University of Illinois Press and North American Philosophical Publications are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to American Philosophical Quarterly.http://www.jstor.orgNorth American Philosophical PublicationsRecent Work on Foundationalsim Author(s): Timm Triplett Source:American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Apr., 1990), pp. 93-116Published by: on behalf of theUniversity of Illinois Press North American Philosophical PublicationsStable URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/20014318Accessed: 05-08-2015 16:07 UTCYour use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jspJSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.This content downloaded from 197.255.75.79 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 16:07:10 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsAmericanPhilosophical Quarterly Volume 27, Number 2, April 1990 RECENTWORKONFOUNDATIONALISM Timm Triplett I.Introduction A prominent belief amongcontemporaryphilos? ophers isthatfoundationalismisdead?that thisaccountofthestructureof justifiedempirical beliefsis a philosophical relicthat hasbeenor ought tobediscarded.Thusa survey ofrecentworkon foundationalism may strikesomeas necessarily brief.Or?ifa lengthybibliography onthe topic is presented?itmight be supposed thattherearea surprising numberof contemporaryphilosophers whohaveacuriousand unhealthy interestin philo? sophical moldandmust. This survey ofrecentliteratureonthe topic, con? centrating onthe period 1975-1987, shouldatleast lay torestthe brevityhypothesis. Infactworkon foundationalismis flourishing;only the highlights canbetouched upon here.But quantity is not, of course, quality.My intenthereistodescribeand categorize ratherthan evaluate, andit remainsto be argued thatthisrenewedinterestin foundationalism establishesorreestablishesit asa plausible alterna? tiveto competing theoriesof empiricaljustification. Thereadershouldatleastbeabletoformsome pre? liminaryjudgments, andto get someorientation regarding the relationships not only betweenfoun dationalistandnonfoundationalisttheoriesbutalso among thevarioustheoriesthathavebeen proposed withinthefoundationalistframework. Certainly, given the prominence oftheviewthatfoundational? ismis dead, suchworkasis surveyed heredeserves tobecomebetterknown. Onematterfortheantifoundationalisttotake special noteofisthe emergence since1975of versionsoffoundationalismthat makemoremodest claimsthanthe theorytraditionally associatedwith Descartes.Itis notclearthatthestandard arguments against foundationalismwillwork against these newer, moremodesttheories. Indeed, these theorieswere by and largedesigned withthe pur? pose of overcoming standard objections. Eventhe more traditional,stronger formoffoun? dationalismhasits contemporary advocates, andhas beenfurther developed. It would appear thenthat theantifoundationalistcannotrest uponpastargu? mentsbutmustatleast surveycontemporary foun? dationalismtodeterminewhetherrecent develop? mentsinboth strong andmodestfoundationalism present a challenge to currently more popular theo? riesof epistemicjustification. FoundationalismversusCoherentism Foundationalismis most frequently contrasted withcoherentism.Thedebatebetweenthetwo theoriescenterson differing accountsofhowthose empiricalpropositions whichare epistemicallyjus? tifiedfora person arerelatedtooneanother.The foundationalistclaimsthatallsuch propositions are eitherfoundationalinthat theyrequire noexternalor independentjustification, orelse they are justified by thesefoundational propositions.Justificatory relationsarelinearandone-directional.Founda? tional (or, in contemporaryterminology,"basic") propositionsjustify nonfoundational ("nonbasic") propositions, andnotvice-versa.Themosttradi? tionalversionsoffoundationalismstatethatbasic propositions are subjectivepropositionsconcerning sensoryexperiences thatare given to a person. Stan? dard examples include propositionsexpressedby "Iseemtofeelheat"and"I appear tosee something red."Such propositions are traditionally saidtobe epistemically certain,indubitable, or incorrigible fora person.Theyprovide the necessary foundation for everyempiricalproposition that weknow. Forthe foundationalist, basic propositions havea special,independentepistemic status. They confer justification without requiringjustification them? selves.The coherentist, by contrast, deniesthe existenceofbasic propositions. All propositions, eventhoseabout subjectivesensoryexperience, requirejustificatorysupport fromother propositions withinthe subject'sepistemicsystem.Anyjustified 93 This content downloaded from 197.255.75.79 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 16:07:10 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions94AMERICANPHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY proposition achievesits justification becauseitis supportedby, andinturn helps to support, the other justifiedpropositions withinthat system. Justifica? tory relationsare interdependent andmulti-direc? tional.Inthe process of revising and correcting our beliefs, wecannotstandoutsideour system of beliefsand critique themfromsome independent standpoint. Beliefrevisioncan only comefrom withinthat system, andno priorjudgments canbe madeaboutwhatbeliefswillfailtocoherewiththe system asa whole.Thusnobeliefor type ofbelief isin principle immunefromrevision. FoundationalismandItsCritics Before 1975 Although Aristotlehasbeen recognized as"the originator of epistemic foundationalism" (Moser and vanderNat 1987,p.26), Descartesisthe philoso? pherprior tothetwentieth century whois most closely associatedwithfoundationalism.Features suchasthe subjectivity and indubitability offounda? tional propositions are clearlyapparent inDescartes' epistemology. Healso gives a prominent roleto propositions about sensoryexperience thatdonot yet entailthe objective existenceofwhatoneis ostensiblyexperiencing. Thestandard interpretation ofDescartesisthatheseekstoestablish epistemo logicalcertainty or indubitability for specificempiri? cal propositions abouttheexternalworld by means ofdeductiveentailmentfromindubitablefounda? tional propositions(plus, asitturns out, various theological and metaphysicalprinciples whichno? toriously areintroducedas thoughthey are unprob lematicassertionsthatcanbeinsertedintoan argu? mentat will). Schmitt (1986) has argued, however, thatDescartesdoesnotinfactorinintent regard specificpropositions abouttheexternalworldas eitherindubitableorasdeducedfrom any setof epistemicallypriorpropositions. Descartes' injection of theological andmeta? physicalpremises atan earlystage ofhis epistemo logical ascentwascriticizedeven by his contempo? raries.In what appears to bethe firstof many subse? quent similarmoves against foundationalism, itwas apparently assumed, fromDescartes' specific fail? ure, that anyattempt to justifypropositions about the worldfrom subjectivestartingpoints wasbound tofail.BerkeleianidealismandKantianconstrue tivismintheirdifferent ways assumedthatit was impossible forthe sensoryimpressionspresented in human experience totellus anything aboutthe world of matterorof things-in-themselves. The question, whichnowseemsanobviousoneto ask, whether wecould justify external-world propositions onthe basisof subjectivesensorypropositions ina more direct way, without taking aCartesiandetourre? quiring a proof of Godandthe metaphysicalbaggage thisinturn required, wasnotaskedand systemati? callyexplored untilthetwentieth century.1 Inthefirsthalfofthetwentieth century, rather undeveloped foundationaliststancescanbefoundin Brentano (1966 [1930]), Russell (1926 [1914], 1940) andsomeofthe logicalpositivists(e.g., Schlick 1959 [1934],Ayer1940).2 Butit wasC.I.Lewis (1929,1946,1952) who provided themost thorough andarticulatedefenseoffoundationalism during thistime.3Lewis gavespecial attentionto developing theideasofthe sensorygiven?the non conceptual elementof experience whichwasto serveasthebasisfor empiricalknowledge?and ofthe necessity of positingepistemically certain propositions ifaninfinite regress of justification wastobeavoided. Thisrevivalofinterestinfoundationalism was, however, short-lived.Oneofthe most prominent featuresof pragmaticphilosophy andof analytic philosophy sincethelater Wittgenstein hasbeenthe sustainedattackondoctrinesassociatedwithif not essentialtotraditionalfoundationalism.Sellars (1956)charged thatthe "given" elementof sensory experience whichthetraditionalfoundationalistre? liesonasthesourceforbasic propositions is a myth. Goodman (1952) andReichenbach (1952) chal? lenged Lewis'claimthatthebasesof empirical knowledge were epistemically certain. Quine(1969) claimedthatthe project of founding scienceon sense-datawas hopeless, andcalledfora naturalized epistemology whichwouldin essencereduce episte mology to psychology.Quine(1951),Wittgenstein (1953,1969), and philosophers ofsciencesuchas Hanson (1958) and Kuhn (1962), sharedaninterest in differing"conceptual schemes," "formsoflife" or "paradigms" and suggested the possibility ofa radical incommensurability betweenthese concep? tualschemes.Such incommensurability would pre? ventusfrom takinganyproposition whateverand This content downloaded from 197.255.75.79 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 16:07:10 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsRECENT WORKONFOUNDATIONALISM95 objectivelyevaluating its epistemic status by deter? mining howwellit expressed the way "theworld" was.Thisundercutan assumption essentialtothe foundationalistthatsuch objective evaluationwas possible. Ifthese philosophers were correct, founda? tionalismseemedtorestonafundamentalmistake. Several philosophersapplied theseideastothe development ofcoherentistalternativestofounda? tionalism (Aune1967; Harman 1973; Rescher 1973, 1974; Lehrer 1974; Seilars 1973). These develop? mentsoftenincludedcriticismsoffoundationalism. In comparative isolationatthe time, Chisholm (1966) reviveda Lewis-type foundationalism. Pollock (1974)joined him, only to reject "classical" formsoffoundationalismafew years later (1979). ButChisholm and, temporarily, Pollock, werefoun? dationalistvoices crying inacoherentistwilder? ness. By the early 1970'sfoundationalismhad gen? erally cometobe regarded asadefunct theory.4 Since1975 The years 1975and1976sawthe publication of important articles by Pastin (1975a,1975b), Alston (1976a,1976c), and Delaney(1976). Thesearticles werethefirstofseveral claiming thatfoundational? ism'scriticshad arguedsuccessfully, ifat all,only againstquitespecific and perhapsimplausible ver? sionsoffoundationalismthatcould readily be modi? fiedor rejectedbyworking foundationalists.5Sub? sequently,many articlesand monographsappeared calling forandinsomecases developing indetail modificationsoffoundationalismthatnonetheless maintainedconnectionstothetraditional theory (e.g., Almeder 1983; Annis 1977,1978; Audi 1978, 1983; Chisholm 1977,1980; Cornman 1977,1979, 1980; Flor 1984; Foley1987; Fumerton 1985; Alan Goldman 1979,1981,1982,1988;Haack1982/83; Moser 1985a; Pollock 1979; Sosa 1985).6 In spite offoundationalism's being revivedonce again, anothertrend?andthedominantoneinthe literature?hascontinuedtoassumethatfounda? tionalismisno longer viable.Some philosophers, most notably LaurenceBonJour (1978,1985) and MichaelWilliams (1977), havecontinuedto press detailedandextensivecriticismsoffoundational? ism.Severalhavefurther developed coherentistand pragmatist alternatives (BonJour1985; Dancy 1984; Davidson 1981,1986;Graybosch 1986; Harman 1986; LehrerandCohen 1983; Lehrer 1986; Margolis 1986; Rescher 1977,1979,1980). Themostradicaltrend away fromfoundational? ismhasbeenthecalltoarticulateand practice a new type of "post-modern" or "post-analytic"phi? losophy.Developments of"culturalhermeneutics" and "epistemological relativism"take muchoftheir impetus fromthe perception thatfoundationalism isdead (Rorty 1979; Rajchman andWest 1985; Wachterhauser 1986).Rorty?perhaps the philoso? pher most responsible forthe prominence ofthe viewthatfoundationalismis dead?specifically discussesthe implications ofthisviewforthe prac? ticeof analyticphilosophy. Heseesthe alleged demiseoffoundationalismasthe startingpoint of his critique of contemporaryanalyticphilosophy. Rorty would likely seetheeffortsofevensome coherentistsas misguidedattempts to carry on analyticalphilosophyby othermeans. Anotherareaofrecentinterestis considerably moreamenabletofoundationalism:a good dealof attentionis beingpaid toformsofnaturalized episte mology,particularly reliabilism (which, as wewill see, canbestatedin aform compatible withmodest foundationalism). Reliabilism appears tohave attractedmoreinterest recently thanfoundationalism itself. (On reliabilism see, for example, Adamsand Kline 1987; Alston 1983,p.74,1986a;Armstrong 1973,pp.159-61; Dretske 1981; Fumerton 1985, pp.68-70; AlvinGoldman 1986; Heil 1984; Kornblith 1980; Luper-Foy1987; Nozick 1981, Ch. 3; Pollock 1984; Schmitt 1981,1983,1984; Swain 1981a,1981b; alsothearticles appearing in The Monist 68, 1985.Onnaturalized epistemology in general see, for example, Annis 1982a; Alvin Goldman 1985; Grandy 1987; Kekes 1977,pp. 106 07; Kornblith 1985;Lycan1985,1988; Papineau 1981/82; Sosa 1983.) It hasbeen suggested thatcoherentismis currently thedominantviewaboutthestructureof epistemic justification(Foley1980,p.53). Butinterest ap? pears tobe growing bothinformsofnaturalized epistemology thatseethefoundationalist-coheren tist dispute as resting onafalse presupposition (Kornblith1980,p.598), andin post-modernist moves away from any universal principlesattempt? ing toaccountforhuman knowledge?whether This content downloaded from 197.255.75.79 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 16:07:10 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions96AMERICANPHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY foundationalistorcoherentistinstructure.There? jection oftraditionalfoundationalismdoesnotentail acceptance of purely coherentist principles. Indeed theliteraturehasnotlackedforcriticismsofsuch principles.7 Although itis notclearwhataccountof epistemic justification, if any, isembraced by a majority of contemporaryepistemologists, itisclearthata majority do regard foundationalism?atleastinthe stronger and moretraditionalversionsthat posit the sensorygiven, the subjectivestartingpoint forall empiricaljustification, andthe certainty orindubi? tability ofbasic propositions?ashaving beenre? futed.Acertainmoralfervorisevento benotedin the rejection offoundationalism: "Suddenly 'anti foundationalist'isa goodthing tobe" (Simpson 1987,p.2);"opposition tofoundationalism ought tobethe philosophicalequivalent ofresistanceto sin" (Levi1981,p.590, characterizingRorty's views). So manyepistemologists haveechoedthe refrainofthedeathoffoundationalismthatitwould appear reasonableforthoselessfamiliarwiththe literatureto simply assumeits falsity.8 Atthis point in time,however, wehavetodeal notwitha single foundationalist theory butwitha variety ofrelatedtheories.Whetherthe arguments thathavebeenmade against foundationalismare successful against alltheoriesthat might be appro? priately describedasfoundationalremainstobe seen.The necessarypreliminaries areto get clearon thetenetsessentialto any formoffoundationalism andtodelineatethevariousversionsoffounda? tionalismthathavebeen proposed intherecent literature. II.TheVarietiesofFoundationalism TheEssence of Foundationalism Mostofthose defining foundationalism agree on twotenetswhichareessentialto any formoffoun? dationalism.The following formulations capture theintentofmostauthors:9 EF1:Therearebasic propositions. EF2: Anyjustifiedempiricalproposition iseither basicor derivesits justification, atleastin part, fromthefactthatitstandsinan appropriate relationto propositions whicharebasic. Thischaracterizationoffoundationalismleavesus withtwoobvious questions: Whatarebasic propo? sitions, and just whatisthe epistemic relation they bearto nonbasic propositions?Virtually allversions offoundationalismwould agree withoneelabora? tion upon theseessentialtenets:Basic propositions formalimitedsetof epistemicallyprivilegedpropo? sitions. They are privileged inthat they areself justified, or, in other formulations, noninferentially or immediatelyjustified.10 Abasic proposition issaid tobe justifiedindependently of any other proposi? tionsthat might be justified fora subject,although onsomeaccountsthe justification ofa basic propo? sitiondoes depend onthe nonconceptualsensory statethe subject isin. But, granting therearebasic propositions, what kindsof propositions arebasic?Howdo wecharac? terizeand explain their property of beingepistem? icallyprivileged? Howdo they confer justification onnonbasic propositions? Itisin differentanswers tothese questions thatthedifferentversionsof foundationalismare generated. VariationsonaTheme Many distinctionshavebeenmadeinthelitera? turesince1975thatcanbe applied to generate differentversionsoffoundationalism.Iwillnot mentionallsuchdistinctions.n My aimisto provide characterizationsofthosedistinctionswhichare most important tothedebateaboutthe viability of foundationalismandtotheclarificationofthe main differencesbetween strong andmodestformsof foundationalism. Thevarietiesoffoundationalismfallintotwo main classes, relatedtothetwoessentialtenetsof foundationalism. First, differentfoundationalist theoriesofferdifferent specifications ofthenature ofbasic propositions. Second, therearedifferent ways of construing therelationbetweenbasicand nonbasic propositions. As Display No.1 shows, thevarietiesoffounda? tionalism may be presented inoutlineformintwo major divisions corresponding tothetwoessential tenetsoffoundationalism. (In whatfollowstheterm "basics"isshortfor"basic propositions.") This content downloaded from 197.255.75.79 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 16:07:10 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsRECENT WORKONFOUNDATIONALISM97 Display No.1 VarietiesofFoundationalism I. Specifications oftheNatureof B asic Propositions A.TheContentofBasic Propositions 1. Psychological Foundationalism 2.External-WorldFoundationalism B.The Epistemic StatusofBasic Propositions 1. Superior BasicsFoundationalism 2.ModestBasicsFoundationalism C.TheStatusof"Pis Basic"orofFounda? tionalist Principles as Basic Propositions 1.IterativeFoundationalism 2. Simple Foundationalism D.BeliefStatusofBasic Propositions 1.BeliefFoundationalism 2. Sensory Foundationalism E.Context Dependence ofBasic Propositions 1.StableBasicsFoundationalism 2.ContextualFoundationalism II.Accountsofthe RelationBetweenBasicand Nonbasic Propositions A. LogicalRelationships 1.DeductiveFoundationalism 2.EnumerativeInductionFoundationalism 3. Explanatory InductionFoundationalism 4. EpistemicPrinciples Foundationalism B.Phenomenalist Relationships 1.PhenomenalistFoundationalism 2. Nonphenomenalist Foundationalism C.ExtentofJustificationof Nonbasic by Basic Propositions 1.PureFoundationalism 2.MixedFoundationalism D.Externalvs.InternalJustificationof Nonbasic by Basic Propositions 1.ExternalistFoundationalism 2.InternalistFoundationalism LAI. Psychological Foundationalism.Thistra? ditional view, going backatleastto Descartes, maintainsthat onlypropositions abouta person's mentalstatescanbebasicforthat person. Such propositions donotentailtheexistenceofthe objects whichthe person is ostensiblyexperiencing or entertaining beliefsabout.Basic propositions are generallythought to include, butneednotbelimited to, propositionsexpressing a person's beliefstates. Examples: Sbelievesthereisan apple onthetable. Sseemstofeelheat.Sseemstosee something red. Sis appearedredly to. Psychological FoundationalistsincludeDescartes (see especially theSecond Meditation), Chisholm (1977,pp.16-22), Lewis (1946,pp.172-75) and Moser (1985a,pp.173-87). Audiusesthe phrase "psychological foundationalism"torefertoa quite distinctview represented asan empirical thesis abouthowanindividual'sbeliefsarerelatedto one anotherintermsoftheindividual's disposition to citeother beliefs, ornoneat all, in support ofa given belief (Audi1978,pp.592,595-96,604). IA2.External-WorldFoundationalism. Ordinary propositions aboutthe"externalworld"arebasic. Forthe Psychological Foundationalist, the proposi? tionthatthereisan apple onthetableisnonbasic for anygivensubject S.Itis justifiedperhapsby S's belief thatthereisan apple onthetableor by some clusterof psychologicalpropositionsdetailing 5" s sensoryexperiences. TheExternal-WorldFounda? tionalist,by contrast, maintainsthatthe proposition thatthereis an apple onthetablecanitselfbebasic. Such straightforwardsingularpropositions about ordinary observationsare immediatelyjustified, re? quiring no support from psychologicalpropositions (which themselves presumably remainbasiconthe External-World account). Afoundationalstructure isretainedbecausemoretheoretical propositions, e.g., thoseof science, require these ordinary obser? vational propositions for justificatorysupport. Theideathat wedonot require further justifica? torysupport for ordinary observational propositions isreminiscentofG.E.Moore's antiskepticalargu? ments (Moore 1959 [1939], 1966 [1925]). But Mooredoesnottalkineitherofthese essays about thestructureofknownor justifiedpropositions. Thusitis difficulttoassessfromthem whetherheis a foundationalistof anysort, although Kekes ( 1977, pp.89-90) doesattributeExternal-WorldFounda? tionalismtoMoore.ClearercasesofExternal-World FoundationalistsareKekeshimself (1979), Foley (1987,pp.73-76),Quinton(1973, Part II) and Swain (1981b,pp.227-28).12 Annis'"contextualist theory"(1977 and 1978)essentially combines This content downloaded from 197.255.75.79 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 16:07:10 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions98AMERICANPHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY External-WorldFoundationalismwithContextual Foundationalism.Annis'viewisthatin appropriate contexts (includingnonproblematic observational contexts)ordinarypropositions abouttheexternal worldcanbebasicforsome observers, butsuch propositionsmay notbeabletoserveasbasicsin othercontexts (Annis1977,p.351). Furtherdis? cussionsofthisviewareto be found,e.g., inAlston (1983,p.75) and Pappas(1982,pp.91-96). Cornman suggests whatcouldbeclassifiedasa third type offoundationalismunder category IA. Thisview might becalled"TheoreticalBasicsFoun? dationalism," andwouldholdthatthetheoretical statementsofscienceare basic, beingepistemo logicallyprior bothto propositions about subjective psychological statesandto ordinarysingularpropo? sitionsabouttheexternalworld. However, I donot find any clear advocacy ofsuchaviewinthelitera? ture.Cornman (1977,pp.296-97)suggests that Sellarsmaintainsthatthefurther development of sciencewill eventually leadustothe point where TheoreticalBasicsFoundationalismisthecorrect account (making itaformofContextualFounda? tionalism). Itisnot clear,however, thatSellarsin fact adopts the viewthatsuchan epistemic shift will occur.He appears toconsiderthe possibility with? out evaluating itslikelihood (Sellars1967,pp.354, 358). In any case, Sellars explicitlyrejects theview that weshouldnow regard thetheoreticalstatements ofscienceasbasic (1967,pp.353-58). IB1. Superior BasicsFoundationalism.Inaddi? tionto beingepistemicallyprivileged as justifiers that require no independentjustification, basic propositions are, according tothe Superior Basics view, justified tothe highestpossibledegree?a statusnotshared byany other empiricalproposi? tions.Thisultimate degree of justification is described variously as certainty,incorrigibility, or indubitability.Certainty isdefinedina variety of ways.Incorrigibility isoftendefinedintermsof the impossibility of being mistaken,indubitability intermsofthe impossibility ofdoubt.13For present purposes, Ishall disregard thedistinctionsbetween these concepts andrefer generically tothe Superior Basicsview. Superior BasicsFoundationalistsincludeLewis (1929, Ch. 10;1946,p.186) andChisholm (1980, pp.549-50). Descartesofcourseisknownforhis emphasis onthe certainty and indubitability of foundational propositions. IB2. ModestBasicsFoundationalism.No super? ior justificatory statusforbasicsis required. On mostsuch accounts, basicsmusthavesome degree of justification, butneednotbemore highlyjusti? fiedthanthe propositionstheyjustify. The general perception hasbeenthatatleastthe Superior Basics aspect oftraditionalfoundationalismmustbe given up. Detailed expositions ordefensesofModest BasicsFoundationalismincludethose by Almeder (1983,1987), Audi (1983), Cornman (1977,1980), Delaney(1976), AlanGoldman (1988,pp.138-43) andPastin (1975a,1975b). Almeder (1983) main? tainsthatbasic propositions arenotthemselves justified. ICI.IterativeFoundationalism.Onthis view, if p isan immediatelyjustifiedproposition for 5, then the propositionthat/? is immediatelyjustified must itselfbe immediatelyjustified for5.That is, where p is basic, the epistemologicalpropositionasserting that/? is basicmustitselfbebasic.Abroadenedver? sionofthisviewwould require ofother episte? mologicalpropositions centraltoafoundationalist account?for example,principlesstating founda? tionalistconditionsunderwhichnonbasic proposi? tionsare justified?thatthey toobe immediately justified orbasic. IC2. Simple Foundationalism.Thisversion denies any iterative requirement for propositions oftheform "/? isbasic"orother epistemological propositions. Alston (1976c) introducedthedistinctionbetween Iterativeand Simple Foundationalism.Iterative Foundationalismis a problematictheory that would bedifficulttodefend.Alstonnotedthatseveral criticismsoffoundationalismmadethe assumption thatfoundationalismwas iterative, andhe wascon? cernedto point outthat Simple Foundationalism presented analternativethat wasnot susceptible to thesecriticisms.The question is whethertherehave actually everbeen any IterativeFoundationalists. Passages inDescartesandLewisdo suggest Itera? tive Foundationalism, although itisnotclearthat either finallyadopts or requires thatview.Alston (1976c,pp.181-82)argues thatforDescartesa foundationalbeliefBcan only beidentifiedassuch This content downloaded from 197.255.75.79 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 16:07:10 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsRECENT WORKONFOUNDATIONALISM99 if the subject is immediately justified in the higher level epistemological beliefthatBis immediately justified.According toAlstonthiscommits DescartestoIterativeFoundationalism.Van Cleve, however, interprets Descartesasa Simple Founda? tionalist (Van Cleve 1979, see especiallyp. 73n43 forhis response to Alston).Although hedoesnot specifically referto Alston's distinction, it would appear thatSchmitt presents an interpretation of Descartesasa Simple Foundationalist (Schmitt 1986). InAn AnalysisofKnowledge andValuation (1946,p.186), Lewisis clearlyattempting to estab? lishthe certainty of"thedatawhich eventually support a genuineprobability," i.e., singular basic propositions. However, in MindandtheWorld Order (1929,pp.311-12), ina passage which appears to be making thesame point, Lewis subtly shiftsfromtheconclusionthathis argument estab? lishesthe certainty of singularpropositions that serveasthe data supporting nonbasic propositions to theconclusionthatitestablishesthe certainty of "antecedent general truths" (emphasismine). Lewis also speaks of"the knowledge which depends on [these principles]," as though the epistemicprin? ciples whichdeterminewhich singularproposi? tionsarebasicarethemselvesnot only certain, but foundationalandbasic. EveninAn Analysisof Knowledge andValuation itself, Lewis'comments might betakento imply iterativist assumptions. In arguing that nothing can be probable unless something is certain, Lewis holdsthatabasic proposition thatis onlyprobable willallowusto say ofnonbasic propositionsonly that they are probablyprobable. Andthis leads, according to Lewis, toacircleoraninfinite regress (Lewis1946,p.186). Thisseemstoassumethat the epistemicjudgments ofafoundationalist theory (e.g.,propositions suchasthose expressedby"/? is probable,""q is basic," "ris evident,"etc.) must themselvesbe certain, andthis might betakento imply IterativeFoundationalism. Alstonalsonotessome"levelconfusions"in Chisholm'ssetofdefinitionsand principles that couldbetakento imply IterativeFoundationalism in Chisholm's system(Alston1980,pp.574-81). Itremainstobeseenwhethertheseindicationsof IterativeFoundationalismintheworksofLewis andChisholmdoindeedcommitthemtothis view, andifsowhethersuchcommitmentsareessential components oftheirfoundationalist systems. ID1. Belief Foundationalism.Thisversionre? quires that whatis basicfora subject bea proposition thatisbelieved by that subject.Many foundation? alists appear to accept this requirement,usually quiteimplicitlybydiscussing foundational proposi? tions only inthecontextofbasicor immediately justifiedbeliefs. Lehrer (1974,p.76), Pollock (1979,pp.93-94), and Williams (1977,p.61) seemtoassumeintheir defining statementsofbasic propositions that any? thing whichis basicmustbea subject's belief, orat any ratethat only suchbelievedbasicscan epistemi? callysupport nonbasics.This assumption isthen used against foundationalism,e.g., whenPollock writes (1979,p.98): According to [foundationalism], all epistemicsupport derives ultimately from what epistemologically basic propositions onebelieves. Unfortunately, one rarely believes anyepistemologically basic propositions at all. ID2. Sensory Foundationalism.Analternative accountholdsthatthat whichfunctionsasthebasic proposition neednotitselfbea proposition thatis believed by the subject,though itis necessarily something trueofher.Whiletherearein principle severalvarietiesoffoundationalism fitting this description,traditionally themost important one maintainsthat propositions aboutthe subject's sen? soryexperiences(plusperhaps memoriesof past sensoryexperiences) arethe primary means by whichthebulkofthat subject's nonbasic proposi? tionscometo be justified. ForthisreasonIreferto thisalternativeas Sensory Foundationalism.It may beassociatedwithdiscussions particularly in Lewis ofthe "given," thedoctrinethatthereis a noninter preted,preconceptual elementin experience thatis simplygiven or presented tothe subject.According to Sensory Foundationalism, propositions aboutthe given elementsofa person'ssensoryexperience are capable of being basicforthat person. Annis (1978,p.213), Cornman (1977,p.287), Pastin (1975b,p.147, reprinted inPastin 1978, p.286), and Will (1974,p.144) donot impose a belief requirementupon theirdefinitionsofbasic propositions,although these philosophers donot go This content downloaded from 197.255.75.79 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 16:07:10 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions100AMERICANPHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY onto espouseSensory Foundationalism.Chisholm's definitionofbasic or, in his terminology,self-pre? senting,propositions doesnot require that whatis self-presenting beabelief (Chisholm1977,p.22; cf.Chisholm 1980,p.549).However, whenhe formulateshis epistemicprinciplesstating how basic propositionsjustify nonbasiconeshedoesso intermsofbasic propositionsbeing thosethatare believed by the subject(seee.g.,1977,p.78, principle C). SensoryFoundationalism/?er se appears in Lewis (1946, Ch. 7, see especiallyp.174). I believethat Moser may alsobe interpreted asa Sensory Foun? dationalist (seemy discussionofMoser's intuitionisminPart III). IE1.StableBasicsFoundationalism.Thisver? sionassumesthat only acertain type of proposition canbebasic.The PsychologicalFoundationalist, for example, insiststhat onlypropositions aboutasub? ject's mental states, as opposed toexternal-world observationstatementsortheoretical statements, caneverbebasic.Thisisa stable,objective fact abouthuman knowledge, not something thatcan change witha change in context, over time, orfrom culturetoculture.NotethattheStableBasicsview isaboutthe stability ofthe type of proposition that canbe basic, notabout anysupposed invariancein a particularproposition'sbeing basic. Obviously, a particularpropositionmay bebasicinsomecontexts andnotin others.Whetherthe propositionexpressed by "5seemstosee something red"isbasicforS would presumablydepend onthe sensoryexperi? encesSis having.Also, the propositionmay be basicforSand justified butnotbasicforotherswho are, for example,observing Sor listening toher report onhercurrent experiences. ItisreasonabletoassumethatStableBasics Foundationalismistheview implicitlyadopted in theworkofthosefoundationalistswhodonot specify thatwhatcountsasabasic proposition is tobeunderstood contextually. IE2.ContextualFoundationalism.Thealterna? tivetotheStableBasicsviewmaintainsthatdif? ferent types of propositions can, indifferent epis? temic contexts, serveasbasics.One subcategory ofContextualFoundationalism emphasizes that dif? ferent types of propositions functionasbasic depending onthe type and depth ofthe particular epistemicinquiry in question. Themain point here seemstobetoallowexternal-world propositions toserveasbasicsin ordinaryepistemic contexts yet to preserve arolefor subjectivesensoryprop? ositionsasbasicin special cases, particularly when doubtsabouttheexternal-worldorabout ordinary knowledge claimsareentertained.Thereis no sug? gestion of changing socio-culturalconditionsasthe driving forcebehindvariationin whatconstitutes a basic proposition. ThismodestformofContextual Foundationalism appears tobeheld by Annis (1977, see especiallyp.351) andAudi (1983, see especiallypp.129-31). Amore influential subcategory ofContextual Foundationalism suggests that whatfunctionsasa basic proposition varieswith changingcultural, his? toricalorscientificconditions.A major tradition descending from (but not including) Kantand asserting theculturalor historical relativity ofcate? gories isatleast compatible withthisversionof foundationalism, even though this compatibility is often unrecognized andeven though infactithas generally beenassumedthatthetheorieswithinthis neo-Kantiantraditionare incompatible withfounda? tionalism.Most likely, thosewhoassumesuch an incompatibility havein mindmoretraditional versionsoffoundationalism. Butthereis nothing in principle to keep theories ofthissortfrom being describedasfoundational. They canretainthetwoessentialtenetsoffounda? tionalismandremain structurally identicalto amore traditional theory. Whether they remain compatible withthe spirit offoundationalismasconceived by philosophers suchasLewisandChisholmis quite another question. Itis unlikely thatthese philoso? phers wouldfeel they were makingonly minor concessionsif they foundthemselvesforcedto adopt thissortofcontextualism. Sourcesfor relatively broadstatementsofthis socio-culturalformofContextualFoundationalism include Wittgenstein'sPhilosophicalInvestigations (1953),Quine's "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (1951), andSellars' "Empiricism andthePhiloso? phy of Mind" (1956). Theseauthors probably did notseethemselvesas foundationalists, evenofa moderate sort, and onlyrecently havethelatter two, at least, beenso interpreted (Cornman1977, pp.296-97; seealsoJohnsen 1986,pp. 598-99on This content downloaded from 197.255.75.79 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 16:07:10 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsRECENT WORKONFOUNDATIONALISM101 Quine). But nowthatthedistinctionbetweenmod? eratefoundationalismand pure coherentismhas been made, ithasbeen argued thatsuch philoso? phers as Quine andSellarsshouldbe placed within theformer category.However, Ithinkthat any interpretation of Quine asafoundationalistwill comefromhis sketchy remarksrelevanttothisin "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" ratherthanfromhis more developed accountin "Epistemology Natur? alized" (Quine1969). Cornman's interpretation of Sellarsasa TheoreticalBasicsFoundationalisthas beendiscussedabove.Theviewthattheoretical propositions willcometobebasic given further scientific developments isofcoursealsoaversion ofContextualFoundationalism.As noted, I donot believethatSellarsmaintainsthisviewin spite of Cornman'sattributionofittohim. Although his metaphilosophical conclusions imply the rejection of anypositivetheory ofknowl? edge,Rorty'sspecific commentsonandcriticisms oftraditionaltheoriesof knowledge seemto imply onesortofContextualFoundationalist account, according to whichbasic propositions are whatever fundamental assumptions remain accepted andun? challenged ina given socialorevenconversational context (see Rorty 1979,pp.159,170,174,178). Sosanotesthatthis"salonaccountof knowledge" isidentifiableasa species offoundationalism (Sosa 1983,pp.56-57). Workswhichareless directly tiedto epistemol? ogy, but whichnonethelesshavebeen closely allied withand perhaps influenced by the epistemological viewsof Wittgenstein,Quine, and Sellars, include studiesinthe philosophy ofsciencesuchas Hanson's Patterns of Discovery(1958), Kuhn'sTheStructure ofScientific Revolutions (1962),andFeyerabend's Against Method (1975). Kuhn'sbookin particular hasinturn haditsinfluencein epistemology,helping to makecontextualistorientations?inthiscasethe concept of paradigm shiftsinthescientificcommun? ity overtime?more popular and accepted. Additionaldiscussionsofcontextualismareto be foundin Airaksinen (1982, witha replyby Annis 1982b), Almeder (1983), Duran (1986), Flor (1984), Haack (1982/83), McGinn (1981/82), andaseries ofarticleson social knowledge in Synthese 73 (1987). Thesemorerecent writingsgenerallyrecog? nizethe compatibility ofcontextualist assumptions withversionsoffoundationalism. IIAl.DeductiveFoundationalism.Abasic prop? ositionmust deductively entailthenonbasic prop? ositionit justifies. IIA2.EnumerativeInductionFoundationalism. Basic propositionsjustify nonbasic propositionsby enumerativeinduction:Afteraseriesofobserva? tionsonearrivesata probable conclusion.Inthe caseof Psychological Foundationalism, aseriesof sensoryexperiences would presumably make prob? ableaconclusionabouttheexternalworld. Unlessoneis a phenomenalist, neitherDeductive FoundationalismnorEnumerativeInductionFoun? dationalism appearsveryplausible. Chisholmindi? catesthedifficultieswithbothviews (Chisholm 1977,pp.64-67). Somecriticsoffoundationalism havealsonotedthese difficulties, andhave appar? ently assumedthatafoundationalist theory must becommittedtooneortheotheroftheseviews (e.g.,Quine1969,p.74; Harman 1973,pp. 164 67; Rescher 1973,pp.207-10). Descarteshasbeen interpreted as requiring a deductiverelationbetweenfoundationalandnon foundational knowledge.Perhaps this interpretation is dueto Descartes' comparison ofhis method, with itsinsistenceon"exact demonstrations," tothatof the geometers(Haldane andRoss edition, Volume I,p.140). Schmitt argues,however, that Descartes granted that manyordinaryempiricalpropositions wereknown only with probability, andthathis comparison withthe geometers' method applied to second-order epistemologicalprinciples, notto merelyprobabilistic first-order knowledge. See, for example, Schmitt'sdiscussionofthe passage in theSixthMeditationin whichDescartes writes, "I conjecture with probability that body doesexist" (Schmitt1986,p.493; cf. Descartes, Haldaneand Ross edition, Volume I,p.187). Itis possible fora phenomenalist suchas Ayer to beconsidereda DeductiveFoundationalist. Ayer assertsa linguisticequivalence betweensense-data propositions and physical-objectpropositions: "Propositions whichare ordinarilyexpressedby sentenceswhichreferto material things couldalso be expressedby sentenceswhichreferredexclu? sively to sense-data," (Ayer 1940,p.232). Buteven Ayer insiststhatnosense-datastatement formally entailsa physical-object statement (p.239).Perhaps thereisatensionbetweenthesetwoclaims.But This content downloaded from 197.255.75.79 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 16:07:10 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions102AMERICANPHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Ayer, at anyrate, wouldnotconsiderhimselfto bea deductivistintermsofthe relationship in question. IIA3. Explanatory InductionFoundationalism. Abasic propositionjustifies a nonbasic proposition becausethelatter provides thebest explanation for theformer.Nonbasicsare justified asinductive inferencestothebest explanationgiven those prop? ositionswhicharebasicforthe subject. IIA4. EpistemicPrinciples Foundationalism.The conditionsunderwhichbasic propositionsjustify nonbasic propositions arestated byspecialepiste? mologicalprinciples,presumablysynthetic anda priori truths whichare independent ofthe deductive andinductiveinferencerulesof logic andscience. Categories IIA3andIIA4illustratethatfounda? tionalistsneednot require thatbasics justify non basics by meansofdeductionorenumerativeinduc? tion.Thealternativeof Explanatory InductionFoun? dationalismis developedby Cornman (1980), Moser (1985a) and AlanGoldman (1988). Chisholmis criticalofthisalternative (1978,pp.605-06) and prefers the EpistemicPrinciplesapproach(1966; 1977, Ch. 4;1980) asdoesPollockin his early work onfoundationalism (1974).Although these episte? mic principles themselvesare presumably necessar? ily true, they dictate only thatabasic proposition renderanonbasic propositionprobably trueorin? creaseits degree of justificationby a particular degree. IIB1.PhenomenalistFoundationalism.Phen? omenalismisa theory of perception, andofthe meaning of physical-objectpropositions, thatis of? tenassociatedwithfoundationalism.Ascombined with Sensory Foundationalismitistheviewthata nonbasic proposition about ordinary external-world objects is definitionallyequivalent to?or, insome formulations, logically constructedfrom?abasic proposition (or seriesofsuch propositions) about sense-dataor sensoryexperiences.Ayer(1940) and possibly Lewis (1946) canbeconsideredPhen? omenalistFoundationalists.14Both attempted to explain in detailhow ordinary external-world prop? ositionscouldbe analyzed intermsofsense-data propositions orconditionals stating what appear? anceswouldfollowfromwhat perceptual actions. More recently, Dickerhas developed aversionof phenomenalism claimedtobenonreductionistthat attempts to respond toChisholm's objections to phenomenalism(Dicker1980, see especiallypp. 167-69; seealsoChisholm 1977,p.127). IIB2. Nonphenomenalist Foundationalism.This category includes any formoffoundationalism whichdoesnot make phenomenalistassumptions. At leastonecriticismoffoundationalismisinfacten? tirelydependent onthe assumption thatfoundation? alismiscommittedto phenomenalism(Dilman 1975).15 Buttheoriesof perception and meaning are logically distinctfromtheoriesof epistemic justification, anditisdifficulttosee why a theory aboutthestructureof justifiedempiricalproposi? tionsmustbecommittedtoa particulartheory of perception orof meaning. Theredoesnot appear to be any reason why an epistemologist whomain? tainsanadverbial theory of perception, oreven direct realism, cannotstillmaintainthat proposi? tionsachieve justificationthrough afoundational structure.Chisholmin particular hastaken pains to develop afoundationalist theory thatavoids phenomenalist commitments (e.g., Chisholm 1977,p.30). IIC1.PureFoundationalism.Basic propositions completelyjustify allnonbasic justifiedproposi? tions.Noadditional epistemic relationsor princi? ples are required to explain hownonbasic proposi? tions acquire their justification. IIC2.MixedFoundationalism.Nonbasicsare justifiedonly in partby basicsinthatsomeoftheir justification canderivefromothernonbasics. Theoriesofthis typemayhold, for example, that basic propositions are necessary butnotsufficient conditionsforthe justification ofatleastsome types ofnonbasic propositions.Theymayhold, inaddi? tion, thatcoherencerelations provide anadditional possible sourceforthe justification ofnonbasic propositions. Thesecondoftheessentialtenetsof foundationalism onlyprohibits anonbasic proposi? tionfrom deriving allofits justification fromcoher? encerelationsorsomeotherrelationsthathave nothing todowithbasic propositions. Basic prop? ositionsmusthave something to dowiththe justifi? cationof everyempiricalproposition. Thosewhoadvocatea mixtureoffoundationalist andcoherentist principles,though with very differ? ent degrees of import attachedtothecoherentist prin? ciples, includeChisholm (1977,1980), Cornman (1977,1980), Haack (1982/83) andPollock (1979). This content downloaded from 197.255.75.79 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 16:07:10 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsRECENT WORKONFOUNDATIONALISM103 Dauer (1980)argues thatcoherentist principles are required and prevent atleastthe stronger formsof foundationalismfrom being viable.I amnotaware of any foundationalistwho explicitly advocates Pure Foundationalism, but Foley(1980) criticizes Chisholm'suseofcoherentist principles as unnecessary. PastinnotesLewis' recognition in An AnalysisofKnowledge andValuationofthe"fact of congruence," i.e., oftherolecoherencerelations play in enhancingjustification(Pastin1975a,p. 409; cf.Lewis 1946,pp.171,187,338-53). IID1.ExternalistFoundationalism.An important distinctionbetweentwo concepts of epistemicjusti? ficationthathas recently beenmadebearsonthe sortoffoundationalist principles oneconstructs. Theliteraturecontainsvariousformulationsofthis distinction?mostoftenreferredtoasthe distinction betweenexternalandinternal justification?and it isclearthatvariousauthorsdonot always have precisely thesamedistinctionin mind.16 Indeed, I believe that, likethefoundationalist-coherentist distinction itself, theinternalist-externalistdistinc? tionis notaclear-cut dichotomy butratherasetof views varyingbydegrees and forming a continuum. Anextremeinternalist conception would require that, if a belief p isto be justified for 5, S musthave consciously reasoned through a justificationpro? cedure forp or, in casesof simpler and moreobvious propositions where steps of reasoning are presum? ably notneededor appropriate, S musthaveinsome sense cognitivelygrasped or directlyapprehended that/? istrue or likely to betrue. Alessstrictformof internalismwould require notthat5 gothrough an actual process of reasoning ordirect apprehension, butthatScoulddoso byreflectingupon whether p is likely tobetruein light oftheevidencethat constituteshercurrent epistemicsystem. Onexternalist accounts, thefullconditionsfor justification neednotbeaccessibleto 5inthe ways requiredby internalism.Theconditionsfor proper justification of pmay obtainevenif5wouldnot beabletodiscoverthis upon reflection.Reliabilist theoriesof justification(e.g., Swain 1981b; Alvin Goldman 1986) areexternalisttheories.Therelia? bility ofthe processby whichScametobelieve p isexternaltoS's epistemicsystem inthatthe process canbereliablewhetherornot5knowsthis orcouldcometoknowthis by reflection upon currentevidence.Causaltheoriesof justification or knowledge arealsoexternalist (e.g., Dretske 1981, Ch. 4).Although advocatesofthesetheories empha? sizethedefinitionandsourcesof justification over thestructuralrelationsbetween justifiedproposi? tions, thetheoriesare quiteeasily alliedwithfoun? dationalist approaches. Basic propositionsmay be seenasthose stating the reliability conditionsfor perceptualexperiences or stating thenoninferential beliefscaused by such conditions, withallother empirical beliefs justifiedby relationtothesebasics. Externalist Foundationalism,then, is any version offoundationalismwhich requiresonly external justification ofnonbasic propositionsby basic propositions. IID2.InternalistFoundationalism.Thisformof foundationalism requires thatinternalist justifica? tory conditions apply tothe justification ofnon basics by basics.Nonbasic propositions donotbe? come justified forthe subjectjust becauseexternal conditionswhichareinsomesenseoutofthesub? ject's current epistemic reach happen to apply. The justification mustbeaccessibletothe subjectgiven theevidence currently availabletoher. Although Chisholmis generallyregarded asan InternalistFoundationalist (e.g., Alston 1986b, p.205), Ibelievethereisatensionbetween Chisholm's generalexplication ofhis approach (e.g., Chisholm 1977,p.17;1986,pp.91-92) and theactual epistemic definitionsand principles he puts forward (Chisholm1977, Chs.1 and 4;1980). The general remarks suggestinternalism, butthe principles themselves appear tobeexternalist. Moser's"intuitionism"isaformofInternalist Foundationalism (Moser1985a). NotethatI have only characterizedInternalistand ExternalistFoundationalismwith respect tohow nonbasic propositions are justified. The question whetherbasic propositions are internally orextern? allyjustified is distinct.Forthe foundationalist, the sensesin whichbasicandnonbasic propositions are justified are quitedifferent, andit would appear possible to advocate, for example, externalist justi? ficationofbasicsandinternalist justification of nonbasics. RelationsBetweenThese Categories Commitmenttooneversionoffoundationalism This content downloaded from 197.255.75.79 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 16:07:10 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions104AMERICANPHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY inoneofthese categories doesnotasarule imply commitmenttoa particular versioninanothercat? egory. Therearesome exceptions tothis (e.g., Sensory Foundationalismasformulatedcan apply only to PsychologicalFoundationalism). Buta commitmentto Psychological Foundationalism, for example, doesnotcommitonetothe Superior Basics view, orto Phenomenalist Foundationalism, PureFoundationalismorIterativeFound? ationalism.Itis possible, however, thatcertain nonobviousconnections may beshownto existsuch thatone variety offoundationalismhereidentified infactentailsanother variety inadifferentcate? gory. Indeeditis myhope thatthe present outline may serveto makesuchconnectionsas might exist more easily discernible. III.StrongFoundationalism In discussing theabove categories, I havecited authors only insofarastheirviews correspond with thoseofa particularcategory. Butnoone category makesfora full-fledgedtheory. To get asenseof whatsucha theory looks like, andto compare theories, itisusefultoconsideratleastafewof thosethathavebeen proposed. Thisdiscussionof specific theoriesmustbe highly selective given thenumberoffoundationalisttheor? iesofonesortoranotherthatareto befoundinthe literature.Iwillcontinueon strong formsoffounda? tionalismandonsomeofthe moremodestformsof foundationalismthatavoidtheradicalcontextualism thatallowsculturalorscientific developments to determinewhatconstitutesa basic proposition. The radicalcontextualismof philosophers suchas Rorty stands quite farfromthetraditionalanti-relativist spirit thathasbeenoneofthe motivationsofmost foundationalists, andisin any casebetterknown thanthe contemporary noncontextualistfounda? tionalisttheoriesI wishtodrawattentionto. Chisholm ' s EpistemicPrinciples Foundationalism Chisholmhascontinuedto develop andrefinea strong formoffoundationalsiminthetraditionof Lewis.He has, for example, insistedon Psycholog? icalFoundationalismoverExternal-WorldFounda? tionalism (e.g., Chisholm 1977,pp.20-22). Psychological Foundationalismisthe stronger theory becausea morelimitedclassofbasic prop? ositionsmust carry theloadof justifying allother empiricalpropositions. Also, Psychological Foun? dationalism attempts toanswerthe skeptical chal? lenge thataskshowour subjective mental experi? encescantellus anything aboutthe worldexternal toour experiences. Ifitis successful, it provides ananswertothis challenge ina way that External WorldFoundationalism cannot, sincethelatter assumeswe already have unproblematic basic knowledge of manypropositions abouttheexternal world. ChisholmalsocarriesontheLewistraditionof Superior BasicsFoundationalism.Lewismaintained thatif anything istobe probable,something must becertain (Lewis1946,p.186). Chisholmis oneof thefew contemporary foundationalistswhomain? tainsthatbasicor self-presentingpropositions are certain (e.g., Chisholm 1980,pp.549-50). Chisholm'sfoundationalismis perhaps most elaborateanddetailedinitsformulationof epistemic principles that attempt to explain how propositions acquirejustification.Particularly essentialfora foundationalist program arethose principlesstating theconditionsunderwhichbasic propositionsjus? tify nonbasic propositions. Such principlesattempt to bridge the epistemicgap thatexistsin strong foundationalisttheoriesbetween subjectivepropo? sitionsaboutsensationsorbeliefsand propositions aboutthe worldexternaltothe subject. Inan early versionofChisholm's theory, such bridgeprinciples wereoftheform: If p, then q is justified forS where p isabasic proposition and q anonbasic proposition(Chisholm1966,pp.45-50).17 After Heidelberger(1969) criticized principles ofthis form, Chisholmrestatedhis principles inrevisedform: If p and q, thenris justified forS where p isabasic proposition, ranonbasic proposi? tion, and q asetof independent conditions (Chisholm 1977,pp.75-81;1980,pp.555-56). These indepen? dentconditions require,roughly, that S mustnothave anygrounds for doubting r. It wouldnot appear thatthe propositionsstating independent conditions q canthemselvesbebasic. InChisholm'sformulations they contain complex This content downloaded from 197.255.75.79 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 16:07:10 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsRECENT WORKONFOUNDATIONALISM105 epistemic relationswhich may notevenbeunder? standableandaccessibletothe subject, letalone propositions forwhichshecouldhavebasicor immediate justification. If they arenotaccessible tothe subject, it would appear thatChisholm's principles mustbe externalist, since they would stateconditions necessary for justification which obtainexternalto whatthe subject isawareofor whatshehas epistemic accessto given theevidence availableto heratthetime.Evenif they areacces? sible, questionsmay beraisedaboutwhether prin? ciples inthemorerecentform proposedby Chisholmare truly foundational, sincenonbasic conditions qappear to beasessentialasbasic prop? osition p tothe justification ofr. Chisholm provides atleasta partialresponse tosuch questions (Chisholm1980,pp.557-59). Morediscussionon bothsidesofthisissuewouldI believebeuseful. (For discussionsand critiques ofother aspects of Chisholm's epistemicprinciples seeAlston 1980; Foley 1980,1983; Fumerton 1985,pp.26-27; Hall 1976; Shirley 1980; Triple? 1980.Seealsothe articleson Chisholm's epistemologyinPhilosophia 7,1978, especially Hall'sarticleand pp. 605-10 forChisholm's reply to Hall.) Onceanonbasic proposition hasachievedsome degree of justification frombasic propositions via bridgeprinciples, its justification canbeenhanced by itscoherencewithothernonbasic propositions inthe subject'sepistemicsystem. Chisholm's epis? temic principles also spell outsuchcoherence enhancementin detail (Chisholm1977,pp.82-84; 1980,p.556). In this, Chisholmis advocating Mixedas opposed toPure Foundationalism, and heisin company with every otherfoundationalist Iamawareof. Moser'sIntuitionism Moser'sfoundationalist theory as presented in EmpiricalJustification(1985a) isinsome respects stronger thanChisholm's. Moser, like Chisholm, isa Psychological Foundationalist.ButMoserfol? lowsLewismore closely thandoesChisholmin the important matterofthe sensorygiven andits roleinthe justification ofnonbasic propositions. Moser grounds all justification inthe"immediate apprehension" ofwhatis given tothe subject in sensoryexperience. Itisthe subject's immediate apprehension ofthe given that provides herwith good reasontothinkthata particular"given belief?e.g., herbeliefthatsheseemstoseea bluebookorherbeliefthatshefeels pain?is true (Moser1985a,pp.121,170). Moserdoesmaintainthatitisthe given-belief itself?as opposed totherelated proposition about whatthe subjectimmediatelyapprehends?that is immediately justified for the subject (p.173). This is presumably becausetheactofimmediate appre? hensionoccurs independently of conceptualization (p.166). AsI understand Moser, aninfantcanim? mediatelyapprehend rednesswithout possessingany concepts orthe capacity toentertainbeliefs.But beingjustifiedrequiresconceptualsophistication onthe part ofthe subject?especiallygiven Moser's internalistsenseof justification. Henceitisnot appropriate toattribute anydegree of justification totheinfant simply for being inthis nonconceptual state.Moser speaks of given-beliefs as"founda? tional," and would probably therefore classify him? selfasa BeliefFoundationalist.Itis possible, how? ever, tothinkofbasic propositions asthoseabout whatthe subjectimmediatelyapprehends, since Moserstressesthe sensoryexperiences such propo? sitionsdescribeastheultimatesourceof justifi? cation.We may inthatcasedescribeMoserasa Sensory Foundationalist.Underthis construal, basic propositions are nonjustifiedjustifiers. As propositions aboutwhatthe subjectimmediately apprehends,they serveasthesourcefor given beliefswhichare immediatelyjustified andinturn mediatelyjustify nonbasic propositions. Moser explicitlyrejects externalismand attempts toconstructa theory offoundationalismbased primarily onaninternalistaccountof justification (seepp. 143-47forhis rejection ofChisholm's foundationalismonthe grounds ofits alleged exter? nalismand pp.147-50, 157-206forhis develop? mentofanInternalistFoundationalismhecalls"in tuitionism"). Moser's explication ofthe means by whichbasics justify nonbasics places himinthe category of Explanatory InductionFoundationalists (pp.198-205). Moser rejectsSuperior BasicsFoundationalism (pp.150-57). Inthishe departs frombothLewis andChisholm. Many wouldonthisbasis classify This content downloaded from 197.255.75.79 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 16:07:10 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions106AMERICANPHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Moser'sasa modestformoffoundationalism.To someextenttheclassificationofa theory as strong or modestisa matterofconvention. My ownview though is that, in light ofthe variety of ways in whichfoundationalisttheories maydiffer, itis best notto makethechoicebetweenthe Superior Basics viewandthe ModestBasicsviewthesolecriterion for classifying afoundationalist theory as strong or modest.I believethatMoser'scombinationof Psy? chological andInternalist Foundationalism, together withhisreintroductionofthe much-maligned doc? trineofthe sensorygiven asthesourceofall empiri? cal justification, makeitmore accurate todescribe his theory asaformof strong foundationalism. The followingsurvey ofsomerecentmodest foundationalisttheoriesshouldmakeclearthat therearemore significantdepartures fromthe theoriesof strong foundationalistssuchasLewis andChisholmthanthe simple denialof Superior BasicsFoundationalism. IV.ModestFoundationalism Pollock's Negative CoherenceTheoriesand DirectRealism Ina1979 article, Pollockcameto reject "classi? calfoundationalism" (including hisownearlier posi? tionof 1974) infavoroftheoriesintermediatebe? tweenfoundationstheoriesandcoherencetheories. Pollock suggests thatthecontinuumbetween classicalfoundationalismand pure coherentismis simplygeneratedby the single variableofthe degree of epistemicprivilege attachedtothesetof basic propositions, withclassicalfoundationalism attributing the highestdegree of privilege(presum? ably a property like certainty) to basic propositions and pure coherentism attaching nointrinsic privilege to anytype of proposition (Pollock1979, p.101).However, thevarioustheoriesbetween the strongest formsoffoundationalismand coherentismcannotbe generated as straightfor? wardly asthis. Indeed, in hisown development of specific theorieshe bringsmany additionalfactors into play. For example, onewould expect Pollock to reject classicalfoundationalismonthe grounds thatbasicshave only asmall degree of epistemic privilege andarenotcertainorindubitable.In fact, aswehaveseeninthediscussionofBeliefFoun? dationalism, his rejection isbasedontheideathat wedonot normally havebeliefsabout epistemolog? ically basic propositions. Pollockmaintainsthat basicsarenot generally believedbecause they are aboutthecontentof perceptualexperience, and ordinarily ourbeliefsareabout physicalobjects andnotthecontentsofour experience(1979,pp. 98-99). This particular movedoesnotinfact dispose of classicalor strong formsoffoundationalism.Even ifit weretruethat wedonothavebeliefs directly aboutthecontentofour experiences thatdonot makecovertreferenceto physicalobjects(a point disputedby Firth 1964), Pollockishere assuming BeliefFoundationalismandnot considering a Lewis-typeSensory Foundationalism.Pollockin effectdefines away thelatterasa possibilityby incorporating BeliefFoundationalism requirements intohis general definitionoffoundationstheories (1979,p.93). But surelySensory Foundationalism doesnotviolateeitheressentialtenetoffounda? tionalism. Sensory Foundationalismwillneces? sarily beaversionof Psychological Founda? tionalism, andifcombinedalsowith Superior Basics Foundationalism, asin Lewis, we surely haveaformof strong foundationalism. One gets abettersenseofversionsoffounda? tionalismthat truly move away from strong founda? tionalism byconsidering theothertheoriesdis? cussed by Pollock.Thesetheoriesareinfactcon? siderably more sophisticated thanthosewhich differfromtraditionaltheories merely onthe Superior Basicsissue.Pollockdiscussesfor example aclassoftheoriesheterms "negative coherencetheories."Suchtheoriesassumethat any given beliefis primafaciejustifiedjustby thefact thatthe subject holdsit.Reasonsfunction nega? tively: a beliefis automaticallyjustified unlessthere issomereasonto question it (p.101). Sucha theory seesno epistemologicalproblem with accepting the subject'sepistemicsystem ofbeliefsasa wholeas it currently exists.Individualbeliefsareexamined andabandoned only if specific reasonsarefound for doing so. Butcansuchcoherencetheoriesbealliedwith foundationalismatall?Pollock recognizes that they can (1979,p.105): This content downloaded from 197.255.75.79 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 16:07:10 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsRECENT WORKONFOUNDATIONALISM107 Given any classicalfoundations theory, wecancon? structa negative coherence theorybysaying thata person Sis justified in believing a proposition Piff hedoesbelievePandhehasnoreasontothinkthat hisbeliefin Pcouldnotbe justified inaccordance withthefoundations theory ifhewere sufficiently reflectiveaboutthosestatesofhimselfwhichare reportedby the propositions considered epistemolog? ically basic by thefoundations theory. Thusfor example: ifafoundations theory takes propositions about anindividual's sensoryexperi? encestobebasicforthat individual, thenthe associated negative coherence theory wouldassert thatan ordinaryphysical-objectproposition is jus? tifiedifbelievedandifthe subject hasnoreason tothinkthatthe proposition wouldberendered doubtful werehetoreflecton propositions about hiscurrent sensoryexperiences. Whetherone prefers toconsiderthisa modest formoffoundationalismwith strong coherence leanings, ora modestformofcoherentismwith strong foundationalist leanings, is perhaps a matter of semantics, perhaps a matterofhowthe interpre? tationofthe theory is workedoutindetail.What? ever category ischosenfor it, itisnotableasan example ofa theory thatstandsbetweenmorecon? ventionalformsoffoundationalismandcoheren? tism, incorporating elementsofbothin moreor less equallysignificantdegrees. Pollockdoesnothimself appear toendorse any theory thatsocombines negative coherencewith foundations.The question ofhowbestto classify Pollock'sown preferredtheory isadifficult one, especially sincehehascontinuedto modify hisviews sincehis1979article.Inthatarticlehe appears to endorsea generalnegative coherence theory for "subjective"justification andwhathecallsdirect realismfora theory of "objective"justification (1979,pp.108-11).(The terms "objective" and "subjective" here distinguish "whata person should believe given whatareinfact good reasonsforbe? lievingthings, andwhata person shouldbelieve given his possibly mistakenbeliefsabout reasons," (1979,p.110.) Directrealismis represented in1979 astheviewthatSis justified in believingp iffthe setofbasic propositions thataretruerelativetoS (asopposed to believedbyS)support/?. In Pollock's mostrecentaccount (Contemporary Theories of Knowledge,1986), directrealismis represented as theviewthat"our epistemic normsmustlicense inference directly from perceptual statesto phys? ical-object beliefswithoutmediation by beliefs aboutthe perceptual states" (1986,p.175). Inthe 1979 article, directrealismand negative coherence arenotcombinedintooneunified theory butrefer todifferentsensesof justification. Directrealismsounds very muchlike Sensory Foundationalism. Indeed, Ibelieveitis Sensory Foundationalism.So when, by 1986, Pollock jetti? sonsthe negative coherence aspect ofhisaccountof epistemicjustification(1986,pp.85-87) andem? bracesdirectrealismasthebestavailableaccount (1986,pp.175-79), I believethatthisineffect re? turnsPollocktoa strong foundationalist theory, specifically to Psychological Foundationalismand Sensory Foundationalism.Pollockhimselfwould not accept sucha description?would notinfact describehimselfasafoundationalistatall? because, as noted, heassumesthat anytheoryprop? erly describedasfoundationalwillbesomeform ofBeliefFoundationalism.Butthisseemsto me mistakenforreasonsnotedabove. In whatever wayPollock, in hislatest incarnation, isto bebest categorized, the variety ofviewshehas described, ifnot endorsed, gives auseful picture ofsome ways in which stronger andmoremodest versionsoffoundationalism may be distinguished. Haack'sFoundherentism Like Pollock, Haack recognizes acontinuumof theoriesfrom"PureFoundationalism"to"Pure Coherentism" (Haack1982/83). Itisinstructiveto compare anintermediate theory likeherswiththe othersherediscussed.Hersis far enough towardthe sideofthe spectrum thatI believeitis bestdescribed asa modifiedcoherence theory thatis incompatible withfoundationalism.Shelabelsherintermediate theory "Foundherentism," a view that, likefounda? tionalism, allowssome"beliefs" (herdescription offoundationalismhere appears toassumeBelief Foundationalism) tobe intrinsically moresecure epistemically thanothers (though not certain) but, like coherentism, allowsthatthe justifica? tionofthesemoresecurebeliefs "maydepend upon the support oflesssecurebeliefs" (p.149). This content downloaded from 197.255.75.79 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 16:07:10 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions108AMERICANPHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Foundherentismwould appear tobe incompatible with anyvariety of foundationalism, sincethe justi? ficatorydependence ofmoresecurebeliefsonless secureoneswouldnotallowtheformerto qualify as basic propositions in any sensewhichafounda? tionalistcould accept. Foley'sSubjective Foundationalism InThe TheoryofEpistemicRationality(1987), Foleydevelops a theory of "subjective founda? tionalism." Foley'soverarching aimisto determine whatitisfora person to be epistemically rationalin believing a proposition(p.1). Foleyrecognizes that thisaimisdifferentfromatleastsomeoftheaims (discussedbelow) thathave traditionally motivated foundationalisttheories.Thisdifferenceinaimsis likely,Foley notes, toleadtoa theoryimportantly differentfromtraditionalfoundationalism. Foley's viewisthatthereare "properly basic" propositions, butthatthereisnoessentialconnec? tionbetweensucha proposition'sbeing trueandits being rationalfora person.(Contrast Chisholm's definitionofbasicor self-presentingpropositions, Chisholm 1977,p.22.)According to Foley,properly basic propositions arethosethatareuncontroversial forthe subject toassume.To say a proposition/? is uncontroversialforStoassumeisto say thatno proposition whichSbelieveswithmoreconfidence than p canbeusedto argueagainstp(seeFoley, pp. 63-64forthefull definition). Itmustalsobethe casethat S would, on reflection, believethatinmost relevant possible situationsin whichshebelieves p, herbeliefthat p wouldbetrue (p. 68). Foley'stheory maintains, asmust any founda? tionalist theory, thatnonbasic propositions are epistemicallysupported atleastin partbyproposi? tionsthatare properly basic. However, the epis? temicrelationsbetweenbasicsandnonbasicsare as subjective asare Foley's criteriafor proper bas icality.Suppose basic proposition p infactmakes nonbasic propositionqlikely, andS rationally believes p. Thisisnot enough to make q rational forS.It willnotdoso if, for example, Swould notevenonreflectioncometorealizethe support pprovides for q.Conversely, a proposition p that doesnotinfactmake qlikelymay nonetheless make q rationalfor S, ifSwouldbelieve "given idealreflection"that p doesmake qlikely(pp. 71-72). For Foley, rationalbeliefisafunctionof the subject's own existing setofbeliefsandher epistemic standards. This theory raisesthe specter that any belief whatever, nomatterhow bizarre, might countas rationalifa person's otherbeliefsandmethodsof reflection were, fromour point of view, quite unac? ceptableepistemically.Foleyacknowledges such a possibility. Hedoesmoveto mitigate thisconcern byclarifying the concept ofideal epistemic reflec? tion (pp.33-39) and noting that, underhis theory, standardsfor attainingepistemicrationality arein fact relatively strict (pp.102-14). Healso points toenvironmentaland biological factorsthatwill tendtomake epistemic standardssimilarfromindi? vidualtoindividual (p.113).Finally, henotesthat "not every failureisafailureof rationality"(p. 114). Weshould acknowledge thatbizarrebeliefs might, forsome individuals, be rational, andlook fora differentsortof explanation for whathas gone wrong thanthe allegedirrationality ofsuchbeliefs. Foleyrecognizes that whilehis theory isstructur? ally foundational, ithas manypoints ofcontact withcoherentism (pp.93-102). Intermsofitsfoundationalist structure, Foley's theory isto beclassedasaModest Basics, External WorldFoundationalism. Foley thinks that, forthe typicalperson, theexternal-world proposition that that person seesacatonthe matwillbe properly basic.No proposition thatthe person believeswith equal confidencewouldbe likely tobeusefulin arguingagainst it (p.74). Asfora Superior Basics property like infallibility, a personmight havewhat isinfactaninfalliblebeliefwith respect toa par? ticular proposition, butifshewouldnotevenon reflectionrealizethe infallibility ofher belief, the proposition in questionmight notevenberational for her, muchless properly basic (p.71). Foley'stheory isaformofInternalistFounda? tionalism. Indeed, Ibelieveitistheresultofthe thoroughgoingapplication oftheinternalist concept of justification toa foundationally structured theory. I believeitcanbe argued thatotherInter? nalistFoundationalistssuchasMoserarenotas thoroughgoing intheir applications ofinternalism. Ultimately Moserties justification toexternalstan? dards?towhatistrue?withhisdoctrinethatall This content downloaded from 197.255.75.79 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 16:07:10 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsRECENT WORKONFOUNDATIONALISM109 justification is grounded inthat whichis given tothe subject in sensoryexperience. Thisdoesnotmean Moser's theory isinconsistent orotherwiseunac? ceptable.Strong foundationalistssuchas Moser, ChisholmandLewishave verygood reasonsfor tyingjustification totruthatsome point inthe justi? ficatoryprocess.They are likely to regardFoley's foundationalism, evenwithits acceptance ofbasic propositions, as straying tooclosetocoherentism. Like coherentism,Foley'stheory allowsnoexit fromthecircleofthe subject's beliefs.Howthen cansuchbeliefsbe properlygrounded? I believethatthe differencebetween Foley andthe strong foundationalistsis basedontwo broadly dif? ferent concepts of justification?what we might call traditional epistemicjustification versus Foley's concept of epistemicrationality. AndI believethat thesedifferencesstemfromdifferentmotivesand interests. Traditionally, foundationalismhasbeen advocatedwiththeaimof solving several philo? sophicalproblems,perhaps chief among themthe problem of skepticism. And given traditional assumptions, oneofthe specificskepticalproblems to besolvedhasbeento explain how knowledge of the objective worldis acquired from subjective ex? periences, andto properly connect up a person's justified beliefswithtrue propositions aboutthe way theworldis.Theseconcernsinvitetheories whichareatleastatsome pointexternalist?they require that justified beliefsbe explainedultimately intermsofwhatistrue independently ofwhatthe subject believes. By contrast, the problem which Foley'stheory attempts toresolveisa subjective one: What, from the subject'spoint of view, ought shetobelieve insofarasher goal istoberational?Since Foley's interestisnotin solving thetraditional problem of skepticism, hecanuseashisreference point the individual's epistemicsystem asit currently exists, without worrying abouthowthat epistemicsystem as awhole, orcritical parts ofit suchasthat person's own epistemic standards, cometobe justifiedby something outsidethat epistemicsystem. Andsince hisconcernis withwhatshouldandshouldnotbe reasonableforthe typicalsubject in typical cir? cumstances, Foley neednotbeconcernedwithevil demon hypotheses andother outlandish-seeming epistemologicalpossibilities. Such possibilities do constitutea skepticalchallenge, andinsofarasour goal istorefute skepticism,they needto beaddres? sed.But Foleyappears tobe right in maintaining thatsincewehaveno positive evidencefor them, they aretoo weakto constitute arguments thatcould typically make ordinary beliefsabouttheworld irrational (pp.72-73).Indeed, it wouldseemirra? tionalofusto suspend beliefabout ordinary matters offactonthe grounds thatthere might beanevil demon systematicallydeceiving us. Barring arefu? tationofthe skeptic, our ordinary beliefs might lacksomeultimate justification inasensethathas concerned philosophers fromDescartesto Chisholm,yet suchbeliefs might be entirely rationalin Foley's sense. Attempting toaddressthe skepticalchallenge is presumably a worthygoal nonetheless, asis developing a theory ofrationalbelief.As Foley observes, insofarastraditionalfoundationalismand hisown theory of subjective foundationalismare operating withdifferent goals anddifferentcon? cepts of justification,they may bothbe right(p.69). V.ConcludingRemarks Myprimary concernhasbeentodescribeand categorize foundationalist theories, nottoevaluate them.Itis possible thatnoneofthemare true, or evenonthe right track.Allthe same, thereisa sensein whichthe very existenceandextentofthe profoundationalist literaturehere surveyed makes it inappropriate toclaimthatfoundationalismis dead.Nordoesit appearlikely thatfoundationalist theorieswillfadefromthesceneintheimmediate future.Itis worth noting that many ofthemost recentlydeveloped foundationalisttheories (e.g., thoseof Foley 1987, Fumerton 1985, Alan Goldman 1988, Moser 1985a) are products ofthe youngergeneration of philosophers whoseworkis justbeginning tobe recognized. Ofcourse vigorous discussionofnonfoun dationalistaccountsof epistemicjustification is also tobe expected. Indeedthecurrentscenein epis? temology asa wholeis particularly vitalandrich. It may well be, assomecriticsoffoundationalism assert, thatfoundationalist epistemology wasfor too long thedominant paradigm, andthatitis good thatit hasbeen dislodged fromsucha position, so This content downloaded from 197.255.75.79 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 16:07:10 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions110AMERICANPHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY thata variety of approaches in epistemologymay flourish.Butit appears thatthe eagerness ofsome philosophers toremovefoundationalismfrom sucha dominatingposition hasledthemto prema? turely dismiss it, as though ithasnoroleincon? temporary debates. Although itremainsto bedem? onstrated,my ownviewisthat wedonot yet know enough aboutthestructureof empiricaljustifi cation especiallygiven thenew concepts anddis? tinctionsthathave recently been introduced, to beassuredthata particulartheory or type of theory iscorrector the obviouslypreferredap? proach. Ifthatisthe situation, thenitisbest thata diversity ofviewsbe debated, andfoun? dationalismshould surely beincluded among them.18 Universityof New Hampshire Received September 11, 1989 NOTES 1.Thisbroadclaim may well require modification bysubsequent historicalresearch.Withthenotable exception ofSchmitt's article, littlehasbeenwrittenaboutthe history offoundationalism. 2.ButthecoherentistviewsofOttoNeurathindicatethatthecentraltenetsof logicalpositivism didnotdictateaviewabout thestructureof epistemicjustification. 3.Gowans (1984) maintainsthatwhileLewisdoesdefendfoundationalismin An AnalysisofKnowledge andValuation (1946), Lewis'earlierbookMindandtheWorldOrder (1929)actually containsa critique offoundationalism.SeeMoser (1988,pp. 197-98) fora response to Gowans' argument. 4. Althoughduring this period ChisholmandPollockwerealonein publishingdeveloped foundationalisttheoriesthatretained the relativelystrongrequirements ofLewis'foundationalist system, other philosophers wrote sympathetically aboutfoundationalism or began to suggestways in whichmoremoderatefoundationalisttheoriescouldbe developed. RoderickFirth (1964) notedseveral ways inwhichtheLewisversionoffoundationalism might bemoderatedwithout yetbecoming acoherence theory.Panayot Butchvarovassumedafoundationalistaccountof knowledge inThe ConceptofKnowledge(1970, see especiallyp.202). Hedid not,however,develop ordefenda specific accountofhowbasic propositions(or"primaryperceptualknowledge") can provide justification fornonbasic propositions(see,e.g.,pp.204-05). InTheNature ofThings(1973),AnthonyQuinton defendeda modified, nontraditionalversionoffoundationalismwhichmaintainedthatbasic propositions wereasarule corrigiblepropositions aboutmaterial objects(see,e.g.,pp.10,213). Hisworkis significant asan early articulationofmodest foundationalism, aview whichwastobe adoptedby severalother epistemologists in subsequentyears.Pappas(1982,p.81)implies that Quinton was notafoundationalistof anysort, basedonanearlierworkof Quinton's(Quinton1955).AlthoughQuinton does say therethat "becauseof multiplicity ofusesthereareno'basicsentences'" (Quinton1955,p.49), healso speaks of"thesinofthecoherence theory"(p.51) andseemsto meto support a post-Wittgensteinian, contextualistfoundationalism. (I discussthis type offound? ationalisminthetext following.) D.M. Armstrong's defenseofreliabilismin Belief, Truthand Knowledge(1973) isalso compatible withmodestformsoffoundationalismandincludesadiscussionofhisreasonsfor departing fromthetraditionalCartesian concept ofthefoundationsof knowledge(Armstrong1973,pp.156-57). 5. Althoughinevitably somewhat arbitrary, 1975marksas good adateas any for beginning our survey oftheserecenttrends. Philosophers suchasFirthand Quinton did anticipate themoveto modestfoundationalism (see note 4). Butit waswitharticles suchasPastin'sandAlston'sthat philosophersbegandirectlychallenging the assumptions and arguments ofthecriticsof foundationalism.See, for example, Pastin (1975a,pp.418-19) on Reichenbach, Goodmanand Rescher; Alston (1976c,pp. 167-69) onAune. 6. Georges Dickerdoesnotrefertofoundationalismas such, buthis approach in PerceptualKnowledge(1980) would appear tobeadefenseofmodestfoundationalismofa phenomenalistictype. 7. Significant criticismsof pure coherentismaretobefoundinCornman 1980,pp.145-51;Foley 1980,p.61; Moser 1985a, pp.72-84; Pollock 1979,pp.101-05; Sosa 1980b,pp.18-20,1985,pp. 13-19. 8.The many statementstothiseffectintheliterature (in additiontothosethatcanbefoundinthe workscriticaloffoundationalism discussedormentionedinthe text)including those by Airaksinen 1978,p.263,1981,p.403; Clark 1977,p.143;Dancy 1985 This content downloaded from 197.255.75.79 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 16:07:10 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsRECENT WORKONFOUNDATIONALISM111 p.62;Frankenberry1987,p.77;Hacking 1980,p.586; Johnson 1978,pp.71-72; Kekes 1982; McGinn 1981/82,pp.97-98; Nielsen 1986,p.277; Pols 1986,p.17;Sayers 1985,pp.84-95; Schenck 1986,p.238; and Verges1987,pp.309, 311.In many casesthe theorythought tohavebeenrefutedisreferredto simply as"foundationalism."Itisoftennotclearinsuchcaseswhether thecriticismis meanttoincluderecentmodestversionsoffoundationalismaswellas stronger formulationsofthe theory. Those advocating modestformsoffoundationalismasaruledosobecause they believe stronger versionsofthe theory arenotviable (seee.g.,Delaney 1975,p.8; Pastin 1975a,p.419). 9. Compare, for example, Annis 1977,p.345; BonJour 1985,p.17; Chisholm 1964,p. 263 (reprinted in Chisholm 1982,pp. 126-27); Gowans 1984,p.241; Lehrer 1977,pp.17-18; Moser 1985a,p.117; Pollock 1979,p.93; Sosa 1980b,p.5; VanCleve 1979,p. 74.Fora moreextendeddiscussionofthedefinitionoffoundationalismseeStiffler1984. 10.For specific characterizationsofbasic propositions seeAlston 1976b,pp.257-58; Annis 1978,p.213; Aune 1967,p.41; Butchvarov 1970,p.62; Chisholm 1977,pp.20-22,1980,p.549; Cornman 1977,p.287; Lehrer 1974,p.76; Lewis 1946,pp. 28,182; Pastin 1975b, p. 147 (reprinted in Pastin 1978,p.286); Pollock 1979,pp.93-94; Quinton1966, p.58; Sellars 1979, pp.171-72; Will 1974,p.144; Williams 1977,p. 61.Formoreextensivediscussionsofbasic propositions seeChisholm 1979, pp.337-41; Feldman 1977; Heidelberger 1979; Pastin1975b and1977. Almeder (1983) maintainsthatbasic propositions arenotthemselves justified.They confer justification withoutthemselves requiring or possessingjustification. Onthisviewbasic propositions are nonjustifiedjustifiers. In whatfollowsI willtalkofbasic propositions as beingjustified. IfAlmederis right,appropriateadjustments willhavetobemadeinhowwetalkaboutbasic propositions. Almeder's positionmay also require revisionsinour understanding ofthe strength andnatureofbasic propositions. SeealsoJohnsen (1985) andMoser (1985b) on Almeder. 11.AdditionaltheoreticaldistinctionsaretobefoundinSosa (1980a,1980b,1981,1983) andHaack (1982/83). 12.Kekes'own rejection offoundationalismisanattackona strong formoffoundationalismthat requires thatbasic propositions be incorrigible (Kekes1982, p.273). 13.Alston (1971,1976b)provides carefuldistinctions among these concepts inthecontextofadiscussionofwhat propositions a subjectmight have "privileged access"to. Pappas(1982)provides definitionsof incorrigible andnon-inferential knowledge. Seealso Lehrer'sdefinitionof incorrigibility(1974,p.83) and definitionsof certainty in Firth (1967), Chisholm (1977,p.10) andKlein (1981, Ch. 3). 14.Pollock (1986,p.41) attributes phenomenalism toLewis.Moser (1988,pp.198-200) more carefully and correctly notesthat Lewis explicitlyrepudiatesphenomenalism(Lewis1946,pp.200-02) while developing a theory thatdoes incorporate some elementsof phenomenalism(Lewis1946,pp.182-200). Lewismaintainsthat phenomenalpropositions(specifically, conditional "terminatingjudgments") are quite differentinreferencefrom "non-terminatingjudgments" about ordinaryphysicalobjects, but thata particularnon-terminatingjudgment is intentionallyequivalent toaninfiniteseriesofrelated terminatingjudgments. Since theseriesis infinite,however, nofinitesetof phenomenalpropositions entailsthetruthofa particularphysical-objectproposition. Moser interprets Lewisasan Explanatory InductionFoundationalistintermsofthemeans by which phenomenalpropositions do justifyphysical-objectpropositions(Moser1988,pp.199-200). Whateverthebest interpretation ofLewisonthis score, he clearly insiststhat physical-objectpropositions are merelyprobable anddonot partake ofthe certainty or indubitability of phenomenal propositions(e.g., Lewis 1946,pp.184-86), andhe explicitlyrejects whatI havecalledDeductiveFoundationalism (e.g.,p.191). 15. Although Dilmandoesnotmentionfoundationalism by name,he clearly has Psychological Foundationalisminoursensein mindwhenhecriticizestheviewthat ordinaryphysicalobjectpropositions cannotbeknown directly and noninferentially(Dilman 1975,pp.88,94-95). 16.Fordiscussionsofexternalistvs.internalist concepts of justification(notalwaysusing this terminology) seeAlston 1985, 1986b; BonJour 1980; Chisholm 1986,pp.91-92; Firth 1978,p.218; AlvinGoldman 1980; Graybosch1986/87; Montmarquet 1987; Moser 1985a,pp.120-38; Pollock 1979,pp.103-04,1987,especiallyp.62; Simson 1986; Swain 1981b,p.37; Walker 1986;Yourgrau 1987. 17.Chisholm employs differenttermsfor degrees of justification:"reasonable," "beyond reasonable doubt,""evident," etc. (Chisholm1966,p.22;1977,pp.7-12). Inthis general discussionofhis epistemicprinciples I suppress referencetothese differing degrees of justification andrefer simply toanonbasic proposition'sbeingjustified. 18.1wishtothankthe University ofNew HampshireFacultyDevelopment CommitteeandDeanStuartPalmerfor grants inaid ofresearchforthis project.WoodyDugan andMichaelPattenassistedwith bibliographical research.Useful bibliographical suggestions were providedby Timo Airaksinen, David Annis, David Austin, Dan Crawford, Alan Goldman, Richard Hall, Bredo Johnsen, William Lycan,JosephMargolis andFrederickSchmitt.Fordetailedand helpful commentsonearlierdraftsofthis paper Iam particularlygrateful to Robert Almeder, HilaryKornblith, PaulMoserandErnestSosa. 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