2 qatar, money and syria

8/11/2019 2 Qatar, Money and Syria

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He insists that he has stopped sending money to the battle, for now. His brigade'sfunds came, at least in part, from Qatar, he says, under the discretion of thenMinister of State for Foreign Affairs Khalid bin Mohammed Al Attiyah. But theinjection of cash was ad hoc: Dozens of other brigades like his received initial start-up funding, and only some continued to receive Qatari support as the months wore on.

When the funds ran out in mid-2013, his fighters sought support elsewhere. "Moneyplays a big role in the FSA, and on that front, we didn't have," he explained.Hossam is a peripheral figure in a vast Qatari network of Islamist-leaning proxiesthat spans former Syrian generals, Taliban insurgents, Somali Islamists, andSudanese rebels. He left home in 1996 after more than a decade under pressurefrom the Syrian regime for his sympathy with the Muslim Brotherhood. Many of hisfriends were killed in a massacre of the group in Hama province in 1982 by thenPresident Hafez al-Assad. He finally found refuge here in Qatar and built hisbusiness and contacts slowly. Mostly, he laid low; Doha used to be quite welcoming to

the young President Bashar al-Assad and his elegant wife, who were often spotted inthe high-end fashion boutiques before the revolt broke out in 2011.When the Syrian war came and Qatar dropped Assad, Hossam joined an expandingpool of middlemen whom Doha called upon to carry out its foreign policy of supportingthe Syrian opposition. Because there were no established rebels when the uprisingstarted, Qatar backed the upstart plans of expats and businessmen who promisedthey could rally fighters and guns. Hossam, like many initial rebel backers, hadplanned to devote his own savings to supporting the opposition. Qatar's donationsmade it possible to think bigger.

In recent months, Qatar's Rolodex of middlemen like Hossam has proved both ablessing and a curse for the United States. On one hand, Washington hasn't shiedaway from calling on Doha's connections when it needs them: Qatarorchestratedtheprisoner swap that saw U.S. soldier Bowe Bergdahl freed in exchange for five Talibanprisoners in Guantnamo Bay. And it ran the negotiations with al-Nusra Front, alQaeda's affiliate in Syria, that freed American writer Peter Theo Curtis in August."Done," Qatari intelligence chief Ghanim Khalifa al-Kubaisireportedly textedacontact -- adding a thumbs-up emoticon -- after the release was completed.But that same Qatari network has also played a major role in destabilizing nearlyevery trouble spot in the region and in accelerating the growth of radical and jihadifactions. The results have ranged from bad to catastrophic in the countries that arethe beneficiaries of Qatari aid: Libya is mired in a war between proxy-fundedmilitias, Syria's opposition has been overwhelmed by infighting and overtaken byextremists, and Hamas's intransigence has arguably helped prolong the Gaza Strip'shumanitarian plight.For years, U.S. officials have been willing to shrug off Doha's proxy network -- oreven take advantage of it from time to time. Qatar's neighbors, however, have not.Over the past year, fellow Gulf countries Saudi Arabia, the United Arab

Emirates, and Bahrain havepublicly rebukedQatar for its support of politicalIslamists across the region.
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Latest-News-Wires/2014/0603/How-Qatar-helped-win-Bowe-Bergdahl-s-releasehttp://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Latest-News-Wires/2014/0603/How-Qatar-helped-win-Bowe-Bergdahl-s-releasehttp://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Latest-News-Wires/2014/0603/How-Qatar-helped-win-Bowe-Bergdahl-s-releasehttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/american-executive-former-fbi-agent-and-qataris-sought-to-free-peter-theo-curtis/2014/08/25/43d24bac-2c85-11e4-9b98-848790384093_story.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/american-executive-former-fbi-agent-and-qataris-sought-to-free-peter-theo-curtis/2014/08/25/43d24bac-2c85-11e4-9b98-848790384093_story.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/american-executive-former-fbi-agent-and-qataris-sought-to-free-peter-theo-curtis/2014/08/25/43d24bac-2c85-11e4-9b98-848790384093_story.htmlhttp://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2014/03/05/Gulf-trio-pull-Qatar-ambassadors-why-now-.htmlhttp://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2014/03/05/Gulf-trio-pull-Qatar-ambassadors-why-now-.htmlhttp://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2014/03/05/Gulf-trio-pull-Qatar-ambassadors-why-now-.htmlhttp://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2014/03/05/Gulf-trio-pull-Qatar-ambassadors-why-now-.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/american-executive-former-fbi-agent-and-qataris-sought-to-free-peter-theo-curtis/2014/08/25/43d24bac-2c85-11e4-9b98-848790384093_story.htmlhttp://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Latest-News-Wires/2014/0603/How-Qatar-helped-win-Bowe-Bergdahl-s-release


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Over the past year, fellow Gulf countries Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates,and Bahrain havepublicly rebukedQatar for its support of political Islamists acrossthe region. These countrieshave threatenedto close land borders or suspendQatar's membership in the regional Gulf Cooperation Council unless the country backsdown. After nearly a year of pressure, the first sign of a Qatari concessioncameon

Sept. 13, when seven senior Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood figures left Dohaat therequestof the Qatari government.Both Qatar and its critics are working to ensure that Washington comes down ontheir side of the intra-Gulf dispute. At stake is the future political direction of theregion -- and their roles in guiding it.Late last week, on Sept. 25, Glenn Greenwald'sThe Interceptdocumented how aWashington, D.C.-based firm retained by the United Arab Emirates made contactswith journalists that appear to have yielded articles detailing how fundraisers forgroups such as al-Nusra Front and Hamas operate openly in Doha, Qatar's

capital. Foreign Policy also obtained documents from the Camstoll Group, run byformer U.S. Treasury Department official Matthew Epstein. Although some of thisopen-source information is referred to in this article, the vast majority of thereporting comes from months of investigation in the region.After several weeks of bad press, Qatar is also going on the offensive. "We don'tfund extremists," Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thanitold CNN's ChristianeAmanpourduring his first interview as Qatar's leader on Sept. 25. Just over a weekearlier, Qatarinstituteda new law to regulate charities and prevent them fromengaging in politics. And on Sept. 15, Doha began a new six-month contract with

Washington lobbying firm Portland PR Inc., which may include lobbying Congress andbriefing journalists.So far, Washington appears unwilling to confront Qatar directly. Aside from the U.S.Treasury Department, which last week designated a second Qatari citizen forsupporting al Qaeda in Syria and elsewhere, no senior U.S. administration officialshave publicly called out Doha for its troublesome clients.The State Department said that nobody would be available to comment for thisarticle, but released afact sheeton Aug. 26 that describes Qatar as "a valuablepartner to the United States" and credits it with "play[ing] an influential role in theregion through a period of great transformation."The question is what the United States is prepared to do about Qatar if it fails tostem its citizens' support for extremist groups, says Jean-Louis Bruguire, theformer head of the EU and U.S. Treasury Department's joint Terrorist FinanceTracking Program, now based in Paris. "The U.S. has the tools to monitor state andstate-linked transfers to extremist groups. But intelligence is one thing and theother is how you react," he told FP by phone. "What kind of political decision is theU.S. really able to make against states financing terrorism?"Friends of QatarThere is no more telling indication of Qatar's ambitions than the fact that Doha taxidrivers are perpetually lost. With construction ongoing everywhere -- part of a$100
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interconnected community of Salafists living in Qatar but also in Saudi Arabia,Kuwait, Bahrain, and elsewhere. Clerics have been hosted by ministries and called totalk for important events. Charities have touted the cause -- charities like theSheikh Eid bin Mohammad al Thani Charity, regulated by the Qatari Ministry of Laborand Social Affairs, which is "probably the biggest and most influential activist Salafi-

controlled relief organization in the world," according to arecent reportby theCarnegie Endowment for International Peace.As early as 2003, the U.S. Congress was made aware that Qatari-based charitieswere helping move and launder money linked to al Qaeda, providing employment anddocumentation for key figures in the operation. At the same time, Qatar's globalinfluence was growing: State-backed Qatar Airways began an aircraft-buying spree in2007 to fuel its vast expansion, linking the once far-flung emirate to every corner ofthe world. And by 2010, Al Jazeera had evolved into the Arab world's most influentialmedia operation, supported by amassive annual budgetof $650 million.

Just as the Arab Spring invigorated opposition movements across the Middle East, sotoo did it electrify Qatar's network of political clients.Power projection by proxy
http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/05/07/kuwaiti-salafism-and-its-growing-influence-in-levant/ha83http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/05/07/kuwaiti-salafism-and-its-growing-influence-in-levant/ha83http://www.journalism.org/2012/11/28/arab-satellite-news/http://www.journalism.org/2012/11/28/arab-satellite-news/http://www.journalism.org/2012/11/28/arab-satellite-news/http://www.journalism.org/2012/11/28/arab-satellite-news/http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/05/07/kuwaiti-salafism-and-its-growing-influence-in-levant/ha83


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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/09/30/the_case_against_qatar_funding_extremists_salafi_syria_uae_jihad_muslim_brotherhood_taliban?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Flashpoints&utm_campaign=2014_FlashPoints_9_30_SPE


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Qatar was the only Gulf country not to view with trepidation the changes that roiledthe Arab world starting in 2011. Saudi Arabia was shaken by how quickly Washingtondropped its decades-long ally in Egypt, Hosni Mubarak. Bahrain convulsed when itsmajority Shiite population took to the streets to demand greater political influence.The UAE joined Qatar in backing NATO strikes in Libya but was considerably more

reticent about the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood there and in Egypt, fearing thegroup would invigorate Islamist-sympathizers among its own population.Qatar, meanwhile, placed a long bet that political Islam was the next big thing thatwould pay off. "Qatar believes in two things. First, Doha doesn't want the Saudis tobe the major or only player in the Sunni region of the Middle East," says Kuwaitipolitical scientist Abdullah al-Shayji. "Second, Qatar wants to have a role to play as amajor power in the region."Yet mismatched with its grand ambitions, Qatar's foreign policy faced a keylimitation. The country is home to just under 300,000 nationals, and government

decision-making is concentrated in the hands of just a few officials. Lacking their owninfrastructure, Qatar sought to amplify its impact by working through its network ofBrotherhood and Salafi allies."The Qataris usually work by identifying individuals who they think are ideologicallyon the same wavelength," says Andreas Krieg, an assistant professor at King's CollegeLondon and an advisor to the Qatar Armed Forces. "There is no vetting process perse; it's 'these are people we can trust.'"The first battlefield test of Qatar's proxy chain was in Libya, where there was abroad regional consensus -- as well as U.S. support -- to oust then-leader Muammar

al-Qaddafi. Qatar, together with the UAE, had signed on to Western airstrikesagainst the regime. But Doha also wanted to help build up rebel capacity on theground."They had to literally go to their address book and say, 'Who do we know in Libya?'"says Krieg. "This is how they coordinated the Libya operation." Doha lined up acollection of businessmen, old Brotherhood friends, and ideologically aligneddefectors, plying them with tens of millions of dollars and 20,000 tons of arms,theWall Street Journallater estimated. After a months-long war, the rebels tookTripoli and Qaddafi was dead. Doha's clients found themselves among the mostpowerful political brokers in the new Libya. And long after the NATO strikes hadended, some Qatari-backed militias continued to receive support, says Bruguire.Amid the initial euphoria of the Arab Spring, many expected the nascent summerprotests in Syria to quickly topple the Assad regime. Presidents in Tunisia and Egypthad lasted just weeks before resigning, after all, and the world had quickly rallied tooust a more persistent Qaddafi. By August, Washington was calling on Assad to stepdown as well. Not long thereafter, Qatar began its Syrian operation, modelled on theLibyan adventure.Like the tendering of a contract, Doha issued a call for bidders to help with theregime's overthrow. "When we started our battalion [in 2012], the Qataris said,'Send us a list of your members. Send us a list of what you want -- the salaries and
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support needs,'" Hossam, the Syrian restaurant owner, remembers. He and dozens ofother would-be rebel leaders submitted a pitch. He doesn't say how much his brigadereceived, but says his own fundraising efforts for humanitarian goods have yieldedhundreds of thousands of riyals.Qatar's friends abroad were also at work. Throughout 2012 and early 2013, activist

Salafists in Kuwaitteamed up with Syrian expatriatesto build, fund, and supplyextremist brigades that would eventually become groups such as al-Nusra Front andits close ally, Ahrar al-Sham.Using social media to tout their cause and a deep Rolodex of Kuwaiti business

contacts, clerics and other prominent Kuwaiti Sunnisraisedhundreds of millions of

dollars for their clients.

Using social media to tout their cause and a deep Rolodex of Kuwaiti businesscontacts, clerics and other prominent Kuwaiti Sunnisraisedhundreds of millions ofdollars for their clients. They were able to work essentially unhindered thanks to

Kuwait'slax counterterrorism financing lawsand its freedoms of association andspeech.One such donor was the young Kuwaiti Salafi cleric Hajjaj al-Ajmi, who on Aug. 6 wasdesignated by the U.S. Treasury Department as a funder of terrorism for backing al-Nusra Front. Ajmi runs the so-calledPeople's Commission for the Support of theSyrian Revolution,many of whose campaign posters on Twitter spoke of charity work-- giving food or medicine to the needy and displaced. But back in June 2012, Qatar'sMinistry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs invited the cleric to speak in the coastalcity of Al Khor, 30 miles outside Doha, wherehe arguedthat humanitarian support

alone would never topple the Syrian regime."Did you know that bringing down Damascus would not cost more than $10 million?" heintoned, wagging his fingers from his chair in front of the old Syrian flag adopted byrevolutionaries. "The priority is the support for the jihadists and arming them."In the months that followed, many of Ajmi's campaigns in Kuwait ranparallelcollectionsin Qatar. Donations could be placed through a representative namedMubarak al-Ajji, according tocampaign posters,which affirm he is under Ajmi's"supervision." Ajji's Twitter bio describes him as loving Sunni jihadists who hate"Shiites and infidels." His timeline is flush with praise for Osama bin Laden.One of Ajmi's Kuwaiti colleagues, a cleric named Mohammad al-Owaihan, also usedQatar as a base,calling ithis "second country" in a tweet in August. As recently asApril, Owaihan solicited Qataris to help prepare fighters for battle on the Syriancoast. "Our jihad is a jihad of Money in Syria," one posterread,offering contactnumbers in Kuwait and Qatar.These fundraising efforts were well-honed appeals, for example placing donors inspecial categories for donations of varying sizes. A "gold" gift was 10,000 Qataririyals ($2,750), while a "silver" donation came in at 5,000 riyals. When particularlygenerous donations arrived, Ajji and others reported them on Twitter, for exampleposting photos of jewelry turned over to fund the cause.
http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/12/06/syria_s_gulf_brigadeshttp://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/12/06/syria_s_gulf_brigadeshttp://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/12/06/syria_s_gulf_brigadeshttp://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/12/06-private-gulf-financing-syria-extremist-rebels-sectarian-conflict-dickinsonhttp://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/12/06-private-gulf-financing-syria-extremist-rebels-sectarian-conflict-dickinsonhttp://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/12/06-private-gulf-financing-syria-extremist-rebels-sectarian-conflict-dickinsonhttp://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/12/06-private-gulf-financing-syria-extremist-rebels-sectarian-conflict-dickinsonhttp://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/12/06-private-gulf-financing-syria-extremist-rebels-sectarian-conflict-dickinsonhttp://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/12/the-foreign-policy-blog-elizabeth-dickinson-on-financing-extremism-in-syria/#.Ut-sA7Rfqothttp://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/12/the-foreign-policy-blog-elizabeth-dickinson-on-financing-extremism-in-syria/#.Ut-sA7Rfqothttp://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/12/the-foreign-policy-blog-elizabeth-dickinson-on-financing-extremism-in-syria/#.Ut-sA7Rfqothttps://twitter.com/alhayahalshabyhhttps://twitter.com/alhayahalshabyhhttps://twitter.com/alhayahalshabyhhttps://twitter.com/alhayahalshabyhhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7tdFIGKEAJAhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7tdFIGKEAJAhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7tdFIGKEAJAhttp://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/12/06-private-gulf-financing-syria-extremist-rebels-sectarian-conflict-dickinsonhttp://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/12/06-private-gulf-financing-syria-extremist-rebels-sectarian-conflict-dickinsonhttp://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/12/06-private-gulf-financing-syria-extremist-rebels-sectarian-conflict-dickinsonhttp://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/12/06-private-gulf-financing-syria-extremist-rebels-sectarian-conflict-dickinsonhttps://twitter.com/suotalfajer/status/484442385879810049https://twitter.com/suotalfajer/status/484442385879810049https://twitter.com/suotalfajer/status/484442385879810049https://twitter.com/Al_owaihan/status/458222660452089856https://twitter.com/Al_owaihan/status/458222660452089856https://twitter.com/Al_owaihan/status/458222660452089856https://twitter.com/Al_owaihan/status/451200304261128192https://twitter.com/Al_owaihan/status/451200304261128192https://twitter.com/Al_owaihan/status/451200304261128192https://twitter.com/Al_owaihan/status/451200304261128192https://twitter.com/Al_owaihan/status/458222660452089856https://twitter.com/suotalfajer/status/484442385879810049http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/12/06-private-gulf-financing-syria-extremist-rebels-sectarian-conflict-dickinsonhttp://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/12/06-private-gulf-financing-syria-extremist-rebels-sectarian-conflict-dickinsonhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7tdFIGKEAJAhttps://twitter.com/alhayahalshabyhhttps://twitter.com/alhayahalshabyhhttp://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/12/the-foreign-policy-blog-elizabeth-dickinson-on-financing-extremism-in-syria/#.Ut-sA7Rfqothttp://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/12/06-private-gulf-financing-syria-extremist-rebels-sectarian-conflict-dickinsonhttp://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/12/06-private-gulf-financing-syria-extremist-rebels-sectarian-conflict-dickinsonhttp://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/12/06/syria_s_gulf_brigades


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Among the grateful rebel brigades that released videos thanking the Kuwaiti clericOwaihan is Ahrar al-Sham, a Salafi group that counted anal Qaeda operativeas oneof its top commanders until he was killed this year: "O the kind people of Qatar, Opeople of the Gulf, your money has arrived," an October 2013videofrom the brigadeproclaims. Ajmi boasted of his proximity to Ahrar al-Sham on Sept. 9 in

atweetshowing the private online message the group's leader sent him when theKuwaiti cleric was designated and sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department.All of these fundraising activities were orchestrated by individuals -- not thegovernment -- as Qatar has noted in its defense in recent weeks. But this is alsoexactly the point: By relying on middlemen, Doha not only outsourced the work butalso the liability of meddling. And even where it wasn't involved directly, Qatar is notunaware of what's going on in its network.Many clerics in the activist Salafi movement have, like Ajmi, been outspoken in theirbacking of groups like al-Nusra Front in Syria -- views that have found a welcome

audience among government-backed organizations in Doha. Saudi cleric Mohammad al-Arefe, who has called for arming jihadists in Syria and Palestine, was invited byQatar's Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs in March 2012 and January2014 to deliver a Friday sermon and a lecture at Qatar's Grand Mosque. KuwaitiSalafist Nabil al-Awadhy -- aknown fundraiserfor groups close to al-Nusra Front --was the featured lecturer in Qatar at a Ramadan festival on July 4, 2014, hosted by acharity and aid group closely linked with the government.Hostage to proxiesQatar's Arab Spring strategy began to fail in the same place it was conceived, amid

the masses of protesters in Cairo's Tahrir Square. On July 3, 2013, demonstratorscheered on the Egyptian military's ouster of Islamist leader Mohamed Morsi, whosegovernment Qatar had backed to the tune of$5 billion.Within days, Saudi Arabia,the UAE, and Kuwait welcomed the new military-backed government with combinedpledges of $13 billion in aid. Days later, Saudi Arabiaseized controlof backing theSyrian opposition by installing its preferred political leadership. By early fall, Libyawas also falling into utter disarray, exemplified by thetemporary kidnappingof thecountry's prime minister in October 2013. Doha, which had just seen the ascension ofa new 33-year-old emir, meekly vowed to focus on internal affairs."One of the things about Qatar's foreign policy is the extent to which it has been acomplete and total failure, almost an uninterrupted series of disasters," says HusseinIbish, a senior fellow at the American Task Force on Palestine. "Except it's all byproxy, so nothing bad ever happens to Qatar."In both Libya and Syria, Qatar helped fund internationally backed umbrella groups --but it also channelled support to individuals and militias directly. In Libya, forexample, one of Qatar's main conduits to the rebels, the Doha-based cleric Ali al-Sallabi, clashed furiously with Mahmoud Jibril, a Western-backed leader who servedas interim prime minister until he resigned in October 2011,warningof "chaos" asvarious factions battled for control. Today, that warning seems prescient as Libya ismired in an accelerating battle between various rival militias split along regional and
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Institute for Strategic Studies. "The evolving nature of the Syrian rebellion createdoften unintended and problematic if at times beneficial entanglements."Even as the Syrian opposition gravitated toward the extreme, Qatar argued in late2012 that the world should worry about radicals later. "I am very much againstexcluding anyone at this stage, or bracketing them as terrorists, or bracketing them

as al Qaeda," Khalid bin Mohammad Al Attiyah, then minister of state for foreignaffairs,arguedat a security conference in December of that year.That sentiment was reiterated by Emir Tamim in his interview with CNN last week,arguing that it would be a "big mistake"to lump together all Islamist-leaning groups inSyria as extremists. Indeed, in all its recent statements rejecting extremism, Dohahas mentioned the Islamic State but never al-Nusra Front by name.Elzein, of the Al Jazeera Center for Studies, defends Qatar's support for Islamistsacross the Middle East. He describes the spat between Doha and the other Gulfmonarchies as a competition "between powers for the status quo and for change,

where Qatar sided itself with change in the region.""Qatar's foreign policy generated a lot of controversy, but perhaps that was part ofits very nature," he says. "When you try something new in a region known to be veryconservative, it's bound to bring that kind of criticism and misperception."And indeed, Qatar is far from the only Gulf country whose role in Syria andelsewhere has had negative repercussions. Saudi Arabia has also backed individualsand disparate rebel groups in Syria, and the UAE has sided with specific militias inLibya. In Egypt, a government strongly backed by both countries has overseen masshuman rights abuses as it cracks down against the Muslim Brotherhood.

But it's still hard to see what Qatar has changed for the better. Although itsintentions to help the Syrian people were almost certainly genuine, a combination ofhaphazard methods and support for ideological proxies helped push the oppositiontoward both radicalization and disarray.Washington and Doha
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Qatar had such freedom to run its network for the last three years becauseWashington was looking the other way. In fact, in 2011, the United States gave Dohade facto free rein to do what it wasn't willing to in the Middle East: intervene.Libya was a case in point. When U.S. President Barack Obama's administration beganbuilding a coalition for airstrikes in the spring of 2011, it took an approachlater

coined"leading from behind": France and Britain took the lead in implementing theno-fly zone, while Qatar's and the United Arab Emirates' involvement demonstratedArab support. When Doha stepped forward to help organize the rebels, they werebroadly welcomed, former U.S. officials said in interviews with FP.The same was true in Syria. Despite reticence among certain camps of the U.S.government, particularly those who had worked on Libya, it was still the least-worstoption: Qatar, an ally of the United States, could help provide a regional solution to aconflict the White House had no interest in getting entangled in. Washington simplyasked Doha not to send anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles to the rebels, which

itoccasionally did anyway.On top of the political convenience was the logistical ease of working with theQataris. Doha makes decisions quickly -- and is willing to take risks. While the Saudismoved slowly getting arms into Syria, the Qatarissent planesto move anestimated3,500 tonsof military equipment in 2012 and 2013, reportedly with theCIA's backing. "Their interagency process has about three people in it," said oneformer U.S. official.The same upsides meant that Washington turned to Doha when it sought to makecontactwith the Afghan Taliban in 2011 and 2012. The goal was to help smooth the

exit of NATO troops from Afghanistan with a political solution. In on-and-offcontacts, always made indirectly through the Qataris, the Taliban agreed tonegotiate -- but first they wanted an office. In June 2013, they got it: a large villa inthe embassy district of Doha near a crowded traffic circle known as RainbowRoundabout.But Qatar's advantages soon turned into liabilities. As Doha moved from crisis tocrisis, the Qataris showed little ability to choose reliable proxies or to control themonce resources had been pumped in. "My view is that Qatari policymaking was a bitamateur. When they got in, they showed no staying power," the ex-U.S. official said.In the Taliban case, Doha proved unable or unwilling to stop the Afghan militantsfrom audaciously raising their flag over their new Qatari villa -- an act of diplomaticsymbolism that infuriated Kabul and scuppered talks before they began. All thatcould be salvaged from the process, it became clear a year later, was aprisonerexchangethat traded U.S. Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl for five top Taliban commanders beingheld in Guantnamo Bay. Qatar gave its assurances that the five operatives would beunder close watch in Doha -- but given the country's history, that doesn't necessarilymean they won't influence the Afghan battlefield.In Syria, meanwhile, it wasn't until the Islamic State gained prominence thatWashington sat up and took notice. In March, David S. Cohen, the TreasuryDepartment's undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, took the
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unprecedented step ofcalling outthe Qataris in public for a "permissive terroristfinancing environment." Such stark criticism, counterterrorism experts say, is usuallyleft for closed-door conversations. A public airing likely indicated Doha wasn'tresponsive to Washington's private requests.This summer, the conflict between Israel and Hamas also shone fresh light on

Qatar's links to extremists in Palestine. Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal has beenbased in Doha since breaking with the Syrian regime in 2012, and Qatar has workedto rehabilitate the group politically and financially ever since. In October of thatyear, Qatar's emir visited the Gaza Strip himself, pledging $400 million in aid.Before and during the latest Gaza war, fellow Gulf states began to lobby inWashington to get tough with Qatar. In 2013, the UAE spent $14 million -- more thanany other country -- on lobbying in Washington, according to data compiled by theSunlight Foundation. The Camstoll Group, which has beenlinkedto recent mediacoverage, has held a contract since 2012 thatdisclosure documentsindicate can

represent fees of up to $400,000 a month. In the first half of 2013, it earned $4.3million for activities thatdisclosure documentsdescribe as advising on matters of"illicit financial activities." (Disclosure: Foreign Policy'sPeaceGameprogram,presented in conjunction with the U.S. Institute of Peace, is underwritten in part bya grant from the UAE Embassy. All FP editorial content, however, is entirelyindependent.)Heads have begun to in Washington. In a Sept. 9 hearing in the U.S. House ofRepresentatives, witnesses and congressmen suggested measures that woulddramatically recast the relationship between Washington and Doha. In testimony,

Jonathan Schanzer, vice president for research at the Foundation for Defense ofDemocracies, proposed measures that could "send shock waves through the Qatarifinancial system": designating charities and individuals in Qatar, putting a hold on an$11 billion arms deal, and even opening an assessment into the cost of moving the U.S.military base away from the emirate."Excellent ideas," hearing chairman Rep. Ted Poe (R-Texas) said in reply to thewitnesses. "We ought to take them all and implement as many as we can."The U.S. Treasury Department is also stepping up efforts to crack down on al Qaedaand Islamic State funds; on Sept. 24, it designated several individuals with links toQatar. In addition to a Qatari national alleged to have moved funds from Gulf donorsto Afghanistan, the designations include Tariq Bin-Al-Tahar Bin Al Falih Al-Awni Al-Harzi, who gathered support from Qatar, including by arranging for the IslamicState "to receive approximately $2 million from a Qatar-based [Islamic State]financial facilitator, who required that Al-Harzi use the funds for military operationsonly," thedesignation says.Doha's pushback in reply is just the latest iteration of a long-running bidding waramong Gulf states for Washington's favor. Qatar has increased its visibility inWashington in recent years, holding active contracts with lobbying groups PattonBoggs, Barbour Griffith and Rogers, and BGR Government Affairs. With its vastphilanthropic arms, it has sponsored everything from student exchange programs to
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thecongressional charity baseball game.Since the global financial crisis, variousQatari investment funds have alsoinvested in propertyin Washington, Chicago, andelsewhere.Qatar's money runs even more obliquely as well, through the dozens of

consultants, businessmen, and former officials whom it has hired at one point or

another.Qatar's money runs even more obliquely as well, through the dozens of consultants,businessmen, and former officials whom it has hired at one point or another. Take theSoufan Group, for example, a well-regarded consultancy on counterterrorism andintelligence. Its founder, Ali Soufan, is alsoexecutive directorof the QatarInternational Academy for Security Studies (QIASS) in Doha, a government-fundedcenter that offers several-week courses to government and military employees.Several other Soufan Group employees are alsolisted as employeesthere -- anaffiliation they rarely disclose in U.S. media interviews. Reached by telephone, Lila

Ghosh, communications specialist at the group, told FP that the firm did not do anywork on behalf of Qatar within the United States.QIASS also appears to have given former Obama White House spokesman RobertGibbs's new PR group, the Incite Agency, one of its first jobs. Just weeks after itopened, Incitehandled RSVPs for an eventco-hosted by the Soufan Group andQIASS on "countering violent extremism." The Incite Agency did not returnrepeated calls from FP seeking to clarify its relationship with QIASS.But the biggest reason that Qatar is likely to remain in good favor with Washingtonisn't money or influence, but necessity. As the United States ramps up a coalition

against the Islamic State militants, it will need first and foremost its air base inQatar, which isserving as the command centerfor operations -- and then once again,the cover of Arab support.With Syria and Iraq in chaos, both countries are now populated by a range ofextremist actors whom Washington won't want to negotiate with. Doha's up for thatjob. Most recently, Qatar was called in to help negotiate the release of 45 U.N.peacekeepers taken captive by al-Nusra Front -- and on Sept. 12 itannouncedthat ithad successfully won the soldiers' release. Qatar insists that a ransom was not paid;perhaps the network of Doha-based funders gave the government a certain leverageover the group. Or it just may be that the al Qaeda affiliate wants something evenmore valuable."I think what Qatar can give them is legitimacy," suggests Krieg. In al-Nusra Front'sofficial demands regarding the peacekeeper hostages, for example, ithad askedtobe taken off the U.N. sanctions list. "Nusra wants to be seen as a legitimate partneragainst [the Islamic State]; Qatar might be able to offer them a platform in thefuture," Krieg says.That's essentially what Qatar has long offered its friends: a platform, with access tomoney, media, and political capital. Washington has so far played along, but thequestion is whether the United States is actually getting played.Mohammed Saber/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images
http://www.congressionalbaseball.org/teams.htmlhttp://www.congressionalbaseball.org/teams.htmlhttp://www.congressionalbaseball.org/teams.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/local/qatar-is-suddenly-investing-heavily-in-the-us-bankrolling-dcs-city-center-other-projects/2013/12/17/1ffaceca-5c6a-11e3-95c2-13623eb2b0e1_story.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/local/qatar-is-suddenly-investing-heavily-in-the-us-bankrolling-dcs-city-center-other-projects/2013/12/17/1ffaceca-5c6a-11e3-95c2-13623eb2b0e1_story.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/local/qatar-is-suddenly-investing-heavily-in-the-us-bankrolling-dcs-city-center-other-projects/2013/12/17/1ffaceca-5c6a-11e3-95c2-13623eb2b0e1_story.htmlhttp://qiass.org/team/http://qiass.org/team/http://qiass.org/team/http://www.qiass.org/team/soufan/http://www.qiass.org/team/soufan/http://www.qiass.org/team/soufan/http://soufangroup.com/world-leaders-and-policy-makers-participate-in-groundbreaking-global-town-hall-on-countering-violent-extremism/http://soufangroup.com/world-leaders-and-policy-makers-participate-in-groundbreaking-global-town-hall-on-countering-violent-extremism/http://soufangroup.com/world-leaders-and-policy-makers-participate-in-groundbreaking-global-town-hall-on-countering-violent-extremism/http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-attacks-islamic-state-in-syria-with-five-middle-east-partners/2014/09/23/b78ad7e8-c8f2-4aa8-aaa7-ec92572f6716_story.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-attacks-islamic-state-in-syria-with-five-middle-east-partners/2014/09/23/b78ad7e8-c8f2-4aa8-aaa7-ec92572f6716_story.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-attacks-islamic-state-in-syria-with-five-middle-east-partners/2014/09/23/b78ad7e8-c8f2-4aa8-aaa7-ec92572f6716_story.htmlhttp://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/09/un-peacekeepers-release-mediated-qatar-201491284647722256.htmlhttp://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/09/un-peacekeepers-release-mediated-qatar-201491284647722256.htmlhttp://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/09/un-peacekeepers-release-mediated-qatar-201491284647722256.htmlhttps://twitter.com/Charles_Lister/status/506729894886121472https://twitter.com/Charles_Lister/status/506729894886121472https://twitter.com/Charles_Lister/status/506729894886121472https://twitter.com/Charles_Lister/status/506729894886121472http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/09/un-peacekeepers-release-mediated-qatar-201491284647722256.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-attacks-islamic-state-in-syria-with-five-middle-east-partners/2014/09/23/b78ad7e8-c8f2-4aa8-aaa7-ec92572f6716_story.htmlhttp://soufangroup.com/world-leaders-and-policy-makers-participate-in-groundbreaking-global-town-hall-on-countering-violent-extremism/http://www.qiass.org/team/soufan/http://qiass.org/team/http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/qatar-is-suddenly-investing-heavily-in-the-us-bankrolling-dcs-city-center-other-projects/2013/12/17/1ffaceca-5c6a-11e3-95c2-13623eb2b0e1_story.htmlhttp://www.congressionalbaseball.org/teams.html


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Karim Jafaar/AFP