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To disseminate knowledge of the military arts and sciences,with special attention to mobility in ground warfare, to promote

professional improvement of the Armor Community, and topreserve and foster the spirit, the traditions, and the solidarity of

Armor in the Army of the United States.

Iraining ueveiopmenrsCOL DUDLEY M. ANDRES

Armor AviationCOL GARY P. BERGERON

Combat DevelopmentsCOL ROBERT W. DeMONT

UNITSThe Lightning BrigadeCOL NEAL T. JACO

1ST AlT/OSUT Brigade (Armor)COL ANDREW P. OMEARA, JR.

4th Training BrigadeCOL DONALD L. SMART

194th Armored BrigadeCOL FRED W. GREENE, 111

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JEANNIE NEWTON

Contributing ArtistsGARY W. WILL IAMSMARK KAYROUZMARK MA RTURELLOARMOR magazine (ISSN 0004-2420) ispublished bi-monthly by the U.S. ArmyArmor Center, 4401 Vine Grove Road,Fort Knox, Kentucky 40121. Unlessotherwise stated, material does notrepresent policy, thinking, or endorse-ment by any agency of the U.S. Army.Use of appropriated funds for printingofthis publication was approved by theDepartment of the Army, 22 July 1981.ARMOR is not a copyrighted publicationbut may contain some articles whichhave been copyrighted by individualauthors. Material which is not undercopyright may be reprinted f credit isgiven toARMOR and the author.Permissionto reprint copyrighted materialmust be obtained from the author.SUBSCRIPTION RATES Individualsubscriptions to ARMOR are availablethrough the U.S. Armor Association, PostOffice Box607, FortKnox, Kentucky40121. Telephone (502) 942-8624.Domestic $12.00 one year, $21.oOtwoyears, $30.00 three years. Foreign: $18.00one year, $30.00twoyears. Single copies,$2.00.CORRESPONDENCEAddress all cor-respondence to US.Army Armor Center,AlTN: ATZK-MAG. Fort Knox,Kentucky, 40121. (Telephone:AUTOVON 464-2249/2610 or commer-cial (502) 624-2249/2610.)SECOND class postage paid at FortKnox, Kentucky and additional mailingoffce.ARMOR maybe forwardedto militarypersonnel whose change of address iscaused by official orders (except at APOaddresses) without payment of additionalpostage. The subscriber must notify thepostmaster.USPS 467-970MayJ une 1983 Vol XCII, No.3

19 Wartime Soviet Tank FormationsBy Major AlbertZ.Conner andRobert G. Poirier

26 The LHX Pursuit Heliopter Squadronby Captain Greg R. Hampton

30 Attacking the Attackerby First Lieutenant Ralph Peters

34 Italian Armor, Past, Present, and Futureby Lieutenant Colonel Pasqualino Verdecchia

38 Armor Technology Part IVby J oseph E. Backhofen, J r.

DEPARTMENTS2 Letters 44 Professional Thoughts5 Commander's Hatch 49 Recognition Quiz Answers

8 Master Gunner's Corner 51 News Notes7 Driver'sSeat 50 OPMS-EPMS

43 Recognition Quiz 52 Books53 Steel on Target

COVERSimulation in training plays an increasingly important role in today's

sophisticated army. Realism is stressed in the newest simulators and thecost savings are of vital importance. Lieutenant Colonel J . MichaelWeaver's and Richard A. Renfrow's article on page 14details the latestin armor training simulators and provides a look into the future of thisadvanced training concept.

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Promotion Criteria?Dear Sir:Only occasionally do Ihave an opportun-ity to read a copy of ARMOR, and it is usu-ally an enjoyable and informative experience despite my being a former cannoneerrather than a tanker. I was appalled, how-ever, on reading CSM J ohn Gillis DriversSeat article in the J anuary-February 1983issue entitled Meeting the PromotionBoard.Dont get me wrong-I am not condemn-ing CSM Gillis. He appears to be a realistwho is looking at a real-life situation andtelling his men how to cope with it. Havingrisen through nine enlisted grades, heknows whereof he speaks and is happy tohave others benefit from his experience.After reading Gillis piece, I sat back andwondered --Good God! Was Iever part ofsuch a system? Are my younger brothers inarms perpetuating such a thing? J ustthink, a man can be awarded 60% of hispromotion board points on sheer eye washand steer manure!! CSM Gillis says so-He can earn 150 out of the 250 total pointspossible without Waving to exhibit hisknowledge on any specific subject..Personal appearance, and bearing, andself-confidence. and oral expression skill-all these have their place, I am sure. But,after a few days of sleeping in the mud, adogface, or cannon shooter, or tanker, getsto looking a little rank; he might even smella little; and his oral expression takes on afair sprinkling of colorful adjectives. Some-how, he can get by despite all this. How-ever, when he displays his deep self-confidence, and maintains full eye contactwhile he tells his troops the wrong thing, heaint worth a damn! His troops will know it,and they are the ultimate promotion board.

I dont recall whether we used anythings? formal as a DA Form 3356 in my day, butthe enlisted promotion picture doesnt seemto have changed much-the glib, sharplooking, superficial PFC became the glib,sharp-looking, superficial corporal, andsergeant, and staff sergeant, and technicalsergeant, on up the chain. Few of that typeacquired knowledge as they acquiredstripes, but promotion seemed to comeright on schedule. That was my fault; thatwds. and is, the fault of DA Form 3356; thatis the fault of present-day promotionboards, if CSM Gillis tells it right.One strong memory remains with mefrom my sleepless, double-timing OCSdays of the early 1950s. A lecturer early inour course told 300 of us eager candidatessitting in the hot Kansas sun of the resultsof a survey conducted in Europe imme-diately following the Big War in 1945.Essentially, it was determined that mencould, and did, overlook virtually any short-coming in a leader except lack of technical

knowledge. He could be sloppy, bigotted,unfair, a real cast-iron prince (usuallyspelled differently); but,so long as he knewhis stuff, men would follow. He had to beable to show the way when the chips weredown. That applied to noncoms as well asto officers.Before Iclose, let me bore you a little witha short story of my quadruple cardiacbypass operation of a couple years back.The evening before the big event,Isat in myroom, 54 years of a full life passing beforemy eyes, when my young surgeon arrivedto pump up my courage. His hair was a bitdisheveled, his suit didnt fit too well, and hehad the command voice of a ballet dancer.But I knew that he had a record of morethan 980 bypass operations over a 2-yearperiod without a single loss. By golly, he gotall 250 of my points on that fact alone!!

RAYMOND E. MESSIERLTC. USA (Ret.)Bellevue, WA

Motorcycles Easy to HideDear Sir:Captain RobertR. Sigl wrote a fine pieceon the motorcycle (Sep-Oct 1982ARMOR) ,however, there is one important virtue ofthis vehicle that I think we must bear inmind.A cycle can behidden in bushes, a barn,or even in a small building. Hiding a trackedcombat vehicle or a truck is much harder.Further, the infrared and magnetic signa-ture of a cycle will be more difficult for sen-sors to detect.

ROBERT P. FAIRCHILDMajor, ArmorNYARNG

Correction to 34th Armor HistoryDear Sir:

I have been following the unit lineages inARMOR magazine with interest and await-ing the appearance of the 34th Armor inWhich I served as a platoon leader andcompanyXO in Vietnam in 1967-68.Unfortunately, there appears to be aserious discrepancy in the decorations sec-tion of the article that should be corrected.The 2d Battalion (less Company C) 34thArmor was awarded a Presidential Unit Ci-tation (Army) as part of a larger force foraction at Suoi Tre on 21 March 1967. Thisaward was cited in DA GO 59, dated 21October 1968.DAVID A. VAN TESLAARStockton, CA

Insignia RecalledDear Sir:Anent the back cover, J uly-August ic-8 inofARMOR magazine.The distinctive insignia was design1LT Oakley Sanders, 7th Cavalry, in Sanders was living with severalOwens of a low rank, including the usigned, in quarters known as Cliff HoiFort Bliss. The quarters were on theabove the polo field, which was put inby me.Sanders was not popular with his SIron commander and left the Armyafter. He was a good officer and desbetter.

WESLEY W. Colonel. USAPebble Beacl

History Evaluation Takes TiDear Sir:

Ienjoyed the article on Kursk veryIt is interesting to note that as ovirtually no significant Soviet docurelating to WW II have been made ible. It wasnt until 1978 (? ) that amaterial on Allied efforts was madeble. The Enigma War, American Magic, TheWizard War-I could go on and on.As far as military history is concerned it isno better or worse than any other history ofmilitary operations. High level decisions areoften based upon available informationwhich may not be exactly what reallyhappened. Read the comments by CaptainBrown in Lessons in Leadership; TheLegacy of Kursk ( ARMOR, J uly-August1981). He comments that Hitler, some 3,000miles away, felt he had a better grasp of thesituation at Kursk than his frontline com-manders. Ithink Hitler had a better grasp ofthe total war than his frontline command-ers! We seem to try to comprehend theGerman campaign in Russia in a vacuum!Letus not overlook the fact that Hitler andhis staff were forced to consider the threatposed by Generals Clark, Patton. andMontgomery who were coming up fast viaNorth Africa, Sicily, and Italy. In addition,there were the constant harassments ofAllied bombers, French Resistance ighters,internal politics and many other factors.I commanded the 11th Military HistoryDetachment in 1966-67 and wrote one ofthe histories of the move out of France. Ithink I knew more about conditions inOrleans, France, than either LBJ orMcNamara. but I did not have the foggiest

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historian and he will tell you that it is at least50 years before we begin to understand anera.I also had the opportunity last year toread an Ordnance Report, dated 1977,about a GermanWW II experiment that Iunderstand s the basisofa new Soviet anti-tank round.I also enjoyed the September-Octoberissue with the article on Soviet armor officertraining. Keep up the good work.

WILLIAM L. HOWARDLieutenant Colonel, Armor, USARSpring Lake Heights, NJ

Armor Skills for theArmor Force Badge

Dear Sir:I would like to make the following com-ments regarding First Lieutenant PrevousWe S till Need an Armored Force Badge.(See Professional Thoughts, J anuary-February 1983 ARMOR. Ed.)Iagree with the lieutenant that the quali-fication standards for the Armored ForceBadge (AFB) must be high. But his criteriaare better suited for an IG inspection oftraining than for what is required to wearthe symbol of armored professionalism.Lets make the test tough, but lets alsomake it standardized, based on common-sense goals and as resource-dependentaspossible. Most importantly, lets make it atest of armored skills.A soldier desiring to be tested for the AFBshould meet these prerequisites:Be a volunteer.Meet army physical fitness and

Have a 19 or 12-series MOS.The hands-on component of the testshould be the non-live-fire tasks of the TankGunnery Crew Skill Test outlined in FM 17-12. Tankers would be required to performall 26 tasks correctly.The hands-on component for the cavalrytrooper, whose primary mission is recon-naissance, needs development. Once theM3ICfV becomes the primary fighting veh-icle of cavalry units, the hands-oncomponent of the AFB should emphasizeboth gunnery skills and reconnaissancetasks. Troopers would be required to corn-plete all tasks.The test criteria should be available to allbattalions and squadrons. Test sites could

weight standards.

With regard to J .W. Woodalls article26th Cavalry in the Philippines, (March-April 1983 ARMOR Magazine), it is disturb-ing that such an article can appear in printand have so little about the men who com-posed this outstanding unit. True, the coverillustration shows a Filipino with horse, andthe opening paragraphs mention that theenlisted men were Filipinos.However, the bulk of the article mentionsWainwright, Pierce, etc., and not a singlename of a Filipino is included. Strange,indeed, for a unit that abounded in deco-rated enlisted men.Woodalls concluding paragraph is a dis-appointing array of names of the gloriousAmerican horse cavalry, not mentioningthat these intrepid horsemen, the guyswho spilled blood and guts, were Filipinos,not Americans.For sources, Woodall should have con-sulted the more than ten articles that haveappeared inCavalry J ournal. And, no mat-ter what Woodall or the editors of ARMORthink, the unit was known throughout itscareer as 26th Cavalry (PS).

Donald ChaputCurator of HistoryNatural History Museum,Los Angeles County, CA

26th Cavalry RememberedDear Sir:Having long been fascinated by the steepodds and great courage of the 26th Caval-rys fight on Luzon. Iam very pleased to seethe tale recounted again by Captain J efferyW. Woodall in the January-February 1983ARMOR Magazine. After the 7th. the 26this-or at least deserves to be-the mostfamed of US. horsed cavalry regiments.Incidentally, speaking of the former unit,that 1941 Errol Flynn film on the Little BigHorn fight is correctly titled, They Died WithTheir Boots On. Hollywood has not beenunaware of the 26th Cavalry either, as itshorsemen are depicted in both Bataan andBack To Bataan, not to mention an entiretroop in the fanciful and disappointingOnce BeforeI ie.

While I agree with Captain Woodall thatthe cavalry delaying tactics were effective, Imust point out that the replacement ofLieutenant General Masaharu Hommaresulted from more than simply the unex-

freighters carrying these vehicles to Singa-pore for the Malayan campaign were turnedback because of the overwhelming J apa-nese command of the sea.So that someonewould benefit from them, the carriers wereoffloaded in Manila, for all intents and pur-poses a reverse Lend-Lease.Finally, a couple of questions: (1)ColonelChandlers account in the pages of theArmored Cavalry Journal some 36 yearsago, says the standand arm used by the26th was the M1 rifle (despite the conven-tional fondness for seeing the old 03Springfield). What is verifas? (2) What dec-orations were eventually given to the menand to the unit itself? Despite the resolutionand bravery of this horsed regiment. the mil-itary awards have not been made terriblypublic (save the monument at Fort Riley).

NELSON H. LAWRYRochester,NY

The following information has beendetermined regarding the 26th Cavalrysunit awards. The unit received threeAmerican Presidential Unit Citations andone Philippine Presidential Unit Citationas follows:PUC for 7 December 1941 to 10 May1942; WD GO 22, 1942, amended by WDGO 46, 1948.PUC for23 December 1941; WD GO 14.1942.PUC for 21 J anuary 1942; WD GO 14,1942.Philippine PUC for 7 December 1941 to10 May 1942; WD GO 47, 1950.Also, in the matter of personal armscarried by the 26th Cavalry members, sofar as can be determined, they carried the

M1 Garand rifle. Ed.

The Tanks Were There TooDear Sir:Having drunk from the same canteen. Iwas very engrossed with Captain Woodallsaccount in the J anuary-February 1983ARMOR Magazine of the 26th Cavalry (PS)and their heroic and indispensible role inthe delaying action of the Northern LuzonForces into Bataan during the early days ofWW II in the Philippines.However, I would like to correct the pos-sible impression that it was the 26th Cavalry

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I am deeply proud to have sewed.I am looking forward to the day thatARMOR Magazine carries an article on therole of the tankers (the other half of thearmored-cavalry branch) in the Philippinesduring those first tragic months ofWW II. Iknow material s being gathered for such anarticle by several persons.

ALBERT L. ALLENLieutenant Colonel, Armor (Ret)Mansfield, OH(See J uly-August 1983issue. Ed.)

Tank Gun Calibration UpheldDearSir.

I read with interest New TankGunCali-bration Policy by Major Brown and C aptain Kloecker (J uly-August 1982ARMOR).This policy was used, or rather, attempted,by the 2d Bn, 69th Armor, Fort Benning,GA, between December 1981 and J anuary1982.Dueto problems experiencedbythefirstcompany to shoot, Captain Kloecker paidus a visit and discussed our results com-pared to those expected. The outcome ofthese discussions was that the policyrequires the use of TPDS ammunition, evenwith the use of the Pye-Watson device, byunits with range constraints comparable tothose at Fort Benning. The round-to-rounddispersion of ammunition other than TPDSis too great to perform calibration. If othererrors are thrown in, such as a lack of abe-Watson device, or periscope and ballis-tic drive improvements not applied, you areback to hisCase 1 with rounds all over thetarget, and justification for individualzeroes. This is after having fired possiblyseven rounds (two initial, two for a crew-error test, and three for aproof test). andbeing back at square one.Additionally, it is critical that the leader-ship on the range, starting with the battalioncommander and master gunner, and includ-

In the September-October 1982 ARMORMagazine, Lieutenant Colonel Fletchersarticle stated that the U.S. Army OrdnanceCenter and School (O cas) Aberdeen Prov-ing Ground, Maryland, had initiated theOrganizational Maintenance Supervisors(Motor Sergeants) Course. (See Profes-sional Thoughts, The Motor Sergeant.Ed.) This is not quite so. We have initiatedthe 63630, 63N30, 63D30, and 63E30courses, which include many common sub-ject items that are needed by an NCO to bea motor sergeant, but the courses are notdesigned ag,Motor Sergeant Courses, perse. However, a soldier who completed oneof the above courses would more effectivelyfill the motor sergeants position thansomeone with another MOS.The OC&S also has a Training ExtensionCourse (TEC) program consisting of 21 les-sons for MOS63B titled, Motor SergeantsCourse. The TEC program can beobtained from the Commander, US ArmyTraining Support Center, ATfN: ATlGAET-TP, Fort Eustis, VA, 23604. A com-bined curriculum of the resident coumsdiscussed above plus participation in cer-tain TEC program lessons would fully qual-ify an NCO as a motor sergeant.Interested NCOs may obtain additionalinformation by writing:Commander Ordnance Center& SchoolATTN: ATSL-TD-PMO (Mr. Lane)Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21005

WILLIAM C. BALLDirector of Training DevelopmentsOCBS, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD


Soviet Tank Gunnery AddendumDear Sir:Soviet Tank Gunnery Training by Captain Matthew S. Williams in the January-February 1983ARMOR Magazine does notquite bring this important subject up todate. The authors basic reference, Soviet

however, current gunnery qualification isconducted on the move (5-30 kmph)against both moving and stationary targets,using full stabilization.Specialist training includes extensiveclassroom study preceeding field training.Manuals, regulations and teaching aids areused for basic tactical training. Hands-ondrills follow, using either simulators or realequipment. After specialist training,replacements are assigned to units wheretactical training of the crew is taught. Thegunner will normally remain in the sameunit for his entire period of service andrepeat the units training each 6 months.Motivation of seasoned crewmen becomesa problem with the repetition experiencedevery6 months.

Many older training devices are still usedalthough both technology and usage haveincreased in recent years. The newest tanktrainer is designed for improvement of theskills using all methods and all types ofrounds under conditions very similar t6combat.The author seems to disparage the KOP-R Optical Control Instrument, while ITACassessed it as an excellent device forteaching firing from a tank. Nevertheless,the device has been replaced with animproved version known as KOP-RM. Bothdevices can be mountedona rocking plat-form, of which there are two types of indi-vidual mounts and two types of full vehiclemounts.Currently, the USAARMC Threat Officefinds no reason to conclude that the Soviettank gunner is anymore less capable thanhis American counterpart. Yes. the trainingtechniques differ in almost every category,but the end product results are about even.Fostering the impression that the currentSoviet system is antiquated does notenhance training of our tank gunners.

J AMES M. SPRAYBERRYMajor, ArmorThreat Branch. DCD, Ft. Knox, KY

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mean, tor example,that a leader must be aware oz themer-ences between and the capabilities of the M735 and M774APFSDSmain gun rounds. Regarding the threat, the leadermust possess a detailed knowledge of the capabilities andlimitations of the T-62, T-72, and now the 2'80 main battletank, including heir points of vulnerability and the capabili-ties and limitations of complementary weapons, such as theSoviet AGS-17 3@mm automatic grenade launcheq andequipment such a s the BMP-2 and how we can best targetand kill it.The basics, however, do not solely relate to our t a n k force,but include similar knowledge of the combined arms-detailed knowledge of infantry, for example-not only their

troop ieacung proceaures, comDat ioacung01 emcles, ana merigors of properly executing the prepareto-fire check.Perhaps most basic of all is the necessity to care for oursoldiers well-to know them, to understand them, to keepthem informed, and to ensure that these soldiers are properlycaredfor by a chain of command that is deeply concernedabout theirwelfare.The basics also include the knowledge of the ru les ofcombat-moving, shooting, communicating, securing, andsustaining. These are basically the drills and exercises thatconstitute the plays within the company and platoon. Thereisnothing exotic about movinga tank platoon in a column orcross-country in a combat wedge, or in communicating


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to hone the indmdual protmency 01 the omcer ana I Y L Uleader, but each is a very basic element of overdl uni t profi-ciency as well.The last aspectof the basics isknowing your own capabili-ties, and those of your organization under situations of greatstress and fatigue. How do you react to the effects of fatigue;to the pressure in peacetime of having your performancetested and evaluated, or to the pressure of depending on yoursubordinates to check everything when you are too exhaustedto do so yourself? Self knowledge includes your capability totake over the job of your senior leaders, o m r even twiceremoved, if necessary.As a platoon leader, you should be ableto take over the company, or under certain Circumstances,multiple companies or even the battalion. Developing leader-ship depth is a serious training responsibility in anorganization.

Practice the BasicsOnce you have developed the basics, then you must prac-tice them in the context of the mission-typeorder. That, to me,is the application of those basics to the factors of ME-T,i.e., tying the basic plays to the situation expressed in termsof mission, enemy, troops, terrain and time each situationrequiring Merent variations of the basic plays.This enhan-ces your ability to react quickly to unforeseen risks andopportunities. That ability is acquired by training ones selfand ones organization to literally crawl before walking. Itmeans using basic battle drills together in different combina-tions to respond to varying situations. It is important thatyou practice your drills over a wide range of situations so thatyou and your subordinates understand each other and canrespond very quickly with minimal communication. In effect,you an d your subordinates must be operating on the samewave length.Some of this practice can be done on a sand table, as wellas in the field; so that the mutua l discussion of the what8s-how to employ your force-encourages your subordi-nates understanding of your operational methods. Really,what you are doing is developing a collective sense for thebattlefield and how to employ the combined arms tha t a reavailable to you. You are accomplishing a major part of thedeliberate planning that must precede the violent executionof a combat operation.It is also necessary to anticipate and practice for differentleadership situations involving officer and NCO responsibili-ties. For example, practice in-depth so that you can absorblosses, so that a tank commander can take over preparing theplatoon to fight should the platoon sergeant becomea casu-alty. It involves practicing procedures so that they becomesecond nature.

Apply the Basics to the SituationOnce we have practiced the basics an d their various com-binations, then we need to tie them together based on thefactors of METT-Tto construct defeat mechanisms th at willthwart the Threats operations. These defeat mechanismscan be likened to walls, and like walls, they can takemany forms and are based on building blocks. We needstandardized building blocks across the Armor Force whileatthe same time encouraging our commanders to apply theirinnovation and initiative in how they put the blocks together.Each configuration will be different depending upon thecommanders assessment of the Threat and what needs to bedone to respond to it.The essence of Armor Force leadership, then, is ensuringthat we have the standardized building blocks while develop6 ARMOR may-june 1983

unit, or the cavalry unit. We are tallung the applicatlon01 heCombined Arms.Train Your Subordinates

The las t element of Armor Force leadership is the funda-mental obligation of leaders to personally train their subor-dinates and to do so in a manner to reinforce the chain ofcommand. Consequently, it is the brigade commandersresponsibility to instruct his battalion commanders in detail.Each level must thoroughly train the next lower level-battalion trains company, company trains platoon, and pla-toon trains the t ank commander. I t goes without saying thatwe expect a continually higher level of tactical and technicalcompetence as we ascend the chain of command. As thischain training occurs, it is incumbent upon the chain ofcommand to use the doctrinal publications. Standardizationmust apply across the board in the use of basic operationalterms and their meaning. This s not a n area in which todemonstrate your abilities to be different; rather, commonal-ity of terms a nd definitions is absolutely essential. As lead-ers, we all need to read an d reread the basics-the how-to-fight manuals, the gunnery manuals, the operatorsmanuals. For example, the Soldiers Manual teaches thespecifics-and in so doing provides the soldiers the opportun-ity to demonstrate their abilities as you demand and test theirproficiency. As these basics are mastered, you must encour-age innovation, the better way, and develop rapid responsesto the new and unanticipated situations based upon thecommon understanding which exists between you and yourchain of command. Encourage your leaders to developinnovative ways to accomplish the mission in consonancewith your conceptual guidance.There is a vital parallel to sports that is applicable t oour Armor Force. As Americans, we tend to thinkofdrillsand plays as related to football. This is true to a point. Thecoach puts in plays in football to respond to generallyrecognized set si tuations. But, our battlefield will be muchmore like a soccer game, consisting of rapidly changingsituations across th e entire depth ofthe playing field, withboth sides rapidly converging, then dispersing in contin-uous action for an extended period. The basic plays haveto be understood well in advance so that the team canrapidly apply those basics to new and unanticipatedsituat ions. We need to train our subordinates to operateinth at sort of fluid environment an d to capitalize on eachfleeting opportunity as it occurs. That is how we can ca pitalize better on our inherent strengths as Americans,knowing our mission, soldiers, a nd equipment, then giv-ing our subordinates the r unni ng room to execute.

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Two Memorable DatesFollowing is a n address given by CSM John W. Gillis at abasic training graduation ceremony on 27 May 1983.

Because you graduate at this particular time of year, I willfocus my remarks on two dates in our immediate future thatare important to every American-two dates that are setaside each year for celebration and rememberance; two datestha t are particularly important; two dates th at a re special toAmerican soldiers, both past and present.The first of these important dates is 14 June 1983. It is onthis day that our Army will celebrate its 208th Birthday. Itwas at Independence Hall in Philadelphia, on a Wednesday,14 June 1775, that the Second Continental Congress resolvedthe following: That six companies of expert riflemen beimmediately raised in Pennsylvania, two in Maryland, andtwo in Virginia. The following day, George Washington wasappointed the first Commander-in-Chief.Our Army is one year older than our nation and has main-tained the freedom of our country for 207 years. It has paidthe price for our freedom, our dreams, and our liberty, byspending 50 of its 208 years involved in mortal combat. Thebattlefields of the Revolutionary War, the Mexican War, theCivil War, the Indian Wars , the Spanish-American War, WWI, and WW 11, Korea and Vietnam tell the history of how ourArmy has determined the destiny of our country.There are many reasons for the success of our Army Astrong industrial base; dedicated civilians giving their timeand efforts towards establishing and maintaining a strongArmy; our provenmilitary eaders; our combat heroes that weall remember, Generals MacArthur, Eisenhower, Patton, andAbrams, and Sergeants York and Murphy; as well as allthose whose heroic efforts earned for them our countryshighest award for valor-the Medal of Honor. But for all thereasons I have mentioned and, for the many others that Ihave not, the success of our Army would not have been real-ized ha d it not been for the soldier. For 208 years-from theshot heard around the world on Lexington Green, to thelas t shot fired in Vietnam-it ha s been the soldier who ha sbeen held responsible asour guarantee of freedom. Whether itbe in the Active Army, National Guard, or Reserve, whetherit be for one enlistment, or two, or for a full career, from theindividual soldiers willingness to serve was born our proudArmy heritage.Many of you graduating today know of these soldiers ofwhom I speak. Some are here today. They are your fathers ,grandfathers, uncles, brothers, cousins, and other relatives.

They were not heroes as we know heroes, but simply averageCitizens of our country who, during a time in their lives, werecalled upon to serve our nation. There was a need for theirservice, and they did wha t had to be done. They sewed withpride. It is these soldiers who won the wars. It is these soldi-ers who kept us at peace during the times we were not at war.It is these soldiers who lay the rightful claim to our Armysheritage.All of you graduating today have mastered those basicskills necessary to perform some of the duties and tasks of asoldier in todays Army. Youwill take th at knowledge withyou to your next unit as you march off this parade field; butyou a l so take something else with you. It is now your respon-sibility to perpetuate the honor and glory of our Army. It isnow your turn to walk as sentries on the walls of freedom. Doso with the same fierce pride as those who came before you.There is another important date in the more immediatefuture tha t causes my thoughts to turn to the glorious historyof our Army. It, too, is a day of great importance to allAmericans-but even more so to the soldier. It is a day setaside to honor our comrades in arms who gave their livesserving our country. In a few short days, on the 31st of May,Memorial Day, our nat ion will honor these soldiers; and wewill honor our own.Soldiers may participate in or observe a parade. They mayparticipate in or observe one of the ceremonies conducted inour national cemeteries. A soldier may put on his uniformand attend a ceremony held in the park i n his hometown; orhe may simply visit the cemetery in his hometown by hi mself, for there is a soldier buried there. However soldiersremember on this day, what is important is tha t they do. Inour national cemeteries, there are rows upon rows of whitecrosses where these soldiers rest for eternity. On many ofthese white crosses is the inscription Here rests in honoredglory a comrade in arms,known but to GOCL While it is truetha t their names are not known to us, we know them-forthey are soldiers, one ofus. Those who have marched, fought,and died in the ranks beforeus have earned their right not tobe forgotten; and it isyour turn to see tha t they a re not. Do sowith the same quiet pride of those who came before you.You pass in review today, in front of your families andfriends and in front of our fellow soldiers,as he future proteetors of our country an d as soldiers who have been entrustedwith the safekeeping of the glorious heritage of the UnitedStatesArmy. I speak for many throughout our nation when Isay that I have the greatest confidence in your ability to doboth.


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Captain Jeffrey D. HawkinsChief, Advanced Gunnery BranchUSAARMS, Fort Knox, KY

Selecting a Master Gunner CandidateSince the graduation of,the first Master Gunner class inMay 1976,Master Gunners have established hemselvesasakey element in the success of unit tank gunnery trainingprograms. Achievements by Master Gunners have earnedthem respect and praise from all levels of command. TheMaster Gunner Course is fashpaced, technically oriented,and is the most challenging course an armor NCO will evertake.Standards of the course are very high and only the mostqualified NCOs are returned to the field asMaster Gunners.Because of the difficulties of the course and the additionalduties and responsibilities an NCO will assume when becom-ing a Master Gunner,it is essential tha t selection of an NCOto attend the course be undertaken with deliberation andthought. By followinga few simple steps, a commander can

ensure tha t the NCO selectedis the best qualified man in hisunit to attend the Master Gunner Course.The fust step in the selection process shouldbe the forma-tion of a battalion-level board that will recommend to thecommander which NCO should attend the course.Thisboardshould be comprised of the units Master Gunners or seniorNCOs. The board will recommend an NCO to go, but thefinal decision is the commanders.During the second step, the board makeaa list of the NCOsthat meet the course prerequisites. These are outlinedin DAPAM 3514 nd their importance cannot be overemphasized.An NCO who meeta the course prerequisites is 50 percentmore likely to graduate than an NCO who does not meetthem. There are several common areas in which NCOs fail tomeet these prerequisites:NCOs are selected who have never qualiiied a tank orhave failed to qualify one within the preceding12months(24months for National Guard).NCOs are selected who have not taken a TCGST within

6months of course attendance and are not prepared to takethe diagnostic TCGST given the first day of the course.Individuals do not volunteer to attend the coursebut aresent by the unit to fill a quota.NCOs from M60A1 units are sent to the M60A3 or MItrack of the Master Gunner Course with no baseline trainingon the newer systems.In the third step, the board should ask several questionsabout each NCO on the list. First,does he have the confi-dence and respect of other members of the chain of com-mand? An NCO who doesnt have this respectand trust will

not beable to functionasaMaster Gunner,regardlessof howwell he does in the Course. Next, does the NCO get thingsdone with minimal guidance and supervision? A MasterGunner is a planner, evaluator and troubleshooter.An NCOwho requires constant guidance and supervisionwill not beable to advise and assist the commander as effectivelyas aMaster Gunner should. Finally, does the NCO have thedesire to become a Master Gunner? This can best be deter-mined by interviewing each candidate. The board shouldquestion each NCO about his qualifications and desire tobecome a Master Gunner and then explain tohimwhat willbe expected of himas a uni t Master Gunner. An NCO with-out the desire or motivationto be a Master Gunner should notbe selected as he will have difficulty completing the course.When all NCOs have been interviewed, the board selects aprimary and an alternate candidateto attend the course. Thenames of the recommended NCOs are then given to thecommander who must interview both men to ensure thatthey are the best his unit has to offer.The final step is to give both selecteea time to preparethemselves for the course. The best way to do this is to haveanother Master Gunner work with them. He should berequired to administer a TCGST and provide both men withassistance in weak areas. The Master Gunner can also briefthem on what to expect at the course, an suggest how to takenotes and what kind of study habits must be developed to getthe most from the course. Knowing what to expect when hearrives at Fort Knox will take some of the pressure off theNCO when he begins the formal instruction. By allowing healternate NCO to prepare for the course, the uni t has someone prepared to go if something unexpected happens to theprimary candidate.This election processisby no means the only way to selectan NCO for the course Boards can also be established atcompany level or a commandercan make his own selections.No matter which process is used, it is important that theselected NCO meets the course prerequisites to increase hischances for completing the course. The commander thatmakes a careful selection will be rewarded when his NCOreturns to the unit as a Master Gunner.Commanders or unitshaving questions on how to select orprepare a n NCO for the course can contact the AdvanceGunnery Branch, Weapons Department, USAARMSby phoning AUTOVON 464-8530, or writing to HQ,USAARMC, A m TZK-W, Fort &OX, KY 40121.


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tians until the armored forces of MajorGeneral Mandlers 252d Armored Divi-sion could amve and counterattack.Instead, the Egyptians bypassed theBar Lev positions and set up ambushpositions inland to destroy the counter-attacking forces. Not only were thesesmall-scale Israeli thrusts blunted onthe first 2 days of the war, but the BarLev positions tha t were stillholding outbecame the focus of IDF attempts atrelief.On 6 and 7 October, whilehis divi-sion alone held the entire Suez front,Mandler lost threequarters of his tankstrength in futile counterattacks,but bylate afternoon on 7 October, reserveunits were arriving. Adans 162dArmored Division assembled in thenorth and Sharons 143dArmored Divi-sion formed up in the center (map 1).Upon receiving additional troops fromSharon, Mandler transferred a brigadeto each of these divisions and assumedresponsibility for the southern sector.

Independent Brigade and the 18thInfantry Division threatened the Israeliright flank (map 1).A mechanized bri-gade under direct control of SouthernCommand was then sent to Adan, buthe had to funnel the unit off to Magen,who was having difficulty holding offthe Egyptians.T h e oss of this infantryforce was later to be a critical factor.The forces Adan had available for theattack included:460th Armored Brigade, ColonelGavriel Gabi Amir, commanding,had fought the first 2 days as a part ofMandlers division, andwas down to50tanks.600th Armored Brigade, ColonelNathan Natke Nir, commanding,was a reserve formation with 71 tanks.217th Armored Brigade, ColonelArieh Karen, commanding, was areserve formation with 62 tanks, butwas strung out along theAI Arish road.Karens third battalion would not even


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Great Bitter Lake. As part of the coun-terattack, h e was to press forward andpush the Egyptians back toward the---- --A ---Le L L - - ^ _ _ - _ _ c

arrive in Adans assembly area untilafter the attack had begun (map 2).Because of the delay in the arrival ofthe 217th Brigade, Adan decided tolaunch the attack with the other t w obrigades and have Karen bring up therear. The 600th Brigade, on the right,was to advance to the canal near AlQantarah . The 460th Brigade would beon the left. Upon reaching the canal,both brigades would wheel south andadvance parallel to the canal down tothe Great Bitter Lake (map 1).Sharons division, in the center, con-sisted of three armored brigades-the

14th, 421st, and 247th. Sharon,a para-trooper turned tanker, had been a bri-gade commander in 1956 and a divisioncommander in 1967. He was, perhaps,Israels most famous and colorful sol-dier. As a commander, Sharon wascompetent, aggressive, vigorous, andextremely confidentin his own abilities.As a subordinate, the very qualitiesthat made him a good commander,hindered his relations with his super-iors. His late arrival at the 7 Octoberconference was typical of his behavior.Sharons division was screening thecenter of the front from Ismailia to the

10 ARMOR may- june 1983

CSLIISLI a11u Illant: LIleIll eaay p1ey I W 1Adans movement from the north.The Egyptian ForcesAt dawn, 8 October, the Egyptianshad been across the canal for 40 hours,and ha d fended off all Israeli attemptsto dislodge them (map 2). The 15thArmored Brigade, equipped with T-62tanks, was employed in the ruins ofAlQantarah opposite Adans division,an d elements of the 18th Infantry divi-sion were dug in around the town.South of Al Qantarah, the 2d InfantryDivision held the sector centered on a6O-ton pierced metal plank bridge at ElFirdan, and behind it the 23d Mecha-

nized Division was poised to cross thebridge into the Sinai on 8 October.St i l lfarther south, the 16th Infantry Divi-sion was deployed between Ismailiaan d the Great Bitter Lake with ordersto secure the dominant ridgelineto theirfront on 8 October. Control of this keyterrain, which had been code namedMissouri by the Israelis, would allowthe 21st Armored Division to cross tothe east bank while protected fromIsraeli artillery fire. Each of the Egy ptian Infan try divisions was reinforcedwith the antitank elements of themechanized and armored division andalso had an exceptionally high numberof RPG-7 antitank rockets and Saggerantitank missiles. By 8 October, theEgyptians had about 600 tanks acrossthe canal, while the IDF could assembleonly 500. n addition to these forces, theEgyptians also had deployed numeroussmall commando units in front of theirunits and along Israeli lines ofcommunications.Actions in theMorn in gAt 0600, Adans two forward bri-gades began their advance and almostimmediately came under sporadicartill ery fire (map 2). As the 600th Bri-gade approached A1 Qantarah, it wa sengaged by the T-62s of the 15thArmored Brigade and also by a singleMiG aircraft. The engagement quicklybecame serious. At the same time, the460th Brigade on the left was delayedby Egyptian commando hunter-killerteams. Adan ordered the 217th Brigade,which was now assembled, to advancesouth along the Tassa road, and swingin on the left of the460th Brigade (map3).Althoughthis road was to the rear ofthe Israeli forward positions, AriehKaren soon found himself engaged byartillery and hunter-killer teams. Thelack of prior reconnaissance by theIsraelis was now felt as they were notcertain of Egyptian locationsand found

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themselves held up by c(small enemy forces. NOWforces became engaged, redistortedand generally unthe Egyptian strength.As the lead elements oision moved into battltechelons of Israeli commafused. As already noted, irthe Egyptian situation vlimited. The Egyptians wepanic and be routed by 1elements to come in conkBecause of this belief, Samand continually modifiplan, making it more axuncoordinated. The basicthe role of Sharons divisicSharon was to be the an\hammer, but Sharon presssubordinate, Gonen, to Lrelieve the Israeli Bar Leiin his sector. So Sharonschanged after Adan depameeting. Sharon was to aicanal, relieve the Bar Lev forts, thenfall back and allow Adan to come infrom the north. Later, during the night,the plan changed again. Anticipatinginstant success with Adans attack,Gonen gave Sharon orders to move outat noon tdattack the bridgehead of theEgyptian Third Army, opposite Mand-lers division. To accommodate thisplan, Adan was to push down to theGreat Bitter Lake and only then forceacrossing (that was where the Israeliseventually did cross). However, theconstant minor changes in the planwere never passed to Adan, whoseheadquarters was having communica-tions difficulties. Instead, the changeswere relayed via Magen, farther to thenorth, and never reached Adan.Mostmilitary plans do not last muchpast the firing of the first shot, but theIsraeli plan wa s changing even beforethe Egyptians had a chance to disruptit.Not only was coordination within theIDF weak, but coordination with theIsraeli Air Force (I AF)was virtuallynonexistent. The IAF found itself fight-

ing the massive air defense umbrellaset up by the Egyptians along thecanal. As a result, air superiority couldnot be obtained until the surfacetuairmissile (SAM) sites were destroyed. TheIsraeli combination of armored forcesand aerial artillery which had broughtrapid victory in 1967 was broken. Therewere no forward air controllers with theground forces, and on 8 October,Adans brigades were continually firedon by their own IAF aircraft.Working under a different conceptthan that of his immediate superior,Adan gave the order to commence hisnorth-tesouth movement at 0753. By

ing, and urged Adan to continue withthe attack, despite the fact that onlyone of his brigadesw as committed at ElFirdan. Slightly to the south, Sharonhad pushed to within 3,000 meters ofthe canal, and was then halted byEgyptian resistance. On the tacticallevel, the Israelis were not prepared forthe intensive antitank defenses set upby the Egyptians, and still tried toadvance by using shock action. Thediversion of the Egyptian mechanizedinfantry to the north was taking its tollof the IDF tanks but the biggest draw-

(map 4).At 0955, with communicationsimproved, Gonen ordered Adan to movesouth and secureMissouri and the areanear the northern end of the Great Bit-ter Lake. Ten minutes later, Gonensdeputy, Brigadier Uri Ben-Ari, reaf-firmed the orders, telling Adan that theEgyptians were on the verge of collapseand maximum speed needed to be a pplied to take the northern tip of the GreatBitter Lake before they got away. Alull had occurred at A1 Qantarah as heEgyptians pulled back to reorganize.Because of this Egyptian move and hislatest orders, Adan directedNir to movesouth to take up positions on Am i r sright-near the canal. Adan receivedconflicting orders from Gonen aboutAlQantarah. First he was told the Egyptians had withdrawn, then he wasordered to clear the rubbled town.Reluctanttomovehisarmor intoa built-up area, Adan eventually left a battal-ion from Nirs brigade to contain theEgyptians and the battalion was at-tached to Magens growing northerncommand to facilitate control.

As the morning wore on, Amirs460th Brigade of two tank battalions(the third was detached to Magen)found itself under increasingly heavypressure. Lieutenant Colonel Am i r sbattalion on the right wa s particularlyhard hit. The other battalion com-manded by Lieutenant Colonel Adiniwas under less pressure, and attemptedto ease the pressure on the rest of thebrigade by conducting a cavalrycharge type of attack against the ElFirdan positions at 1100. This attack,which was launched on Adinis owninitiative, cost him 18 of his 25tanks. twas to be the first of many such small-


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timed attack by Adini left Amirs bri-gade in bad shape. Therefore, whenNiisbrigade, less the battalion detachedto Magen, began to arrive, rather thanbeing in a better position to attack,Adan found himself feeding Nir in onAmirs right, just to preserve Amirsremaining tanks.At the same time, the most remarka-ble event of the day occurred-Gonenordered Sharon to move to the south.Previously, Gonen had shown a lack ofknowledge concerning what was actu-ally occurring on the battlefield. Nowhe amplified his mistake. Sharonsthree brigades were holdinga line southof Adan from below El Firdan to theGreat Bitter Lake. Originally orderedtohold the Egyptians in place, whileAdan attacked the north flank, Sharonfound himself under increasing pres-sureas he Egyptian 16th Infantry Divi-sion, reinforced with armor, attemptedto expand its bridgehead to ease thecrossing of the 21st Armored Division.The pressure on Sharon was veryheavy when he received his orders. Hewas tomove south and secure the MitlaPassan d aid Mandler in containing theThird Army. The withdrawal of Sharonexposed Adans left flank at a time

wi ie i i ni iarui i wiLiiurew, uuc wasattacked by Egyptians from both thenorth a nd south and forced towithdrawto the northeast (map 4).Actions in the Afternoon

As the afternoon began, the IDFattack had not materialized. Poorreconnaissance, conflicting orders, anda lack of awareness had caused the IDFforces to launch uncoordinated, piecemeal attacks. However, Adan stillplanned to attack, now that he had twoarmoredbrigades positioned in front ofEl Firdan. Both Amir and Nir were toadvance at the same time on lineagainst the Egyptian positions. Themornings action had seriously reducedthe forces tha t Adan could commit to ameager four battlaions of about 20tanks each. Fire support was limited tothree batteries of field artillery. Airsupport was on the way and sched-uled to arrive in 30 minutes. There wasno infantry.Because of the situation, Adandeemed it best to advance slowly withthe four battalions, using the terrain ascover and closing the distance betweenthe Israelis and the Egyptians. Once airsupport became available, the finalassault would commence. Reports indi-cated a steady flow of Egyptian vehi-cles across the El Firdan bridge into theSinai; therefore, as soon as Nir was inposition at 1315,Adan gave the order toadvance.Initial movement was slow, and by1330 Nirs right battalion, LieutenantColonel Nathan, commanding, washalted by fires from Egyptian tanksand Sagger missiles. The battalionssecond-in-command was killed. Shortlyafterward, Egyptian multiple rocketlauncher volleys began landing amongthe lead elements, totally destroyingtheir visibility and further slowing upthe advance. While Nirs right battalionwas stopped by this fire, his left battal-ion (with whom he was collocated)under Lieutenant Colonel Yagouri, con-tinued to advance toward the canal. Inthe meantime, Amirs brigade, reducedto remnants except for a battalion d etached from Karen, advanced only asfar as the edge of the hills, approxi-mately 1,500 meters from the canal.There, all cover ended and the groundwas flat and open up to the canal.Already stung in the morning, Amirwas prepared to wait for the promisedair support before trying to advanceagain. To the south, Karen was to support the attack by attacking the Eg ypti an s frontally-the role originallyreserved for Sharons departed division.

By 1400, only Yagouris lone battal-

within 800meters of the canal at about1415 hours, all hell broke loose. Theattacking force was trapped in the killzone of a n Egyptian ambush. Yagourifound himself suddenly among theEgyptian trenches and his tanks werefired upon at close range by machineguns and RpGs. Furtherto the rear, Nirwatched the tanks around him getpicked off one after another. He beat ahasty retreat, taking only four surviv-ing tanks with him. Then Yagourisluck totally ran out. By 1430, Nir nolonger received any radio messagesfrom him. The Egyptian commander,Brigadier General Hasan Abu Saada,reported later that Yagouris battalionhad been destroyed within 3 minutes.Yagouri himself, along with four oth-ers, was taken prisoner. That nightYagouri was paraded on Egyptian television and Egyptian propagandaquickly promoted him to brigadecommander. Out of the attacking forceof 25 tanks, only n ine survived. Adanhad lost one tank battalion in the morn-ing and a second in the afternoon.The Israelis had little time to ponderthei r defeat because indications of anEgyptian counterattack were evident.Egyptian forces were massing in frontof Amir and Nir, and to the south,Karen was already under attack. At1430 Karen reported armored attacksfrom the north and south and heavyartillery f i r e began to fall on Israelipositions all along the hn t .The Egyptian AttackThe Egyptian attack on 8 Octoberwas not a counterattack per se. Theattack was part of the Egyptian planand was made to consolidate thebridgeheads. The unsuccessful Israeliattacks just happened to play right intothe Egyptians hands. So did the timeof day. The sun was slowly setting inthe west a nd would be in the Israeliseyes all afternoon, reducing visibility,and allowing the Egyptians to getcloser before the highly-effective IDFtank gunnery could take effect. Theattack would be launched along twoaxes, both due east.The northernmosteffort would be made by elements of the23d Mechanized and 2d Infantry Divi-sion moving out of the El Firdanbridgehead. This forcewas o seize thesmall range of hills upon which Amirhad positioned himself and to push asfar inland as possible. The southerndrive would be made by elements of the16th Infantry Division, reinforced withtanks, to secureMissouri ridge near thenorthern end of the Great Bitter Lake(map 5).


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when-radio calls indicated tha t both oftheir brigades were on the verge ofbeing overrun and they hastily returnedto their units. Meanwhile, to the south,Karen was being attacked by anotherlarge force.By 1700, Adan was thinking in termsof a general retreat to preserve his divi-sion, but he was old tha t Sharon wasreturning a nd would be able to counter-attack, so he ordered his brigades tohold their positions. Due to muddledcommunications, Sharons attack nevertook place, but one of his brigades, the421st, conducted a n uncoordinatedattack abreast of Karens flank. At thesame ime, Karen sent two battalions tothe southeast to spoil the Egyptianattack and they were fired upon by e lements of the 421st brigade. Nevertheless, the pressure on Karen was relievedand with the sun now set, the tablesturned in the battle in front of El Fir-dan. The initial Egyptian attack wasstopped in the same devastatingmanner as had been earlier Israeli

is proved to o eager to advance withoutadequate reconnaissance an d flankprotection. While unity of commandunder Gonen existed on paper, it didnot exist in fact. His division com-manders, being senior, generally disregarded his orders whenever they feltlike it. The result was lack of coordina-tion, which resulted in units of Sharonsdivision sitting watching Adans unitsbeing destroyed, or later, units of thetwo divisions running into and shoot-ing at each other.One of the major causes of the earlydefeat was the lack of combined armscoordination. The tank isdesigned to beused as the center piece of a combinedarms system consisting of armor,infantry, artillery, and combat supportelements including engineer units andtactical air. Adans force was almosttotally lacking in these elements. heinfantry had been given away to shoreup hot spots along the northern edge ofthe canal. Air support was limited dueto the Egyptians SAM threats and

FIRST LIEUTENANT JOHNJ. McGRATH was cornrnis-sioned through ROTC in FieldArtillery and is a graduate ofthe FAOBC and FACBOC atFort Sill. He served in variousfield artillery and mechanizedinfantry uni t s in the 8 th Infan-tr y Division, Germany, beforetransferring to the Infantry in1980.He is an honor graduateof the IOAC in 1982 and pres-ently is assigned to Co A, 3-18 th Inf. 187th Inf Bde,USAR.

may-june 1983 13

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Armor Training Simulators Are On The Wayby Lieutenant Colonel J. Michael Weaver and Richard A. Renfrow

After several years of red tape, engineering, building, test-ing, and modifying, a production contract has been signedand assembly lines are being set for the Unit Conductof FireTrainer (U-C0FT)-one of several high-technology simula-tors tha t are designed to support armor training.The U-COFl' is a training device used to sustain a highlevel of gunnery proficiency over long periodsof time. Unlikethe subcaliber devices in current use, the U-COFl' providesthe environment, he scenario, and the feedback.It is a simu-lator that , in many ways, outperforms he real thing (in train-ing),as opposed to subcaliber substitution or miniaturizationdevices.Every Active Component battalion or squadron equippedwith the Ml Abrams tank orM2/3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle(BFV) ill have a U-COFT. The dust ha s not yet settled overwhether or not we will have a n M60A3 model U-COFT andwhich Reserve Component uni ts will get the U-COFT.

The most noticeable characteristic of the U-COFT is ita

size. It is not a tabletop trainer. It is housed in three standardmilitary shelters (a type of van without wheels) that areinterconnected, placed on a gravel or concrete pad, andhooked up to a power supply (figure1).Internal ArrangementsOperational testing at Fort Hood, TX, using a two-shelterconfiguration, evealed a need for an environmental buffer-something to keep the air in the main sheltersat a constanttemperature. The first shelter (figure la ) does this whilea lsoprovidinga waiting room, maintenance area, and a briefing/-debriefingarea The shelters avoid having to erect specialbuildings all over the world and make it possibleto move theU-COFT, if necessary. However, the U-COFTis not meant tobe a portable trainer and moving it is a big operation, not tobe done unless absolutely necessary.The instructor station (figure lb ) looks somewhat forbid-ding when viewed close up (figure 2)-Knobs, switches,lights, monitors and, most forbiddingof all,a keyboard). But


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it was designed to be run b y armor platoon sergeants Lplatoon leaders. The operational test proved that these peccan do the job. After the U-COFTis fielded, platoon leadcmaster gunners, and Advanced Noncommissioned 0%Course and Armor Officer Basic Course students will receinstruction on it and be certified as U-COFT operators.Operating the U-COETThe instructor switches the trainer on, checks it out, ecorrecta minor problems. He may occasionally havechange a plug-in module when a faulty one is found du rthe beforeoperation check. All maintenance above the opttor level-organizational, direct support, general suppan d depot-will be done by contractor personnel. A contItor maintenance technician for organizational and dirsupport maintenance will be at or near each U-COFT sitcThe instructor tells the incoming crew what they willdoing during their U-COFT training session, sees tha t tlare properly placed i n the crew compartment an d followiinstructions in the Instrudors Utilization Handbook, selethe exerciseto be conducted by using the keyboard and mctors the action. He sees what both the tank commander(Iand the gunner see in their sights, hears wha t is going Iand has a monitor tha t displays the gunners progress. If 1crew has problems, he can talk them through the exercisechange them toone that is more appropriate to their levelexpertise. After the session, the instructor can debrief 1crew, using a printout showing what they did, or failed to IThe magazines front cover and figure3show a represention of a sight picture from the MI U-COFT. The picture icomputor-generated image (CGI). It looks like a color animation, and it could be made with more detail, but o n l ya greater dollar cost. Nevertheless, it does the job. The reatic action of the simulated engagements makes the crforget that the scenesare animated. But, even though thena wide variety of scenes, targets, and engagement exercisthe clarity of the U- COWS visual presentations limitsability to teach target acquisition and identification.The crew compartment (figureIC)ncludes only the gun1and TC stations an d is cut down the centerline of the mzgun to save space (figure4). Nevertheless, the TC and gunrstations are nearly exact replicas of those in a real tank.0major difference is in the TCs hatch. There is only the fward vision block and the hatch must remain closed. TIwas a cost tradeoff.The U-COFI enables the gunner and TC to do about eve,,thing they can do in a real tank in the closed-hatch mode. Toachieve passing scores for the exercises and to progress tomore advanced exercises, they must do everything correctly.Successful U-COFT training will not depend upon theinstructors mood that day, or what the crew thinks they canget by with.The crew moves through a series of 390 different multien-gagement exercises that are progressively more difficult.However, they do not have to go through each exercise toreach the top, an d there are many paths through the system,depending upon the crews ability and the selections of theinstructor. The exercises range from stationmy-tank tostationary-target engagements to moving-tank to moving-target engagements. Engagement conditions vary from full-up fire controls to a degraded mode, from single to multipletargets, and from day to night and other reduced visibilitysituations. Gunners use the periscope, telescope, and thermalsight; the laser rangefinder, and both the coaxial and caliber.50 machineguns. On a good day, the TC and gunner mayattain a high score and return 2 weeks later to find that theycannot beat it. Users should not be discouraged by thisbecause the device was designed to be as challenging as thetank system. No one is going to get bored from the same old,repetitious stuff.

voltage and capacity to run the U-COFI. The power specifi-cations will come with the site selection criteria, and th is iscertain-a heavy duty extension cord will not do the job.Without an adequate power source, the installation teammaybe forced to move on to the next site leaving the unit with acold U-COFI until an adequate hookup is installed and thecontractors can return to hook it up and train the unit.Unit UsageUnits must be prepared to use the U-COFTat its maximumcapacity to sustain proficiency at substantial cost savings.An armor battalion at Training Readiness Condition Arequires over $2 million in ammunition costs alone forannual gunnery training and qualification. Multiply that bythe number of battalions that exist and it is evident tha t a nextremely large amount of money is spent each year for tankgunnery. Even that expenditure doesnt buy a high level ofproficiency between qualiiication periods. Studies indicate a

rapid decline in hit probability, coupled with a n increase inARMOR may- june 1983 15

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engagement time, beginning very shortly after the quaMca-tion period. An intensive tra ining program to shore up thissag in proficiency, using standard training methods-a lot oflive fire-would cost over $5 million per battalion (to saynothing of time an d range space tha t are usually in shortrmPP1Y.)That same high level of proficiencyis attainabl e for a frac-tion of the cost using a U-COFIbased training program. Ofcourse, differing training programs and cost computationmethods are going to make comparisons difficult However,we are confident that substantial savings over currentmethods will be realized using the U-COFT program. Moreimportantly, within current or reduced training budgets,uni ts will be able to maintain a high level of gunnery profi-ciency between periods of intensive livefire gunnery t rainingand aualification.

Conversely, if the U-COFI is not used, or is used only in aperfunctory manner, neither savings nor proficiency will berealized an d the un i t will waste its time and money. Th er efore, as ammunition and fuel costs continue to rise, as rangespace and time remain in short supply, and the need for sus-tainment of a high proficiency level exists, U-COFI use mustnot be left to chance or whim-time in the simulator must bemade mandatory for tank crews, just as time in a flight simu-lator is for aviators.New technology in the form of the U-COFT will maketraining:

Efficient in terms of cost and time.Frequent with less scheduling problems an d administra-Objective in terms of better scoring and feedback.Interesting and challengingwith a variety of progressiveexercises.Standardized because units the world over will use thesame core training.Hence, U-COFI will be more effective in sustaining and,when necessary, gaining gunnery skill and proficiency.The U-COFT can be used for all types of single tank

engagements. It can be used regardless of weather, doesntrequire a range, provides proper feedback, and it gives thecrews a challenge and a real change of pace. But with onlyone U-COFT per battalion to go around, each crew has alimited slice of time in it per month. And, it does not giveinteraction with the driver, loader, and other tanks.More New TrainingDevicesAnother high technology initiative is called the Tank Wea-pons Gunnery Simulation System (TWGSS).This s a preci-sion gunnery trainer hooked into a tank which can be usedon the range or in a tactical forceon-force exercise. It will bethe product of technological evolution.From 1975 to 1977, REALTRAIN, low-level tacticalengagement system for armor vehicles, was developed andfielded. At the same time, the requirements for a better sys-tem using laser technology were approved and engineering16 ARMOR may-june 1983

tive time.

workbegun.As a result,we now have the Multiple IntegratedLaser Engagement System (MILES)or combined arms aetical training. The system enables a tank to kill an d be killedin a fair ly realistic manner. But while MILES permits you toshoot, it does not provide the capability to do precision tankgunnery-and wasnt intended to. The technology was notthen available to put precision gunnery in to a tactical trainerat a reasonable cos t There was also the safety problemasso-ciated with the M60A3 and MI tank laser rangefinders toconsider. But the idea of providing precision gunnery simula-tion on the tank was pursued.The requirement was first expressed as the Marksmanshipand Gunnery Laser Device (MAGLAD). After a feasibilitystudy was made to explore possible technological solutions,the requirement for a laser was eliminated since its directlineof-sight characteristics were not suitable for ballistic tra-jectory simulation. When the requirement was changed toallow any technological solution, the acronymn was changedto TWGSS. The weapons to be simulated were the main gunan d both machineguns. A key feature was that it would notonly be a gunnery trainer, for use with target systems on arange, but would also put that gunnery training into a forceon-force context, thus integra ting tactics an d gunnery, asmust be done in battle. But i n the forceon-force context it wasrestricted to tank-on-tank unless it could be integrated intoMILES, which didnt seem likely at the time.The TWGSS concept has evolved further. TWGSSwas restricted o main gun use only, with the machinegunsemploy-ing the MIUS systems.Now, there are indications th at technology ha s evolvedtothe point where a precision tank gunnery system can be in tegrated into the total MILES.There are two ways to do this:Buy or build a system, distinct from the current MILES,which is capable of operating on ranges, and which wouldreplace or be a substitute for the tank-mounted MILES devi-ces for tactical force-on-force training.Obtain a product improvement of MILES to allow precision tank gunnery during tactical training and permitstand-alone precision gunnery with a target system on arange.In either case, there should be one system in the field toSUPPOrt.The TWGSS operational requirements can be brieflystated. It will be developed for the M1, M60A3, and M60AItanks (and possibly the BFV) to provide the capability tosimulate all engagements within the capability of the actualweapon system. It will provide flash, bang, obscuration, sightdisplacement during firing, a tracer display as appropriate,and an impact indication-hit or miss. It will simulate firinga round in engagements under the same kind of visibilityconditions as could be fired in actual combat. Ranging to atarget and leading moving targets will be done exactly aswith the simulated weapon system with the same penaltiesfor errors. TWGSS can be used to either engage a target sys-tem on a range or for forceon-force exercises at battalionlevel or below. Itwillbeeasily installed a nd removed and willalso permit normal t ank system calibration/boresighting obe done. One last, but very important feature, is the crewevaluation subsystem. The subsystem will record informa-tion on each engagement, including aim and impact points,true range and crew-determined range, ammunition indexedan d fi red, and engagement time.To use the TWGSS on th e MI an d M60A3 tanks, the laserrangefinder safety problem had to be solved. A set of twofilters was developed for the M60A3 tank to fit over the laserport. A completely eyesafe green filter is used for forceon-force exercises. But the beam is attenuated so much thatreflectors are needed to aid th e beams return. Consequentlythere are no multiple returns. So a red filter was developed o

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provide something less than absolute eycmitting unaided returns and multiple retsafe for the naked eye beyond 300metersmeters it is safe even when using binocul;M60A3 tanks equipped with TWGSS anbe used on a range with full rangefinder cmore, the red filter can also be used duringfiring exercises to permit proper rangingsince some ranges that are safe for projesufficiently safe for lasers.Filters are being produced now to outfiUSAREUR with other units to follow. A 6MI tank presents a more complicated insUnlike the M60A3, the MI tank design d aapplication of an external filter, since thethe rangefinder is shared by other optics. 1ne M I K pro-ject manager has taken on the task of building the filter intothe rangefinder.

A Mixture ofSimulators and Other DevicesThe plan, for these training simulators n general,is to fielda swi%cient variety and quantity of them to enable a n effec-tive sustainment gunnery training program to be accomplished economically, regardless of unit location. While thattakes in new technology,it does not exclude the old when itserves a useful purpose. Thus, wewill have a mixture of oldand new devices, of high and l o w technology, with eachfillinga definite need in the training spectrum.How much ofeach need is filled by using a particular device is dependentupon the units training requirements.For instance, for some gunnery skills training, the scaledrange with theBrewster subcaliber deviceis good enough-ifa range is available. Even though a complete precisiongunnery engagement is not faithfully duplicated,some of themanual and coordinationskills and some procedurescan betaught. The troops get into the tank environment and theyget cold, or hot, or dirty, according to the existing situation.They also get bored if thats all they ever do.

TWGSSwill enable the whole crew to train together-thewhole platoon, for that matter. (We are still investigatingloader interaction.) Now they can tie together the manualand procedural skills derived from the subcaliber trainingwith the engagement skills acquired from the U-COFI. Theycan train in an environment tha t checks out and confirmstheir skills, builds confidence in past training, provides stillmore training using a slightly different angle, and keepstheir interest up between main gun live firings.Since the U-COFI trains only two crewmenat a time, aplatoon would probably schedule concurrent training forcrew members not occupied with the U-COFI.There is no single training method tha t is economical,effi-cient, and effective and that holds interest week in and weekout. Tank crews need to do some of their work together, someas ndividuals. Sometimes hey need to train in close contactwith the vehicle and sometimes they need to save wear andtear on the tank.The Armor Center intends to create a series of trainingdevices tha t areadaptable to the varied training situations ofarmor units worldwide and will permit those units to gainand maintain gunnery proficiency within the local con-straints of time, money, space, and people. A report by theUS. rmy Training Support Center makes this point, how-ever: Extensivevisits to units in the field. . evealed a lmos tas many approaches to training as there were units. Thetraining devices under development will permit flexibilityinscheduling and allow for differences in unit capabilities,while creating a considerable degree of standardization intraining. That is not to say that everyone will use the U-COFI for2 hours on alternate Thursdays. But everyone who

proposetoaaatoournst 01aewces oxuy when a new item a i sa gap, and replace an existing or programmed device onlywhen the replacement is clearly superior and affordable.The Tank Gunnery and Missile Tracking System and theMK60 low-cost gunner trainer are such devices under consid-eration. The MK60 was developed to check out the applica-7

cion of video disc technology to army training.The MK60, in its basic form, is a tabletop device tha t pro-vides stationary M60Al tank gunnery engagements for thegunner only. It can be adapted to simulate the M60A3 andMI tanks, and the addition of a TC position is planned.Engagements are limited toown tank stationary using thegunners primary sight-there is no compartment withrealistically-situated controls as in the larger U-COFI. Itpresents realistic targets in a real scene on a TV monitor andpermits the gunner to practice difficult engagement proce-dures with proper fire commands; particularly, it presentsrealistic moving-target engagements much more frequentlythan can be done with the U-COFT. The MK60 should beused during the time gaps between U-COFT training andon-tank training sessions to provide effective, interesting,and frequent training that will prevent the rapid deteriora-tion of gunnery skills. Asa relatively low-costdevice, enoughof them can be purchased for each company to have one.The Tank Gunnery and Missile Tracking System(TGMTS)issometimes calledDetras, the name of the British manufac-turer, and is also known as he combat training theater. Itsadevice that tums the tank into a stationary simulator.2 Arear-projection movie screen is the dominant feature(figure5).As the gunner tracks the target in h is sights, optical d evices mounted on the tank and projector console track thelineof-sight aiming point. When the gun is fired, a smallcomputer calculates the hit point for the detectedai mpoint,


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and fires a point of red eyesafe laser light to simulate thetrajectory and impact of the indexed round. The instructorcontrols the engagements and critiques the crew.This train-ing occupies a relatively small space in a darkened buildingand gives the gunner and TC the ability to fire stationary-tank to moving-target engagements. Its disadvantages areranging limitations, and no own-tank-moving engagements can be simulated. Ita advantages over scaled-range,subcaliber exercises include more target realism and betterengagement procedure duplication, while retaining theenvironment of thetank.TGMTS isnow used by USAREURuni ts and it appears to have great potential as a gunnerytrainer for Reserve Componentuntawhose Training Readi-ness Condition levels do not warrant a U-COFT. It representsa good balance between training coverage on the one handand costltime effectiveness on the other, with the majoralternatives being scaled ranges and U-COFT. Scaled rangeswith subcaliber devices have a definite place in a full unittraining program, but given he limited amount of trainingtime available to Reserve Components,a training device pro-viding more realism, but less costly than a U-COFT, isdesirable.Gunner and TC training devicesare mportant because thecost of gunnery training ha s grabbed the lions share ofattention in armor training device development. But, train-ing developers are also lookingat training for the driver andthe mechanic-for the full crew via a full-crew interactionsimulator and, as we mentioned, for the platoon leader, andpossibly the full platoon leadership team. Other devices inthe works include new targets and target carriers plus newtraining ammunition and safety devices. The family of tacti-cal engagement simulation devices is growing. A targetacquisition training device using video disc technology and amicrocomputer is under consideration. The TRADOC Com-bined A r m s Test Activity at Fort Hood, TX has developed athrough-thesight video system that promisesto make dryfiring more objective and meaningful.Finally, a trainer has been built for the M2 /M3 Bradleyfighting vehicles and a contract ha s been let forM60AI tankprototype devices resembling video arcade games that are tobe used to determine their adaptability to military trainingrequirements. ConclusionNew technology in an d of itself is not a panacea for all theold training ills, just as it is not necessarily the remedy forperceived shortcomings in combat readiness. There isabundant evidence that technology can cause more problemsthan it is intended to cure, if not applied carefully. Onedefense analyst concluded:The acrosstheboard thrust toward ever-increasing ech-

nological complexity just is not working. We need to18 ARMOR may-june 1983

it down. ..The evidence presented reveals that: Our strategy ofpurs uing eve r-increa sing technical complexity a ndsophistication has made high technology solutions andcombat readiness mutually exclusive.(emphasis by orig-inal a~t ho r) . ~At first glance, this quotation appears to be a damningindictment of what we are trying to d-apply new technol-ogy to training problems that affect combat readiness. Butkey to his conclusion is his statement th a t We need tochange the way we do business.. .we should use our superiortechnology in a positive way. Technology should and canincrease readiness . . .We agree. The fact that a certain technologyis availabledoes not mean th at is ha s to be used. We must be selectiveand careful in its application-careful that, in prescribing adose of technology to a training problem, we do not incapaci-tate the patient with pain from supply and maintenanceproblems-careful that the technology in question is reallyright for the training requirement-and careful th at we donot replace something that worksfor u s with something tha t

works against us.Yes, new technology is coming. We need to be alert, notalarmed. We need to be enthusiastic about the opportunity,not overwhelmed by fascination with gadgetry, or angeredby the passing of the older forms of training. If we use newtechnology wisely, we can train better th an we do now-andmore cheaply.Footnotes

1 WeaponsCrewTraining Study,Interim I Report, November !%@February1982.US. rmy TrainingSupportCenter.p. 1-5.2 Combat Training Theaters.by Ann Mulligan, MayJune 1978ARMOR p.46.Defense Facts of Life, by Franklin C. Spiney, December 5, 1980. IyIlCADA111544.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL: J.MICHAEL WEAVER has servedas Chief Training Devices Divi-sion, DTD. U S A A R M C . sinceJuly 1981. He was commis-sioned in armor from OCS in1965and before that served asa tank driver, loader, gunner,tank commander and platoonsergeant. Since commission-ing, he has served in tank an dcavalry u n i t s as platoonleader, company XO and CO,and, battalion XO. He hasserved in CONUS, Europe,Korea, and Vietnam.

RICHARD A. RENFROW is anequipment specialist at theTraining Devices Division ofthe Armor School Directorateof Training Developments.Before joining the ArmorSchool staff in 1975, he wasan electronic technician withthe Armor Center Directorateof Industrial Operations.

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Soviet Wartime Tank Formationsby Major Albert 2. Conner and Robert G. Poirier

(This material has been reviewed bythe Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA)toassist the authors in eliminating class-ified information, f any; however, thatreview neither constitutes CIA au th n-tication of material as factual nor im-plies CIA endorsement of the authorsviews,,Todays massive modem Soviet ar-mored forces occupy terri torystretchingfrom the Pacific westwardto the borderof the Federal Republic of Germany.These forces, crowned by tank forma-tions, are clearly the most formidablemass of that type found in any of theworlds major powers. Together with thearmored forces of th e Warsaw Pac tnations they embody the decisiveground-gainingstrike force threateningNATOin both conventional and nuclearwar scenarios.Therefore,it is essential for the Westto understand th e underlying nature of

thsthreat. In orderto accurately do so,we must examine its historicalprogres-sion in threeways.First,the essentialaspectsof militaryart, which drove the development oftank forces, must be set forth. Second,the organizational methodologyusedbythe Sovietsmust beanalyzed.Third,theevolution of the tank formations in theepoch years ofWW 11must be reviewed.The Great Patriotic W d (WW 11),which served as the crucible for thedevelopment of all Soviet armed forces,can be more objectively studied nowthan at any time in the past. We havet ied to do so in this article by using acombination of Soviet writings,recentlydeclassified intelligencedocuments,andthe files of the wartime German in-telligence organization,ForeignArmiesEast (Fremde Heere OstFH O). Webelieve that these sources can providethe most realistic insights to date into

the development of the Soviettankforce.The ability to view tank forcerequi rementa through Soviet eyes is of primeimportance to understanding theirdevelopmental processes. The U.S.S.R.is historically a Continental power andenjoys grea t geographic adva ntag eswhen considering land combatin eitherAsia or Europe. Thus, Russian forceplanners pay considerable attention tospecific military-geographic reg ionswhere their enormous ground forces arelikelytobe in combat.This s in contrastto American planners who, due to thenature of our global commitments,mustshape forces hat can operatesuccessful-ly in any environment. Soviet militarytheorists have organized all of theregions of the periphery of the U.S.S.R.an d the rest of the worlds continentaland maritime areas into theaters of war(teatr toyny-TV).2 These a re threedimension al area s where hostilities


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SIZE Of F W E SBRINGING UNIT 1W

TO STRENGTHBANNERSAOMIN/

IFigure 1.

may occur. The TV s further dividedinto theater s of military operations( teatr voynnykh deystviy-TVD). Theaear e ground, maritime, or interconti-nental areas where their armed services(strategic rocket, ground, national airdefense, and air and naval forces) willengage in actual combat. T V D s areclassified as either main or secondary,and are themselves subdividedintooneor more strategic axes or directions.Strategic axes lead from key areas ofSoviet territory to an adversary'sstrategic objectives.' Since the Sovietsview the modem tank army as both amajor field force and a strategic forma-tion of the ground forces, the strategicaxis de facto becomes an importantmilitary geographic entity in force plan-ning. Even more important in the structuring of tank forces, however, is theoperationalaxis.Thisisa subdivision ofa strategic axis tha t, like its largercounterpart, leads to important objeetives. The primary significance of anOperational axis, however, is the facttha t i t considers the enemy's mainforces in terms of both locations andcomposition.A shifting or restructuringof the enemy's forces causes a consequent shift in the Soviet operationalaxis . Otherwise, only a change in thegoals or objectivesof the operation couldforce such a shift.Thus, we arriveat ourfirst significant conclusion: Soviet forcestructure for tank units is primarilybased on the premise of defeating a

specific enemy on the designated opera-tional a x i s . 5Second in importance, when viewingtank force development through Sovieteyes, is an insight into their organiza-tional methodology figure1). n ordertoaccomplish this, we must first under-stand the roles of the OrganizationalDepartment of the General Staff. InWW 11, as today, that department wasresponsiblefor the size, composition andstructure of the armed forces. I t em-ployed a n approach that may at fi rstseem peculiar to American readers-that of extreme centralization. Thecommand element a t every level strictlycontrolled the actions of the units andmeans assigned to it in the execution ofhighly centralized plana and orders.Centralization in the planning andorganization of forceswas (and is) th enat ura l extension of th at principle.Tank forces were systematicallystructured according to studied an destablished norms, calculations and for-mulae. This was accomplished in anenvironment that drew heavily onhistory and science, supplemented byexperimental feedback. The availablehistories of the organizationalprocessesreveal a confluence of the ruthless,driving personalities of major Sovietwartime leaders and the steady, schol-arly seriousnessof general staffofficers.These staff officers immersed them -selvesin the study ofmilitary geographicregions, the battles or operations at

hand, and the availability, quality, andquantity of weapons, vehicles, andequipment. All of this was intended toassur e one resul t the superiority ofSoviet formations over those of theirenemies. The end result of this processwas vested in a "correct" tab le oforganization to defeat a specif~cnemy,at a specific time, and in a speciscoperation.6The mechanics of the organizationalprocess are worth summarizing. Thepolitico-military strategic goal s wereestablished by Stalin and the St ateDefense Committee (Gosudars tvennyKomi t e t O borony - G KO ) . Militarystrategy, which primarily determinedthe mission of the armed forces andweighted the main efforts, was workedout by the senior military leadership( S t a v h ) . A commander of a front orarmy was given a plan, orders, a pre-determined and tailored force structure,and an ar ray of subcommanders (ar-tillery, tank, ear services, etc.), withstr ict vertical command chai ns an doperating procedures. The combat orderitselfreflected hisprocess: itwa s ar igiddirective issued by the commander tosubordinatesto carry out the plans hemade. The order not only includedintelligence and other general itemscommon to all orders, but it also con-tained radical differences. It had rigidtimetables; designated placement ofcommand posts with their deploymenttimes and extremely precise tasks tobe executed byt he chief/commandersof t he various arm s and services. It iswithi thi s context tha t the organiza-tional process took place.7The Organization, or SecondDeparbment, of th e General Staff receivedvalidated requirements from the Opera-tions (First) Department.These werear-rived a t through the process describedearlier. Specific responsibility for ar-mored and cavalry forcesw as vested ina section of the Organization Depart-ment, which normally contained adozen officers commanded by ageneral-major (one star). The section made athorough study and analysis tha t led tospecialized organizational structures ofregiments, divisions,corps,and armiesfor the planned operations. This taskrequired that the section have detailedknowledge of the curren t locations,personnel, an d equipment st at us ofevery uni t (by 1944, for example, theGermans had identified173Soviet tankregiments, 181brigades and 33cavalrydivisions).B In addition to the normalfactors, the section also had to considerstudies of combat experienceswritten bya special section of the General Staff.Input from active field commanders andfrom the s t a f f of the Commander ofTank Troops of the Red Army also had


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only the General Staff, as the execu-tive arm of the Supreme HighCommand ( ue rkhounoy e g lav noy ekomamandouaniye- VGK), ould de-termine the organization of the armedforces. Only they answered all the ques-tions incumbent on such decisions. Inthe Soviet view, only a radical shift inthe political goals of the war, or the in-troduction of dramatic new technologyor weaponry, could radically alter thisorganizational methodology.9The final step in comprehending thedevelopment of Soviet tank forces is theexamination of structural changes thatappeared during WW 11. To set thisscene into its historical perspective, wemust first set forth the principal factorsaffecting tank troops before Germanysinvasion of Russia. The Eastern Frontin WW I was essentially the same futilebloodbath inflicted in the west. It had,however, left some Germans with a nalternate school o

1983 may june

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