1

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

Model United Nations at UC Davis

Topic 1: The Viability of Alternative Nuclear Reactors

Topic 2: International Nuclear Disarmament Safeguards

Letter From the Head Chair

Greeting Delegates,

My name is Axton Chandra, and I will be your Head Chair for the International Atomic

Energy Agency at DMUNC XIV.

I am an international student from Indonesia and am a fourth year Economics major with

a minor in Political Science. Outside of Model UN, I like to play sports, especially football

(called soccer here), the guitar, and the piano. As soon as I came to UC Davis, I realized that

Davis was the perfect city for me to live in. I especially like that I can bike to all of my classes,

and the campus has a recreational football field for anyone to play in. The professors are also

amazing here, and I enjoy living in Davis.

As Head Chair, I will guide the debate of this committee. You can expect my

professionalism and consistency during committee, and I will lead the committee to reach a

comprehensive resolution to the topics at hand. For the conference to be lively, I expect active

participation from all of you. You will act as delegates from your respective countries, so you

will be representing your countries’ policies and advocating for your national interests. With this,

I guarantee this will be a fun, lively, and memorable educational experience. Please, do not be

afraid to ask questions throughout the conference. This is going to be a learning experience for

all of us.

Cheers,

Axton Trixie Chandra

Head Chair, IAEA, DMUNC XIV

dmunc.iaea@davismun.org

About the Committee

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established on July 29th, 1957.1 It

is known as the world’s “Atoms for Peace” organization, derived from President Eisenhower’s

address for peaceful use of nuclear material to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly.2 As

the center for cooperation in the nuclear field, the organization works with its member states and

partners worldwide to promote the safe, secure, and peaceful use of nuclear technologies. Even

though the IAEA was established independently of the UN through the IAEA Statute that acts as

the charter, it reports to both the UN General Assembly and Security Council. This means that

the organization’s actions are restricted as such. Also, since big powers like the United States

have a disproportionately large influence in the UN, IAEA actions and agendas are also

influenced by the national interests of these countries. Currently, it has 167 member states, and

its headquarters is located in Vienna, Austria.3 However, it has Regional Safeguard Offices

located in Toronto, Canada, and Tokyo, Japan.4 It also has three laboratories in Vienna, Austria;

Seibersdorf, Austria; and Monaco.5 In addition, liaison offices lie in New York City, United

States and Geneva, Switzerland.6

In 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed the creation of a body that regulates and

promotes peaceful use of nuclear power in his “Atoms for Peace” address to the UN General

1 Todeschini, Claudio. The International Nuclear Information System. The first forty years 1970-2010. International Atomic Energy Agency, INIS and Knowledge Management Section, Vienna (Austria), 2010. 2 Eisenhower, Dwight D. "Atoms for peace." IAEA BULLETIN 45, no. 2 (2003): 62-67. 3 Podgorsak, Ervin B. "Radiation oncology physics." a handbook for teachers and students/EB Podgorsak.–Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency657 (2005). 4 Jasani, Bhupendra, and Gotthard Stein. Commercial Satellite Imagery: A tactic in nuclear weapon deterrence. Springer Science & Business Media, 2002. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid.

Assembly.7 The following year, the United States proposed to the UN General Assembly the

creation of an international organization to take possession of fissile material, which is capable

of sustaining chain reaction of nuclear fission.8 For twelve days starting from August 8th, 1955,

the UN held the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Geneva.9

During the conference, it was agreed that an organization is needed to control the use of nuclear

resources. Fifteen months later, in October 1956, a conference regarding the IAEA statute was

held at the UN Headquarters to approve the organization’s founding document, which was

negotiated from 1955 to 1956 by a group of twelve countries: Australia, Belgium, Brazil,

Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Portugal, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United

Kingdom, and the United States.10 The statue of the IAEA was approved on October 23, 1956,

and came into force on July 29, 1957.11

The purpose of the IAEA, based on its statute, is to encourage the applications of

peaceful uses of technology, provide international safeguards against the misuse of nuclear

technology and materials as weapons, and promote nuclear safety and security standards. The

IAEA has an inspection system, the safeguard, to ensure that countries comply with their

commitments under agreements they have signed. In the particular, there is a focus on the

international community’s compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty that prevents the spread

of nuclear weapons and only legally recognizes five nations to have the ability to possess nuclear

7 John Brittain, Agustina Grossi, Jean-Pierre Cayol, and Aldo Malavasi, “The International Atomic Energy Agency: Linking Nuclear Science and Diplomacy,” Science & Diplomacy, Vol. 4, No. 2 (June 2015). 8 Fischer, David. "History of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The First Forty Years." (1997). 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid.

weapons: the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China.12 These five

nations are notably also the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Under this

treaty, nations agree to only use nuclear resources for peaceful purposes.

12 Ibid.

Topic 1: The Viability of Alternative Nuclear Reactors

Topic Introduction

Nuclear plants, like other power plants, produce electricity by boiling water, transforming

it into steam to rotate turbines that drive electric generators to produce electricity. Unlike other

plants that burn oil, natural gas, or other fossil fuel, nuclear plants heat water using uranium fuel

to produce electricity through a process called fission. This allows nuclear power plants to

operate with zero carbon emission, setting them apart from other plants. Fission is a physical

process of splitting the atoms of uranium isotope U-235.13 Since the nucleus of U0235 is

unstable, it breaks up and releases neutrons along with heat. The process repeats itself, creating

chain reactions.

Since they do not release carbon emission, energy experts consider nuclear power plants

as one possible solution to the global energy problem.14 Currently, uranium is the most common

resource for generating nuclear energy. However, it has several drawbacks. Although the amount

of waste is relatively small compared to the waste of fossil fuel using electricity generators, there

is the potential for meltdowns and hazards, because parts of the waste remain radioactive.

Nuclear waste can be categorized into three levels. The first is high-level waste, which is the

used nuclear fuel left after it has spent about three years in the reactor generating heat. The

second is low-level waste composed of lightly contaminated items such as tools and work

13 Rosen, Louis, and Alvin M. Hudson. "Symmetrical Tripartition of U 235 by Thermal Neutrons." Physical Review 78, no. 5 (1950): 533. 14 Sims, Ralph EH, Hans-Holger Rogner, and Ken Gregory. "Carbon emission and mitigation cost comparisons between fossil fuel, nuclear and renewable energy resources for electricity generation." Energy policy 31, no. 13 (2003): 1315-1326.

clothing. Lastly, the third type is intermediate-level waste that might include used filters, steel

components from within the reactor, and some effluents from reprocessing. The low-level

category makes up the majority of the waste, while the high-level waste composes the least.15

By Volume By Radioactive Content

High Level Waste 3% 95%

Intermediate Level Waste 7% 4%

Low Level Waste 90% 1%

Table 1: Nuclear Waste Composition and Radioactive Content16

The direst drawback is the ability of nuclear energy from uranium plants to be utilized as

a weapon. Nuclear power has changed international politics, because it can be made into

massively destructive weapons.17 It is of the interest of countries and international organizations

to prevent nuclear power from being used as weaponry. Consequently, there have been non-

proliferation treaties regarding nuclear weapons. The development of uranium by countries as

nuclear energy is closely monitored because of its ability to easily transformed into weapons.

Monitoring the use of uranium and any other source of radioactive material is one of the

purposes of the IAEA.

As an alternative to uranium as a nuclear power fuel, scientists have recommended

thorium. It has several potential advantages over uranium. First, it has three times greater

15 Scott, Britain A., Elise L. Amel, Susan M. Koger, and Christie M. Manning.Psychology for Sustainability. Routledge, 2015. 16 Ibid. 17 Kissinger, Henry A. "Nuclear weapons and foreign policy." (1984).

abundance on earth compared to uranium.18 The Thorium Energy Alliance (TEA) estimates that

“there is enough thorium in the United States alone to power the country at its current energy

level for over 1,000 years”.19 This leads to low cost of electricity production in the long run. The

low cost also comes from the fact that it thorium does not need other fuel except itself, because it

makes most or all of its own fuel.20 In addition to that, thorium’s ore, monazite, generally

contains higher concentrations of thorium than the percentage of uranium found its respective

ore.21 This makes thorium an even more cost efficient fuel source. Second, thorium provides

higher quality fuel than uranium. According to Nobel Laureate Carlo Rubbia of CERN, one ton

of thorium can produce as much energy as 200 tons of uranium.22 Third, there is a much less

nuclear waste. Chinese scientists claim that hazardous waste will be a thousand times less than

uranium.23 Lastly, even though it is possible, thorium has less potential of being used as a

weapon. It is difficult to make a practical nuclear bomb from a thorium reactor. Alvin Radowsky,

designer of the world’s first full-scale atomic electric power plant, stated “a thorium reactor’s

plutonium production rate would be less than two percent of that of a standard reactor, and the

plutonium’s isotopic content would make it unsuitable for a nuclear detonation”.24 However, it is

to be noted that it is possible to make a nuclear weapon out of thorium.

18 Goswami, D. Yogi, ed. The CRC handbook of mechanical engineering. CRC press, 2004. 19 Ibid. 20 Nuttin, A., D. Heuer, A. Billebaud, R. Brissot, C. Le Brun, E. Liatard, J-M. Loiseaux et al. "Potential of thorium molten salt reactorsdetailed calculations and concept evolution with a view to large scale energy production."Progress in nuclear energy 46, no. 1 (2005): 77-99. 21Thorn, J. D., C. T. John, and R. F. Burstall. "Thorium fuel cycles." In Nuclear power technology. 1983. 22 Evans-Pritchard, Ambrose. "Obama Could Kill Fossil Fuels Overnight with a Nuclear Dash for Thorium." The Daily Telegraph (London). 23 Evans-Pritchard, Ambrose. "Safe nuclear does exist, and China is leading the way with thorium." The Telegraph (2011). 24 Martin, Richard. Superfuel: Thorium, the Green Energy Source for the Future. Macmillan, 2012.

Despite these advantages of thorium over uranium, there are some hurdles as well. One

concern is the significantly higher start-up costs for thorium reactors compared to uranium

reactors. A great deal of testing, analysis, licensing, and qualification work is required before any

thorium fuel can enter into service.25 This is expensive and will not eventuate without a clear

business plan that encourages investment and government support. Even though there is a lesser

amount of uranium stock on earth, it is still abundant and cheaper. Therefore, there is no actual

incentive for thorium investment. Another concern is that the development of breeder reactors,

which are nuclear reactors capable of generating more fissile material than it consumes. This

includes thorium reactors, which increases proliferation concerns.26 Even though it has less

potential compared to uranium, thorium can still be transformed into weapon. The risk of

countries developing nuclear weapons does not go away with the development of reactors.

The job of this committee is to determine if thorium is a good alternative to uranium for

generating nuclear power. Once this has been determined, the committee must find methods of

inducing nations of different economic, geographic, and political backgrounds to cooperate and

implement nuclear policies. The reduction or elimination of nuclear power as a weapon will alter

the world’s power distribution greatly, and the balance between the world safety and national

interests need to be discussed.

25 Green, Jim. "Thor-bores and uro-sceptics: thorium’s friendly fire." 26 BarP, R., L. Y. Chengl, J. PhiHipS, J. PilatJ, G. Rochau, I. TheriosS, R. Wigeland, E. WonderJ, and M. Zentner. "Proliferation Risk Reduction Study ofAlternative Spent Fuel Processing." (2009).

Past UN Involvement

There are several UN actions in the past that should be considered, and affect the

arguments whether uranium should be replaced with thorium as nuclear energy resource. The

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Underwater

(Partial Test-Ban Treaty) restricts nuclear testing to underground sites only.27 This is the

beginning of gradual restrictions applied to nuclear possession. In 1967, the Treaty for the

Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

prohibits testing, use, manufacture, storage, or acquisition of nuclear weapons by Caribbean and

Latin American nations.28 It is followed in 2006 by Central Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

Treaty (Treaty of Semipalatinsk) that also prohibits testing, use, manufacture, storage, or

acquisition of nuclear weapons by five Central Asian States: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,

Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.29 There are also treaties that ban stationing nuclear weapon in

certain regions. In 1995, the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of

Bangkok) bans the development or stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of countries

in Southeast Asia.30 Then in 1996, the development or stationing of nuclear weapons is also

27Shadrina, Sasha Izni. "Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in The Atmosphere in Outer Space and Under Water (Limited/Partial Test Ban Treaty)." Indonesian Journal of International Law 8, no. 1 (2010): 164-188. 28 Goldblat, Jozef. "Nuclear‐weapon‐free zones: A history and assessment."The Nonproliferation Review 4, no. 3 (1997): 18-32. 29Roscini, Marco. "Something old, something new: The 2006 Semipalatinsk Treaty on a nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Asia." Chinese Journal of International Law 7, no. 3 30 Goldblat, Jozef. "Nuclear‐weapon‐free zones: A history and assessment."The Nonproliferation Review 4, no. 3 (1997): 18-32.

banned in the African continent under the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of

Pelindaba).31

In addition to treaties that ban nuclear weapon acquisition and emplacement in political

regions of countries, there are other forms of treaties. In 1971, the Treaty on the Prohibition of

the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil

Thereof (Seabed Treaty) bans the placement of nuclear weapons on the seabed or ocean floor.32

Also in 1996, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) places a worldwide ban on

nuclear test explosions of any kind and in any environment.33

However, the most important and well-known treaty is the Treaty on the Nonproliferation

of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968.34 With this treaty, the non-nuclear weapon states agree

never acquire nuclear weapons, and in exchange, are promised access to and assistance in the

peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Nuclear-weapon states pledge to carry out negotiations relating

to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament, and not to assist in any way in

the transfer of nuclear weapons to states without nuclear weapons.35

31Reddy, K. "African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) and the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, The." JS Afr. L. (1997): 273. 32Henkin, Louis. "Sea-Bed Arms Treaty--One Small Step More, The." Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 10 (1971): 61. 33Hoffmann, Wolfgang, Rashad Kebeasy, and Petr Firbas. "Introduction to the verification regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty." Physics of the Earth and Planetary Interiors 113, no. 1 (1999): 5-9. 34 Bunn, George. "The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems." Arms Control Today 33, no. 10 (2003): 4-10. 35 Ibid.

Questions to Consider

1. Should countries use thorium instead of uranium for nuclear energy? What countries

might not want to use thorium? What countries will be proponents of using thorium?

2. Is it necessary under the past UN treaties to alter the use of uranium to thorium because

of its lack of potential to be used as a weapon?

3. Are the benefits of switching the entire international community to thorium worth the

costs? Is this is a feasible goal?

4. Would it be an infringement upon national sovereignty to ban the use of uranium to

produce nuclear power?

5. If it is agreed that thorium needs to be used instead of uranium, should countries stop

using uranium in total? What countries might not agree with that?

6. Are radioactive chemicals such as uranium and thorium recommended in general to be

used as electricity generators? Think about its capability as weapons and its lack of carbon

emission compared to other sources such as natural gas, oil, etc.

7. What countries or parties would support using nonradioactive sources compared to

uranium and/or thorium?

8. What measurements should this committee and countries, especially those with nuclear

weapons, do to make sure that uranium and thorium reactors are not transformed into nuclear

weapons?

Topic 2: International Nuclear Disarmament Safeguards

Topic Introduction

The IAEA was founded out of concern regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The purpose of the IAEA was reflected in United States President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for

Peace” address to the UN General Assembly, in which there was recognition of a need for an

international body to both regulate and promote peaceful use of nuclear power.36 The safeguard

role of the IAEA is derived from this purpose. In the context of nuclear proliferation, safeguard

is the international accounting and verification system designed to ensure that fissile material is

used only for peaceful resources.37 A fissile material is able to undergo nuclear fission chain

reactions.

In practice, safeguard is a tool for the IAEA to provide timely detection of undeclared

diversion and signification production of nuclear weapons.38 It has its own standard of what is to

be declared significant. The standard for a significant amount of radioactive material is 8 kg of

plutonium or uranium U022, or 25 kg of less reactive highly enriched uranium (HEU).39 The

respective amount of plutonium and HEU can result in a devastating nuclear weapon, and thus it

is the standard of the IAEA. However, nuclear material can be weaponized with less than the

standard amount of plutonium, even though it would result in a less effective weapon. The

atomic bomb used in Nagasaki by the United States, for instance, only used 6 kg of plutonium.40

36 John Brittain, Agustina Grossi, Jean-Pierre Cayol, and Aldo Malavasi, “The International Atomic Energy Agency: Linking Nuclear Science and Diplomacy,” Science & Diplomacy, Vol. 4, No. 2 (June 2015). 37 Arkin, William M., and Milton M. Hoenig. Nuclear weapons databook. Vol. 1. Ballinger, 1984. 38 Bunn, Matthew, “How IAEA Safeguards Work.” Lecture at the Harvard Kennedy School for IGA 232 Course: Controlling the World’s Most Dangerous Weapons, Cambridge, MA, September 20, 2013. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid.

However, the IAEA acts only as an alarm for timely detection of the diversion of nuclear

material to weaponry. The committee has no power or authority to force countries to stop

producing nuclear weapons.41 Once an alarm has been triggered, it is a matter for member states

to discuss, negotiate, and take action. It is to be noted that international organizations such as the

IAEA do not have military force, and only states are capable of possessing it.42

The IAEA conducts containment and surveillance in addition to material accountancy

while conducting inspections, detecting unusual activities, and confirming that there has been no

removal of material from sealed containers. Typical measures include surveillance cameras that

are placed in areas within a reactor with tamper-resistant seals that will break if the item is

opened and tamper-resistant tags.43 If there is a disruption within these measurements, such as

when cameras malfunction or seals break, re-inspection is required.44

There are two kinds of safeguards developed by the IAEA. The older kind is the

traditional safeguard is the inspection system by the IAEA on reactors reported by host

countries.45 IAEA inspectors are given information about facilities in a country by the host

country, and they conduct inspections on the reactors to make sure that the reactors meet

standards. This has mostly been the system until the discovery of covert nuclear facilities in Iraq

in 1991.46 The second, new kind of safeguard is the inspection system to make sure that there are

not secret and undeclared facilities. The key in this safeguard is the integration of information

41 Moglewer, Sidney. "IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation." Bull. At. Sci.;(United States) 37, no. 8 (1981). 42 Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics." International organization 46, no. 02 (1992): 391-425. 43 Bunn, Matthew, “How IAEA Safeguards Work.” Lecture at the Harvard Kennedy School for IGA 232 Course: Controlling the World’s Most Dangerous Weapons, Cambridge, MA, September 20, 2013. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid.

from many sources, such as open source information (news, visitors’ accounts, etc.), intelligence

information provided by IAEA member states, expanded access to more locations, and other

sorts of information sources.47

With the development of the new safeguard, especially after the discovery of covert

nuclear facilities in Iraq, the IAEA developed an additional protocol (AP). This is because even

though the IAEA had the right and obligation to check the declared total of materials as the state

reported for its correctness and to make sure that there are no hidden stocks and/or secret

facilities. Existing traditional safeguards were not able to perform the latter task. It requires

greater access to information, more access to locations, and better procedures for inspections.48

For more access to information, state are required to provide more information about their

nuclear activities, including R&D on technologies that could be used to produce HEU or

plutonium. Regarding access to locations, the IAEA now as more access to both additional

locations at both declared and undeclared nuclear sites. Better procedures for inspections include

the ability of the IAEA to conduct inspections with less advance warning to the host country.

With the AP, the IAEA seeks to understand the total picture of a state’s nuclear activities.49

Past UN Involvement

Safeguards are mostly applied to non-nuclear states under the Non-Proliferation Treaty

(NPT). However, nuclear weapon states including the United States, the United Kingdom,

France, China, and Russia can voluntarily offer their nuclear reactors to inspection by the IAEA

47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid.

by signing the voluntary offer agreement.50 India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel are not

signatory to the NPT in the first place can also let the IAEA inspect their nuclear reactors.51

These countries offer themselves to inspection by the committee for non-discriminatory reasons.

The following table shows the safeguard situations for various countries.

Country Year of First Nuclear

Weapons Test

Safeguard Situation for

Nuclear Power

United States 1945 All civil nuclear facilities are

subject to safeguards.

United Kingdom 1952 All civil nuclear facilities are

subject to IAEA safeguards.

Russia 1949 IAEA safeguards are

generally not applied.

France 1960 All civil nuclear facilities are

under Euratom safeguards.

All civil nuclear facilities

containing safeguard-

obligated nuclear material

are subject to IAEA

50 Denza, Eileen. "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: the European Union and Iran." European foreign affairs review 10, no. 3 (2005): 289-311. 51 Bunn, Matthew, “How IAEA Safeguards Work.” Lecture at the Harvard Kennedy School for IGA 232 Course: Controlling the World’s Most Dangerous Weapons, Cambridge, MA, September 20, 2013.

jurisdiction.

China 1964 All imported nuclear power

plants are under safeguards,

as is the Russian-supplied

centrifuge enrichment plant.

India 1974 14 civil power reactors are

under IAEA safeguards,

along with all future civil

facilities, pursuant to the

2008 US-India agreement

and 2014 additional

protocol.

Pakistan 1998 Civil power reactors under

item-specific IAEA

safeguards.

Israel Nil No nuclear power

North Korea 2006 No nuclear power

Table 2: Voluntary Offer Agreement Situation for Nuclear Power52

Case Studies

Iraq 52 Shea, Thomas E. "On the application of IAEA safeguards to plutonium and highly enriched uranium from military inventories." Science & Global Security3, no. 3-4 (1993): 223-236.

After the 1991 Gulf War, inspectors found that Iraq had large nuclear weapons program

that was undetected by traditional safeguards.53 It was only partly detected by United States CIA,

which triggered further investigation. It was discovered that Iraq had major undeclared facilities

and secret activities at declared sites. Realizing this, the UN Security Council gave the IAEA a

chance to test out new approaches, and thus the AP was developed.54

Iran

In 2011, it was discovered that Iran had an 18-year undeclared centrifuge program that

was undetected by traditional safeguards.55 Iran imported uranium from China without reporting

it.56 After the discovery, surveillance and containment with the new safeguard was conducted to

ensure that material is neither added nor removed without detection. This includes unannounced

inspections roughly once a month, and actual measurements on all material once a year.57

Questions to Consider

1. What should the international community do to make sure that a state develops nuclear

energy for productive reasons and not for weapons?

2. How should countries with nuclear powers react to non-proliferation treaties that they

have agreed on? How should this committee influence them to reduce and eradicate their nuclear

weapons?

53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid.

3. What measurements should be taken when states refuse to comply with IAEA inspection?

Would these measurements be different when addressing member states of the IAEA vs. non-

member states?

4. Is 8 kg of plutonium an appropriate amount to be considered the IAEA’s standard for a

significant amount of nuclear fuel?

5. How can the IAEA detect secret nuclear facilities without infringing on national

sovereignty?

6. What frequency of inspections should be adequate enough to deter the development of

nuclear weapon utilization by states?

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