FIRST DIVISION[G.R.No. L-41001. September 30, 1976.]MANILALODGENO.761,BENEVOLENTANDPROTECTIVEORDEROFTHEELKS, INC.,petitioner,vs.THEHONORABLECOURTOFAPPEALS, CITYOFMANILA, and TARLAC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,respondents.[G.R.No. L-41012. September 30, 1976.]TARLAC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,petitioner,vs.HONORABLECOURTOFAPPEALS, CITYOFMANILA,LODGENO.761,BENEVOLENTANDPROTECTIVEORDEROFELKS, INC.,respondents.Quasha, Asperilla, Zafra, Tayag & Ancheta, forManilaLodgeNo.761,BenevolentandProtectiveOrderoftheELKS, Inc.Jose P. Bengzon, Villegas, Zarraga, Narciso & CudalaandEmmanuel G. Cochico,for Tarlac Development Corporation.S.M. Artiaga Jr.andRestituto R. Villanueva, OfficeoftheCity Legal Officerfor CityofManila.D E C I S I O NCASTRO,Jp:STATEMENTOFTHECASE AND STATEMENTOFTHEFACTSThese two cases are petitions on certiorari to reviewthedecision dated June 30, 1975oftheCourtofAppealsin CA-G.R.No. 51590-R entitled "Tarlac Development Corporationvs. CityofManila, andManilaLodgeNo.761,BenevolentandProtectiveOrderofElks, Inc.," affirmingthetrial court's finding in Civil CaseNo. 83009 thattheproperty subjectofthedecisiona quois a "public park or plaza."LibLexOn June 26, 1905thePhilippine Commission enacted ActNo. 1.360 which authorizedtheCityofManilato reclaim a portionofManilaBay.Thereclaimed area was to form partoftheLuneta extension.TheAct provided thatthereclaimed area "shall bethepropertyoftheCityofManila" and that "theCityofManilais hereby authorized to set aside a tractofthereclaimed land formed bytheLuneta extension . . . atthenorth end not to exceed five hundred feet by six hundred feet in size, for a hotel site, and to leasethesame, withtheapprovaloftheGovernor General, to a responsible person or corporation for a term not to exceed ninety-ninety years."Subsequently,thePhilippine Commission passed on May 18, 1907 ActNo. 1657, amending ActNo. 1360, so as to authorizetheCityofManilaeither to lease or to selltheportion set aside as a hotel site.Thetotal area reclaimed was a little over 25 hectares.TheCityofManilaapplied fortheregistrationofthereclaimed area, and on January 20, 1911, O.C.T.No. 1909 was issued inthenameoftheCityofManila.Thetitle describedtheregistered land as "un terreno conocido con el nombre de Luneta Extension, situado en el distrito de la Ermita . . .."Theregistration was "subject, however, to suchoftheincumbrances mentioned in Article 39 or said law (Land Registration Act) as may be subsisting" and "sujeto a las disposiciones y condiciones impuestas en la LeyNo. 1360; y sujeto tambien a los contratos de venta. celebrados y otorgados por la Ciudad deManilaa favor del Army and Navy Club y laManilaLodgeNo.761,BenevolentandProtectiveOrderofElks, fechados respectivamente, en 29 de Diciembre de 1908 y 16 de Enero de 1909."1On July 13, 1911theCityofManila, affirming a prior sale dated January 16, 1909, conveyed 5,543.07 square metersofthereclaimed area totheManilaLodgeNo.761,BenevolentandProtectiveOrderofElksoftheU.S.A. (BPOE, for short) onthebasisofwhich TCTNo. 21952was issued tothelatter overthe"parcela de terreno que es parte de la Luneta Extension, Situada en el Distrito de la Ermita . . .." Atthebackofthis title was annotated document 4608/T-1635, which in part reads as follows: "que la citada Ciudad deManilatendra derecho a su opcion, de recomprar la expresada propiedad para fines publicos solamente, en cualquier tiempo despues de cincuenta anos desde el 13 de Julio de 1911, previo pago a la entidad compradora, o a sus sucesores del precio de la venta de la misma propiedad, mas el valor que entonces tengan las mejoras."FortheremainderoftheLuneta Extension, that is, after segregating therefromtheportion sold totheManilaLodgeNo.761, BPOE, a new CertificateofTitleNo. 21963was issued on July 17, 1911 totheCityofManila.ManilaLodgeNo.761, BPOE, subsequently soldthesaid 5,543.07 square meters totheElksClub, Inc., to which was issued TCTNo. 67488.4Theregistered owner, "TheElksClub, Inc.," was later changed by courtorderto "ManilaLodgeNo.761,BenevolentandProtectiveOrderofElks, Inc."In January 1963theBPOE petitionedtheCourtofFirst InstanceofManila, Branch IV, forthecancellationoftherightoftheCityofManilato repurchasetheproperty. This petition was granted on February 15, 1963.On November 19, 1963theBPOE sold forthesumofP4,700,000theland together with alltheimprovements thereon totheTarlac Development Corporation (TDC, for short) which paid P1,700,000 as down payment and mortgaged tothevendorthesame realty to securethepaymentofthebalance to be paid in quarterly installments.5Atthetimeofthesale, there wasnoannotationofany subsisting lien onthetitle totheproperty. On December 12, 1963 TCTNo. 73444 as issued to TDC overthesubject land still described as "UNA PARCELA DE TERRENO, que es parte de la Luneta Extension, situada en el Distrito de Ermita . . .."In June 1964theCityofManilafiled withtheCourtofFirst InstanceofManilaa petition forthereannotationofits right to repurchase;thecourt, after hearing, issued anorder, dated November 19, 1964, directingtheRegisterofDeedsoftheCityofManilato reannotatein tototheentry regardingtherightoftheCityofManilato repurchasetheproperty after fifty years. From thisorderTDC and BPOE appealed to this Court which on July 31, 1968 affirmed in G.R.Nos. L-24557 and L-24469thetrial court'sorderofreannotation, but reserved to TDCtheright to bring another action fortheclarificationofits rights.LLphilAs a consequenceofsuch reservation, TDC filed on April 28, 1971 againsttheCityofManilaandtheManilaLodgeNo.761, BPOE, a complaint, docketed as Civil CaseNo. 83009oftheCourtofFirst InstanceofManila, containing three causesofaction and praying "a)Onthefirst causeofaction, thattheplaintiff TDC be declared to have purchasedtheparcelofland now in question withthebuildings and improvements thereon fromthedefendant BPOE for value and in good faith, and accordingly orderingthecancellationofEntryNo. 4608/T-1635 on Transfer CertificateofTitleNo. 73444 inthenameofthePlaintiff."b)Onthesecond causeofaction, orderingthedefendantofManilato paytheplaintiff TDC damages inthesumofnot less than one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00);"c)onthethird causeofaction, reserving totheplaintiff TDCtheright to recover fromthedefendant BPOEtheamounts mentioned in par. XVIofthecomplaint in accordance with Art. 1555oftheCivil Code, intheremote event thatthefinal judgment in this case should be thattheparcelofland now in question is a public park; and"d)For costs, and for such other and further relief astheCourt may deem just and equitable."6Therein defendant CityofManila, in its answer dated May 19, 1971, admitted allthefacts alleged inthefirst causeofaction excepttheallegation that TDC purchased said property "for value and in good faith," but denied for lackofknowledge or informationtheallegations inthesecond and third causesofaction. As special and affirmative defense,theCityofManilaclaimed that TDC was not a purchaser in good faith for it had actual noticeoftheCity's right to repurchase which was annotated atthebackofthetitle prior to its cancellation, and that, assumingarguendothat TDC hadnonoticeoftheright to repurchase, it was, nevertheless, under obligation to investigate inasmuch as its title recites thattheproperty is a partoftheLuneta extension.7TheManilaLodgeNo.761, BPOE, in its answer dated June 7, 1971, admitted having soldtheland together withtheimprovements thereon for value to therein plaintiff which was in good faith, but denied for lackofknowledge as to their veracitytheallegations underthesecond causeofaction. It furthermore admitted that TDC had paidthequarterly installments until October 15, 1964 but claimed thatthelatter failed without justifiable cause to paythesubsequent installments. It also asserted that it was a seller for value in good faith without having misrepresented or concealed facts relative tothetitle ontheproperty. As counterclaim,ManilaLodgeNo.761(BPOE) sought to recoverthebalanceofthepurchase price plus interest and costs.8On June 15, 1971 TDC answeredtheaforesaid counterclaim, alleging that its refusal to make further payments was fully justified.9After due trialthecourta quorendered on July 14, 1972 its decision findingthesubject land to be partofthe"public park or plaza" and, therefore, partofthepublic domain.Thecourt consequently declared thatthesaleofthesubject land bytheCityofManilatoManilaLodgeNo.761, BPOE, was null and void; that plaintiff TDC was a purchaser thereof in good faith and for value from BPOE and can enforce its rights againstthelatter; and that BPOE is entitled to recover fromtheCityofManilawhatever consideration it had paidthelatter.Thedispositive partofthedecision reads:"WHEREFORE,theCourt hereby declares thattheparcelofland formerly covered by Transfer CertificateofTitleNos. 2195 and 67488 inthenameofBPOE and now by Transfer CertificateofTitleNo. 73444 inthenameofTarlac Development Corporation is a public park or plaza, and, consequently, instant complaint is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs."In viewofthereservation made by plaintiff Tarlac Development Corporation to recover from defendant BPOEtheamounts mentioned in paragraph XVIofthecomplaint in accordance with Article 1555oftheCivil Code,theCourt makesnopronouncement on this point."10From said decisionthetherein plaintiff TDC as well asthedefendantManilaLodgeNo.761, BPOE, appealed totheCourtofAppeals.In its appeal docketed as CA-G.R.No. 51590-R,theManilaLodgeNo.761, BPOE, avers thatthetrial court committedthefollowing errors, namely:1.In holding thattheproperty subjectoftheaction is not patrimonial propertyoftheCityofManila; and2.In holding thattheTarlac Development Corporation may recover and enforce its right againstthedefendant BPOE.11TheTarlac Development Corporation, ontheother hand, asserts thatthetrial court erred:(1)In finding thattheproperty in question is or was a public park and in consequently nullifyingthesale thereof bytheCityofManilato BPOE;(2)In applyingthecasesofMunicipalityofCavitevs. Rojas, 30 Phil. 602, andGovernmentvs. Cabangis,53 Phil. 112, tothecase at bar; and(3)In not holding thattheplaintiff-appellant is entitled to recover damages fromthedefendant CityofManila.12Furthermore, TDC, as appellee regardingthesecond assignmentoferror raised by BPOE, maintained that it can recover and enforce its right against BPOE intheevent thattheland in question is declared a public park or part thereof.13In its decision promulgated on June 30, 1975,theCourtofAppealsconcurred inthefindings and conclusionsofthelower court upontheground that they are supported bytheevidence and are in accordance with law, and accordingly affirmedthelower court's judgment.Hence,thepresent petitions for review on certiorari.G.R.No. L-41001TheManilaLodgeNo.761, BPOE, contends, in its petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R.No. L-41001, thattheCourtofAppealserred in (1) disregardingthevery enabling acts and/or statutes according to whichthesubject property was, and still is, patrimonial propertyoftheCityofManilaand could therefore be sold and/or disposedoflike any other private property; and (2) in departing fromtheaccepted and usual courseofjudicial proceedings when it simply made a general affirmanceofthecourta quo'sfindings and conclusions without bothering to discuss or resolve several vital points stressed bytheBPOE in its assigned errors.14G.R.No. L-41012TheTarlac Development Corporation, in its petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R.No. L-41012, relies onthefollowing grounds fortheallowanceofits petition:1.thattheCourtofAppealsdid not correctly interpret ActNo. 1360, as amended by ActNo. 1657,ofthePhilippine Commission; and2.thattheCourtofAppealshas departed fromtheaccepted and usual courseofjudicial proceedings in that it did not make its own findings but simply recited thoseofthelower court.15ISSUES AND ARGUMENTSFIRST ISSUEUponthefirst issue, both petitioners claim thattheproperty subjectoftheaction, pursuant totheprovisionsofActNo. 1360, as amended by ActNo. 1657, was patrimonial propertyoftheCityofManilaand not a park or plaza.ArgumentsofPetitionersIn G.R.No. L-41001,theManilaLodgeNo.761, BPOE, admits that "there appears to be some logic intheconclusion"oftheCourtofAppealsthat "neither ActNo. 1360 nor ActNo. 1657 could have meant to supplytheCityofManilatheauthority to sellthesubject property which is located atthesouth end notthenorth ofthereclaimed area."16It argues, however, that when ActNo. 1360, as amended, authorizedtheCityofManilato undertaketheconstructionoftheLuneta extension by reclaiming land fromtheManilaBay, and declared thatthereclaimed land shall bethe"propertyoftheCityofManila,"theState expressly grantedtheownership thereof totheCityofManilawhich. consequently, could enter into transactions involving it; that upontheissuanceofO.C.T.No. 1909, there could benodoubt thatthereclaimed area owned bytheCity was its patrimonial property;17thatthesouth endofthereclaimed area could not be for public use for. as argued by TDC, a street, park or promenade can be property for public use pursuant to Article 344oftheSpanish Civil Code only when it has already been so constructed or laid out, andthesubject land, atthetime it was sold totheElk's Club, was neither actually constructed as a street, park or promenade nor laid out as a street, park or promenade;18that even assuming thatthesubject property was atthebeginning propertyofpublic dominion, it was subsequently converted into patrimonial property pursuant to Art. 422oftheCivil Code, inasmuch as ithad never been used, regarded, or utilized since it was reclaimedin 1905 for purposes other than thatofan ordinary real estate for sale or lease; thatthesubject property had never been intended for public use, is further shown bythefact that it was neither included as a partoftheLuneta Park under PlanNo. 30oftheNational Planning Commission nor considered a partoftheLuneta National Park (now Rizal Park) by ProclamationNo. 234 dated December 19, 1955ofPresident Ramon Magsaysay or by ProclamationOrderNo. 274 dated October 4, 1967ofPresident Ferdinand E. Marcos;19that, such beingthecase, there isnoreason whythesubject property should not be considered as having been converted into patrimonial property, pursuant totheruling inMunicipalityvs. Roa, 7 Phil. 20, inasmuch astheCityofManilahas considered it as its patrimonial property not only bringing it undertheoperationoftheLand Registration Act but also by disposingofit;20and that to consider nowthesubject property as a public plaza or park would not only impairtheobligationsoftheparties tothecontractofsale dated July 13, 1911, but also authorize deprivationofproperty without due processoflaw.21G.R.No. L-41012In L-41012,thepetitioner TDC stresses thattheprincipal issue istheinterpretationofActNo. 1360, as amended by ActNo. 1657ofthePhilippine Commission,22and avers that inasmuch as Section 6ofActNo. 1360, as amended by Act 1657, provided thatthereclamationoftheLuneta extension was to be paid for outofthefundsoftheCityofManilawhich was authorized to borrow P350,000 "to be expended intheconstructionofLuneta Extension,"thereclaimed area became "public land" belonging totheCityofManilathat spent forthereclamation, conformably totheholding inCabangis,23and consequently, said land was subject to sale and other disposition; thattheInsular Government itself consideredthereclaimed Luneta extension as patrimonial property subject to disposition as evidenced bythefact that Sec. 3ofAct 1360 declared that "theland hereby reclaimed shall bethepropertyoftheCityofManila;" that this property cannot be property for public use for, according to Article 344oftheCivil Code,thecharacterofproperty for public use can only attach to roads and squares that have already been constructed or at least laid out as such, which conditions did not obtain regardingthesubject land; that Sec. 5ofAct 1360 authorizedtheCityofManilato leasethenorthern partofthereclaimed area for hotel purposes; that ActNo. 1657 furthermore authorizedtheCityofManilato sellthesame;24thattheexpress statutory authority to lease or sellthenorthern partofthereclaimed area cannot be interpreted to mean thattheremaining area could not be sold inasmuch asthepurposeofthestatute was not merely to confer authority to sellthenorthern portion but rather to limitthecity's powerofdisposition thereof, to wit: to prevent dispositionofthenorthern portion for any purpose other than for a hotel site;25thatthenorthern and southern endsofthereclaimed area cannot be considered as extensionoftheLuneta for they lie beyondthe-sidesoftheoriginal Luneta when extended inthedirectionofthesea, and that isthereason whythelaw authorizedthesaleofthenorthern portion for hotel purposes, and, forthesame reason, it is implied thatthesouthern portion could likewise be disposedof.26TDC argues likewise that there are several itemsofuncontradicted circumstantial evidence which may serve as aids in construingthelegislative intent and which demonstrate thatthesubject property is patrimonial in nature, to wit: (1) Exhibits "J" and "J-1", or PlanNo. 30oftheNational Planning Commission showingtheLuneta and its vicinity, do not includethesubject property as partoftheLuneta Park; (2) Exhibit "K", which istheplanofthesubject property covered by TCTNo. 67488ofBPOE, prepared on November 11, 1963, indicates that said property is not a public park; (3) Exhibit "T", which is a certified copyofProclamationNo. 234 issued on December 15, 1955 by President Magsaysay, and Exhibit "U" which is ProclamationOrderNo. 273 issued on October 4, 1967 by President Marcos, do not includethesubject property intheLuneta Park; (4) Exhibit "W", which isthelocation planoftheLuneta National Park under ProclamationsNos. 234 and 273, further confirms thatthesubject property is not a public park; and (5) Exhibit "y", which is a copyofO.C.T.No. 7333 inthenameoftheUnited StatesofAmerica coveringtheland now occupied bytheAmerican Embassy,theboundariesofwhich were delineated bythePhilippine Legislature, states thatthesaid land is bounded onthenorthwest by propertiesoftheArmy and Navy Club (BlockNo. 321) andtheElksClub (BlockNo. 321), and this circumstance shows that eventhePhilippine Legislature recognizedthesubject property as private propertyoftheElksClub.27TDC furthermore contends thattheCityofManilais estopped from questioningthevalidityofthesaleofthesubject property that it executed on July 13, 1911 totheManilaLodgeNo.761, BPOE, for several reasons, namely: (1)theCity's petition forthereannotationofEntryNo. 4608/T-1635 was predicated onthevalidityofsaid sale; (2) whentheproperty was bought bythepetitioner TDC it was not a public plaza or park as testified to by both Pedro Cojuangco, treasurerofTDC, andthesurveyor, Manuel Aonuevo; (4)theproperty was never used as a public park, for, sincetheissuanceofT.C.T.No. 2165 on July 17, 1911 inthenameoftheManilaLodgeNO.761,thelatter used it as private property, and as early as January 16, 1909theCityofManilahad already executed a deedofsale overtheproperty in favoroftheManilaLodgeNo.761; and (5)theCityofManilahas not presented any evidence to show thatthesubject property has ever been proclaimed or used as a public park.28TDC, moreover, contends that Sec. 60ofCom. ActNo. 141 cannot apply tothesubject land, for Com. ActNo. 141 took effect on December 1, 1936 and at that timethesubject land wasnolonger partofthepublic domain.29TDC also stresses that its rights as a purchaser in good faith cannot be disregarded, forthemere mention inthecertificateoftitle thatthelot it purchased was "partoftheLuneta extension" was not a sufficient warning thatthetitleoftheCityofManilawas invalid; and that althoughthetrial court, in its decision affirmed bytheCourtofAppeals, foundtheTDC to have been an innocent purchaser for value,thecourt disregardedthepetitioner's rights as such purchaser that relied on a Torrens certificateoftitle.30TheCourt, continuesthepetitioner TDC, erred in not holding thatthelatter is entitled to recover fromtheCityofManiladamages intheamountofP100,000 caused bytheCity's petition for reannotationofits right to repurchase.DISCUSSION AND RESOLUTIONOFFIRST ISSUEIt is a cardinal ruleofstatutory construction that courts must give effect tothegeneral legislative intent that can be discovered from or is unraveled bythefour cornersofthestatute,31and inorderto discover said intent,thewhole statute, and not only a particular provision thereof, should be considered.32It is, therefore, necessary to analyze alltheprovisionsofActNo. 1360, as amended, inorderto unravelthelegislative intent.ActNo. 1360 which was enacted bythePhilippine Commission on June 26, 1905, as amended by ActNo. 1657 enacted on May 18, 1907, authorizedthe"constructionofsuch rock and timber bulkheads or sea walls as may be necessary forthemakingofan extension totheLuneta" (Sec. 1[a]), andtheplacingofthematerial dredged fromtheharborofManila"insidethebulkheads constructed to inclosetheLuneta extension above referred to" (Sec. 1[c]). It likewise provided thattheplanofArchitect D. H. Burnham as "a general outline fortheextension and improvementoftheLuneta intheCityofManila" be adopted; that "thereclamation fromtheBayofManilaoftheland included in said projected Luneta extension . . . is hereby authorized andtheland thereby reclaimed shall bethepropertyoftheCityofManila" (Sec. 3); that "theCityofManilais hereby authorizedto set aside a tractofthereclaimed land formed bytheLuneta extension authorized by thisAct atthenorth endofsaid tract, not to exceed five hundred feet by six hundred feet in size,for a hotel site, and to leasethesamewiththeapprovaloftheGovernor General, . . . for a term not exceeding ninety-nine years;" that "shouldtheMunicipal Board . . . deem it advisable it ishereby authorized to advertise for sale to sell said tractofland. . .;" "that said tract shall be used for hotel purposes as herein prescribed, and shall not be devoted to any other purpose or object whatever;" "that shouldthegrantee . . . fail to maintain on said tract a first-class hotel . . . thenthetitle to said tractofland sold, conveyed, and transferred tothegrantee shall revert totheCityofManila,and said CityofManilashall thereupon become entitled totheimmediate possessionofsaid tractofland" (Sec. 3); thattheconstructionoftherock and timber bulkheads or sea wall "shall be paid for outofthefundsoftheCityofManila, butthearea to be reclaimed by said proposed Luneta extension shall be filled, without cost totheCityofManila, with material dredged fromManilaBay attheexpenseoftheInsular Government" (Sec. 6); and that "theCityofManilais hereby authorized to borrow fromtheInsular Government . . .thesumofthree hundred thousand pesos, to be expended intheconstructionoftheLuneta extension provided for by paragraph (a)ofsection one hereof" (Sec. 7).Thegrant made by ActNo. 1360ofthereclaimed land totheCityofManilais a grantofa "public" nature,thesame having been made to a local political subdivision. Such grants have always beenstrictlyconstrued againstthegrantee.33One compelling reason given forthestrict interpretationofa public grant is that there is in such grant a gratuitous donationof, public money or resources which results in an unfair advantage tothegrantee and for that reason,thegrant should be narrowly restricted in favorofthepublic.34This reason for strict interpretation obtains relative totheaforesaid grant for althoughtheCityofManilawas to pay fortheconstructionofsuch work and timber bulkheads or sea walls as may be necessary forthemakingoftheLuneta extension,thearea to be reclaimed would be filled attheexpenseoftheInsular Government and without cost totheCityofManila, with material dredged fromManilaBay. Hence,theletterofthestatute should be narrowed to exclude matters which if included would defeatthepolicyofthelegislation.cdllThereclaimed area, an extension totheLuneta, is declared to be propertyoftheCityofManila. Property, however, is eitherofpublic ownership orofprivate ownership.35What kindofpropertyoftheCity isthereclaimed land? Is itofpublic ownership (dominion) orofprivate ownership?We hold that it isofpublic dominion, intended for public use.Firstly, ifthereclaimed area was granted totheCityofManilaas its patrimonial property,theCity could, by virtueofits ownership, disposeofthewhole reclaimed area without needofauthorizationto do so fromthelawmaking body. Thus Article 348oftheCivil CodeofSpain provides that "ownership istheright to enjoy and disposeofa thing without further limitations than those established by law."36Theright to dispose (jus disponendi)ofone's property is an attributeofownership. ActNo. 1360, as amended, however, provides by necessary implication, thattheCityofManilacould not disposeofthereclaimed area without beingauthorizedbythelawmaking body. Thusthestatute provides that "theCityofManilaishereby authorizedto set aside a tract . . . atthenorth end, for a hotel site, and to leasethesame . . . shouldthemunicipal board . . . deem it advisable, it ishereby authorized. . . to sell said tractofland . . ." (Sec. 5). Ifthereclaimed area were patrimonial propertyoftheCity,thelatter could disposeofit without needoftheauthorization provided bythestatute, andtheauthorization to set aside . . . lease . . . or sell . . . given bythestatute would indeed be superfluous. To so construethestatute as to rendertheterm "authorize," which is repeatedly used bythestatute, superfluous would violatetheelementary ruleoflegal hermeneutics that effect must be given to every word, clause, and sentenceofthestatute and that a statute should be so interpreted thatnopart thereof becomes inoperative or superflous.37To authorize means to empower, to give a right to act.38ActNo. 1360 furthermore qualifiestheverb "authorize" withtheadverb "hereby," which means "by meansofthis statue or section." Hence withouttheauthorization expressly given by ActNo. 1360,theCityofManilacould not lease or sell eventhenorthern portion; much less could it disposeofthewhole reclaimed area. Consequently,thereclaimed area was granted totheCityofManila, not as its patrimonial property. At most, onlythenorthern portion reserved as a hotel site could be said to be patrimonial property, for, by express statutory provision it could be disposedof, andthetitlethereto would revert totheCity shouldthegrantee fail to comply withtheterms provided bythestatute.LLprTDC, however, contends thatthepurposeoftheauthorization provided in ActNo. 1360 to lease or sell was really to limittheCity's powerofdisposition. To sustain such contention is to begthequestion. Ifthepurposeofthelaw was to limittheCity's powerofdisposition, then it is necessarily assumed thattheCity had alreadythepower to dispose, for if such power did not exist, how could it be limited? It was precisely Act 1360 that gavetheCitythepower to dispose for it was "herebyauthorized" by lease or sale. Hence,theCityofManilahadnopower to disposeofthereclaimed land had such power not been granted by ActNo. 1360, andthepurposeoftheauthorization was to empowerthecity to sell or leasethenorthern part and not, as TDC claims, to limit onlythepower to dispose. Moreover, it is presumed that whenthelawmaking body enactedthestatute, it had full knowledgeofprior and existing laws and legislation onthesubjectofthestatute and acted in accordance or with respect thereto.39If by another previous law,theCityofManilacould already disposeofthereclaimed area, which it could do if such area were given to it as its patrimonial property, would it then not be a superfluity for ActNo. 1360 toauthorizetheCity to disposeofthereclaimed land? Neither has petitioner TDC pointed to any other law that authorizedtheCity to do so, nor have we come across any. What we do know is that ifthereclaimed land were patrimonial property, there would benoneedofgiving special authorization totheCity to disposeofit. Said authorization was given becausethereclaimed land was not intended to be patrimonial propertyoftheCityofManila, and withouttheexpress authorization to disposeofthenorthern portion,theCity could not disposeofeven that part.LibLexSecondly,thereclaimed area is an "extension totheLuneta intheCityofManila."40Ifthereclaimed area is an extensionoftheLuneta, then it isofthesame nature or character astheold Luneta. Anent this matter, it has been said that a power to extend (or continue an act or business) cannot authorize a transaction that is totally distinct.41It is not disputed thattheold Luneta is a public park or plaza and it is so considered by Section 859oftheRevised OrdinancesoftheCityofManila.42Hencethe"extension totheLuneta" must be also a public park or plaza and for public use.TDC, however, contends thatthesubject property cannot be considered an extensionoftheold Luneta because it is outsideofthelimitsoftheold Luneta when extended tothesea. This is a strained interpretationoftheterm "extension," for an "extension," it has been held, "signifies enlargement in any direction in length, breadth, or circumstance."43Thirdly,thereclaimed area was formerly a partoftheManilaBay. A by is nothing more than an inletofthesea. Pursuant to Article 1oftheLawofWatersof1866, bays, roadsteads, coast sea, inlets and shores are partsofthenational domain open to public use. These are also propertyofpublic ownership devoted to public use, according to Article 339oftheCivil CodeofSpain.Whentheshore or partofthebay is reclaimed, it does not lose its characterofbeing property for public use, according toGovernmentofthePhilippine Islandsvs. Cabangis.44Thepredecessoroftheclaimants in this case wastheownerofa big tractofland includingthelots is question. From 1896 said land began to wear away due totheactionofthewaterofManilaBay. In 1901thelots in question became completely submerged in water in ordinary tides. It remained in such a state until 1912 whentheGovernment undertookthedredgingoftheVitas estuary and dumpedthesand and silt from estuary onthelow lands completely submerged in water, thereby gradually formingthelots in question. Tomas Cabangis took possession thereof as soon as they were reclaimed; hence,theclaimants, his successors in interest, claimed thatthelots belonged to them.Thetrial court found fortheclaimants andtheGovernment appealed. This Court held that whenthelots became a partoftheshore. As they remained in that condition until reclaimed bythefilling done bytheGovernment, they belonged tothepublic domain for public use.45Hence, a partoftheshore, and for that purpose, a partofthebay, did not lose its characterofbeing for public use after it was reclaimed.Fourthly, Act 1360, as amended, authorizedthelease or saleofthenorthern portionofthereclaimed area as a hotel site.Thesubject property is not that northern portion authorized to be leased or sold;thesubject property isthesouthern portion. Hence, applyingtheruleofexpresio unius est exlusio alterius,theCityofManilawas not authorized to sellthesubject property.Theapplicationofthis principleofstatutory construction becomesthemore imperative inthecase at bar inasmuch as not only mustthepublic grantofthereclaimed area totheCityofManilabe, as above stated, strictly construed againsttheCityofManila, but also because a grantofpower to a municipal corporation, as happens in this case wherethecity is authorized to lease or sellthenorthern portionoftheLuneta extension, is strictly limited to such as are expressly or impliedly authorized or necessarily incidental totheobjectivesofthecorporation.Fifthly, Article 344oftheCivil CodeofSpain provides that "propertyofpublic use, in provinces and in towns, comprisestheprovincial and town roads,thesquares, streets, fountains, and public waters,thepromenades, and public worksofgeneral service paid for by such towns or provinces." A park or plaza, such astheextension totheLuneta, is undoubtedly comprised in said article.Thepetitioners, however, argue that, according to said Article 344, inorderthatthecharacterofproperty for public use may be so attached to a plaza,thelatter must be actually constructed or at least laid out as such, and sincethesubject property was not yet constructed as a plaza or at least laid out as a plaza when it was sold bytheCity, it could not be property for public use. It should be noted, however, that propertiesofprovinces and towns for public use are governed bythesame principles as propertiesofthesame character belonging tothepublic domain.46Inorderto be propertyofpublic domain an intention to devote it to public use is sufficient.47Thepetitioners' contention is refuted by Manresa himself who said, in his comments48on Article 344, that:"Las plazas, calles y paseos publicos corresponden, sin duda alguna, aldominio publicomunicipal, porque se hallan establecidos sobre suelo municipal y estan destinadas al uso de todos. Laurent presenta, tratando de las Plazas, una cuestion relativa a si deben conceptuarse como de dominio publico los lugares vacios, libres, que se encuentran en los Municipios rurales. . . . Laurent opina contra Proudhon, que toda vez que estan al servicio de todos esos lugares, deben considerarse publicos y de dominio publico. Realmente, para decidir el punto, bastara siempre fijarse en el destino real y efectivo de los citados lugares, y si este destino entraa un uso comun de todos,nohay duda que son de dominio municipal sinopatrimoniales."It is not necessary, therefore, that a plaza be already construed or laid out as a plaza inorderthat it be considered property for public use. It is sufficient that it be intended to be such. Inthecase at bar, it has been shown thattheintentionofthelawmaking body in giving totheCityofManilatheextension totheLuneta was not a grant to itofpatrimonial property but a grant for public use as a plaza.We have demonstratedad satietatemthattheLuneta extension was intended to be propertyoftheCityofManilafor public use. But, could not said property later on be converted, asthepetitioners contend, to patrimonial property? It could be. But this Court has already said, inIgnaciovs.TheDirectorofLands,49that it is onlytheexecutive and possiblythelegislative department that hastheauthority andthepower to makethedeclaration that said property isnolonger required for public use, and until such declaration is madetheproperty must continue to form partofthepublic domain. Inthecase at bar, there has beennosuch explicit or unequivocal declaration. It should be noted, furthermore, anent this matter, that courts are undoubtedly not primarily called upon, and are not in a position, to determine whether any public land is still needed forthepurposes specified in Article 4oftheLawofWaters.50Having disposedofthepetitioners' principal arguments relative tothemain issue, we now pass totheitemsofcircumstantial evidence which TDC claims may serve as aids in construingthelegislative intent intheenactmentofActNo. 1360, as amended. It is noteworthy that all these itemsofalleged circumstantial evidence are acts far removed in time fromthedateoftheenactmentofActNo. 1360 such that they cannot be considered contemporaneous with its enactment. Moreover, it is not far-fetched that this massofcircumstantial evidence might have been influenced bytheantecedent seriesofinvalid acts, to wit:theCity's having obtained overthereclaimed area OCTNo. 1909 on January 20, 1911;thesale made bytheCityofthesubject property toManilaLodgeNo.761; andtheissuance tothelatterofT.C.T.No. 2195. It cannot be gainsaid that ifthesubsequent acts constitutingthecircumstantial evidence have been based on, or at least influenced, by those antecedent invalid acts and Torrens titles, they can hardly be indicativeoftheintentofthelawmaking body in enacting ActNo. 1360 and its amendatory act.LexLibTDC claims that Exhs. "J," "J-1," "K," "T," "U," "W" and "Y" show thatthesubject property is not a park.Exhibits "J" and "J-1,"the"Luneta and vicinity showing proposed development" dated May 14, 1949, were prepared bytheNational Urban Planning CommissionoftheOfficeofthePresident. It cannot be reasonably expected that this plan for developmentoftheLuneta should show thatthesubject property occupied bytheElksClub is a public park, for it was made 38 years afterthesale totheElks, and after T.C.T.No. 2195 had been issued toElks. It is to be assumed thattheOfficeofthePresident was cognizantoftheTorrens titleofBPOE. Thatthesubject property was not included as a partoftheLuneta only indicates thattheNational Urban Planning Commission that madetheplan knew thatthesubject property was occupied byElksand thatElkshad a Torrens title thereto. But this innoway proves thatthesubject property was originally intended to be patrimonial propertyoftheCityofManilaor thatthesale toElksor thattheTorrens titleofthelatter is valid.Exhibit "K" isthe"Planofland covered by T.C.T.No. ____, as prepared for Tarlac Development Company." It was made on November 11, 1963 by Felipe F. Cruz, private land surveyor. This surveyor is admittedly a surveyor for TDC.51This plan cannot be expected to show thatthesubject property is a partoftheLuneta Park, fortheplan was made to showthelot that "was to be sold to petitioner " This plan must have also assumedtheexistenceofa valid title totheland in favorofElks.Exhibits "T" and "U" are copiesofPresidential ProclamationsNo. 234 issued on November 15, 1955 andNo. 273 issued on October 4, 1967, respectively.Thepurposeofthesaid Proclamations was to reserve certain parcelsofland situated intheDistrictofErmita, CityofManila, for park site purposes. Assuming thatthesubject property is not withintheboundariesofthereservation, this cannot be interpreted to mean thatthesubject property was not originally intended to be for public use or that it has ceased to be such. Conversely hadthesubject property been included inthereservation, it would not mean, if it really were private property, thattherightsoftheowners thereof would be extinguished, forthereservations was "subject to private rights, if any there be." Thatthesubject property was not included inthereservation only indicates thatthePresident knewoftheexistenceoftheTorrens titles mentioned above.ThefailureoftheProclamations to includethesubject property inthereservation for park site could not changethecharacterofthesubject property as originally for public use and to form partoftheLuneta Park. What has been said here applies to Exhibits "V", "V-1" to "V-3," and "W" which also refer tothearea and locationofthereservation fortheLuneta Park.LLjurExhibit "Y" is a copyofO.C.T.No. 7333 dated November 13, 1935, coveringthelot where now standstheAmerican Embassy [Chancery]. It states thattheproperty is "bounded . . . ontheNorthwest by propertiesofArmy and Navy Club (BlockNo. 321) andElksClub (BlockNo. 321)." Inasmuch asthesaid boundaries were delineated bythePhilippine Legislature in ActNo. 4269,thepetitioners contend thattheLegislature "recognized and concededtheexistenceoftheElksClub property as a private property (theproperty is question) and not as a public park or plaza. This argument isnon sequitur, plain and simple. Said Original CertificateofTitle cannot be considered as an inconvertible declaration thattheElksClub was in truth and in facttheownerofsuch boundary lot. Such mention as boundary owner is not a meansofacquiring title nor can it validate a title that is null and void.TDC finally claims thattheCityofManilais estopped from questioningthevalidityofthesale it executed on July 13, 1911 conveyingthesubject property totheManilaLodgeNo.761, BPOE. This contention cannot be seriously defended inthelightofthedoctrine repeatedly enunciated by this Court thattheGovernment is never estopped by mistakes or errors onthepart.ofits agents, and estoppel does not apply to a municipal corporation to validate a contract that is prohibited by law or its against public policy, andthesaleofJuly 13, 1911 executed bythecityofManilatoManilaLodgewas certainly a contract prohibited by law. Moreover, estoppel cannot be urged even iftheCityofManilaacceptedthebenefitsofsuch contractofsale andtheManilaLodgeNo.761had performed its partoftheagreement, for to applythedoctrineofestoppel againsttheCityofManilain this case would be tantamount to enabling it to do indirectly what it could not do directly.52Thesaleofthesubject property executed bytheCityofManilatotheManilaLodgeNo.761, BPOE, was void and inexistent for lackofsubject matter.53It suffered from an incurable defect that could not be ratified either by lapseoftime or by express ratification.TheManilaLodgeNo.761therefore acquirednoright by virtueofthesaid sale. Hence to consider nowthecontract inexistent as it always has been, cannot be, as claimed bytheManilaLodgeNo.761, an impairmentoftheobligationsofcontracts, for there was in contemplationoflaw,nocontract at all.CdprTheinexistenceofsaid sale can be set up against anyone who asserts a right arising from it, not only againstthefirst vendee,theManilaLodgeNo.761, BPOE, but also against all its successors, including,theTDC, which are not protected by law.54Thedoctrineofbona fidepurchaser without notice, being claimed bytheTDC, does not apply where there is a total absenceoftitle inthevendor, andthegood faithofthepurchaser TDC cannot create title where none exists.55Theso-called saleofthesubject property having been executed,therestoration or restitutionofwhat has been given is inorder.56SECOND ISSUEThesecond ground alleged in supportoftheinstant petitions for review on certiorari is thattheCourtofAppealshas departed fromtheaccepted and usual courseofjudicial proceedings as to call for an exerciseofthepowerofsupervision TDC, in L-41012, argues thattherespondent Court did not make its own findings but simply recited thoseofthelower court and made a general affirmance, contrary totherequirementsoftheConstitution; thattherespondent Court made glaring and patent mistakes in recounting eventhecopied findings, palpably showing lackofdeliberate considerationofthematters involved, as, for example, when said court said that ActNo. 1657 authorizedtheCityofManilato set aside a portionofthereclaimed land "formed bytheLuneta Extension or to lease or sellthesame for park purposes;" and that respondent Court, furthermore, did not resolve or disposeofanyoftheassigned errors contrary tothemandateoftheJudiciary Act.57TheManilaLodgeNo.761, in L-41001, likewise alleges, as oneofthereasons warranting review, thattheCourtofAppealsdeparted fromtheaccepted and usual courseofjudicial proceedings by simply making a general affirmanceofthecourta quo'sfindings without bothering to resolve several vital points mentioned bytheBPOE in its assigned errors.58COMMENTS ON SECOND ISSUEWe have shown in our discussionofthefirst issue thatthedecisionofthetrial court is fully in accordance with law. It follows that when such decision was affirmed bytheCourtofAppeals,theaffirmance was likewise in accordance with law. Hence,nouseful purpose will be served in further discussingthesecond issue.CONCLUSIONACCORDINGLY,thepetitions in both G.R.Nos. L-41001 and L-41012 are denied for lackofmerit, andthedecisionoftheCourtofAppealsofJune 30, 1975, is hereby affirmed, at petitioners' cost.Makasiar, Muoz PalmaandMartin, JJ.,concur.Teehankee, J.,concurs intheresult which is wholly consistent withthebasic rulings and judgmentofthis Court in its decisionofJuly 31, 1968.Footnotes1.Exh. "H," Exh. "13-Elks."2.Exh. "I."3.Exh. "X."4.Exh. "B".5.Exh. "C."6.Joint Record on AppealofthePlaintiff andtheDefendantManilaLodgeNo.761,BenevolentandProtectiveOrderofElks, Inc., pp. 33-34.7.Ibid., pp. 49-63.8.Ibid., pp. 64-71.9.Ibid.,pp. 87-88.10.Ibid.,pp.92-110.11.Record, L-41001, p. 7.12.Record, L-41012, p. 11; Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant in CA-G.R.No. 51590-R, pp. 1-2.13.Brief forthePlaintiff-Appellant Tarlac Development Corporation in CA-G.R.No. 51590-R, p. 2.14.Record, L-41001. pp. 14-16.15.Record, L-41012, pp. 16, 46.16.L-41001, Record, p. 17.17.Ibid.,p. 19.18.Ibid.,pp. 19-20.19.Ibid.,p. 21.20.Ibid.,pp. 21-22.21.Ibid.,pp. 22-23.22.L-41012, Record, pp. 16-17.23.53 Phil. 112 (1930).24.L-41012, Record, pp. 22-23, 25-26.25.Ibid.,pp. 23-25.26.Ibid.,pp. 27-28.27.Ibid.,pp. 28-34.28.Ibid.,pp. 34-41.29.Ibid.,pp. 42-43.30.Ibid.,pp. 44-45.31.Borromeovs. Mariano, 41 Phil. 322.32.Aboitiz Shipping Corporationvs.TheCityofCebu, L-14526, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 449, 453.33.Sutherland,Statutes and Statutory Construction,3rd ed., vol. II, p. 240.34.Ibid.,Vol. III, pp. 204-208.35.Art. 338, Civil CodeofSpain; Art. 419ofthePhilippines provides: "Property is eitherofpublic dominion orofprivate ownership.".36.Art. 428, Civil Code.37.Sutherland,op. cit.,p. 339.38.4 Words and Phrases, p. 830, citing Statevs. BoardofCom'rsofFranklin County, 114 p. 247, 248; 24 Kan. 404.39.Tamiami Trial Toursvs. Lee, 194 So. 305, 306.40.Sec. 1, Act.No. 1360.41.See 15-A Words and Phrases, p. 602, citing Clements' Ex'rsvs. Dickey, 5 Fed. Cas. 1025, 1027.42.BureauofPrinting, 1908, p. 281.43.15-A Words and Phrases, p. 614, citing Mayor, etc.ofMonroevs. Quachita Parish, 17 So. 498, 499, 47 La. Ann. 1061.44.53 Phil. 112.45.Syllabus, citing Aragonvs. Insular Government, 19 Phil. 223; Franciscovs. GovernmentofthePhilippine Islands, 28 Phil. 505.46.Viuda de Tan Tocovs. Municipal CouncilofIloilo, 49 Phil. 52, 55.47.Art. 420, Civil Code.48.3 Codigo Civil Espaol, 6a edicion, p. 106.49.108 Phil. 335, 339.50.Monteverdevs. DirectorofLands, 93 Phil. 134, cited in Ignaciovs.TheDirectorofLands,supra.51.L-41012, Record, p. 29.52.Republicvs. Go Bon Lee, L-11499, April 29, 1961, 1 SCRA 1166, 1170; Go Tian Anvs. Republic, L-19833, August 31, 1966, 17 SCRA 1053, 1055; Pechueco Sons Companyvs. Provincial BoardofAntique, L-27038, January 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 320, 327, citing San Diegovs. MunicipalityofNaujan, L-9920, 29 February 1960, cited in Favisvs. MunicipalityofSabangan, L-26522, 27 February 1969, 27 SCRA 92; see also CityofManilavs. Tarlac Development Corporation, L-24557, L-24469 and L-24481, 31 July 1968, 24 SCRA 466.53.Arts. 1409 and 1458, Civil Code.54.4 Tolentino, Civil Code, p. 575, citing 1 Von Tuhr,Obligaciones,p. 164.55.92 CJS p. 219, citing Chestnutvs. Weekes, 188 S.E. 714, 183 Ga. 367; Bradburyvs. Green, 351 p. 2d 807, 207 Okl. 586; Noblevs. Kahn, 240 P. 2d 757, 206 Okl. 13, 35 A.L.R. 2d 119.56.4 Tolentino, Civil Code, p. 576, citing Perez Gonzales and Alguer; I-II Enneccerus, Kipp and Wolff, 364-366; 3 Von Tuhr 311; 3 Fabres 231. See also 92 CJS p. 550, citing Bologna Bros.vs. Stephens, 18 So. 2d 944, 206 La. 112; Partlowvs. Mulligan, 76 N.Y.S. 2d 181.57.L-41012, Record pp. 40-49.58.L-41001, Record, p. 15.|||(Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41001, L-41012, September 30, 1976)