1972-11-15 memo re marshall study of india and pakistan.pdf

8/10/2019 1972-11-15 memo re Marshall study of India and Pakistan.pdf

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286. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau ofIntelligence and Research (Cline) to the Deputy Secretary ofState (Irwin)1

Washington, November 15, 1972.

NSCIC CONSIDERATION OF WORKING GROUP CASE STUDYON INDIAPAKISTAN CRISIS

Henry Kissingers office has asked for your comments on theNSCIC Working Groups Case Study of the IndiaPakistan Crisis of1971.2 The recommended response is attached (Tab A).3

This case study is the first of several planned by the WorkingGroup to illuminate problems in the relationship between the Intelli-gence Community and its prime consumers. The study was preparedin the spring of 1972 by a three-man team from CIA, DIA and INR un-der the supervision of Andrew Marshall of the NSC staff. Curtis Jones,Director of INRs Office of Research and Analysis for Near East andSouth Asia, served as team leader. The team examined CIA, DOD andState files and a summary of WSAG minutes, and interviewed some

of the policy makers directly concerned with the India-Pakistan crisis.The study reaches conclusions about the performance of the In-

telligence Community and poses issues related to these conclusions. Itdoes not examine how policy makers used the Communitys productsor offer recommendations for action. The key conclusions are:

1. Most intelligence products are produced by a single agency butthe products of different agencies are often very similar. Only NationalIntelligence Estimates (NIE or SNIE) and items in the daily Current In-telligence Bulletin published by CIA are coordinated.

Issue: What is the optimum mix of coordination with timelinessand responsiveness to departmental needs?

The Intelligence Community and the White House 645

1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files: NSCICNSCIC WorkingGroup, 19711974. Secret. Drafted by Berry and concurred in by Kux and Laingen.

2 Intelligence Support in Political-Military Crises: A Case Study of the India

Pakistan Crisis of 1971, June 15, 1972. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 197073,POL 27 INDIAPAK) Kissinger asked for comments on the study in anticipation of ameeting of the NSC Intelligence Committee on November 29, which would have beenthe committees second meeting and first since December 3, 1971, but the meeting didnot take place. Marshalls agenda for the meeting, dated November 27, is in the Libraryof Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 301, Intelligence Commit-tee, 197174.

3 Attached but not printed.


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2. Some intelligence collection was very timely, pertinent and ac-curate, but for some periods, places and topics there were no satisfac-tory collection facilities.

Issue: What collection capabilities ought to be maintained for usein possible contingencies of this regional crisis kind?

3. Many intelligence estimates and judgments were impressivelycorrect. On other points the Community was silent, wrong, or contra-dictory. Some correct key judgments were expressed once and not re-peated even though much of the Community still considered themvalid. A clandestine report relating to Indian intentions was presentedto the NSC early in December in unevaluated or uncoordinated formsand policy makers could have formed the erroneous view that the Com-munity accepted the report without reservation.

Issue: How can the Community most effectively keep policy mak-ers aware of its current coordinated positions?

4. Members of the Community reported to policy makers volu-minously and, for the most part, separately. Caution, volume, brevityand variations caused by agency requirements muffled the Commu-nitys message, but the Community members had no way of knowingwhether an intelligence finding reached any individual policy maker

or whether he understood and accepted it.Issue: Through what channel and in what format or volume can

the Community most effectively communicate with policy makers and,in critical cases, get some feedback on the usefulness of reporting?

5. INR, CIA and DIA often lacked information on policy sessionsand high level exchanges with other countries. Generally these intelli-gence producers felt isolated from policy makers and usually they hadto decide for themselves what intelligence might be relevant to policy

making. Some comments and actions by policy makers indicated thelatter were not aware of intelligence judgments or not persuaded bythem.

Issue: Can intelligence effectively support policy making if intelli-gence producers are not informed on the nature and basis of policyproblems?

The Chairman of the NSCIC Working Group, in forwarding theCase Study to NSCIC, reported that the Working Group will make adetailed analysis of lessons learned in this study and recommend im-proved procedures. To facilitate this process he also suggested that af-ter NSCIC members had reviewed this study the Committee might seekto bring the lessons and issues more sharply into focus and discusssome implications for the interface between policy makers and theCommunity. He highlighted three problem areas in which NSCICmight consider giving guidance to the Community:

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1) how policy makers tell the Community what their intelligenceneeds are;

2) how the Community tells policy makers what its judgmentsare;

3) how well the Communitys response satisfies policy needs.

The Working Group Chairman also suggested some specific meas-ures or questions that NSCIC might consider, much along the lines ofour listing of key conclusions above. Would a focal point for develop-ing, coordinating and transmitting consumer needs provide a satisfac-tory balance between the usefulness of formal statements of intelligenceneeds and requirements for rapid response? How can top priority in-telligence data and judgments be flagged so that they come to the per-

sonal attention of key top officials during a crisis? What kinds or formsof intelligence are wanted by consumers during crises? For example,should raw intelligence be provided or should it always be supple-mented by intelligence evaluation or comment? Are more frequentNIEs or other forms of coordinated intelligence desired? Should in-telligence briefings normally be either coordinated or multi-agency?Should the Community periodically restate judgments that remainvalid?

The team that conducted this case study had difficulty in deter-mining how intelligence reached top decision makers, what intelligencereached them, and what impact it had. The study could therefore notreach firm conclusions on the effectiveness of the Communitys per-formance or on the changes most likely to make it responsive and ef-fective. The Working Group Chairman has suggested that NSCIC mem-

bers may wish to consider planning a real-time study of the handlingand use of intelligence at the NSC level during an actual crisis.

All of these problems, questions and issues ought to come before

NSCIC in some fashion, as well as the more extensive exposition andvoluminous detail contained in the Case Study itself. We do not, how-ever, know that any NSCIC member intends to press for resolution ofany of these specific issues within the NSCIC at this time. In view ofthe Chairmans statement that the Working Group will undertake a de-tailed analysis and recommend improved procedures, it is not neces-sary for NSCIC to settle these detailed questions now.

We recommend that NSCIC take note of the Chairmans statementand ask the Working Group to continue its exploration of these issuesand of ways to deal with them, of course bringing to NSCIC any pro-posals requiring decision at that level. The Working Group is uniquein combining a wide range of consumer and producer interests and itis a most appropriate body to examine the complications of presentarrangements and the implications of changes. Indeed, it may be foundthat the Working Group itself can perform a useful planning function

The Intelligence Community and the White House 647

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