2000 choice 2000_socialism or barbarism

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Choice 2000: Socialism or BarbarismAuthor(s): Samir AminReviewed work(s):Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 35, No. 28/29 (Jul. 15-21, 2000), pp. 2515-2519Published by: Economic and Political Weekly

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Perspectives

Choice 2 0 0 0 - Socialism

o r Barbarism

The20thcenturysaw euphoriaover capitalism;but also

experimentswithcommunism.Thoughthe latter is in a troughat

present,the 21st centurywill not be America'scentury.It will seethe rise of social struggles thatquestionthe disproportionateambitionsof Washington nd global capital.

SAMIRAMIN

T he 19thcentury came to a close in

an atmosphereastonishingly remi-

niscent of that which had presidedover its birth- the 'belle epoque' (and it

vws beautiful, at least for capital). The

bourgeois of theTriad,which hadalreadybeen constituted (the European powers,the US andJapan)were singing hymns to

the glory of theirdefinitive triumph. The

working classes of the centres were no

longer the 'dangerous classes' they had

beenduringthe 19thcentury,and the other

peoples of the world were called upon to

accept the 'civilising mission' of the west.The 'belle epoque' crowned a century

of radical global transformations, duringwhich the first industrial revolution and

the concomitant constitution of the mod-

ern bourgeois nation state emerged from

thenorth-westernquarterof Europe - the

place of their birth - to conquer the rest

of the continent, the US and Japan. The

old peripheries of the mercantilist age -

LatinAmerica, British and Dutch India -

were excluded from this dual revolution,while the old states of Asia (China, the

Ottoman sultanate, Persia) were being

integrated n turnas peripherieswithin thenew globalisation. The triumph of the

centres of globalised capital was mani-

fested in a demographic explosion, whichwastobring heEuropeanpopulationfrom

23 per cent of global population in 1800

to 36 percent in 1900. The concentration

of the industrial revolution in the Triad

had simultaneously generated a polaris-ation of wealth on a scale humanity had

never witnessed during the whole of

its preceding history. On the eve of the

industrialrevolution, thegaps in the social

productivityof work for80

percent of the

planet's population hadnever exceeded a

relation of 2 to 1. Towards 1900, thisrelation had become equal to 20 to 1.

The globalisation celebrated in 1900,

alreadyas the 'end of history', was never-

theless a recent fact, brought about pro-

gressively during the second half of the

19th century, after the opening of China

and of the Ottoman empire (1840), the

repression of the sepoys in India (1857)andfinally the division of Africa (startingin 1885). This firstglobalisation, farfrom

accelerating the process of capital accu-

mulation, brought on a structural crisis

from 1873 to 1896;almostexactly acentury

later, it was to do so again. The crisis,however, was accompanied by a new

industrial revolution (electricity, petro-leum, automobiles, the airplane), which,it was expected, would transform the

human species; much the same as is said

today about electronics.

Inparallel, the firstindustrialand finan-

cial oligopolies were being constituted -

the transnationalcorporationsof the time.

Financial globalisation seemed to be esta-

blishing itself definitively in the form of

the gold-sterling standard,and there was

talk of the interationalisation ofthetrans-

actions made possible by the new stock

exchanges, with as much enthusiasm as

companies talk of financial globalisationtoday. Jules Verne was sending his hero

(English, of course) around the world in

80 days - the 'global village', forhim, was

already reality.The political economy of the 19th cen-

tury was dominated by the figures of the

greatclassics (AdamSmith, Ricardo,then

Marx's devastating critique).The triumphof fin de siecle liberal globalisation

brought to the foreground a new genera-tion, moved

bythe desire to

provethat

capitalism was 'unsurpassable' because it

expressed thedemandsof aneternal,trans-

historicalrationality.

Walras - a central

figure in this new generation, who was

rediscovered (no coincidence here) by

contemporaryeconomists - dideverythinghe could to prove that markets were self-

regulating. He never managed - no more

thanthe neoclassical economists of todayhave been able to prove the same thing.

Towards Globalised Liberalism

Triumphant liberal ideology reduced

society to a collection of individuals and,

through this reduction, asserted that the

equilibrium produced by the marketbothconstitutes the social optirnm andguaran-tees,bythe sametoken,stabilityand demo-

cracy. Everything was in place to substi-

tute a theory of imaginary capitalism for

the analysis of the contradictions in real

capitalism.Thevulgarversionofthis econo-mistic social thought would find its ex-

pressioninthemanualsof the BritonAlfred

Marshall, he bible of economics at the time.

The promises of globalised liberalism,'as they were vaunted at the time, seemed

to come truefor a while - duringthe 'belle

epoque'. After 1896, growth startedagain

on the new bases of the second industrialrevolution, oligopolies and financial

globalisation. This 'emergence from the

crisis' sufficed not only to convince or-

ganic ideologues of capitalism - the new

economists butalsoto shake hebewildered

workers'movement. Socialistpartiesbegan.to slide from their reformistpositions to

more modest ambitions: to be simple asso-

ciates in managing the system. The shift

was very similar to that constituted today

by the discourse of the Britishprimemin-

isterTony Blair and the Germanchancellor

Gerhard Schroeder a century later. The

modernist elites of the peripheryalso be-lieved then thatnothingcould be imaginedoutside the dominant logic of capitalism.

The triumphof the 'belle epoque' lasted

less than two decades. A few dinosaurs

(still young at the time - Lenin, for in-

stance) predicted its downfall, but no one

heard them. Liberalism - that is, the uni-

lateral domination of capital - would not

reduce the intensity of the contradictions

of every sortthatthesystem carries within

itself. On the contrary, it aggravated their

acuity. Behind the workers' parties and

tradeunions,

mobilisation in the cause of

Economic and Political Weekly July 15, 2000 2515

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capitalist-utopian nonsense, lurked themutedrumbleof afragmentedsocial move-

ment,bewildered but always on the vergeof exploding and crystallising around the

inventionof newalternatives.A fewBolshe-vik intellectuals used their gift of sarcasm

withregard o theLenitive discourse of the

'rentierpolitical conomy', astheydescribed

the sole way of thinking of the time.

Liberalglobalisation could only engen-derthesystem's militarisation in relations

among the imperialist powers of the era,could only bringabout a war which, in its

cold and warm forms, lasted for 30 years- from 1914 to 1945. Behind the apparentcalm of the 'belle epoque' it was possibleto discern the rise of social struggles and

violentdomestic and nternational onflicts.

In China, the first generation of critics of

the bourgeois modernisationproject were

clearing a path; this critique, still in its

babbling stage^n India, the Ottoman and

Arab world and in Latin America would

finally conquer the three continents and

dominate hreequarters f the20thcentury.Threequartersof our century are there-

fore markedby the management of more

orless radicalprojects designed to retrieve

ortransform heperipheries, projectsmade

possible bythedislocationof 'belle epoque'

utopianliberalglobalisation. Ourcentury,

coming to its end, has therefore been the

century of a series of massive conflicts

between the dominant forces of globalised

oligopolistic capitalism andthe states that

support it, on one hand, and the peoples

and dominated classes that refuse suchdictatorship, on the other.

Succession War

Between 1914 and 1945, the stage was

held simultaneously by the 'thirty years?war' between the US and Germany, over

who would inherit Britain's defunct hege-

mony, andby theattempts o 'catch-up', byothermeans,thehegemony describedas the

construction f socialism n theSovietUnion.

In the capitalist centres, both victors

and vanquished in the war of 1914-1918

attempted persistently - against all odds- to restore the utopia of globalised liber-

alism. We thereforewitness a return o the

gold standard; the colonial order was

maintained through violence; economic

management was liberalised once again.The results seemed positive for a brief

time, and the 1920s witnessed renewed

growth, drawnby the US's dynamism and

the establishment of new forms of assem-

bly line labour(parodied so brilliantly byCharlieChaplin n 'ModernTimes'). These

would find fruitful ground for generali-

sation only after the second world war,however. But the restoration was fragile,and as early as 1929 the financial stakes -

the mostglobalised segment of thesystem- collapsed. The following decade, untilthewar,was anightmare.Thegreatpowersreacted to recession as they would againin the 1980s and 1990s, withsystematicallydeflationist policies which served only to

aggravate the crisis, creating a downward

spiralcharacterisedby massive unemploy-ment - all the more tragic, for its victims,inthat hesafetynetsinventedbythewelfare

state did notyet exist. Liberalglobalisationcould notwithstand hecrisis; themonetary

system based on gold was abandoned.The

imperialistpowers regrouped n the frame-

workofcolonial empiresandprotected ones

of influence- the sourcesof theconflict that

would lead to the second world war.

Western societies reacted differentlyto the catastrophe. Some sank into fas-

cism,choosing

war as a means of redis-

tributing the deck on a global scale

(Germany,Japan, taly).TheOSandFrance

were the exceptions and, throughRoosevelt's New Deal and the Front

Populaire in France, launched another

option: that of marketmanagement regu-lation through active state intervention,backed by the working classes. These

formulas remaintimid, however, and were

expressed fully only after 1945.The collapse of the belle epoque myths

triggeredananti-imperialistradicalisation.

Some of the countries of Latin America,

taking advantage of their independence,invented populist nationalism in a varietyof forms: Mexico renewed the peasantrevolutionof the 1910s- 1920s;Peronism in

Argentinain the 1940s. In theeast, Turkish

Kemalism was their counterpoise, while

China settled into civil war between bour-

geois modernists, engendered by the 1911

revolution - the KuoMinTang- and com-

munists. Elsewhere, the yoke of colonial

rule imposed a delay several decades longon the crystallisation of similar national-

populist projects.Isolated, the Soviet Union sought to

invent a new trajectory. During the 1920s,it had hoped in vain that the revolution

would become global. Forced to fall backon its own forces, it followed Stalin into

a series of five-year plans meant to allow

it to make up for lost time. Lenin had

alreadydefined thiscourseas"Sovietpowerplus electrification". We should note that

the reference here is to the new industrial

revolution - electricity, not coal and steel.

But electricity (in fact, mainly coal and

steel) would gain the upperhand over the

power of the Soviets, emptied of meaning.

Centrally planned accumulation, of

course, was managed by a despotic state,

regardless of the social populism that

characterisedits policies. But then, neither

GermanunitynorJapanese modernisation

hadbeen theworkof democrats.TheSoviet

system was efficient as long as the goalsremained simple: to accelerate extensive

accumulation (the country's' industriali-

sation) and to build up a military forcewhich would be the first capable of facingthe challenge of the capitalist adversary,first by beating Nazi Germany, then by

ending the American monopoly on atomic

weapons and ballistic missiles during the

1960s and 1970s.

Post War

The second world war inaugurated a

new phase in the world system. The take-

off of the post-war period (1945-75) was

based on thecomplementarity

of the three

social projects of the age:(a) In the west, the welfare state projectof nationalsocial-democracy, which basdits action on the efficiency of productive

interdependent national systems.(b) The 'Bandung project' of bourgeoisnational construction on the system's

periphery (development ideology).(c) Finally, the Sovietist project of 'capi-talism withoutcapitalists', relatively auto-

nomised fromthe dominant world system.The double defeat of fascism and old

colonialism hadindeed createda conjunc-

ture allowing the popular classes, thevictims of capitalist expansion, to imposethe forms of capital regulation and accu-

mulation, to which capital itself was forced

to adjust, and which were at the root of

this period of high growth andaccelerated

accumulation.

The crisis that followed (starting in

1968-75) is one of the erosion, then the

collapse of the systems on which the

previous take-off had rested. This period,which has not yet come to a close, is

therefore not that of the establishment of

a new world order,as is too often claimed,

but thatof chaos. Thepolicies implementedunder these conditions do not constitute

a positive strategy of capital expansion,but simply seek to manage the crisis of

capital. They have not succeeded, because

the 'spontaneous' project produced by the

immediate domination of capital, in the

absence of any framework imposed bysocial forces through coherent, efficient

reactions, is still a utopia: that of world

management via what is referredto as 'the

market' - that is, the immediate, short-term interests of capital's dominantforces.

2516 Economic and Political Weekly July 15, 2000







In moder history, phases of reproduc-tion basedon stable accumulation systemsaresucceeded by moments of chaos. Inthefirst of these phases, as in the post-wartake-off, thesuccession of events gives the

impressionof a certainmonotony, because

the social and international relations that

make up its architecture are stabilised.

These relations are therefore reproduced

through hefunctioning of dynamics in the

system. In these phases, active, defined

and precise historical subjects are clearlyvisible (active social classes, states, politi-cal parties and dominant social organi-sations). Their practices appearsolid, and

their reactions are predictable under al-

most all circumstances; the ideologies that

motivate them benefit from a seeminglyuncontested egitimacy. Atthesemoments,

conjunctures may change, but the struc-

tures remain stable. Prediction is then

possible, even easy. The danger appearswhen we

extrapolatethese

predictionstoo

far, as if the structures in question were

eternal, and marked 'the end of history'.Theanalysisof thecontradictions hatriddle

these structures is then replaced by what

the postmodernists rightly call 'grandnarratives',which propose a linear visionof movement,guided by 'inevitability', or

'the awsof histor.y'.Thesubjectsof history

disappear, making room for supposedly

objective structural logics.But the contradictions of which we are

speakingdo theirworkquiety, and one daythe 'stable' structures collapse. History

then enters a phase that may be describedlater as 'transitional', but which is lived

as a transition toward the unknown, and

during which new historical subjects are

crystallised slowly. These subjects in-

auguratenewpractices, proceeding by trial

and error, and legitimising them throughnewideological discourses, often confused

at the outset. Only when the processes of

qualitative change have matured suffi-

ciently do new social relations appear,

defining 'post-transitional' system.The post-war take-off -allowed for

massive.economic, political and social

transformations nall regions of the world.These transformationswere theproductof

social regulations imposed on capital bythe working and popular classes, not, as

liberalideology would have it, by the logicof market expansion. But these transfor-

mations were so great that they defined a

new framework for the challenges that

confront the world's peoples now, on the

threshold of the 21st century.For a long time - from the industrial

revolution at the beginning of the 19th

century to the'1930s (as far as the Soviet

Union is concerned), then the 1950s (forthe thirdworld) - the contrast between the

centreandperipheriesof themoder world

system was almost synonymous with the

opposition between industrialisedand non-

industrialised countries. The rebellions in

theperipheries whether hese were social-

ist revolutions (Russia, China) or national

liberationmovements revised his old form

of polarisation y engaging heirsocieties inthe modernisationprocess, Gradually, the

axis around which the world capitalist

system was reorganising itself, and which

would define the future forms of polari-sation, constituted itself on the basis of the

'five new monopolies' that benefit the

countries of the dominantTriad:control of

technology; global financialflows (throughbanks, insurancecartels andpension funds

of thecentre); access to theplanet'snatural

resources;media andcommunications;and

weapons of mass destruction.

Takentogether,

these fivemohopoliesdefine the frameworkwithin which the law

of globalised value expresses itself. The

law of value is hardly the expression of

a 'pure' economic rationalitythat could be

detached from its social andpolitical frame;

rather, it is the condensed expression of

the totality of these circumstances, which

cancel out the extent of industrialisation

of the peripheries, devalue the productivework incorporated in these products, and

overvalue hesupposedaddedvalueattached

to the activities through which the new

monopolies operate to the benefit of the

centres. They therefore produce a newhierarchy n the distributionof income on a

worldscale, moreunequalthanever, while

makingsubalterns f theperipheries'ndus-

tries, and reducing them to the status of

putting-outwork. Polarisation inds its new

basis here, a basis which will dictate its

future form.

During the 'Bandung period' (1955-75),the states of the third world had begun to

implement autocentric development poli-cies aimed at reducing global polarisation

(catching up). This implied systems of

national regulation as well as the perma-

nent, collective (North-South) negotiationof international regulatory systems. (Therole of the United Nation Conference onTrade and Development (UNCTAD) was

particularly mportant nthisrespect.)This

also aimed at reducing "low-productivitylabour reserves" by transferringthem to

higher-productivity modern activities

(even if they were 'non-competitive' on

open world markets). The result of the

unequal success (not the failure, contraryto common belief) of these policies has

been the production of a contemporary

third world now firmly engaged in theindustrial evolution.

Theunequalesults fan ndustrialisation

imposedon dominantcapital by socialforces engendered by the victories ofnational iberation odayallow us to dif-ferentiatehefront-line eripheries, hichhave beencapableof buildingproductivenationalystemswithpotentiallyompeti-tive industries in the framework ofglobalised apitalism,nd hemarginalisedperipheries,which havenotbeen as suc-cessful. The criterionof differencethat

separatesheactiveperipheriesrom hosethat have been marginaliseds not onlythatof competition n industrialproduc-tion: it is also political.

The politicalauthoritiesn the active

peripheries-and,ehindhem, llofsociety(thisdoes notprecludehecontradictionswithinsociety tself) - have aproject, ndastrategyor ts mplementation.hisclearlyseems tobethecase for

China,Korea,nd

to a lesserdegree, or certain ountries fsouth-eastAsia,Indiaandsome countriesof LatinAmerica.Thesenationalprojectsareconfronted ith hoseofgloballydomi-nant mperialism;heoutcomeof thiscon-frontationwill shape omorrow'sworld.

On the other hand, the marginalisedperipherieshave neithera project(evenwhenrhetoric ike that of politicalIslamclaims the contrary), or theirown strat-

egy. Inthiscase,imperialistircles'thinkfor them' and take the initiativealone in

elaborating'projects'concerningthese

regions (like the EuropeanEconomicCommunityEEC)-ACPassociation, he'Middle Eastern'projectof the US and

Israel,or Europe'svagueMeditarranean

projects).No local projectsoffer an op-position; hese countriesare thereforehe

passive subjectsof globalisation.This rapid overview of the political

economyof transformationsn the 20th

centuryglobal capitalistsystemmust be

completedby a reminder f thestunning.demographicevolutionhathas aken laceinthesystem'speripherytthesame ime,bringingthe proportion ormedby the

populations f Asia(excludingJapan ndtheUSSR),Africa,LatinAmericaand heCaribbeanrom68 percentof theglobalpopulationn 1900 to 81 percent today.

Thethirdpartnern thepost-warworld

system,madeup by the countrieswhere

'actually xisting ocialism'prevailed, asleft hehistorical cene.Theveryexistenceof theSovietsystem, tssuccesses nexten-sive industrialisation and its militaryaccomplishments,ereoneoftheprincipalmotors f all thegrandioseransformationsof the 20thcentury.Without he 'danger'








thatthe communist ounter-modelepre-sented,westernsocial democracywouldneverhavebeenable oimpose hewelfarestate.Theexistenceof theSovietsystem,andthecoexistence t imposedon the USfurthermore, einforced the margin of

autonomy vailable o the bourgeoisieofthe south.

The Soviet system, however,did not

manageopass o anewstageof intensiveaccumulation;t thereforemissed out onthenew computer-driven)ndustrialevo-lution with which the 20th century is

comingto an end. The reasons for thisfailurearecomplex;still, it placesat the

.centreof its analysis he anti-democraticdrift fSovietpower,whichwasultimatelyunable o internalisehe fundamentalxi-

gencyofprogressoward ocialism srepre-sented ythe ntensificationfademocrati-sation apable f transcendinghatdefinedand imitedbytheframeworkf historical

capitalism.ocialismwill bedemocratic r

willnot exist: his s thelessonof thisfirst

experience f the breakwithcapitalism.Social thoughtand the dominanteco-

nomic,sociologicalandpolitical heoriesthategitimisedhepractices f autocentricnationalwelfarestatedevelopmentn thewest,of the Sovietsystem n the east andof populism o the south,as well as the

negotiated, regulatedglobalisationthat

accompaniedhem,werelargely nspiredbyMarxandKeynes.Thelatterproducedhis critiqueof market iberalism n the

193Cs,but was not read at the time.

Relationsbetweensocial forces,skewedincapital's avourat thetime,necessarilyfuelled the prejudices f liberalutopia-as is the caseagain oday.Thenew socialrelations of the post-warperiod, morefavourable o labour,would inspirethe

practicesof the welfarestate,relegatingthe iberals o apositionof insignificance.Marx'sfigure,of course,dominated hediscourse f 'actually xistingsocialism'.But the two preponderantiguresof the20thcentury raduallyost theirqualityas

originators f fundamentalritiques,be-

coming he mentors f the legitimation f

thepractices f statepower.Inbothcases,we maytherefore bservea shift towards

simplification nddogmatism.Critical ocial thought hen shiftedfor

a time - the 1960s and 1970s - toward the

peripheries f the system.Herethe prac-tices of national opulism apoorversionof Sovietism triggered brilliant xplo-sion in the critiqueof 'actuallyexistingsocialism'. At the centre of this critiquewas a new awarenessof the polarisationproducedby capital's global expansion,which had been underestimated,f not

purely and simply ignored, for over a

century ndahalf.This ritique ofactuallyexistingcapitalism,of the social thoughtthatlegitimatedts expansion,andof thetheoretical ndpractical ocialistcritiqueof both of these- was at theoriginof the

periphery'sdazzling entry into modern

thought.Herewas a rich andvariegatedcritique,which it would be mistaken o

reduce o 'dependencyheory',since thissocial thoughtwas to ieopen the funda-mentaldebateson socialismandthe tran-sition towardt, but also on Marxism ndhistorical materialism, understood as

having o transcendhe limitsof theeuro-centrismhatdominatedmodem hought.Undeniably nspired or a momentby theMaoist eruption, it also initiated the

critiqueof both Sovietismand the 'new

globalismglimmeringon the horizon.

Structyral Crisis

Startingn 1968-71, hecollapseof thethreepost-warmodelsof regulated ccu-mulationopenedup a structuralrisis ofthesystemveryreminiscent f thatof theend of the 19thcentury.Growthandin-vestmentrates fell precipitouslyo half

previous levels; unemployment oared;pauperisationwas intensified.The ratioused omeasurenequalitynthecapitalistworld(1 to 20 toward1990; 1 to 30 in

1954-48; 1 to 60 at the end of the post-wargrowthspurt) ncreased harply: hewealthiest20 per cent of humanity n-

creased heirshareof the globalproductfrom60 to 80 percentduring he two lastdecadesof thiscentury globalisation asbeen ortunateorsome.Forthe astmajority- notably, or the peoplesof the south,subjectedounilateraltructuraldjustmentpolicies,andthoseof theeast,locked ntodramaticnvolutions it hasbeenadisaster.

But thisstructuralrisis,like its prede-cessor,is accompanied ya third echno-

logicalrevolution,whichprofoundlyltersmodes of labourorganisation, ivestingthe old forms of worker and popularorganisationnd truggleftheir fficiency,

and therefore heirlegitimacy.The frag-mented ocialmovement asnotyetfounda strongformulafor crystallisation, a-

pableof meeting hechallengesposed;butit hasmaderemarkablereakthroughs,ndirections hat-enrichts impact:princi-pally,women'spowerful ntry nto social

life, as well as a new awarenessof envi-ronmentaldestruction n a scale which,for the firsttime in history, hreatens heentireplanet.

Themanagementf thecrisis,basedona brutalreversalof relationsof powerin

capital'sfavour,has made t possibleforliberalistrecipes to impose themselvesanew.Marx ndKeyneshavingbeenerasedfromsocialthought, he 'theoreticians' f

'pure conomics'havereplacedheanaly-sis of the realworldwith thatof animagi-nary apitalism.But he emporaryuccessof thishighly reactionary topian houghtissimply hesymptom fadecline witch-

craft takes the placeof critical houghtthattestifies to the fact thatcapitalisms

objectivelyreadyto be transcended.Crisismanagement asalready ntered

thephaseof collapse.The crisis in south-eastAsiaandKoreawaspredictable. uringthe 1980s these countries,andChinaas

well, managed o benefit from the worldcrisis throughgreater nsertion n world

exchanges(basedon their 'comparativeadvantage'of cheap labour),attractingforeigninvestmentbutremaining n thesidelines of financialglobalisation,and

inscribingheir

development rojectsn a

nationallyontrolledtrategyinthecasesof ChinaandKorea,not the countriesofsouth-eastAsia).Inthe 1990s,Koreaandsouth-eastAsia opened up to financial

globalisation, while China and India

beganto evolve in the same direction.Attractedby the region's high growth

levels, hesurplusffloatingoreign apitalflowed in, producing not accelerated

growthbut inflationin stocks and realestate.As hadbeenpredicted,hefinancialbubbleburstonly a few yearslater. Po-liticalreactions o this massivecrisishave

been new in severalrespects differentfrom hoseprovoked ytheMexican rises,for nstance.TheUS,withJapan ollowingclosely,attemptedo takeadvantage f theKoreancrisis to dismantle he country'sproductive system (under thefallaciouspretextthat it was controlled

oligopolistically)and to subordinatet tothestrategies f US andJapanese ligopo-.lies. Regionalpowersattemptedo resist

by.challenginghequestionof their nser-tion within financialglobalisation withthe re-establishmentf exchangecontrolin Malaysia), or - in China and India- by

removingparticipationrom their list ofpriorities.

Thiscollapseof the financialdimensionofglobalisationorced he'G-7oenvisageanewstrategy, rovoking crisis n liberal

thought. t is in lightof this crisis thatwemustexaminetheoutlineof the counter-attack aunchedby theG-7. Overnight,t

changed its tune: the term regulation,forbiddenuntil then, reappearedn the

group'sresolutions. t becamenecessaryto 'regulatenternationalinancial lows'.TheWorldBank's hiefeconomist, tiglitz,

2518 Economic and Political Weekly July 15, 2000







suggested a debate aimed at defining anew 'post-Washington consensus'.

Towards 21st Century

At this chaotic conjuncture,the US tookthe offensive once more to re-establish its

global hegemony andtoorganise the world

system in its economic, political and

militarydimensions according to this he-

gemony. Has the US hegemony entered its

decline? Or has it begun a renewal that

would make the21 st century 'America's'?It we examine the economic dimension

in the narrow sense of the term, measured

roughly in terms of per capita GDP, and

the structural endencies of the balance of

trade, we will conclude that American

hegemony, so crushing in 1945, receded

asearlyas the 1960s and1970s withEuropeand Japan's brilliant resurgence. The

Europeans bring it up continuously, in

familiar terms:TheEuropean

Union is the

first economic and commercial force on

a world scale, etc. The statement is hasty,however, for, if it is true that a single

Europeanmarketdoes exist, and even that

a single currency is emerging, the same

cannot be said of 'a' European economy

(at least, not yet). There is no such thingas a 'European productive system', such

a productive system can be spoken of in

the case of the US. The economies set upin Europe through the constitution of

historicalbourgeoisie in therelevantstates,and the shaping, within this framework,

of autocentricnationalproductive systems(even if these are also open, even aggres-

sively so), have stayed more or less the

same. There are no European TNCs: onlyBritish, German,or FrenchTNCs. Capital

interpretation s no denser in inter-Etro-

peanrelations than n the bilateral relations

betweeneach Europeannation and the US

or Japan. If Europe's productive systemshavebeeneroded,and thereforeweakened

by 'globalised interdependence' to such an

extent thatnationalpolicies lose agood deal

of theirefficiency, this is precisely to the

advantage of globalisation and the forces

that dominate it, not to that of 'Europeanintegration',which does not exist as yet.

US hegemony rests on a second pillar,however: that of military power. Built up

systematically since 1945, it covers the

whole planet, parcelled out into regions,each underthe relevant US military com-

mand. This hegemonism had been forced

to acceptthepeaceful coexistence imposed

by Soviet military might. Once this check

collapsed, the US went on the offensive to

reinforce tsglobaldomination,whichHenry

Kissingersummedup in amemorablyarro-

gantphrase: Globalisationsonlyanotherword or US domination". hisAmerican

global strategyhas five aims:

(1) To neutralise ndsubjugateheother

partnersn the Triad EuropeandJapan),while minimising heirabilityto act out-side the US orbit.

(2)Toestablishmilitaryontrol verNATOwhile Latin-Americanising'he ragmentsof the former.Sovietworld.(3) To exert uncontested influence inwestAsia, especiallyover its petroleumresources.

(4) To dismantleChina,ensurethe sub-ordinationftheother reatnationsIndia,Brazil),and preventthe constitutionof

regionalblocs potentially apableof ne-

gotiatingthe terms of globalisation.(5)Tomarginaliseheregionsof the souththatrepresentno strategic nterest.

The favoured nstrument f this hege-mony is thereforemilitary,as the US's

highest-rankingepresentativesever ire

of repeating d nauseam.Thishegemonydemands hatUS alliesaccept o navigatein its wake.GreatBritain,Germanyand

Japanmakeno bones (not even cultural

ones)about his mperative. ut hismeansthatthe speecheswhichEuropean oliti-cians make o theiraudiences regardingEurope'seconomicpower- haveno real

significance.By placing tselfexclusivelyon the terrainof mercantilesquabbles,Europe,which has no politicalor social

projectf itsown,has ostbefore heracehaseven started.Washingtonnows hiswell.

Theprincipalmeans n theserviceof thestrategychosenby Washington-isNorthAlliance Treaty Organisation NATO),which explains why it has survivedthe

collapseof theadversaryhatconstitutedthe organisation's aisond'etre. NATOstillspeaks oday n the nameof the 'inter-national ommunity', hereby xpressingits contempt or the democraticprinciplethatgoverns his saidcommunityhroughthe UN. Yet NATO acts only to serve

Washington's ims- no moreandno less- as the historyof the pastdecade,fromthe Gulf warto Kosovo,goes to show.

The strategy employed by the TriadunderUS directiontakes as its aim theconstructionfaunipolarworldorganisedalongtwo complementary rinciples:heunilateraldictatorship f dominantTNC

capital,andtheunfurlingf a US militaryempire,o whichallnationsmustbe com-

pelledto submit.No otherprojectmaybetoleratedwithin hisperspective, oteventheEuropeanprojectof subalternNATO

allies,andespeciallynota project ntail-

ingsomedegreeofautonomy,ikeChina'swhichmustbebroken y orce,f necessary.

This vision of a unipolarworld s beingincreasinglyopposedby thatof a multi-

polarglobalisation,heonly strategy hatwould allow the differentregionsof theworld o achieveacceptableocialdevelop-ment and would thereby foster socialdemocratisationand the reduction ofmotives for conflict. The hegemonisticstrategyof theUS and ts NATO allies is

todaythe mainenemyof social progressdemocracyandpeace.

The 21stcenturywillnotbe 'America's

century'.It will be one of vastconflicts,and the rise of socialstruggles hatques-tion the disproportionateambition of

.Washingtonand of capital.Thecrisis sexacerbatingontradictions

within heblocsofdominant lasses.Theseconflicts must takeon increasingly cuteinternationalimensions, nd herefore it.states and groupsof states againsteachother.Onecanalready iscern he irsthintsof a conflict betweenthe

US, Japan,and

their aithfulAustralianlly,on onehand,andChinaand the otherAsiancountries,onthe other.Nor is it difficult oenvisagethe rebirthof a conflict betweenthe USandRussia, f the lattermanages o extri-cate tselffrom hespiralBorisYeltsinhas

dragged t into. Andif theEuropeanLeftcouldfree tselffrom ts submission o thedoubledictateof capitalandWashington,it wouldbe possibleto imaginethat thenew European trategywouldbe articu-latedon the lines of Russia, China,andthe thirdworld ngeneral, n theperspec-

tive of anecessarymultipolaronstructioneffort. If this does not come about,the

Europeanproject tself will fade away.The centralquestion, herefore,s how

conflictsandsocialstruggles it is impor-tant o differentiate etween hetwo)willbe articulated.Who will triumph?Willsocialstruggles esubordinated,nframed

byconflictsand hereforemastered ythedominantpowers,even instrumentalisedto the benefit of these powers?Or willsocialstruggles,on thecontrary, onquertheirautonomy nd orce hemajor owersto conformto theirexigencies?

Of course, I do not imaginethat theconflictsandstrugglesof the 21stcenturywillproduce remake f the29thcentury.Historydoes notrepeattselfaccordingoa cyclicalmodel.Today's ocieties recon-fronted ynewchallenges nalllevels.But

preciselyecausehe mmanentntradictionsof capitalism resharper t theendof the

centuryhanheywereat tsbeginning, ndbecause he meansof destruction realsofargreaterhan heywere,thealternativesfor the 21stcenturymore hanever beforeare 'socialismor barbarism'J






2000 choice 2000_socialism or barbarism

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