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    4. To prevent Leon Lumasac from entering the hut, Exequiel Senoja(appellant) and Jose Calica stood by the door while simultaneously trying topacify Leon Lumasac;

    5. Exequiel Senoja with a knife then went outside and tried to pacifyLeon Lumasac but the latter angered by the gestures of the former tried to

    hack Exequiel Senoja;

    6. To avoid any injury, Exequiel Senoja embraced Leon which gave anopportunity to disarm the duo. Jose Calica got the bolo of Leon and threw itaway while Fidel Senoja took the colonial knife of Exequiel;

    7. Jose Calica and Fidel Senoja were able to pacify Leon Lumasac sothey invited him to get inside the hut. Inside the hut, Leon Lumasac tried tobox Fidel Senoja for siding with his brother, Miguel, but was prevented byExequiel Senoja who held Leons hands;

    8. After a while, Leon Lumasac left but returned and angrily demandedfor his bolo. Jose Calica gave his own bolo with a sabbard to replace the

    bolo of Leon which he threw away;

    9. With Jose Calicas bolo in him, Leon Lumasac left but only afterleaving a threat that something will happen to Exequiel Senoja for siding withhis brother;

    10. After walking for about 10 meters away from the hut, Leon Lumasacturned around and saw Exequiel Senoja on his way home following him;

    11. Leon Lumasac walked back to meet Exequiel Senoja and uponreaching him, the former suddenly and treacherously hacked the latter at theleft side of his head and right thigh;

    12. Unable to evade the treacherous attack by Leon Lumasac who

    persisted in his criminal design, Exequiel Senoja drew his colonial knifeand stabbed Leon Lumasac in self-defense, inflicting upon him multiplewounds which caused his death.

    [5]

    On June 7, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment against the petitioner,finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimecharged. The fallo of the decision reads:

    WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused ExequielSenoja GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide for thedeath of victim Leon Lumasac and hereby sentences him, applying Article64, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 1 of the

    Indeterminate Sentence Law, (a) to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) yearsofprision mayoras minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) monthsofreclusion temporalas maximum; (b) to pay the heirs of the victim theamount of Fifteen (sic) Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) by way of civilindemnity; and (c) to pay the costs.

    SO ORDERED.[6]

    In due course, the petitioner appealed the decision to the CA which renderedjudgment affirming, with modification, the decision of the RTC. Thepetitioner now seeks relief from this Court, contending that:

    The Honorable Court of Appeals failed to appreciate vital facts which, ifconsidered, would probably alter the result of this case on appeal findingappellants plea of self-defense credible.

    [7]

    The petitioner faults the CA for its analysis of his testimony, as follows:The injuries suffered by the petitioner at the left side of his head and rightthigh was confirmed by Dr. Rodolfo Eligio in open court. The relative

    positions of the wounds clearly show that the drunken Leon Lumasacbrandished and executed several hacking blows against Exequiel Senojabefore he was stabbed, neutralized and finished by the latter. It would bephysically and highly improbable for the victim if he was treacherously hit atthe left buttock and as he turned around to face the petitioner, the latterstabbed him successively and without let-up hitting him 9 times resulting in 9fatal wounds. This did not give a chance to the victim to retaliate and inflictthose wounds upon the aggressor. The victim used Mr. Jose Calicas bolowhich was secured by its scabbard. Unless earlier drawn, it would beimpossible for the victim to use it indefending himself from the surprise attack and stabbing at a lightningfashion inflicting nine (9) fatal wounds. Time element was the essence ofthis encounter which, as narrated by the Honorable Court, after the assailantpoked the victim at the left side of the buttock with the use of the colonial

    knife he stabbed him successively until he fell down dead. Under thesecircumstances, how could Exequiel Senoja suffered (sic) those hacking (sic)wounds inflicted by the victim using Calicas bolo? In all indications, it wasLeon Lumasac who attacked his adversary first but lost in the duelconsidering that he was older than Exequiel Senoja and drunk. Clearly,therefore, it was Leon Lumasac who was the aggressor both in the first andsecond phases of the incident and Exequiel Senoja was compelled todefend himself.

    A closer scrutiny of the attending circumstances which resulted in thisstabbing incident shows that Exequiel Senoja has no compelling reasons tokill his godfather. On that same occasion, Mr. Exequiel Senoja was with the

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    brother of the victim, Miguel Lumasac, which only shows that there was nopre-existing grudge between these families. And still, what titillates ourimagination is the fact that Miguel Lumasac, who was then with the groupdrinking gin at the hut of Crisanto Reguyal did not clearly impute this crimeto petitioner. On the contrary, when he was presented to the witness stand,he was very evasive in answering the questions profounded by the

    prosecutors if he wanted the petitioner to be imprisoned. Miguel Lumasaccould have told the real truth that Senoja murdered his brother.

    [8]

    The CA declared that, based on the evidence on record:

    As seen from appellants testimony, Leon Lumasacs actions can be dividedinto two (2) phases: the first phase, when Leon entered Crisanto Reguyalshut, up to the time he and the appellant reconciled. The second phase waswhen Leon left to go home. In phase one where Leon entered Reguyalshut, Leon was the aggressor but his aggression was mostly directed to hisbrother Miguel who was not inside the hut anymore, although it was alsopartly directed at the appellant and even at Fidel Soneja (sic). But Leonsaggression against the appellant and Fidel Senoja ceased since, as

    appellant testified, when Leon tried to box Fidel Senoja and he (appellant)told Leon Huwag po, Huwag po, Leon was pacified.

    In the second phase, when Leon left the hut to go home, his aggression hadalready ceased.

    It is uncontroverted that the appellant followed the victim when the latterwent out of the hut to go home. Appellants testimony is that when he wastwo meters outside the hut, Leon turned around to face him saying if yourenot only my godson in a threatening way, then approached and hacked him(with Calicas bolo) inflicting wounds on the left side of his head and his rightthigh, thus, he (appellant) attacked the victim with the kolonial knife he washolding. That appellant suffered such injuries was corroborated by thetestimony of Dr. Rodolfo Eligio.

    [9]

    The petition is denied.

    Paragraph 1, Article 11, of the Revised Penal Code provides:

    ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur any criminalliability:

    1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that thefollowing circumstances concur;

    First. Unlawful aggression;

    Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repelit;

    Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending

    himself.

    The affirmative defense of self-defense may be complete or incomplete. It iscomplete when all the three essential requisites are present; it is incompleteif only unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and any of the twoessential requisites were present. In fine, unlawful aggression on the part ofthe victim is a conditionsine qua non to self-defense, complete orincomplete. Whether or not the accused acted in self-defense is a questionof fact. Like alibi, the affirmative defense of self-defense is inherently weakbecause, as experience has demonstrated, it is easy to fabricate and difficultto disprove.

    [10]

    The right of self-defense proceeds from necessity and limited by it. The rightbegins where necessity does, and ends where it ends.

    [11] There

    is, however, a perceptible difference between necessity and self-defense,which is that, self-defense excuses the repulse of a wrong; necessity justifiesthe invasion of a right. Hence, it is essential to self-defense that it should bea defense against a present unlawful attack.

    [12]

    Life can be taken under the plea of necessity, when necessary for thepreservation of the life on the party setting up the plea. Self-defense is anact to save life; hence, it is right and not a crime.

    [13] There is a need for one,

    indeed, for it is a natural right for one to defend oneself when confronted byan unlawful aggression by another. It is a settled rule that to constituteaggression, the person attacked must be confronted by a real threat on his

    life and limb; and the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, notmerely imaginary. Absent such an actual or imminent peril to ones life orlimb, there is nothing to repel; there is no necessity to take the life or inflictinjuries on another.

    [14]

    But then what is the standard to use to determine whether the persondefending himself is confronted by a real and imminent peril to his life orlimb? We rule that the test should be: does the person invoking the defensebelieve, in due exercise of his reason, his life or limb is in danger? After all,the rule of law founded on justice and reason: Actus no facit remin, nisimens sit rea. Hence, the guilt of the accused must depend upon thecircumstances as they reasonably appear to him.

    [15]

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    Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, unexpected attack orimminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidatingattitude.

    [16] Hence, when an inceptual/unlawful aggression ceases to exist,

    the one making a defense has no right to kill or injure the former

    aggressor.[17]

    After the danger has passed, one is not justified in followingup his adversary to take his life. The conflict for blood should be avoided ifpossible.

    [18]An assault on his person, he cannot punish when the danger or

    peril is over. When the danger is over, the right of self-defense ceases. Hisright is defense, not retribution.

    [19]

    When the accused offers the affirmative defense of self-defense, he therebyadmits killing the victim or inflicting injuries on him. The burden of evidenceis shifted on the accused to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, thathe killed the victim or inflicted injuries on him to defend himself. Theaccused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on theweakness of that of the prosecution because if the evidence of theprosecution were weak, the accused can no longer be acquitted.

    [20]

    We agree with the CA that, as gleaned, even from the testimony of thepetitioner, there were two separate but interrelated incidents that culminatedin the petitioners stabbing and killing of the victim Leon Lumasac. The firstwas the arrival of the victim, who was armed with a bolo, in the hut ofCrisanto Reguyal, looking for his brother Miguel Lumasac, whom he wasangry at. The victim hacked the wall of the house in anger. The petitioner,who was armed with a knife, tried to pacify the victim. The victim attemptedto hack the petitioner; nevertheless, the latter embraced and managed topacify the victim. Forthwith, Jose Calica took the bolo of the victim andthrew it away. For his part, Fidel Senoja took the petitioners knife. As itwas, the victim was already pacified. He and the petitioner were alreadyreconciled.

    [21] Fidel even gave back the knife to the petitioner.

    The second incident took place when the victim demanded that Calica returnhis bolo as he wanted to go home already. Because he had thrown awaythe victimsbolo, Calica was, thus, impelled to give his own. The victimthen warned the petitioner three times, May mangyayari sa iyo, kung hindingayon, bukas, and left the hut. When the victim had already gone aboutten meters from the hut, the petitioner followed the victim. The victim turnedaround and told the petitioner, Kung hindi lang kita inaanak. The victimthen hacked the petitioner, hitting the latter on the left side of his head andthigh. Believing that the victim would attack him anew, the petitionerstabbed the victim frontally several times.

    [22] He also stabbed the victim on

    the left buttock. The petitioner could not recall how many times he stabbedthe victim and what parts of the latters body had been hit.

    The first episode inside the hut had been completed with the protagonist, thevictim, and the petitioner reconciled. The second episode commencedinside the hut and continued outside, and ended with the petitioner stabbingthe victim several times.

    The trial and the appellate courts gave no credence and probative weight tothe testimony of the petitioner. So do we.

    First. The findings of fact of the trial court and its conclusions based on thesaid findings are accorded by this Court high respect, if not conclusive effect,especially when affirmed by the CA. This is because of the uniqueadvantage of the trial court of having been able to observe, at close range,the demeanor and behavior of the witnesses as they testify. This rule,however, is inapplicable if the trial court ignored, overlooked, ormisinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, will alteror reverse the outcome of the case. We have reviewed the records andfound no justification for a reversal of the findings of the trial court and itsconclusions based thereon.

    Second. The victim sustained six hack wounds and one laceratedwound. This is gleaned from the Necropsy Report of Dr. Pura Uy, to wit:

    FINDINGS: The victim lies in supine position, stocky in built; his clothingcompletely soaked with fresh blood.

    CHEST:(+) stab wound 2 inches below the L nipple 4 inches deep running mediallyto the anterior median line.(+) stab wound 2 inches to the L of the anterior median line at the level ofthe L nipple 5 inches deep running posteriorly.(+) stab wound 1 inch above the L nipple 4 inches deep runninginferomedially.

    (+) stab wound 2 inches to the left of the anterior median line 4 inches deeprunning inferoposteriorly.(+) stab wound 1 inch to the right of the anterior median line at the level ofthe second right intercostal space 0.5 inch in depth.(+) stab wound inch to the right of the anterior median line at the level ofthe xyphoid process 3 inches deep running superiorly.(+) stab wound at the level of the L nipple L anterior axillary line 4 inchesin depth running superiorly to the left armpit.(+) hack wound at the left armpit 3 inches long injuring the muscles and theblood vessels.(+) lacerated wound on the left palm almost cutting off the proximal phalanxof the left thumb.

    [23]

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    Five of the wounds of the victim on his chest were fatal.

    [24] The victim also

    sustained a stab wound on the left buttock. According to the doctor, it wasunlikely for the victim to have survived even with medical attention .

    [25]After

    the doctor made her initial autopsy and submitted her report, she noted thatthe victim sustained a stab wound of about two inches deep at the left

    buttock, thus:

    Q In this medico-legal report, you indicated that the cause of death ofthe victim is Hypovolemic shock 2 to multiple stab wounds, chest. Will youplease explain this?A Ito pong nakalagay o dahilan ng pagkamatay ng biktima sa sobrangnatapon na dugo gawa ng maraming saksak na tinamo ng biktima sakanyang dibdib ang nagbigay ng daan sa kanyang kamatayan.

    Q Will you please tell us, Dr. Uy, if there is one amont (sic) theselesions that is located at the back of the victim?A I forgot to tell you that a day after I submitted the report, the funeralparlor which attended the victim has called my attention because of the

    wound at the back of the victim and I attended immediately to see theselesions at the home of the victim. I reviewed for (sic) these lesions and I sawone lesion located at the left buttock of the victim.

    Q What is the nature of the injury?A Stab wound, about two inches deep.

    Q By the nature of the lesion, is it not fatal?A It is not that fatal.

    Q In your expert opinion, by the nature of the wound sustained by thevictim, what could have been the relative position of the victim in relation tohis assailant?A Based on my examination, I think the victim and the assailant were

    facing each other. Masyadong malapit.

    Q How many fatal wounds have (sic) the victim sustained in his chest?A Five fatal stab wounds on the chest.

    [26]

    Considering the number, nature and location of the wounds sustained by thevictim, the petitioners plea of self-defense is incredible.

    [27]It bears stressing

    that the petitioner resolutely denied stabbing the victim at the buttock andinsisted that he stabbed the victim frontally:

    Q As a matter of fact, he sustained an injury at the back of his buttock(pigi) and when he faced you, you s tabbed him again several times?

    A That is not true, Sir.

    Q But you are admitting that you stabbed him several times frontally?A Yes, Sir, because I am (sic) defending myself.

    Q You also stabbed him in his left armpit?

    A I dont know, Sir.

    Q But you knew that you stabbed him in his buttock?A No, Sir.

    Q After stabbing him several times and felt that he was already dead,you already left the place?A Yes, Sir.

    [28]

    The testimony of the petitioner is belied by the physical evidence onrecord. The settled rule is that physical evidence is evidence of the highestorder; it speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses.

    [29]

    Third. The petitioner threw away his knife and failed to surrender it to thepolicemen; neither did he inform the policemen that he killed the victim inself-defense. The petitioners claim that the victim was armed with abolo ishard to believe because he even failed to surrender the bolo.

    [30]

    Fourth. The petitioners version of the events that transpired immediatelybefore he stabbed the victim does not inspire belief. He claims that when hesaw the victim emerged from the hut, the victim walked towards thepetitioner saying, Kung hindi lang kita inaanak, but hit and hacked the latteron the left buttock.

    [31]As gleaned from his statement, the victim was not

    disposed, much less determined to assault the petitioner. And yet, thepetitioner insists that without much ado, the victim, nevertheless, hit him onthe head and on the thigh with his bolo.

    Fifth. According to the petitioner, the victim warned him three times beforeleaving the hut, May mangyayari sa iyo, kung hindi ngayon, bukas. Thepetitioner testified that shortly before the victim uttered these words, thelatter even touched the blade of the bolo to see if it was sharp.

    [32] The

    petitioner was, thus, aware of the peril to his life if he followed thevictim. The petitioner, nevertheless, followed the victim and left the hut afterthe victim had gone barely ten meters. He should have waited until after thevictim had already gone far from the hut before going home to avoid anyuntoward incident.

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    Sixth. The petitioner presented his brother-in-law Ruben Dulay tocorroborate his testimony that the victim stabbed the petitioner and that thisimpelled the latter to stab the former. But the testimony of Dulaycontradicted the testimony of the petitioner:

    Q When Exequiel Senoja stabbed Leon Lumasac several times, he

    immediately fell to the ground and was fatal[ly] wounded, immediately diedbecause of several stabs and lay (sic) down?A I did not see that scene because Exequiel Senoja stabbed LeonLumasac, I turn (sic) back upon seeing Leon Lumasac hack ExequielSenoja, I turn (sic) back because I was afraid then. When I turn (sic) back Isaw them embracing each other, Sir.

    Q And that is the time when Exequiel Senoja stabbed Leon Lumasac?A I did not see the stabbing. What I only saw was that they wereembracing each other, Sir.

    Q So you are now changing your answer, you actually saw ExequielSenoja stabbing Leon Lumasac several times, after he was hack[ed] by

    Leon Lumasac?A I did not see that Exequiel Senoja stab Leon Lumasac, Sir.[33]

    Seventh. The bare fact that the petitioner sustained a five-centimeterwound at the left temporal region and an eight-centimeter hack wound onthe anterior portion of his right thigh does not preclude the fact that he wasthe unlawful aggressor; nor buttress his plea that he acted in self-defense. The petitioner failed to inform the doctor that he sustained thewounds to defend himself. Moreover, the doctor testified that the woundsthe petitioner sustained were slight:

    Pros. Ronquillo:

    Q Does (sic) the wound at the right anterior thigh vertical, diagonal or

    what?A I did not place it, Sir.

    Q So, you dont know?A It is vertical, Sir, but I did not place it on the record. And the hackwound on the temporal region is oblique.

    Q Were the injuries only slight?A Yes, Sir.

    Q So, it is (sic) possible that these injuries were self-inflicted?A Probably, Sir, but I cannot comment on that.

    Q You said that the patient was under the influence of alcohol?Would you say that the patient was then so drunk at that time?A When I saw him at that time, he was moderately drunk.

    [34]

    The doctor gave the petitioner due medications for 30 minutes and the

    petitioner then went home:

    Q How did it happen that you were able to kill the victim in this case Mr.Leon Lumasac?

    A Because when I went out, he hacked me, Sir.

    Q Were you hit by the hack made by the victim in this case?A Yes, Sir.

    Q Where?A Here, Sir.

    And Witness is pointing to his left head.

    Q Where else?A (His) right thigh.

    Q In what place did this incident happen?A In the hut of Tata Santos, Sir.

    Q What is his real name?A Crisanto Reguyal, Sir.

    [35]

    If, as claimed by the petitioner, the victim stabbed him frontally, it isincredible that the victim was able to hack the anterior part of his right thigh.

    Eighth. The testimony of the petitioner that the victim stabbed himoutside the hut on the left side of his head and the anterior portion of hisright thigh is belied by his testimony on direct examination that the victimstabbed him while still inside the hut of Reguyal:

    Q How did it happen that you were able to kill the victim in this case Mr.Leon Lumasac?

    A Because when I went out, he hacked me, Sir.

    Q Were you hit by the hack made by the victim in this case?A Yes, Sir.

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    Q Where?A Here, Sir.

    And Witness is pointing to his left head.

    Q Where else?

    A (His) right thigh.

    Q In what place did this incident happen?A In the hut of Tata Santos, Sir.

    Q What is his real name?A Crisanto Reguyal, Sir.

    [36]

    But then, after the said incident, the petitioner and the victimhad reconciled. We agree with the following findings of the appellate court:

    The question that must be resolved is whether or not the victim was theunlawful aggressor as the appellants testimony pictures him to be. The

    Court rules in the negative. The victim had already left the hut and was ten(10) meters away from it. There is no showing that the victim, who wasdrunk, was aware that appellant was following him, or that the appellantcalled out to him so that he (the victim) had to turn around and notice him. Itis clear that at that point in time, the victim was simply walking toward hishome; he had stopped being an aggressor. It was the appellant who,smarting from the earlier incident in the hut where Leon told him hindi katatagal, sa loob ng tatlong araw mayroong mangyayari sa iyo, kung hindingayon, bukas repeated three times, wanted a confrontation. Appellantstabbed or poked the victim in the left buttock resulting in the non-fatalwound, and when the latter turned around, successively stabbed and hackedthe victim in the armpit and chest until he fell. In all, the victim suffered nine(9) wounds.

    It is the well-considered finding of this Court that while Leon Lumasac hadceased being the aggressor after he left the hut to go home, accusedExequiel Senoja was now the unlawful aggressor in this second phase oftheir confrontation. It bears mentioning that appellant contradicted himselfwith respect for (sic) the reason why he left the hut. First, it was to pacifyLeon and the second reason was that he was going home.

    As for appellants injuries, it is clear that they were sustained in the course ofthe victims attempt to defend himself as shown by the lacerated wound onthe victims left palm, a defensive wound.

    [37]

    IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. Theassailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

    SO ORDERED.

    ROMEO J. CALLEJO,SR.

    Associate Justice

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    FIRST DIVISIONPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 140985

    Appellee,

    Present:

    PUNO,C.J.,Chairperson,

    SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

    - v e r s u s - CORONA,

    AZCUNA and

    GARCIA,JJ.

    VICTORIANO M. ABESAMIS,

    Appellant. Promulgated:

    August 28, 2007

    x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

    D E C I S I O N

    CORONA,J.:

    This is an automatic review of the decision[1]dated July 30, 1999 of

    the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 21860 finding accused-

    appellant Victoriano M. Abesamis guilty of murder and meting outthe penalty ofreclusion perpetuato him.

    This is a story of a game of billiards with a tragic ending.

    At around 6:00 p.m. of September 18, 1994, accused-appellant and

    his brother, Rodel Abesamis, were in the billiard hall located at Cruz

    corner Pepin Streets in Sampaloc, Manila. Accused-appellant played

    a game of billiards with Rogelio Mercado, Jr. called rotation where

    the first player who garners 61 points wins the game. AP40 bet was

    on the line. Ramon Villo stood as spotter for them.

    Accused-appellant was ahead with 59 points when he pocketed the

    number 3 ball. Ramon erroneously scored it for Rogelio. Aggrieved,

    accused-appellant protested. Matters got worse when Rogelio

    suddenly rearranged the balls on the table and the game turned

    into a shouting match between Rogelio and accused-appellant.

    Ramon tried to mediate but accused-appellant vented his ire on

    him, sparking a heated argument.

    Ramon decided to leave and proceeded to go out of the hall.

    However, Rodel, accused-appellants brother, pursued him and

    caught up with him in front of Andokslechon manokstore a few

    meters away. A fistfight between the two ensued. While the two

    were trading blows, accused-appellant ran to a Ford Fiera[2]parkednearby and got a foot-long butchers knife. He then rushed to where

    Ramon and Rodel were fighting. He stabbed Ramon in the back. The

    victim turned around to face accused-appellant but Rodel grabbed

    his hands and held them from behind. Accused-appellant then

    stabbed Ramon two more times, one in the upper right portion of

    the chest and another in the lower left portion of the chest.

    Thereafter, accused-appellant and Rodel boarded the Ford Fiera

    and drove away.

    Greatly weakened by the mortal wounds inflicted on him, Ramonmanaged to take a few steps before slumping on the pavement. His

    mother[3]and brother[4]soon arrived. He was brought to the

    University of Sto. Tomas Hospital but his wounds were fatal and he

    was declared dead on arrival.

    Dr. Manuel Lagonera[5]performed an autopsy on Ramons cadaver.

    His report stated:

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    EXTERNAL FINDINGS:

    1. Stab wound, right anterior thorax, 51 inches from heel, 5 cms.

    from anterior midline, measuring 20x6 cms., directed slightly

    downwards backwards towards right lateral, transecting the

    sternum at the level of 1stintercostal space, incising the upper lobe

    of the right lung, transecting the right sub-clavian artery and

    ascending aorta. Depth 11 cms.

    2. Stab wound, left lower anterior thorax, 43 inches from heel,

    17 cms. from anterior midline, measuring 5x2 cms., directed

    upwards, backwards towards midline, lacerating the diaphragm,

    and spleen. Depth 13 cms.

    3. Stab wound, left lower posterior thorax, 41 inches from heel[,]

    10 cms. from posterior midline, incising the lower lobe of the leftlung. Depth 10 cms.

    INTERNAL FINDINGS

    1. Injuries to organs and tissues as indicated in the internal

    extensions of the stab wounds, with massive bleeding in the

    thoracic and abdominal cavities.

    2. About one glassful of partially digested meaty materials with

    slight alcoholic odor was recovered from the stomach.

    CAUSE OF DEATH

    STAB WOUNDS.[6]

    An information[7]for murder was filed against the brothers accused-

    appellant and Rodel in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,

    Branch 41. It read:

    That on or about September 18, 1994, in the City of Manila,

    Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederatingand

    helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and

    feloniously with intent to kill and with treachery and evident

    premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one

    RAMON VILLO y MANGALINDAN thrice with a butchers knife,

    hitting him on the different parts of his body thereby inflicting upon

    him mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate

    cause of his death thereafter.[8]

    However, accused-appellant and his brother remained at-large.Thus, the case was temporarily archived. It was reactivated when

    accused-appellant was arrested on March 26, 1996.

    Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned. During the

    trial, he admitted stabbing Ramon with a butchers knife but

    claimed that he did so only to defend himself. He claimed that when

    he questioned the victim why ball number 3 was credited to

    Rogelio, he suddenly cussed him and threatened to kill him. When

    he tried to leave the billiards hall, Ramon blocked his way and tried

    to stab him with a balisong. He evaded the thrust and ran outside toget a butchers knife from the Ford Fiera. Ramon pursued him but

    he stood his ground. The victim tried to stab him again, this time

    hitting him in the left arm. He fought back and stabbed Ramon

    several times.

    He then boarded the Ford Fiera and drove towards Espaa Street in

    Manila. He encountered heavy traffic along the way and abandoned

    the vehicle somewhere in Forbes Street, Manila. He wanted to

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    surrender to the police but was advised by his relatives not to do so

    because Ramons relatives might kill him. He then went to his

    hometown in Calamba, Laguna. He managed to elude arrest until

    March 26, 1996.

    On April 1, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision.[9]It ruled that,

    while it was established that accused-appellant killed Ramon, the

    prosecution failed to prove the existence of either evident

    premeditation or treachery. Thus, the trial court found accused-

    appellant guilty of homicide and sentenced him to suffer the

    penalty of eight years and one day ofprision mayoras minimum to

    fourteen years, eight months and one day ofreclusion temporalas

    maximum. It also ordered him to pay the heirs of the victimP50,000

    as indemnity andP100,000 for other damages:

    WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accusedguilty of Homicide and[,] with the application of the Indeterminate

    Sentence Law[,] sentencing him to suffer the penalty of eight (8)

    years and one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years[,]

    eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum

    and maximum respectively and to pay the heirs of the victim the

    amount ofP50,000.00 for the latters life andP100,000.00 for other

    damages, with legal interest from the time this decision has become

    final until the same is fully paid.

    SO ORDERED.

    [10]

    On appeal, accused-appellants conviction was affirmed with

    modification by the CA.[11]It ruled that the evidence sufficiently

    established that Ramon was killed with treachery: he was first

    stabbed in the back while he was engaged in a fistfight with Rodel,

    then twice in front when he turned around to face accused-

    appellant, with his hands held behind him by Rodel. He was

    completely unaware and caught off-guard when he suffered the

    first stab. He was defenseless when he was stabbed again. Thus, the

    appellate court found accused-appellant guilty of murder,

    sentenced him toreclusion perpetuaand certified the case to this

    Court for review:

    IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING,the Decision of the Courta

    quois herebyAFFIRMEDwith the modification that the Appellant is

    hereby found guilty of Murder qualified by treachery defined and

    penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby

    meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. However,

    considering the penalty imposed on the Appellant, the Court hereby

    certifies this case to the Supreme Court for appropriate review.

    The Clerk of Court of this Court is hereby ordered to elevate allrecords of this case, including documentary and testimonial

    evidence, to the Supreme Court for appropriate review.

    SO ORDERED.[12]

    Accused-appellant faults the appellate court for (1) disregarding his

    claim that he was only acting in self-defense when he inflicted the

    mortal wounds on Ramon and (2) finding that the killing was

    attended by treachery.

    In a letter dated June 12, 2007, Julio Arciaga, assistant director for

    prisons and security of the Bureau of Corrections, informed the

    Court that accused-appellant was granted parole by the Board of

    Pardons and Parole (Board) on March 5, 2003 and released from the

    custody of the Bureau of Corrections on March 20, 2003.[13]

    We are thus confronted with the following issues:

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    1. whether the grant of parole rendered this case moot;

    2. whether accused-appellant only acted in self-defense and

    3. whether the victim was killed with treachery.

    The appeal has no merit.

    ACCUSED-APPELLANTS RELEASE ON PAROLE DID NOT RENDER THE

    CASE MOOT

    The appeal was not mooted by accused-appellants release on

    parole. His release only meant that, according to the Board, he had

    already served the minimum penalty imposed on him [14]and that he

    was fitted by his training for release, that there [was] reasonable

    probability that [he would] live and remain at liberty withoutviolating the law and that such release [would] not be incompatible

    with the welfare of society.[15]Should he violate the conditions of

    his parole, accused-appellant may be ordered rearrested, to serve

    the remaining unexpired portion of the maximum sentence.[16]

    Parole refers to the conditional release of an offender from a

    correctional institution after he serves the minimum term of his

    prison sentence.[17]The grant thereof does not extinguish the

    criminal liability of the offender. Parole is not one of the modes of

    totally extinguishing criminal liability under Article 89 of the RevisedPenal Code.[18]Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.

    Similarly, accused-appellants release on parole did not extinguish

    his civil liability.[19]Article 113 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

    ART. 113.Obligation to satisfy civil liability. Except in case of

    extinction of his civil liability as provided in the next preceding

    article,[20]the offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil

    liability resulting from the crime committed by him,

    notwithstanding the fact thathehas served his sentence consisting

    of deprivation of liberty or other rights, or has not been required to

    serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon commutation of

    sentence or any other reason. (emphasis supplied)

    Thus, accused-appellants civil liability subsists despite his release

    on parole.

    Moreover, the grant of parole would be improvident if the CA

    decision finding accused-appellant guilty of murder and sentencing

    him to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetuawere to be affirmed

    by this Court. In such a case, the determination of the Board that

    accused-appellant would have already served the minimum penaltyimposed on him would turn out to be erroneous. Worse, in basing

    its determination of accused-appellants eligibility for parole on the

    penalty imposed in the RTC decision, the Board effectively ignored

    the decision of the CA.

    Furthermore, the Board violated its own rules disqualifying from

    parole those convicted of an offense punished with reclusion

    perpetua.[21]Thus, the Board should be warned in no uncertain

    terms for actingultra vires, carelessly disregarding the CA decision

    and improvidently granting parole to accused-appellant.

    We will now proceed to consider the merits of the appeal.

    ACCUSED-APPELLANT DID

    NOT ACT IN SELF-DEFENSE

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    He who admits killing or fatally injuring another in the name of self-

    defense bears the burden of proving: (a) unlawful aggression on the

    part of his victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed

    to prevent or repel it and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on his

    part. By invoking self-defense, the burden is placed on the accused

    to prove the elements thereof clearly and convincingly.[22]

    While all three elements must concur, self-defense relies first and

    foremost on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the

    victim.[23]If no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may

    be successfully pleaded.[24]Here, both the trial and appellate courts

    found that there was no unlawful aggression on Ramons part and

    that, in fact, it was accused-appellant who was the unlawful

    aggressor. Thus, accused-appellants claim of self-defense cannot

    stand.

    The nature, number and location of the wounds sustained by the

    victim disprove accused-appellants claim of self-defense.[25]On this

    account, the appellate court correctly ruled that the accused-

    appellants version that he fought face to face with the victim was

    inconsistent with the fatal stab wound at the victims back.

    Moreover, the wounds inflicted by accused-appellant on the victim

    indicated a determined effort to kill and not merely to defend.[26]

    Accused-appellants failure to surrender, his escape to Laguna and

    hiding for more than a year until his eventual capture and arrestalso contradicted his claim that he acted in self-defense. Flight is

    indicative of guilt.

    Furthermore, whether or not accused-appellant acted in self-

    defense is a question of fact. It is a matter that is properly

    addressed to the trial court, not to this Court. In fact, the trial and

    appellate courts amply evaluated and carefully considered the issue.

    Their identical conclusions were based on competent evidence.

    There is therefore no reason to disturb their findings.

    TREACHERY ATTENDED THE

    KILLING OF THE VICTIM

    According to the CA, Ramon was defenseless when accused-

    appellant stabbed him in the back. And he was completely at the

    mercy of accused-appellant when he was repeatedly stabbed in

    front while Rodel was holding his hands from behind. Thus, the CA

    ruled that Ramon was killed with treachery.

    We agree.

    Accused-appellant perpetrated the killing in such a manner that

    there was absolutely no risk to himself arising from the defense

    which the victim might have made. Ramon was unarmed, had his

    back turned to accused-appellant and was fighting with another

    person when stabbed in different parts of the body. He was caught

    totally by surprise and did not even have a chinamans chance to

    survive the attack. As we ruled in People v. Fabrigas, Jr.:[27]

    Treachery is present where the assailant stabbed the victim while

    the latter was grappling with anotherthus, rendering him practically

    helpless and unable to put up any defense. (emphasis supplied)

    THE AWARD OF OTHER

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    PHILIPPINES VS. PAULINOFIRST DIVISION

    [G.R. No. 148810. November 18, 2003]PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,appellee, vs. HEVER PAULINO yBIYAYA,appellant.

    D E C I S I O NYNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:

    This is an appeal from the decision[1]

    of the Regional Trial Courtof DumagueteCity, Branch 34, in Criminal Case No. 12720 findingappellant Hever Paulino yBiyaya guilty beyond reasonable doubt of thecrime of Murder, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusionperpetua and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum ofP50,000.00.For the death of the Leonarda Paulino, appellant was charged with murder inan Information that reads:That on 18 August 1996 at about 5:00 oclock in the afternoonin Sitio Tubod, Tamao, Tayasan,Negros Oriental, Philippines and within thejurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, with intent tokill and with treachery and evident premeditation and without regard of therespect due to the offended party on account of her sex did then and therewillfully, feloniously and unlawfully attack, assault and stoneone Leonarda Paulino with a large rock thereby inflicting upon the latter fatalinjury at her head which caused her death soon thereafter.CONTRARY TO ART. 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

    [2]

    When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter trial on the meritsensued.

    The facts of the case are as follows:On August 18, 1996, at about 5:00 p.m., the victim and her daughters, JoyandMylene, were at their house when appellant passed by and asked forwater to drink. Since he was the nephew of the victim, appellant was

    welcomed into the house and was given a glass of water by Mylene. Hestayed at their porch while Mylene left for the house of hergrandmother, Vivenciana Cantero, approximately 40 meters away. Momentslater, the victim advised appellant to go home as his father might be lookingfor him. Appellant left the house angry at the victim for telling him toleave. Then, as the victim and Joy walked towards the houseof Vivenciana Cantero to fetch Mylene, Joy saw appellant, who was onlyabout 2 meters behind them, throw a rock at them hitting the head of thevictim. The victim slumped to the ground with her face down while appellantran away. Vivenciana heard the cries of Joy for help, and rushed to thescene. Her husband, Timoteo Cantero and Leonila Onayan, Joys aunt,

    helped Vivenciana bring the victim to Bindoy District Hospital where she wastreated.

    She was then transferred to the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital later thatnight. The victim died the following day.

    [3]

    Dr. Fe Herrera, a resident physician of Bindoy District Hospital, testified that

    the victim was unconscious when she was brought by the relatives to thehospital. The victim sustained two lacerated wounds, one on the lefttemporal region, about three centimeters long and the other one on the rightparietal region, about six centimeters long. She referred the victim tothe Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital for further treatment.

    [4]

    Dr. Virgilio de Guzman, the government physician atthe Negros OrientalProvincial Hospital who attended to the victim, testifiedthat the injuries sustained by the victim were fatal and no amount of surgicalintervention could have saved her. The victim died on August 19,1996 at 8:30 a.m. due to cardio-pulmonary arrest secondaryto uncal herniation secondary to severe traumatic injury.

    [5]

    For his part, appellant admits that he threw a stone at the victim but claimsthat he did so in self-defense. According to him, in the afternoon of August18, 1996, he passed by the house of the victim and asked for water todrink. After Mylene Paulinogave him a glass of water, he asked her if shealready had a boyfriend. Mylene did not reply but kicked him instead. Shethen went into the kitchen. Suddenly, the victim came out of the kitchenholding a scythe in her hand and shouted at him, I will kill you! I will chopyou finely with the use of this scythe! Appellant ran away and the victimchased him. When the victim was about 3 meters away from him, he pickeda stone and threw it at her to defend himself. After that, he ran towards theirhouse. He did not see whether the victim was hit or not. That same night,he told his father what happened. The following morning, he went to thehouse of policeman RemegioTorres to surrender. He was accompanied tothe police station of Tayasan, NegrosOriental, where he was investigatedand detained.

    [6]

    After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision, the dispositive portion ofwhich reads:WHEREFORE, accused HEVER PAULINO is hereby found guilty beyondreasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, and theCourt hereby imposes upon him the penalty ofRECLUSION PERPETUA.Accused is likewise directed to indemnify the heirs ofvictim Leonarda Paulino the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS(P50,000.00).In line with Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, asamended, accusedHever Paulino is hereby ordered to be immediatelydetained at the New Bilibid Prison inMuntinlupa City, Metro Manila. Theaccused is, however, hereby given full credit for the entire period of his

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    preventive detention, provided that he has submitted himself to andobserved the rules and regulations imposed by the detention center.No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.

    [7]

    Hence, this appeal, based on the following assignment of errors:

    I.THE COURTA QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMEOF MURDER.II.THE COURTA QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THEJUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE INTERPOSED BYTHE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.III.ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS LIABLEFOR THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF, THE COURTA QUO GRAVELYERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING AGGRAVATINGCIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.

    [8]

    Appellants claim of self-defense is unavailing.

    Settled is the rule in criminal cases that the prosecution hasthe onus probandiin establishing the guilt of the accused.

    [9] However, where

    the accused admits commission of the crime but invokes self-defense, thebasic rule that the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies on theprosecution is reversed, and the burden of proof is shifted to the accused toprove the elements of his defense.

    [10] It then becomes incumbent upon him

    to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of theevidence of the prosecution, for even if the latter were weak, it could not bedisbelieved after he had admitted the killing.

    [11] Hence, if the accused fails to

    discharge the burden of proof, his conviction must ensue as a matter ofconsequence.

    [12]

    By invoking self-defense, appellant must prove: (a) unlawful aggression onthe part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed torepel or prevent it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of theperson defending himself.

    [13]Although all the three elements must concur,

    self-defense must rest firstly on proof of unlawful aggression on the part ofthe victim. If no unlawful aggression has been proved, no self-defense maybe successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete. In other words inself-defense, unlawful aggression is a primordial element.

    [14]

    The question whether appellant acted in self-defense is essentially aquestion of fact.

    [15] In convicting appellant, the trial court succinctly held that:

    In the case at bar, the court is not persuaded to believe the assertion ofaccused Hever Paulinothat he acted in self-defense when he threw a bigstone at the head of victim Leornarda Paulino, which led to her death. Asadmitted by the accused on the witness stand, he had no previous quarrel ormisunderstanding with victim Leonarda Paulino, nor with eyewitnessJoy Paulino, or with any members of their family. There is no reason,

    therefore, why Leonarda would chase him with a scythe. There is also noreason at all why Joy Paulino would impute to the accused the heinouscrime of Murder, if he did not commit the crime as charged. This isespecially so, taking into account the fact that the accused, the victim andthe eyewitness are relatives. Leonarda is the wife of the uncle of theaccused, while Joy is the first cousin of the accused. Well-settled is the rulethat where there is no showing that the principal witnesses for theprosecution were actuated by any improper motive, the presumption is thatthey are not so actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full faith andcredit. Mere relationship of a witness to the victim does not impair hercredibility as to render her testimony unworthy of credence where noimproper motive can be ascribed to her for so testifying. The assertion ofthe accused that the victim chased him with a scythe is unworthy of belief asit is unnatural, coupled by the fact that it runs counter to the credible andstraightforward testimony of eyewitness Joy Paulinox x x x x x x x x

    The fact that victim Leonarda Paulino advised the accused, who is thenephew of her husband, to go home because he has his own house and hisfather might be looking for him, does not constitute an unlawful aggression incontemplation of law. The victim simply showed concern for the accusedand his father.

    [16](Citations omitted)

    We have consistently held that findings of facts and assessment of credibilityof witnesses are matters best left to the trial court because of its uniqueposition of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence ofthe witnesses deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is

    denied to the appellate courts. The trial courts findings are accordedfinality, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance ofweight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstoodor misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the resultsof the case.

    [17] No such fact or circumstance obtains in the case at bar.

    Appellant failed to prove with satisfactory and convincing evidence that thevictim was guilty of unlawful aggression. Self-defense cannot be justifiablyentertained where it is not only uncorroborated by competent evidence but isseriously doubtful. Like alibi, self-defense is inherently a weak defense,which is so easy to concoct but very difficult to verify.

    [18]Appellants

    invocation of self-defense therefore deserves scant consideration.

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    Appellant next argues that if he were to be held criminally liable, it shouldonly be for homicide. According to him, treachery was not alleged in theInformation with specificity as to qualify the killing to murder. He cites asbases for his argument the cases ofPeople v. Alba

    [19]andPeople

    v. Manlansing,[20]

    wherein the Court disregarded the qualifying circumstanceof treachery for the reason that it failed to specify treachery as a

    circumstance qualifying the killing to murder. In said cases, treachery wasconsidered only a generic aggravating circumstance; thus, the crimecommitted was only homicide and not murder.We do not agree.In the subsequent case ofPeople v. Aquino,

    [21]the Court clarified its ruling in

    the cases ofAlba and Manlansingby holding that:[T]he Court has repeatedly held, even after the recent amendments to theRules of Criminal Procedure, that qualifying circumstances need not bepreceded by descriptive words such as qualifying or qualified by toproperly qualify an offense.x x x x x x x x xSection 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states thatthe-x x x qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinaryand concise language and not necessarily in the language used in thestatute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understandingto know x x x (the) qualifying and aggravating circumstances x x x.Thus, even the attendant circumstance itself, which is the essential elementthat raises the crime to a higher category, need not be stated in thelanguage of the law. With more reason, the words aggravating/qualifyingcircumstances as used in the law need not appear in the Information,especially since these words are merely descriptive of the attendantcircumstances and do not constitute an essential element of thecrime. These words are also not necessary in informing the accused that heis charged of a qualified crime. What properly informs the accused of thenature of the crime charged is the specific allegation of the circumstancesmentioned in the law that raise the crime to a higher category.

    The rules require the qualifying circumstances to be specifically alleged inthe Information in order to comply with the constitutional right of the accusedto be properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation againsthim. The purpose is to allow the accused to prepare fully for his defense toprevent surprises during the trial.x x x x x x x x xSection 8 of Rule 110 requires that the Information shall state thedesignation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissionsconstituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravatingcircumstances. (Emphasis supplied). Section 8 merely requires theInformation to specify the circumstances. Section 8 does not require the useof the words qualifying or qualified by to refer to the circumstances which

    raise the category of an offense. It is not the use of the words qualifying orqualified by that raises a crime to a higher category, but the specificallegation of an attendant circumstance which adds the essential elementraising the crime to a higher category.x x x x x x x x xWe therefore reiterate that Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 merely require that

    the Information allege, specify or enumerate the attendant circumstancesmentioned in the law to qualify the offense. These circumstances need notbe preceded by the words aggravating/qualifying, qualifying, or qualifiedby to be considered as qualifying circumstances. It is sufficient that thesecircumstances be specified in the Information to apprise the accused of thecharges against him to enable him to prepare fully for his defense, thusprecluding surprises during the trial. When the prosecution specificallyalleges in the Information the circumstances mentioned in the law asqualifying the crime, and succeeds in proving them beyond reasonabledoubt, the Court is constrained to impose the higher penalty mandated bylaw. This includes the death penalty in proper cases.In the case at bar, the Information clearly passes the test as it specifiedtreachery as an attending circumstance in the commission of the crime. Theallegation, although not preceded by the words aggravating/qualifying,qualifying, or qualified by, is sufficient to apprise appellant of the chargeagainst him as to enable him to prepare fully his defense.The trial court correctly found the presence of the qualifying circumstance oftreachery in the instant case. There is treachery when the offender commitsany of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms inthe execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure itsexecution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which theoffended party might make. The essence of treachery is the swift andunexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocationon his part.

    [22]

    In the case at bar, it was established that the victim had no reason to expectthat she will be assaulted by appellant. She and her daughter Joy were just

    walking towards the house of Vivenciana to fetch her otherdaughter Mylene.

    The unexpected and sudden attack on Leonarda constitutes treacherybecause said assault rendered her unable and unprepared to defendherself. Appellants act of throwing a stone at the victim from behind showsthat he deliberately adopted a mode of attack that would deprive the victimof an opportunity to defend herself.

    As to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, we agree withappellant that the same should be considered in his favor. The evidenceshows that appellant surrendered to a person in authority a day after the

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    incident. This fact was not contested by the prosecution. Notwithstandingthis, the presence of voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance willnot affect the penalty to be imposed upon appellant. Under Article 248 ofthe Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for murder is reclusionperpetua to death. Article 63 of the same code states that when the lawprescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties and the crime is

    attended by a mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance, thelesser penalty shall be imposed.

    [23] Consequently, the penalty ofreclusion

    perpetua was correctly imposed by the trial court.Finally, the trial court correctly awarded civil indemnity in the amount ofP50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim. Civil indemnity is automaticallyimposed upon the accused without need of proof other than the fact of thecommission of murder or homicide.

    [24] Likewise, the trial court was correct in

    not awarding actual, moral and exemplary damages because theprosecution failed to present competent evidence to prove the same. Tojustify an award of actual damages, there must be competent proof of theactual amount of loss.

    [25] Further, in murder cases, moral damages cannot

    be granted in the absence of proof therefor[26]

    and exemplary damageswithout any aggravating circumstance.

    [27]

    WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional TrialCourt of Dumaguete City, Branch 34, in Criminal Case No. 12720 findingappellant HeverPaulino y Biyaya guilty beyond reasonable doubt of thecrime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusionperpetua and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim the sum ofP50,000.00 as civil indemnity is AFFIRMED in toto.Costs de oficio.

    SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur,

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    PHILIPPINES V CLEMENTE CASTA

    SECOND DIVISION

    PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

    Plaintiff-Appellee,

    - versus -

    CLEMENTE CASTAyCAROLINO,Accused-Appellant.

    G.R. No. 172871

    Present:

    QUISUMBING, J., Chairman,CARPIO MORALES,

    TINGA,VELASCO, JR., andBRION, JJ.

    Promulgated:

    September 16, 2008

    x ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

    D E C I S I O NBRION,J.:

    This is an appeal from the March 10, 2006 Decision[1]

    of the Court ofAppeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01217. The CA affirmed theAugust 18, 1999 Decision

    [2]of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 55,

    Alaminos, Pangasinan, finding the appellant Clemente Casta yCarolino(appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder andsentencing him to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua.

    ANTECEDENT FACTS

    The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with the crimeof murder under an Information that states:

    That on or about the 20th

    day of August, 1989 in the afternoon, at barangayGoyoden, municipality of Bolinao, province of Pangasinan, New[sic]Republicof the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, theabove-named accused, with intent to kill and by means of treachery, did,then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, suddenly and without

    warning attack and stab DANILO CAMBA with a knife, inflicting upon thevictim the following injuries to wit:

    - stab wound, 3 inches in length, 4 inches in depth, located at the back,left side, 5 inches (level) below the armpit;

    - stab wound at the left forearm, 3 cm. length and 1 inch depth.

    which caused his instantaneous death to the damage and prejudice of theheirs of Danilo Camba.

    CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.[3]

    The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge upon arraignment. Theprosecution presented the following witnesses in the trial on the merits thatfollowed: Marlyn

    [4]Cister; Modesto Cardona; Domingo Camba; Dionisia

    Camba; and Dr. Prudencio C. de Perio. The appellant took the witness standfor the defense.

    Marlyn Cister (Marlyn) testified that in the afternoon of August 20,1989, while seated on the steps of the stairs of their house, she saw DaniloCamba (Danilo) and Modesto Cardona (Modesto) standing by theroadside.

    [5]Suddenly, the appellant appeared from behind Danilo and

    stabbed him(Danilo).[6]

    Danilo fell and died on the spot. Thereafter, theappellant fled.

    [7]

    Modesto narrated that at around 3:00 oclock in the afternoonofAugust 20, 1989, he was walking along the road at Sitio Makber, Goyoden,Bolinao, Pangasinan when Danilo emerged from a small road and joinedhim. Along the way, they met Marcos Gumangan (Marcos) and AngelGatchalian (Angel) with whom they exchanged greetings; it was Danilos first

    time to visit Goyoden after several years. They all walked towards the westwith Marcos and Angel walking behind them. Suddenly, the appellantappeared from behind Danilo and stabbed him using a double-bladedknife.

    [8]Danilo turned around and then fell; the appellant fled still holding the

    knife he used in stabbing Danilo.[9]

    On cross-examination, he testified that he was at about two (2) armslength away from Danilo when he was stabbed, while their othercompanions were behind them.

    [10]

    Senior Police Officer I Domingo Camba (SPO1 Camba), a member ofthe Bolinao Police Station, narrated that on August 20, 1989, Barangay

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