20 years of cd gwald ronis psychrev 1978.ocr

8/12/2019 20 Years of CD Gwald Ronis PsychRev 1978.OCR

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Psychological Review1978 Vol. 85 N o. 1

Twenty Years of Cognitive Dissonance Case Study of theEvolution of a Theory

A n t h o n y G . G r e e nw a ld a n d D a v i dL. R o n i sOhio State University

Recent revisions of cognitive dissonance theory no longer encompass some ofthe imp ortant examples, dat a, and hypotheses tha t were part of Festinger'soriginal statement. Further, the psychological character of the motivation forcognitive change can be interpreted, in recent statem ents of the theory, as aneed to preserve self-esteem rather than a need to maintain logic-like consist-ency among cognitions. These changes are so substantial as to prompt the ob-servation that the evolved theory might be identified as a different theory-infact, as one that predates cognitive dissonance theory.A final, disturbingthought: What if the original dissonance theory, which has now surrenderedits name to somewhat different ideas, was correct?

S i n c e t h e o ri g in a l s t a t e m e n t b y F e s t i n g e rin 1957 , there hav e been per iod ic majorr e s t a t e m e n t s of c o g n i t iv e d i s so n a n c e t h e o r y( A r o n s o n , 1 9 6 8 ; B r e h m C o h e n , 1 9 6 2 ;Wicklund Breh m, 1976). Ea ch of th e re-s t a t e m e n t s of d i s s o n a n c e t h e o r y h a s d e s c r ib e da ma jor cons tr ic t ion of Fest inger 's (1957)o r i g i n a l p r e m i s e t h a t d i s s o n a n c e i s a m o t i v a -t i o n a l s t a t e a r o u s e d b y t h e j u x t a p o si t io n of t w ocogni t ive e lements , x an d y, when no t -xfol lows from y ( p . 1 3 ) . B r e h m a n d C o h e n( 19 6 2) n o t e d t h a t i n c o n si s te n c y h a d s t r o n g~ n o t i v a t i o n a l p r o p e r ti e s o n l y w h e n a n i n -d i v i d u a l w a s b o u n d b y a b e h a v i o r a l c o m m i t -m e n t t o o n e of t h e i n c o n s i s te n t c o g n i ti o ns . I nA r o n s o n ' s ( 19 6 8) s t a t e m e n t , d i s s o n a n c e w a shypothes ized t o be a s ign i f ican t mot iv a t ion a lf o r c e o n l y w h e n t h e s e lf -c o n c ep t o r s o m e o t h e rf i rm l y he ld e x p e c t a n c y w a s in v o l v e d . I n t h em o s t r e c e n t s t a t e m e n t , Wi c k l u n d a n d B r e h m( 19 7 6) h a v e i n c o r p o r a t e d a n d r ef in e d t h e t w oear l ie r rev i s ions in t e rm s of t he c onc ept ofpersona l respons ib i l i ty : Rec ent researchh a s m a d e i t a b u n d a n t l y c l e a r t h a t d i s s o n a n c e

r e d u c t io n a s w e k n o w i t t a k e s p la c e o n l y w h e nt h e d i s s o n a n t e l e m e n t s h a v e b e en b r o u g h tt o g e t h e r t h r o u g h t h e p e r s o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t yof th e ind iv idua l who exper iences d i ssonance

P. 7).

Requests for reprints should be sent to AnthonyG.Greenwald, The Ohio State University, 4 4C West17th Avenue, Co lumbus, Ohio43210

Obs erva t io ns on the Evo lu t ion ofC o g n i t iv e D i ss o n an c e T h e o r y

Wi c k l u n d a n d B r e h m ( 1 9 7 6 ) c o m m e n t e d o nth e 20-year h i sto ry of d i ssonance theory byo b s er v in g , To t h e e x t e n t t h a t d i s s o n an c et h e o r y h a s e v o l v e d s i n c e 1 9 5 7 , t h e e v o l u t i o nh a s b e en p r im a r il y d u e t o t h e d i s c ov e r y t h a trespons ib i l i ty i s a p re requis i t e fo r e ffec t s tha twe ca ll d i s sonance reduc t ion (p . 71) . Wh i let h i s m a y s e e m a m o d e s t c h a n g e , t h e r e a d e rw h o p e r u se s t h e o ri g in a l s t a t e m e n t of t h etheo ry (Fes t inger, 1957) wil l d i scover thefo l lowing subs tan t ia l changes

1. Several of the original defining il lustrationsof cognitive disso nanc e are not gncompassed b ythe contemporary def ini t ion A m o n g t h e se a r e :

If a person bel ieved t h a t man will reacht h e m o o n i n t h e n e a r f u t u r e a n d a l s o be li ev e dt h a t m a n w ill n o t b e a b l e t o b u il d a d e v i c et h a t c a n l e av e t h e a t m o s p h e r e of t h e e a r t h ,t h e s e t w o c o g n i t i o n s a r e d i s s o n a n t w i t h o n ea n o t h e r. ( F e s ti n g e r, 1 95 7 ,p 14)

If a p e r so n w e r e s t a n d i n g i n t h e r a i n a n dy e t c o u ld s e e n o e v i d en c e t h a t h e w a s g e t t i n gw e t , t h e s e t w o c o g n i t io n s w o ul d b e d i s s o n a n twi th o ne anoth er. (Fes t inger, 1957 , p .14)

I n t h e p r e s e n t v e r si o n of t h e t h e o r y , n e i th e rof th ese s i tua t ion s i s expec ted to a ro use d i s-s o n a n c e b e c au s e t h e y h a v e n o a p p a r e n t e le -m en t of personal responsibi l i ty. (T he role ofpersonal responsibi l i ty in the defini t ion of

Copyr ight 1978 by the American Psycholo gical Associatio n Inc. A ll rights of reproduction in an y form reserved.

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5 THEORETICAL NOTES

d i s s o n a n c e i s d i s c u s s e d f u r t h e r u n d e r t h ef o u r t h p o i n t b e l o w, c o n c e r n i n g t h e p s y c h o -log ica l cha rac te r o f th e theory ' s m ot iva t ion forcogni t ive change . )

2 . As a consequence of th e rev i sed def in i tionof dissonance, some of the evidence once takena s support for dissonance theory is n o longergermane. H e r e a r e t w o e x a m p le s .

Fir s t , Fest in ger (1957, pp . 158-162) c i teda n e x p e r i m e n t b y E w i n g ( 19 4 2) i n s u p p o r t ofa d i ssonance pred ic t ion about e ffec t s o f un-e x p e c t e d e x p o s u r e t o a d i s a g re e a b l e c o m -m u n i ca t io n . E w i n g f o u n d t h a t t h e c o m m u n i c a -t i o n p r od u c e d g r e a t e r a t t i t u d e c h a n g e a m o n ga u d i e n c e m e m b e r s w h o h a d b e e n l e d n o t t oe x p e ct t h a t t h e c o m m u n i c a t io n w o u l d d i s a gr e ew i t h t h e i r p r i o r o p in i o ns t h a n a m o n g a u d i e n c em e m b e r s w h o w e re le d ( p r o p e rl y ) t o e x p e c t t h ec o m m u n i c a t i o n t o d is ag re e . I n t h e p r e s e n tvers ion of d i ssonance th eory , s ince Ewing ' sa u d i e n c e m e m b e r s s h o u l d n o t h a v e f e l t r e -s p o n s i b le f o r t h e i r e x p o s u r e t o t h e u n e x p e c t e dd i s a g r e e i n g i n f o r m a t i o n , t h e r e s h o u l d b e n oe x p e c t a t i o n t h a t t h i s c o n d i t i o n w o u l d e n h a n c ed i s s o n an c e r e d u c t i o n v i a o p i n i o n c h a n g e .

Second , Fes t ing er (1957 , pp . 236-239) no tedt h a t t h e r e s h o u l d b e d i s s o n a n c e a r i s i n g f r o mth e exper ience of be ing in a mass ive ear th -q u a k e w i t h o u t e x p e r i e n c in g p e rs o n al i n j u r yo r o t h e r d a m a g e s . H e c i t e d s u p p o r t f o r th i sa n a l y s is i n a s t u d y of r u m o r s t h a t o cc u rr e df o ll o w in g a m a j o r e a r t h q u a k e i n I n d i a i n 1 9 3 4 .

T h e r u m o r s , w h i ch p r e d i c te d t e r ri b l e d i s a st e r st o c o m e p. 238) , were seen by Fes t ingera s s e r v i n g t o r e d u c e d i ss o n an c e . B e c a us e ,h o w e v e r, t h e lo c al i n h i b i t a n t s sh o u l d n o thave fe l t pe rsona l ly respons ib le fo r the i r ex-per ience of l iv ing in th e a re a which rece ivedt h e s h oc k of t h e e a r t h q u a k e b u t w h i ch d i d n o ts u f f er a n y d a m a g e ( p . 2 3 7 ), t h i s e v i d e n c e i sno t per t ine n t t o th e p resen t vers ion of d i s -s o n a n c e t h e o r y.

3. On e of Festinger's (1957) original basichypotheses (p . 3 has had suf ic ient discon-firmation to have been, n efec t , d ropped f rom

the theory. T h e h y p o th e s is w a s W h e n d is -s o n a n c e is p r e s e n t, i n a d d i t i o n t o t r y i n g t or e d u c e i t , t h e p e rs o n w ill a c t i v e l y a v o i d s i t u a -t i o n s a n d i n f o r m a t i o n w h i c h w o u l d l i k e l y i n -c r e a s e t h e d i ss o n an c e ( p . 3 ) . Wi c k l u n d a n dB r e h m ( 19 7 6) h a v e c o n c lu d e d t h a t i t isd i ff icu lt t o ob ta in ev idence for se lec t ive avo id-an ce of 'd issonance-arousing ' inform ation(p. 189) .

4. T h e psychological characteristics of themotivation for dissonance reduction have changed.I n t h e o r ig i na l t h e o r y, d i s s o n a n c e w a s a

s t a t e of d i s c o m f o rt a s s o c i a te d w i t h a n y i n -c o n s i s t e n c y b e t w e e n r e l e v a n t c o g n i t i o n s . T h epsycholog ica l essence of t he m ot iva t iona l s ta tewas someth ing ak in to log ica l incons i s tencya s ind ica ted by th e words fol low f rom inth e defini t ion (Fest in ger, 1957, p . 13): Tw oelem ents a re in a d i ssonan t re la t ion i f, con-s idering these tw o a lone , th e obverse of on ee lem ent would fol low f rom th e o ther. Inc o n t r a s t , t h e m o t i v a t i o n a l f o r c e i n p r e s e n tvers ions of d i ssonance theory has much moreof a n ego-defens ive cha rac te r.

As no te d ear l i e r, se l f-concept cogni t ions weref i r s t m a d e i m p o r t a n t i n d i s s o n a n c e t h e o r y i nAronson 's (1968) ana lys is . Wick lund an dB r e h m ( 19 7 6) w o u ld a p p e a r t o h a v e s t e e re daw ay f rom Aronson ' s app ea l to se l f-concept.H o w e v e r, t h e i r a s s u m p t i o n t h a t d i s s o n a n c eis a roused on ly when a person i s respons ib lefor p roduc ing some undesi red conseq uencemakes i t d i ff i cu l t to d i s t inguish the i r concep-t ion of dissonanc e redu ct ion from on e of egodefense . ' T h i s po in t may be i l lus t ra ted byo b s e r v i n g t h a t c o n t e m p o r a r y d i s s o n a n c et h e o r is t s a n a l y z e t h e c o u n t e r a t t i t u d i n a l r ol e-p l a y i n g e x p e r i m e n t a s i n v o l v in g d i s s o n a n c eb e tw e e n t h e c o g n it iv e e l e m e n t s A ( Ibelieve X,w h e r e X i s t h e i n i ti a l op i n io n ) a n d B ( Iagreed to advocate no t- X ). Ta k e n b y i t s e l f , t h i sA B p a i r of c o g n i t io n s h a s a n o b v i o u s p r o p e r t yof logic- l ike inconsis tency. However, becauserespons ib i l i ty fo r undes i red conseque nces is

a l s o a s s u m e d t o b e p r e s e n t w h e n d i s s o n a n c e isa roused , i t becomes poss ib le to hyp othes ize

Wicklund and Brehm (1976) did not, in fact, assertthat a person must be responsible for producing anundesired consequence in order to experience dissonance(see their exact statement about responsibility quotedin the first parag raph of this article ). However, a morerecent statement by Brehrn (Note1) has made thisexplicit: A dissonance reductio n effect is obtaine d whena person brings about a consequence that he would (intheab senceo f othe r forces) avoid as long as he knew th atthe consequence would or could happ en. Some other

currently active dissonance researchers, Mark Zannaand Joel Cooper, similarly have stated that the condi-tion necessary for dissonance arousal is responsibilityfor aversive consequences (Cooper, Note 2). Theresponsibility-for-undesired-consequences definition ofdissonan ce is a produc t of two decades of research oncoun terattitudina l role playing, originating in experi-ments by Kelman (1953) and Festinger and Carlsmith(1959) an d culminating in publications by Calder,Ross, and Insko (1973) and Collins and Hoyt (1972).In both of th e latte r article s, responsibility for undesiredconsequences was pinpointed as a condition thatmaximized att itu de change in the direc tion of coun ter-attitudina l role playing.


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t h a t t he pa i r of cogn i t ions t ha t p roducest ens ion t oward co gn it i ve c hange is no t t h e ABpa i r j u s t d e s c r i bed , b u t r a t he r a s o mewha td i ffe ren t pa i r, tha t i s , C ( I caused [undesired]consequence Y and a self-concept cognit ion,D ( I a m a good [or in te l l igent] person who does

not do such evi l [or s tupid] thing s . I n t h i sf a sh ion , i t is poss ib l e t o a rgue t h a t t h e m o t iva -t ion for cogni t ive change in contemporaryversions of dissonan ce theory i s indist ingu ish-ab le f rom ego defense .

D i s so nance The o ry an d Self T he o ry :Conv e rgen t Evo lu t i on

Cog ni t ive d i ssonance theory has shown ah i s to ry of ada p t i n g i t s t heo ret i ca l s t a t em en t t obe consi s t en t w i th t h e bod y of em p i r ic a l da t ai t has spawned. In te res t ing ly, the behavior of

the theor i s t s do ing the rev is ing i s a near-perfect i l lustrat io n of disson ance reduct ion oft h e so r t i n t ended i n t h e o r ig ina l s t a t em en t ofth e theory b u t exc luded by t he presen t vers ion .( I t i s exc luded in t he p resen t vers ion becausethose do ing t he rev is ing were of ten no t per-sona l ly respons ib le e i ther for the ear l ie r ver-s i o ns o r f o r t he da t a t h a t sugge s t ed t he i rrevisions.)

T h e cont inu ing process of ad jus t ing ath e o re t i ca l s t a t em en t t o m a i n t a i n i t s cu r r encvwi th empir ica l da ta i s sc ien t i f ica l ly ques t ion-able. Revision, as opposed to reject ion, of atheory i s acceptab le on ly so long as bas iccharac te r i s tics of th e theo ry remain in tac t . Inth e case of d i ssonance theory, t he emerg ingcen tral i ty of th e not ion of personal responsi-b i l ity for undes i red consequences does appe arto have changed t he ba s i c cha r a c t e r o f t hetheo ry. T he t heo r y s eems now to be fo cu sed oncognit ive changes oc curr ing in th e service of egodefense , o r se l f -es teem main tenance , ra therth an in t he in te res t of p reserv ing psycho-log ica l cons is tency. Indeed , contemporarydissonance theory bears a s t r ik ing resemblanceto t h e o re t i c a l s t a t emen t s abou t ego - r e l a t edcognit ive processes th a t existed well beforeFes t inger s (1957) s ta t em ent . For example ,

Wh en a person reac ts in a neut ra l , im-persona l , rou t ine a tmosphere , h i s behaviori s one th ing . But when he i s behaving per-sona l ly, perhaps exc i ted ly, se r ious ly com-mi t ted to a t ask , he behaves qu i te d iffe ren t ly.I n th e f i rs t condi t ion h i s ego i s no t engage d;in th e second condi t ion i t i s. W e hav es e e n t h a t under conditions of ego-involvementthe whole personality manifests greater con-sistency in behavior, reveals not specif ici ty

in conduc t bu t gene ra l i t y and cong ruence .(Allport , 1943, pp. 459, 472, i ta l ics added)

If self-deception ei ther by denial or bydisguise is accepted a s character is t ic of a[defense] mech anism , th e problem st i l lremains a s to t he source of o r reasons for

th e se lf -deception . Th e obvious in te rpre ta -t ion i s th a t th e need for se l f-decept ion a r i sesbecause of a more fundamenta l need tomain ta in o r to res tore se l f-es teem. Any th ingbeli t t l ing to the self is to be avoided.(Hilgard, 1949, p. 374)

As experiences occur in th e l ife of t heind iv idua l , they a r e e i ther (a ) symbol ized ,perce ived and organized in to some re la t ion-sh ip t o t he s el f, (b ) ignored because the re isno perce ived re la t ionsh ip to the se l f - s t ruc-ture , (c ) den ied symbol iza t ion or given adistorted symbolization because the experience

i s inconsistent wit h the structure of the self.(Rogers , 1951, p. 503, i ta l ics added)

I t s eems nea r l y a s d i ff icul t t o a cc e p t aperception which would al ter the self-concep t in a n expand ing or soc ia l ly accept -ab l e d i r ec t i on a s t o a ccep t an expe r i e n cewhich would a l te r i t in a cons t r ic t ing orsocial ly disapproved direct ion. (Rogers ,1951, p. 506)

Whi l e t he abov e s t a t emen t s a r e ha rmo n iou swith contemporary versions of dissonancethe ory a nd i ts associated body of empirical

da t a , t hey have l i t t l e d i r ec t pe r t inence t o t h eoriginal version. Dissonance theory hasevolved , in o ther words , in the d i rec t ion ofconvergence wi th a bo dy of the ory t h a t p re -d a t e d i t .

The passages quoted above f rom Al lpor t(1943) and Hilgard (1949) were from addressesin which each fo recast a s hif t in psychologicaltheory to a focus on sel f o r ego. Th is pred ic tedfocus on self was apparent in cl inical psy-chology and persona l i ty theory in th e 1940s an d1950s, as exemplif ied in t he inf luential n atu reof th e work of Allport , Golds tein, M aslow,

Snygg and Combs , and Rogers . Soc ia l psy-cho log i s t s , on t he o the r hand ( and a f t e r al ong de l ay r e l a ti ve t o t he p r ed i c ti on ), appea r t ohav e backed in to a focus on se lf . Th is emerg-ing t rend in socia l psychology i s appa re n t no tonly in th e evolu t ion of cogni t ive d i ssonancetheo ry b u t i n o the r deve lopmen t s such a s ( a )the in te res t in d i ffe rences in in fe rence (a t t r ib u-t ion) processes for self-relevant versus other-re levant in format ion ( th i s i s re fer red to as theactor-observer distinction by a t t r i bu t i on t h eo -r is ts , e .g., Jones Ni sbe t t , 1971), b) theo-re t ica l in te rpre ta t ion of t he consequences of


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perceptual focus on th e self (Duval Wick-lund, 1972; Scheier Carv er, 1977), an d (c)th e incipient developme nt of a body of da tain which self is dem ons trat ed to be anorganizing principle in human informationprocessing (e.g., Ca nt or Mischel, 1977;Mark us, 1977; Rogers, Kuiper, Kirker,1977).

Final Observation : St at us of theOriginal Dissonance Theory

There have been many good consequences ofthe 20-year history of dissonance theory. Ifthe present authors are correct in assumingthat the 20-vear evolution signals a birth ofsocial psychological interest in the constructof self, th is converge nce with self theo ryshould not be regarded as a step backward.

Rather, th e many studies inspired by dis-sonance theory assure th at th e new focus onself will proceed from a strong foundation ofrelevant empirical findings.

Perhaps th e only vict im of the evolut ionaryprocess is the original version of dissonancetheory, which has effectively been discarded.But has i t ever real ly been proven wrong?

Consider the possibility that dissonanceresearchers abandon ed portions of th e originaltheory because their experiments inadvertent lytapped self-protective cognitive processinginstead of, or in addition to, dissonance reduc-

tion. Th e ego-related cognitive processes, beingrelatively easy to observe, ma y have pulled th etheory in their direction. Had effort beendirected instead a t achieving more precisemethod s of testing t he original dissonanceformulat ion, perhaps more support for i twould have been obtained. Possiblv. dis-sonance-reduction effects in the original senseexist but are weaker than the self-esteem-maintaining effects that have been observed.For this reason, th e experiments needed t oobserve effects predicted by the originaldissonance theory must be carefully designed

to avoid confounding wi th self-esteem processesand must a lso be powerful enough t o detectrelatively small effects. Are these experimentsstill worth doing?

P o s t s c r i p t: A n A p p r e c i a t i o n of D i s s o n a n c eT h e o r y

Th e authors , a long with many others , bel ievethat dissonance theory has been an extremelystimulating force within and beyond socialpsychology. T he enigmas posed b y t he originalst at eme nt of dissonance theory a nd later, by

the juxtaposi t ion of t ha t s ta temen t withresearch results. have motivated research thathas advanced greatly the understanding ofhuman cognit ion. We have observed that , inth e course of t hese 20 years of emp irical andtheoretical advance. dissonance theorv has

evolved in a directio; of converge nce w i t i ideasfrom th e tradi tio n of self theory . A t th e time ofthis writing, dissonance theory is still activelyinspiring novel empirical findings and evolvingfurther theoretically (e.g., Cooper, Note ;Zanna, Note 4), perhaps to a point a t whichthe present observations about congruencewith self theory may soon be outdated. Thepace of theo retical evoluti on indicates th e sus-tained vigor of the dissonance theory tradi-t ion. At th e same t ime, this rapid evolut ionarypace entails a risk that some ideas will beaccepted or abandoned without adequate

empirical scrutiny.

Reference Notes

1. Brehm, J. W. Personal communication, November15, 1977.

2. Cooper, J. Personal communication, February 10,1977.

3. Cooper, J. The arousal of dissonance and re-sponsibility for aversive events. In Charles A.F l e r (Chair), Twenty years later: Current per-spectives on cognitive dissonance. Symposium pre-sented at the meeting of the Society of ExperimentalSocial Psychology, Austin, Texas, October 1977.

4. Zanna, M P. Self perception, dissonance, and egodefensive style . In Charles A. Kiesler (Chair),Twenty years later: Current perspectives on cognitivedissonance. Symposium presented a t the meetingof the Society of Experimental Social Psychology,

Austin, Texas, October 1977.

References

Allport, G W. The ego in contemporary psychology.Psychological Reuiem 1943, 50 451478.

Aronson, E. Dissonance theory: Progress and problems.In R. P. Abelson et al. (Eds.), Theories of cognitive

consistency: A sourcebook. Chicago: Rand McNally,1968.

Brehm, J. W., Cohen, A. R. Explorations in cognitivedissonance. New York: Wiley, 1962.

Calder, B. J., Ross, M. Insko, C A. Attitude changeand atti tud e attribution: Effects of incentive, choice,and consequences. Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology 1973, 25 84-99.

Cantor, N. Mischel, W Traits as prototypes:Effects on recognition memory. Journal of Personalityand Social Psychology 1977, 35 38-48.

Collins, B E., Hoyt, M F. Personal responsibility-for-consequences: An integration and extension ofthe forced compliance literature. Journal of


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Hilgard, E . R. Human motives and the concept ofself. American Psychologist 1949 4 374-382.

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