CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Since 1945 the US involvement in the Middle East

1as brought about a new dimension to international rela-

tions. Its emergence as a victorious power in the Second

Jorld War has motivated her, inter alia, to adopt a strong

posture in its foreign policy towards the Middle.East. The

main reasons for the US to attach importance to the Middle

East appears to be, its strategic geographical location

being a trijunction of Asia, Africa and Europe, the fear of

communist expansion in the area as such an expansion would

cause military and political advantage to the Soviet Union

and adversary to the US, and the region possessing the

greatest single reserve of oil which is more than half of

the world's proven oil reserves.

The US contact with.the Middle East region goes

back to the eighteenth century when the region was mostly

under the Ottoman Empire. The US Continental Congress made

the government of the US in 1777 to recognize the legitimacy

of the rule of Sublime Porte in the region. In 1785 US

vessels made voyages to the region venturing to find out

whether it could establish trade relations with those areas

which were not under the domination of Great Britain.

Simultaneously, other US vessels were sent to China for the

same purpose. Few years later, some Middle Eastern products

like dates, olive oil and figs appeared in the American

markets especially in Boston.

In 1792, during the Presidency of George Washing-

ton the US signed a treaty with the government of Sultan of

Morocco. This treaty was the first treaty signed between

the US and a local government in the Middle East. Through

this treaty the US recognised Morocco as an independent

State and in return Morocco pledged not to interfere with

the US vessels passing through the strait of Gibraltar.

Nevertheless, between 1801 and 1805 there were

many clashes between the North African Arab States and the

US navy in the Mediterranean. In 1815, North African pi-

rates captured American vessels and enslaved all of their

crews. However, the pirates were finally captured by the

Americans in 1816. Subsequently, the US maintained a naval

squadron in the Mediterranean to protect its interests in

and around the region. This squadron helped the US to enjoy

free trade with the countries in the Mediterranean region.

Apart from this, many Americans used to visit

palestine, Jordan rLver and Egypt, for religious purpose as

many of them had learnt from the Bible about the Holy Land

in the Middle East and were too eager to see that place. In

1819, several American missionaries were sent to the Middle

East by missionary societies based in the US, like the

Boards of Missions of the Presbyterian Church, the Reformed

Church of America and the American Board of Commissioners of

Foreign Missions. The latter had established mission cen-

tres in Palestine as early as 1819 and in Syria in 1823.

During the early period, the US missionaries relied on Great

Britain's diplomatic protection. However, from 1830 to 1914

there were constant visits by the US fleet to the eastern

coast of the Mediterranean ostensibly for the purpose of

protecting the missionaries. This change possibly was an

indication of the growing influence of the missionary lobby

in Washington, and in 1850 several missionaries were serving 1

in the region in a consular capacity.

In fact the US missions had established several

colleges, schools, clinics etc. in the region. They had

established the Robert College in 1863 in Istanbul, the

1. James A. Field, American and the Mediterranean World, 1776 - 1882, (Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press, 1969), p.288.

Istanbul Women's College in 1871, the Syrian Protestant

College (now the American University of Beirut) in 1866, and

the American University of Cairo in 1919. Schools up to the

secondary stage level (but known as colleges) were estab-

lished in Alexandria, Baghdad and Teheran. The graduates of

these institutions tried their best to maintain cordial

relation between their home countries and the United States.

Subsequently, the US had established several consular

offices in Fez, Tunis, Algeris, Tripoli, Alexandria, Beirut

and Domascus. The main purpose of these offices were to

protect the US missionaries in the area and to expand the US

trade in the East Mediterranean region. The US had signed

treaties of friendship and commerce with the Ottoman Empire

in 1831, Muscat in 1838 and Persia in 1857, Some US organi-

sations like Near East Relief, Near East Foundation and

other agencies of the US government were established during

the first half of the eighteenth century. In 1826, the

Secretary of State Henry Clay, expressed the need for teach-

ing young Americans the Eastern Languages like Arabic,

Persian and Turkish to serve in the American consuls in the

Middle East.

By mid-19th century though the US commercial and

trade interests in the Middle East had grown, the missionary

interest continued to be conspicuous over any other American

interest in the region. The American businessmen gave much

importance to the development of trade with the lucrative

markets in the Far East, Europe and Latin America. However,

during the second half of the century, there were many

visits by US merchants to the region for finding ways and

means of improving commercial relations between the US and

the Middle East.

The US relations with the region from 1774 to 1914

were based on the principle of non-intervention. Many

separatist movements sprang up in different parts of the

Ottoman Empire, but the US did not extend any help to these

movements as it did not want to interfere in the affairs of 2

the Ottoman Empire. Though the rapid industrialization in

the US had changed the nature of its interest all over the

world, including the Middle East, as it needed new markets

for its goods, new outlets for investing its capital and new

sources of raw materials for its growing industry, the

missionary interest appears to have remained the predominant

interest for the US in the Middle East. However, many

business firms, petroleum geologists, ships, travellors and

educationists from the US established good relationships

with states of the Middle East. Simultaneously, people from

the Middle East too showed much interest to migrate to the

2 . Some of these movements are: Beirut Secret Association in 1875, Arab World Association in 1875, AL-Qahtanih Association in 1909 and Young Arabian Association in 1911.

US for economic and religious reasons and a significant

number of people from Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and Palestine

did migrate to the United States.

The US administrations did not show much interest

in Middle Eastern petroleum before First World War. In

fact, despite the US navy's decision to use oil rather than

coal as fuel for its ships and the Egyptian and Persian

governments request to several American petroleum geologists

and engineers to search for oil in their countries, the US

State Department did not support the American companies plea

for getting petroleum concession in the region.

During the First World War, the US did not declare

war on the Ottoman Empire, though the Empire was a close

ally of Germany, Austria and Hungary. The US broke its

relations with the Ottoman Empire, but did not send its

troops to the Middle East or to the European borders of the

Empire. After the war, it appears that one of the main

reasons for a change in the American perception of the

Middle East was President Woodrow Wilson's sympathy towards

the Jewish cause in Palestine. In his fourteen point ad-

dress on January 8, 1918, Wilson had stated that the "Turk-

ish portions of the Ottoman Empire should be assured a

secure sovereignty, but that the national minorities under

Ottoman rule should be assured the right of self determina-

3 tion". He also called for "a free passage to the ship of

4 commerce of all nations under internations guarantees". To

implement his principles, Wilson sent two fact finding

missions to the region to assess the will of the people.

The first mission, King Crane mission, was sent to Syria and

Palestine and the second, Harbord mission, was sent to

Armenia. Britain and France had already agreed upon the way

in which the Ottoman Empire should be divided in the event

of its defeat. Britain had promised Sharief Hussein of

Mecca that Great Syria (now Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon

and Syria) and the Arabian Peninsula would be given com-

plete independence and that these would be under his leader- 5

ship, if he started a revolt against the Ottoman Empire.

The Great Arab Revolt against the Turkish rulers on June 5 ,

1916 was led by Sharief Hussein of Mecca with the blessings

of the British.

In April-May 1916, Britain and France secretly

agreed to divide the Ottoman Empire between themselves.

Indeed, while the negotiations were going on between Sharief

3. Council on Foreign ReLations, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1918), p.132.

4. Ibid.,

5. These promises to Sharief Hussein are known as the Sharief Hussein-McMohan correspondence from July 1915 to March 1916.

Hussein and McMohan, the allies had signed an agreement,

known as Sykes-Picot Agreement, according to which the Asian

part of the Arab world was to be divided between the two

allies. Britain's share was, what is now known as Iraq,

Jordan and Palestine. France was promised the coastal areas

of Syria, Lebanon and the Syrian hinterland up to the

present boundaries of Iraq. On November 2, 1917, British

government announced its commitment to the creation of a 6

homeland for the Jews in Palestine. The announcement came

in the form of a letter from Balfour, the British foreign

minister, to the British Jewish leader Lord Rothschild, and

was known as the Balfour Declaration. The Declaration which

had the approval of the British cabinet reads as follows

"His Majesty's Government view with favor the establish- ment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people ... it is being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and reli- gious right of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by

7 the Jews in any other country".

6. The British motives behind this appears to be to secure the monetary and political support of the Jews, to request the American Jews to influence the US govern- ment to enter the war beside the allies, to lure the Jews to buy the war debt bonds which was issued in 1917 and to use the Zionist movement to do subvertive and terrorist activities in Germany and in its allies during the war.

7. Quoted by Hassan Rian and Mahmoud Tawalbieh, Modern History of the Arab World (In Arabic) (Amman: Almata- bia AL-Watnieh, 19821, p.11.

It was widely believed that consent of the US

president was secured for the Balfour Declaration before it

was announced. Wilson agreed to the Declaration on April 8

22, 1917, when Lord Balfour visited the United States.

During the visit Balfour met the leader of the American

Zionist movement, Justice Louis Brandeis, who was also one

of the advisors of Wilson. Brandeis appears to have played

a very important role in securing President Wilson's sympa-

thy to the cause of establishing a Jewish homeland in Pales-

tine.

The Kind Crane mission's report which was sent by

President Wilson stated: "The people of Syria and Palestine

wanted an independent and a united Arab country under the

leadership of Prince Faisal. In case of failing to achieve

independence the great majority of the inhabitants were

found to be in favor of US mandate rather than the British 9

or French mandate". However, the commission's report was

not even discussed by the Paris Peace Conference. During

the conference the American Zionist delegation pressed

President Wilson to ask for the implementation of the Bal-

8. Philip Hatta, Modern Arab History (in Arabic), (Beirut:Dar Al-Aliem, 19681, p. 211).

9. Council on Foreign Relations, King-Crane Mission's Report (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 19181, p.13.

four Declaration. President Wilson did not mention the

commission report in the conference perhaps because of the

Senators' opposition to his policy of US joining the League

of Nations and the proposed Treaty of Versailles.

On April 24, 1920, the British and French delega-

tions met in San Remo for the purpose of dividing the great

Syria (Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon and Syria) and some parts

of Iraq into their respective mandates. The San Remo Agree-

ment allocated Syria and Lebanon to France, while Palestine,

Jordan and Iraq were given to Britain. An additional state-

ment on the Agreement stated: "the mandated country on 10

Palestine has to implement the Balfour Declaration".

On August 24, 1921, after the San Remo Agreement

between Britain and France, the US in a statement announced

that it was "expected her interests and the fair and equal

opportunities which it is believed the US should enjoy in 11

common with the other powers to be safeguarded". In fact,

the US was not in full agreement with the British foreign

policy in the Middle East; for example, during the Egyptian

10. Hassan Rian and Mahmoud Tawalbieh, Modern History of the Arab World, op.cit., p.22.

11. Council on Foreign Relations, Mandate for Palestine, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1937), pp.49-50.

demand for independence in the early months of 1919, the

American Consul in Cairo sent a communique to the British

~ i g h Commissioner in Egypt stated: "In this connection, I am

desired to say that the President and the American people

have every sympathy with the legitimate aspirations of the

Egyptian people for a measure of self government, but that

they view with regret any effort to obtain the realisation 12

thereof by a resort of violence".

Although the US Congress passed a resolution

approving the Balfour Declaration and the Jewish rights in

Palestine, it did not use its influence to implement the

Declaration. After the death of President Wilson and the

disowning of the Versailles Treaty, the US involvement in

the world politics in general and in the Middle East in

particular had lessened and gradually retreated into an

isolation that was only ended by the Japanese attack on

Pearl Harber. However, despite US administration's policy

of isolation, the oil companies in US wanted the government

to help them to enter the Middle East, while the British

French and Dutch companies wanted to keep the region 'to

themselves. Because of the companies pressure US State

12. Council on Foregin Relations, Foregin Relations of the United States, (Wasington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1934), p.204.

Daprrtment started taking an active role in securing access

to the American oil companies in the region.

The contest for concessions in oil explorations in

the Middle East began during the first decade of the century

when it was under the Ottaman Empire. The British, Dutch,

Germans and Americans were competing for concessions.

However, the British, Dutch and Germans were united and due

t o their influence on the Ottoman government, they did not

allow the US companies to enter the Middle East. Later

these three countries established what is called the Turkish

Petroleum company. The British share in this company was 50

per cent, the Germans and the Dutch, 25 per cent each.

During the First World War, the Americans used

large volume of petroleum to fuel its engines of war. The

war affected the domestic reserves to such an extent that

some officials expressed deep concern that domestic petrole-

um would not be sufficient to meet the US needs. Others

voiced their apprehension over the growing control of the

industrial countries on the energy sources in the Middle

East. In 1919 and 1920 some members of the US Senate de-

manded that the State Department should take steps to remove

all restrictions placed by foreign governments on oil explo- 13

ration in the Middle East.

After Warren G. Harding became the President of

the US and Chales Evans Hughes, Secretary of State, both

agreed to encourage US companies to enter into the Middle

Eastern oil fields. Harding continued to follow the open

door policy and adhered to the principle of equal opportuni-

ty in the mandate areas and denies the validity of the

British claim in the region. He urged the British govern-

ment to settle the issue by arbitration, but the British

government was not prepared for that. Harding especially

cooperated with the oil companies like the Standard Oil

Company of New Jersy and Standard Oil Company of New York

for the advancement of their interests in the region.

Herbert Hoover. the Secretary of Commerce, was one of the

strong advocates for government aid to oil companies outside

the United States. He took the lead in calling the execu-

tives of large American Oil Companies to Washington in May

1921 to boost the possibilities of entry into the potential- 14

ly rich Mesopotamian oil fields. During the meeting, the

13. Herbert Feis, Petroleum and American Foreign Policy, (Standford, Calif., Standford University Press, 19441, p . 4 .

14. Gerald D. Nash United States Oil Policy, 1890-1964 (Pittsbrugh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968), p.56.

director of research for the American Petroleum Institute,

Van H. Manning, had suggested that the American oil compa-

nies form a consortium to present a united front against the 15

intransigent British. Secretary Haghes stated that he had

every reasons to believe that the British government would

allow the American companies to have a share in the Turkish

petroleum Company. The US asked the British permission for

the American companies to have shares in the company and

after a protracted negotiations between the US State Depart-

ment and the British Foreign Office, the US secured a share

of 25 per cent from the British share in the Turkish Petro-

leum Company and the German share was transferred to the

French. In 1924 an Anglo-American agreement concerning

equality of opportunity on searching for oil in Palestine

was reached.

In the immediate aftermath of the First World War,

the US State Department was under severe public criticism

for using its influence on the behalf of the American oil

companies as it violated the American tradition of non-

involvement. However, the administration justified its

interference by stating that it was serving and protecting

the economic well-being of the American people.

15. John A. DeNovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963), p.185.

In 1930 Standard Oil Company of California ac-

quired exclusive concession in the Bahrain Island. This was

the first full concession an American oil company could get

in the Middle East region. The Standard Oil Company, known

after 1944 as ARAMCO, was also the first American company to

obtain concession in Saudi Arabia on May 29, 1933. In 1934,

the US Eastern Gulf Oil Corporation was granted concession

in Kuwait, but with an equal partnership with the Anglo-

Iranian Oil Company. The growing concessions to the Ameri-

can oil companies, generated in US more political and

military interest towards the Middle Eastern affairs.

The US economic interest abroad developed steadily

during 1920s and 1930s and the Middle East region assumed

significant position as far as the US interests were con-

cerned. In 1939, about 15 per cent of the oil produced in

the Middle East was by American Companies. Texas and Stand-

ard Oil Company of California which had an exclusive conces-

sion in Bahrain Island produced 7.5 million barrel per year.

New Jersey Standard and Standard Oil Company of New York

which had 24 per cent of the shares in the Iraqi Petroleum

Company, was producing 30.7 million barrel per year. Other

American companies had secured 8ood concessions in Saudi

Arabia and Kuwait.

Associated with the concession which was granted

to the US companies was the growing American consumption of

oil. In fact, with the start of production of oil in 1860,

the structure of energy consumption all over the world,

including the US, began to change in favor of oil at the

expense of other sources, mainly coal. The wide uses of

automobile and the movement towards mechanization in all

economic sectors increased the demand for oil because it was

the only fuel that could meet certain particular type of

energy demands. The outbreak of the Second World War, hand

increased greatly the American economic interests in the

Middle Eatf. With the American involvement into the con-

flict in 1941, the region became an area of importance to US

as the American forces needed oil to fuel its armed ma-

chines.

T W SECOND WORLD WAR, UNTIED STATES AND THE MIDDLE EAST

During the Second world war, the US interests in

the region increased considerably because of its trade and

oil considerations. On March 6, 1944, President Roosevelt

declared that "The united States had vital interests in the

Middle East, the peace and security of which were of signif- 16

icance to the world as a whole". However, he did not

16. Department of State Bulletin, October 29 , 1944, p.321

formulate any specific foreign policy towards the region and

recognized Britain as a major power in the region. By 1943,

it was apparent that the US had to acquire additional

sources of overseas oil to get new supplies for its growing

demands and to save its diminishing domestic oil reserves.

The only potentially rich area in oil reserves was the

Middle East. There were two schools of thought in the US

regarding the procurement of oil from outside countries.

The first one warned the government from entering into oil

production in any overseas areas and the second was calling

for encouraging and backing the private enterprises to 17

develop and refine petroleum from outside sources. Right

in the middle of the war, US government started utilizing

the open poor policy to ensure American companies equal

access to Middle Eastern oil with other foreign companies.

The object of this was to keep the oil away from the enemy

and thus winning the war could be achieved faster.

The Arabian-American Oil Company, owned jointly by

Standard Oil of California and Texas, which had secured

concessions in Saudi Arabia, convinced the US government of

the urgent need to protect the concessions to the national

interests and security of the US and its allies. Other US

17. Philip Hatta, Modern Arab History, op.cit., p.123.

oil companies urged the US government to support their 18

activities in the region.

Simultaneously, the growing Zionist power in the

US brought about a sharp reaction from the Arab leaders.

The Middle East people were very much concerned about the

pro-Zionist sentiment in the United States. King Abdul Aziz

Ibn Saud, urged President Roosevelt not to act on Palestine 19

without consulting him. The joint Chiefs of Staff, Lieu-

tenant Colonel Harold B. Hoskins was sent to the region and

he was of the view that immediate steps should be taken to

reduce the tensions between the Arab and the Jewish over the

Palestine question or else violence would break out in the 20

Middle East. President Roosevelt tried in many occasion

to arrange a meeting between King Ibin Saudi and American

Zionist Leaders, but the King was not prepared for that as

18. George. Russell, The Early American Experience in the Middle East ( N . Y : Cornell University Press, 1951), p.312.

19. Ibid.,

20. James Lionel, United States and the Middle East (Berke- ley; University of California Press, 1955), p.125..pa

2 1 he felt that he could not speak for the Arab world. Other

Arab leaders also refused to meet the Jewish leaders for the

same reason.

Therefore, the US government found itself in an

impasse. On the one hand, the oil lobbiests were pressing

the government for support in the region through maintaining

cordial relations with the local governments and on the

other hand the Zionist leaders were urging the administra-

tion to adopt a policy supporting the creation of an inde-

pendent Jewish State in Palestine. It appears that the US

government found it hard to resist the Zionist pressures and

finally succumbed to the Jewish demand by supporting the

creation of Israel. It also felt that by creating a state

which would be friendly to the US in a region where the

richest deposits of oil is available would be to the inter-

est of the United States. Nevertheless, on February 14,

1945, President Roosevelt met Kind Ibin Saud and assured him

that US would do nothing to assist the Jews against 'the

21. The King was much opposed to Zionist movement. His reply to the World's sympathy for the Jewish perse- cution by Nazist was that the Jewish refugees from Nazi persecution should be given the choicest lands and homes of the Germans who had oppressed them not the Arabs lands and homes. (Philip Hatta, Modern Arab History, op.cit., p.132.

2 2 Arabs and would make no move hostile to the Arab people.

In a letter later President Roosevelt wrote to King Ibin

S a d that:

"I would take no action in my capacity as chief of the Executive Branch of this Government, which might prove hostile to the Arab people. It gives me pleasure to renew to your majesty the assurances you have previously received regarding the attitude of my Government and my own, as Chief Executive, with regard to the question of Palestine and to inform you that the policy of this Government in

2 3 this respect is unchanged ...."

However, Roosevelt continued to favor the creation of a

homeland for the Jewish in Palestine and unrestricted Jewish

immigration into Palestine. This situation had brought a

public outrage all over the Arab world and to cool down the

tension, the US Department of State affirmed the President's

pledge to Kind Ibin Saud and the other Arab leaders that the

US would not take any action related to Palestine without

prior consultation with the Arabs. However, Roosevelt's

death on April 12, 1945 opened a new chapter in the US

policy towards the Middle East. Utile the time of his

death, President Roosevelt had been adhering to the princl-

ple of full consultation with both the Arabs and the Jewish

before taking decisions on the Palestine question. David

Niles White House advisor on minority problems, maintained

22. Department of State Bulletin, October 21, 1 9 4 5 , pp.620- 621.

23. Ibid, p.623.

in 1962 that if President Roosevelt had lived longer, the

State of Israel most probably would never have come into 24

existence.

UNITED STATES, UNITED NATIONS AND THE PARTITION OF PALEST~NE

The General Assembly of the UN had created a

United Nations Special Committee on Palestine to gather

facts about the different aspects of the issue. On Septem-

ber 3, 1947 the committee submitted its report to the Gener-

al Assembly, in which it recommended the partition of Pales-

tine into two States one for the Arabs and one for the 25

Jews. Of course without the US support it would not have

been possible for the Partition resolution to get the statu- 2 6

tory two-third majority of the General Assembly. The

result of the vote was thirty-three for, thirteen against, 2 7

with ten abstentions.

24. New York Times, January 20, 1962.

25. Jamal Issa, The UN and the Palestine question (in Ara- bic), (Beirut: Dar el-Etihad, 19641, p.112.

26. Nadav Safron, The United States and Israel (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1963), p.35.

27. The Countries opposed the Partition were Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Afghanistan, Spain, Pakistan, India, Turkey, Cuba and Greece. Soviet Union voted for the Partition. United Kingdom abstained.

On 15 May, 1 9 4 8 , the State of Israel came into

existence and on the same day the US President Harry Truman

had sent a letter to the US delegation to the UN wherein he

stated: "This Government had been informed that a Jewish

State has been proclaimed in Palestine, and recognition has

been requested by the provisional Government thereof. The

United States recognizes the provisional Government as the 28

de facto authority of the new State of Israel." The US

immediate recognition of the State of Israel further

strained the US-Arab relations. The Arabs felt that the US

support a gross violation of its often repeated stand of

non-intervention and its support to the doctrine of self-

determination.

THE EARLY ARAB'S ATTEMPT TO USE THE OIL EMBARGO

As soon as the State of Israel was created, an

Arab-Israel war broke out. The Arab League members called

for a meeting on June 1948 by King Ibin Saud. Subsequently,

the Arab League members met at Alexandria in Egypt and

passed a set of resolutions regarding the Palestinian ques-

tion, one of which had called for an oil embargo against the

countries helping Israel. They also decided to launch an

2 8 . James Lionel, United States and the Middle East, pp.cit., p.131.

2 2

economic boycott against Israel and an immediate termination

of the Iraqi Petroleum Company Pipeline which was laid

between Kirkuk and the port of Haifa. Egypt decided not to

allow the transit of any ship bounded to any Israeli port

through the Suez Canal.

However, the move to use the oil embargo as a

diplomatic weapon in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict could

not be put into operation. Saudi Arabia believed that

"commercial oil operation should be divorced from political 2 9

consideration". Further, the Arab oil was being produced

by the international oil companies and the Arab countries

had little role in deciding the quantity of oil to be pro-

duced, fixing its price and the countries to which it should

be exported. Moreover, in 1948, the European countries were

largely depending on Coal for their energy requirements, and

the Western European dependence on oil was 10 per cent 30

only.

29. George Lenzowski, Oil and State in the Middle East (Irhaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1960), p.188.

30. Khalid Metwali, "The Political-Economy of the Arab oil", International Politics Journal (in Arabic) No.3, 1951, p.192.

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AND THE BAGHDAD PACT

When President Dwight D. Eisenhower assumed power,

he started pursuing a balanced foreign policy towards the

Arab-Israeli conflict and other regional issues. He was

much concerned about the issue of regional security in the

Middle East. In January 1953, when the British Prime Minis-

ter, Churchill met President Eisenhower in Washington, the

latter agreed to support the British in their talks with the

Egyptians relating to the continuation of the British 3 1

presence in the Suez Canal. The continuation of the

British presence in Suez Canal was in the interest of the US

and the countries in Europe. Ships carrying oil from Middle

East can quickly reach Western Europe through the Suez 32

Canal. On April 2 7 , 1953, the Anglo-Egyptian talks had

commenced but the new nationalist government in Egypt re-

fused to consider any possibility of joining a Middle East

defense organisation before a full and complete evacuation

of the British troops from the Suez area and it refused

Eisenhower's invitation to participate in the negotiations

for creating such an organisation.

31. Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My years at the State Department. (New York: W.W. Norton Co., 1969), p.567.

3 2 . Louis L. Gerson, John Foster Dilles (NY: Cooper Square, 1961), p.243.

On May 9 , 1953, Secretary Dulles started a visit

to the Middle East for the purpose of finding a new way to

counter the growing Soviet threat in the region. On May 11,

he met the Egyptian President Mohammed Naguib. Naguib

stressed that the British forces should leave the Egyptian

soil. However, he assured Dulles that though Egypt could

not take part in any pact with the Western powers, it

would co-operate with them once the British had pulled 33

out. Dulles also visited Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon,

Iraq, Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan, Turkey and Greece

subsequently. The Arab leaders unequivocally told Dullas

that they were strongly against the recognition of the

Israeli right to exist in the Middle East and he realised

that the Arab States were particularly concerned about the

pro-Zionist sentiment in the US and wanted to increase the

standard of living of the Arabs. In addition, he noticed,

anti-British feeling among the people especially in Egypt.

Dulles came to the conclusion that the US should reduce the

tension in the Middle East especially that which had accen-

tuated as a result of the creation of Israel. He was con-

vinced that at that time it was very difficult to bring most

of the countries in the region into one defense arrangement.

However, he thought that this could be achieved in the

future if the US could help bring mutual understanding among

--

33. Ibid., p.248.

countries of the region. He was convinced that any attempt

by the US to arrange a Middle East defense system with the

participation of US, Britain, Turkey, Iran and the Arab

countries was not possible. So the US started concentrating

on forming a security arrangement with the Northern Tier

States, i.e., Turkey, Iran and Iraq.

On July 28, 1954, an agreement between Egypt and

Britain was signed whereby Britain agreed to withdraw all

its military personnel from the Suez Canal area, leaving

only some civilian personnel to carry out the maintenance

operations and that the British troops could return to the

Canal area only in accordance with the provisions of the 3 4

1888 Constantinople treaty.

The achievement of the Anglo-Egptyian agreement

motivated Secretary Dulles to move ahead with his policy of

forming a regional defense arrangement in the region. On

August 1, 1953, commenting upon the proposal of forming the

defense arrangement, Dulles said: "No such system can be

imposed from without. It should be designed and grow from

within, out of the sense of comllion destiny and common 35

danger". Most of the Arab rulers were opposed to the idea

3 4 . Ibid., p.256.

35. Ibid., pp.257-258.

of forming a defense pact with foreign governments. In

fact, with the exception of Iraq, all the Arab countries had

already denounced the idea of forming such a pact. However,

Dulles was relying mainly on Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan

rather than on the Arab countries excepting Iraq for the

success of his policy.

During the month of April 1954 Pakistan and Turkey

signed three treaties, one of which was the treaty of

friendship and co-operation for the purpose of mutual secu-

rity. This treaty was viewed by the US as a step towards

creating a security pact which could counter the Soviet

threat in the region. Subsequently, the US had succeeded in

bringing some of the countries of the region to sign the

Baghdad Pact in February 1955. The Pact was a pro-~estern

alliance in the region, formed by the states along the

Soviet border, i.e, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Iraq, and

Britain. Syria strongly opposed the pact and accused Iraq

of participating in a conspiracy against the Arab nations.

Saudi Arabia, mainly due to its historical hatred to the

Hashemite dynasty of Iraq and Jordan, criticised Iraqi

participant in the pact and described the Iraqi Prime Minis-

ter, Nuri el-Said, as a betrayer of the Arab nation. Leba-

non refused to join the pact but did not denounce it. The

British attempt to associate Jordan with the pact led to

violet reaction among the Jordanian masses. The Egyptian

media and the Saudi funds mobilized the Jordanian population

against any attempt by their government to join the pact.

Some American officials believed that the US should press on

Egypt which was the most important Arab country, to join the

pact, but President Nasser rejected the pact and described

it as a vehicle for the reentrance of Western imperialism 3 6

into the region. The Arab countries endosed the Egyptian

President's stand. Nasser's popularity among the Arab

masses increased after he rejected the pact. The US offi-

cially did not become a member of the pact probably because

of the fear that if it participated then the revolutionary

regime in Egypt and other countries in the Arab world would

not be interested to join the pact. However, the US mili-

tary and civil representives were active in the committees

of the pact.

The pact did not rule out the possibility of

Soviet penetration into the region. The key countries in

the region, Syria and Egypt, who had identified themselves

with Arab nationalism maintained good relations with the

Soviet Union.

36. Ahmad Badar, "Abdel Nasser and Baghdad Pact", Interna- tional Politics (In Arabic) No.32, 1957, p.49.

28

THE SUEZ CANAL CRISIS

The Egyptian refusal to join the pact, led to US

withdrawing its offer of financing the building of the Aswan

Dam. Perhaps the US decision to withdraw the offer created

a chain of events that led to the Suez crisis which changed

the political map of the region. Nasser's reaction to the

American decision was the nationalisation of the Suez Canal.

Nasser thought that was the only alternative to get finance

for building the dam. In his nationalisation speech, NasGer

stated: "the initial US-British grant for the Dam had been

for $ 70 million over five years, while the Canal earned the

equivalent of $ 100 million yearly, and that Egypt had been

getting only f: 1 million, out of the Company's $ 35 million 3 7

in earnings (nearly $ 2 out of every $ 70)". On July 27,

1956 Anthony Eden discussed the nationalisation issue with

his Cabinet. He said: "the British essential interest in

the area must be safeguarded, if necessary by military 38

action, and that full preparation must be made".

Nationalisation of the Suez Canal was a major

challenge to the British influence in the Middle East.

President Nasser was the most popular figure in the Arab

37. AL. Ahram (Cairo) (in Arabic), July 23, 1956.

38. Anthony Eden, The Suez Crisis of 1956 (Boston: Beacon Press, 19601, pp.53-54.

world and the British though that, if Nasser's action was

not challenged, he would exploit the pan-Arabism to control

the regional natural resources, especially the oil which had

become the life blood of the British and Western economies.

On August 16, the London Conference of the Users of the Suez

Canal was held and it was agreed that a delegation be sent

to Egypt to present to President Nasser the proposal agreed

to by the London Conference participants. The proposal

called for the adoption of a scheme which visualized the

setting up of an international management body which should 3 9 . .

be authorized to exercise control over the Canal. Howev-

er, the delegation failed to secure Nasser's acceptance to

the proposal and on September 19, delegations from fifteen

countries attended the Second London Conference. Secretary

Dulles was the dominant figure at the conference. On Sep-

tember 21, Secretary Dulles announced that the US had joined

the Suez Canal Users Association. He also stated: "there

are pressures which gradually grow up, not artificially

stimulated but as quite natural and inevitable.... But I do

not believe that the situation is such now as to call for 40

any drastic action like going to war"

39. Ismail Sabri, The Suez Canal (in Arabic) (Cairo: Al-am Al-kutub, 1960), p.191.

40. Ibid., p.292.

On October 5, three days of public debate on the

Suez Canal began in the General Assembly of the United

Nations. The outcome of the debate was in the form of six

points proposal for solving the Suez crisis, viz.

(1) There should be free and open transit through the Canal

without overt or covert discrimination,

( 2 ) Egypt's sovereignty should be respected,

( 3 ) The operation of the Canal should be isolated from the

politics of any one country.

( 4 ) The manner of fixing tolls and charges should be signed

by agreement between Egypt and the users.

( 5 ) A fair proportion of the dues should be allotted to the

maintenance and development of the Canal and,

(6) In case of dispute, it should be settled by arbitra- 41

tion.

President Nasser rejected the proposal and announced that

Egypt's decision to nationalize the Canal was irreversible

and described the proposal a clear violation of the Egyptian

sovereignty and legitimacy over the Canal.

As per plan already agreed to, the British, French

and Israeli Forces invaded the Suez Canal area. In the

battle field, the three alliances were able to win easy

41. Kennett Love, Suez: The Twice Fought War, (New York: Mc Graw Hill, 1969), p.445.

31

victories against the poorly equipped, disorganized, un-

trained and inferior Egyptian armed forces. Israeli forces

occupied the Sinai desert and the Anglo-French forces with

its full air superiority and airborne troops defeated the

Egyptian forces.

United States opposed the tripartite aggression

against Egypt. On October 30, President Eisenhower phoned

the British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, and urged him to

halt the attack and reemphasized the US stand which called 42

for a peaceful settlement to the crisis. Simultaneously,

Secretary Dulles ordered Cabot Lodge, the US representative

to the UN, to ask for a meeting of the UN Security Council

and try for the passing of a resolution calling for an

immediate ceasefire, ceasation of hostilities and the with-

drawal of all Israeli forces from the Sinai Peninsula to the 43

points prior to the invasion of the Canal. However, when

the resolution was put to vote in the Security council, both

the French and British representatives vetoed it.

On October 31, President Eisenhower commenting on

the events in Hungary and Suez stated:

42. Ismail Sabri, The Suez Canal, op.cit., p.201.

4 3 . Samer AL-Aam The Suez Crisis, (in Arabic), (Cairo: Dar AL-Haikma, 19611, p.328.

"the actions taken can scarcely be reconciled with the principles and purposes of the UN to which we have all subscribed. And beyond this, we are forced to doubt even if resort to war will for long serve the permanent interests of the attacking nations... There can be no peace-without law. And there can be no law - if we were to invoke one code of international conduct for those who oppose us

44 and another for our friends".

However, inspite of the US appeal to end the combat, the

Anglo-French bombing attacks were intensified and the Israe-

li forces penetrated deep into the Egyptian territories and

controlled the main road between Al-Arish and Al-Ismailiya

city near the Canal.

Early on October 30, the Yugoslavian representa-

tive to the UN had asked the Security Council to call for an

immediate meeting of the General Assembly so that it could

pass a resolution asking the parties to put an end to the

conflict, since France and Britain had vetoed a Security

Council resolution called for ceasefire. A draft resolution

of the US submitted to the General Assembly called for an

immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of the triple alliance

from the Egyptian territories. The General Assembly adopted

the resolution "by sixty-two votes to two (Britain and 45

France), with seven abstentions". However, Britain and

44. Department of State Bulletin, January 2, 1957.

45. United Nations, Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, 1956, p.29.

France announced that they would not abide by the resolu-

tion. The Soviet Union sent a note to the British govern-

ment which read in part: "The Soviet Union emphatically

protests against the illegal actions by the UK and France

and declared that the responsibility for all the possible

consequences of those actions rests with the governments of 46

the UK and France". On November 2, the Soviet Foreign

Minister, Kimitri Shipilov, informed the President of the UN

Security Council that the Soviet Union would send Air and

Naval forces to defend the Egyptian territory and repulse L7 -,

the tripartite aggression if the attacks did not stop.

Moreover, the Soviet Prime Minister sent a letter to the US

President proposing a joint and immediate use of the Naval 48

and Air forces of the two countries to end the aggression.

However, the US rejected the Soviet proposal probably due to

its apprehension that once the Soviet forces entered the

region, it would be difficult to get them out. A statement

issued by the US administration made it clear that

"neither Soviet nor any other military forces should now enter the Middle East area except under United Nations mandate... The introduction of new forces under these circumstances would violate the United Nations charter, and it would be the duty of all United Nations members, including the United

49 Sfates, to oppose any such effort".

4 6 . Quoted by Samer AL-Aam, The Suez Crisis, op.cit., p.330

47. Ibid., 332.

48. Habieb Na'oubi, The Suez Canal Crisis (Cairo: Dar El- Etihad, ld62), p.39.

49. Quoted in Ibid., p.59.

~eanwhile, the Arab countries met at Baghdad and decided to

apply an oil embargo against Britain and France and to

extend it to any country that tried to help the aggression.

Subsequently on November 4, at the UN General

Assembly, another draft resolution, which was proposed by

Canada, Columbia and Norway and was supported by the US,

calling for the establishment of a United Nations Emergency

Force (UNEF) in order to take over the Suez Canal Zone was

put to vote. The resolution was adopted on November 4. On

October 5, President Eisenhower won a new term of Presidency

and he started applying pressure on Britain and France to

abide by the General Assembly resolutions and end the hos-

tilities. The US government started from November to with-

draw dollars from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and

encouraged the drain of British reserves through buying

British pound from the market. On November 5, the Bank of

England found itself under immense pressure to withdraw its

dollar and gold reserves by 15 per cent in order to meet the

growing demand for dollars and gold from the pound holders.

The large amount of pound selling by US holders affected

adversely the British economy. In addition, the British and

French economies were put to strain because of the closure

of the Suez Canal and the Syrian decision to cut the pipe-

lines running from Kirkuk in Iraq to the Port of Triploli in

Lebanon through the Syrian territory. France was also in a

vulnerable financial position and its economy was about to

be jeopardized by a possible oil shortage. The stoppage of

oil flow from the Middle East was expected to strike a blow 50

to the French balance of payments. Since Israel was

depending heavily on the American and Anglo-French aid, thus

the US threat to stop its financial aid unless Israel with-

draws from the occupied areas had put Israel in a vulnerable

position.

Subsequently, the US Secretary of Treasury, George

Humphrey, promised his British counterpart during a visit to

Washington, that adequate financial help would be given 'if

the British government announced an immediateceasefire. On

November 7, the triple alliance had agreed to a ceasefire in

the Suez War. Thus the US pressure on Britain was the main 5 1

reason for the end of war in the Suez Canal in 1956.

The British and the French government had notified

to the United Nations that they would start the withdrawal

of their forces as soon as the UNEF gained strength in the

area. On November 22, a UNEF arrived in the Suez Canal

50. "The cost for France,"Economist, November 10 1956, p.499.

51. It should be stressed that the British domestic politics and the Soviet warning had also contributed to end the conflict.

area. On November 30, President Eisenhower, as a reward for

the Anglo-French response, permitted the US petroleum indus-

try to assist the British and the French industries in

handling the oil supply problem resulting from the closure

of Suez Canal and the disruption of some pipelines in the

Middle East.

The Anglo-French forces left the Egyptians soil by

the end of 1956. Israel refused to withdraw its forces from

the entire Sinai Peninsula and stressed its right to passage

through the international waterways controlled by the Arab

states. As a result, the Security Council issued an ulti-

matum to Israel that it would apply economic sanction

against it if it did not withdraw from the Egyptian territo-

ry. In the meanwhile Secretary Dulles reached an agreement

with the Israeli government whereby Israel would remove all

its forces from Sharm-el Sheikh and the Gaza strip in return

for a guarantee of the right of freedom of passage through 5 2

the strait of Tiran. On March 1, 1957, the Israeli For-

eign Minister, Golda Meir, declared that all Israeli forces 53

would pull back to its position before October 29.

52. Kenneth Love, Suez: The Twice Fought War, pp.cit., p.666.

53. Jerusalem post, March 2, 1957.

THE IMPACT OF SUEZ CANAL CRISIS

One of the immediate impact of the Suez crisis was

the increase in the reputation of Nasser and the other was

the decline of western prestige in the Arab world. It is

ironic to note that the war came to an end and a total

evacuation of the Anglo-French and Israeli troops from the

Egyptian territory was ensured because of the US efforts,

but .the credit went to the Soviet Union. In fact, even if

the media projected the US efforts, it would have been

difficult for it to get the Arabs convinced of the fact that

the US which was much against President Nasser and his idea

of pan-Arabism would have come to help him in his hour of

need. So the Suez crisis did not help much to improve the

American image among the Arab people. During the crisis in

1956 Egypt came closer to the Soviet Union than to the

United States. Therefore, at the end of the crisis, the

Western influence in the region declined and Soviet influ-

ence increased and President Eisenhower had to start working

on a policy that would guarantee the US and Western inter-

ests in the Middle East.

By 1956 Suez Canal had acquired great importance

as an oil transportation artery, offering Middle Easter oil

54 the shortest outlet to the European and US markets. In

1959, consumption of oil from Arab countries in West Europe

was estimated to be 2.5 million barrels per day (mb/d) and

it was met from the Persian Gulf through Suez Canal. About

1.2 mb/d passed via the Canal and about 0.8 mb/d moved to

the Mediterranean ports on Syrian and Lebanese coasts and

from there the oil was shipped to Europe by tankers. The

pipelines which was bringing the Gulf oil to the Mediterra-

nean ports passed through more than one Arab country and

despite the arrangement which were made by the governments

to ensure the safety of these pipelines, the growing pro-

Nasser and anti-Western sentiment put the continuation of

the flow of oil in jeopardy. For example, the Trans-Arabia

Pipeline Company (Tapline) had operated in four unstable

Arab countries (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon),

any of which could come under the control of Pro-Nasser ele-

ments. Through the Syrian territory two pipelines were

passing oil to the Mediterranean; the first line connected

Kirkuk oil fields, through the Syrian territory, and port of

Tripoli in Lebanon and the second passed through the Syrian

territory only and terminated at Banias port. The combined 5 5

capacity of these two line was about 500,000 b/d.

54. S. Karpov, "The Closure of the Suez Canal: Economic consequences", International Affairs (Moscow), April, 1974, p.83.

55. Mohammed Jumaa, The Arab Oil Industries (in Arabic), (Beirut: Dar AL-Nahar, 19651, p.211.

39

Soon after the commencement of the tripartite

aggression against Egypt, the Executive Council of the

International Confederation of Arab Trade Union (ECICATU)

urged the Arab workers to strike at the Western interests in

the region, mainly on oil pipelines which feed their war ma-

chine. On November 3, the Syrian army blew up all the Iraqi

petroleum Company installations in the Syrian territory,

thus cutting of the flow of oil from Iraq to the Western

market and destroying the Kirkuk-Tripoli Pipeline, the big-

gest single piece of pipeline in the Middle East. There

were bomb explosions in parts of the Kuwait oil fields and

in and around the oil fields in Qatar and Saudi Arabia. On

November 15, the Syrian Minister of Public Works had stated

that his government would not permit the repair of the

pipelines without total withdrawal of the forces, which

committed aggression, from the Egyptian soil. The closure

of Suez Canal, the blowing up of the oil pipelines along

with the embargo on the shipment of oil by the Arab coun-

tries to Britain and France had created unprecedented crisis

not only in the British and French economy, but also in the

entire western economy. The US felt that it had a major

role in lessening the severe consequences of the oil short-

age in the West European countries. The US had organised a

worldwide redistribution of oil and put into operation

special oil carrier tanker fleets to rescue the affected

countries in the West. An emergency oil programme known as

Oil Lift to Europe was created for that purpose.

There were three major factors that contributed to

the success of the US emergency oil programme. The first

one was the increase in the supply of oil from the Western

hemisphere to Western Europe. The second was the increase

in the volume of production of oil in the US and the Carib-

bean and the heavy stock withdrawals from those areas.

According to Professor John M. Blair, "no shortage de-

veloped, as the affected area received slightly more than 90

per cent of the supplies prior to the stoppage. These

additional supplies were made possible by increased produc-

tion, by heavy stock withdrawals during November and Decem-

ber, and by numerous unusual operations. .. particularly in 56

the United States" The third was the increase in the

number of tankers that kept a steady flow of oil, by moving

oil from the Gulf via the Cape of Good Hope.

EVALUATION OF 1956 ARAB OIL EMBARGO

The Arab oil embargo of 1956 was not maintained

till Israel, France and Britain decided to withdraw from the

Egyptian territory. The economies of the embargoed coun-

56. John M. Blair, The Control of Oil (NY: Pantheon, 1976), p.3.

41

tries were not affected much. The unity that was shown by

the Western countries in the face of the Arab challenge was

met with disunity in the Arab world. The failure in using

the oil as a diplomatic weapon during the crisis was due to

the unsystematic, unpremeditated and unplanned nature of the

Arab oil embargo, the lack of unity in the Arab world

during the crisis (which was mainly due to the Egyptian-

Iraqi and Syrian-Iraqi rivalry for the leadership of the

Arab world, the presence of the British military forces in

the Arabian Peninsula, and the Frech influence in the North

African Arab States), the fear of Western retaliation in

form of food embargo and the total control of the interna-

tional oil companies over the volume of production, the

level of prices and the distribution of the oil.

EISENHOWER DOCTRINE

For the US the Suez crisis had produced mixed

results: it succeeded in getting a hold on the oil of the

region and retaining some regional friends like Saudi Ara-

bia, but it alienated the most influential Arab country,

Egypt, inspite of the US efforts to get the Israeli and the

Anglo-French troops out from the Egyptian soil. In fact,

when the US dropped the Aswan d t n offer the Soviet directly

jumped in the fray and helped Egypt to build the Dam. This

Opportunity given by the US opened the Middle Eastern door

to the Soviet Union. In 1957, Saudi Arabia allowed the US

to keep its air base of Dharan, north of Saudi Arabia in

return for American military assistance and a promise of not

stationing US-Jews at the base. Immediately after the Suez

Crisis the US administration feared that a communist expan-

sion might take place in the Middle East. On November 1956,

a memorandum prepared by the US administration asserted that

the US should be ready to take any action which would ex- 5 7

clude the Soviet influence from the region. Eisenhower

proposed American economic and military aid to the Middle

Eastern countries. He was of the view that "the leaders of

the Soviet Union, like the Czars before them, had either

eyes on the Middle East... The Soviet objective, was in

plain fact power politics; to seize the oil, to cut the

Canal and Pipelines of the Middle East, and thus seriously 58

to weaken western civilisation."

On January 5, 1957, Eisenhower draw the attention

of the US Congress to the Soviet threat to the Middle East.

In the course of his address to the Congress, he wanted the

Congress to give him authority to use military force for

57. Ramzi Fouad, The After Math of Suez Crisis (in Arabic) (Cairo: AL-Ahram Publication, 1961), p.210.

58. Dwight David Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956-1961 : White House Years (NY: Doubleday, 19651, pp.177-178.

securing the integrity of the states in the Middle East, if

neceaeary, and to extend military aid and economic assist- 59

ance to those counties requesting help. He maintained

that:

"All this instability (in the Middle East) has been heightened and, at a time, manipulated by interna- tion communism.... Russia's interest in the Middle East is solely that of power politics. Considering her announced purpose of communizing the world, it is easy to understand her hope of dominating the Middle East.... (If this came about) Western Europe would be endangered just as though there had been no Marshall Plan, no north Atlantic Treaty Organi- sation. The free nations of Asia, Africa, too,

&n "" would be placed in serious jeopardy."

Such utterances of President Eisenhower indicated that his

intention was to follow a policy modeled on the Truman

Doctrine of 1947 when Greece and Turkey were under the

communist threat, and that he was ready to apply military

force in the Middle East if necessary to maintain stability

and to fill up the power vacuum which was created by the

decline of the British and French influence after the Suez

Crisis. Eisenhower proposed and sought the authorization of

Congress for three types of actions: (1) to co-operate with

some of the Middle Eastern countries to build up their

economic strength; (2) to give a free hand to the President

5 9 . Ibid., p.180.

60. Congressional Record, 85 Congress 1 Sess, p.225.

in the use of the already allocated funds to assist any

country desiring military assistance and co-operation and

( 3 ) for permission to include the use of the US armed forces

to protect the integrity and political independence of such

nations requesting such aid against any aggression con-

trolled or supported by International communism. After a

prolonged debate on the President's request, the US Congress

approved his proposal by 75 votes to 19. On March 9, 1957

President Eisenhower signed the resolution into law and it 6 1

was known popularly as the Eisenhower Doctrine. Subse-

quently, he appointed James P. Richards, former Chairman of

the House Foreign Affairs Committee, as his Special Assist-

ence.

On late March, James Richard toured the Middle

East for the purpose of getting support to the doctrine.

President Shukri el-Kuwatly of Syria strongly denounced the

doctrine and warned the Arab countries from failing into the

American trap. President Nasser denounced the doctrine and 6 2

called it a piece of imperialism. However, the doctrine

was given a good reception in Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi

Arabia and the Northern tier States of the Baghdad Pact.

During his tour to the region, James Richard had managed to

get sanction of $ 120 million to the most needed states in

61. AL-Ahram, March 10, 1957.

62. Ibid., March 20, 1957.

the region. Upon his return, he stated before the House of

Foreign Affairs Committee that "this entirely American time

of action, evoked a heart-warming trust from the nations of 6 3

the area". And in his first report about his achievement

from the mission, he stated: "International Communism has

been put on notice.... and the nations of the area are 6 4

encouraged to help themselves"

The Eisenhower Doctrine, in fact, was the accumu-

lation of earlier statements made by Eisenhower. The doc-

trine was based on the assumption that there was an imminent

Soviet aggression or pro-Soviet wave going to capture the

power in the pro-western states of the region. The nation-

list Arab States (Egypt and Syria) were against the doctrine

and they argued that the US was trying to betray the Arabs

that they were vulnerable to the Soviet threat, while the

real threat to the Arabs came from the presence of Israel

and the imperialist policies of Britain and France which had

exhibited their imperialist ambitions when they invaded

Egypt.

However, the Arab nationalist regimes' rejection

of th doctrine was not the only criterion to be used to

63. Department of States Bulletin, October 21, 1957, p.121.

64. Ibid., p.134.

judge its success. The doctrine indicated to the Soviet

Union that the US was serious about the 'stability' in the

Middle East, thus it is possible that it might have discour-

aged the Soviet Union from interfering directly in the

region. In addition, the doctrine was, in part, addressed

to the public at home so that the people of the US realise

the importance of the Middle East to the United States.

In April 1957, the doctrine was for the first

time tested in practice when King Hussein of Jordan was

pressurised by President Nasser as well as by the Jordanian

nationalists to severe his relation with Britain and to

remove the British bases from Jordan. When King Hussein

finally succumbed to the pressure, Britain suspended its

entire military and economic aid to Jordan. The King no-

ticed that the growing pro-Nasser trend in Jordan, especial-

ly among the Palestinians, was a danger to his throne and

that the intention of his Prime Minister (Suleiman Nabulsi,

a Jordanian from Palestine) was for Jordan to establish good

relation with the Soviet Union. When it become clear that

the King then was having control over the army, Suleiman

Nabulsi and his colleague flew to Syria and from there they

tried to establish contact with the pro-Nasser factions in

the Baathists and the communists in Jordan for the purpose

of toppling the King. The timely statements of President

Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles that the US regarded the

independence and the integrity of Jordan as vital to its

national interest strengthened the hands of the King against 65

his plotters.

In fact, Eisenhower regarded the crisis in Jordan

as a struggle between the pro-Nasser and pro-Western regime

or in other words a struggle between the East and the West.

The success of pro-Nasser elements in controlling the power

in Jordan would definitely jeopardize the American interest

in the region. Had US not promised help to the Jordan King

in time, the other pro-Western leaders in the Middle East

would have felt insecure and might even have shifted their

allies. United Sates had sent its Sixth Fleet to east

Mediterranean waters to be ready for any eventuality, thus

demonstrating its willingness to help the King from possible

interventions from Syria and Egypt, both of whom were re-

ceiving large amount of Soviet military aid. King Hussein

finally gained control in Jordan and received an additional

$ 10 million as aid from Washington as part of the Eisenhow-

er Doctrine fund.

The US economic assistance to Jordan and the show

of force in support of the King were clear demonstrations of

the US preparedness to match the disturbances which was

6 5 . New York Times, April 25, 1957.

created by heavy Soviet military assistance to Egypt and

Syria. Jordan crisis was a turning point in the sense that

the vacuum of power in Jordan which was created by the

evacuation of British forces from Jordan and the subsequent

decline in the British influence in the region was filled by

the United States.

However, the success of Eisenhower Doctrine in

Jordan was followed by a failure in Syria. Syria moved

closer with the Soviet Union and in August 1957 Soviet Union

approved large amount of economic and military aid to Syria.

This development led the American officials to believe that

Syria would soon be taken over by the communists and it 6 6

would be the Soviets' outpost in the Middle East.

On August 15, the Syrian Chief of Staff was re-

placed by a person viewed by the US as a strong pro-Soviet

and anti-Western officer. Few days later, the Syrian Minis-

ter of Information announced that there was a conspiracy

made in the American Embassy against the nationalist regime

of President Shukri el-Kuwatly and expelled three officials

of the American Embassy in Domascus who were supposedly

involved in the conspiracy. In retaliation, the Syrian

66. Dwight David Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956-1961: White House Years, po.cit., p.197.

49

Ambassadors to the US was asked to,leave the country within

forty eight hours. This strained the US-Syrian relations

considerably.

Subsequently, massive US arms shipments were sent

to countries neighboring Syria and to Saudi Arabia. This

was followed by announcement by Secretary Dullers that

"Turkey now face growing military danger from the majpr 6 7

buildup of arms in Syria". Eisenhower felt that if the

communist secured power in Syria, it would likely to affect

the neighboring countries mainly Jordan, Turkey, Iraq and

Lebanon. He assured the Turkish Prime Minister, King of

Jordan, King of Iraq and Lebanese President that the US

would help them military and economically against any out- 6 8

side aggression. And to give creditability to his prom-

ises, he instructed the Sixth Fleet to move to east Mediter-

ranean waters once again. In addition, the US air bases at

Adana, South of Turkey was strengthened. By September 1957,

the situation in the Middle East was at the verge of a war

and the military forces of Jordan, Iraq, Turkey and Lebanon

were stationed on the borders of Syria. In addition, the

Sixth Fleet of the US was a few miles from the Syrian terri-

67. Ramzi Fouad, The After Math of Suez Crisis, op.cit., p.219.

68. New York Times, August 20, 1957.

torial waters in the Mediterranean. Commenting on the US

military preparation President Eisenhower said: "US ... had 6 9

done everything we felt it possible to do".

Did the US was seriously trying to intervene in

Syria and overthrow a supposedly pro-Soviet government there

which might become a Soviet ally? The British Prime Minis-

ter Harold Macmillan was of the view that the US was inter-

preting the Eisenhower Doctrine with all the enthusiasm of 70

recent converts. It appears that the US then was not

attempting to over throw the pro-Soviet regime in Syria but

was to prevent any adventuristic moves by Syria against its

neighbors. Commenting upon the episode Eisenhower wrote:

"All we could do now was to watch the situation closely for

the next sign of a move either a major aggression on the

part of the Syrians or some evidence that the situation was 7 1

relaxing".

69. Dwight David Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956-1961: White House Years, op.cit., p.202.

70. Quoted by T.C. Bose, The Superpowers and the Middle East (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1973) p.477.

71. Dwight David Eisenhower, Waging Peace 1956-1961~ White House Years, op.cit., p.202.

But no event had occurred and by September 1957

all the Arab countries had given up the idea of any collec-

tive action against the Syrian regime. Iraq, which could

match the military might of Syria, was not interested to

antagonize Syria as the latter could retaliate by blowing up

the oil pipeline which was running from Kirkuk oil fields to

the Syrian port of Banias in the Mediterranean. The Iraqi

King visited Syria in September 1957 and announced that the

two countries have started a new relation based on 72

mutual respect. King Saud of Saudi Arabia stated on

September 26 that the US was creating an unnecessary crisis 7 3

situation in the region. The King of Jordan and the

President of Lebanon despite their acceptance of the Ameri-

can aids announced their firm support to the Arab unity and 74

Arab solidarity. Turkey, refused to demobilize its 50,000

troops on the Syrian border. The Soviet leader Khurchev

reacted sharply to the Turkish decision of massing troops in

the Syrian border by stating that the US wanted to wage a 75

war against Syria. He alleged that after the American

failure to convince the Arab countries to attack Syria, it

was now pushing Turkey to do the attack. However, steadily

72. AL-Thoura (Damoscus) (in Arabic), September 25, 1957.

73. Ibid, September 27, 1957.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

the situation was bubbling down, especially after Henry

Cabat Lodge presented the American view of the situation in

the United Nations wherein he stated that US had no aggres-

sive designs against Syria. This speech had a favorable

reception in Domascus and Moscow, and Turkey too had indi-

cated that it was prepared to shift most of its troops away

from its border with Syria.

The outcome of the Syrian crisis was not to the

expectation of the United States. The American efforts to

build up a regional coalition from the Arab States to coun-

ter the communist threat had failed. In fact the wave of

Arab nationalism strengthened Arab solidarity, and resulted

in the formation of the United Arab Republic in February

1958 between Syria and Egypt.

The Lebanon crisis of 1958 put the Eisenhower

Doctrine in action for the first time. The pro-Nasser

forces were growing very fast in Lebanon, especially among

the Muslim community and when President Camille Chamoun

announced his intention to amend the constitution in a way

that would keep him at the Presidency, a full scale civil

war was erupted. On May 8, 1958, a pro-Nasses editor of a

Beirut newspaper was shot suspectedly by a government agent.

This incident charged an already strained and smouldering

Situation. In retaliation, the US Information Service

Library in Tripoli was ransacked on May 10, and two days

later Beirut was blockaded. The US saw the events in Leba-

non as a communist attempt to expand its influence in the

Middle East. Subsequently, President Eisenhower instructed

some elements of the Sixth Fleet to move to the Mediterra-

nean and ordered the American airborne troops in Europe, to 7 6

be on alert to meet any eventuality. On May 21, President

Chamoun protested to the Arab League Council against what he

called "interference in the Lebanon domestic affairs by the 77

United Arab Republic". On June 6, C. Malik, the Lebanese

Foreign Minister, filed charges against the United Arab

Republic in the Security Council, accusing it for planning

to topple the legitimate government and intervening in 78

Lebanese internal affairs. By July 14, the situation in

the Middle East tumbled into a heap, and the US found itself

in a position where it might have to use military power. A

revolution lead by General Abdel Karim Kassim erupted in

Baghdad. The pro-Western government in Iraq was over-

thrown and King Faisal, the King of Iraq, his uncle, the

Crown Prince Abdel Illah and Prime Minister Nuri el-Said

were murdered, and a new military government was installed.

The new government was instantly recognised and supported by

76. AL-Ahram, May 13, 1958.

77. AL-Nahar (Beirut) (in Arabic), May 23, 1958.

78. Ibid, June 7, 1958.

president Nasser. After the Iraqi military coup the Baghdad

pact which was signed by Nuri el-Said had become null and

void as far as Iraq was concerned and the place of advantage

gained by the US and the West in the region had disappeared

into thin air.

The situation in Iraq appeared to the US to be a

Nasser-inspired pro-communist conspiracy, which would result

in the loss of the Iraqi oil fields to the West in addition 7 9

to the loss of a valuable link in the Baghdad Pact. Thus

when Lebanese President Camille Chamoun asked for American 80

military support, the US was willing to provide him.

Before talking any final decision about sending

troops to Lebanon, Eisenhower consulted Harold MacMillan,

the British Prime Minister, who declared that his country

would send sufficient troops to Jordan to support King

Hussein, if he was threatened. On May 15, the US began

landing of some 15,000 American troops in Lebanon. Presi-

dent Eisenhower in a statement after the Marines entered

Lebanon said that they were going there to protect the

little country against communism and the terroristic tactics

79. John C. Campbell, Defence of the Middle East: Problems of American Diplomacy (NY: Harper, 19601, p.142.

80. New York Times, May 16, 1958.

81 of the President of the United Arab Republic. It was

announced that the US was doubling the Marines force with 8 2

the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.

The quick American response to the Lebanese re-

quest had served two purposes. It was to prevent any Iraqi

type of coup occurring again and to demonstrate that the- US

was serious in taking any action against a possible Soviet

or Nasser threat to any pro-Western government in the Middle

East. The US State Department announced that US troops went

to assist the Lebanese people in choosing their President in 83

accordance with their constitution.

On July 16, a resolution submitted by the US

representative in the United Nations to the Security Council

called for the replacement of UN Military Forces instead of

the Americans troops in Lebanon. However, the Soviet repre-

sentative vetoed the resolution and Khrushchev suggested a

conference with the participation of all concerned parties

to solve the Lebanese crisis. When the US rejected

Krushchev's suggestion, a special session of the UN General

Assembly was convened. A meeting of the General Assembly

81. New York Times, May 16, 1958.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid, July 17, 1958.

was called on August 12 to discuss Lebanese crisis. Howev-

er, in the meanwhile the situation eased after the Lebanese

government and the US military forces reached an agreement

with the rebels. On July 31, the Lebanese army commander,

General Fuad Chehab was elected as President.

On August 1, Robert Murphy began a tour to the

Middle East with the purpose of solving the crises in the

region. During his visit to Iraq, President Kassim assured

him that the revolution was purely an internal affair and

had no foreign connection and promised that his country

would continue its shipment of oil to the West, and would

even increase its shipment, if needed. In return, Murphy

assured the Iraq President that the US had no ill intentions

against Iraq. On August 3, Murphy met President Nasser, and

appeared to have succeeded in removing many misunderstand-

ings between the US and the Republic. Murphy also visited

Israel and Jordan and assured the leaders of the two coun-

tries the US continuous support to their countries.

On August 12, the UN General Assembly was convened

to discuss the Lebanon crisis and on the next day, President

Eisenhower addressed the General Assembly and proposed a

six-point peace plan which called for the dispatch of a UN

peace-keeping force to replace the American and the British

forces, the control of arms exports to the region, and

84 putting sn end to the propaganda broadcasts. Subsequent-

ly, the Arab delegates to the UN had prepared an all Arab

resolution calling for an immediate withdrawal of US and

gritish forces from Lebanon, urging the Arab countries to

respect each other's integrity and not to interfere in each 85

other's internal affairs. This resolution which got the

support of the US, Britain, and Soviet Union was passed by

the General Assembly. On October 25, the US and British

forces left Lebanon and on November 2, the British forces

withdrew from Jordan also. With the withdrawal of US and

British forces from the region, for the time being, the

Lebanon crisis had come to an end.

KENNEDY'S POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Towards the end of Eisenhower administration .the

US policy-makers acknowledged the growing pan-Arab sentiment

in the Middle East. With the inauguration of Kennedy admin-

istration in 1961, there was a reassessment of the US policy

in the region. The new administration appointed John Badean

as Ambassador to Egypt, for he had good reputation among the

84. United Nations, Official Records of the Plenary Meeting of General Assembly, 1958.

85. United Nations, Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, 1958.

Arabs and had been the President of the American University

of Cairo. President Kennedy showed keen interest in improv-

ing simultaneously US relation with Israel and the new

nationalist Arab countries including Nasser's Egypt.

The new thinking which was widespread in the US

during the early period of Kennedy was that the US should

have good understandings with those forces in the Third

World who would be having decisive say in regional and world

politics in the future. In the case of the Arab world this

meant that the US should act in such a way that it would get

the progressive forces such as Egypt into its side. The

American government was not much concerned about Iraq's

hegemony over Kuwait, for Kuwait was then much more impor-

tant to the British than to the United States. Britain was

supposed to take the initial steps to preserve Kuwait's

independence as British troops were stations there. Due to

the good relations between Kuwait and the other Arab States,

Kuwait was able to replace the British forces by a mixed

Arab contingent within a short time, thus avoided internal

and Arab public criticism.

However, while the new image of US-Arab relations

was in its first stage, the Yemen civil war and the subse-

quent Egyptian forces' intervention brought in new dimen-

sions. The Yemen crisis started when Iman Ahmad was report-

ed to have been died of natural causes on September 19, 1962

and the Crown Prince Al-Badr was proclaimed as the new Imam

for Yemen. A few days later, the Free Yemen Party and other

Liberal army groups led a revolt against the Imamate and

~bdullah Al-Sallal, an army officer, emerged as the leader 86

of a successful revolution. The mew Imam, Al-Badr,

along with other Royal family members and many tribal loyal-

ists sought refuge in the northern mountains close to the

Saudi border and also inside Saudi Arabia. King Saud, who

was opposed to the regime of Abdullah Al-Sallal, started

helping the Imam in the northern mountains to take back the

Imamate. The US, which had cordial relations with Saudi

Arabia, was also opposed to the new regime. The US, which

had strained relations with President Nasser had opposed any

regime supported by Nasser. British protectorate Eden, a

southern neighbor of Yemen, was having a chronicle boarder

disputes with Yemen. Further, the new regime refused to

recognize the British enclaves in the southern part of the

Arabian Peninsula. These made Britain to worry about its

ability to maintain a colonial position in the region. Thus

the Britain sided with the Imam and Saudi Arabia and against

the new regime. President Nasser was left with two choices,

86. Samer Fahmi, Modern Arab History (in Arabic) (Cairo: Dar Al-Ahrarn, 1967), p.182.

60

either to accept the strangulation of the pro-Nasser repub-

lic in Yemen, or offer a help to the new Republic. Nasser

chose the later.

Soon after the revolution, the Royalists began

their attack on republican centres in the northern part of

Yemen. President Al-Sallal ordered general mobilisation of

forces on October 4, 1962, to counter the rebel forces and

three days later the Republican forces were fighting Saudi 8 7

Arabian forces on Yemen's northern frontier. The Deputy

Premier of Yemen warned that the US'S delay in recognising

the new Yemen might jeopardize American interests in the 88

country. In the meanwhile, the Royalist with the help of

Saudi army, got almost full control of the north and started

moving towards the south. When Abdullah Al-Sallal requested

help from Egypt, President Nasser sent 30,000 troops to

Yemen to help President Abdullah Al-Sallal. But the Egyp-

tian troops proved insufficient to bring the fighting to an 89

end. Yemen then entered into a civil war during which the

Egyptians army used air power, tanks and other tools of 90

modern warfare. In the meanwhile, the Yemen civil war

87. Middle East Journal, Vo1.16, 1962, p.141.

88. bid.,

89. John C. Spain, Crisis in Yemen, (New Jerssy: Rutgers University Press, 1963), p.22.

90. Ibid., p.29.

became part of the cold war inside and outside the United

Nations organisations in the sense that the Arab progressive

governments lead by Egypt and backed by the Soviet bloc were

on one side, and Arab conservative governments lead by Saudi

Arabia and backed by the US and Britain were on the other.

On October 25, 1962, President Kennedy assured the

visiting Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, the US full support

for the maintenance of Saudi Arabia's territorial integrity.

The American support to Saudi Arabia was a clear sign to

President Nasser that the US would not tolerate any attack

against the Saudi regime, even if his clients succeeded in

Yemen. In fact, the American assurance to the Saudi Arabia

came after the American failure to arrange a ceasefire

between the Egyptians and the Saudis and their Yemeni cli-

ents. In spite of his desire to improve relation with pro-

gressive Arab regimes, Kennedy could not ignore Saudi

Arabia's pro-US stand and the US interests in the Saudi oil.

Soon after, the US got involved in the Yemeni

crisis, for a success of the pro-Nasser regime in Yemen

might result in instability in Saudi Arabia where the US

had high oil interests. Any instability in Saudi Arabia

might bringing down the pro-Western government of King

Hussein, and eventually the whole of the Middle East would

be lost from United States.

However, the US and after three months of hesita-

tion recognised the republican regime in Yemen on December

19, 1962, in circumstances which were criticised as too late 91

to win friends and too early to be safe. The US recog-

nistion to the new regime was under certain conditions to be

.et by the new regime. The recognition statement in part

reads as follows:

'I... The United States government is gratified by the Statesmanlike appeal of the Yemen Arab Republic to Yemen's in adjacent areas to be law-abinding citizens and notes its understanding to honor all treaties concluded by previous Yemeni governments. This, of course, includes the Treaty of Sanaa'

concluded with the British Government in 1934, which provides reciprocal guarantees that neither party should intervene in the affairs of the other across the existing international frontier dividing the Yemen from territory under British protection. Further the United States Government welcomes of the United Arab Republic signifying its willingness to undertake a reciprocal disengagement and expedi- tious phased removal of troops from Yemen as exter- nal forces engaged in support of the Yemen Royal- ists are removed from the frontier and as external support of the royalists is stopped.

In believing that these declarations provide a basis for terminating the conflict over Yemen... the United States had today (December 19) decided to recognise the Government of the Yemen Arab

$9 2 Republic ...

91. L. Tarig, "The Yemeni Crisis", Journal of Palestine Studies, I1 (Summer, 19661, p.46.

92. Department of States Bulletin, January 7, 1983, pp.11- 12.

Here, of course, the US seemed to be clearly

protecting the interests of both Britain and Saudi Arabia as

conditions for recognition of the new regime.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND THE STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

President Lyndon B. Johnson's initial policy

towards the Middle East was to keep the situation in the

region as undisturbed as possible. He contended himself

with keeping a working relationship with the progressive

states in the region like Egypt, Syria and Iraq, to continue

the US cordial relationship with the conservative states

like Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and to extend regular economic

and military assistance to Israel in such a way that the

balance of power in the region was maintained. On February

1964, President Johnson declared during a visit of the

Israeli Prime Minister, Levi Eshkol, to Washington that the

US stood "for the territorial integrity and political inde-

pendence of all countries in the Near East and firm opposi-

tion to aggression and the use of force or the threat of 9 3

force against any country" He also made a similar state-

ment when Israel's President Shazar visited Washington on

93. Quoted by David Grabil, "The Arab Israeli War, 1967: How it Began", American Political Science Review, 23, (1968), p.93.

~ugust, 1966. However, the outbreak of the six-day war in

June 1967 between Israel and the Arabs changed partially

this American policy towards the Middle East.

2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Much has been written about the US interests in

the Middle East as well as the US policy towards the

region. Quite few studies were on the US policy towards

the October 1973 war in the Middle East. But till now there

is no comprehensive research done on the role of the Arab

cil in the US policy towards the Middle East in the context

of the different events which had occurred in the region

from 1967 to 1981. Further many of the studies on the US

policy towards the region in different periods were done

mainly by Western scholars based on materials*Western lan-

guages.

In the following pages a review of the most rele-

vant literature relating to the topic of the dissertation is

provided.

94 ARAB OIL AND MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

M. Taielat, an Egyptian scholar, brings out in

this study, the historical development of the Arab oil

industry and the role of oil in enhancing the Arab economic

and political position in the world from 1950 to 1973. he

discussed the various issues involved in the Arab-Israeli

conflicts since 1948. He urges the Arab policy makers to

employ oil wealth to solve the various Arab economic and

political problems.

9 5 ENGAGEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

In this article, Safran gives a vivid description

about the process of negotiation on the disengagement in

1974. He argues congently and was of the view that what had

made the Arab-Israeli conflict so inteactable over the years

was the intricacies of inter-Arab politics, particularly

arising out of the conflicts of views in furthering the

cause of pan-Arabism. Safran notes that the most disquiet-

ing prospect resulting from the October war was the Middle

94. Dr. Mohammed Taielat, Arab Oil and Middle East Crisis (in Arabic) (Cairo: Egypt's General Foundation Books, 1 9 7 4 ) .

95 . Nadav Safran, "Engagement in the Middle East" Foreign Affairs, No.1, October 1974.

East coming under the Soviet predominance. He highlights

two features of the American efforts in the Middle East.

The first is the "American intervention of different sorts

and at different times that made the disengagement negotia-

tions possible" and ensured their success. The second is

the "American commitment that have tended to snowball as the

negotiations advanced from area to area and from issue to

is sue" .

96 THE UNITED STATES AND THE ARAB WORLD

The author of this work, analyses the reasons for

the US interest in the Middle East. He argues that the

motives behind the US interest to keep stability in the

Middle East was the existence of oil in this region as oil

continues to be the life blood of the Western capitalist

economy. The author notes that the US policy makers had

taken into consideration the following when they formed the

US policy towards this region ( 1 ) prevent an outbreak of

hostilities among the countries in the region, ( 2 ) prevent

the area from falling under the control of a great power

hostile to the US, and ( 3 ) maintain the flow of oil from the

Middle East oil fields to the Western markets.

96. William R. Polk, The United States and the Arab World, 3rd Edition (London: Harvard University Press, 1975).

9 7 AFTER RABAT: MIDDLE EAST RISKS AND AMERICAN ROLE

The author of this article is of the view that the

consequences of eruption of a new Arab-Israeli war would be

catastrophic and therefore he suggests the ways and means by

which the US can prevent the occurrence of a major war in

the region. In his opinion, the US interests would be

enhanced by a harmonious relationship between the Israelis

and the Arabs and the policies of the US should help to

bring about such a relationship.

98 OIL: THE ISSUE OF AMERICAN INTERVENTION

In this article, Robert Trucker examines the

technical feasibility of the US seizing the Arab oil fields

through a military intervention. He argues that the oil

crisis was one of the turning points of history and that it

did not occur earlier because the Arabs feared that it might

lead to an armed intervention from the West. The article

examines the possibility of the Soviet counter intervention

in the region in case the US seizes the oil fields.

97. Richard H. Ullman, "After Rabat: Middle East Risks and American Roles", Foreign Affairs, No.2 Januaryl975.

98. Robert Trucker, "Oil: The Issue of American Interven- tion", Commentary, January, 1975.

9 9 ARAB-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF

100 THE UNITED STATES AND SAUDI ARABIA: A POLICY ANALYSIS

The author of these two booklets analyses the

policy implication for the US in having good relations with

Saudi Arabia and the other Arab oil-producing countries in

the region. He warns against the over-enthusiasm of the -US

in selling arms to the region and calls for a serious re-

examination of such sales. He cautions the United States'

over-reliance on ties with specific individuals or regimes

in the region as such individuals or regimes might not

remain in power for along period of time.

101 OIL FIELDS AS MILITARY OBJECTIONS: A FEASIBILITY STUDY

This study examines the requirements, costs and

risks of military intervention in the oil fields. It

examines the military intervention in terms of international

99. Emile. A. Nakhleh, Arab-American Relations in the Per- slan Gulf (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975).

100. Emile. A. Nakhleh, The United States and Saudi Arabia: A policy Analysis (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975).

101. John Collins and Clyde Mark, Oil Fields as Military Objectives: A Feasibility Study (Washington: Aug. 7 5 ) , Prepared for the Committee on International Relations, US Congress.

law, constitutional responsibilities and public opinion in

the US and other parts of the world. The study examines

the possibility of counter-intervention threats by the OPEC

countries and the Soviet Union and analyses in-depth the

feasibility of the US seizing the Saudi oil fields.

102 SAUDI ARABIA AND OIL DIPLOMACY

In this study, Sheikh Rsutum Ali analyses the

importance of oil in Saudi's foreign policy. He opines that

although Saudi Arabia has almost one-fourth of the total

non-communist world reserves of oil, the desert Kingdom

alone is not capable of instituting an oil embargo against

the industrialized world. He concludes that Saudi Arabia

may not participate in another oil embargo, if it is imposed

by other Arab countries because of the fear of invasion of

its oil fields by the United States. Without Saudi partic-

ipation in any future embargo, the author notes, oil cannot

be used effectively as a weapon of diplomacy in any prospec-

t i v e Palestinian-Israeli War.

102. Sheikh Rustum Ali, Saudi Arabia and Oil Diplomacy (New York: Preager Publishers, 1976).

103 AMERICAN INTEREST GROUPS AFTER OCTOBER 1973

In this article the author gives an account of the

Israel and Arab lobbies in the US and their role in shaping

the US policy towards the Middle East. He notes that the

Israeli lobby in the US is powerful, especially in the

Congress. The Arab lobby, the author notes, has less power

and composed of recently organised groups. A number of

separate Arab governments have been involved in providing

support to the Arab groups in the United States, he ob-

served.

104 RESOLVING THE CRISIS

The author analyses the various stage of Middle

East peace process from 1974 to 1976. He focuses upon the

US and Egyptian role in achieving a lasting settlement to

the Arab-Israeli conflict. He opines that the oil crisis

has played an important role in strengthening the Arab

position in the world affairs and that the Arabs should make

the maximum use of their oil wealth.

103. Robert H. Trice, American Interest Group After October 1973, in Oil, The Arab-Israeli Dispute and the Indus- trial World, ed. by J.C. Hurewitz (Boulder, Colo: West view Press 1976).

104. Dr. Boutros Ghali, "Resolving the Crisis" (in Arabic) International Political Journal, No.41, 1976.

DECADE OF DECISIONS: AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD THE ARAB-ISRAELI 105

CONFLICT, 1967-76

The author in this work gives a detailed descrip-

tion of the American efforts to solve the Arab-Israeli

conflict. He is of the opinion that few issues have been

more critical to American foreign policy than the Arab-

Israeli dispute. In his view the US policy is not based on

cool and rational calculations of American national inter-

ests in the region; it is also not related in any signifi-

cant way to domestic or bureaucratic politics. He states

that the President do have independent choices to make,

after taking into consideration the external and domestic

constrains. The author notes that nothing is more important

in determining the US policy towards the Arab-Israeli

conflict than the definition of the situation by the Presi-

dent. The President's perception and understanding of

issues will set the tone, establish the framework, and

determine the rules by which the policy will be carried out.

He states, that, this is not to say that 'the President is

omnipotent, but he is certainly more than merely first among

equals'.

105. William B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy toward the Arab Israeli Conflict, 1967-76 (Berkely: University of California Press, 1977).

7 2

106 HOW TO SAVE ISRAEL IN SPITE OF HERSELF ?

In this article the author states that the ques-

tion is no longer whether the US should continue to assure

Israel's survival and prosperity, but it is rather how the

Americans, in approaching the problems in the Middle East,

can at best fulfill the US responsibilities not only to

Israel and to the US itself but also to people all over the

world whose well-being could be seriously endangered by

further conflicts. The author reports that Israel, though

in the long run almost certain to lose ground because of her

intractable economic problems, as well as the "logic of

number", temporarily holds military superiority because of

the influx of sophisticated US weapons. He concludes that

the time is ripe for the US to take strong actions to save

Israel from herself and try to prevent a tragic war that

could endanger the economies of the major non-communist

powers, separate the US from its allies, precipitate enor-

mous internal debate in the US and lead to the US clashing

with the Soviet Union.

106. George W. Ball, "How to save Israel in spite of Her self?" Foreign Affairs, No.3 April, 1977.

T H C 107 OIL POWER IN,MIDDLE EAST

In this study, Campbell examines the Saudi Arabian

and Iranian efforts to achieve economic development and to

gain influential voice in the regional affairs. The study

analyses the limitations and uncertainties of their endeav-

ors. It also looks into the vulnerability of the US and

its Western allies, as their oil imports from the Middle

East has been going up.

108 US INTERESTS IN IRAN: MYTHS AND REALITIES

In this article the authors argue that the primary

American stakes in Iran, as had been propounded by US

policy planners, was the stability of that country in the

region. They suggest that Iran should have an effective and

strong central government because without political stabili-

ty, it is not easy to ensure reasonable economic, military

and social stability. They give a detailed analysis of

Iran's importance as a monitoring station on the Soviet

107. John C. Campbell, "Oil Power in the Middle East", Foreign Affairs, No.1, October 1977.

108. Streedhar and John Cavanagh, "US Interest in Iran: Myths and Realities", Institute for Defence studies and Analyses Journal, No.4, April June 1979.

Union, and arms buyer and an oil supplier during the 1970-78

period. The Revolution demonstrated the US incapacity to

intervene and influence the course of events in the oil rich

region. The authors note that the only plausible reason for

the US not taking any action was the fear that it might

lead to terrorist attacks on the oil tankers passing through

the straits of Hormouz which could disrupt the oil supplies

to the entire West.

109 IRAN, THE PALESTINIANS AND THE GULF

In this work, Cooley examines the implications of

the alliance between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the

Plastine Liberation Organization. He looks into the role a£

Palestinians and Shia population in the political life of

the Gulf states. He analyses the consequences of Iran's new

orientation and its immediate military implications for the

Arab-Israeli conflict and for future conflicts in the Gulf

a r e a .

109. John K. Cooley, "Iran, the Palestinians and the Gulf" Foreign Affairs, No.15 Summer 1979.

110 A STRATEGY FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Shimon Peres starts the article by stating that

peace, like a tree, is a process of growth; it demands great

patience, continuous nurturing and surmounting many obsta-

cles. He gives a vivid description of the Soviet attempts

to penetrate into the Middle East and of the Israeli view of

the peace in the region. He concludes that one should not

under estimate the difficulties in attaining peace in the

Middle East just because the chances of peace have increase

after the Camp David agreements. He adds that the Middle

East is subjected to enormous external pressure, and if it

does not get organised in time to face them, there is. an

imminent danger that the region will be severely damaged by

Soviet pressure and religious fanaticism.

111 ARAB OIL AND US THREATS OF INTERVENTION

This study deals with the US efforts to minimize

the growing political and economic influence of the Arabs in

the world. It examines some of the threats issued by lead-

110. Shimon Peres, "A strategy for Peace in the Middle East", Foreign Affairs, No.&, Spring 1980.

111. Marwan Bohyri, Arab Oil and US threats of Intervention (in Arabic) (Beirut: Institute of Palestine Study, 1980).

ing Congressmen and some US officials and the Arab response

to these threats. After examining whether the US threats

are real or not, the author looks not only into the US

ability to carry out them but also the extent to which the

Arabs believed in such threats.

112 THE GULF AND THE WEST: DEPENDENCE TO HOSTAGE

In this article the authors examine the interplay

of the Gulf countries' efforts to modernise their economies

and the OECD countries' efforts to secure assured sources of

oil supply. The authors give in detail the importance of

crude oil as a primary energy resource and the importance of

the Gulf as an arms market for the US and Western Europe.

The article also highlights the dependence of the Western

world on the oil exports from the Gulf as well as the means

by which these countries have minmised the economic fall-out

of the rising of oil price on their economies. It also

deals with how the Western countries made the Gulf region

dependent on them for the economic development and security

of the countries in the region.

112 . Sreedhar and M. Shankar, "The Gulf and the West: Dependence to Hostage", Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journals, No.3 January-March, 1981.

THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE AND US MILITARY INTERVENTION 113

IN THE ARAB GULF

In this work, the author indicates that the US

would intervene in the region militarily in any of the

following eventualities: (a) A direct Soviet intervention in

any of the Gulf oil-producing country (b) Attack by a re-

gional power on any oil-producing country, and (c) Terrorist

attacks by internal forces on the oil fields. He argues

that for a successful military intervention in the Gulf, the

US should overcome substantial military and political

obstacles. Though the US , in his view, can overcome the

former it will be difficult for it to overcome the latter.

THE OTHER ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLIC: MAKING AMERICA'S 114

MIDDLE EAST POLICY, FROM TRUMAN TO REAGAN

The author gives a detailed description of some of

the difficult decisions taken by the US with regard to the

1 1 3 . Mortaza J . Bakar The Rapid Deployment Force and US Military Intervention in the Arab Gulf (in Arabic) Basra: Basra University, Central for Gulf Studies 1983).

114. Steven L. Spiegel, The other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).

problems in the Middle East. He examines the various ef-

forts of the US to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The

book contains an analysis of the influences of the different

interest groups on the US administration, the Congress and

certain individuals in shaping the US policy towards the

Middle East.

115 ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: EMBARGO LEVERAGE AND WORLD POLITICS

The authors, in this study analyse the importance

of oil for the Arabs and the Western countries. They have

given a detailed description of the Arab political structure

and its adverse impact on the utility of the Arab oil. In

addition, they looked into the various Arab attempts to use

their economic power to achieve their politics goals.

116 OIL AND ARAB INTERESTS 1972-87

This book is a collection of lectures delivered by

Ali Ahmed Attiqa in different occasions during his tenure as

the OAPEC Secretary-General. The lectures are on the role

115. M.S. Daoudi and M.S. Dajani, Economic Diplomacy: Embar- go leverage and World Politics (Boulder, Colo: West view Press, 1985).

116. Ali Ahmed Attiqa, Oil and Arab Interests 1972-87 (in Arabic) (Kuwait: OAPEC Publication 1988).

of oil in South-South Co-operation, the Arab economic devel-

OpmrrlL and tne relation of the Arabs with other countries.

He discusses the problems raised by the Arab countries and

the international oil companies. He also examines the

economic and political benefits the Arabs had secured from

the oil wealth.

117 ARAB OIL POLITICS: NO MORE WEAPON

In this article, after giving a detailed analysis

of the oil market situation, K.R. Singh concludes that the

Arab oil, though has the capacity to be a potent weapon, it

appears that the Arabs did not want to use it after 1973.

He notes that the Arab oil embargo of 1973 was not very

effective because the countries of the world found ways and

means of evading it, but still the Arab decision to cutback

production, despite its half hearted implementation, proved

a fairly potent weapon to force the oil dependent countries

of Western Europe and Japan to publicly demonstrate their

loyalty to the Arabs through their voting in the UN and

through official pronouncements.

117. K.R. Singh, "Arab Oil Politics: No More A Weapon" World Focus, No.113, May 1989.