In 2003, the leaders of China‟s fourth generation announced the launch of a new program of

growth, dubbing it the „Peaceful Rise‟ initiative. Yet by 2004, the name was dropped in favor of

„Peaceful Development‟, as Chinese politicians feared that the relative meaning of the term „rise‟

would suggest to suspicious states that China was attempting overtake the current international

order (Xuetong, 2006, 13). While the purpose of the policy‟s message was to quell international

fears of an expansionist and aggressive China, the connotation of „rise‟ still evoked the image of

a power-transition not unlike that explained by realists. Theorists and statesmen find the realist

framework of analysis fitting for explaining China‟s rise, identifying the causal relationship

between China‟s rise and its behavior through notions of realpolitik and structural influences.

Realism is a general outlook which is centrally and substantively focused on power, but it also

embodies a group of explanatory theories and models which emphasize anarchy and the balance

of power (Burchill, 31, 2009). Important to remember, however, is that theories are meant to

abstract and simplify, and consequently can exaggerate the application of their principles.

Nevertheless, theories of structural or neo-realism in particular have much to say regarding

China‟s rise and the complementary theories of offensive and defensive realism in particular

present a grounded, realistic understanding of how power politics and systemic factors have

come to shape Beijing‟s ascendancy.

Neo-realists maintain that the anarchic nature of the international system, with its absence

of an overarching government-of-governments, cannot offer any protection to states against one

another and drives them to accumulate the power to protect themselves within this self-help

system. Power exists as a means to an end and that end is survival, and power itself is comprised

of the material capabilities under a given state‟s control (Dunne, 2010, 78). John Mearsheimer

and Kenneth Waltz‟s respective theories of offensive and defensive realism are rooted in the

same neo-realist assumptions but diverge when it comes to the question of how much power is

enough for a state. While this divergence could be viewed as a weakness, the reality is that the

orientation of a given state can easily deviate between the two depending on the circumstances,

and Glenn Snyder contends that “the dynamics of the two models tend to interact” (Snyder, 158,

2002). Thus, where an offensive realist explanation may be lacking, it is possible to turn to

defensive realist principles and achieve clarity.

From Mao to Deng and from Jiang to Hu, China has elevated itself from its position as an

isolated, broken developing country at the end of the Cold War to an increasingly engaged

pivotal power of immense military and economic capability. Transitions in leadership were

accompanied by transitions in strategy, and the complementary models of offensive and

defensive realism explain these changing behaviors as they precipitated China‟s rise.