2. dizon vs. suntay, 47 scra 160.docx

8/9/2019 2. Dizon vs. Suntay, 47 Scra 160.docx

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G.R. No. L-30817 September 29, 1972

DOMINADOR DIZON, doi! b"#ie## "der t$e % irm &me '(&)#$op o% Domi&dor

Di*o', petitioner,

vs.

LO+RDS G. S+NA, respondent.

Andres T. Velarde for petitioner.

Rafael G. Suntay for respondent.

/RNANDO, J.:p

In essence there is nothing novel in this petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals

affirming a lower court judgment sustaining the right of an owner of a diamond ring, respondent

Lourdes G. Suntay, as against the claim of petitioner Dominador Dion, who owns and operates a

pawnshop. !he diamond ring was turned over to a certain Clarita ". Sison, for sale on commission,

along with other pieces of jewelry of respondent Suntay. It was then pledged to petitioner. Since

what was done was violative of the terms of the agency, there was an attempt on her part to

recover possession thereof from petitioner, who refused. She had to file an action then for its

recovery. She was successful, as noted a#ove, #oth in the lower court and thereafter in the Court

of Appeals. She prevailed as she had in her favor the protection accorded #y Article $$% of the

Civil

Code.1!he matter was then elevated to us #y petitioner. &rdinarily, our discretion would have #een

e'ercised against giving due course to such petition for review. !he vigorous plea however,

grounded on estoppel, #y his counsel, Atty. Andres !. (elarde, persuaded us to act otherwise. After

a careful perusal of the respective contentions of the parties, we fail to perceive any sufficient

justification for a departure from the literal language of the applica#le codal provision as uniformly

interpreted #y this Court in a num#er of decisions. !he invocation of estoppel is therefore

unavailing. )e affirm.

!he statement of the case as well as the controlling facts may #e found in the Court of Appeals

decision penned #y *ustice +ere. !hus -+laintiff is the owner of a threecarat diamond ring valued

at +$,$//.//. &n *une 01, 0%23, the plaintiff and Clarita ". Sison entered into a transaction

wherein the plaintiff4s ring was delivered to Clarita ". Sison for sale on commission. 5pon receiving

the ring, Clarita ". Sison e'ecuted and delivered to the plaintiff the receipt ... . !he plaintiff had

already previously 6nown Clarita ". Sison as the latter is a close friend of the plaintiff4s cousin and

they had fre7uently met each other at the place of the plaintiff4s said cousin. In fact, a#out one year

#efore their transaction of *une 01, 0%23 too6 place, Clarita ". Sison received a piece of jewelry

from the plaintiff to #e sold for +$//.//, and when it was sold, Clarita ". Sison gave the price to the

plaintiff. After the lapse of a considera#le time without Clar ita ". Sison having returned to the

plaintiff the latter4s ring, the plaintiff made demands on Clarita ". Sison for the return of her ring #ut

the latter could not comply with the demands #ecause, without the 6nowledge of the plaintiff, on

*une 0$, 0%23 or three days after the ring a#ovementioned was received #y Clarita ". Sison from

the plaintiff, said ring was pledged #y 8elia Sison, niece of the hus#and of Clarita ". Sison,

evidently in connivance with the latter, with the defendant4s pawnshop for +3,2//.// ... .- 2!hen

came this portion of the decision under review -Since the plaintiff insistently demanded fromClarita ". Sison the return of her ring, the latter finally delivered to the former the pawnshop

tic6et ... which is the receipt of the pledge with the defendant4s pawnshop of the plaintiff4s ring.

)hen the plaintiff found out that Clarita ". Sison pledged, she too6 steps to file a case of estafa

against the latter with the fiscal4s office. Su#se7uently thereafter, the plaintiff, through her lawyer,

wrote a letter ... dated Septem#er 33, 0%23, to the defendant as6ing for the delivery to the plaintiff

of her ring pledged with defendant4s pawnshop under pawnshop receipt serial9 :o. 2$2/2, dated

*une 0$, 0%23 ... . Since the defendant refused to return the ring, the plaintiff filed the present

action with the Court of ;irst Instance of 8anila for the recovery of said ring, with +$//.// as

attorney4s fees and costs. !he plaintiff as6ed for the provisional remedy of replevin #y the delivery

of the ring to her, upon her filing the re7uisite #ond, pending the final determination of the action.

!he lower court issued the writ of replevin prayed for #y plaintiff and the latter was a#le to ta6e

possession of the ring during the pendency of the action upon her filing the re7uisite #ond.- 3It was

then noted that the lower court rendered judgment declaring that plaintiff, now respondent Suntay,

had the right to the possession of the ring in 7uestion. +etitioner Dion, as defendant, sought to

have the judgment reversed #y the Court of Appeals. It did him no good. !he decision of 8ay 0%,

0%2%, now on review, affirmed the decision of the lower court.

In the light of the facts as thus found #y the Court of Appeals, wellnigh conclusive on use, with the

applica#le law #eing what it is, this petition for review cannot prosper. !o repeat, the decision of the

Court of Appeals stands.

0. !here is a fairly recent restatement of the force and effect of the governing codal norm in De

Gracia v. Court of Appeals.!hus -!he controlling provision is Article $$% of the Civil Code. It

reads thus 4!he possession of mova#le property ac7uired in good faith is e7uivalent to a title.

:evertheless, one who has lost any mova#le or has #een unlawfully deprived thereof may recover

it from the person in possession of the same. If the possessor of a mova#le lost of which the ownerhas #een unlawfully deprived, has ac7uired it in good faith at a pu#lic sale, the owner cannot o#tain

its return without reim#ursing the price paid therefor.4 "espondent Angelina D. Guevara, having

#een unlawfully deprived of the diamond ring in 7uestion, was entitled to recover it from petitioner

Consuelo S. de Garcia who was found in possession of the same. !he only e'ception the law

allows is when there is ac7uisition in good faith of the possessor at a pu#lic sale, in which case the

owner cannot o#tain its return without reim#ursing the price. As authoritatively interpreted in Cruz

v. Pahati, the right of the owner cannot #e defeated even #y proof that there was good faith in the

ac7uisition #y the possessor. !here is a reiteration of this principle in Aznar v. Yapdiangco. !hus

4Suffice it to say in this regard that the right of the owner to recover personal property ac7uired in

good faith #y another, is #ased on his #eing dispossessed without his consent. !he common law

principle that were one of two innocent persons must suffer #y a fraud perpetrated #y another, the

law imposes the loss upon the party who, #y his misplaced confidence, has ena#led the fraud to #e

committed, cannot #e applied in a case which is covered #y an e'press provision of the new CivilCode, specifically Article $$%. 9etween a common law principle and a statutory provision, the latter

must prevail in this jurisdiction.- -

3. It must have #een a recognition of the compulsion e'erted #y the a#ove authoritative precedents

that must have caused petitioner to invo6e the principle of estoppel. !here is clearly a

misapprehension. Such a contention is devoid of any persuasive force.


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court is to see to it then that there is no turning #ac6 on one4s word or a repudiation of one4s act. So

it has #een from our earliest decisions. As *ustice 8apa pointed out in the first case, a 0%/$

decision, Rodriguez v. artinez, 10a party should not #e permitted -to go against his own acts to

the prejudice of =another>. Such a holding would #e contrary to the most rudimentary principles of

justice and law.- 11?e is not, in the language of *ustice !orres, in !rlanda v. Pitargue, 12promulgated

in 0%03, -allowed to gainsay =his> own acts or deny rights which =he had> previously

recognied.- 13Some of the later cases are to the effect that an un7ualified and unconditional

acceptance of an agreement forecloses a claim for interest not therein provided. 1 previous misrepresentation had already estopped him from disavowing the contract. 1It is

easily understanda#le why, under the circumstances disclosed, estoppel is a frail reed to hang on

to. !here was clearly the a#sence of an act or omission, as a result of which a position had #een

assumed #y petitioner, who if such elements were not lac6ing, could not thereafter in law #e

prejudiced #y his #elief in what had #een misrepresented to him. 1As was put #y *ustice La#rador,

-a person claimed to #e estopped must have 6nowledge of the fact that his voluntary acts would

deprive him of some rights #ecause said voluntary acts are inconsistent with said rights.-17!o

recapitulate, there is this pronouncement not so long ago, from the pen of *ustice 8a6alintal, who

reaffirmed that estoppel -has its origin in e7uity and, #eing #ased on moral right and natural justice,

finds applica#ility wherever and whenever the special circumstances of a case so demand.- 18

?ow then can petitioner in all seriousness assert that his appeal finds support in the doctrine of

estoppel@ :either the promptings of e7uity nor the mandates of moral right and natural justice

come to his rescue. ?e is engaged in a #usiness where presuma#ly ordinary prudence would

manifest itself to ascertain whether or not an individual who is offering a jewelry #y way of a pledge

is entitled to do so. If no such care #e ta6en, perhaps #ecause of the difficulty of resisting

opportunity for profit, he should #e the last to complain if thereafter the right of the true owner of

such jewelry should #e recognied. !he law for this sound reason accords the latter protection. So

it has always #een since Varela v.

"innic#, 19a 0%/ decision. According to *ustice !orres -In the present case not only has the

ownership and the origin of the jewels misappropriated #een un7uestiona#ly proven #ut also that

the accused, acting fraudulently and in #ad faith, disposed of them and pledged them contrary to

agreement, with no right of ownership, and to the prejudice of the injured party, who was there#y

illegally deprived of said jewelsB therefore, in accordance with the provisions of article 2, the

owner has an a#solute right to recover the jewels from the possession of whosoever holds them, ...

.- 20!here have #een many other decisions to the same effect since then. At least nine may #e

cited. 21:or could any other outcome #e e'pected, considering the civil code provisions #oth in the

former Spanish legislation 22and in the present Code. 23+etitioner ought to have #een on his guard

#efore accepting the pledge in 7uestion.


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+etitioner4s contentions at #ar had long #een disposed of in the Court4s 0%00 decision ofArenas

vs. Ray+undo,per 8r. *ustice ;lorentino !orres, reiterating the doctrine of the earlier cases and

holding that


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personal property may recover it from the possessor without reim#ursement, with the sole

e,ceptionwhere the possessor ac7uired the article in good faith at a pu*lic sale.2

?e thus concedes finally that -!Ehere are writers who #elieve that the phrase 4unlawfully deprived4

in our Code does not have the same meaning as stolen in the ;rench codeB that it is used in the

general sense, and is not used in the specific sense of deprivation #y ro##ery or theft. 5nder this

view, it e'tends to all cases where there has #een no valid transmission of ownership, including the

case where the proprietor has entrusted the thing to a #orrower, depositary, or lessee who has sold

the same. It is #elieved that the owner in such case is undou#tedly unlawfully deprived of his

property, and may recover the same from a possessor in good faith- citing De 9uen 3II Colin

Capitant 0//HB 0 9onet31E3and cites the long un#ro6en line of decisions of the Court of Appeals and of this Court

upholding the import of the #roader language of the codal article in 7uestion.

Indeed, if our legislature had intended to narrow the scope of the term -unlawfully deprived- to

-stolen- as advocated #y !olentino, it certainly would have adopted and used such a narrower term

rather than the #road language of article 2 of the old Spanish Civil Code with its longesta#lished

and accepted meaning in accordance with our jurisprudence.

+etitioner4s contentions at #ar had long #een disposed of in the Court4s 0%00 decision ofArenas

vs. Ray+undo,per 8r. *ustice ;lorentino !orres, reiterating the doctrine of the earlier cases and

holding that


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mova#le or has #een unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the

person in possession of the same. If the possessor of a mova#le lost or of

which the owner has #een unlawfully deprived, has ac7uired it in good faith at

a pu#lic sale, the owner cannot o#tain its return without reim#ursing the price

paid therefor.-

3 Appendi' A to +etitioner4s 9rief, pp. III.

1 !*id, pp. IIIII.

L3/32, *anuary 1/, 0%0, 1 SC"A 03%.

$ !*id, pp. 0101$. Cru v. +ahati is reported in %H +hil. HH 0%$2E and Anar

v. apdiangco, L0H$12, promulgated on 8arch 10, 0%2$ in 01 SC"A H2.

2 According to the "ules of Court, "ule 010, Sec. 1aE -)henever a party has,

#y his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and deli#erately led

another to #elieve a particular thing true, and to act upon such #elief, he

cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, #e

permitted to falsify itB ... .-

Section 110, Act 0%/ 0%/0E.

H Cf. ?erman v. "adio Corporation of the +hilippines, $/ +hil. %/ 0%3E.

% Cf. -!he doctrine of estoppel having its origin in e7uity, and therefore #eing

#ased on moral right and natural justice, its applica#ility to any particular case

depends, to a very large e'tent, upon the special circumstances of the case.-

8irasol v. 8unicipality of !a#aco, 1 +hil. 20/, 20 0%33E.

0/ $ +hil. 2. &ther cases follow 8unicipality of &as v. "oa, +hil. 3/ 0%/2EB

!rinidad v. "icafort, +hil. % 0%/EB ;a#le v. !he City of 8anila, 0/ +hil. 2

0%/HEB 5nited States v. 8acaspac, 03 +hil. 32 0%/HEB Chinese Cham#er of

Commerce v. +ua !e Ching, 0 +hil. 333 0%/%E and Amancio v. +ardo, 3/

+hil. 101 0%00E.

2. dizon vs. suntay, 47 scra 160.docx

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