1983 the three world theory and post-mao china's global strategy

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The Three World Theory and Post-Mao China's Global StrategyAuthor(s): Herbert S. YeeReviewed work(s):Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 59, No. 2(Spring, 1983), pp. 239-249

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TheThreeWorld heoryndpost-Mao hina'sglobal trategy

HERBERT S. YEE*

After he Soviet invasion of Afghanistann December 1979, China in its alarmturned ncreasinglyo theWest, in particular o theUnited States.The Chinesequest for modernization lso pushedBeijingevercloserto the industrial tates,while its muchpublicizedrelationswith ThirdWorld countrieswere neglected.Since thistime,the ThreeWorld theoryhas rarelybeen mentionedby Chineseofficials.However, the more recent eteriorationn Sino-American elations, uepartly o disputes verWashington'srms ales toTaiwan,andthereappearancenthe official hinesepressof criticism irected gainstboth superpowers s hege-monists,have promptedChina-watcherso speculatethatBeijing s reviving hetheory ftheThreeWorlds. Nothingcould be furtherrom hetruth. he coolingofBeijing'sattitude owardWashington otonlydoes not indicate heresurgenceof theThreeWorld theory,tsignals learly policyshift ntheoppositedirection.This article rguesas its central hesis hatnotwithstandingheextreme lexibilityoftheThreeWorldtheory, hangesn the nternationalnvironmentndinChina'sdomesticpoliticaldevelopment ave shatteredtsbasic tenets.The once celebrated

unitedfront trategy as beengreatly nderminedn Beijing'spolicycalculations;China is feelingtsway towardan integrated oreign olicy emphasizing riendlyor at leastworking elationswith ll countries.

The united ront nd theThreeWorld heoryIn his first ppearanceat theUnited Nations in April 1974,Vice-Premier engXiaoping drew world-wideattentionwith his speech differentiatinghe threepoliticalforces n internationalolitics.The now famous ThreeWorld' theory,though ccredited o Mao Zedong by theChinese leaders,was firstmostclearly

and explicitly resented y Deng in thisUN speech.1The conceptpostulated hatthetwo superpowers, heUnitedStates ndtheSovietUnion, constituted he FirstWorld; thedeveloping ountriesnAsia, Africa, atin America nd otherregionstogether ormed heThirdWorld; and thedevelopedcountries etween the twomadeup theSecond World.2Deng declared ehementlyhatChinabelonged o theThirdWorld. This view of world order ubsequently ecame standard hetoricn

Dr Yee is Assistant rofessor f nternational elations tthe nternational hristian niversitynMitaka,Tokyo.

1. Deng's speechwas made on 9 April1974 at the Sixth pecial Session of theUN GeneralAssemnbly

(convenedto studytheproblemsof rawmaterials nd development). eng was the Chairmanof theChinesedelegation. or the full ext f hisspeech nEnglish ee theSupplementoPekingReview, No.15, 12 April 1974. The Chinese leadership sserted hat t was Mao who first ormulatedheThreeWorldtheorynhis talkwiththe eaderof a Third Worldcountryn February 974.The unidentifiedleader was probablyPresidentK. D. Kaunda of the Republic of Zambia, who had an interviewwithMao on theafternoon f22 February 974.

2. It is interestingo note that he socialist ountries' ther han he SovietUnion were not ncludedin the threeworlds'presented y Deng; neitherweretheymentioned yMao when he first ormulatedthe concept in February 1974. This was not simplyan oversight.Mao apparently ad difficultynplacingthe Sovietsatellite tates: to classify hem s a Soviet bloc would onlyadmitSoviet eadership

0020-5850/83/2/0239-1$3.00(?1983 International ffairs







240 THE THREE WORLD THEORY

Beijing'sforeign olicy statements. n 1 November1977 RenminRibao publisheda lengthy ocument ntitledChairmanMao's theory f the differentiationf theThreeWorlds s a majorcontributionoMarxism-Leninism'ndvowedto upholdMao's revolutionaryine n foreign olicy.3 The document eaffirmed ao's ThreeWorld theory s first rticulatedy Deng three nd a halfyears arlier nd stressedin particular he strategic imensions f the concept.

Centralto the Three Worldconcept s theunitedfront trategy,4hegenesisofwhichcanbe tracedbackto theearlyyearsof theChinese Communist artywhenit joined theNationalistParty n the1920sfor the commongoal of defeating heregional warlords. An anti-Japanese nited front ncluding he reactionary ndbourgeois lasses was advocatedbyMao at thebeginningfChina's anti-Japanesewar, anda similar trategy as againadoptedduring hina's civilwar. Mao insistedthattheChinese communistsmustperseveren a political ine of developing he

progressive orces, winningover the middle forces,and isolatingthe diehardforces'.5 he anti-Chiang ai-shekunited ront onstituted orkers, easants, ettybourgeoisieand national bourgeoisie.The last two categories,though to beliquidatedafter he civilwar,were regarded y Mao as essential lementsn thecoalitionfront.n short, he basicprinciple f a unitedfront trategy as 'not tostrikeout in all directions nd provoke too many oppositions'.6This strategyenabled the Chinese communists o win the warby concentratingheir fforts nattackingheChiang regime, heir hief nemy.

Mao's inclination o divideChina's socialandpolitical orces ntothree ategories

in his united front trategywas first ppliedto the internationalituationn hisconversation ithAmerican orrespondentnna Louise Strongn1946. Mao statedthatUnitedStates reactionaries' erestrivingo dominate heworld but that heirdrivewas haltedbytheSovietUnion,the progressive'ocialist tate nda 'defenderof worldpeace'. The UnitedStates nd theSovietUnion wereseparated y a vastzonewhich ncludedmany apitalist,olonial ndsemicolonial ountriesnEurope,Africa nd Asia-including China. BeforetheUnited Stateshad subjugated hese'middle one' countries,Mao stressed,n attack n theSovietUnionwas out ofthequestion.7Eighteenyears ater,Mao modifiedhis view of theworldorder n an

interview ithM.M. Ali of Zanzibaron 18June1964by dividing hemiddleforcesinto two categories: firstmiddlezone, comprising hedeveloping ountries fAsia,Africa ndLatinAmerica, nd a secondmiddle onemadeup ofthedeveloped

anddominationn the ommunistorld; oclassifyhemwith he econdWorld, n the ther and,wouldblur he deologicaline between hecapitalistndsocialist tates. he Chinese eaders atersolved he problem y declaringhat he internationalroletariats'f the socialist tates nd the'oppressed' eopleof thedevelopingountrieselongedo theThirdWorld. ee Chairman ao'stheoryf he ifferentiationf he hreeWorldssamajorontributiono Marxism-Leninism,'enminRibao, November977. n any ase,therole f the ocialisttates asonlymarginalnthePRC'sThreeWorld trategiconcept.

3. RenminRibao devoted he whole ssue six pages)of 1 November 977to thedocument,unprecedentednChina's oreignolicytatements.or he nglishersionf his ocumenteePekingReview, o. 45,4 November 977.

4. For a detailedccount f theoriginnd evolutionf Mao's united ront trategyee J. D.Armstrong,hineseoreignolicyndtheUnitedront octrineCalifornia:niversityfCaliforniaPress, 977);andL. P. VanSlyke, nemies ndFriends: heUnited rontn Chinese ommunistHistoryStanford:niversityfStanfordress, 967).

5. SelectedWorksfMao Zedong Chinese ersion,haractersnhorizontalrder; eijing, 952),Vol.4, p. 1154.

6.- electedWorksfMaoZedongBeijing,977),Vol.5, p. 23.7. SelectedWorksfMaoZedongBeijing, 952),Vol.4, pp. 1089-1091.







Herbert . Yee 241

countries romWestern urope plus Japan,Canada, Australia ndNew Zealand.8It is not difficulto see thatMao's two-middle one conceptwas the forerunnerfhis Three World theory: he firstmiddle zone has becomethe ThirdWorld, thesecond middle zone the SecondWorld; and thetwo contending uperpowers heFirstWorld.As inthe middle one' concept, heSecondand ThirdWorldcountrieswerethecentre f superpower ontention. he SovietUnion, ofcourse,was nowlabelled by Beijing as a 'social-imperialist'tate which had replaced the UnitedStates s the main threat o worldpeace. The essenceof Mao's ThreeWorldtheorywas to unitethe progressive' hirdWorldstates, o win over the middle'SecondWorldand to isolatethetwo reactionary' uperpowers.

At theoutset,Beijingthusengagedthe two superpowers, specially heSovietUnion, in a warof nerves. dentifyinghina as a member f the ThirdWorldthatformed hestrategic ase oftheunitedfront, eijinghad apparently ssigned tselfa leadership ole in the forefrontf defence' gainst uperpower xpansion.Howdid Mao and otherChineseleaderscalculate nd differentiateheworld'spoliticalforces?The Chinese themselves ave a straightnd direct nswer:therewas nohard and fastformula.9 he politicalforceswere delineated o meet the PRC'sstrategic equirementsf thetime, nd these n turnwere determinedy Chineseperceptionnd analysis f the overall ituation n theglobal system.n essence, heThree World theorywas a dynamic onceptwhichcould be modified nd adoptedto new situations y changing r shiftinghecomposition fpoliticalforces n the

'threeworlds'. The concept itselfwas therefore art of and an instrumentfBeijing's global strategy.

The three hases fpost-Mao oreign olicy

SinceDeng Xiaoping'shistorical N speech nd thepublication fRenminRibao'sarticle n theThreeWorldtheory, oth the nternationalnvironmentndChina'sdomesticpoliticshave undergone remendoushanges. n theregional nd inter-national rena,theunificationf thetwo Vietnamsn1975changed hebasicpowerstructure nd great power relations n the region. The US withdrawalfrom

Indochina signalledthe end of an era of direct.American nvolvement nd thebeginning fdiminishing S military resence.in heAsia-Pacific egion.Hiddendifferencesnd conflicts etween he Chinese and the Vietnamese e-emergedfterthe removal fthecommonUS militaryhreat. he Soviet nvolvementnthe 1975Angolan ivilwar,on theotherhand,marked heSovietUnion's increasingtrategic.offensive nd its ascendancyas a global power. Conflicts between China andVietnam xploded ntoa large-scale orderwar nFebruary 979 after ietnamhadinvadedKampucheaand installed pro-Hanoi regime n PhnomPenh. Finally,beforethe 1970s drew to a close, the world was surprised nd shockedby the

Soviet nvasionofAfghanistan.

8. Long Live Mao Zedong's Thought Beijing, 1969), p. 514. This volume of Mao's speeches andwritingswas collectedand circulatedn China during heCulturalRevolution. t was made availableoutside China byTaiwan. It is generally egarded s authentic y China scholars.For theauthenticityof the above document ee Stuart chram,Mao Tse-tung:A Self-Portrait', hina Quarterly,No. 57,Jan./March 974, pp. 156-65. On 21 January 964 RenminRibao published n editorial ividing heintermediateone into two zones, similar o thatpostulated y Mao six months ater.

9. 'ChairmanMao's Theory of the Differentiationf the Three Worlds ...' Renmin Ribao, 1November 1977.

INTER AFFS-4








On the domesticfront, hina recovered rom hecrisesofleadership uccessionafterMao's death n September 976 and overcame ther,natural,disasters n themid 1970s. It hastily aunched n ambitiousmodernization rogramme, iming ttransforming poor and backward economy into an industrial nd prosperous

Chinabythe end of thecentury.However, Beijing oon foundout that herewerenumerous obstacles confronting his new 'Long March' toward modernization.Politically, hereexisted a strongundercurrentf 'leftist' eeling,directedby afaction n the leadershipwhich insistedon a policy of upholding nd followingwhateverMao had said and conducted, nd opposed policyreformsntroduced ythemoderate action. conomically, eijingwas embarrassedyitsover-ambitiousmodernization rogrammend was forced o adopta morerealistic lan.

In the ight fchangingnternationalnd domestic nvironments,hen,how didtheChinese eadership alculatenewstrategiesndmodifyheThreeWorld theory?

We can distinguish hreephases of development ince the theory's nception n1974: first, ssertingMao's revolutionaryine nforeign olicy; second, uniting llanti-Soviet orcesncludingheUnitedStates; ndthird, mphasizing self-reliancestrategy.There is no clear-cutdividing ine between the different hases ofdevelopment.Roughly,the first haselasted from 974to 1978,thesecondphasebegan n late 1978 and enduredfor lightlymorethanone year,and thethird ndpresent hase beganto take hapeat thewake of theSoviet nvasion fAfghanistan.However, overlappings r concurrent ses of strategies erecommon n all threephasesofdevelopment.

In his 1974 UN speech Deng Xiaoping declared that: 'history develops instruggle,nd theworldadvances midst urbulence . . Countrieswant ndepend-ence,nationswant iberationndthepeoplewantrevolution-this s the rresistibletrend f history'.The Beijing eadersmaintain hatthePRC, beinga communiststate,would support the revolutionarytruggles f thecommunist artiesof allcountries'.10 hina also repeatedly ointedout, however, hat evolutionould notbe exported ndthat ll communist artieswere ndependentndshouldmaketheirowndecisions.This revolutionary'asis was thenreaffirmedyChinese eaders sBeijing'sofficial oreign olicy line in RenminRibao's 1977 article n theThree

Worlds.The policywas clearly imedatrallying hirdWorldsupport or tsglobalstrategies;t reiteratedhat the developing ountrieswere themain force n theinternationalnitedfront gainsthegemonism.

The reasonswhy Beijingtook thisrevolutionaryine in foreign olicy lie inChina's assessment f the global situation, ts perception f external hreat nddomesticChinesepolitics.After hebreakthroughsf theearly1970s when Chinasecureddiplomaticrelationswith numerousdevelopedand developing ountriesand established onnectionswith theUnitedStates,Beijing's diplomatic ffensivecameto a completehalt n themiddleof the decade.Littleprogress ad been made

innegotiationswithJapanfora peace and friendshipreaty ecauseof the atter'sobjectionto the anti-hegemony'lause aimed at the SovietUnion; negotiationswith theUnitedStateson formaldiplomatic inks were also deadlocked over theTaiwan issue. Meanwhile, Beijing watched hopelesslythe gradual shifting fVietnam nd India towards tsarch-rival.heSoviet Union and the atter'smilitaryand diplomatic gains in Angola and the Horn of Africa. Frustrations n the

10. See Hua Guofeng'sPoliticalReportto the 11thNationalCongresson 18August 1977:







Herbert . Yee 243

diplomaticfront pparently trengthenedhe radical hard-liners' emand for arevolutionaryinepolicy against ll reactionary' orces.

At the same time, a debate was apparentlygoing on among Beijing's top

leadership oncerning hina's defence trategies.1"arshalYe Jianyingn a speechmarking hefiftiethnniversaryf theestablishmentftheRed Army tressed heimportance f the people's war' in China's defence trategy. et Ye also pointedout theurgency fstrengtheninghina's defences, quipping tsarmies,navy andairforceswithmodern acilitiesncludingmissiles ndnuclearweapons. Ye's speechhighlightedhecontroversiesverChina'sdefence trategies.12nderstandably,hemilitary stablishmentrguedfor trongerefencesnd demanded hat op prioritybe accorded to the modernization f China's backward and poorly equippedmilitary orces.13Many Chinese eaders, ncluding ome from he top echelonsofthe military,however, disagreedand argued that the top priority hould bedeveloping hePRC's backward conomy.14

It is importanto note thatpracticallyll Chinese eadersrealizedthenecessityofmodernizing hina's defences, heydisagreedmerely n thetimingndurgencyof the modernization rocess. The debate on the timingwas closelyrelated toChineseleaders'perceptions f external hreat. he military ard-linerserceiveda distinctiveossibility fa future ino-Sovietwar, ncluding nuclear ttack romthe Russians.China, therefore,hey rgued,mustbe prepared orfightingll kindsof war againstthe USSR and accordinglymustmodernize ts defencesat fullspeed.15The moderates, n the otherhand,were inclined o believe that China's

presentdefenceswere formidable noughto deterthe SovietUnion and that f aSovietattackdid takeplace itwas likely o be a large-scale onventional ttack.16

11. Thedebate verChina's efencetrategiesas, fcourse, ersistedince he stablishmentf hecommunistegimen1949.For an excellentccountfthe ssues nvolvednthe ontroversialebatesee AliceLangleyHsieh,Communisthina's trategyn theNuclear ra (Westport,onnecticut:Greenwood,962).

12. For thefull ext f Ye's speech eeHongqi,No. 8, 1977. n July 975the Military ffairsCommissionMAC) of thePLA isued reportecommendinghe cquisitionfadvanced eaponssystemsorthePLA. Chief f Staff engXiaoping uggestedt an MAC meetinghatweaponsprocurementouldbe financedyreducingheChinese rmed orces.engwasbynomeans military

hard-liner,owever; isproposal asprimarilyimed tcounteringhe xtemeeftistolicies dvocatedby theradicaleadershipaction hich rotesquelyxaggeratedao's people'swar'strategynd theimportancefChina'smilitia orces.n any ase,theChinese eaders ailed oreach consensusnChina'smilitaryodernizationrogrammen the irst alf f 1977 ven fterhe ownfallf he adicalGangofFour. A series fmilitaryonferenceseld n Beijingn early 977merely eached omeagreementnpurchasinglimitedangefdefensiveeaponsromWesternources. oranaccountfthe 975MACmeetingsnd he ebates vermilitaryodernizationmong hineseeadershipactionsseeHarry arding,TheDomesticolitics fChina'sGlobal osture, 973-78,'nThomas ingar,d.,China'sQuest or ndependence:olicy volutionn the1970sBoulder, olorado:Westview,980),pp. 114-24.

13. AnarticlenHongqibytheTheoreticalroup fChina'sAcademyfMilitarycience eclaredthat hepolitical uturef a socialist hina,under hedictatorshipf theproletariats,epends nmodernizinghina'sdefence. uXiangqian,hina's efence inister,lsoargued hat hina houldlearn dvancedechnologyndexperienceromoreignountries.eeHongqi,No. 8, 1977.

14. SeeespeciallyieRongzhen'speechttheNationalWorkingonferencentheMilitia, enminRibao 8 August 978.Nie was then vice-chairmanf theMilitaryommissionf the CentralCommittee.

15. XuXiangqian, ongqi,No. 8, 1977.16. NieRongzhen,peech t NationalWorkingonferencentheMilitia. eealsoChinese oreign

ministeruangHua's speecht theUN General ssemblypecial essionnDisarmamentn29May1978.Huang ssertedhat uture arbetweenhe wo uperpowersasmoreikelyobe conventionalwar.ApparentlyheChinese elieved hat heUSSR wouldhesitateo launch nuclear ttackn afuture ar;neitherienorHuang,however,xplained hy hey ismissedhe ikelihoodf a nuclearconfrontationith he oviet nion.








The importance f a people's war and guerrillawarfare n a future rotractedwaragainst he USSR, according o themoderates,would increase, ot decline. For thetime being, the latter eemed to have won the debate and persuaded he militaryhard-liners o agreethat a strongdefencemustbe builtupon the foundation f astrongnational economy; only when the economyhas developed rapidly cannationaldefencebe progressed'.17

This belief n a people's war and guerrilla acticswas clearlyreflected n thePRC's global strategy-a revolutionaryine emphasizing he Third World (the'countryside') s the strategic ase in the anti-Soviet nitedfront.This school ofstrategic hinking as reinforcedythepolitical limate fChina's domestic cene.Elatedbythe arrest f theGangofFour andthequickrestoration fsocial order,the Chinese leadershipunderHua Guofeng who lacked a strongpowerbase ineither hemilitary stablishment,arty pparatus r statebureaucracies) uled the

country nd itsideologically erplexed eople by relying eavily n Mao's 'teach-ings'. It is thusnot surprisinghat Mao's revolutionaryine was adopted as theguideline or China's foreign olicyand the backboneof itsThree World theory.

Yet the objectiverealitieshad forced he Chinese leadership o play down therevolutionaryine even before hedownfall fHua's 'whatever' action.18eijing'sopen conflictswithHanoi had driven he atter oward he Soviet Union and gaveMoscow the opportunity o encircleChina from the south. The progressofnegotiations etween heUnitedStates nd theSovietUnionon SALT II apparentlyaroused Chinese concern bouta detente etween hetwo superpowers hatmight

allow Russia a freehandto strengthentsmilitary osture gainstChina. In a driveto avoiddiplomatic solation,Beijingconcluded peace andfriendshipreatywithTokyo in August 1978; previousdifficultiesereovercomeby theinclusionof aclause specifyinghenon-binding atureof the anti-hegemony'lause regardingrelationswith third ountries.Beijingalso compromised n theTaiwan issue andannounced he establishmentfdiplomatic elationswith theUnitedStates t theend of 1978.

In response otheperceived ncreasingoviet hreat nda resurgentrend owards'appeasement'n theWest, Beijing eiteratedheurgencyfformingninternational

anti-hegemonyront.The second phase of the ThreeWorld theory alled for aunitedfront, ncluding heUnitedStates, heprimary arget f which was clearlythe Soviet Union. In an interviewwith Timemagazine nJanuary 979beforehisdeparture or the United States, Deng Xiaopingasserted hatthe significancefnormalization f relationsbetween China and the United States ay not in thedevelopment f bilateral elationsbut in theglobal strategicmplications.19engnotedthat heUnitedStateshad beenon thestrategicetreat incetheearly1970sand that the true hot bed of war' was not Americabut the SovietUnion. Heinsisted hatthe bestway to resistSovietexpansion,whose characteristicactics

were to 'bullying he soft and fearing he strong' nd 'goingin and grabbing te'very pportunity,'was not throughnegotiations r agreementsut through heestablishmentf an anti-Soviet nitedfront onstitutingeveloping nddeveloped

17. Nie Rongzhen, Speech at National Working Conference n the Militia. See also 'Speed upnationaldefencemodernization-celebratinghe50th anniversaryf the establishmentf the People'sLiberationArmy', oint AugustFirst' editorial f 1977byRenminRibao, Hongqi andJiefang n Bao.

18. That is, a policy ine to follow whateverMao had said and conducted.19. Time,5 February 979, pp. 26-9. The interview ithTime Editor-in-Chief edley Donovan was

held n Beijingfourdays beforeDeng's scheduleddeparture orWashington n 29 January.







Herbert. Yee 245

countries nd including heUnitedStates.Beijing's trategyt thetimewas twofold:first, o rally the support of Washington or China's military ampaign gainstVietnam and second, to obstruct he conclusion of SALT II between the twosuperpowers. eng failedbadlyto achieve he econdobjective ndwas onlypartlysuccessfuln lobbyingWashington's upport orChina's Vietnam enture.Never-theless, immy arter's mbivalentttitudeowardsDeng's provocative tatements,togetherwiththetiming fChina's attack n Vietnamwhichtook place less thantwo weeks afterDeng's US visit)and thevisitofUS Treasury ecretaryMichaelBlumenthalo Beijing n theheat of the borderwar,cautioned heKremlin eadersagainst aking dventurous ptions gainst heChinese.

The inability fthePeople's LiberationArmies o win a decisivevictory gainsttheoutnumbered ietnamese, owever, rouseda newroundof debate concerningChina's defencestrategies mong Chinese leaders. It worried and alarmedthehardlinemilitary eadership action,whichrenewed ts demands fortop prioritystatusfor modernization f China's defences.The militaryeadershad apparentlylearned the lessonsfrom hefightingn Vietnam nd discardedMao's concept ofpeople's war. In an importantditorial umming p the essonsof the Korean warand the more recentborderwarwith theVietnamese, iefangjun ao arguedthatthe only way to win a modernwar was to meet the technical equirements fmodern warfare.20he editorialmaintained hatover thepast threedecades thepace ofmodernizing hina's defencehadbeen too slow andhadfailed o close the

wideninggap betweenChina and othermoretechnologicallydvancedcountries.The same themewas echoedby China'sdefenceminister u Xiangqian: Achievingthemodernization f defence s an extremelymportant trategic ask,an urgentneed forresisting he social-imperialist'snvasion and an essential onditionforprotectingnd developingChina's socialist onstruction'.21

Yet China's ability o standup and defy heSovietthreat uring tsborderwarwithVietnammay have persuadedsome civilian eaders that China was strongenoughto defend tself nd that t shouldpaymore attention o raising heoverallliving tandard f the Chinese- eople. This, however, epresentedpparently nly

a minority iew amongChinese leaders.A clear ndicator hatthemilitary ard-liners ad probablywon thisnew round n thestrategicebatewas the notedabsence f any major tatementy a top leader o counter heJiefangftunaoeditorialor Xu's article.Meanwhile,the visits of Chinese militarymissions toEuropean tates, speciallyrance,heUnitedKingdom,WestGermanynd taly,forweapon hoppingncreasedharplyn1978 nd1979.22n the utumn f1979,Hua Guofeng ecame hefirst hinese eadofstate o visit he boveEuropeancountries. t the sametime,China'seconomic nd trade olicies aidstress nlearningllpossible dvancedechnologynd skills rombroad, ndnegotiations

forconcludingoan agreementsereconducted ithan increasingumber findustrialountries,ncludingheUnited tates. ffortsoimproveelations iththe econdWorld ountriesndtheUnited tates adthus learlyecome higher

20. 'Raise ur rmies'ightingapabilitieso amodernnd dvancedevel', iefangjunao,1August1979.ReprintednRenmin ibao, August 979.

21. 'Strivingor he ealizationf defence odernization',ongqi,No. 10, 1979.22. For an accountfChina'smilitaryhoppingndher ctual urchasesrom heWest ee William

T. Tow andDouglasT. Stuart,China'smilitaryurnso theWest',nternationalffairs,ol.57, No.2, Spring 981, p.286-300.








prioritynBeijing'sveralltrategicalculationshanmaintaininghe evolutionarylineThirdWorld-basedolicy.

The SovietmilitarynterventionnAfghanistan,owever, rought hesecond

phase ftheThreeWorld heoryo a sudden nd nd tartedhe volution rocessof the hird nd currenthase.Thecrisisolted heBeijingeadersnto eassessingChina'sglobal trategy.he AfghanncidentemonstratedotheChinese hat heSovietUnionwascapable f aunchingswiftttackndsupportingwar gainsta neighbouringountry sing argenumbers f combat roops nd enormousquantitiesf arms nd equipmentuppliedhroughirliftnd mountainousandroutes. he Chinese eaders elievedhat heSovietswerepreparednd ready orwaging arious ypes fwar-a nuclear aror a conventionalar, worldwarora limited ar.23 eijing's mmediateesponse othenew Soviet hreat as never-

theless autiousndcalculated.Whenformer S Secretaryf DefenseHaroldBrowndeliberatelyadepro-vocative tatementsgainst he Sovietsn Beijing everal aysafter he Russiansbegan heirnvasion fAfghanistan,heChinesewere urprisinglyrudentndrestrainedrommaking imilar ccusations.eijingwasapparentlyully ware ftherealdanger o China'snational ecurityehind rown's China card'; t wasclear to theChinese eaders hattheUnitedStateswould offer nly limitedassistance,fany,to China n a Sino-Soviet ar.Chinese ealism ndprudencewere also reflected-n Beijing's mbivalentttitudesegardinghepurchase f

military eapons rom heWest. ts hesitationopurchasedvanced eapons romAmerica's uropean llies, houghtcouldbepartly xplained yChina's hortageof urrencyeservesnd oncernsbout ts apabilityo absorbhenew echnology,reflectedhineseworriesbout oviet eactions.

More ignificantly,he ailureftheWesternllies o form coordinatedtrategyagainst.theovietUnion astdoubt nChina's wnunitedrontcheme hich adbeenovertly mphasized uringhe secondphaseoftheThreeWorld trategy.Beijing eptwarningheUnited tatesnd tsallies hat, espiteheSoviet ttackat the ast, heUSSR'sprimary ilitaryoalremainednEurope ndthattwould

continueoexpand nd trike,funchecked,he outhernront,where he il-richGulf tatesre ocated, ecause fthe talematet the woother rontsnEuropeand Asia.24 he wholeworld, hePRC reiterated, fusthereforenite ndstandfirmgainstherelentlesspolarbear'. Yet inprivateheB3eijingeaders ealizedthat hinamust ely n itsown effortsornational efencegainstoviet hreats.

Beijing ssertedhatChinahasalways oughtobuild tssecuritynthebasisof n ndependentnd elf-reliantefenceolicynd twilln-everesortoshelteringunder n external rotectivembrella'.25he PRC flatly ejected he idea of'balanced rms ales'andmade tclear hat eijingwouldratherefuse obuyUS

arms han onsent oUS arms oTaiwan.26ndeed, heTaiwanssuewasprobablyamajor onsiderationnpromptinghePRC toplaydown he nited ronttrategysince 980.Beijingwasapparentlyryingo make point hat hePRC wouldnot

23. For a detailednd thoroughfficialhinese nalysisf theAfghanncidentee Sovietmilitarystrategyorworld omination',enmin ibao, 1January980. For he nglishranslationeeBeijingReview, o. 4, 28 January980.)

24. 'Sovietmilitarytrategyorworld omination'.25. '1980 n retrospect:he nternationalituation',eijingReview, o. 1, 5 January981.26. Renminibao, 2June 981.







Herbert . Yee 247

compromise ts territorialntegrityn exchangefor US participationn the anti-Sovietfront.

The Chinese eadersdo not see any imminentovietmilitaryttack.The Soviet

Union, it s argued, s not likely o invadeChina because tcannotpossiblybenefitfrom such an action. Even granting hat the Soviet troops could succeed inoccupying argeareas of Chineseterritory,eijingbelieves hat ontinuous esist-ancefrom he ChinesepeoplewoulddragtheRussia-nsntoa costly ndprotractedwar. The Chinese leaders oftenreiterate sayingfromZhou Enlai: 'China is anattractive iece of meatcovetedby all yettoo toughforanyoneto bite into it'.Beijing also seemsto ruleout thepossibility f a nuclear ttackfrom heSoviets.In a recent tudy by theBeijing nstitute or nternationaltrategic tudies, theChineseasserted hat heSoviet Union would not launph nuclear ttackbecauseit could not destroy ll of China's nuclearweapons in a first trike nd wouldtherefore acea nuclear ounterattack.27

To some Chinese leaders, moreover, heUSSR's invasionof Afghanistan adalso exposed itshiddenvulnerability. eijingbelievedthattheSovietUnion wasover-stretched;urdenedwithheavymilitaryndeconomic ommitmentsnEasternEurope, Cuba, Vietnam,Afghanistan nd otherpartsof the world, its globalexpansionwas seriously mpeding ts plans to revive the faltering conomy.Furthermore,s viewedfromBeijing,the Kremlin eaderswerealso troubledbyinternal thnic nstabilitynd increasing esentmentn theirEast European allies,

suchas theunrest nd crises n Poland. Thisperceptionf nherentovietweaknessapparently onvinced ome Chinese leadersthattheRussiansmightnot be in aposition o launch nyattack gainstChinafor ometime ocome. This calculationof Soviet limitationswas reinforcedne year after heAfghan ncidentwhen itbecameclear thatthe Russianswere not able to win a quick and decisivewar,despitetheir far superiormilitaryweapons and much betterequipped armies,against he ocal guerrillas ho were argely rmedwith ightweapons suppliedbyChina and the United States.The PRC hailedthe situation n Afghanistan s aclassicalpeople's war: a resistanceo outsideaggressors y guerrilla nits, rmed

withpatriotismnd skilful uerrillaacticsmost uitable ospecial ocalconditions.28To theChinese,theAfghan esistance ad demonstratedividly hat elf-reliancewas thekeyto repulsing oreign nvasion, xternal ssistance, hough mportant,beingonly secondary.

It was obviouslyno coincidence hat campaign o raise the spirit f patriotismandrevolutionaryeroism'wasbeing onducted mong hePLA units.29he meritsof Mao's guerrilla actics n a people's war were reaffirmedn the documentappraising he CCP's history ince 1949.30 n contrast o the first hase of thepost-Mao policy strategy, owever, hereassertionfthepeople'swar was devoid

ofrevolutionarylogans,whereas he ndependencend self-reliancespectsof the27. TheJapan Times,12 June 1981.28. 'The revelation f theAfghanwar', Hongqi, No. 1, 1981. See also 'Afghanistan: ne year after

the Soviet nvasion',BeijingReview,No. 1, 5 January 981.29. See thetitle fJiefang1unBao's editorial n 1August1980. (Reprintednpart nRenminRibao,

2 August 1980.)30. 'Resolutionon certain uestions n thehistory f our party ince thefounding f thePeople's

Republic of China', adopted by theSixthPlenary essionof the 11thCentralCommittee f theCCPon 27 June1981. For fulltext ee RenminRibao, 1July1981; Hongqi, No. 13, 1981; BeijingReview,No. 27, 6 July1981.








guerrilla arfare ere mphasized.3'hemilitaryas alsocalled ponto assistnthe ourmodernizationsindustry,griculture,efence,nd cience nd echnology)with atrioticnd heroic pirit; hedefencendustry as urged ully o utilize tscapacityo developndproduceonsumeroods or ivilianses.The combinationofmilitaryndcivilianroduction,twasargued,ould aise he verallechnologylevel fChina's ndustry,ncludinghedefencendustry.32

Meanwhile, evelopmentsn domestic hinese olitics adreinforcedheevo-lution fthe currenthaseofChina'sforeign olicy trategy.he fifthlenarySession fthe Eleventh entral ommittee,eld n February 980, uccessfullyremoved he whatever' action rompower.The eventual emotion f HuaGuofengnd theascendancyf ZhaoZiyang s thePremierndHu Yaobang sParty hairmanompletedeng's trategyoeliminatell leftist'lementsmongthe op eadership. he new eadershipeclared hat lass truggle as no longer

essentialn Chinabecausets ocialistransformationasfundamentallyompleted.To concentraten economiconstructionasregardeds a crucialstrategichift'that hinamustmake ndfrom hichtmust ever eviate xceptnthe vent flarge-scalenvasion y a foreignnemy.33rom longterm erspective,twasargued, self-reliancetrategyasimperativenachieving steady nd sustainedeconomic rowthowardsmodernizationn all four ronts.n any ase,owing othe RC's limitedurrencyeservesnd urrentconomicetrenchment,heBeijingleadershipad ittle ption ut orely nChina's wn efforts.

Paralleloa renewedmphasisnself-relianceas thegradualormulationfan

integratedoreign olicy.The Chinese eadersbeganto realizethatmilitarycapabilityhouldnotbe theonlynornecessarilyhemost mportantspect fChina'sdefence olicy.Beijing pparentlyecame onvincedhat united ndstable omesticoliticalystem,prosperousconomynd peacefulnternationalenvironmentereequally mportanto a country'security. his new policyframework,oiced nly ya disregardedinoritynthe ast, egan ogain roundin mid 1981when tbecame pparenthatdespite heheroic esistancef localguerrillas,heSoviet orcesweregoing o staynAfghanistan.tthe ame ime,the ooling fSino-Americanelationsad alsoforced eijingoreassesstsanti-

Soviet ront.heChineseeaders elievedhat heAmericans eremore nterestedinstrengtheningheirwnglobal nfluencehannformingnanti-SovietlliancewithChina.WithoutctiveUS participation,eijing's nited ronttrategyouldeasily e crippled.

Sensinghe hangingnternationalnvironment,heChineseeaderswere uicktomodifyheir lobal trategy.alkof n inevitable'ewworldwarwas no ongerheard ffrom hineseeaders. ublicityfa united rontgainstocial-imperialisthegemonismasgreatlyubdued.nstead, eijing ademphasizedhedesirabilityofpeacefulolutionsoall internationalisputes. hina ook neutralositionn

31. It is significanthatRenmin ibao andothermajor ewspapers)ublishedn their rontageson 7 July 981Mao'sfive elegraphsontainingnstructionsfguerrillaactics oarmy ommanders.The telegraphstressedhe independence'nd self-reliance'spectsftheguerrilla arfare.ee alsoarticlenRenmin ibao, August 981, yYangYong,Deputy hief fGeneraltafff he LA, andarticlenHongqi,No. 15,1981, yFuZhong, eputy irectorftheGeneraloliticalepartmentfthePLA. The two articleseaffirmedao's 'people'swar'conceptnd assertedMao's axiom hat'although eaponsre mportantna war, t s thepeople, otweapons,hat ecide he utcomefawar'.

32. Renmin ibao, August 980.33. 'Resolutionncertainuestionsn thehistoryfourparty .







Herbert . Yee 249

thewarbetweenran nd raq andurged he wo ides o endthemilitaryonflictby peacefulmeans. n the case of theAnglo-Argentinear over the FalklandIslands,Beijing, ccusing heUnited tates f sidingwithBritain nd theSoviet

Union withArgentina,rged hetwo conflictingationso restrainrom singmilitaryorces.ndeed, eijing venhintedhattwould ecognizehe xistencefIsrael, move hatwould ertainlyrovoke epercussionsrom rabian tates,nexchange ora peaceful olution n the Middle East conflict.34urthermore,althoughherewere easonableoubts boutBeijing's inceritynseeking eacefulsolutions or onflictsn Indochina nd disputes ver heTaiwan trait, hina's'peace offensive' as neverthelessn linewiththemajorthrustf its foreignpolicy.35

ConclusionFollowing ts nceptionn 1974, heThreeWorld heory adservedwith omesuccess heChinese bjectivefopposing hetwosuperpowersnd solatingheSovietUnion,China's hiefnemy. owever,he hangingnternationalnviron-ment nd thedynamicsfChina'sdomesticolitics orced eijing onstantlyomodifyheThreeWorld cheme. he latest daptationf China'sforeign olicyhasmarked drasticepartureromtsrevolutionarynited ronttrategy.nsteadofbeingpreoccupied ith dentifyingenemies' nd friends',heessence ftheunitedronttrategy,eijing as mphasizedelf-reliancend sstrivingomaintaincordial, r at eastworking,elations ith ll nations. hisnewforeignolicy ine

hasbeenreinforcedy the scendancynChinese omesticolitics f a pragmatic,collectiveeadership.- Contraryo thebeliefsfmany bservers,hina'srecent ositive esponseoSoviet verturesnd therenewalfnegotiationsnbilateralelationsetweenhetwo communisttates eld nBeijingastOctober o not ndicate newshiftnChinese oreignolicy. ndeed,Beijing'sffortoimproveelations ithMoscowwas the nticipatednd ogical evelopmentfChina's elf-reliantnd ndependentforeign olicy ine.AlthoughheChinese eaders till nsistedhatChinawoulduphold hegeneral piritf theThreeWorld heorynd theunited ronttrategy,

they lso admittedhat n nternationalnited rontna global calewasno ongeradvocated ythe hinese overnment.36Anti-hegemonic'olicy asbeen estrictedto certainituations,uch s the oviet resencenAfghanistanndthe lleged Ssupportf sraeli ndSouthAfricanegemonism.npractice,herefore,heThreeWorld heory as beendiscardedythepost-Mao eadership.n thefinalnalysis,a ThreeWorld heory eprivedf tsunited ronttrategyimplyasnooperationalvalue, lthoughodoubt heChinese overnmentay noccasion everto tforrhetoricalurposes.

34. Beijing eview, o. 43, 26 October 981, . 9.35. On the veof the 2nd nniversaryfthe oundingf the RC, Beijingnnouncednine-point

proposal s a basisfornegotiatingith aipei oncerninghereturnf Taiwan o themainland;eeRenmin ibao, 1 October1981. Beijing lso softenedts stand n political olutions o Indochinaconflictsroposed ytheASEANandotherountries.

36. Informationased on the author's nterviews ithpolicy nalysts t Beijing's nstitutefInternationaltudies,he thinkank' fChina's oreignolicies, 5 November982.

1983 the three world theory and post-mao china's global strategy

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