1.99 - kaniowsky, andrzej m. - critical activity and ethics. the problem of generalization (en)

7/30/2019 1.99 - Kaniowsky, Andrzej M. - Critical Activity and Ethics. the Problem of Generalization (en)

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Critical Activity and Ethics: the Problem of Generalization

Critical Activity and Ethics: the Problem of Generalization

by Andrzej M. Kaniowski

Source:

PRAXIS International (PRAXIS International), issue: 1+2 / 1990, pages: 117-129, on www.ceeol.com.
http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.dibido.eu/bookdetails.aspx?bookID=95a45f0d-f2c0-4003-90c1-b55ffe1d4be9http://www.ceeol.com/


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Andrzej M. Kaniowski

Modern authors in the tradition of critical social theory who at the same timedefend the rationalistic and cognitivistic conception ofKantian ethics usually definetheir position by their negative attitude towards various relativistic and contextualistic approaches. 1 Acknowledging their affinity to Kant, they nevertheless rejecthis dualism, individualism, and his subjectivistic conception of freedom, as wellas the Kantian distinction between the theoretical and the practical dimension; andwithin the pratical dimension, the distinction between what is regulated by moralnorms and what is regulated by the law.The polemics with relativistic positions are rich in arguments. Yet the critiqueof Kant employs some stereotypes and is based on some questionable assumptions which I would presently like to bring to light and perhaps refute. The basicassumption on which the partial rebuttal of Kantian ethics rests is the belief thatit is both possible and necessary to eliminate the distinction between ethics andthe theory of justice, and between the critical approach of a social theorist andthe moral approach of an individual. More precisely, the representatives of criticalsocial theory - beginning with Max Horkheimer and ending with Jiirgen Haberrnas- would like to "dissolve" ethics in critical social theory and find a commonnormative basis both for the critical attitude of a social theorist and the moral standpoint of an individual. The obliteration of this distinction leads to the conclusionthat the moral standpoint must already include the critical attitude towards socialreality, or that the critical attitude itself already has the value of a moral standpoint. This, in my opinion, is an unwarranted belief, and the critique ofKant thatis built on it overlooks certain implicit Kantian distinctions, or it at least suggestsintentions that Kant could not have had. The aim of the present paper is thus torefute - however incompletely - some of the criticisms levelled against Kant byMax Horkheimer and Jiirgen Habermas.As regards the problem discussed here, that is, the problem of obliterating thedistinction between the moral standpoint and the critical social attitude, the generallyemphasized differences between Horkheimer, seen as still embracing the paradigmof the philosophy of subject, and Habennas, understood as founding a new paradigmof communicative intersubjectivity, seem to be of only marginal importance. Whilestill perceiving the differences between these paradigms, especially those that arerelevant to the problem I am discussing here, I would, however, like to emphasizethose points common to Horkheimer's and Habermas's thinking which are connected with the postulate of identifying the critical-social and the moral point ofview. The analysis presented here will proceed in the following stages:Praxis International 10:1/2 April & July 1990 0260-8448 $2.00


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118 Praxis International1. the reconstruction of the characteristics of critical behaviour, as proposed by

Max Horkheimer;2. the presentation of the assumptions of Horkheimer's early critique of Kant(paying attention to additional arguments recently put forward by Benhabib);3. the selective presentation of the differences, and especially the similarities, inHorkheimer's and Habermas's thinking;4. the attempt at defending the Kantian position and the Kantian conception of

"universalization. "I

Characterizing the differences between the traditional and the critical theory,Horkheimer emphasizes the difference in attitude between a traditional and a socialtheorist. The difference lies thus not so much in the object as it does in the subject.The specific character of this position consists mainly in the fact that all facts andstates of affairs are perceived as human products "which in principle should beunder human control and, in the future at least, will in fact come under it". 2Looked at in this way, they "lose the character of pure factuality" .3 Ascribingto them the status of facts independent of the actions of social subjects is the resultof the tension which appears within the "relationships on which society isbuilt',.4 This tension permeates social reality in all its aspects, and manifests itselfas, for example, the opposition between an individual and the society, betweenthe individual's purposefulness, spontaneity, and the social dependencies treatedas natural and independent of the subjects, and also as the opposition between a"scientist" and a "citizen", i.e. the tension within the subject who then losesself-identity. The philosophy of this contradiction-laden social formation alsoreproduces and petrifies these oppositions, since an individual is granted autonomywhile at the same time he is forced to comply with universal laws which he findsincomprehensible.Critical activity is thus oriented at eliminating this tension, and establishing anew identity which will, however, only be possible when the "framework whichis conditioned by the blind interaction of individual activities" becomes "a functionwhich originates in human action and therefore is a possible object ofplanful decisionand rational determination of goals." 5 Until then, or as long as "men act asmembers of an organism which lacks reason", "reason cannot become transparentto itself." 6We might ask of Horkheimer how it is possible for the critical theory - whichclaims to be rational - to exist at all, since reality is contradiction-laden andirrational, and thus all thinking within it should in principle be burdened with thesame shortcomings. Horkheimer attempts to solve this problem in several differentways. He speaks about the possibility and necessity of changing thinking itselfand of changing its role, or more precisely, about the necessity of changing thethinking about thought. Critical thinking cannot perceive itself' 'in a detachedlydepartmentalized" way, but it should "become aware of its own proper function" .7 This is possible because thinking is an element of the social work process,which has a certain telos. Grasping this, thinking reveals its own function. It mustonly direct itselfat concrete historical circumstances, and it will reveal perspectives

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Praxis International 119which objectively reveal the tensions and contradictions within the then existingsociety. According to Horkheimer, the idea in whose light we can see the truthabout social reality, is "the idea of a reasonable organization of society that willmeet the needs of the whole community", which is "immanent in humanwork" .8In connection with the problem discussed here, I would like to point out thedouble status of this "whole" (AIIgemeinheit). On the one hand, this refers toa concrete society in specific historical circumstances. On the other hand, however,critical thinking transcends that concrete world, which includes empirical individualsand their consciousness. Critical thinking, or critical theory "does not labor inthe service of an existing reality but only gives voice to the mystery of thatreality. "9 The truth about existing reality is not suprahistorical truth, and yet itdoes not come from empirical subjects. According to Horkheimer, "critical thinkingis the function neither of the isolated individual nor of a sum-total of individuals. " 10 Thus critical thinking depends neither on a suprahistorical idea nor onthe historical consciousness of individual subjects. The generality referred to bythe critical theory is therefore located somewhere between what is concrete andwhat is universal. It seems to be the result of both.The elements ofHorkheimer's conception of critical behaviour and critical theorythat are particularly relevant to the problem discussed here, are the following:(a) the belief that a critical attitude is one that negates the factuality of existingreality and that sees in it human products which potentially can and in the futurewill be shaped according to the aims and intentions of the members of society;Cb) the conviction that rationality is only realized in the social dimension and thusthat only the social totality can be really rational: not until such totality exists,

can the behaviour of individuals be defined as rational, or the identity of theseindividuals be established;(c) the thesis that the critical attitude arises from and is the articulation of the tensionbetween the truth contained in concrete reality, however hidden or distorted,and the affirmative thinking about that reality. It must also be emphasized,that for Horkheimer,(d) the concept of reason is identical with the concept of social justice: "the criticaltheory has no specific influence on its side, except concern for the abolitionof social injustice. This negative formulation, ifwe wish to express it abstractly,is the materialist content of the idealist concept of reason." 11

The basic elements of Horkheimer' s thinking, explicitly formulated within theframework of the conception of "critical activity", can already be seen in his earliercritique of Kantian ethics.11

Particularly important is Horkheimer's perception ofKant's ethics as an expressionof the contradictions within the historical period or the social formation in whichit originated. Such an approach, directed at finding the "objective sense" of somephilosophical conceptions, is bound to lead to the discovery that they have anideological-affirmative character. This is also true in the case of young Horkheimer's


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120 Praxis Internationalcritique of Kantian ethics. "The fact that everybody obeys his conscience doesnot eliminate chaos or the poverty that it gives rise to. The formal requirementto be at peace with oneself and to keep one's mind free of contradictions, doesnot give any directions about how to eliminate the source of moral unrest. ( . . . )The belief that good will - however strong its impulse - is the only good, andevaluating actions only with regard to their intentions, and not with regard to theirreal significance in a given historical moment, is an idealistic illusion. From thisideological aspect of the Kantian conception of morality, it is only a short wayto the moralist mysticism of sacrifice and obedience . . . The tendency prevailingin bourgeois morality to ascribe value exclusively to conscience, turns out to be- especially in the present times - a hindrance to progress. In the face ofprevalentpoverty, not just the sense of obligation, enthusiasm or sacrifice, but the senseof obligation, enthusiasm or sacrifice serving a purpose determines the fate ofmankind. The will of a man ready for sacrifice may undoubtedly become an effectiveinstrument in the service of any power, including a reactionary one. The constellation of the content ofwill and the development of the society as a whole is definednot by conscience, but by the right theory." 12Moral value is thus ascribed to the right theory, or the critical social theoryput forward by Horkheimer four years later, rather than to the conscience-directedactions of an individual; moral activity itselfwill only be possible in a future societywhich eliminates poverty and shapes its reality in a rational manner, that is,purposefully, systematically and consciously (in a society which will take controlof itself). "If people wish to act in such a way that their maxim could becomea general law, then they must establish such order in which this wish would notbe so problematic as it is in the cases described by Kant, but would be truly basedon criteria. Society must then be shaped in such a way as will allow it to establishits interests - i. e. the interests of all its members - in a rational way." 13According to this diagnosis, the moral point of view can only be adopted whenreality is rid of the discrepancy between' 'individual activity" and public welfare.So long as this discrepancy is not eliminated, individuals will not be able to understand how the particular and the generalmay be mediated. In Horkheimer's opinion,philosophy, including the moral philosophy ofKant, is likewise mistaken in leavingthe question of that mediation for the individual's practical reason to solve. Onlycritical social theory can solve this problem and help eliminate the discrepancyby contributing to social change.Two further objections to Kantian ethics, true to the spirit of Horkheimer'sreflections but made already from the perspective of Jiirgen Habermas's theoryof communicative rationality, were raised by Benhabib. 14 She maintains thatKantian ethics suffers from a "dogmatic narrowing of the concept ofmoral reflection' '. She believes this is manifested in Kant's abstracting both from "concreteidentity of individuals" and from "concrete situations ofmoral behaviour". "Moralreflection is", Benhabib claims in partial reference to Horkheimer's postulate ofbasing upon historical facts, "the capacity for critical consideration of the givenprinciples of behaviour, taking into account contextual differences." 15 In heropinion, this dogmatic narrowing of the concept ofmoral reflection is also connectedwith the fact that Kant "identifies the standpoint of social generality with lawfulness(Gesetzmassigkeit)", and therefore "neglects the mediation between I and we,


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Praxis International 121and thus the question of how I, as a concrete individual, can bring my point ofview into agreement with the point of view of other subjects." 16The above objections cannot be left without comment. On the one hand, these

objections reveal the problem of the centre of attention of critical social theoristsand show what conception of generality they have in mind. This problem is thequestion ofmediation between the concrete and the universal. The conception ofgenerality would be just such a mediating term that is neither too concrete nortoo universal. It is the ambiguous status of the concept of generality that I believeto be the source of the difficulties and obscurity of Habermas's conception ofdiscourse ethics. This is the reason why Habermas constantly oscillates betweenthe conception of ideal and the conception of real communicative community, asthe instance to which discourse ethics refers. On the other hand, Benhabib'sobjections to Kant may also reveal the mechanism of misunderstandings andmisinterpretations of this critique of Kant. The question posed by Benhabib isobviously not a Kantian question, at any rate not a question ofhis moral philosophy,narrowly understood. There, an individual does not relate directly to other subjectsin their concrete identity, but to something universal. Moreover, Kant is notconcerned with reaching a compromise between the universal (Le. moral law) andthe concrete (i.e. a finite human being with concrete needs). Before one chargesKant with ignoring the question of the mediation between "I" and other subjects,one should first think about the reasons for this omission.

I I IAs to the question of differences and basic similarities between the positions

of Horkheimer and Habermas, I should point out that this comparison is highlyselective, although the similarity which will be discussed below concerns the vitalquestion of preserving the specific character of the moral dimension.Let us begin with the differences. Regarding Horkheimer's thesis about the futurepossibility of a fully conscious and planned shaping of social reality and itstransparency for all members of society from the perspective of the two-stageconception of society laid out in Habermas's Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns,we find that it is the occasional optimism of Horkheimer, and also that ofMarxand of an earlier Habermas himself that has turned out to be an "idealistic illusion" .Because of functional-systemic imperatives, social subsystems must functionindependently of the intentions and subjective goals of social subjects. Their functioning must then be perceived by individuals as the result of natural forces.Habermas's conception of "lifeworld" introduced by him into critical social theorymust also contribute to diminishing the optimism, since the social world is seenhere as always only partly transparent. In short, in Habermas's version of criticalsocial theory, social reality possesses a certain degree of factuality, and consequentlythe conditions in which an individual acts are contingent to him to the same degree.Thus the conditions in which morality becomes possible and necessary are partlypreserved; alternatively, we could say, in accord with Horkheimer's earlier conception, that in these conditions, morality cannot be realized so as to become

unnecessary.Unlike Horkheimer, Habermas does not make a simplistic assumption that an


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122 Praxis Internationalidentical' 'I" may only be formed in a harmonious society. Quite rightly, Habennasdoes not make such a large leap from a global diagnosis of the condition of societyto diagnosis of the condition of the individual as Horkheimer does. Socializationprocesses are conditioned not only by macro-social factors, but largely by microsocial factors (such as family or peer group). That is why the formation of theidentical' '1" in Habermas 's conception is not what will only be possible in futuresociety; it is already possible in the existing historical circumstances.The above differences between the position of Habermas and that taken byHorkheimer in his early works, are connected with a different attitude towardsreality. Habermas's evaluation of reality is essentially more affirmative and notso dramatic as Horkheimer's.The most important question, however, as regards the present discussion is thebelief shared by Horkheimer and Habermas that rationality is only ascribed to socialreality, and consequently, so is generality which is referred to both by Horkheimer'scritical social theorist and Habermas's discourse participant. Locating rationalityand generality in the social dimension must, I believe, lead to the rejection of theKantian conception of moral subject, and to transforming the question of moralbehaviour into the question of moral justice. In this respect, the positions ofHorkheimer and Habermas do not differ significantly. Habermas programmaticallyaims at eliminating "the dichotomy between internal and external morality." 18The proportion of similarity and difference between the positions of Habermasand Horkheimer changes somehow when we take into account Horkheimer's latertexts, written at the time when the idea of "critical social theory" from the latethirties was subordinated to what Horkheimer believed was the primary task ofcritical social philosophy, namely the criticism of instrumental reason. The motivesbehind Habermas' s criticism ofHorkheimer' s critique of instrumental reason arewell known and well-justified. 19 The pessimistic conclusion at which Horkheimerand Adorno arrive in their analysis of moral consequences of the process ofenlightenment,20 must have been particularly objectionable. These consequenceswere openly and radically drawn by Sade and Nietzsche, who "have not postulatedthat formalistic reason is more closely allied to morality than to immorality." 21The authors of The Dialectic ofEnlightenment felt compelled, somewhat resignedly,to admit that Nietzsche was right and to accept the thesis about' 'the impossibility

of deriving from reason any fundamental argument against murder". 22 Thisrenouncement of morality, according to Habermas, has its source in the narrowand false conception of reason employed in The Dialectic ofEnlightenment. Thereduction of reason to instrumental reason allegedly devoids moral values of allrational foundations.Habermas is also dissatisfied with the attempt at staving off the above consequences by restituting the concept of objective reason,23 as well as with theattempts at placing it within the tradition of grand philosophy or in the mimeticallyaccessible content of language,24 or else in "unconscious recollections." 25 Thevery construction which Horkheimer builds to provide some support in the battleagainst moral nihilism is rejected by Habermas as ineffective. The oppositionbetween subjective and objective reason, which Horkheimer believes is alwayspresent in history, appears within the paradigmwhose' 'hard core" is the differentiation between "spirit" and "nature", between subject and object. Habermas


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Praxis International 123claims that within the frame of such paradigm, in the present post-metaphysicalage, the rational character of morality is untenable. Hence his desire to build anew paradigm, whose core elements are the relations between subjects, the paradigmaccording to which rationality is realized in intersubjectivity, or more precisely,in linguistic communication.Let us look again at the similarities and differences between the position of thelate Horkheimer, (Horkheimer from the period of the critique of instrumentalreason), and the position of Habermas, this time, however, from an unusualperspective, (examining Habermas's position from the point of view of lateHorkheimer). We shall not be interested in the difference between their respectiveparadigms, but rather in the question of how morality is understood and whetherit is possible to distinguish it from other value systems.To begin with, however, let us point out that Horkheimer's position as outlinedin the Kritik der lnstrumentellen Vernunft modifies his earlier views. He does notreassert (although he does not discard) his earlier claim that morality is possibleonly in a radically restructured society, and that the idea of moral order may bederived from the existing (though in time to be eliminated) work-process relations.Horkheimer's position is not clear, in that on the one hand he allows for the possibility of individual access to the contents of practical reason handed down bytradition, and of an individual being guided by it in concrete life situations, andon the other hand he sees these concrete situations, which are a real moral challengeto the individual, as "segments of reality" which lose their moral validity whenhe is dealing with "more general structures" which need "different norms ofbehaviour" .26 It can thus be said that although Horkheimer leaves room formorality as an indicator of the right course of action in individual cases, at thesame time he gives priority to a critical social attitude.The change of attitude towards morality is probably connectedwith Horkheimer'saltered perception of such products of the intellect as philosophy, political thought,and social theory, which are no longer treated as ideological adulterations of thetruth about reality, or as a distorted picture of the contradictions existing in thatreality; in Horkheimer's altered view, those products express some universal truthsand the contents of objective reason.Presenting the process of the destruction of objective reason which found itsfullest expression in religious and metaphysical systems, and of its supersessionby subjective reason, Horkheimer turns against the subjectivization of reason, whichfor him is identical with its formalization. "The formalization of reason hasfar-reaching theoretical and practical consequences. If the subjectivist position iscorrect, thought cannot help in determining the validity of a goal. The affirmationof ideals, the criteria for our behaviour and convictions, the principles of ethicsand politics, all our final solutions are dependent on factors other than reason. "27This reason, whose reign cannot be restored, but whose traces Horkheimer wouldlike to save from complete eradication, is the reason that was once the organ of, 'grasping the true nature of things and establishing the leading principles of ourlife".28 The content of this reason can still be read, according to Horkheimer" inthe words that have not yet been ousted out of our still more formalized and functionalized language. Therefore, "philosophy must become more sensitive to thetacit testimony of language and penetrate the layers of experience that are thus


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124 Praxis Internationalrevealed. Each language is a spiritual substance expressing forms of thought andstructures of belief rooted in the past of the nation that uses it." 29 Thephilosopher cannot, however, trust popular images and fixed usage, but is to bringto light the forgotten meanings of such formalized concepts as good, justice, dignityor democracy; and "the guiding principle is the word with its half-forgotten layersof meaning and association." 30The two motifs ofHorkheimer's reflections discussed above are directly relevantto Habermas's conceptions. Bearing them in mind, we may attempt an evaluationof Habermas's position from Horkheimer's perspective. However hard it wouldbe to agree fully with the emerging reflection that Habermas' s discourse principleis the evidence of the formalization and subjectivization of reason criticized byHorkheimer, Habermas's reasoning undoubtedly goes in the direction oppositeto that which had been laid down by the author of the Kritik der InstrumentellenVernunft. Taking Kant's position as the point of reference (which is justified bythe fact that in Kantian conception, metaphysical content of practical reason andformalistic construction of that reason co-exist on equal terms), we find that theconception of discourse and of ethics relying on formal rules of argumentationis doubtless on its way to the formalization of reason, while at the same timepreserving its objectivistic claims. 31 There, content-filled ideas of good, justice,respect for others or dignity disappear. The idea of good present in Kantian ethicsand which plays the key role for him now seems to give way to the formally definedidea of justice. Habermas believes that the content of this and of other ideas ofpractical reason is not lost, since the formal principle of discourse fills with thiscontent when the stage is taken by concrete subjects - the discourse participants,who bring into the discourse and put to the argumentative test their needs, interestsand value preferences. However, the last instance is the formally defined consensus.It is doubtful, though, whether a consensus (arrived at either in the real or theideal conditions of communication)may be an adequate criterion in deciding whethera goal is valid or not. The formal criterion introduced by Habermas of determiningthe validity of goals, is more formal than the Kantian criterion..Although inKant'sconception, the form of a maxim was to determine its capacity for becoming amoral law, this formalism was complemented by the idea of absolute good, orgood will. This good will is the metaphysical complement of the "form of lawfulness(Form der Gesetzmassigkeit)" 32 and an element that makes possible the transitionto the concrete content of human desires. Habermas's consensus is s o m e h o ~ ' externalto the goals of concrete subjects; in other words, it lacks connection with the needs,interests or value preferences of the subjects. The Kantian criterion of the' 'formof lawfulness" is, however, internally connected, through the conception of "goodwill' , , with the content-filled needs and preferences. Good will is simply just oneof the forms of human will (though a specific one). The idea of a consensus,however, conceived as an equivalent ofKant's supreme moral maxim, lacks similarconnection with the content-filled needs and preferences of an individual. In myopinion, Habennas's formalism is in this sense much more far-reaching thanKantianformalism, while Horkheimer's position seems to be going back to pre-Kantianconceptions. That is why one may justifiably claim that just as Horkheimer seenfrom Habermas' s perspective wants to turn the process of rationalization back topre-Kantian metaphysics, Habermas seen from Horkheimer's perspective tends


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Praxis International 125towards the formalization of reason and even goes further than the Kantianformalization; he would like to rid this reason of all metaphysical remains.The other motif of Horkheimer's reflections in the Kritik der InstrumentellenVemunft which also makes visible the difference between Horkheimer's andHabermas's positions, is the question of language. It is not surprising thatHorkheimer did not take into account the findings of analytical philosophy oflanguage and could not appreciate the importance of the speech act theory whichHabennas bases himself on. However, the approach to languageofboth these criticalsocial theorists reveals an essential difference in philosophical positions which hasfar-reaching consequences. In Habermas's theory, language is primarily a mediumof communication, and this largely (though not exclusively) instrumental functioncomes into the foreground. In Horkheimer's theory, language primarily refers tothe Truth, and its multiple layers of meaning reveal, or rather conceal, somemetaphysical reality which cannot be reduced to language or restricted to the contextof linguistic communication. It does not only (or does not primarily) regulate socialinteractions, but it also conveys unconscious or forgotten "spiritual" content.This spiritual content, according to Horkheimer, also lies at the foundation of,for example, the idea of democracy, and the founders ofmodern democracy "didnot accept any principle whose authority did not come from a metaphysical orreligious source." 33 Depriving political ideas of this spiritual background (theformalization of these ideas) is for Horkheimer tantamount to depriving them oftheir political character. Though not in the same way, and not using the sameexpressions, but with the same intention, Habermas too opposes the formalization of the principle of legitimation, which leads to authoritarian legalism: "Derautoritare Legalismus verleugnet die humane Substanz des Nicht-Eindeutigen genaudort, wo der demokratische Rechtsstaat van dieser Substanz zehrt. " 34 The abovestatement at the close of Habermas's defence of the idea of "civil disobedience"may probably be also read as cryptic defence of the relevance of this spiritual ormetaphysical background which Horkheimer speaks about. It is, however, difficultto reconcile this defence with the formalistic construction of the idea of democracy,and with Habermas's generally anti-metaphysical standpoint.Let me, however, return to the main concerns of this paper and to the beliefshared by Horkheimer and Habermas that it is possible to eliminate the distinctionbetween internal morality and external morality, between ethics and a theory ofjustice.

IVHabermas hoped that the above dichotomy could be eliminated if we could find- following in Hegel's footsteps - the genesis of all generality in the relationshipbetween Ego and Alter. However, I believe that the generality which emergesat that point must be, and should be, understood in two ways: either as the generalitywhich may be referred to by the principle of justice, or as the universality referred

to by moral behaviour. This distinction corresponds to the Kantian distinctionbetween the empirical and the intelligible dimensions: between the domain of ourfiniteness and the dimension in which human desire for infinity, the capacity fortranscending this finiteness, expresses itself.


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126 Praxis InternationalThe above distinction in the understanding of the concept of generality is onlypossible when we distinguish between the question of the genesis of generality andthe question of the possible forms of its existence. In accordance with Habermas's

viewpoint, we should assume that this idea exists and has significance only whereit originates, i.e. in the interaction between Ego and Alter. Yet, Habermas himselfobserves that such interaction also produces' 'ein Neuter" , which is neither a sumnor a dialectical relationship between Ego and Alter, but something still different- perhaps this perspective of universality. The carrier of this universality (andat the same time the subject who has access to it) must nevertheless be an individual.Discourse, as well as all linguistic interaction, may contribute to the formationof that perspective, or rather of the ability to take that perspective, but it is theperspective transcending the bounded horizon of intercommunicating subjects. Intheir interactions, the subjects are bound by their needs, interests and inclinations;otherwise there would be no discourse but a "communio angelis", and the discoursewould be unnecessary. The situation is different when the finite subject confrontsa possible perspective of universality. In this confrontation, the moral calling ofman is realized, and he is constituted as a moral subject. That is why the intersubjective dimension is where the idea of justice is realized, while 'the realizationof the idea of being a moral subject takes place in the intrasubjective dimension.The difference between these two dimensions (and thus between the principle ofjustice and the moral principle) comes out of the different character of theconfrontation between the subjects in the intersubjective and the intrasubjectivedimension. The former is where at least two finite subjects confront each other;the latter, where the finite subject confronts the subject taking the perspective ofinfinity or universality. Naturally, in both cases we are dealing with generality,although in the first case it is the generality limited to mankind (in the sense ofthe total number of people); in the second case, another form of generality universality-transcends this limitation and represents the viewpoint of humanity.Of course, the latter conception of generality should not be understood as theviewpoint which the individual can fully identify with. He would then take thestandpoint of an ideal objective observer. Despite his limitations, however, he maybe taking this as his goal, especially when he knows that the moral challengeposed by a concrete situation in which he acts cannot be met, and the expectationswhich one may normally cherish towards another person cannot be fulfilled inthat specific situation. Trying to take the standpoint of an ideal subject, theempirical subject does not behave monologically, as it might seem, but enters intoa dialogue with the ideal subject. Neither does he lose his concrete identity. heonly transcends his empirical limitations, and in this way he also shapes his identity.Only in this confrontation can an unconditional imperative appear. In the area ofthe confrontation between empirical subjects, only conditional imperatives can beformulated.The proposed differentiation between the two interpretations of the concept ofgenerality allows us to avoid the dangers of taking the perspective of universality

when dealing with the questions pertaining to the intersubjective domain (i.e. thedomain in which the principle of justice is primarily realized). Adopting thisperspective in such cases may result in terror or attempts to make people happyagainst their will, as there then appears a dangerous tendency to realize a utopia.


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Praxis International 127If such danger is eliminated, we shall be able to show tolerance, accept otherstogether with their shortcomings, needs and weaknesses.Thanks to the separation of these two perspectives, the problems undergoinginstitutional regulation (above all, those regulated by the law) are set apart from

those which cannot be regulated in this way. Naturally, this does not mean thatthe separation of these two types of questions is easy and uncontroversial. Despitethe obvious difficulties that must arise in connection with concrete cases, (e.g.the question of the admissible degree of justifying family relationships, obligationstowards other people, or the question of euthanasia), I believe this separation isnecessary; and the attempts to eliminate the difference between "private morality"and' 'public morality" are motivated by an ill-conceived idea of establishing some"average", or a resultant, between human particularism and equally human universalism. In my opinion, we should give these two attributes of human conditiontheir due by differentiating between them and keeping their specific character.In this way we shall preserve the human right to behave not according to theexpectations of others, but according to the idea of dignity; we shall preserve thechance to be moral, the chance to behave morally even (or particularly) in thecircumstances which in Horkheimer's opinion would make being moral impossibleor nonsensical. Adopting the view proposed above, we would also reject Haberrnas'sclaim that "Selbstachtung erfordert gegenseitige Achtung." 35 In fact, the reverseis true: it is the mutual respect that requires self-respect. At least this is how thisrelation looks like in the domain of the strictly moral use of practical reason.Claiming that I can accept myself only when I am respected by others, Habermasunderstands these "others" not as empirical subjects, but rather as ideal subjects,as only they would be capable of behaving in such a way as to merit absolute respect.If, however, "the other" is an empirical subject, it may happen that I could beexempted from carrying out my duty when "the other" does not fulfil his duty.Habermas accepts this conclusion when he conceives "the other" as an empiricalsubject: "no one can fulfil his duties without the reciprocal expectation that otherswill fulfil theirs". 36 Such conception of duty is congruous with contractarianconceptions which Habermas, as a matter of fact, rejects. It is, however, quiteincompatible with Kantian moral philosophy. One is also reminded ofHorkheimer'searlier belief (expressed in somewhat different form) that moral behaviour isimpossible or absurd in immoral reality.The differentiation, following in the footsteps of Kantian thought, which I amdefending here, will hopefully provide support for the thesis that a man can demand

more of himself than he has the right to demand from others or from social reality.His critical impulse, i.e. the normative claims directed at social reality must bemore moderate and take into account human imperfection, a tendency to instrumentalize their actions, and so on. He can, however, demand more of himself,set high standards for his behaviour, even though he knows that the world in whichhe has to live cannot come up to these standards, and the desire to realize suchan ideal world could even be dangerous.Another conclusion that could be drawn from the proposed differentiation would

pertain to the question of the continuity of an identical subject, a unique individual.Ego-identity is constituted not only in relations with others (in interactions), butalso in self-reflective intrapersonal relationships, where the subject is able to look


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128 Praxis Internationalat himself not only from the other's perspective, but also from the perspectiveof an ideal, rational human being; to give up his vital interests (even give his life)in the name of being moral.This aspect of being a moral subject is also overlooked by Habermas in hisrecently formulated differentiation of the use of practical reason. In his paper"Individual Will Formation in Terms of What is Expedient, What is Good andWhat is Just", Habermas distinguishes between three different uses of practicalreason: its pragmatic use, its critical use and its moral use. Each of these usescorresponds to a different type of discourse, and in each, there is a different relationobtaining between reason and will. This distinction, unlike the distinction whichI have proposed above, is to some extent evaluative. Practical reason in its pragmaticuse is oriented at finding means for the realization of the given preferences ofthe subject. In the context of the present remarks, we should pay more attentionto the other two ways of using reason. To give their short characteristics, onemight say that in the ethical aspect reason serves as the medium of reaching' 'selfunderstanding" (as well as the conscious shaping of one's biography), while inthe moral aspect, it serves to regulate interpersonal conflicts "that arise fromopposing interests" .37 The lower value of the use of reason in the ethical aspectcomes from the fact that the "ethical issues do not require a complete break withan egocentric perspective; they refer, after all, to the telos of one's own life." 38The ethical use of practical reason is oriented at shaping one's identity, and inspite of the fact that the potential participants in this process are other membersof one's "lifeworld", what directs the reason is one's own "good and happylife" .39 Only in the moral use are other subjects and their interests taken intoaccount, and what directs the practical reason is the collective will formation.Though Habermas' s distinctions resemble the earlier distinctions between whatis ethically good and what is just, they curiously reduce the ethical question towhat is good for a particular subject, and interpret the moral question as the questionof the collective welfare. Thus, the difference between what is moral (in the sensein which I have been using this term) and what is just is obliterated. This is connectedwith the pragmatic limitation of the idea of good, and with interpreting good assomething which is good as regards the organization of individual life course orthe interests of all the members of the community. In both cases, however, thepoint of reference is the generality restricted to the particular subject's ownbiography or to the interests of all concerned subjects. Naturally, the generalitywhose carrier is a community has a wider range. The transition from the ethicalto the moral aspect of the use of reason is not, however, the transition to a differentquality, since Habermas's idea of good and the generality to which this idea isrelative are characterized by similar limitations. This is why the starting point forbuilding the conception which would preserve the distinction between what isethically good and what is just should be the differentiation within the conceptof generality itself. Then the use of reason in its ethical aspect, the shaping ofone's biography which Horkheimer postulated as a goal, will also be different.It will not only be a desire to realize a particular idea of a good and happy lifebut shaping one's biography will mean being capable of deciding which life situationsrequire the ethical and which ones the moral use of practical reason, and also whento take the limited generality as the point of reference and act according to the


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Praxis International 129expectations of empirical subjects (including oneself), and when to take the unlimitedgenerality as the point of reference and act according to the expectations of anideal, rational moral subject.The arguments for the separation of the two aspects of the concept ofgenerality,and consequently the two senses of the principle of universalization, in my opinionalso warrant the necessity of preserving the distinction between the "criticalapproach" to the problems of social reality, and the individual's ethical behaviourin concrete situations which are a moral challenge for this individual.Of course, the moral actor cannot entertain the illusion that his concrete actcontributes to the realization of moral order, or even social justice. Neither cana social critic or reformer, however, imagine that through his activity he achievesthe status of a moral subject.

NOTES1. J. Habermas, "Diskursethik - Notizen zu einem Begriindungsprogramm," inMoralbewu.f3tseinund kommunikatives Handeln (Frankfurt a.M.: 1983), pp. 53-126; S. Benhabib, "Zur Dialektikvon Gliick und Vemunft. Max Horkheimers friihe Moralphilosophie, " inA. Honneth and A. Wellmer,ed., Die Frankfurter Schule und die Folgen (Berlin-New York: 1986), pp. 128-138.2. M. Horkheimer, "Traditional and Critical Theory", in Critical Theory. SelectedEssays, (NewYork),209.3. Horkheimer, "Traditional and Critical Theory."4. Horkheimer, "Traditional and Critical Theory," p. 210.5. Horkheimer, "Traditional and Critical Theory," p. 207. In the original version of this articlepublished in the Zeitschriftftlr Sozialforschung (1937 Val. VI, No. 2) Horkheimer uses the expression"Klassenherschaft" which he himself only later changed into "gesellschaftlichen Unrecht" ("theabolition of social injustice' ').6. Horkheimer, "Traditional and Critical Theory," p. 208.7. Horkheimer, "Traditional and Critical Theory," p. 212.8. Horkheimer, "Traditional and Critical Theory," p. 213.9. Horkheimer, "Traditional and Critical Theory," p.217.10. Horkheimer, "Traditional and Critical Theory," p. 210-1l.11. Horkheimer, "Traditional and Critical Theory," p. 242. See also note 5 above.12 .M. Horkheimer, "Materialismus und Moral," Zeitschriftfar Sozialforschung 1933, Vol. 11,No. 2, p. 171. Translation by A. Kwiatkowska.13. Horkheimer, "Materialismus und Moral."14. S. Benhabib, "Zur Dialektik von Gliick und Vernunft."15. Benhabib, "Zur Dialektik von Gliick und Vernunft."16. Benhabib, "Zur Dialektik von Gliick und Vernunft," p. 133.

17. 1. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Vol. 2. (Frankfurt a.M.: 1981), pp.171-293.18. 1. Habermas, Legitimationsproblems im Spatkapitalismus (Frankfurt a.M.: 1973) p. 122.19. Cf. J. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Vol 2., pp. 548-593.20. Th. W. Adorno and M. Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment London: Verso, 1986.21. Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 117.22. Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 118.23. M. Horkheimer: Zur Kritik der Instrumentellen Vemunft. Aus den Vortragen und AuJzeich-nungen seit Kriegsende, ed. Alfred Schmidt, (Frankfurt a.M.: 1967).24. Horkheimer, Zur Kritik der Instrumentellen Vemunft, p. 156.25. Horkheimer, Zur Kritik der Instrumentellen Vemunft, p. 40.26. Horkheimer, Zur Kritik der Instrumentellen Vemunft, p. 22.27. Horkheimer, Zur Kritik der Instrumentellen Vemunft, p. 19.


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130 Praxis International28. Horkheimer, Zur Kritik der Instrumentellen Vernunjt, p. 27.29. Horkheimer, Zur Kritik der Instrumentellen Vernunjt, pp. 155-56.30. Horkheimer, Zur Kritik der Instrumentellen Vernunjt, p. 156.31. This tendency towards formalization of practical reason in Habermas' conception has also

been pointed out by Albrecht Wellmer, Ethik und Dialog. Elemente des moralischen Urteils belKant un in der Diskursethik (Frankfurt a.M.: 1986).32. I. Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunjt, Ak. Ausgabe, Vol. 5, p. 25.33. M. Horkheimer, Zur Kritik der instrumentellen Vemunjt, p. 38.34. J. Habermas, "Ziviler Ungehorsam - Testfall rur den demokratischen Rechtsstaat," in DieNeue Unubersichtlichkeit (Frankfurt a.M. 1985), pp. 97-8.35. This view has been formulated expressis verbis in "ErHiuterungen zur Diskursethik" (mimeographed article - unrevised and carrying the author's note "zitierunfahig" p. 31). It fits in withHabermas' earlier views.36. "ErHiuterungen zur Diskursethik," p. 29.37. J. Habermas, "Individual Will Formation In Terms of What is Expedient, What is Goodand What is Just," (mimeographed article) p. 7.38. Habermas, "Individual Will Formation,"39. Habermas, "Individual Will Formation," p. 6.

1.99 - kaniowsky, andrzej m. - critical activity and ethics. the problem of generalization (en)

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