Foreign Correspondents ClubU Hla Htwe, President U Sao Kai Hpa and members and invited guests.

Minister U Tin Winn explained that members of National League forDemocracy including U Tin Oo led by Daw Suu Kyi toured some towns andvillages where peace and tranquility prevailed and incited unrest with the crowd



of the people, and due to their acts, there occurred a traffic jam and instability.Therefore, people who opposed Daw Suu Kyi and NLD staged protests.Then, clashes between those in support of Daw Suu Kyi and those opposedto her broke out. At the same time, NLD, using the media, tried to exaggeratethe incidents with the aim of putting pressure on and finding fault with theGovernment. He continued to say that real situation was going to be clarifiedexplained as it was required to do so.

Daw Suu Kyi and NLD members had been allowed to travel freely to meetwith party members in the states and divisions since May 2002. Daw Suu Kyitoured Thamanya in Mon State from 11 to 15 June 2002; 16 townships inMandalay and Magway Divisions from 22 to 29 June 2002; 12 townships inMon and Kayin States from 20 to 23 July 2002; 14 townships in Bago Divisionfrom 14 to 17 October 2002; 17 townships in Shan State from 13 to 27November 2002; 15 townships in Rakhine State and Magway and AyeyawadyDivisions from 16 to 24 December 2002 and 21 townships in Magway

Division and Chin State from 3 to 13 April 2003 totalling 95 townships. Theymade the present tour of Mandalay and Sagaing Divisions, Kachin and ShanStates and Mogok of Mandalay Division and Monywa via Mandalay startingform 6 May. The State dignitaries believed that if they reached states, divisionsand townships and saw the changing situation of development which pavethe way for the good future of the State, there would be a change in theirnegative views and contribute to national reconsolidation. Therefore, duringtheir previous tours they were treated as VIPs and invited to visit DuyinkaboRiver Water Pumping Project near Aunglan; Yanpae Creek Dam Project nearTaungdwingyi; Ayeyawady River Bridge (Magway) Project; Paunglaung HydelPower Project; Thanlwin River Bridge (Mawlamyine) Construction Project;

Winphanon Dam Project; Thayetdabin Agriculture Project near Minhla; SouthNawin Dam Project near Paukkhaung; Nyaungaing Dam Project nearPadaung and Nathmaw River Water Pumping Project near Pyay.

First, there were bilateral prior agreements before setting out the trip, to avoidunnecessary gathering of crowds and undesirable problems, and tosystematically put up signboards after obtaining the permission of therespective Township Multi-Party Democracy Election Commissions in thealready agreed townships. During the trip, Daw Suu Kyi and NLD followers



carried out extended party organization and youth organization work, openedparty offices and conducted organizational task. In addition, they madeattempts to organize people to come out in crowds and made politicalspeeches at every opportunity; they even used monasteries to hold politicaltalks; they blocked the public roads, by placing tables in the middle of theroad to hold political talks. In their political talks, they didn’t educate the people

about the remedial and positive measures to help fulfill the national needsand ensure national peace and stability. Instead, they tried to find fault withand exaggerate the weak points of the government, and ultimately, they incitedthe public to fight. Trip after trip, they intensified their opposition to and criticismagainst the government and the State service personnel and attempted toincite the public. Their unjust criticism and accusations against educationand health employees, departmental personnel, local authorities and someorganizations were based on false information. Thus, dissatisfaction at DawSuu Kyi grew among a large number of people. They were also creatingmore problems by gathering crowds. The authorities found out that during thetrip, Daw Suu Kyi knew some information by herself and some from others.

Most of the information she received were incorrect. Because the news reportsshe received were unfair, that were written much in favour of one side whilestrongly opposing and slandering the other side. Such biased andexaggerated information was sent to Yangon from other places, and thendistributed to foreign media. The bad system of ardently featuring orbroadcasting the news reports that will have ill effects on Myanmar governmentby the foreign media is overwhelming the NLD. As Daw Suu Kyi is surroundedby pessimists, the government understands that it was very difficult for her tohave a positive outlook on the government however much the governmenttried with good intention and constructive attitude. Thus, although the

government has no desire to blame Daw Suu Kyi, it is true that her criticismsand attempts to instigate the public, with democracy as an excuse, will leadto undermining peace and stability of the State. He then recounted someincidents during her latest trip to Kachin State, Sagaing Division, andMandalay Division.

Daw Suu Kyi informed the government officials on 2 May that she and herteam had a plan to travel to Kachin State on 6 May; and that she wanted to putup signboards of some Township NLD offices during the trip. Thus, the officials



gave a reply to her on 4 May permitting her to put up signboards in sometownships. Then, she asked the officials to allow her to put up signboards at16 more townships in Sagaing and Mandalay Divisions and Shan State. Theofficials found out that some townships where NLD offices already hadsignboards were also included in her list of 16 townships. The officials toldher that it was impossible to issue permits for the townships in time for hertrip; that they also had difficulties sometimes it was a public holiday; thatsometimes the senior official concerned was away on a trip; that the listpresented by the NLD stated only the names of the townships; that theaddresses of the places where the signboards were going to be put up werenot mentioned; that the place and the building where the signboard of a politicalparty would be erected had to be free from anything; that unnecessaryproblems might occur if the party office was located at a religious land, aState-owned building or land, a municipal-owned land, a farm land, a disputedland, or a building without the consent of family members; that it was necessaryto study whether the land or the building would have such problems; that if theofficials asked the NLD to wait sometime for putting up the signboards

because of such problems, it usually accused the government of trying to banits signboard erection plan; that the officials had willingly permitted to put upsignboards at township NLD offices in Sagaing Division in time; that althoughthere were difficulties, the government always obliged with intention to buildmutual understanding and respect and to solve the problem.

If some incidents during the trip to Kachin State made by Daw Suu Kyi andher NLD followers including U Tin Oo is reviewed, the NLD’s aims andintentions can be seen clearly.

The problem started on 8 May when they left Mandalay for Sagaing. Beginning

from Sagaing Bridge, the NLD members flanked their convoy with about 20motorcycles each flying flags, switching on the headlights although it was daytime, and blowing horns all along the way till reaching Shwebo. It was not surewhether the party elders knew this or not. However, the motorcycles wererolling flanking the convoy like that all along the way. The worst and the mostdisorderly was the trip to Mogok from Momeik. The NLDs violated traffic rulesto the highest degree during the journey. About 40 motorcycles were rolling inpairs in front of the convoy causing traffic jams all along the way till reachingthe guest house in central Mogok. The convoy was also flanked by motorcycles.Traffic congestion also occurred in the town. During the journey from Mogokto Mandalay, the NLDs also rode their motorcycles lawlessly. Because of

violating traffic rules, a motorcycle hit and ran over a 21-year old woman, MaMyat Thin Thu, of Pathein-lay village, Patheingyi Township. She was injured.

On 9 May, on arrival at Sabai Natha Village on its way from Kanbalu to KawlinTownship, the convoy met with about 20 youths who came out of the videohouse shouting “We don’t want Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.” The convoy stoppedthere and the followers, who are the so-called NLD youths, used abusivelanguage and harsh words in the middle of the village. The village youths hadto ran away as the NLD followers were throwing stones at them. At about 6



pm, the convoy arrived in Kawlin. Preparations had been made for a summercourse organized by the Union Solidarity and Development Association at ahigh school. As usual, the signboard bearing the points of the People’s Desirewas also hung at the school. The so-called NLD youths took photos and shotvideo of the school. The two youths from the school compound also tookphotos of the convoy. The NLD youths shouted at those youths and threwstones at them. The youths from the school compound had to flee. On reachingIndaw, it had already past nine. Some 70 people who did not support DawSuu Kyi staged a demonstration, holding placards bearing the four-pointPeople’s Desire. However, NLDs in the dark threw stones at them. As a result,some villagers, Htay Lwin (a) Bo Lwin, Thein Nu, Than Oo, Soe Myint Oo andZaw Lwin Oo, were injured.

On 11 May, the convoy reached Katha. There were a lot of people whoopposed Daw Suu Kyi’s trip there. Both sides shouted at each other withslogans. The two sides retreated from the place and the convoy could leavethe village only after the Chairman of District Peace and Development Council

had intervened. Fortunately, there were no physical attacks between the twogroups. NLD party members in some townships and villages in Kachin Statewelcomed Daw Suu Kyi in various forms. Those who opposed her also stagedprotests to let NLDs know their desire. There were not so much prohibition,obstruction or disturbances to the convey as stated in the NLD announcementsthat were sent to foreign broadcasting stations daily. There were also no hurlingof stones at the convoy, attacks with clubs, hitting the windscreen with fist orthreats with Kachin traditional sword. If such threats and attacks had takenplace, the NLD convoy would have been crushed into pieces.

After arriving at Momeik on 21 May, not only did Daw Suu Kyi made political

speeches, but also U Tin Oo made slanderous remarks against thegovernment, threatening the local authorities to sue under various legalsections. On 25 May, Kyaw Naing of Wayongon Village and San Oo and BoCho of Yaukpinyoe Village of the crowd which came out to oppose Daw SuuKyi at Nweyon Village in Singu Township were injured by NLD catapult attack.According to the NLD announcement, one of its members was also injured inthe incident. When Daw Suu Kyi arrived at Mandalay Division NLD Office inMandalay, where she and her followers were temporarily staying, she madeattempts to organize a crowd and gave a speech. As the crowd was blockingthe street, traffic police of Maha Aungmye Township came to the scene andcleared the traffic jam and blockage. Some NLD party members struck the

Dyna light truck bearing number plate 5 Ka/8175 with iron rods. The car whichcarried the policemen parked between 78th and 79th streets. The car’swindscreen was smashed. An NLD news report said that the NLD membershit the car as it drove into the crowd.

The acts of Daw Suu Kyi and party had reached beyond the degree of creating just public disorder wherever they arrived. They intensified their act of movingin a group of motorcycles, cars and men. They started their journey fromYangon with only three cars carrying 18 persons. Their manpower had risen



to over 100 riding seven cars, 20 motorcycles in travelling from Mandalay toMonywa on 29 May. When they arrived in Monywa from ChaungOo, the convoyhad 150 motorcycles, 16 cars and over 300 people. They went round Monywafor three hours and created disturbances and disorder in the peaceful andtranquil Monywa. A photographer named Maung Myo Myint documenting theincident was beaten by a pack of NLDs. He received head injuries and waswarded at the hospital. His video camera was also destroyed. Daw Suu Kyiand party put up signboard in Monywa NLD party office at night, which wasagainst the rules of the bilateral agreement. According to the agreement, theNLD must inform the matter to and ask permission from the Township MultipartyDemocracy General Election Commission or Township Peace andDevelopment Council.

At about noon on 30 May, the convoy of 15 cars, with about 100 motorcyclesserving as point men left and right flanks and rearguards left Monywa forBudalin. They entered Budalin at high speed, switching on the headlights ofthe motorcycles and making much noise. The signboard of Budalin Township

NLD Office was then put up. Afterwards, they left for Dapayin. They stoppedat Saipyin Village and continued their trip to Dapayin with a convoy of ninecars and 40 motorcycles at roundabout 7.30 pm. A large group of peoplenumbering about 5,000 were waiting for Daw Suu Kyi to stage a demonstrationagainst her at a place two miles from the entrance to Dapayin. As the vehiclesof NLD convoy drove out of the mob, clashes broke out between the twoopposing groups. Disorder and brawl occurred from about 8 pm to 11 pm. Avehicle at high speed ran into a tree on road side. A vehicle of NLD convoyrun off the road, breaking its windscreen. It is learnt that NLD members torcheda vehicle of those opposed to Daw Suu Kyi. Four people died in the carcrash. The clashes left 50 people injured. Eight vehicles and nine motorcycles

were destroyed. After hearing the news, security personnel comprising MPFmembers led by the Secretary of Sagaing Division Peace and DevelopmentCouncil rushed to the scene and tried to put the situation under control. Thesituation was put under total control about midnight. The injured were admittedto hospitals for medical treatment. The authorities are taking measures toaddress the situation and ensure regional peace and tranquility. There weresome incidents in which NLD members destroyed at night some signboardsbearing “People’s Desire” set up in Monywa but when security personnelarrived NLD members dispersed in all directions. Now peace and tranquilityprevails in Monywa.

In the incident, the problem would not have arisen if the NLD convoy couldmanage to peacefully pass through the demonstrators on either side of theroad and on the road. The conflict occurred as vehicles and motorbikes fromNLD convoy sped past the mass of the people. The cause of the problemwas that NLD broke the terms of the agreement reached with the governmentand had taken the course of confrontation, thus causing disorder anddisturbances. The NLD could not even control its supporters on the road andmotorcyclists. Officials of the government frequently contacted and forewarnedthose responsible in NLD to exercise restraint to avoid untoward incidents



during the organization tour. But it is assumed that the problem occurred sinceNLD did not accept the warning and took the course of confrontationintentionally with the use of its members.

The security personnel concerned are giving NLD members including DawSuu Kyi and U Tin Oo proper care and protection.

It is known to all that Myanmar could not make efforts peacefully to build amodern and developed nation after regaining the independence like othercountries. Time was consumed in tackling problems including internal strife,power struggles resulting from differences in ideologies, internal uprisingsand machinations of the national traitors. Tasks for national development couldnot be carried out peacefully. Nowadays, those unfavourable conditions havebeen wiped out to a great extent and favourable conditions are being created.Way has been paved for the national development. Efforts are to be made forthe national development with the effective use of good conditions. Thus,national reconciliation or national recon-solidation or national unity is to bebuilt based on understanding. At the same time, all are to take part in seekingmeans and ways for development of the Union of Myanmar with understanding.Having to tackle problems and refute accusations will not contribute to thenational recon-solidation mentioned above. The government will takesystematic measures to ensure community peace and tranquility andprevalence of law and order for development of the State.

Then, Head of Department Brig-Gen Than Tun of the Ministry of Defencereplied to queries raised by the journalists and the press conference endedat 4.45 pm.



Appendix (6)

Translation of an interview w ith Zaw Zaw Aung, head of NLD Youth W ing Mandalay Division, concerning the brutal attack on

30 May. He was traveling along with Aung Suu Kyi at the timeof the attack.

To listen to the interview in Burmese, please visit http://www.nldla-australia.org/. This translation is also available at www.ncgub.net

Q. You were in the midst of the attack on Daw Su’s motorcade atDepayin Township in Sagaing Division and luckily escaped. What timedid you leave Butalin for Depayin?

A. Between 4:30 and 5.

Q. At about what time did you reach Kyi Village? A. At about 8 at night.

Q. Were there people on the road to greet Daw Aung San Suu Kyi? A. Yes. We responded and spoke to the people.

Q. Were there people who shouted and opposed Daw Aung San Suu Kyithere?

A. I heard no such shouting.

Q. It was 8 p.m. when you arrived at Kyi Ywa. How many people were

there to greet and welcome you all? A. I would estimate about 3000. It could have been as large as four orfive thousand.

Q. Is it a big village? A. Yes.

Q. Is there jungle on both sides of Kyi Ywa? A. There are paddy fields.

Q. Did you hear any opposition voices in the crowd that was out there towelcome you all?

A. No. I did not hear any opposition voices.

Q. Were there any posters, etc. expressing dissent? A. No.

Q. So Daw Suu addressed the people for how long? A. About 10 minutes.



Q. You all went on from there? A. We had not gone very far. About 200 feet from the villagers – thecars behind had not caught up with us as yet. We could see the villagers.They had not dispersed. Then, two monks and three laymen stood infront of Daw Suu’s car stopping it from proceeding. They asked Daw Suuto speak to the people.

Q. Instead of being at the place where the people had alreadyassembled?

A. They could have joined them if they wanted. Instead, they stood andwaited at a distance.

Q. Stood and waited, then asked for a speech? A. Yes, they asked her to step out and speak. It was late. We had to goon to Depayin also. So, the NLD member who was in Daw Su’s car said,

“ Honorable monk, it is very late and there is no time. Please excuseyour disciples.” But the monks did not leave. They were looking back

and said, “The people in our gang are useless.” We got out of the carand stood around to protect Daw Su. Then the monk said, “My peoplewill be following up. Listen to a monk’s words. Try your best to preachto them.” We requested them to let us pass, but they insisted that westay. Then, the place was lit up by car headlights and we saw about 7cars.

Q. What sort of cars? A. All sorts. Trucks that carry goods, earth, and Dyna cars. Peopledescended from those cars and without saying anything they beat up thevillagers. Because the headlights were on we could see all that was

happening.

Q. Were the villagers beaten up by the people who came out of thosecars?

A. Yes. The cars were not close by but because the headlights were onwe could see everything. There were a lot of monks who carried out thebeatings. A lot of men too.

Q. So monks came out of those cars? A. When the villagers were being beaten up they screamed and fled.

They were chased by some of those men. Others came around to ourside, surrounded us and without saying anything just thrashed at us. Wenoticed that these monks had pieces of white cloth tied around theirright hands.

Q. These monks are referred to as ‘Identity’? A. This is how they identify themselves. This indicates that they are notlike ordinary monks.



Q. Can we accept them as genuine monks? A. How could that be. When they beat up the villagers and our partywho were acting peacefully. We heard and we saw for ourselves howthey continued thrashing even those who were dead on the ground.Innocent people were beaten to death. Genuine monks would not dothat.

Q. So, they beat up the villagers first, then went between the villagersand the NLD party and proceeded to beat them up also?

A. Yes. They beat up NLD members. The villagers fled and some couldhave fallen with NLD members. Our numbers were small. But whetherour numbers were small or large, no one had any weapons. Our leadersgave strict instructions that even if attacked we were not to respond withviolence. We were to bear it with fortitude.

Q. So they continued to brutally beat up all the NLD members whoaccompanied the motorcade?

A. To kill, to mutilate was their purpose. So much so that if they saw abody moving they went for it saying, “There is still sign of life – beat,beat.” Not with just one stick. They went through the crowd with two orthree sticks in hand and thrashed at fallen bodies. They responded togroans or pleas for mercy with severer thrashings. At that time we werevery afraid for our lives. So we lay very still and did not move. At thattime these were the words they uttered, “ We have built roads, we havebuilt bridges. You do not talk about these things. What has your AungSan Suu Kyi done for the country? You want to be under the authority of the Kala’s wife.” [Kala meaning white man] Again they thrashed at thefallen bodies.

Q. We heard that women also accompanied Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.What happened to them?

A. Yes, the women wore ‘pinny’ [home-spun material]. The men alsowore pinny. They announced that they did not want to see any ‘pinny’ and ordered all to remove their pinny clothing. They snatched andpulled off the pinny clothing of the fallen bodies and those within theirreach. The girls asked them not to pull off their clothes, but they forcedthem and grabbed and tugged and removed their clothes. Some of themhad their gold chains snatched. I saw this with my own eyes. Not

satisfied with this, they grabbed and took away their handbags also.

Q. So they beat up the people, and then made them remove their pinnygarments. For the men, removal of the pinny jacket is no problem, butfor the women this would be most embarrassing and disgracefulbecause it is worn as a blouse. So this was a deliberate act to causethem shame.

A. Yes, they took their necklaces and their bags with money too.Q. For how long were they doing this?



passengers. They saw the injured and fallen, some dead and the line of cars. They turned back and left.

Q. So those injured and the dead were left lying there? A. Yes, I saw some being taken away in cars.

Q. In the end what happened? A. We were not steady on our feet. I looked on. At about 12:45 (I hadmy watch on so I knew the time) members of the police force, the firebrigade, and local authorities put the injured and dead bodies into motorvehicles. Then what astonished me most was that our car, which washeading west for Depayin, was pushed so that it appeared to be headingsouth and shoved down into the ditch. Another car was also pushed intothe ditch. This was a deliberate act to create a different scenario. Iwitnessed this with my own eyes.

Q. To look as if two cars had collided?

A. Yes, to appear that way. I couldn’t believe my eyes. I remember thisvery clearly. Then some of the cars with injured people drove off towards Depayin. Some cars went in the other direction. About 30persons remained. I cannot say definitely if they were the police orUSDA members because they all were in the same uniform. Theypushed the cars towards the Ye U side.

Q. These were the cars in which NLD members had traveled? A. Yes. They pushed them. Then we could hear them removing steelparts from them.

Q. All of this happened in Kyi Ywa? You don’t know what happened inDepayin?

A. No, I don’t know about that.

Q. Earlier you said that you had heard gunshots from the place towardswhich the cars were headed after this incident. Some did not say so.Some said they saw. It looks like there was another party of attackers.

A. Yes, that is definite. Because we heard those shots and people whosaw it have spoken about it.

Q. Thank you for giving us this information. A. This is an account of what we know. If they fired shouts many wouldhave died. It must be worse than what happened here.

Q. The events that happened later must have been more serious. A. Yes. We have experienced very serious attacks. Thank you.



Appendix (7)

Testimony of Soe Than, NLD member, Kamaryut Township,

Rangoon

Personal data

Name: Soe Than (a.k.a. Aung Soe Than)

Date of Birth: 1 January 1971

Parents: U Sein Net & Daw Aye Yee

Education: 8th standard

Occupation: Farmer

Address Kyauk Twinn Village, Myaing Township, MagweDivision

ID number: 8/Ma Ma Na (Naing) 032 913



My name is Soe Than (a.k.a. Aung Soe Than). My ID number is 8/Ma MaNa (Naing) 032 913. My parents are U Sein Net & Daw Aye Yee. I wasborn on 1 January 1971. My educational level is eighth standard. I workedas a farmer when I lived in Kyauk Twinn village, Myaing Township, MagweDivision.

In 1995, I joined the National League for Democracy (NLD) in KamarutTownship, Rangoon. My position was “In Charge No. 1” of the NLD YouthWing of my Township.

On 24 August 1998, I was arrested. I was prosecuted under State Provision Act, section 5 (j). On 20 October, I was sentenced to 7 years imprisonmentin Special Court No. 1 inside the compound of Insein Prison.

On 22 January 2000, 47 political prisoners and I were transferred toTharawaddy Prison. On 23 September 2002, I was released from prisonunder an agreement (401 criminal procedure code) that my sentence was

suspended but would be extended if I engaged in any political affairsagainst the regime. Military Intelligence (MI) personnel took me to mynative village on 25 September. I joined the township NLD branch inRangoon.

While I was working in the NLD, I experienced the following confrontationsbetween the junta and Aung San Suu Kyi:

1. The planned attack on people gathered to listen to Aung San Suu Kyi’s speech at Gwitalit junction,Bahan Township, Rangoon, on 3 November 1996.

2. The planned attack on the Aung San Suu Kyi, TinOo and Kyi Maung, leaders of NLD on 9 November1996. They had left their residences to meet withthe public.

3. Disturbance against the founding ceremony of theNLD Youth Wing in Mayangone Township,Rangoon Division on 28 October 1997.

4. Physically harming the participants of a readingcircle session on 25 June 1998.

5. Disturbing Aung San Suu Kyi’s trip to Irrawaddy(21-29 July 1998)

6. Disturbing Aung San Suu Kyi’s trip to Irrawaddy(12-24 August 1998)



As far as I can remember, the military government has attempted repeatedlyto assassinate Aung San Suu Kyi since 1996.

Win Sein delivered a speech against Aung San Suu Kyi during a ceremonyat the Lel Pyin Village primary school in Indaw Township. He delivered thespeech at the ceremony to present applications for USDA memberships.He was Minister for Rail Transportation and a secretary of the USDA atthat time. He said, “We must get rid of Aung San Suu Kyi, who is creatingpolitical unrest. Do you understand what it means to ‘get rid of?’ It meanswe’ll have to kill her. Have you got the guts to kill her?” He repeatedlyasked the crowd of USDA members. No one responded to him. Therefore,he continued, “We must kill her.”

After his speech, USDA members in Rangoon Division were selected fortraining in order to attack Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD members. Since 1November 1996, there were special trainings for USDA members in abuilding near the Ministry of Home Affairs compound. The trainings even

emphasized practicing how to attack people and vehicles. At that time, Aung San Suu Kyi usually gave public speeches in front of her residence on the weekends. On 3 November 1996, the authoritiesstopped people at Gwitalit junction. As a result, the public was not able togo to Aung San Suu Kyi and they just stayed at the junction. In someother places also, the public was blocked from going to Aung San Suu Kyi.The people coming from North Okalapa Township and Kaba Aye Pagodawere blocked at the junction near Sedona Hotel. The people coming fromSouth Okalapa Township, Thinggangyun and Tamwe Townships wereblocked at Harmittit junction.

At about 5:00 pm, some vehicles reached the public blocked near SedonaHotel. Several USDA members got out of the vehicles and went into thecrowd. I was in the crowd. We all were forced to stay in a small areabecause the authorities had blocked the roads.

We all stayed close together. Then, we decided to join the crowd at theGwitalit junction. We walked together along Set Hmu Tit Road. USDAmembers also stayed among us. Several riot police disturbed us at theback of the crowd.

While we were walking, some USDA members in the crowd shouted, “Run! Run! ” The people had no idea why they were being asked to run. Inoticed that the people shouting and running away were USDA members.They have (Burmese traditional) bags. Some of them were wearing theirsarong over their shoulder. After they alarmed people and began running,many people also ran. The riot police chased after those running and beatthem up. USDA members also attacked the people using batons andcatapults they had in their bags. As the two groups systematically attackedthe people, the people scattered and some were arrested.



On Saturday, 9 November, people tried to reach Aung San Suu Kyi’sresidence to hear the speech she was giving. The authorities prohibitedthe gathering by using various tactics. The authorities also tried toassassinate NLD leaders.

That day, the University Avenue was closed between Innya Road junctionand Gwitalit junction. Kaba Aye Pagoda Road was also blocked from SedonaHotel to Harmitit junction. The authorities had effectively blocked everyroad leading to Aung San Suu Kyi’s residence.

The people were not allowed to pass through to that area. USDA memberswere placed there in advance and behaved like local residents. USDAmembers from North Okalapa Township stayed around the Sedona Hotel.Some were playing ‘Chin Lone’, cane ball and football. Some were playingchess, while others sat on the side of the road as though they were porters.

In the early evening, Aung San Suu Kyi and Tin Oo went to Kyi Maung’sresidence. After Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade left his home, some 200thugs on the Kaba Aye Pagoda Road attacked the motorcade. They hadweapons and had been waiting for the motorcade. During the attack,

Aung San Suu Kyi’s driver drove the car through the thugs so that she wasable to escape the assassination attempt. As the thugs used stones, chainsand batons, the windows of Aung San Suu Kyi’s car were destroyed. If thedriver hadn’t been able to drive away, she would have been killed on thespot.

Tin Oo’s vehicle was also under attack. His left cheek was injured by pieces

of glass. Vice Chairperson Kyi Maung was also attacked. He later told methat he barely escaped the attacks with different sorts of weapons. However,he did incur some head injuries from pieces of glass.

The three NLD leaders barely escaped the brutal attack and just reachedus at the Gwitalit junction. Then, they gave speeches for a while, as thepeople were waiting to hear them.

It’s clear that the authorities had tried to assassinate the NLD leaders.

On 28 October 1997, Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD members tried to go tothe Mayangon Township NLD branch office in order to join in the foundingceremony of a local NLD Youth Wing. USDA members and several riotpolice blocked the road. On Kaba Aye Pagoda Road, Aung San Suu Kyiand NLD members were harassed in various ways. Vice Chairperson KyiMaung and some 20 others were arrested and sent to Shwe Ta KawCemetery, on the outskirts of Rangoon. Some 100 NLD members, includingmyself, were arrested and sent to different places on the outskirts of



Rangoon. In the evening, eight activists, including the following, werearrested at their homes. They received seven years imprisonment each.

1. Khin Maung Myint (died in Kalay Prison)

2. Win Win Htay (a.k.a. Ma Po)

3. Nyan Thaung, owner of the residence in which the MayangoneTownship NLD branch was operating

4. Soe Myint, Chairperson of Thakata Township NLD branch

5. Dr. Than Nyein, elected MP

6. Dr. May Win Myint, elected MP

On 24 June 1998, there was another assassination attempt against AungSan Suu Kyi. Some other Youth Wing members and I tried to reach AungSan Suu Kyi’s home in order to join a circle reading session. We wereplanning to discuss the book “United States Government” . The book wastranslated by Daw San May (a.k.a. Shwe Ku May Hninn).

The MI checkpoint in front of ‘Pyae Wa’ restaurant didn’t allow us to go onto Aung San Suu Kyi’s residence. The MI personnel told us that the YouthWing members were not allowed to go because there would not by anyreading session. They refused to allow us to go to her house because they

said they hadn’t received the list of people who wanted to attend. Theygave different sorts of excuses and kept us from passing the MI checkpoint.The intelligence units had been running camps around Aung San Suu Kyi’shome. They claimed that they had to stay there for her security. Intelligencepersonnel carefully checked everyone before they visited Aung San SuuKyi.

On that day, Tin Oo, vice chairperson of the NLD, gave a list to theintelligence personnel. The list included the names of the participantsgoing to join the reading circle session. However, we were still not permitted

to enter her residence. We reported to Tin Oo that we were at the checkpointand he later reached us. The intelligence personnel still continued to block us. Tin Oo went to Aung San Suu Kyi to inform her about what washappening at the checkpoint and he was allowed to enter her residence.

Soon after, he and Aung San Suu Kyi reached us by car. She told us, “Come to my residence. (We’re having a) reading circle session.” Finally,we passed the checkpoint. The two NLD leaders followed us in their car.



Aung San Suu Kyi’s left shoulder was hurt. Tin Oo warned, “Young girls,protect your aunty, embrace her!” Then, the young girls embraced her. Wealso stayed behind the girls while we held each others’ hands. Our backswere terribly hurt because of the beatings. They attacked us for ten orfifteen minutes before they stopped. However, the riot police and soldierscontinued to surround us. They then placed barbed wire around thesoldiers.

There were about 30 of us. We had tried to enter the compound at about2:00 pm. It was raining all day and water flooded the tar road. Aboutseven buses pulled up so no one at the junction would be able to see us.Riot police moved back behind the buses. Then, the authorities placed thebarbed wire behind the riot police. We were completely blocked in.

There was blood on Aung San Suu Kyi’s shoulder. Major Thura (also knownas Major Nay Soe) said, “You can go if you want. Ask the young people toreturn home. Don’t let them go into your compound.” She replied, “Thura,

you know me. We will all go inside. Otherwise, we will not go.” Then, heand some other officers went back to their base camp around Aung SanSuu Kyi’s house.

We just sat there in the rain. Aung San Suu Kyi explained that the book was about the United States’ government and we had planed to discuss itduring a reading circle session. The book details the duties andresponsibilities of the president, congressmen, and the rights of the peopleguaranteed by the Constitution of the United States. This constitution wascreated by the people’s representatives. In Burma, the military governmentwas trying to draw up a constitution by themselves. The junta didn’t want

us to discuss the book because it contained facts about the U.S. Constitution.

Tin Oo talked about his experiences on the battlefield. Then, we all sangpolitical songs.

At midnight, Tin Oo slept on the tar road while leaning against us. AungSan Suu Kyi also leaned against the girls and slept.

The next morning, at 10:45 am, Major Thura came to us and said, “Youall can go inside the house.” We then took showers and rested for awhile.

Dr. Tin Myo Win came to us and treated people who had been injured. Atabout noon, we had lunch together. We hadn’t eaten a meal with herbefore. It was our very first time.

The attack carried out by riot police and soldiers was the second assassinationattempt against Aung San Suu Kyi. She escaped because Tin Oo was ableto protect her.



In 1998, the military government arrested elected MPs all over Burmaunder 1961 Habitual Criminal Offenders Act, Section 5(1) (f) and (g). TheNLD objected to those arrests, releasing a statement that read that thepeople of Burma had elected those representatives and that the authoritieshad arrested them merely to insult them.

However, the junta told the international community that those electedMPs were not under arrest. Aung San Suu Kyi wanted to show that theywere in fact under arrest. She tried to visit Min Hla Township in order tomeet Hla Hla Moe, an elected MP. She was stopped along the way. She wasblocked in front of Riot Police Regiment 5 in Mawbe Township, on theoutskirts of Rangoon.

She also tried to visit elected MPs in the Irrawaddy Division. She wasblocked when she went to Nyaung Done Township. She left Rangoon ataround 9:30 am. She was blocked in front of the Riot Police Regiment 9in Hlaingthaya Township. When the road was crowded with vehicles the

authorities unblocked the road. However, she was blocked off again inHtan Tapin Township.The authorities forced the local people of Ahnyasu Village, Htan TapinTownship to carry sandbags, which were placed on the bridge in Ahnyasu

Village. The villagers were also forced to erect barbed wire in order toblock the road. Highway buses were standing by near the bridge.

When Aung San Suu Kyi’s car arrived, the two buses moved to the bridgein order to block the road. Aung San Suu Kyi’s driver was forced to make aU-turn. The driver was skilled, which is why there wasn’t an accident.

When the car stopped, riot police rushed to the car. The riot police officerordered Aung San Suu Kyi to return to Rangoon. She replied, “I came tomeet the elected MPs. Why did you block the road?” The officer said, “Ican’t answer your question. Just go back to Rangoon.” She replied, “I willnot go back at all. Don’t tell me again.”

Then, the riot police lifted up her car to the small bridge nearby. Thebridge was over the ditch along the road. Inside the car, Aung San Suu Kyiwas with Hla Pe, chairperson of Irrawaddy Division NLD branch, and twodrivers.

The officer said, “You are allowed to return to Rangoon. But, you can’tcontinue your trip.” The riot police unblocked the highway road. Aung SanSuu Kyi’s car tried to drive away. A truck waiting nearby blocked thehighway road. The riot police lifted the car and moved it onto the smallbridge again. They installed brake locks on the car’s wheels because theydidn’t want the car to drive away. Anyone on the highway could not haveknown that her car was blocked. Passersby would have thought that thecar was parked along the roadside and that the people inside the car were



taking a rest. The authorities systematically blocked her because they wantedto maintain the claim to the international community that they didn’t stopher.

Aung San Suu Kyi and the three others in the car didn’t receive any meals.They collected water using an umbrella when it rained. They stayed therefor eight days.

Dr. Tin Myo Min, her family doctor was allowed to meet them. On theeighth day, the doctor claimed that she would die if she didn’t receiveproper food and water. The international community asked the junta tofree her. At about 10:00 pm, Major Thura and two female police officerstook her away by force. She was then forced to return to Rangoon. Apolice officer drove the car. Inside the car, Major Thura held her waistwhile two female police officers held her legs.

After they were forced to return to Rangoon, Aung San Suu Kyi, Hla Pe,

and the two drivers held a press conference. They presented somephotographs at the press conference. Dr. Tin Myo Win also explained howhe had to save her life while she was in a weakened state inside the car.That was the third assassination attempt against her. Fortunately, she lived.I believe that she survived because of her goodwill for the country.

From 12-24 August 1998, she tried to visit Irrawaddy in order to meet Dr.Tin Min Htut, elected MP of Pantanaw Constituency-1. Again, riot policemoved her car to the same small bridge for 13 days. This time she broughtwater bottles and snacks in the car. Because of those provisions, her healthdidn’t deteriorate too seriously. The authorities didn’t feed her anything

over the 13 days. This was the fourth assassination attempt.

To obtain information about Aung San Suu Kyi, four other NLD membersand I went to the place where she was being held under arrest. On 21

August, the authorities tried to arrest us so we left for Rangoon. On 24 August, I was arrested. I was tortured while in prison.

After I was released from prison, I rejoined the NLD. I took part in AungSan Suu Kyi’s trip to Chin State in 2003. During the trip, the local peoplewho came to see Aung San Suu Kyi were attacked. Htay Oo, chairperson

of the District Peace and Development Council beat them using a bambooshoot. I witnessed it in Myoma Road. Firemen in uniform also arrived atthe area where Aung San Suu Kyi was giving speech. In their car, theyplayed loud music to disrupt and disturb her.

Captain Lin Zaw Kan of MI Unit 20 came and recorded her speech using atape recorder. The authorities blocked the suspension bridge that connectsthe east and west areas of Gangaw Township. A Kalay-Yay Ne train wasalso canceled. The authorities didn’t want the local people to welcome



Aung San Suu Kyi. The authorities understood that she has the support of the local people.

When we left Gangaw Township, large logs blocked the road. We had toremove them from the road in order to continue the trip. Those large logswere from the forest reserve. The authorities claimed that Aung San SuuKyi had freedom of movement, which was clearly untrue.

The above-mentioned events are my own experiences. I had to express itbecause I want other people to know that the junta has tried to assassinate

Aung San Suu Kyi. The junta cannot hide what happened at Depayin.Now, many people are becoming aware of the Depayin Massacre.

-Soe Than (a.k.a. Aung Soe Than)



Appendix (8)

Statement by Prof. Paulo Sergio Pinheiro

Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in M yanmar

58th Session of the General Assembly

Third Committee, Item 117 (c)

12 November 2003, New York

Mr. President,

I have the honor to introduce my interim report, which refers to myactivities and developments relating to the human rights situation inMyanmar in the first seven months of 2003. I am pleased to present youan update following my sixth visit to Myanmar from 3 to 8 November2003.

My main government interlocutors were the Prime Minister, General KhinNyunt Secretary-2 of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC);the Foreign Minister and his Deputy; the Home Minister; the Head of Department of the Office of the Military Intelligence; the Director-General

of the Prisons Department; representatives of the governmental HumanRights Committee and the National Convention Convening Commission. Ihad access to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (DASSK), the General Secretary of the National League for Democracy (NLD), as well as three members of the NLD Central Executive Committee (CEC), who are currently underhouse arrest. I also met with representatives of ethnic nationalities partiesand other political parties, the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), thediplomatic community, international civil society organizations, internationaland local, business community, and the media. I would like to express myappreciation to the Myanmar authorities for their full cooperation infacilitating my mission.

Mr. President,

This visit took place in a very different context to past visits. Since my lastmission in March 2003, the human rights situation and the process fornational reconciliation have been marked by significant setbacks, theincident in Depayin on 30 May 2003 involved serious human rights abusesand had deep political implications. In my last report, I presented theaccounts of the 30 May events according to the version of the authorities



and other reliable sources, as well as my own preliminary reading of theincident, based on the information available at the time of writing. Duringthis mission, I was able to supplement my knowledge about the incidentthrough interviews with some victims and eyewitnesses as well asdiscussions with the authorities and DASSK. In response to my request, Iwas told that the authorities would share with me an unpublished reporton the results of their official investigation. From what I heard and sawduring this mission, I can say that there is prima facie evidence that theDepayin incident could not have happened without the connivance of Stateagents. The evidence that I was able to collect until now indicates that, aspro-DASSK rallies were growing larger, in particular from 25 to 30 May2003, there was an escalation of threats, provocation, harassment,intimidation, bullying, and orchestrated acts of violence with the involvementof those opposed to the NLD and/or those who had some connection togovernment affiliated bodies. I find it difficult to believe that it would nothave been possible to handle the evolving situation peacefully, thus avertingthe unnecessary loss of human life and suffering.

What happened at Depayin constitutes a lamentable regression in the areaof human rights, not only the incident itself but also its ripple effects; theclosure of all NlD offices in the country; the incommunicado detention of DASSK; the house arrests of NLD-CEC members; arrests and sentencingof NLD members and supporters and others activists; and their increasedsurveillance and intimidation. Effective measures to bring perpetrators to

justice are still lacking, as mostly people who were victims of attack, ratherthan their attackers, had been arrested.

Rectifying this regression requires the immediate unconditional release of

all those who have been in detention or under house arrest since 30 May2003. In addition, compensation for the surviving victims and the familiesof those who lost their lives should be considered. There should also be athorough investigation, in accordance with international standards includingpublic announcement of its results and accountability of those responsible.There should also be guarantees for non-reprisal and non-intimidationagainst those who cooperate in establishing the truth about Deapyin. NLDoffice should be re-opened too. All of these measures will contribute tohealing some of the wounds left by this tragedy.

Looking back at the period between May 2002 and May 2003, when many

people had some hope, albeit mixed with uncertainty, I have the impressionthat opportunities were missed to build on the earlier confidence-buildingefforts. Lack of sufficiently solid bonds of mutual confidence lead to mistrustinstead of growing confidence and eventually resulted in what happenedin Dapayin. The tragedy on 30 May 2003 should not have happened andmust not occur again.

The 30 May events also became a key defining moment in the change of attitude of the international community towards Myanmar. The SPDC came



under unprecedented international condemnation, which resulted inincreased international sanctions against the country. Subsequent actionsof the SPDC, namely the appointment of the new Prime Minister in August2003 and his announcement of the seven-point road map, wereacknowledged by some members of the international community.

Lessons should be learned from the Depayin incident and that knowledge

applied sooner rather than later by all those who really care for the futureof Myanmar. It is not a question of seeking revenge, or taking a partisanpolitical stance. Effective redress of those human rights violations involvedin the incident would also provide a moral compass to guide the countryforward on the path to democratization. Missing this opportunity forreconciliation could lead to more negative developments. I, therefore,proposed to the SPDC that they allow me to conduct an independentassessment of the 30 May events. The authorities have not yet agreed tothis proposal.

During this mission, I got sufficient insights on the so-called road map of

the SPDC, The SPDC established three committees (Convening, Workingand Administrative) to prepare the National Convention, which had theirfirst joint meeting on 5 November 2003. The authorities informed me thatthe starting point for the National Convention would be the 104 Principles,all political parties would be able to participate equally in the Conventionand there would be new elections according to a new constitution. Myreading of this information is that the results of the 1990 elections areunlikely to be considered. In my view, these and other indications do notyet show those elements conducive to a genuinely free, transparent, andinclusive process involving all political parties, ethnic nationalities andelements of civil society.

I reiterated that any credible political transition, to be successful, shouldbe guided by human rights principles. These require the lifting of allremaining restrictions on the freedoms of expression, movement,information, assembly and association and the repealing of related “security” legislation. I indicated that the opening and reopening of all political parties’ offices must be considered as an immediate priority. At the moment, theonly political party able to conduct its activities is the National Unity Party(NUP). The remaining nine of the ten legally registered political partiesexist only in name because of the restrictions in place. I also proposed thatthe SPDC pursues the establishment of a national human rights institutionaccording to the Paris Principles, as an important step on the path towardsa credible political transition. The implementation of the above-mentionedhuman rights requirements will create at enabling environment for openand wide-ranging discussion among the SPDC, all political parties andethnic nationalities.

As the authorities at all levels expressed their agreement in principle to myproposals for incorporation human rights and freedoms from the earlystages of any process leading to political transition. I expect that credible



indications would be given as to when and how these human rights reformswould be implemented.

Concerning the circumstances surrounding the situation of DASSK, I wasinformed by the authorities that she is no longer being detained under anyprovision of “security” legislation. However her phone line remains cut off and security arrangements remain in place. In effect, her circumstances

are those of one who has been placed under house arrest. She made itvery clear to me that she would not accept freedom for herself until allthose arrested since 30 May 2003 have been released. To my knowledge,so far, the SPDC has not yet made any offer to release her.

Despite my repeated calls to refrain from new arrests, I received reportsthat there have been approximately 250 new arrests since 30 May 2003.However, the latest governmental figures I received quote 153 peoplearrested in connection with the Depayin incident, out of which, accordingto the same source, 109 have so far been released, including the eightprisoners released on 9 November 2003. My estimation, based on

crosschecking the figures from various sources, is that the number of remaining detainees appears to be higher than the official figure. Theirimmediate and unconditional release in no way affects the standing requestfor the release of all remaining political prisoners. I called for an amnestyto release all political prisoners as a “barometer” of a sound politicaltransition. In the political history of Myanmar, there have been examplesof amnesty laws, which could encourage the government in pursuing suchan initiative at this juncture.

During my visit to Insein Central Prisoners, where I interviewed 19 politicalprisoners, I was able to verify that the practice of extending the detention

of those political prisoners who have served their prison sentence by placingthem under “administrative detention” still continues. This practice continuesto be applied even to very elderly and infirm prisoners. Although I ampleased to report that their spirit is strong in spite of their longimprisonment, I condemn this practice as cruel and unacceptable. Althoughthe law provides for this measure, I called for the repealing of the relevantlegislation as these provisions contravene international human rights

standards.

I have to report the continuing ill treatment of detainees in pre-trial

detention, especially in Military Intelligence (MI) interrogation centers. Inaddition, I am very concerned about detainees either in pre-trial detentionor undergoing trial proceedings who are allegedly kept in conditions whichamount to incommunicado detention. Moreover, the grounds for arrestingthese individuals are often highly arbitrary, i.e. purely for the exercise of their freedoms of opinion and expression. In addition, the right to a fairtrial, including the right to access a lawyer, continues to be denied topolitical detainees.

I am also concerned with reports of recurring religious intolerance and



violence allegedly instigated to distract attention from present politicalproblems, which I will address in more detail in my future reports. I amalso concerned about the reportedly forced conscription of civilians intomilitary training, as well as forced participation at political rallies staged tosupport the government’s roadmap.I have to report that an agreement on the modalities for an independentassessment in Shan State has not yet been reached. I will pursue it with

the relevant authorities, as I remain concerned with continuing allegationsof serious human rights violations in ethnic minority areas.

The suffering of the vulnerable in Myanmar is evident. I was able to visitthe recently inaugurated exhibition on HIV/AIDS, and was impressed bythe efforts of the government and the development assistance communityto prevent and fight HIV/AIDS. I am also aware of the other activities of

2004 second preliminary report (eng.)

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