1Prosecution PROSECUTOR V. MR. TONY GUSMAN October 2014 PROSECUTION MEMORIAL Preliminaries Page I of XII TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................................................................... III INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................................... IV STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................................................. IX SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS ........................................................................................................... XII PLEADINGS...................................................................................................................................... 1 I.PRELIMINARILY, AN IAC EXISTS................................................................................. 1 A.AN IAC EXISTS. ................................................................................................................... 1 B.ALTERNATIVELY, THERE WAS AN INTERNATIONALIZED NIAC. ....................................... 1 1.An NIAC existed between the AAF and the Resistance-Militia. ........................... 1 2.The NIAC became internationalized. ........................................................................... 2 C.GUSMAN AND THE AAF WERE AWARE OF THE IACS EXISTENCE. ................................... 3 II.GUSMAN IS INDIVIDUALLY CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR USING STARVATION AS A METHOD OF WARFARE AGAINST CIVILIANS. .......................... 3 A.ALL ELEMENTS ARE PRESENT. ........................................................................................... 3 1.Civilians were deprived of objects indispensable for survival. .................................. 3 2.Gusman intended to starve civilians as a method of warfare. ................................... 5 3.An international armed conflict exists. ........................................................................ 6 4.The Astron Military troops knew of the existence of an armed conflict. .................. 6 B.GUSMAN IS LIABLE UNDER ARTICLE 25(3)(A). .................................................................. 6 III.GUSMAN IS LIABLE FOR THE WAR CRIME OF ATTACKING THE CIVILIAN POPULATION. ............................................................................................................................. 6 A.ALL ELEMENTS ARE PRESENT. ........................................................................................... 7 PROSECUTION MEMORIAL Preliminaries Page II of XII 1.Hanson directed an attack against Nirvana. ................................................................ 7 2.The attack on Nirvana is an attack on a civilian population. ..................................... 7 3.Hansons mens rea was manifest. .................................................................................. 8 4.An IAC exists. ................................................................................................................. 9 5.Hanson knew of the existence of an IAC. ..................................................................... 9 B.GUSMAN IS LIABLE UNDER ARTICLE 28(A). ...................................................................... 9 1.Gusman and Hanson have a superior-subordinate relationship. ............................ 10 2.Gusman knew that the crime was committed. ........................................................... 10 3.Gusman failed to punish Hansons criminal act. ...................................................... 10 IV.GUSMAN IS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR THE WAR CRIME OF EXCESSIVE INCIDENTAL DAMAGE TO THE ENVIRONMENT. ......................................................... 10 A.ALL ELEMENTS ARE PRESENT. .......................................................................................... 10 1.Gusman launched an attack. ....................................................................................... 10 2.The attack was excessive and disproportionate in relation to the overall military advantage. ............................................................................................................................. 11 3.Gusman had knowledge that the attack would cause widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the environment. .................................................................................... 12 4.The oil spill was conducted in the context of an IAC. ............................................... 13 5.Gusman was aware of the factual circumstances that established the existence of armed conflict. ..................................................................................................................... 13 B.GUSMAN IS CRIMINALLY LIABLE AND RESPONSIBLE UNDER ARTICLE 25(3)(B). ............ 13 1.Gusman ordered the crime committed by Ardent. ................................................... 13 PRAYER ......................................................................................................................................... 14 PROSECUTION MEMORIAL Preliminaries Page III of XII TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS Non-International Armed ConflictNIAC International Armed ConflictIAC Geneva ConventionGC International Criminal CourtICC Additional Protocol IAP-I International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Rwanda ICTY ICTR Astron Armed Forces International Committee of the Red Cross United Nations Development Programme AAF ICRC UNDP PROSECUTION MEMORIAL Preliminaries Page IV of XII INDEX OF AUTHORITIES Treaties and ConventionsCited asPage Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of theWoundedandSickinArmedForcesintheField of 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (1949). GC-I8 InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC), Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, (1907). Hague Regulations 9 InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC),Protocol AdditionaltotheGenevaConventionsof12August 1949,andrelatingtotheProtectionofVictimsof InternationalArmedConflicts(ProtocolI)1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (June 8, 1977). AP-I4,6,7,9,11,12 InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC),Protocol AdditionaltotheGenevaConventionsof12August 1949,andrelatingtotheProtectionofVictimsof Non-InternationalArmedConflicts(ProtocolII), Commentary,1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (June 8, 1977). AP-II 1 United Nations Documents International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. P.C.N.I.C.C./2000/1/Add.2 (2000). Elements3,6,12 UNCommitteeonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights (CESCR),GeneralCommentNo.12:TheRightto Adequate Food. (May 12, 1999). General Comment 12 4 UNEnvironmentalProgramme,Whathappenstooilin water? Global Marine Oil Pollution (Aug. 1, 2014). (GPA) UNEP11 PROSECUTION MEMORIAL Preliminaries Page V of XII UnderstandingstotheConventionontheProhibitionof militaryoranyhostileuseofenvironmental modification techniques, Report of the Conference of theCommitteeonDisarmament,VolumeI,General AssemblyOfficialrecords:Thirty-firstsession, Supplement No. 27. Understandings11 Judicial Decisions Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (1998).Akayesu2,4 Prosecutorv.Bemba,CaseNo.ICC-01/05-01/08-424 (2009). Bemba1,2,3 Prosecutorv.BlagojevicandJokic,CaseNo.IT-02-60 (2009). Blagojevic & Jokic 10 Prosecutor v. Boskoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, (2008).Boskoski1 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14 (2004).Blaskic5,9 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A (2006).Blaskic-Appeals8 Prosecutor v. Brjdanin, Case no. IT-99-36 (2004). Brjdanin10 Prosecutor v. Celebici, Case No. IT-96-21-T (1998).Celebici1,2 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A (2000).Furundzija12 Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T (2006).Galic7 Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-A (2006).Galic-Appeals8 PROSECUTION MEMORIAL Preliminaries Page VI of XII Prosecutor v. Halilovi, Case No. IT-01-48-T (2005).Halilovi1,2,10 Prosecutorv.KayishemaandRuzindana,CaseNo.ICTR-95-1-A (2001).Kayishema & Ruzindana 7 Prosecutor v. Kordi, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T (2001).Kordi1,2,7,10 Prosecutor v. Kordi, Case No. IT-95-14-A (2004).Kordi-Appeals7 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33 (2009).Krstic8 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T (2001).Kunarac1 Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T (2002).Krnojelac6 Prosecutor v. Kvocka, et al, Case No. IT-98-30/1 (2005).Kvocka5 Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, (2005).Limaj2,5,8,10 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 (2012).Lubanga1,2,3 Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-98-29/1 (2007). Milosevic2 Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T (2000).Musema1,2 Prosecutor v. Simic, et al., Case No. IT-95-9 (2003). Simic5,6 Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-T (2003). Stakic6 Prosecutor v. Tadi, Case No. IT-94-1-T (1997).Tadi1,2,8 Prosecutor.v. Tadi, Case No.IT-94-1-A (1999).Tadi-Appeals1,2,3,6 PROSECUTION MEMORIAL Preliminaries Page VII of XII Prosecutor v. Zigiranyirazo, Case No. ICTR-01-73-T (2008).Zigiranyirazo8 ZagrebCountyCourt.kipminor Case No. II-K-rz-1/06, 1st Instance Verdict. Zagreb5 Books, Treaties, Digests, and Restatements ANTOINEBOUVIERANDMARCOSASSOULI,HOWDOESLAW PROTECTINWAR?CASES,DOCUMENTSAND TEACHING MATERIALS ON CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, VOLUME II: CASES AND DOCUMENTS (2006). BOUVIER & SASSOULI 5 DIETERFLECK,THEHANDBOOKOFINTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2013). FLECK3 JUDGEBAKONEJUSTICEMOLOTO,COMMAND RESPONSIBILITYININTERNATIONALCRIMINAL TRIBUNALS. MOLOTO9 JEANPICTET,COMMENTARYONTHEGENEVACONVENTION FORTHEAMELIORATIONOFTHECONDITIONOFTHE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD, INTERNATIONALCOMMITTEEOFTHEREDCROSS (1952). PICTET3 YVESSANDOZ,ETAL.(eds.),COMMENTARYONTHE ADDITIONALPROTOCOLSOF8JUNE1997TOTHE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949. SANDOZ1 WILLIAM SCHABAS, A COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE (2010).SCHABAS9 PROSECUTION MEMORIAL Preliminaries Page VIII of XII Essays, Articles and Journals InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC),Howis theTermArmedConflictDefinedinInternational Humanitarian Law?, Opinion Paper, March 2008.ICRC Opinion Paper1 KnutDormann,PreparatoryCommissionforthe InternationalCriminalCourt:TheElementsofWar Crimes, Volume 83 (2001). Dormann5 StanislavPatin,EnvironmentalImpactoftheOffshoreOil and Gas Company (2014).Patin11 Meo, S.A., et al., Effect of Duration of Exposure to Polluted AirEnvironmentonKungFunctioninSubjects Exposed to Crude Oil Spill into Sea Water, 22INTL J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. & ENVL HEALTH. Meo,11 GerhardWerle,PrinciplesofInternationalCriminalLaw, (2005). Werle1,3 SylvainVite,TypologyofArmedConflictsinInternational HumanitarianLaw:LegalConceptsandActual Situations. Vite 1 LindseyCameron,Privatemilitarycompanies:theirstatus underinternationalhumanitarianlawanditsimpact on their regulation, 88 INTL REV. RED CROSS. Cameron8 PROSECUTION MEMORIAL Preliminaries Page IX of XII STATEMENT OF FACTS Since World War II, Bereto has been exercising sovereignty over the Yukule Archipelago Archipelago.AlthoughcompltlyutonomousinmngingitsintrnlffirsYukuls defense and foreign affairs remains under the Bereton central government. On 4 February 2008, the Astron Armed Forces AAF invaded the Archipelago. On 10 February2008,itsGovernorsurrendered.However,astronglocalresistanceledbyColonel Spartan of the Bereton Army, continued to oppose Astro. For the duration of the armed conflict, Bereto was the main source of military supply to the Resistance-Militia.Ban on Imports and Aid in Yukule On1July2008,asthearmedconflictincreasedinintensity,AdmiralTonyGusman (Gusman) ordered checkpoints established across the island.Gusman imposed limitations on localfishinguptosixnauticalmilesoffshore,aswellasrestrictedtheimportationofgoods. Importationofgoodswasapprovedorrejectedonacase-by-casebasis,withtheMilitary Administration refusing to publish a list of controlled goods.By September 2009, thetotal catch of local fishermenwas halved and still continued to decrease,causingpricestosoar.Therestrictionontheimportoffertilizersandpesticides reduced local food production by a third of its past level. Inspections in checkpoints significantly delayed the delivery of basic necessities. Damages along main roads, which remained unrepaired becauseofthelackofconstructionmaterials,alsodelayedthedeliveryofbasicnecessities. Consequently, the food distributed to Yukule civilians was insufficient to meet their needs. On15November2009,militiamembersattackedtheMilitaryAdministrationin Solfrino.Wounmilitimmbrswrsnskingshltrinhumnitrinorgniztions offices.Thenextday,16November2009,Gusmanorderedanabsolutesuspensionofall imports,includinghumanitarianaids,lastinguntil15January2010.Thistwo-monthperiod lastedthroughoutthewinterseasonintheArchipelago.Withtheban,hospitalsandmedical storesfailedtosupporttheneedsofthelocalpopulation,whichledtotheworseningofthe Yukulrshalthconditions.Lastly,thelackofwaterfitforconsumptionalsoworsenedtheir livingconditions.WhentheYukulersappealedforanintermediateinternationalintervention through Peppermint Express, the AAF shut it down. PROSECUTION MEMORIAL Preliminaries Page X of XII Operation Blue Due to the tension in Yukule, ten non-govrnmntl orgniztions NGO fromstro nBrtoformthFrYukulovmntMovementolitionthtimstolivr humnitrinpkgstoYukulnonfrontthoupyinginvrs.On20July2010 Nirvana, a Casa-registered vessel carrying the Movement, 200 passenger-activists and 30 Sphinx guards, sailed to Yukule. mirlGusmnstblishOprtionBlutolwithpotntilthrtsn ppoint Commnr Hnson to l th oprtion. Oprtion Bluommno unit, which iscomposedof60marines,seizedandboardedtheNirvana.Uponstrossizurofthship theSphinxguardsandpassengersattemptedtoresist.However,alloftheSphinxguardsand pssngrsffortswrfutil.Thmrinessubsequentlyopenedfireuponthepassengersof Nirvana resulting in severe casualties. Out of 30 Sphinx guards, 15 were killed. Also, 60 people were injured, including guards and passengers. ThemarinesthenassumedcontrolofNirvana.TheNirvanawasescortedtoPort Solferino and all its passengers were held as prisoners.Oil spills and oil fires Bereto, in itsgoal to recapture Yukule, launched an intensiveair campaignand its navy against Astron forces. The Bereton navy subsequently engaged the Astron navy on the high seas.On20September2010,GusmanorderedRearAdmiralFreedman(Freedman)to rsorttollrsoursvilbltostllthBrtonnvy.Inthnsuingyssvrlpro-governmentmagazinesstatedthattheBeretongovernmentshouldre-consideranyattemptto isrupt stros sovrignty ovr Yukul whih woul only l to unforsn onsquns. On24September2010,CaptainArdent(ArdentpursunttoGusmnsorrs discharged oil into the sea, from three oil valves and three oil tankers. On 16 October 2010, Gusman told the Hashtag Daily that further Bereton attacks would only l to th strution of Yukul. Gusmn orr rnt to tk ll msurs possibl to stop th vnmnt of th Brton fors. On the same day, large oil storage tanks on a site near Port Solferino burst into huge fires. Port Solferino and the surrounding areas were awash in smoke, soot and ash.It took ten days toget the fires under control and bythen, several million liters of oil have already been released into the sea. The oil spill and oil fires had several negativenvironmntl ffts on Yukuls bioivrsity. PROSECUTION MEMORIAL Preliminaries Page XI of XII In May 2011, Astro and Bereto agreed to jointly refer the situation to the International Criminl Court ICC. PROSECUTION MEMORIAL Preliminaries Page XII of XII SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS Gusman, in his capacity as military commander, is criminally liable as he(i) committed; (ii) directed; (iii) and ordered the (a) use of starvation as a method of warfare; (b) attack against civiliansnottakingdirectpartinhostilities,and;(c)launchofanattackintheknowledgethat suchwillcausewidespread,long-termandseveredamagetothenaturalenvironment,inthe contextofaninternationalarmedconflictinviolationofinternationalhumanitarianlaw. PROSECUTION MEMORIAL Pleadings and Authorities Page 1 of 14 PLEADINGS I.PRELIMINARILY, AN IAC EXISTS. A.AN IAC EXISTS. AnIAC exists when there is resort to armed force by two or more States,1 regardless of theintensityoftheconfrontation.2Thepartiesmustresorttoactualcombataction3withthe intent of harming the enemy.4 From4February2008(C.6)upto31December2010(C.44),Bereto,throughthe Rsistn-ilitiandtheirNavy,wasengagedinarmedhostilitiesagainsttheAAF(C.7-8,10-11,13,16,19,24-28,35-40).5 B.ALTERNATIVELY, THERE WAS AN INTERNATIONALIZED NIAC. Anarmedconflict,firstcharacterizedasnon-international,6isinternationalizedwhen either(1)aforeignStatesendstroopsintoaterritorytosupportanon-governmentalgroup opposingthelocalgovernment,or(2)whensomeoftheparticipantsinthenon-international armed conflict act on behalf of a foreign State.7

1.An NIAC existed between the AAF and the Resistance-Militia. AnNIACexistswheneverthereisprotractedarmedviolencebetweengovernmental forces and an organized armed group.8In Boskoski, the existence of an armed conflict depended on two criteria: intensity of the conflict and organization of parties to the conflict.9 Here, the intensity of the conflict between Astroand the Resistance-Militia is evidenced by the following: first, the conflict lasted for more than twoyears;10 (C.7,37)second, the AAF

1 Bemba, 294. 2 ICRC Opinion Paper. 3 SANDOZ, 603. 4 Vite, 72. 5 Musema, 248; AP-II, 4338-41. 6 Tadic, 70,561-62; Kunarac,56. 7 Tadic-Appeals, 84,94; Lubanga,209; Bemba, 220. 8 Tadic, 70; Werle, at 289. 9 Boskoski, 177 10 Celebici, 186; Hallilovic, 163-166,169. PROSECUTION MEMORIAL Pleadings and Authorities Page 2 of 14 occupiedYukule;11(C.7)third,theResistance-Militiareceivedweapons,explosives,and military supplies after they were organized;12 (C.7,8) fourth, the severity and effect of the clashes increasedasthesituationbecamemorevolatile;13(C.7-9,13,16)andfifth,theResistance-ilitis growing prsn ws not onntrt on on prt of Yukul s rprssion fforts wr widespread.14 The Resistance-Militia was organized as shown by their sustained and concerted military operations.15Such operations were sustained, as the attacks by the Resistance-Militia lasted for more than one year, or from 10 February 2008 (C.7) to 16 November 2009 (C.16), and they were concerted because the attacks were made to hamper the operations of the AAF. (C.7) Thus, the Resistance-Militia was clearly organized.2.The NIAC became internationalized. Brtos gr of involvmnt oupl with th Rsistn-ilitis bility to pln n carry out military operations,16 internationalized the armed conflict. a.Bereto sent troops to support the Resistance-Militia. In Kordic, theICTY held that the conflict, originally non-international incharacter, was internationalizedwhentheSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslaviasentfightersfromthe Yugoslv Popls rmy in support of the Bosnian Serbs.17The participation of Bereton armed and police forces internationalized the conflict. (C.7) b.The Resistance-Militia acted on Beretos behalf. An NIAC is likewise internationalized when a foreign State exercises overall control over thearmedgrouppartytotheNIAC.18InLubanga,overallcontrolispresentwhentheforeign

11 Limaj, 146,158; Hallilovic, 163. 12 Celebici, 188; Milosevic, 31. 13 Milosevic, 28. 14 Tadic, 566; Celebici, 188. 15 Akayesu, 626; Musema, 258. 16 Bemba, 261. 17 Kordic, 299; Lubanga, 209-11. 18 Tadi-Appeals, 120,131. PROSECUTION MEMORIAL Pleadings and Authorities Page 3 of 14 Statehasaroleinorganizing,coordinatingorplanningthemilitaryactionsofthegroup,aside from any financial and military support.19 BeretowastheResistance-ilitisminsourofmilitrysupplis.C.7Th Resistance-ilitislrwsSprtnnactivememberoftheBeretonArmedForces.As such,theBeretonArmedForcesthroughSpartandictatedthesustainedandconcertedmilitary operationsoftheResistance-Militia.PresidentBlackofBeretohadeveninstructedSpartanto rivinvrsoutofYukul.C.7ClrlySprtnhovrllontrolofthRsistn-iliti. C.GUSMAN AND THE AAF WERE AWARE OF THE IACS EXISTENCE. InBembathICTYhlthtthprptrtorsknowlgofthftulirumstns establishingthearmedconflictissufficienttosatisfytheawarenessrequirement.20Itisnot necessary that they consider the conflict as war.21 GusmanisAAFsCommnr-in-Chief.(C.2)Underhiscommand,checkpoints(C.8), th ritim Control Zon C.9 limittions on th tivitis of fishrmn C.10 n ontrol overimportationofgoods(C.11)wereimposedtoweakentheResistance-Militia.Thus, Gusmns knowlg of th fts ws shr to th F.II.GUSMANISINDIVIDUALLYCRIMINALLYLIABLEFORUSING STARVATION AS A METHOD OF WARFARE AGAINST CIVILIANS. Gusman committed a war crime under Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) when he (1) deprived civilians of objects indispensable for their survival, (2) with an intention to starve them, (3) in the context of an IAC, (iv) with him being aware of such.22 A.ALL ELEMENTS ARE PRESENT. 1.Civilians were deprived of objects indispensable for survival. a.The attack affected Yukule civilians. AP-I rtil 511 provis tht ivilins shll njoy prottion ginst ngrs rising frommilitryoprtions.23SinceYukuleciviliansarepersonsneitherbelongingtothearmed

19 Lubanga, 211; Tadic-Appeals, 120,131. 20 Bemba, 238. 21 Werle, at 287; FLECK, at 203; PICTET, at 28. 22 See Elements. PROSECUTION MEMORIAL Pleadings and Authorities Page 4 of 14 forcesnortakinganyactivepartinthehostilities,24theyshouldbeimmunefromattacks.25

Neither did the civilians perform any act to lose their civilian status.26 b.Civilians were deprived of objects indispensable for survival. Deprivationhappenswhenobjectsindispensabletocivilianssurvivlinluing foostuffsropsrinkingwtrinstlltionsnsupplisnirrigtionworks27arenot made available in a quantity and quality sufficient to satisfy their needs.28Likewise, deprivation existswhensuchobjectsarenotmadeaccessibletociviliansinwaysthataresustainableto them.29 Yukuleciviliansweredeprivedofobjectsnecessaryforaself-sustainingfoodsupply through the imposition of unreasonable regulations (C.9-11) and subsequently, the absolute ban onimportations.(C.16)Importedgoodswereapprovedorrejectedarbitrarily,sinceaccepted items consistently changed and no list of controlled goods was published. (C.12)Raw materials and manufactured goods were significantly reduced, resulting to increase in prices. (C.12)Metal objects,suchastincans,whichfarmersusetopreservefood,werebanned.(C.12)Fertilizers and pesticides were prohibited (C.12), reducing local food production by a third of its past level. (C.15)Th limittion on fishrmns activities also caused the significant decrease in their total catch.(C.15)Thus,itcanbeclearlyseenthatthemereregulationalonehadalreadycaused harmful effects to civilians. Despitethis,Gusmanstillhadtheaudacitytonotonlyremovetheunreasonable regulations but to impose an absolute ban. Thisban included the prohibition on importation of cement, steel, and other construction materials (C.12,16) necessary for sustainable food delivery andaccessibilitytocivilians.Consequently,hospitalsandmedicalstoreswereunableto maintain and repair their equipment (C.17); civilians suffered from poor living conditions (C.17); 23 AP I, art.51(1).24 Akayesu, 582.25 AP-I, art.51 26 AP-I, art.51(3). 27 Id.art.54(2).28 General Comment, 12(8). 29 Id. PROSECUTION MEMORIAL Pleadings and Authorities Page 5 of 14 and sewerage networks and pumping stations were left unrepaired, making water supply unfit for consumption(C.18).30Clearly,civiliansweredeprivedofobjectsindispensableforsurvival when food quantity was significantly reduced and was not made accessible to them. 2.Gusman intended to starve civilians as a method of warfare. a.Civilians were starved as a method of warfare. The intention to starve covers not only killing by hunger or depriving of nourishment, but also depriving sufficient supply of something necessary to live.31Thus, the death of one or more prsons from strvtion srsult of th uss ts is not required.32

Here,Gusmanandhissoldierstightenedcontrolmeasures,pressuringthepopulationto disengagefromunrest(C.9).33Whenthiswasunsuccessful,asevincedbytheResistance-ilitis ttk in Solfrino C.16 th bsolut bn ws impos for the same purpose.b.Gusman clearly had intent. Mensreaisestablishedwhentheaccusedisawareofthesubstantiallikelihoodthata criminal act would occur as a consequence of his conduct.34Clearly, Gusman intended to starve Yukuleciviliansfromthetimecontrolmeasureswereimposed.First,approvalofgoodswas inconsistent, strictly curtailed and scrutinized, (C.12) and no fixed standard was followed. (C.11) Second, inspections in checkpoints continued even when it slowed down the distribution of food andmedicine.(C.13)Third,theAstronGovernmentintentionallyusedtheresearchonthe minimumintakeofcaloriesforsurvivalasthesolebasisforallowableimportations,andany importation in excess of the minimum would be disallowed. (C.14)Yukule Watch reported that food distributed remained insufficient to meet the ivilins needs. (C.14) Despite these, Gusman even worsened the situation by imposing an absolute import ban, knowing that it would result in the starvation of not only the members of the Resistance-Militia but also the civilians residing in Yukule. (C.14,15)Further, this shows that Gusman, in imposing

30 Zagreb, at 264. 31 Dormann, 475. 32 Id. at 476.33 BOUVIER & SASSOULI, 2413. 34 Kvocka, 251; Limaj, 509; Simic, 137; Blaskic, 42. PROSECUTION MEMORIAL Pleadings and Authorities Page 6 of 14 theabsoluteban,deliberatelyfailedtodistinguishbetweencombatantsandcivilians.35

Therefore, mens rea was manifest. 3.An international armed conflict exists. See Supra [I.A and I.B]. 4.The Astron Military troops knew of the existence of an armed conflict. See Supra [I.C]. B.GUSMAN IS LIABLE UNDER ARTICLE 25(3)(A).InStakicthICTYhlthtommittingrimnotonlymeansthattheaccused participated directly or indirectly in the material elements of the crime charged through positive acts as an individual but also, jointly with others.36This means that joint criminal enterprise is a formofommissionunriniviualcriminalresponsibility37aslongasthefollowing elementsarepresent:(i)pluralityofpersons;(ii)plan,designorpurposeamountingtothe commission of a crime, and; (iii) participation of the accused.38Gusman satisfied all elements as evinced by (i) the presence of AAF (C.6) who acted with (ii) a common purpose to starve Yukule civilians in pursuant to (iii) Gusmns orrs. Clearly no rim of strving ivilins woul hv ourr if not for Gusmns orrs in hiscapacityasCommander-in-Chief.(C.2,11,13,16,19)Havingcommittedthecrimewithhis troops, Gusman is individually criminally liable by joint criminal enterprise. III.GUSMANISLIABLEFORTHEWARCRIMEOFATTACKINGTHE CIVILIAN POPULATION. Thedutytodistinguishbetweenciviliansandcombatantsisabsolute;thewarcrimeof intentionallydirectingattacksagainstcivilianpopulationsoccurswhen:(1)anoffenderdirects an attack, (2) against a civilian population, (3) with deliberate intent, (4) during an IAC, and (5) with knowledge of an existing IAC.39

35 AP-I, art.51(3). 36 Stakic, 439; Simic, et al., 137; Tadic-Appeals, 190 37Stakic, 438,528. 38 Krnojelac, 31.39 See Elements. PROSECUTION MEMORIAL Pleadings and Authorities Page 7 of 14 Gusman, having appointed Hanson, C.24 is rsponsibl for his suborints ts unr the principle of command responsibility. A.ALL ELEMENTS ARE PRESENT. 1.Hanson directed an attack against Nirvana. In Kordic, it was held that attacks launched deliberately in the course of an armed conflict andarenotjustifiedbymilitarynecessityareprohibited.40HrFstofnotonly infiltrating,butalsoopeningfireagainstNirvana,(C.27)constitutedanattacknotjustifiedby militarynecessity.orovrHnsonirtthttkbyorringOprtionBlus commencement. (C.27) 2.The attack on Nirvana is an attack on a civilian population. Acivilianpopulationiscomposedofpersonswhoarenotpartofthearmedforces.41

Moreover,thepresenceofcombatantswithinthecivilianpopulationdoesnotdepriveitofits civiliancharacter.42Nirvana,attheveryleast,had200civiliansonboard,givingitacivilian character. (C.23)a.Nirvana did not carry military weapons. Military objectivesare limited to objects which bytheir nature, location,purpose or use makeaneffectivecontributiontomilitaryactionandwhosetotalorpartialdestruction,capture orneutralization,inthecircumstancesrulingatthetime,offeradefinitemilitaryadvantage.43

According to the principles of distinction and protection of the civilian population, only military objectivesmaybelawfullyattacked.44KordicandCerkezfurtherstatesthatallobjectswhich are not military objectives are civilian objects.45In case of doubt as to whether an object which isnormallydedicatedforcivilianpurposesisbeingusedtomakeaneffectivecontributionto military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.46

40 Kordic, 328. 41 AP-I, Art.50. 42 Id.art.50(3); Kayishema & Ruzindana, 179-80. 43 Kordic-Appeals, 53. 44 Galic, 51. 45Kordic-Appeals, 53. 46 Id. PROSECUTION MEMORIAL Pleadings and Authorities Page 8 of 14 Here,NirvanaisaCasa-registeredmerchantvesselcharteredtodeliverhumanitarian packagestoYukule.(C.21)Itspassengersaremembersofacivilianpopulation,specifically human rights activists from Astro, Bereto, Casa, and ten other countries. (C.23)b.TheSphinxguardsresistancedidnotchangeNirvanascivilian character. Civilianobjectsdonotloseprotectionwhenguardedbyciviliansecurityforces,47or when the latter uses arms to defend themselves.48Hnson nnot lim th Sphinx gurs n NirvanapssngrsrsistnsjustificationtoattackNirvana,especiallywhentheSphinx guards only fired shots to prevent the commandos from advancing. (C.27)3.Hansons mens rea was manifest. To establish mens rea, the accused must have either intended to cause the commission of the crime, or have been aware of the substantial likelihood that the crime would be committed as aconsequenceoftheexecutionofthisorder.49Hnsonsorrtoopnfirmnifstshis criminal intent. (C.27) a.Hanson intended to attack civilians. InGalic,theICTYruledthatintentmaybeinferredfromcircumstantialevidence.50

HansonwasinformedthattheMovementwoulddeliverhumanitarianpackagestoYukule. (C.21)HewasawarethatNirvanacarriesaround200membersoftheMovementandhuman rights activists. (C.23)Regardless, Hanson ordered to open fire. (C.27) b.Hansonknewthesubstantiallikelihoodofanattackagainstthe Nirvana. Krstic51 enunciated that aperson who orders an attack may beconvicted of a warcrime thatisthenaturalandforeseeableconsequenceofhiscriminalplan,evenifcommittedby others,52basedonhowareasonablepersonwouldhavejudgedtheattendingcircumstances.53

47 GC-I, art.22(2). 48 Id.; Cameron, 589. 49 Limaj, 515; Zigiranyirazo, 102; Blaskic-Appeals, 42. 50 Galic-Appeals, 171. 51 Krstic, 622. 52 Tadic, 204. PROSECUTION MEMORIAL Pleadings and Authorities Page 9 of 14 Hanson,beingawareoftheciviliansaboardNirvana,wouldhaveforeseenthatopeningfire (C.27) would result to the death of civilians. Moreover,criminalintentismanifestedbyhisfailuretotakenecessaryprecautions.54 Under AP-I, a commander must take the following actions before attacking:first, do everything feasibletoverifythattheobjectsoftheattackarenotcivilians;second,takeallfeasible precautions to avoid or minimize loss of civilian life or injury to civilians; and third, refrain from launching any attack which may cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury and damage.55 Hnsonsmensreaisevidencedbyhisfailuretotakenecessaryprecautionsto distinguishbetweenciviliansandcombatants.(C.27)Hefailedtogiveadvancedwarningsfor prior to the attack,56 showing his failure to take necessary precautions amounting to bad faith, or at its worst, gross negligence in carrying out the military operation. (C.28) 4.An IAC exists. See Supra [I.A and I.B]. 5.Hanson knew of the existence of an IAC. See Supra [I.C]. B.GUSMAN IS LIABLE UNDER ARTICLE 28(A). UndertheprincipleofcommandresponsibilityGusmnisrsponsiblforHnsons offenses.57Acommandermayincurcriminalresponsibilityforcrimescommittedbypersons whoarenotformallyhisdirectsubordinates,insofarasheexerciseseffectivecontrolover them.58 53 SCHABAS, 1033. 54 AP-I, art.57. 55Id. 56 Hague Regulations, art.26. 57 MOLOTO,15-16. 58 Blaskic, 301. PROSECUTION MEMORIAL Pleadings and Authorities Page 10 of 14 1.Gusman and Hanson have a superior-subordinate relationship. Theexistenceofasuperior-subordinaterelationshipischaracterizedbyahierarchical relationshipbetweensuperiorandsubordinate,whetherformalorinformal.59Gusmanwasthe AAF commander-in-chief (C.2) who appointed Hanson to lead Operation Blue (C.24). 2.Gusman knew that the crime was committed. Knowledgeofacrimemaybeestablishedbycircumstantialevidence thatamilitary commander is part of an organized structure and monitoring systems has been found to facilitate proof of actual knowledge.60Gusman, Fs ommnr-in-chief, would surely have access to theradiofrequencyoverwhichtheexchangebetweenHansonandBormantookplace.(C.26) Given this, he would have known that his subordinates would resort to military retaliation.3.Gusman failed to punish Hansons criminal act. Personsassumingcommandafterthecommissionofthecrimehasthedutytopunish.61

Thedutyencompassestheobligationtoconductaneffectiveinvestigationwithaviewto establishing the facts, and take active steps to ensure that the perpetrators will be punished.62

Gusmn fil to punish or t th vry lst invstigt Hnsons tions.The Ministry of Defense questionably cleared Hanson of any responsibility for Operation Blue. (C.32) IV.GUSMANISCRIMINALLYLIABLEFORTHEWARCRIMEOFEXCESSIVE INCIDENTAL DAMAGE TO THE ENVIRONMENT. Under Article 8(2)(b)(iv), Gusman committed a war crime by (1) launching an attack, (2) knowingthatitwillcauseexcessiveincidentaldamagetotheenvironmentdisproportionateto the overall militaryadvantage,(3) duringanIAC, and(4)n with th wrnss of thICs existence. A.ALL ELEMENTS ARE PRESENT. 1.Gusman launched an attack.

59 Blagojevic & Jokic, 791; Brdjanin, 276. 60 Blagojevic & Jokic, 792; Halilovic, 524. 61 Halilovic, 72; Kordic, 446. 62 Limaj, 529. PROSECUTION MEMORIAL Pleadings and Authorities Page 11 of 14 Thereleaseofoilisanattacksinceitwasanactofviolence63intendedtodamageand temporarily immobilize Bereton vessels. (C.37)The hazardous oil fumes affected the quality of theenvironmentsurroundingtheBeretonnavy.64Byreleasingtheoil,Ardentlaunchedan attack. 2.Theattackwasexcessiveanddisproportionateinrelationtothe overall military advantage. a.The attack caused widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the environment.Duetoitsviscosityanddensity,65theoilrapidlycoveredseawateroverawidespread area,encompassingseveralhundredsquarekilometers.66Theoilfires(C.39)likewisecaused widespreaddamage,encompassingseveralhundredsquarekilometers,asPortSolferinoandits surrounding areas were awash with smoke, soot, and ash.67 (C.40) ThedamagefromthespillandfiresaffectingYukulsmrinnirnvironmntis long-term68 as it would take years for the environment to return to its former state. (C.42)There wasseveredamagetotheenvironment,whichsignificantlydisruptedandharmedhumanlife, natural, and economic resources.69Th ttk us signifint isruptions to Yukuls frgil ecosystem. (C.4,41-42) Thetotalityofcircumstancesshowsthattheattackcausedwidespread,long-term,and severe damage to the environment.b.Theoilspillandoilfireswereclearlyexcessivevis--visthe concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. Inadditiontocausingenvironmentaldamage,theattackwasclearlyexcessivetothe military advantage anticipated.The only objective of the oil spills was to temporarily delay the

63 AP-I, art.49(1). 64 Meo, 3541 (2009). 65 (GPA) UNEP; Patin. 66 Understandings, 91-92. 67 Id.68 Id. 69 Id.PROSECUTION MEMORIAL Pleadings and Authorities Page 12 of 14 advancing Bereton navy.The resort to an oil spill was clearly disproportionate70 to the military advantage.Stalling the Bereton navy could have been achieved by either opening only three oil valvesorusingonlythreetankers(C.37),butnotboth.Infact,acombinationofonlyoneoil valveandoneoiltankercouldhavedelayedtheBeretonnavy.However,Gusmanorderedthe simultaneousutilizationofthreeoilvalvesandthreeoiltankers,whichwasclearlyexcessive. TherewasalsonoguaranteethatAstrohadcompletecontroloverthemovementoftheoil. Releasingcopiousamountsofoiltothesea,whichposedagreatdegreeofdamagetothe environment by being widespread, long-term, and severe, was not justified.71 Theadvantagesoftheattackcouldnothavebeenforeseeableatitscommissionsinceit wasalast-ditcheffortofaprecariouslyweakAstrongovernmentagainsttheBeretoninvasion. (C.35)Thedesperateattackwasresortedtoafterengagingandbeingunabletostopthe advancement of the Bereton navy. (C.36)Gusman could not have foreseen any advantage at the time the attack was launched.The oil fires were also clearly excessive since other measures could have been resorted to bytheAAFinstoppingtheadvancementofBeretonforces,suchasengagingthemonthe ground instead of retreating to the mainland. (C.39) Thsonlmntofthrimisprsntsrntsttkuswisprlong-term, and severe damage to the environment and was clearly excessive, serving no concrete and direct military advantage.3.Gusmanhadknowledgethattheattackwouldcausewidespread, long-term, and severe damage to the environment. Gusman had knowledge that the attack would be excessive and disproportionate because asareasonablyprudentman72heshouldbeawareoftheeffectsofanoilspillonYukule. Gusman governed Yukule for two years, giving him enough time to be familiar with its resources andbiodiversity.(C.3,7)Fromthisinformation,Gusmancouldhavemadeamorecareful evaluation of the facts.73By having knowledge of the devastating effects of the attack in relation

70 AP-I, art.51(5b). 71 AP-I, art.5(5)(b) & 57.72 Furundzija, 189-190. 73See Elements. PROSECUTION MEMORIAL Pleadings and Authorities Page 13 of 14 toafutilemilitaryobjectiveandstillproceedingwithit,thethirdelementofthecrimeis satisfied. 4.The oil spill was conducted in the context of an IAC. See Supra [I.A]. 5.Gusman was aware of the factual circumstances that established the existence of armed conflict. See Supra [I.A]. B.GUSMAN IS CRIMINALLY LIABLE AND RESPONSIBLE UNDER ARTICLE 25(3)(B). 1.Gusman ordered the crime committed by Ardent. GusmaniscriminallyliableandresponsibleunderArticle25(3)(b)becauseheordered the crime committed by Ardent.74(C.36,39) a.Gusmans actions brought about the criminal result. Being Commander-in-Chief (C.2), Gusman had the power and authority to order Ardent to release the oil.Although unspecified in the manner given, the order may be accepted in any formforGusmantobeculpable.75GusmanexplicitlyorderedFreedmanandsuchwaspassed ownthhinofommnftrrntsonsulttionwithFrmn.C.37Beinga subordinate, Ardent is duty-bound to follow orders. Clearly, Gusman ordered the commission of the crime.b.Gusman intended to order criminal actions. Gusmanhasactualknowledgeofsuchsubstantiallikelihood,76asCommander-in-Chief oftheAAF(C.2),whichhasreportingandmonitoringsystems.77Therefore,Gusmanhas unintrrupt n irt ss to informtion rgring his troops tions.CirumstntilvinlsostblishsGusmnsknowlgofrntsoffnss.78

Theseinstancesare:havingonlytwoacts,localizedinoffshorewesternYukuleandPort Solferino; requiring a few personnel to open the valves and navigate the tankers; and burning the

74 Krstic, 601; Akayesu, 483. 75 Blaskic, 281-282 76 Supra, II.A.2b. 77 Halilovic, 66; Blagojevic & Jokic, 792. 78 Galic, 174; Blagojevic & Jokic, 792; Blaskic, 307. PROSECUTION MEMORIAL Pleadings and Authorities Page 14 of 14 storg tnks show tht Gusmn knw of his suborints tions. C.36-39)Whether Gusman wasinAstroorYukule,heisstillwithinproximityoftheattack.Therefore,circumstantial vin shows tht Gusmn knw of rnts offnss. c.Giving the order constitutes a crime. Ordering the release of oil into west Yukule (C.37) and setting the oil tanks ablaze (C.39) isacrimeunderArticle8(2)(b)(iv).SinceGusmanorderedtheseattacks(C.36,39)heis criminally liable under Article 25(3)(b). PRAYER WHEREFORE,ProsecutionrequeststhisHonorableCourttodeclare,adjudge,and confirm that Gusman is liable under: 1.25(3)(a) for the war crime of Article 8(2)(b)(xxv); 2.28(a) for the war crime of Article 8(2)(b)(i); and3.25(3)(b) for the war crime of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute.