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DOI: 10.1177/0010414001034004003

2001 34: 400Comparative Political StudiesCAMERON G. THIES

NegotiationsA Historical Institutionalist Approach to the Uruguay Round Agricultural

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COMPARATIVEPOLITICALSTUDIES/May2001Thies /URUGUAYROUND AGRICULTURALNEGOT IATIONS

The reduction of agricultural trade barriers accomplished at the close of the Uruguay Round

(UR) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is a puzzle because previous research has

suggested that producer groups would always succeed in blocking liberalization efforts. The

author explains this apparent puzzle through the use of a comparative historical method devel-oped by Collier andCollier foranalyzingtheUR as a critical juncture.Theanalysis suggests that

transformations in productive technology enabled producer groups to reap extraordinary eco-

nomic and political rents during most of the postWorld War II era. However, the fiscal crises of

the 1980s provided governments an incentive to exert relative autonomy from producer groups

and initiate bargaining over trade barriers. As trade barriers and the political influence of pro-

ducer groups were reduced, the UR emerged as the product of a critical juncture in the transition

from the Fordist to the post-Fordist mode of agricultural accumulation.

A HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISTAPPROACH TO THE URUGUAY ROUND

AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS

CAMERON G. THIESLouisiana State University

In this article, I analyze the political economy of the agri-food complex inthepostWorld War II era. This involves an examination of theunderlyingeconomic structure of agri-food production and the more readily observable

political negotiations between states over the regulation of agri-food trade

under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). I

argue that technological innovations adopted by agricultural producers led to

unanticipated and dramatic changes in the nature of the economic structure.

These changes in the economic structure undermined the privileged political

position of agricultural producer groups in developed societies by relegatingmore of the profits and control of production to agri-food corporations orga-

nized on a global scale.

400

AUTHORS NOTE: I would like to thank Bill Avery, Pat McGowan, Steve Walker, Carolyn

Warner, the editor andreviewers ofComparative Political Studies, and participants in colloquia

at Arizona State UniversityandLouisianaState University for their helpful comments on earlier

drafts.

COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES, Vol. 34 No. 4, May 2001 400-428

2001 Sage Publications, Inc.

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The traditional national security justification for agricultural protection-

ismfailed toaccordwith this new situationinwhichagri-foodproductionand

accumulation moved toward transnational organization. However, the sys-

tem of Fordist agricultural accumulation would remain in place until a fiscal

crisis, felt in all developed states, began to dislodge agricultural producer

groups from policy preeminence.1 The crisis prompted the ensuing critical

juncture when the new post-Fordist mode of agricultural accumulation

emerged.2 Post-Fordist and Fordist modes of production had existed along-

side of each other for many years, yet the Uruguay Round (UR) marked the

transition period in which the former overtook the latter in preeminence.

The agreement on agricultural trade concluded during the UR of GATT

negotiations institutionalized the new politics of agriculture: Agriculture

became subject to negotiations just like any other sector of national econo-mies, domestic producer groups were no longer invulnerable to reduction in

their politicoeconomic rents, and transnational agri-food corporations began

to ascend to political andeconomicprominence. Theinstitution of theGATT

prior to the UR was marked by a long period of equilibrium in which agricul-

ture was off-limits to negotiations. Not until the UR, after the fiscal crisis led

to a reevaluation of agriculture, was the institution altered to include agricul-

tural negotiations and a successful outcome to those negotiations. Given the

path-dependentnatureof institutions, it is likelythat the ensuing tradenegoti-

ations under the World Trade Organization (WTO) will also include agricul-

ture, with more substantive reduction in barriers to trade in agriculture. Thelegacy of the critical juncture of the UR has ushered in a new equilibrium in

the institutional nature of the WTO.

HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM

AND CRITICAL JUNCTURES

Central to the argumentmade in this article is the claim that the UR was in

itself a significant event. This is a matter of some debate. Paarlberg (1997)

suggests that although the final agreement represents significant technicalbreakthroughs for the GATT, any actual reduction in trade barriers was the

Thies / URUGUAY ROUND AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS 401

1. Fordism is a system of mass production of standardized goods employing semiskilled

workers using specialized equipment. It is a reference to Henry Fords assembly line mass pro-

duction of automobiles and the social and political relationships it generated. The specifics of

Fordist agriculture will be described later in the article.

2. Post-Fordisminvolves thesmall-batch production of a variety of products through theuse

of flexible machinery. Just what exactly constitutes post-Fordist agriculture is a matter of some

speculation and will be discussed later in the article.



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result of previous domestic-level action in the various states. I do not dispute

his claims. The UR resulted from a series of fiscal crises felt in the developed

states with regard to their protectionist programs in the 1980s. Each state

reacted in slightly different ways to the fiscal crisis brought on by changes in

theunderlying mode of agriculturalproduction. TheUR as a critical juncture

marks the acknowledgment of the disjuncture between political arrange-

ments and underlying economic realities. Even if the agricultural agree-

ment is largely symbolic, it still illustrates a break from past ways of thinking

about agriculture that reflects thechanged economic structureof agricultural

production.3

Swinbank and Tanner (1996, p. 142) echo this sentiment by arguing that

although the trade impact of the final agreement might be dismissed as mod-

est, this wouldmisjudge theagreements importance, inasmuchas thecon-tracting parties recognized the long-term objective of reducing agricultural

trade barriers and continuing the negotiation process. Furthermore,

SwinbankandTanner state that theagreementmarks a significant change in

the way countries can support their farm sectors and brings agricultural trade

firmly within the GATT disciplines (p. 141).

McDonald (1998, p. 213) also suggests that the UR achieved a very firm

blueprint for thecontinuedreformofglobalagriculture.Schott (1994,p. 10)

gives the agreement on agriculture a grade of B+ for reversing decades of

hard-core sectoral protection. The agreement misses a grade of A (which

few areas of the UR received fromSchott) because someincomesupport pro-grams of the United States and Europeare exempted, but as Schott (1994,p.11)

notes, the agreement nonetheless establishes for the first time significant

multilateral disciplines on trade-distorting farm programs. Finally, Wolfe

(1998, p. 85) declares that the UR was a sharp break from GATTs past in

agricultural dealings. On balance, it seems that although the final agreement

on agriculture may have fallen short of some economists dreams of com-

pletely unrestricted trade, it still marks a significant shift from the old to the

new political economy of agriculture. What this article attempts to explain ishow that transition was made possible and why it was necessary.

Previous research on the creation of agricultural trade policy has focusedalmost exclusively on domestic-level actors and processes or on the nexus

between domestic politics and international bargaining. Moyer and Josling

(1990, chap. 1) identify five different approaches to the analysis of agricul-

tural trade policy creation that attribute causality primarily to domestic-level

actors: the rational actor model, public choice analysis, organizational pro-

402 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / May 2001

3. Skogstad (1998) links changes in ideas about agricultural exceptionalism to changes in

agricultural policy in the United States and Europe.



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cess and bureaucratic politics, partisan mutual adjustment, and the process

schematic approach.4

More recent research has employed Putnams (1988) two-level game

framework to analyze the intersection of domestic and international politics

within the context of interstate negotiations. Putnams framework has been

applied to the UR agricultural negotiations by a number of scholars and col-

lected in an edited volume published before the conclusion of the talks

(Avery, 1993). Such an intermestic approach is an advance over purely

domestic-level theorizing but seems to have failed in its predictive and

explanatory capacities with regard to agricultural trade liberalization.

Theconclusion of both types of analyses is that domesticagriculturalpro-

ducergroups will alwaysblock efforts to liberalize agricultural trade. Indeed,

this conclusion operated as a virtual iron law during all GATT rounds priorto the UR. This explains why most theoretical approaches prior to the UR

focused on domestic politics. Indeed, states and their domestic producer

groupshavegenerally insisted that agriculture is special anddeserves protec-

tion from market forces toprevent statevulnerability during times ofcrisis.5

When agriculture was included as one of the 14 areas under negotiation in

the UR, scholars employed the two-level game framework to analyze how

linkage politics might affect agricultural trade liberalization. Rather than

viewing agricultural trade linked to other issues in a way that maximized

overall trade liberalization, these scholars generally argued that the UR

would fail because of domestic producer groups intransigence on agricul-ture (e.g.,Paarlberg, 1993).These scholars appeared to becorrect up until the

last minute, because France, in particular, seemed unwilling to giveup on her

agricultural producers.

Recent analyses (Meunier, 1998; Pollack, 1998) have extended the bar-

gaining logic of the two-levelgametofocus onthe autonomyof the European

Commission vis--vis the member states of the European Union (EU). They

argue that althoughthecommission was able to utilize externalpressure from

the United States and internal budgetary pressures to push for a reform of the

Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 1992, it was unableto exertautonomy

from member states during the GATT negotiations, thus resulting in a poten-tial Frenchveto of thefinal agreement. Although these analyses highlight the

importance of the European Commission as one of the actors in the negotia-

tion process and the impact of the budget crises on its autonomy, they are an


4. Thevariousliteratures associated with each of these approaches aretoo lengthy to be dealt

with in this article.

5. The provision of a secure food supply is one of the most frequently cited objectives of

agricultural policiesin the Organization for EconomicCooperationand Development states. See

Winters (1988) for an elaboration of so-called noneconomic objectives of agricultural policy.



6/30

exercise in short-run comparative statics that fails to understand the long-run

economic sea change that (dis)empowered the various actors in this process.

Despite the electoral imperatives that influenced the French government to

make a show of supporting agriculture for the short run by demanding una-

nimity voting on the final agreement, in the end theydid not side with domes-

tic producer groups.

The result of previous research is that neither purely domestic-level nor

intermestic approaches using the logic of the two-level game were capable of

predicting that agricultural trade barriers would become the subject of nego-

tiations; in addition, the approaches could not fully explain the subsequent

reductionof those barriers during thecritical historical juncture known as the

UR of the GATT. These twin theoretical failures are mainly due to a lack of

historical awareness. They are guilty of what Pierson (1996, p. 127) callsexamining a photograph rather than a moving picture.

Piersons (1996) logic applies to the series of intergovernmental bargains

that have taken place under theauspices of theGATT. Looking at agricultural

negotiationsunder the GATT from a historical, process-oriented perspective,

one finds that at a certain critical juncture (the UR) the scope of state auton-

omy relative to its domestic agriculture producers is increased. Thedomestic

constraints faced by states during the UR were lax in comparison with previ-

ous GATT rounds.Thequestionis,Whatmade theUR unique in this respect?

Collier andCollier (1991)provide a useful starting point for comparative-

historical research by employing an analysis of critical junctures. The majordifference between the Colliers approach and my application of their

method is that the institution I am interested in analyzing is international.

Whereas the Colliers are interested in comparing the differing impact of

external factors on individual and group behavior within the institutions of

the state, my interest is in examining the impact of external factors (changes

in agri-food production and accumulation) on state behavior in an interstate

institution (GATT).

My international relations perspective focuses on global processes that

affect the interests of producers and governments in a similar manner across

states, hence shaping preferences independent of purely domestic consider-ations.6 I believe that my approach will offer yet another possibility in the

ongoing attempt to negotiate the divide between comparative politics and


6. A strictly comparative approach would examine the way in which global processes were

adopted differently in each state/region and how that would affect bargaining in the Uruguay

Round. An example of this type of research that crosses the comparative/international relations

divide would be Gourevitchs (1978, 1986) second image reversed. However, I will argue that

the processes inherent in Fordism were global in nature and more or less uniformly adopted in

the developed states.



7/30

international relations (Caporaso, 1997). Furthermore, it provides a compre-

hensive framework for the analysis of the modes of production and trade

policy.

The historical institutionalist approach I am employing in this article

shares several features with existing international relations theory with

regard to the study of international institutions or regimes. First, historical

institutionalism (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Steinmo, Thelen, & Longstreth,

1992), neoliberal institutionalism (Keohane, 1984), and liberal inter-

governmentalism (Moravcsik,1992) view statesas important agents in inter-

national relations. States do more than simply aggregate preferences to pro-

duce a policy choice or bargaining position. States guide, redirect, magnify

and inhibit policy battles (Ikenberry, 1988, p. 222). Therefore, states, and

the regimes they create, can be independent or intervening variables in thepolicy process, not just dependent variables (Krasner, 1983).

Second, historical institutionalism and neoliberal institutionalism empha-

size the path-dependent nature of institutions. Once created, institutions

shape andconstrain thebehaviorof agentswithin them. Furthermore, institu-

tions are resistant to change. Institutional change is sticky and episodic

rather than continuous and incremental. This is due to the fact that institu-

tional arrangements privilege agents who work to perpetuate those arrange-

ments. Finally, the costs of uncertainty act as a countervailing force against

institutional change (Ikenberry, 1988, pp. 223-224).

Historical institutionalism differs from both neoliberal institutionalismand liberal intergovernmentalism in important ways that provide the ratio-

nale for its employment in this study. First, historical institutionalism is not

predicated on a liberal theory of preference formation and interest aggrega-

tion at the domestic level like the other two theories. Historical

institutionalism is agnostic on the process of interest aggregation. However,

it does emphasize that past institutional choices will shape how interests are

represented to the state.

Second, historical institutionalism emphasizes theroleof unintended con-

sequences. These consequences are the result of feedback loops and inter-

action effects generated in situations with large numbers of actors or highissue density (Pierson, 1996, pp. 136-137).7 Central to this study is the fact

that participants in institutional design are unable to know how an institution

will function in the long run given the complex social processes involved in

institutional evolution.


7. Ikenberry (1988, pp. 225-226) refers to the same situation as a claim of causal

complexity.



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Finally, historical institutionalism stresses the role of crisis in disrupting

long periods of stability in institutional arrangements. Due to the sticky,

path-dependentnatureof institutions, institutional changeis most likely to be

successful during times of crisis such as war or depression. Political or eco-

nomic crises acts as a solvent, throwing into relief discontinuities between

underlying social forces and existing institutions (Ikenberry, 1988, p. 224).

We should expect a pattern of long periods of institutional stability during

which pressure for change builds, only to be released in sudden infrequent

fits of institutional change, or what Krasner (1988), borrowing from Gould

and Eldredge (1977), labels punctuated equilibrium. Collier and Collier

(1991) incorporate the notion of crisis and infrequent institutional change

into their method of analyzing critical junctures.

Collier and Collier (1991, p. 29) define a critical juncture as a period ofsignificant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different coun-

tries (or in other units of analysis) and which is hypothesized to produce dis-

tinct legacies. The major modification I will make to this definition is that it

is possible to analyze critical junctures from a within-case approach to

explanation rather than from a comparative cases analysis. I will employ A.

George and McKeowns (1985) process-tracing procedure, which Collier

and Collier (1991, p. 5) also advocate for the portion of their analysis that is

within country.

Process tracing seeks to explain the stream of events in a process bywhich

various initial conditions are translated into outcomes. It involves an attemptto reconstruct agents definitions of the situation and their resulting action.

Theframework withinwhich agents perceptions andactions aredescribedis

given by theresearcher, not by theagents themselves.Theprocess ofcreating

such an explanation is similar to the construction of a web or network, with

the researcher assembling bits and pieces of evidence into a pattern. The

process-tracing approach attempts to uncover what stimuli create agents

interests, how interests are translated into behavior, and theeffects of various

institutional arrangements on agents behavior (A. George & McKeown,

1985, pp. 34-37).

The within-case analysis is crucial to this project because I have only onecase to analyze: the Fordist regime of agricultural accumulation. However,

within that singlecase, whichencompassesmainlyeconomicand technolog-

ical processes, I also have a political process of international trade negotia-

tions. I assume that theeconomic and technological processesdrive thepolit-

ical process.8 However, at certain critical junctures, the political process


8. Thisassumption is implicitin previousdomestic-level and intermestic approaches to agri-

cultural trade negotiations. Under these approaches, domestic agriculturalproducer groups seek



9/30

becomes relatively autonomous from economic processes. This relative

autonomy attained during a critical juncture enables agents to change

entrenched, path-dependent institutional patterns (Collier & Collier, 1991,

p. 36)andthus affect theeconomicstructures that conditionthemselves in the

process of a feedback loop. Therefore, I can examine the political process of

GATT negotiations to uncover crucial yet difficult-to-observe changes in

underlying economic and technological processes that may demonstrate a

transition from Fordism to post-Fordism.

Collier and Collier (1991, p. 36) discuss three elements, in addition to the

components of their definition, that must be considered in any analysis of

critical junctures: antecedent conditions, cleavages or crises, and the legacy

of the critical juncture (see Figure 1). I will begin my analysis with an elabo-

ration of the antecedent conditions that form the baseline against which Icompare the critical juncture and the legacy. The antecedent conditions in

this analysis are the economic and technological processes inherent in the

Fordist mode of agricultural production. Following the general discussion of

Fordism, I will examine the interests it created within certain groups and the

resulting political crises in the developed states that set the stage for the criti-

cal juncture of the UR. Next, I will examine the legacy, or what I hypothesize

is the beginning ofa legacy, ofpost-Fordismand compare itwith the anteced-

ent conditions to highlight the importance of the UR as a critical juncture.

ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS: PRODUCTIVE

TECHNOLOGY IN FORDIST AGRICULTURE

The technological and economic processes that are responsible for the

phenomenal increase in agricultural productivity under Fordism have their

roots in the 19th century. The industrial revolution created a demand for

urban workers that dramatically changed the occupational structure of the

economies in the industrializing states. For example, in the 18th and early

19th centuries, more than 70% of the U.S. population earned their income

from agriculture (Curry, 1990, p. 95). Today that figure is less than 5% inmost developed states.9


rents from the state to further their economic interests. The liberal state, in its function of aggre-

gating domestic interests, then adopts agricultural trade barriers. Finally, the state prevents any

reduction in trade barriers among states at the level of interstate bargaining.

9. The obvious exceptions are the poor four of the European Community (EC): Ireland,

Greece, Portugal,and Spain,whoseagricultural labor forcesare in excess of 10%of their respec-

tive total workforces.



10/30

Thetwo fundamental differences between modern andtraditional agricul-

ture according to Grigg (1992, p. 2) are the capacity of modern agriculture to

increase output at a very high rate and the much higher productivity of land

and labor. For example, U.S. agricultural output in the 1940s was 17 times

what it was in 1800. This type of increase in output cannot be explained sim-

ply by increasing the area sown to crops, the number of livestock kept, or the

number of hours worked. This is not to suggest that traditional agriculture

was static. Indeed, the agricultural revolution is described by many histori-

ans, includingWallerstein (1974,p. 42), as having taken place in Europe long

beforethe industrial revolution. Before the19th century, there were increases

in output and productivity, but these were dwarfed in the 20th century.

Industrialization brought profound changes to agriculture in the devel-

oped states. The most rapid change in farming came as agriculture declined

both as a proportion of the workforce and in its contribution to the value of

output. Demand for agricultural produce increased as a result of industrial-

ization and the accompanying rise in population. Indeed, growing prosperity

led to a change in the structure of output to favor more expensive, quality

products such as meat, milk, and fresh vegetables demanded by urban con-sumers. In addition, farmers began buying an increasing proportion of their

inputs from the industrial sector to meet this demand.

This phenomenon began with the development of an agricultural machin-

ery industry. The first commercial tractor was produced in the United States

in 1892. Only 1,000 were in use before World War I in the United States, but

by 1930, the numbers had reached 1 million. By 1950, there were 4 million

tractors in use in the United States. The introduction of the tractor followed a


Figure 1. Building blocks of the critical juncture framework.Source: Adapted from Collier and Collier (1991, p. 30).Note: UR = Uruguay Round; WTO = World Trade Organization.



11/30

slower pace in Europe, where by 1950, 85% of all draught power still came

from horses and oxen (Grigg, 1992, pp. 49-51). Other developments of the

early 20th century included the use of chemical fertilizers, seed merchants,

pesticides, and power from petroleum and electricity.

An even more profound change in modern agriculture is that much of the

processing of raw materials once done on the farm came to be done in facto-

ries. In the 19th century, most processing was small scale and took place

either on the farm or in mills that served the local community. By the 1950s,

most processing took place away from the farm, and the farmer was essen-

tially producing raw materials for factories (Grigg, 1992, pp. 107-109).

The dramatic changes in technology during the Fordist era had equally

important consequences for the structure of agricultural production in the

developed states of Japan, the United States, and the European Community(EC). The number of Japanese farm households has fallen by 50% since

1950. At the same time, the amount of land per farm has increased by 49%

since 1950. Finally, the number of workers engaged in agricultural labor has

decreased by two thirds in the period 1950 to 1980 (Imamura, Tsuboi, &

Odagiri, 1993, pp. 54-58).

The data on the United States also confirm what one would expect for the

period of Fordist agriculture. The period between 1920 and 1940, in which

Fordism was becoming the dominant mode of production, demonstrates a

decreasing trend in the number of farms to approximately 2.1 million in

1987, after a height of 6.4 million in 1920. The area under cultivation alsoincreased greatly in this period and reached a high point of 1,161 million

acres in 1950. In addition, the average farm size shows a clear upward trend

since 1920. The average farm size increased from 148 acres to 462 acres

between 1920 and 1987. The percentage of the U.S. workforce engaged in

agriculture was decliningrapidly at this time as well (Stanton,1993,p.118).

In the EC, one also sees a long-term trend toward decreasing numbers of

farms. The number of farms has dropped from 9.8 million in 1950 to 5.7 mil-

lion in 1980 for the whole of the community. This amounts to a 42% reduc-

tion in the number of farms overall, although the poorer states haveretained a

greater percentage of their farms than the wealthier states (Goodman &Redclift, 1988). Nevertheless,average farm size in Europe is small compared

with the farm sizes in the United States or Canada. The majority of farms on

the continent are well smaller than 100 hectares. However, in England and

Wales, the average farm size has doubled since 1950, to around 200 hectares

(Grigg, 1992, p. 101). This difference is not surprising given the fact that

farms in the United Kingdom have historically been more efficient than their




12/30

continental counterparts (giving rise to Thatchers demand at Fontainebleau

in 1984 for a rebate on contributions to the EC budget).10

This discussion has illuminated the salient features of Fordist agricultural

production. Fordist agriculture is capital intensive, as witnessed by the

increase in the numbers and types of farm implements in use as well as the

decrease in the percentage of the workforce engaged in agricultural produc-

tion. Under Fordist agriculture, the number of farms has decreased while the

area under cultivation per farm has increased. The application of technology

further extends productive capacity through the use of fertilizers and pesti-

cides.TheFordist farm specializes in a limited number ofcommodities.Farm

inputs are purchased from the industrial sectornot only tractors and com-

bines but seed as well. The uniformity of inputs is crucial to Fordist agricul-

ture in that the agricultural output is produced for factory processing. Thus,Fordist agriculturalproduction relegates the farmer to the initial raw material

production along a conveyer belt that extends from the field to the grocers

shelves.

This discussion has given an account of the antecedent conditions that

form the baseline for future comparison against the critical juncture and leg-

acy. The economic and technological processes inherent to Fordism as it

developed under U.S. auspices also have a political counterpart in the inter-

state trade negotiations known as the GATT. That political process was

largely captured by economic interests stemming from the Fordist mode of

agricultural production. However, through their intervention in the politicalprocess, those economic interests helped create a crisis in Fordist agriculture

that led to the critical juncture of the UR in which governments were able to

exert some autonomous influence over the negotiations.

NEGOTIATIONS AND INTERESTS

IN THE FORDIST ERA

Protective barriers to agricultural imports are not unknown among the

developed countries. They were introduced in the late 1800s in Europe asindustrial development at home and agricultural export expansion in the

Americas and Australasia began to reduce the competitiveness of European

farmers (Gourevitch,1977;Tracy, 1989). Protectivebarriers were raiseddur-

ing the Great Depression of the 1930s and again during the period of rapid


10. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has historically accounted for 50% to 60% or

more of the EC budget and has often required the solicitation of additional funds from the mem-

ber states to avoid a deficit.



13/30

industrial growth that began in the1950s. Similarly, when Japan first became

a net importer of food around 1900, a tariff on rice imports was introduced,

accompanied by a decline in the high taxation of the agriculture sector

(Anderson, 1983). The United States did not begin major intervention in the

agricultural sector until the advent of the New Deal in 1933.

Most agricultural trade has not been conducted according to the funda-

mentalnorms, rules, andprocedures of theGATT. TheGATT system is pred-

icated on the predominance of market forces, the liberalization of exchange

by the removal of government intervention within and at borders, the provi-

sion of any remainingprotection by tariff, andtheresolution of trade disputes

by reference to a set of agreed rules (Viraven, 1987). Agricultural trade has

failed miserably on each of these conditions, despite the presence of the

United States as a hegemon ostensibly committed to freer trade.However, there have been attempts to bring agricultural trade into the

GATT. Agricultural products were a contentious issue throughout the

mid-1940s in the conferences leading to the drafting of the Havana Charter

with its provision for the creation of an International Trade Organization.

These disagreements carried over into the drafting of the GATT in 1947.

From the very beginning, there were differences over whether agriculture

should be subject to the normal GATT rules or whether it should be managed

between exporters and importers and between the economically advanced

and developing countries (Curzon, 1965). Ultimately, the agreement left the

door open to both liberalized and managed agricultural trade.Provisions were written into the agreement, at the insistence of the United

States, that would allow for import restrictions and production and export

subsidies because the U.S. administration felt that the Congress would not

ratify theGATT if it interfered with domestic farm legislation. Thus, from the

very start, the agricultural trade rules of the GATT were tailored to fit domes-

tic farm programs rather than the reverse (Hathaway, 1987). Thus, domestic

producers hadan overriding interest in preventing future institutional change

that would liberalize agricultural trade. The sticky nature of the GATT with

regard to agriculture becomes more apparent as we examine its institutional

trajectory.Agricultural trade was constantly before the GATT contracting parties in

the early and mid-1950s. However, no proposal for action was acceptable in

the 1950s other than the study of the problem of mounting agricultural sur-

pluses. Many states obtained waivers from the GATT for agriculture imports

during this period, including the United States in 1955 (Siebeck, 1988).

TheDillonRound(1960-1962) wasdesigned to securenew tariff bindings

from theEuropean EconomicCommunity (EEC) on itscommon external tar-

iff. The United States also used the round to attempt a minimization of the




14/30

possibleadverse agricultural tradeeffects stemming from theemergingCAP.

However, the United States and others acquiesced and allowed the introduc-

tion of theminimum variableimport levyandvariableexport subsidy mecha-

nisms of the CAP. The United States obviously felt that the strategic impera-

tive of fostering European unity was worth some economic price (Warley,

1989, p. 307).

The Kennedy Round (1963-1967) was initiated by the United States to

ensure that a united Europe would be outward-looking economically and

wouldcooperatewith theUnitedStates for themanagementof economicand

security problems. Agricultural trade liberalization was a principal U.S.

objective at the start of the negotiations (Swinbank & Tanner, 1996, p. 13).

TheUnitedStates sought to reduceborder measures (through tariffication)

on temperate-zone agricultural products, particularly cereals. However, theEEC was still not willing to accept external constraints on the CAP. Negotia-

tions on dairy products and meat collapsed as a result of the lack of progress

ongrains. In fact, the EEC, the United States, and Canadaall introduced agri-

cultural protectionist measures during the course of the Kennedy Round

(Warley, 1989, pp.307-308).Thefrictionscausedby theagriculturalnegotia-

tions were thought to threaten future U.S.-European cooperation in security

as well as economic affairs (Wolfe, 1998, p. 61).

TheTokyo Round(1973-1979)was largely a response to the turbulence in

the world economy during the 1970s caused by the virtual collapse of the

Bretton Woods system, theoilshock, thedemandbydevelopingcountriesfora New International Economic Order, stagflation, and the enlargement of the

EEC. The Tokyo Round was seen as a rededication to multilateralism in sta-

bilizing theglobaleconomy. Agriculture was important to thenegotiations of

this round for several reasons. First, the United States and other exporters

neededgreater accessto importmarkets if theagri-foodsectorwasto contrib-

uteto payments balances andoverall economicrecovery. Second, agriculture

epitomized the problem of the influence of domestic subsidies on trade.

Third, the stabilization of commodity markets could be fostered by inter-

national cooperation. Finally, it was thought that food security could be

enhanced by liberalizing agricultural trade (Warley, 1989, p. 309).The United States insisted that agricultural trade be brought under the

same rules as other goods, whereas the EEC believed that negotiations on

agriculture should proceed separately from other goods. This debate held up

negotiations for4 years until the EECfinally got itsway. Subsequent negotia-

tions largely failed. Agreement was reached only on codes for beef and dairy

products that provide for periodic market review and, in the case of certain

dairy products, for an obligation not to export below a minimum price as

revised from time to time (Siebeck, 1988).




15/30

Preeg (1995) has argued that U.S. leadership was the main reason for the

successful agricultural agreement at the UR. This argument suggests that

when the United States decided to put pressure on Europe, it acquiesced to

trade liberalization. However, if U.S. leadership was so effective in the UR,

why wasnt it even more effective in the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds? As a

hegemon during the Kennedy Round, the United States was in much more of

a position to dictate terms to its European allies. The United States also had

plentyof incentives to demandliberalization in theaftermathof themonetary

and oil crises of the early 1970s during the Tokyo Round. However, liberal-

ization did not occur until the UR, when underlying changes in the structure

of production allowed states to establish enough autonomy from domestic

producer groups to come to an agreement.

Thus far in our history of the political process of Fordist agricultural tradenegotiations there is a close congruence between agricultural producer inter-

ests andgovernmentpolicy, just as thepublic choiceliterature wouldsuggest.

It is expected that politicians will pursue a farm-oriented trade policy for the

greater electoral benefits it will bring as compared with a consumer-oriented

policy (Keeler, 1996; Tracy, 1989). Opposition to agricultural interest groups

tends to be weak because of the relatively high costs to individual consumers

and taxpayers of forming a counterlobby (Guyomard, Mahe, Munk, & Roe,

1993). In general, groups with an intense interest in a given policy are more

likely to mobilize than those with a weaker interest due to the higher per

capitagains they obtain (whichsupport thecosts oforganizingandrepresent-ing these concentrated groups). This creates a systemic political bias in favor

of producers with specific interests versus those with more diffuse interests,

such as consumers and taxpayers (Hillman, 1989; Olson, 1965).

In addition, those groups in society that hold the greatest influence, such

as agricultural groups, determine the actions that are most likely to be taken

based on their preference for greater incomes without adjustment costs (Hill,

1989, p. 6). Thus, a states agricultural trade policy is the result of the relative

political power of economic groups in society (Fulton & Storey, 1990). In

general, the empirical evidence suggests that the agricultural policies of

developed states tend to assistagriculture relative to other sectors (Anderson &Tyers, 1989). Furthermore,upuntil themid-1980s it hadnot been toanyones

advantage, including farmers, politicians, and government agency adminis-

trators, to change the system and methods by which incomes are supported

and protected (Hill, 1989; Keeler, 1996). This suggests a strong element of

path dependence to the political process of GATT negotiations as a result of

low pay-offs to actions that would lead to change (Kiser, 1996; Krasner,

1988; North, 1990). Finally, governments participating in internationalnego-

tiations that derive support from domestic producer groups are both empow-




16/30

ered and constrained by these groups, which calculate their interests in terms

of the expected gains and losses from specific policies (Gourevitch, 1986;

Milner, 1988).

The irony of the situation is that when U.S. administrations finally did

seek to reduce trade protectionism through the GATT, they were confronted

with a monster of their own making. The United States initially insisted that

agriculture be exempted from GATT rules at the time of the institutions

founding. This action further empowered domestic producer groups within

the United States and other states. The feedback from this policy created a

system in which producer groups largely captured agricultural trade policy

and international negotiations for the next half century.

THE CRISIS OF FORDIST

BUDGETARY POLITICS

At the regular fall meeting of the contracting parties in 1985, it was agreed

to set up a Preparatory Committee to work out the substance and procedures

of a new round of GATT talks, in which agriculture was to be included.

Siebeck (1988, p. 25) notes three factors that were crucial to developing the

political will to include agriculture in the negotiations. First, the United

States was being forced to step up its export subsidization in response to the

growing competition of EC exports. Second, resistance to the enormous billfor the CAP was growing within the EC.11 Finally, the Cairns Group was

formed by several countries that were increasingly feeling the pinch of

declining world agricultural prices as a result of the subsidies war.12

Thus, it had become increasingly evident in the early 1980s that domestic

agricultural producer groups were draining substantial resources from their

home governments in the developed states as well as having a negative

impact on global agricultural prices. The crisis in Fordist agriculture was

most keenly felt in the EC when the rapidly escalating farm subsidy costs of

the CAP threatened to break the budget in the mid-1980s and forced EC deci-

sion makers to agree to include agriculture in the UR (Moyer, 1993; Rieger,1996). As Patterson (1997,p.146) notes, averageagriculturalexpenditures in

the EC exploded from 30 billion European Currency Units (ECU) in 1979-


11. See Patterson (1997) for a three-level game analysis of the 1988 stabilizers reform pack-

ageand the1992 MacSharryreform package. Both were attemptsto reign in CAPexpenditures.

12. The Cairns Group was set up in July 1986 in the Australian seaside resort of Cairns. The

group was spearheaded by Australia and includes New Zealand, Canada, four Association of

Southeast Asian Nations states (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand), five Latin

American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay), and Hungary.



17/30

1981 to 59 billion ECU by the start of the UR in 1986. The 1988 stabilizers

program failed to resolve the budgetary imbalance, leading to the 1992

MacSharry reforms.

In the United States, the Reagan administration also was interested in

reducing outlays to farmers, at least ideologically and symbolically.13

Between 1980 and 1986, the cost ofU.S. farm programs increased fivefold in

real terms to nearly $26 billion. In 1990, the U.S. Congress reduced the acre-

age on which farmers could receive deficiency payments. Paarlberg (1997,

pp. 429-434) argues that it was internal budgetary pressures that forced uni-

lateral U.S. reductions in agriculture subsidies. My analysis seeks to account

for the causes of these budgetary pressures in which states reacted in slightly

differentways to theunderlying transition from one modeofagriculturalpro-

duction to another.The UR (1986-1993) was launched as one of the most ambitious and com-

plex rounds ofGATT negotiations yet. This round covereda numberof sensi-

tive issues, including trade in services and intellectual property rights, in

addition to agriculture. Negotiations in agriculture had a somewhat rocky

start when the United States proposed its infamous zero option, whereby

price supports, import levies, and export subsidies would be eliminated

within 10 years.14 In general, one could say that the United States and the

Cairns Group were more anxious for agricultural trade liberalization than

was the EC, but Paarlberg (1993) makes the case that the United States made

its zero option proposal, and domesticproducer groups supported it, with thefull knowledge that the EC would never accept such a proposal.

In any event, the resulting agreement did make headway into liberalizing

agricultural trade. All customs duties, including those resulting from

tariffication, are to be bound and reduced on average by 36% over a 6-year

period from 1995 to 2000. Domestic support levels are to be cut by 20%.

Export subsidies are to be reduced 36% in value and 21% in volume between

1995 and 2000 (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

[OECD], 1994, pp. 58-60).15 Economists have hailed this as a positive first

step toward the elimination of agricultural trade protectionism.

Thus far, we have established the history of Fordist agricultural trade pol-icy among developed states. This history emphasizes the general failure of


13. Paarlberg (1993) argues that what the United States really desired was the opening of EC

and Japanese markets to U.S. agricultural produce.

14. Paarlberg (1993) presents an overview of the first round of proposals from the United

States, the European Community, and the Cairns Group, as well as the compromise proposal put

forth by the Swedish agricultural minister Hellstrom.

15. Schott (1994, pp. 43-54) andMcDonald (1998, pp. 207-213) provide good summaries of

the final agreement on agriculture.



18/30

states to reduce their protectionist policies within a multilateral negotiating

framework as predicted by domestic-level and intermestic theories based on

public choice analyses. Agricultural protectionism was rising throughout

most of the postWorld War II era at the same time that industrial protection-

ism was declining. Only with the UR does one see the possible advent of a

substantial reduction in agricultural protectionism. The obvious question is,

Why now? What is it about this particular moment in history that requires a

shift in thinking about agricultural protectionism?

The answer, as I have been suggesting, is that the UR, brought on by a

political crisisof fiscal imbalance, marksa critical juncture in theagricultural

regime of accumulation. The next portion of this article compares the legacy

of post-Fordism with the antecedent conditions of Fordism. The juxtaposi-

tion of the two modes of agricultural production suggests that the UR didindeed mark a critical historical juncture.

THE LEGACY: POST-FORDIST

AGRICULTURE AND THE AGRI-FOOD COMPLEX

Throughout the Fordist era one can trace the development of a number of

transformative trends in agricultural production. There are now fewer and

larger farms than at the start of the Fordist era, including fewer full-time com-

mercial farms. Agriculture is marked by greater capital intensity, technologi-cal sophistication, dependence on nonfarm inputs, and productivity per unit

of land andlabor. Agriculture occupies a decliningshare of thenational econ-

omy and population. Finally, agricultural labor now depends more on

off-farm jobs, income, and part-time farming (Tweeten, 1993). Thus,

changes in technology, adopted by agricultural producers themselves, have

drastically altered the mode of production.

The previous discussion of Fordist agriculture hinted at the notion that

agriculture andindustryarebecomingless distinct as sectors of theeconomy.

Indeed, as Friedmann (1991) argues as well, the distinction is no longer via-

ble and shouldbereplacedbythe concept ofanagri-food complex that iscen-tral to capital accumulation in the world economy. Farming has come to

depend on industrial inputs and credit to sustain agricultural investments.

Furthermore, farmers increasingly supply industrial inputs to food manufac-

turing industries or to industries manufacturing inputs for other farms, such

as feed grainsor livestock.Agri-food industries, for thefirst time in capitalist

history, provide a significant field for accumulation in production.

The accumulation of capital in agri-food products is made possible by the

disparity between the price of agricultural commodities and the price that




19/30

consumers pay for food. Agricultural commodity prices have been declining

since the end of World War II. Real food prices have been declining over the

past century (Tyers & Anderson, 1992). However, consumers still pay a sig-

nificant proportion of their incomes for food. In general, the people of the

poorest of the developed states spend a bigger share of their income on food

than the people of the wealthier states. People in Portugal and Greece spent

nearly one third of their income on food in 1993, just as the UR was being

concluded. In most of the other developed states, the portion of income

devoted to food is less than 15%. However, even the Japanese spend 20% of

their income on food (Economic Indicators, 1994, p. 100).

Thegrowthin food processing andagriculturalprotectionism arethemain

reasons for continued high food prices. Consumers have historically borne

the brunt of paying for protectionist policies. Just exactly where do the bene-fits of agricultural protectionism accrue? On average, 50% of subsidies are

reinvested in extraproduction, 45.2% accrueas profit to land andcapital, and

approximately 4.8% translate into higher pay for agricultural workers (A

Survey of Agriculture, 1992, p. 10).

Indeed, labor is increasingly a scarce commodity in agriculture. As agri-

culture industrialized during its Fordist era, purchased inputs were substi-

tuted for labor in an effort to increase productivity and take advantage of

economies of scale. For example, between 1950 and 1990 the ratio of chemi-

cal use to labor use increased from 0.07 to 1.60, the ratio of machinery use to

labor use increased from 0.27 to 0.96, and the ratio of purchased inputs tohomegrown inputs increased from 0.36 to 1.22. Tractor horsepower use

increased from 26 to 97 per 100 acres during that same period (Hallberg,

1992). Today, farmers are heavily dependent on the nonfarm sectors for their

inputs, and the nonfarm sectors are dependent on the farm sector for their out-

puts. Therefore, the process of industrialization and labor substitution that

began in Fordism continues unabated to this day.

Friedmann (1991, p. 66) argues that since agriculture has lost its distinc-

tiveness as a sector, the general distinction between primary, industrial, and

service work is less useful than a more specific approach tracing links

through the agri-food complex. For example, one such commodity chainwould go from farm inputs (industry) to soybeans (agriculture) to feedstuffs

manufacturing (industry) to cattle (agriculture) to frozen meat production

(industry) to fast food hamburgers (service). This is part of the reciprocal

relationship between thedemandcreated by changingdiets and thesupply of

new and improved food products.

Not only have consumer diets shifted to quality foods (meat, fresh fruits,

and vegetables) but they also have involved a change in the form of foods

desired. Processing, which multiplies the value of simple crops rather than




20/30

increasing the foods utilization for consumption, has been the significant

change underlying core diets. The potato provides a familiar example of this

phenomenon. Consumption of fresh potatoes in the United States has

dropped almost in half since the 1950s, whereas that of frozen potatoes grew

almost 50 times by 1970 (Friedmann, 1991, p. 72). Obviously, there is little

profit in fresh potatoes, whereas there is a lot of money to be made in frozen

potatoes and their commercial preparation.

By 1980, approximately 95% of the potato crop in the United States was

under the control of industrial firms through production and marketing con-

tracts or vertical integration.16 One hundred percent of sugar beets, sugar-

cane, and citrus production occurs in similar circumstances. Processing veg-

etables, broilers, and turkeys are also high on the list at higher than 90%. The

frequentuseof production and marketing contracts suggests that the individ-ual farmer is losing independent decision-making power. Vertical integration

in agri-foods has almost doubled since the 1960s but still controls only a

small portion of total agricultural production (Hallberg, 1992, p. 92). How-

ever, agri-food corporations realize that physical control over the production

process is irrelevant; they make the market for the producer (S. George,

1977).

What is really new about this process is that commodity chains in pro-

cessed agri-food products are transnational.17 Friedmann (1991) powerfully

makes this case with regard to the livestock/feed complex. Whereas in the

19th century, cattle were nationally produced for international trade, nowthey are technologically standardized and produced internationally.18 This

deepening of capitalist agriculture within the developed states during this

phase of capitalism is marked by increasing intrasectoral integration across

international borders.

Much like the automobile, meat was a key product in the mass production

andconsumption of standardized products that provided thecentral dynamic

of Fordist capitalism. The production of meat (particularly beef) spurred the

development of soybeans, hybrid corn, and other coarse grains. Beef con-

sumption increasedfully 50% after 1950. Theconsumption of poultry tripled


16. Production and marketing contracts are agreements between farmers and producers,

dealers, or others, including cooperatives. Vertical integration occurs when production, process-

ing, and marketing activities are performed by the same firm.

17. My approach appears to fall under Goodmans (1997) typology as trans-

nationalization.

18. See Sanderson (1986) for an argument on the standardization of global markets for

high-quality beef and the requirements for producing a world steera play on the term world

car.



21/30

after 1950.To supply this consumption, livestock producers became increas-

ingly linked to corporations that processed and distributed meat on an

ever-increasing geographical and social scale. Corporations collected,

graded, packaged, and distributed meat and other products; manufactured

traditional products on an increasing scale; created new versions of cheeses

andmeats,preserved in various ways;andcreated entirely new food products

(Friedmann & McMichael, 1989, p. 108).

Furthermore, the transnational organization of agri-food production has

already given rise to transnational agri-food corporations. That this is the

case gives further evidence to the notion that agri-food production is now a

significant sphereforcapitalist accumulation. Indeed, duringtheUR,3 of the

top 30 nonfinancial multinationals (as ranked by foreign sales) were

agri-food corporations (see Survey of Multinationals, 1993, p. 6, in TheEconomist). Nestle (Swiss-based) ranked 7th with total assets of $27.9 bil-

lion and foreign sales of $33 billion (98% of its total sales). Unilever

(U.K./Netherlands-based) ranked 8th with total assets of $24.8 billion and

foreign sales of $16.7 billion (42% of sales were outside of the EC). Finally,

the U.S.-based Philip Morris came in at number 29. Once again, it should be

stressed that these corporations are listed as part of the food industry. The

Economists study did not allow for the type of intersectoral connections that

this article considers important for the agri-food complex.

Recently, we have seen a rapid consolidation of chemical companies, bio-

technology firms, andseed suppliers. Dupont purchased Pioneer Hi-Bred for$7.7 billion in March 1999. Monsanto has purchased many companies,

including Delta, Pine Land, and Holden Seeds. AstraZeneca and Novartis,

two large life sciences firms, have merged their agribusiness division to form

Syngenta, which is now the worlds largest producer of agrochemicals and

genetically modified seeds, to the tune of $7.9 billion in annual sales. The

American Farm Bureau has been vocal in its opposition to the rapid consoli-

dation under way in the agri-food complex, yet it appears unlikely that the

U.S. Congress or the executive branch will intervene to derail these mergers.

In addition to mergers and acquisitions, these agri-food corporations have

also learned the benefits of strategic alliances.Alliances allow the aforementioned agri-food companies to exercise con-

trol over all aspects of the commodity chain. Monsanto, for example, has an

agreement with Cargill to distribute its seed and handle the harvested grain.

Allianceswork best in situations like this when companiesarenotconsidered

rivals but are located at different points in the same commodity chain. The

most frequently cited reason for alliances is the acquisition of markets (for-

eign and domestic) and infrastructure for market access. Strategic alliances




22/30

are one way to avoid the formality of mergers and acquisitions but retain all

the benefits. Thus, we need not expect vertical integration in an era of

post-Fordism.

The transnational organization of agri-food production may signal the

eclipse of the Fordist mode of production.19 Agri-food production may now

occur in any part of the globe. Further increases in biotechnology will only

add to the durable quality of agri-food products. These two forces will pro-

vide theflexibility anddiversificationof production that heralds the arrival of

post-Fordism. New information technologies will permit more production

diversity at nearly the same cost as mass-produced items. Large-scale pro-

duction of any commodity will be a low-valueadded business. Thus, only

the largest scale, most technologically advanced producers will survive in

such a market (Piore & Sabel, 1984).Biotechnology is thekey to thediversity andflexibility of thepost-Fordist

model. Developments in plant, animal, and food-processing biotechnologies

have already begun to transform the mode of agricultural production. Con-

sider the changes already under way: Sugar has been hard hit by the develop-

ment of corn sweeteners and sugar substitutes such as Nutrisweet, and palm

oil production has been increased by 30% using tissue culture techniques to

clone high-yielding trees (Busch, Bonanno, & Lacy, 1989, p. 124).

Work is in progress to produce coffee, cocoa, rubber, and tea in vitro. Cit-

rus pulp vesicles have been produced in vitro, raising the possibility of daily

production of fresh orange juice. These components would be biochemicallyidentical to thecompounds naturally found in these products. Therefore, they

would not be artificial in the sense now currently understood but would be

true equivalents (Rogoff & Rawlins, 1987).20

Most recently, genetically modified organisms and the foods in which

they are found have come under public scrutiny. Dupont, for example, pro-

duces genetically modified soybeans that are engineered for higher oil pro-

duction. By 1996, approximately 55% of soybeans, 50% of cotton, and 40%

of corn in the United States were genetically modified (Food for Thought,


19. Sabel and Zeitlin (1985) have argued that mass production and flexible alternatives can

exist side by side in the same historical period. I agree that during a transition period both types

of production mayoccur, yetI posit that thecriticaljuncturereflects thepointin which onemode

surpasses the other as the dominant mode of production. Empirical validation of this point will

require some patience as the critical juncture occurred less than a decade ago. Interested readers

shouldsee Wardand Almas (1997)for an overview of thedebate as to whether theagri-food pro-

duction system is Fordist or post-Fordist.

20. The impact of these developments will obviously be disastrous for many peripheral

states.



23/30

1999, p. 19). The Europeans, in particular, have raised objections to U.S.

bovine growth hormones and other genetically modified foods. Monsanto

has taken heat for its so-called terminator gene that prevents replanting grain

produced from an original modified seed (Fertility Rights, 1999, p. 104).

However, consumer protests have had little effect on the biotechnological

revolution under way in the production of agri-food products. The new

Biosafety Protocol hinders states authority to restrict imports of genetically

modified foods. The United States, where most of the biotechnological

advances are occurring, pushed for free access on behalf of agri-food corpo-

rations, andtheEU accepted this, despite consumerandsmall-scale producer

protests.

In summary, the trends identified as under way in Fordism are likely to

intensify during the legacy of post-Fordism, suggesting strong path depen-dency in economic and technological processes. Agriculture will be mean-

ingless when considered in isolation from the industrial and service sectors,

hence the agri-food complex. Flexibility in production will be enhanced by

biotechnology and the transnational nature of this complex. Components of

agri-food products may now be produced at any geographical locale as long

as they conform to global standards. Furthermore, transnational agri-food

corporations will increasingly control global agri-food trade, either through

vertical integration, production and marketing contracts, strategic alliances,

or simple market power.

The discussion of the legacy of post-Fordism is necessarily speculative.Collier and Collier (1991) assume that the critical juncture the researcher is

examining is far enough in the past that the researcher is able to specify the

end of the legacy. At this point in history I am unable to determine the end-

point and am able to offer only tentative propositions about its beginnings.

However, Collier and Collier (1991, pp. 30-31) offer three components of a

legacy that must be present as distinguishing features: mechanisms of pro-

duction of the legacy, mechanisms of reproduction of the legacy, and the sta-

bilityof thecore attributes of thelegacy. This section has emphasized theeco-

nomic and technological mechanisms that produced and will probably

reproduce the legacy of post-Fordism. As to the stability of these core pro-cesses, only time will tell. But, as mentioned previously, because these pro-

cesses are an intensification of earlier Fordist tendencies, they seem to dem-

onstrate elements of path dependency. This suggests that they will remain

fairly stable until the next critical juncture. In the next section, I will discuss

the political and institutional factors that produced and will likely reproduce

the legacy into the future.




24/30

THE UR OF GATT AS A CRITICAL JUNCTURE

Throughout the early years of Fordist production in agriculture, there was

little incentive for states to negotiate on the reduction of agricultural trade

barriers. Domestic agricultural producer groups had a lock on state agricul-

tural trade policy. Agriculture still had not become a significant source of

capitalist accumulation. However, the expansion of agricultural production

and the accompanying crisis of fiscal imbalance spawned the first efforts to

negotiate on the subject within the GATT framework. Fordism brought agri-

culture to the fore of capitalist production and to the attention of govern-

ments dwindling treasuries.

Just as the negotiators began the UR, core trade in agricultural products

began to expand greatly. In 1986, agricultural trade among the developedstates amounted to approximately $80 billion per year. By 1988, that number

had reached $110 billion, and in 1992 agricultural trade soared to $130 bil-

lion (OECD, 1994, p. 54). During the UR alone, before negotiations were

completed, agricultural trade had increased 63% among developed states.

That trade should increase at this pace without the benefit of tariff reductions

is astounding. It is strong evidence that agriculture is an important field of

accumulation for capitalism. Undoubtedly, the negotiators felt that with a

successful agreement, trade would increase at an even greater rate.

However, greater trade in agricultural products also meant an ever-

increasing budget for subsidies. During the fiscal crisis of the 1980s, govern-ments obtained relative autonomy from domestic producer groups, enabling

them to break the entrenched institutional status of price supports and trade

barriers. In fact, governments were able to use the institution of the GATT to

enforce a decision on domestic groups that they had been unable to control in

the past.

In addition to breaking the traditional bond with domestic producer

groups, governments also found welcome allies in bigbusinesses involved in

the agri-food complex. Because most price supports go to the production of

the raw materials of agricultural production and most of the value added

comes in the processing stages of production, price supports tend to benefitsmall producers while serving as a barrier to international trade in processed

foods conducted by large corporations. Therefore, the tendency in corporate-

capitalist agricultural production is to seek a reduction in agricultural trade

barriers rather than an increase as in the past under Fordism.21 Thus, the pro-

duction of the legacythatbegan duringthe URafter the fiscalcrisishad begun

to sever the links between government and domestic agricultural producers


21. The phrase corporate-capitalist agricultural production is from Friedland (1991).



25/30

and forge new links between government and corporate-capitalist agricul-

tural producers.

The political and institutional mechanisms for reproducing the legacy of

post-Fordism are to be found in future WTO negotiations and in the dispute

resolution mechanisms put in place at the close of the UR of the GATT. The

dispute mechanisms, if adhered to by governments, should ensure that the

reduction in agricultural barriers accomplished during the UR is enforced.

Given the progress achieved in the UR, future WTO negotiations are likely to

continue to include agriculture.

Despite the failure of the recent WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle in

1999 to launcha new round of multilateralnegotiations, agriculturalnegotia-

tions will continue. Under the leadership of the director-general of the WTO,

Mike Moore, agricultural negotiations began again in March 2000 with avariety of proposals from memberstatesunderconsideration in this andaddi-

tional meetings to be held in 2000 and 2001 (After Seattle, 2000, p. C4).

This is a clear statement of how important agriculture now is to the world

economy. Thecombination of theeconomic andtechnological processes that

brought the agri-food complex to this stage of its development and the politi-

cal and institutional processes of the WTO are likely to crystallize into a leg-

acy of post-Fordism.

I can onlyspeculate as to the stability of that legacybased onthe past. Dur-

ing Fordism, theworld experienced a tremendous growth in agricultural pro-

duction and trade, a cozy relationship between domesticagriculturalproduc-ers and their governments, and high agricultural trade barriers. That system

was stable for nearly half a century. The legacy of post-Fordism will likely

include continued growth in agricultural production and especially trade in

agri-food products; a closer relationship between corporate-capitalist agri-

cultural producers and governments, similar to governmental relationships

with big business as a whole (Lindblom, 1977); and decreasing agricultural

trade barriers.This agricultural regime will be reinforced by thepoliticalbar-

gains struck at the UR. Thus, political institutions such as the GATT doshape

underlying economic structures, just as they themselves are shapedin turn by

those structures.

CONCLUSION

Most observers of the UR of the GATT talks were fairly certain up until

December 1993 that the talks would fail due to the unwillingness of devel-

oped states to agree toa reductionin agricultural tradebarriers.Thoseobserv-

ers were proven wrong when the UR included the first significant multilateral




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reductionin agricultural tradebarriers in modern history. Domestic-level and

intermestic theoreticalpredictions of disaster for theUR were equally proven

wrong, as domestic producer group influence seemed to wane during this

period.

What these theorists failed to recognize was the importance of viewing

political economy as a historical process marked by critical junctures. Collier

andCollier (1991)provide an excellent template for understanding andmap-

ping the occurrence and influence of such critical junctures. By modifying

their approach to incorporate a process-traced account of a single case, I was

able to identify the URofthe GATTasa critical juncture in the regimeofagri-

cultural accumulation.

The antecedent, or baseline, conditions of Fordism were contrasted with

the legacy of post-Fordism. This suggests that thecritical juncture separatingthe two occurred during the UR. It further suggests that the key actors in

Fordism, thedomesticproducer groups, hadcreated theconditions that led to

their own downfall with the fiscal crisis of the mid-1980sa clear example

of unintended consequences. Domestic producer groups thought they had

firm control over their governments with regard to agricultural trade policy,

but as Fordist technology increased their productivity, they broke the bank.

This enabled governments to exert autonomy in the political process of

GATT negotiations. Governments newpartners in the agriculture regimeare

likely to be thecorporate-capitalistagriculturalproducers whofavor a reduc-

tion in trade barriers to facilitate their global production and trade in agri-food products. Just how stable this legacy of post-Fordism proves is a matter

for future study.

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