2001 crisis

8/6/2019 2001 Crisis

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/2001-crisis 1/20

INDEX

A-) CAUSES OF THE CRISIS

Standy-by Credit ............................................................................................. 3

9 December Decisions .................................................................................... 3

B-)WHAT HAPPENS WHILE 2001 CRISIS ................................................. 6

2000-2001 Crisis Macroeconomic and Financial Indicators ............................ 8

C-)STRUCTURAL CHANGES FOLLOWING THE CRISIS .................... 13

D-)TURKEY ± LETTER OF INTENT ......................................................... 17

8/6/2019 2001 Crisis


A-) CAUSES OF THE CRISIS

The relations between the President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and the Prime Minister

Bulent Ecevit have been straining over the past nine months. The main reason for thiswas the fact that the President Sezer had permanently vetoed government¶s decisions,and the Prime Minister had considered that by such acts the President exceeded his

powers. On February 19, 2001 for the first time in the history of the Turkish NationalSecurity Council, the contradictions between the President and the Prime Minister

became public which lead to annimmediate negative reaction of the financial markets.

The economic crisis in Turkey burst out straight after the regular monthly meeting of the National Security Council on February 19 and reached its peak on February 21-22.The basic factors for the crisis could be arranged in three clusters: economic problems,

political factors and pending issues of the society.

Coming into power in 1999 the coalition government of Ecevit achieved significantresults. The population has been encouraged that eventually the country will havestable leadership to cope with the chronic inflation, the big budget deficit and the highinterest rates. The major stock exchange index registered an increase of nearly 650 %in 1999 ± 2000. An agreement with the IMF was concluded in December 2000 for support of the government¶s antiinflationary program amounting to USD 11 billion.

The country was at last given the status of candidate for accession to the EU. Alongwith the public expectations, Ecevit began a series of investigations on cases of corruption (e.g. in the energy sector ± the White Energy graft case). This provided him

with the necessary public support without which the coalition government would notresist the negative social effects generated by the economic stabilization program.

The basic problem of the stabilization program is the financial and economic sector adjustment from working in conditions of high inflation and permanent refinancing of

banks at the expense of state guaranteed foreign credits (till 1999) to working inconditions of low inflation, free competition and without state guarantees. In fact, theadoption of the stabilization program itself and the IMF assistance were necessitated

by the danger of the state ceasing its guarantees on credits and the refusal of the major foreign creditors to further finance this system. In conditions of high inflation and highinterest rates, under which the Turkish economy used to develop until 1999, the so-

called interest lobby was bound to success. It had been specialized in receivingenormous profits at the expense of the state-owned banks and enterprises and itsinterests were badly affected by the stabilization program. The last but not least inthese conditions was the successfully working system for drawing out private banksthrough own companies and their refinancing at the expense of state guarantees on

bank deposits.

8/6/2019 2001 Crisis


Stand-by Credit

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) today approved a three-year Stand-By credit for Turkey in an amount equivalent to SDR 2,892 million (about US$ 4 billion) to support thegovernment's 2000-2002 economic program. The first installment, which will be availableimmediately, will be in an amount equivalent to SDR 221.7 million (about US$300 million).

After the IMF Executive Board's discussion on Turkey, Stanley Fischer, First DeputyManaging Director, made the following statement:

"The Turkish authorities have decided to embark on a strong program designed to free thecountry from the high inflation that had plagued the economy for two decades, to restor macroeconomic fundamentals, and to address the long-standing structural weaknesses inthe economy.

"Turkey's program is strong and well balanced. The large adjustment in the primary fiscal balance will help re-establish fiscal solvency and reduce inflation. With fullimplementation, the program should restore Turkey's credibility vis-à-vis markets. In

particular, rigorous implementation of the budget, and the mobilization of resourcesthrough the privatization program are necessary to lower the need for domestic borrowinand hence support the decline of interest rates.

"The preannounced path of the exchange rate is designed to play a key role in anchorininflation expectations and reducing interest rates. The up-front fiscal adjustment, the strongcommitment to the exchange rate path, and the ambitious structural reforms provided strongsafeguards against the risk of an unsustainable real appreciation of the exchange rate in the

near future. The pre-announced exit strategy included in the program will limit the risk common in other exchange-rate based disinflation programs, namely that of locking the

exchange rate in at levels that could prove inappropriate over the long term.

"The structural reform agenda is comprehensive and far reaching. The privatization program is appropriately ambitious; the pension reform represents a major turning pointand the reforms of agricultural policies should produce important efficiency gains anallow the government to keep fiscal costs in check. Implementation of these structurameasures is critical, both to contribute to the medium-term sustainability of the fiscaladjustment and to increase economic efficiency and growth," Fischer said.

9 December Decisions

Turkey's economic program centers on an ambitious goal: freeing Turkey from inflatioand enhancing the prospects for growth and for a better standard of living for all sectors o

society. The persistent cause of inflation in Turkey has been the weakness of publicfinances, as the large and sustained primary deficits that emerged during the 1970s ancontinued during the 1980s and 1990s were, to a large extent, monetized.

The government's program1 rests on three pillars: up-front fiscal adjustment, structural

reform, and a firm exchange rate commitment supported by consistent income policies. Thefiscal adjustment is necessary because the weakness of public accounts is the ultimat

factor behind high inflation. Structural reform is needed to make the fiscal adjustmensustainable; improve economic efficiency; and, through increased privatization receipts,

8/6/2019 2001 Crisis


Outlined in the table above related to indicators of public finance and commercial banks draws

attention to three main issues. First, the SPO definition of the public sector than out-of-interest

(including privatization revenues) compared to the national income increased, although the internal

facilitate the decline of public debt. A firm exchange rate commitment and consistentincome policies are needed to bring inflation and interest rates down more rapidly,

particularly in the first phase of disinflation. In 2000, real GNP growth is expected to be 5-5½%, with an expected rebound from negative growth in 1999. CPI inflation is projected at25%, compared to about 65% in 1999; and the external current account balance is projectedat -1.8% of GNP, against -0.5% in 1999.

The main fiscal goal for 2000 is to raise the primary surplus of the public sector-whichincludes the consolidated central budget, the extrabudgetary funds, the local government,the nonfinancial state enterprises, the central bank, and the so-called duty losses of state

banks-to 2.2% of GNP in 2000 (or 3.7% excluding earthquake-related expenses, which ar estimated at about 1½% of GNP). Fiscal policy will be complemented by a more active anddiversified debt management policy and through the acceleration of privatization, so as tcontain the burden of interest payments.

Monetary and exchange rate policies will be guided by two considerations. First,disinflation and a rapid decline in interest rates require that the monetary and exchange ratedevelopments become more predictable, to reduce uncertainty on the value of financia

investment for both residents and nonresidents. Second, to avoid being locked into amonetary and exchange rate framework that may lead to unnecessary rigidities in the lonrun, the program calls for a transparent and preannounced exit strategy from this exchangrate regime.

Structural reforms are designated to make the fiscal adjustment implemented in 2000 sustainable over the medium term, to lower the burden of interest payments on public sector debt, to improve transparency and economic efficiency, and to reduce the contingentliabilities of the public sector. In the fiscal area, reforms will aim at strengthening publicfinances, providing better services to the population over the medium term, reducinginequalities in the tax burden, and reducing waste in public expenditure. To addressdistortions built up in the agricultural sector, the government aims to phase out existinindirect support policies over a two-to-three year period and replace them with a direcincome-support program. In the area of privatization, the government is committed todisengage further from economic activity, raising sizeable receipts for debt reduction,including through major privatization operations in the key sectors of telecommunicationand energy.

Turkey joined the IMF on March 11, 1947 and its quota2

is SDR 964.0 million (aboutUS$1.323 billion). Its outstanding use of IMF financing currently totals SDR 437 million(about US$599 million).

8/6/2019 2001 Crisis


8/6/2019 2001 Crisis


Turkey: Selected Economic Indicators ( 96-2002)

1996 1997 1998 Est. 1999 Proj. 2000 Prog. 2001 Prog. 2002 Prog.

Real economy (changein %)

Real GNP 7.2 8.2 3.8 -2.1 5.6 5.2 5.8

Domestic demand 10.0 7.5 0.6 -2.3 6.5 5.0 5.5

CPI (end-of-period) 79.8 99.1 69.7 65.4 25.0 12.0 7.0

Unemployment rate (in

%)6.0 6.4 5.9 ... ... ... ...

Gross national saving1/ 2/ 18.9 20.8 23.2 20.0 20.4 19.5 19.5

Gross domesticinvestment 1/ 2/

23.4 24.6 23.9 22.8 24.4 23.3 23.2

Public finance (in % of GNP)

Central government

Primary balance 1.2 -0.2 3.6 0.9 3.9 5.3 5.6

Overall balance -8.4 -7.6 -7.7 -12.1 -12.6 -6.0 -2.2

Central government

debt 48.0

48.4 48.5 60.5 6

0.1

58.8 57.0

Consolidated publicsector

Primary balance -1.2 -2.1 0.5 -2.7 2.2 3.7 3.7

Operational balance -7.1 -3.0 -4.9 -13.6 -9.9 -4.6 -3.0

Consolidated net debt 46.5 42.9 44.5 58.0 57.9 56.6 54.6

Money and credit(end-year,% change)

Broad liquidity 3/ 113.1 117.6 76.0 82.6 41.1 28.9 22.0 Credit to private sector 120.5 125.8 81.7 58.3 38.0 28.9 22.0

Interest rates (year

average)

Treasury bill rate 4/ 132.4 105.2 115.7 106.2 ... ... ...

Overnight moneymarket rate

115.8 101.4 111.9 107.0 ... ... ..

8/6/2019 2001 Crisis


B-) WHAT HAPPENS WHILE 2001 CRISIS?

In an environment of expectations in the economy becomes negative, the Treasury's domestic

debt redemption prior to a loaded 19 February 2001 was an unexpected political tensions.

Prime Minister of the state's "crisis there" descriptions panic in financial markets started the

process, to defend the local currency overnight interest rates rose despite astronomical

proportions, because of the intense demand for foreign exchange 20 ± 21 Central Bank's $ 5

billion in February resulted in foreign exchange sales. State bank liquidity needs can not be

met, payments hadreached the size that lock the system. Banking system to prevent a big fallin February 22 of the Turkish lira against foreign currencies has been left to fluctuate in value.

Balance of payments

Trade balance 1/ -5.7 -8.0 -7.0 -5.8 -7.1 -7.2 -7.0

Current account balance

(including shuttletrade) 1/

-1.3 -1.4 0.9 -0.5 -1.8 -1.6 -1.5

Reserves (US$ billions, end-of- period)

17,695 19,575 20,112 ... ... ... ...

Reserve cover (inmonths of

imports of GNFS)

3.9 3.8 4.0 ... ... ... ...

Sources: Turkish authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

8/6/2019 2001 Crisis


Brought the crisis with the loss of reliability, predictable exchange rate regime options

expired. Capital movements in an environment that is not checked and the exchange rate and

interest both as a tool to use are not possible. Free-floating exchange rate regime and forced asudden transition, and then the high rate of devaluation, interest rate shock before their

damaged balance sheets and corporate sector banks, especially foreign currency open

positions with this crisis have been captured by unexpected economic unit sizes, equity and

asset values fell. Following the February 2001 crisis, the collapse of the banking system to

prevent the financial obligations of the state regulations dragged to a very high level. Capital

account balance of payments occurred in the large net outflow. Real economy supply and

demand has narrowed significantly by the effect of negative way. Quick and easy exit from

the crisis of the prevalence of opinion can not be won.

³Strong Economy in Transition Program´ described in May 2001, and signed a new stand-by

arrangement with the IMF and World Bank loans and is supported by free-fall in production

could not prevent the crisis but has contributed to be controlled. Despite all the difficulties

and some negative aspects, free-floating exchange rate regime may arise suddenly in the

market of the currency crisis into a panic is a system that can prevent.

In this program, the priority in the process of recapitalization of the banking sector to avoid

inflation out of control in favor of increased public debt burden, monetary aggregates were

kept under control. This approach, if taken as floating exchange rate regime data, the localcurrency against foreign currency, much larger depreciation and prevent the collapse of real

wages. Fiscal surplus target of interest-to-reach and use of IMF credit, which allows monetary

targets should not be exceeded are two main factors. Programs often prescribed in regulations

under the Act, efforts to exit from the crisis in confidence have helped to provide. Central

Bank independence, providing tools and price stability as the primary target determines the

new legal regulations, the method will change the design of macroeconomic policies is a new

development.

Strengthening the financial structure of the banking system was conducted from threechannels. Liquidation of stock of duty losses to the balance sheet, public banks were given the

special arrangement. Closure of financial liabilities and equity and foreign currency position

SDIF banks to strengthen their special composition and foreign currency bonds were

exported. Open foreign currency position of commercial banks to private capital to contribute

to closure and the Treasury's domestic borrowing to provide conditions that may extend the

term of this sector domestic debt exchange was performed.

8/6/2019 2001 Crisis


Strengthening the financial structure of the banking system, as well as the system's

institutional structure and legal and operational arrangements to enable control was

implemented. New legal framework for public sector banks be given the task to the central

government budget appropriations be made to connect to conditions. Turkey's importance for

political economy, this change, the political function of the budget and will contribute to the

increase in transparency is a phenomenon. However, in 2001, re-configuring the state-owned

banks have shrunk their capacity credit line, the crisis has made the output difficult.

2000-2001 CRISIS MACROECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL

INDICATORS

2000 and 2001 of the macroeconomic and financial data in a way comparable with

earlier periods are shown in the following tables. To be summarized briefly, in 2000 a large

increase in net capital inflows, the real exchange appreciation; a decline in domestic debt

interest, together with rapid increases in domestic credit stock at a higher rate of growth of

national income has been caught, inflation rate was decreased and investment / national

income rate is clearly rising. In 2000 compared to the year 1999 in the public sector interest-

balance an improvement in provision and public external borrowing facilities increased as a

result of domestic debt / national income ratio and the IMF fixed by definition net public

external debt stock / national income ratio to a certain extent has decreased.

8/6/2019 2001 Crisis


8/6/2019 2001 Crisis


At first glance, the positive qualities common to these developments, but the current

account deficit of $ 10 billion closer to the commercial bank sector intra-balance sheet net

deficit position of 18 billion dollars to reach (the exchange rate risk growth), public banks'liquidity demand growing and short-term external debt CBRT gross foreign exchange

reserves prepare the ground to a level beyond the coming crisis are the most negative

indicators. Longer than six months deposits in total deposits in 1999, the share 28% to 15%

decline in 2000, the built-in financial experts, despite some positive indicators, fiscal

developments and full confidence and trust preferred to remain relatively liquid is pointing.

The table above belong to the year 2001 (partly temporary nature) indicators in the economy

caused by the collapse of the crisis suggests that the different dimensions. Net capital inflows

in 2000 from 9.6 billion dollars, 13.9 billion net capital outflows in 2001 to become the real

economy of the new activation mechanism of adaptation to the external balance. In the

financial sector and foreign trade liberalization in the data received, if such adaptationmechanisms, an increase in inflation, real devaluation, and real interest rates to rise in real

wages to decline in credit to contraction in the volume, an increase in tax burden, public

expenditure to reduce or additional foreign borrowing does not cover. Of the economy in

general equilibrium system, one or more of these tools at its use, others require more intensive

use of doses and macro results, depending on car use may change. As of year-end local

currency against foreign currency (21.3% on the basis of the real CPI) for lost, real credit

volume shrunk 26%, interest on domestic debt rose again, domestic spending has been cut,

and imports by 25% and GDP has been shrinking at a rate of 9.4%. Under these conditions,

the urban unemployment rate 2000.IV at 2001.IV was increased 8% to 13% and the

unemployment rate of educated young people in the same period came to 27% from 23%.

In 2001 (net error / defect items included) 16.2 billion dollars of capital outflows, 3.3

billion dollars and 12.9 billion more in the current account was balanced with the use of

reserves. Contrast, loans from international organizations to strengthen their reserves with the

Central Bank's gross foreign exchange reserves with $ 3.4 billion in decrease seems to be

limited. Question (IMF weighted) international external support had not realized, by the

melting together of foreign exchange reserves, external debt crisis of the domestic debt

problem that could have been articulated.

External support from official channels provided in the financing of loans being used

in expanding the liquidity of the Treasury, the Central Bank's foreign exchange sales at the

back and base money expansion has been limited. A higher plateau of inflation and public

debt does not explode able to provide translated in this context should be interpreted.

However, external debt service does not cause new problems in terms of domestic debt with

foreign debt substitutes for a few years to be de-risk and is objectionable.

8/6/2019 2001 Crisis


8/6/2019 2001 Crisis


Outlined in the table above related to indicators of public finance and commercial

banks draws attention to three main issues. First, the SPO definition of the public sector than

out-of-interest (including privatization revenues) compared to the national income increased,

although the internal and external public debt stock has reached high levels. Second,

commercial (especially private) significant improvement in banks' foreign exchange position

is provided. Third, the commercial bank sector (especially public sector banks and funds)

8/6/2019 2001 Crisis


under the influence of domestic borrowing from the central government receivables, due from

private initiatives more quickly than increased. In these cases the real sector the decline credit

usage is synonymous.

The increase in public external debt stock to GNP ratio, as previously mentioned thenew loans from international agencies and obtained from the impact of devaluation of the TL

value of foreign debt is the result of the increase. Capitalizing of the banks again, the major

factors that increase the domestic debt stock. In addition, real interest rates rise and the growth

rate turned negative with the corruption of the debt dynamics have led to the rise of the debt

profile. Domestic debt / GDP ratio to 68% rise in 2001 to the non-cash and cash should be

evaluated in the context of categories. Public sector in its own obligations issued money and

do not provide cash to the Treasury securities made up of domestic debt, is classified as non-

cash. 122 quadrillion TL at the end of 2001 reaching 52 percent of the total domestic debt is

non-cash nature. Among non-cash debt will be the Central Bank, the share of public banks

and funds of the bank are calculated as, respectively29%, 36% and 3

1%. This detection of

moving from the internal debt problem, reversibility is critical in the context of the debt in

cash. However, the new financial order non-cash debt conversion problem, if not, the interest

burden will be a very heavy.

C-)Structural Changes Following the Crisis

The impact of the 2000-2001 financial crisis was also felt in the realm of policymaking. While the economy, and especially the external sector, had been graduallyliberalized in the 1980s and 1990s, the government had retained a strong role in managing theeconomy. Then, in response to the macroeconomic turbulence of the 1990s, as well as thedeteriorating financial position of the government, the IMF was called upon. The stabilization

program it devised in collaboration with the government made IMF help conditional onseveral reforms in line with the Washington Consensus, such as the privatization of several

publicly-owned enterprises. However, the 2001 financial crisis acted as a catalyst for further neoliberal reforms, which in turn influenced the subsequent relative bargaining power of capital and labor.

8/6/2019 2001 Crisis


Figure 1: Transaction between Turkey and the IMF (million SDRs)

The government borrowed a lot of money from the IMF in the course of the crisis(Figure 1). Between December 2000 and the end of 2002, the total debt owed to multilateralinstitutions rose from about $8 billion to $31 billion (Figure 8). Five years after the fact, thegovernment still owes over $23 billions to these institutions. These funds were urgentlyneeded at the time they were borrowed, thus as lender of last resort the IMF had considerableleverage vis-à-vis the government¶s policy agenda. It was in this context of 20 cooperation

with the IMF throughout the crisis that the government nationalized the debt of all theinsolvent banks while maintaining the country¶s complete openness to capital flows. After thecrisis, the implementation of the policies contained in the stabilization program was to besped up and further neoliberal reforms were introduced.

8/6/2019 2001 Crisis


Figure 8: Outstanding debt Owed The Multilateral Institutions (Million U.S. Dollars)

Prior to the crisis, the IMF was dissatisfied with the pace of privatization. The onlymajor privatization that had occurred before the crisis was in the telecommunicationsindustry, and even this one had only been partial (Figure 9). The IMF believed that ³slippageshad emerged, partly because of market conditions, partly because of delays and less than a fullcommitment to privatize´ (IMF, 2001, p. 17). Following the crisis, the new privatizationstrategy envisaged a ³stronger effort on the side of the authorities to put Turkey in the best

position to privatize its public enterprises´ (ibid.). This µeffort¶ included the full privatizationof Turk Telekom, sale of the state monopolies in sugar, tobacco, and gas sectors, the sale of

Turkish Airlines, ERDEMIR (steel), and TUPRAS (petroleum refineries); and a privatizationof the companies responsible for the generation and distribution of electricity (IMF, 2001 b, pp. 17, 60). The state also expressed a will to attract more FDI in conjunction with this privatization effort (IMF, 2001 b, pp. 17, 60). This new emphasis did indeed generate more privatizations following the crisis, especially in 2004 and2005 (Figure 9).

8/6/2019 2001 Crisis


Figure 9: Total Privatization Revenue(Million US Dollars)

The restructuring of the banking sector following the crisis was a key part of this new privatization drive. To preempt objections to the nationalization of failing banks and their subsequent (re)privatization, a complete immunity from prosecution was granted to theindividuals involved in this restructuring (IMF, 2001c). This is a rather exceptional privilege,heretofore only awarded to the military ± by itself ± after the 1980 coup.

The stabilization program regarded the level of government debt as highly

problematic. The large-scale privatization effort was envisaged as a solution to that situation.However, government borrowing to honor guarantees to foreign investors and support an

unsustainable peg was seen as acceptable. By the end of 2001, the government was left witha debt amounting to 93 percent of GDP, up from 44 percent when the program was designed

in 1998 (Akyüz & Boratav, 2003). As some other objectives ostensibly trumped debtreduction, the discourse evolved and efficiency considerations, rather than government

financing needs, came to be cited as justification for privatization (e.g., IMF, 2001a),suggesting that privatization was in fact an end in itself.

Government spending grew in large part thanks to the $47.2 billion bailout of thefinancial system. Social spending and labor costs in the public sector were reduced, indicatingthat the government prioritized spending on financial creditors rather than their less affluent

counterparts. It will be difficult to reinstate social spending, since debt servicing costscurrently absorb a very large portion of tax revenues (Figure 3). Taxes themselves have become more regressive, as the government has increasingly resorted to indirect taxes insteadof income taxes (see Figure 10). (See IMF, 2001 b, p. 18 for a review of fiscal policy in theaftermath of the crisis).

8/6/2019 2001 Crisis


Figure 10: Ratio on Indirect Taxes to Direct Taxes

The 2000-2001 crisis also provided an impetus for further neoliberal organizationalchanges within the government. In response to the crisis, key amendments were made to thelaw governing the Central Bank to give it formal independence from the government. TheCentral Bank then started pursuing µinflation targeting¶ as its primary goal.

We do not wish to suggest that there is a unilateral relationship of subservience between the IMF and the government. What we argue is that the crisis has given leverage tocertain entities, notably the IMF, which has allowed them more power in the contested field of

policymaking. This resulted in the establishment of policies that were both largely neoliberalin their thrust and advantageous to capitalists and affluent groups in general.

D-)Turkey²Letter of Intent

y Turkey has kept up the determined implementation of the economic program.

y The program has continued to deliver positive results, increasing our confidence

that both the 3 percent growth target and the 35 percent inflation target for 2002

will be met.

y We remain determined to stay the course, recent uncertainties notwithstanding.

y Against this background, we request that the second review under the stand-by

arrangement be completed.

8/6/2019 2001 Crisis


y We remain on track to achieve our public sector primary surplus target of

6.5 percent of GNP in 2002.

y For 2003, we remain committed to maintaining the public sector primary surplus at

6.5 percent of GNP.

y The main focus of monetary policy is the achievement of the inflation target.

y Depending on the strength of the balance of payments and on reverse currencysubstitution, the CBT will continue to accumulate foreign exchange reserves

through the daily auction mechanism.

y We are making progress in improving the efficiency of the money and foreign

exchange markets

y We are moving ahead with the strategy for recapitalizing private banks, with

public support if needed.

y The SDIF is making progress in ensuring the transparency of its operations and

resolving the remaining intervened banks

y The SDIF is also working on a strategy for the resolution of assets in intervened

banks, including through setting up an asset management company (AMC).y The implementation of International Accounting Standards is proceeding as

envisaged.

y The reform of state banks is proceeding apace.

y To complement the strengthening of the banking system and to support the real

sector, we have launched the "Istanbul Approach" to encourage corporate debt

restructuring

y Also in support of corporate debt restructuring, we are taking steps to improve

bankruptcy and foreclosure procedures

y We are making progress with the overhaul of the tax system.

y We are moving ahead with the rationalization of staffing in state economicenterprises and in other parts of the public sector

y We are continuing our efforts to update Turkey's fiscal legislation and fiscal

management

y We will advance the sale of key companies, building on the improved market

conditions

y We are also pressing ahead with the preparation for sale of other companies

y Finally, we are taking additional steps to improve the business climate

8/6/2019 2001 Crisis


The Plan of Paying the Loan Back That Was 19 Billion Dollars Taken From IMF

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Early Plan 2,6 9,7 10,1 3,6 1,8 0,8 0,0

Normal Plan 1.6 2.7 9.2 10 3.6 1.8 0.8

New Plan 2.6 5.2 7.8 10.7 1.8 0.8 0.0

2001 crisis

Documents