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Introduction

The documents below were declassified by the US Department of State around June 2005.

They cover a crucial period in Indias relations with the US; the years 1969-1972 which are

generally considered as the low points in Indo-American relations.

These declassified documents are important because they provide glimpses into the minds of

important decision makers on both sides. The surprising revelation in these documents is that

emotions and personal equations play a significant role even among people who should know

better.

These are must read documents for students of Indian history, and for those who wish to learn

from the past.

- Assembled by Center for Indian Military History -

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Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia,1969-1972

Released by the Office of the Historian

Persons

Abbas, M. M.,Director General for Americas and Europe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

PakistanAbshire, David M., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations from April 1970Agha Khan, Prince Sadruddin, United Nations High Commissioner for RefugeesAgnew , Spiro T., Vice President of the United States, January 1969 October 1973Ahmad, Khondkar Mushtaq, Vice President of the Awami League and Foreign Minister of the

Provisional Government of Bangladesh, April December 1971Ahmad, M. M.,Deputy Chairman of the Economic Planning Commission in Pakistan, Economic

Adviser to President YahyaAhmed, Aziz,Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan Ahmed, Tajuddin, General Secretary of the Awami League and Prime Minister of the Provisional

Government of Bangladesh, April 1971 January 12, 1972; thereafter Minister of Finance ofBangladesh

Ahsan, Vice Admiral Syed Mohammad, Deputy Martial Law Administrator and Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Navy until August 1969; Governor of East Pakistan, August1969 February 1971

Al i, Ift ikar, Foreign Secretary of the Foreign Ministry of Pakistan from April 1972 Al i, M. Hossain, Bangladesh Ambassador to the United States from December 1972 Al i, Mahmud (Mahood), Head of Pakistan s delegation to the United Nations General

Assembly, October 1971Alvie, Momtaz A., Additional Foreign Secretary of the Pakistani Foreign Ministry Annenberg, Walter H., United States Ambassador to the United Kingdom from April 1969Ayub Khan, Mohammad,President of Pakistan until March 1969 Beam, Jacob D., Ambassador to the Soviet Union, March 1969 January 1973 Bhashani, Maulana Abdul Hamid, Leader of the National Awami Party in East Pakistan Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali, Chairman of the Pakistan People s Party; Minister of Foreign Affairs and

Deputy Prime Minister, December 7 December 19, 1971; thereafter President, Minister ofForeign Affairs, and Minister of Defense of Pakistan

Blee, David H.,Chief, Near East and South Asia Division, Directorate of Operations, CentralIntelligence Agency

Blood, Archer K., Consul General in Dacca until June 1971 Bowles, Chester, Ambassador to India until April 1969 Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich,General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Bush, George H. W., Republican Congressman from Texas until January 1971; Permanent

Representative to the United Nations, February 1971 January 1973Cargo, William I.,Director of the Policy and Coordination Staff, Department of State

Cargill, Peter,Director, South Asia Department, International Bank for Reconstruction and

Development (World Bank)Chapman, General Leonard F., Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps until December 1971Chaudhry, Air Marshal Zafer, Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Air Force from March 1972Chavan, Yashwantrao B., Indian Minister of the Interior until June 1970; thereafter, Indian

Minister of FinanceChowdhry, Abu Ayed,President of Bangladesh from January 12, 1972 Cline, Ray S., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from October

1969- Assembled by Center for Indian Military History -

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Connally, John B., Jr., Secretary of the Treasury, February 1971 May 1972Cushman, Lieutenant General Robert E., Jr.,USMC, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence,

May 1969 December 1971

Davies, Rodger P., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Davis, Jeanne W.,Director, National Security Council Staff Secretariat, 1970 1971 DePalma, Samuel, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Desai, Morarji Ranchhodji, Indian Minister of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister until July 1969Dobrynin, Anatoliy F.,Soviet Ambassador to the United States Durrani, S.U., Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan

Eilts, Hermann F., Ambassador to Bangladesh from September 1972Eliot, Theodore L., Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary and Executive Secretary of the

Department of State from August 1969Etemadi, Nur Ahmed, Prime Minister of Afghanistan until May 1971

Farhadi, Rawan, Deputy Foreign Minister of AfghanistanFarland, Joseph S., Ambassador to Pakistan, September 1969 April 1972Farooqi, Zahir M., Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy of PakistanFiryubin, Nikolai Pavlovich,Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union Gandhi, Indira, Prime Minister of IndiaGiri, Varahagiri Venkata, Vice President of India until May 3, 1969; Acting President, May

3 July 29, 1969; President from August 20, 1969Gordon, Herbert,Consul General in Calcutta Green, Marshall, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from May 1969;

also, Chairman, Special Group on Southeast Asia from May 1970Gromyko, Andrei A., Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union Gross, Nelson, Ambassador, Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State, and Coordinator for

International Narcotics MattersGuyer, Roberto,United Nations Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs Haig, General Alexander M., Jr., Senior Military Adviser to the Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs, January 1969 June 1970; Deputy Assistant to the President forNational Security Affairs, June 1970 January 1973

Haksar, Parmeshwar Narain, Secretary to Prime Minister GandhiHaldeman, H. R.,Assistant to the President Hamed, Samad, Deputy Prime Minister of Afghanistan Handley, William J.,Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian

Affairs until May 1969; Ambassador to Turkey, May 1969 April 1973Hannah, John A., Administrator, Agency for International Development, April 1969 October

1973Haq, Major General Inam-ul, Director General, Defense Procurement, Pakistan Ministry of

DefenseHassan, Lt. General Gul, Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Army, from December 1971 March

1972Helms, Richard M.,Director of Central Intelligence until February 1973

Henry, Paul-Marc, Assistant Administrator and Associate Director, Bureau of Operations and

Programming, UNDP; Coordinator, UN Relief Operations in Dacca (UNROD), 1971 Hilaly, Agha, Pakistani Ambassador to the United States until September 1971Holdridge, John H., member of the National Security Council staff, 1970 1972Hoskinson, Samuel M., member of the National Security Council staff, 1970 1972 Hussain, Zakir, President of India until his death, May 3, 1969 Hughes, Thomas L., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until

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Irwin, John N., II,Under Secretary of State, September 1970 July 1972; thereafter, DeputySecretary of State

Islam, Syed Nazrul, Acting President of the Provisional Government of Bangladesh,April December 1971

Jha, Lakshmi Kant, Governor of the Reserve Bank of India until May 1970; thereafter, IndianAmbassador to the United States

Johnson, U. Alexis, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 1969 Jung, Nawab Ali Yavar, Indian Ambassador to the United States until May 1970 Karamessines, Thomas H., Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence AgencyKarim, Muhammad Enayet, Bangladesh Ambassador to the United States, May August 1972;

thereafter Foreign Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign AffairsKarim, S. A., Foreign Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bangladesh until August 1972 Kaul, Triloki Nath, Foreign Secretary of Indian Ministry of External Affairs from February 1969 Keating, Kenneth B., Ambassador to India, May 1969 July 1972 Kellogg, Francis L., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Refugee and Migration Affairs

from January 1971; also Chairman of the Interagency Committee on Pakistani Refugee ReliefKennedy, Richard T., member of the National Security Council staff, January 1970 January

1972Khan, General Abdul Hamid, Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army and Deputy Chief Martial Law

AdministratorKhan, Abdul Monem, Governor of East Pakistan until March 1969 Khan, Lieutenant General Tikka, Martial Law Administrator and Governor of East Pakistan,

February September 1971; Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army from March 1972Khan, Nawabzada Nasrul lah, Leader, Democratic Action Committee of Pakistan Khan, Air Marshal Nur,Deputy Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan Kissinger, Henry A., Assistant to the President for National Security AffairsKittani, Ismat,United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Inter-Agency Affairs; also Special

Representative of the Secretary-General for Assistance to East PakistanKosygin, Aleksei N., Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet UnionLaingen, L. Bruce, Deputy Chief of Mission in Afghanistan until July 1971; thereafter Country

Director for Pakistan and Afghanistan, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,Department of State

Laird, Melvin R., Secretary of Defense, January 1969 January 1973Lall, K. B., Indian Defense Secretary Lewis , Samuel W.,Deputy Chief of Mission in Afghanistan MacDonald, Donald G., Assistant Administrator for Near East and South Asia, Agency for

International DevelopmentMace, Charles, Deputy United Nations High Commissioner for RefugeesMacomber, William B., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations until October

1969; thereafter Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (title changed toManagement after July 12, 1971) October 1969 April 1973

Malik, A. M.,Special Assistant to President Yahya for Displaced Persons and Relief and

Rehabilitation Operations in East Pakistan, July September 1971; thereafter Governor ofEast PakistanMalik, H. R.,Chairman of the East Pakistan Agriculture Development Corporation, 1971 Malikyar, Abdullah, Afghan Ambassador to the United StatesManekshaw, General Sam Hormusji Framji Jamshedji, Chief of Staff of the Indian Army Mayo, Robert P.,Director, Bureau of the Budget, 1969 McNamara, Robert S., President, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World

Bank)Meyer, Armin H.,Special Consultant in the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,

Department of State, from April 1972- Assembled by Center for Indian Military History -

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Mitchell, John, Attorney General, January 1969 February 1972Moorer, Admiral Thomas H., USN, Chief of Naval Operations until July 1970; thereafter

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffNalle, David, Assistant Director for Near East and South Asia, United States Information AgencyNass, Charles, Political Counselor at the Embassy in Afghanistan Narayan, J. P.,elder statesman, Indian Congress Party Niazi, Lt. General Amir Abdullah Khan, Martial Law Administrator for East Pakistan from

September 1971Neumann, Robert G.,Ambassador to Afghanistan Newberry, Daniel O., Deputy Chief of Mission in Afghanistan from October 1972Nixon, Richard M.,President of the United States, January 10, 1969 August 9, 1974 Noyes, James H.,Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security AffairsNutter, G. Warren, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Oehlert, Benjamin H., Jr., Ambassador to Pakistan until July 1969 Packard, David,Deputy Secretary of Defense until December 1971 Peterson, Peter G., Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs, and Executive

Director of the Council for International Economic Policy, 1971 January 1972; Secretary of

Commerce, January 1972 January 1973Patel, I. G., Special Secretary, Indian Ministry of FinancePickard, Sir Cyril, British High Commissioner in Pakistan Popper, David H.,Ambassador to Cyprus Qaiyum Qazi Zahiru l, member of the Pakistan National Assembly, Awami League representativeQuainton, Anthony C .E., Political and Economic Affairs Officer, New Delhi, 1969; thereafter

member of the Office of Nepal, India, Ceylon, and Maldives Islands, Bureau of Near Easternand South Asian Affairs

Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur, (Mujib),President of the Awami League; Prime Minister and Ministerof Defense of Bangladesh from January 1972

Ram Jagjivan, Indian Minister of Defense from June 1970Rasgotra, Maharajakrishna, Minister for Political Affairs of the Indian Embassy in the United

StatesRaza, Major General Nawabzada Agha Mohammad, Pakistani Ambassador to the United

States, November 1971 April 1972Rees, C. Herbert, Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs, Bureau for Near East and South

Asia, Agency for International DevelopmentRichardson, Elliot L., Under Secretary of State, January 1969 June 1970 Rockwell, Stuart W., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian

AffairsRogers, William P., Secretary of State, January 1969 September 1973 Rush, Kenneth,Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, July 1969 February 1972;

Deputy Secretary of Defense, February 1972 January 1973Ryan, General John D., Chief of Staff, U.S. Air ForceSathe, R. D., Joint Secretary, Indian Ministry of External Affairs Samad, Abdus, Foreign Minister of BangladeshSarabi, Abdul Wahed, Afghan Minister of Planning Saunders, Harold H.,member of the National Security Council staff Scali, John,Special Consultant to the President, January 1971 January 1973 Schlesinger, James R.,Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget, 1969; Acting Deputy Director,

1969 1970; Assistant Director, Office of Management and Budget, 1970 1971; thereafter,Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission


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Schneider, David T., Country Director for India, Ceylon, Nepal, and the Maldives Islands, Bureauof Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from August 1969

Selden, Armistead I., Jr., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for InternationalSecurity Affairs

Seraj, Dr. Majid, Afghan Minister of Public Health Sethi P. B., Indian Minister of State for Finance Shafiq, Mohammad Moussa, Afghan Foreign Minister, July 1971 December 1972; thereafter

also Prime MinisterShahi, Agha,Pakistani Permanent Representative to the United Nations Shakespeare, Frank, Director, United States Information Agency, February 1969 February

1973 Sher Ali Mohammad, Pakistani Minister of Information and National AffairsShultz, George P., Secretary of Labor, January 1969 July 1970; Director, Office of Management

and the Budget, July 1970 May 1972; Secretary of the Treasury, and also Assistant to thePresident, May 1972 May 1974; also head of the Council on Economic Policy fromDecember 1972

Singh, Dinesh, Minister of External Affairs of India, February 1969 June 1970 Singh, Kewal,Foreign Secretary of the Foreign Ministry of India from November 1972 Singh, Swaran,Indian Minister of Defense until June 1970; thereafter Minister of External AffairsSisco, Joseph J., Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until

February 1969; thereafter, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South AsianAffairs; also Chairman of the NSC Interdepartmental Group for the Near East and South Asia

Sober, Sidney,Director of the Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and SouthAsian Affairs, Department of State until November 1969, thereafter Deputy Chief of Mission inPakistan

Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, member of the National Security Council staff, 1969 1972 Sorabi, Abdul Wahid,Minister of Planning of Afghanistan Spain, James W.,Director of the Office of Pakistan and Afghanistan Affairs, Bureau of Near

Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, January July 1969; Chargi dAffaires in Pakistan, July November 1969; thereafter Country Director for Pakistan

Spengler, William F., Country Director for Pakistan and Afghanistan, Bureau of Near Easternand South Asian Affairs, Department of State, July 1970 July 1971

Spiers, Ronald I., Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, September

1969 August 1973Spivack, Herbert D.,Consul General in Dacca, June 1971 September 1972 Stans, Maurice, Secretary of Commerce, January 1969 January 1972 Stone, Galen L., Chargi d Affaires in India from August 1969 Sultan Khan, Mohammad, Foreign Secretary of the Foreign Ministry of Pakistan until April 1972,

thereafter Pakistani Ambassador to the United StatesTimmons, William,Deputy Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs, January

1969 February 1970; thereafter, Assistant to the President for Legislative AffairsThant, U,Secretary-General of the United Nations until December 1971 Van Hollen, Christopher, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian

Affairs, May 1969 September 1972; thereafter, Ambassador to Sri LankaVolcker, Paul A.,Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs

Vorontsov, Yuli M., Minister of the Soviet Embassy in the United States Waldheim, Kurt, Austrian Permanent Representative to the United Nations until December 31,

1971; thereafter, Secretary-GeneralWeinberger, Caspar W.,Deputy Director, Office of Management and the Budget, July

1970 May 1972; Director, May 1972 January 1973; Secretary of Health, Education, andWelfare

Westmoreland, General William C., Chief of Staff, U.S. Army until June 30, 1972- Assembled by Center for Indian Military History -

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Williams, Maurice J., Deputy Administrator, Agency for International Development; Chairman ofInterdepartmental Working Group on East Pakistan Disaster Relief

Winspeare-Guicciardi, Vittorio, Under Secretary General of the UN and head of the UN sGeneva office, appointed at the end of December 1971 as Special Representative of theSecretary General to deal with the humanitarian problems growing out of the conflict in SouthAsia

Yahya Khan, General Agha Mohammad, Chief Martial Law Administrator, President, Minister ofDefense, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, March 1969 December 1971

Yost, Charles W., United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, January1969 February 1971

Yung, Ali Yavar,Indian Ambassador to the United States until May 1970 Zahir, Abdul, Afghan Prime Minister, June 1971 December 1972 Zahir, Mohammad, King of AfghanistanZiegler, Ronald L., Press Secretary to the President, January 1969 January 1973 Zumwalt, Admiral Elmo R., Jr.,Chief of Naval Operations


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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONSUBJECT : Discussion with Ambassador Joseph S . Farlan dParticipants :

Department of Defens eSecretary of Defense - Melvin R . Lair dAssistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) - G . Warren Nutte rISA Assistant for South Asia - Colonel Seymour kravit z

Department of Stat eU .S . Ambassador to Pakistan - Mr . Joseph S . Farlan dCountry Director for Pakistan - William Spengle rTime : 1430 - 1500 hrs, 21 May 197 Place : ffice ofthe Secretary of Defens eI US/Pakistani Relation s

Ambassador Farland gave a brief resume of US/Pak relations . He summe dup by stating that the lack of decision on the U .S . military supply polic yhas caused the Paks to turn increasingly to the Chinese and Russians . H estated that the Paks considered that President Johnson had made a commitmen tto get them tanks and that President N ixon had ind icated sympathy toward tha tcommitment . The Ambassador estimated that US/Pak relations had taken amarked turn for the worse since the end of Februar y2 MilitaryupplyPolic y

Ambassador Farland recounted a recent meeting during which the Chief of the Pak Army Staff said that they had to be prepared to defend Pakistanand would secure the necessary equipment where they could, d espite highe cost . The Chief of Staff said his main worry was not-the add ed costs o fpurchasing from other sources, but the commitment that goes with the purchase . Following a discussion of how much equipment the Chinese hav ealready provided to Pakistan, Mr . Laird questioned whether Pakistan wa snot already committed to China . Mr . Farland opined ; there is still som eleeway but that time is growing short and the Pak feeling of disenchantmen twith the U .S . is growing . As an example he cited is attempts since


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2March to get an appointment to present to President Yahya Khan fro mPresident Nixon, the moon rock and Pak flag which had been carried t othe moon by U .S . astronauts . He has been denied an audience and at thesame time has been politely informed of the need for the U .S . to sel llethal end items to Pakistan . The Ambassador also told how much bette rreception in the Pak press the Chinese enjoy as contrasted to the U .S Their small moves are given greater and more favorable play than muc hlarger U S . activities in Pakistan . Mr . Laird stated that the Ambassador' sreport was so pessimistic that perhaps it was too late to do anything The Ambassador assured him we still have time but that our options ar ebeing reduced rapidly 3. Pak Commitments to the USSR and Communist Chin a

Mr . Laird asked Mr . Farland what the Chinese Communists and Soviet Unio nhoped to get for their favors to Pakistan . The Ambassador said that pos-sibly China is seeking increased Communist control of the states betwee nChina and the Bay of Bengal . If Burma Assam and East Pakistan were unde rCommunist control, China would effectively outflank Southeast Asia and i fcommunists gained control of Pakistan, China could outflank India as well He ad ded that the Russians are probably seeking more influence in th eIndian Ocean and Persian Gulf and looked for help from Pakistan in thi sregard 4. Ta nks for Pa kista n

Ambassador Farland stressed the need to provide some tanks for Pakistan A discussion ensued as to whether the third country route remains feasible There was general agreement that it will not be as easy to do now as i twould have been some months ago . The question of proposed Congressiona lamendments to the Foreign Military Sales bill was considered and Congressionaattitudes d iscussed . The Ambassador said that he has talked to many peopl eon the Hill and has a feeling that a change is in the wind . The Secretar yexpressed a hope that the Ambassador is right and he and Mr . Nutter assure dMr . Farland that DOD is working along the same lines-as he is 5. Conclusio n

After an exchange of courtesies the meeting ended

Memorandum of Conversation Approved by: The Assistant SecretarPrepared by : of Defense (ISA Colonel Seymour Kravitz Date : 26 May 197 OASD(ISA)NESA Regio nDistribution SecDe fDepSecDe fOSD File ISA RFDASD ISA)NESA NESA RF SD-IYR Chron STATE : NEA/PAF


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MEMOR N UMTHE WHITE HOUS E

W SHiN TON ACTION 1085 June 11, 197

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENTFROM : Henry A. KissingSUBJECT : Arms Supply Policy for South Asi a

When our Cambodian decision-making was at its height, you mad ea decision on the South Asian arms supply question but asked us t ohold it. Then during your meeting with the CENTO foreign minister syou asked Assistant Secretary Sisco to take another look at what w emight do for Pakistan . His memo is attached, and t s will give youan opportunity for making a final decision. Tab ATo refresh your memory, the present policy bans the sale of letha lequipment but does allow sale of spare parts and non-lethal equipmentas well as the sale of U .S. -made equipment now in the hands of thir dcountries like Turkey . On this last point, you should be aware tha tone of the restrictions being proposed for inclusion in the Foreig nMilitary Sales Act would prohibit third-country sales of this kind You will recall that the most realistic choice is between :

relaxing the ban to permit sale of equipment to replaceworn out equipment formerly provided by the U .S. and--not changing policy, keeping it under review but making aone-time sale to provide Pakistan with some equipment i tmost urgently needs

In your earlier consideration of this problem, you approved th esecond--the one-time exception--but asked that the decision be held The two sides of the case are well known to you

. Ambassador Farland--like Ambassador Hilaly at y umeeting with the CENTO ministers--argues strongly tha tPakistan is at a political crossroads, that President Yahy aneeds support in his effort to keep Pakistan from going radical


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and that re-opening of regular U .S. military supply can hel phim in his argument with his officers that Pakistan must kee pits lines open to the U .S. He points out that Yahya is going onlong-delayed trip to Moscow June 22 and that a U .S. answe rbefore then is necessary so that Yahya will know what he canexpect from the U.S. Farland concludes by describing th epotential effects for U .S. interests if Yahya fails in his effort sto keep Pakistan out of radical hands--much greater Chines einfluence in East Pakistan and even the commitment of Pakistan itroops beside Arab forces against Israel . Ambassador Keating argues the desirability of not reinsertin g

ourselves in the middle of the India-Pakistan rivalry by going bac kinto the regular military aid business . He also argues that th esharp Indian reaction is not worth what must be the margina lU .S. influence on the Pakistani political scene

Secretary Rogers concurs in your earlier judgment not to remove th e.arms embargo altogether . That leaves us, he feels, with only th echoice of making a one-time exception to that embargo to permit on edirect sale to Pakistan. While this has the obvious advantages of doin gsomething for Pakistan, he points out that it will not meet Pakistan' sdesire for a basic change in policy. He feels that even a one-time sal ewould create major problems with those in the Congress who feel tha twe should not after almost five years re-involve ourselves in a disput ewhere we do not have direct security interests .If you wish to go ahead, the Secretary recommends a package consistin gof :

--6 replacement F-104 fighter-interceptors or 12 F-5's orF-104's of a different model ;

--300 a rmored person nel carriers--4 anti-submarine patrol aircraftOther possibilities for a package include :

- -7 B-57 bomber s- -100 M-48 tanks


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The Secretary would exclude these because of adverse Congressionaland Indian reaction. He feels that the controversy on the Hill ove rthe Turkish tank deal alone could end the prospect of doing anythin gsignificant for Pakistan at this time . He rules out the B-57s becaus ethey are a more obviously offensive weapon If you decide to proceed with the arms offer to Pakistan a srecommended by Secretary Rogers, he suggests the followin gscenario ;

Early consultations with Congress Z A letter from you to President Yahya containing ou r

arms offer .3. Informing the Indian Government simultaneousl y

through our embassy in New Delhi.4. Asking both the Indians and the Pakistanis to treat ou r

decision as confidential, but when leaks almost inevitablyoccur emphasize that the arms offer to Pakistan is aspecial exception

Recommendation: That you approve Secretary Rogers' recommenda-tion for carrying out your decision to make a one-time exception fo rPakistan and that you approve transmittal of the decision to Presiden tYahya before hq goes to Moscow June 22 ApproveAdd tanksAdd B-57'sdd tanks and B-57' s

Other


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DEPARTMENT OF STAT Washington D C. 2052

O C T 1 9 9TO The SecretarTHROUGH : S/

JFROM : - Joseph J . Sisc oSUBJECT : U . S . S ale of Military Equipment to Pakistan INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

The Indians have now protested our decision to sell alimited quantity of military equipment to Pakistan, both i nNew Delhi and in Washington . They have also issued a verystarchy public statement indicating their dissatisfaction wit hour explanations for the sale The Pakistanis are pleasedthat we have brought this matter to a c onclusio n and ar ecooperating with us closely and discreetly in handling it President Yahya has publicly announced his plans to dine a tthe White House Oc tober 24 and have a bilateral meeting wit hthe President in Washington In formal oral presentations in New Delhi and Washingto nOc tober 7 and 8, the Indians conveyed their strong protes tand serious misgivings about our decision . They were carefu lto say, however, that they meant this in a friendly spirit The Indian spokesmen (Acting Foreign Sec retary in Delhi -

Indian Minister in Washington) warned of the most advers eand violent reaction of Indian public opinion and expresse dconcern about the political pressures which our decision woul dplace on Mrs . Gandhi's Government . They expressed fear thatour sale might seriously affect India-Pakistan negotiation swhich have been showing some signs of progress . They tookserious exception to the rationale for our sale which had bee npreviously conveyed to them . They explained that Pakistan wa sarming only against India . Therefore they said the GOI must

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take an extremely serious view of any addition to Pakistan' sarmed strength . They claimed that India had expressed similarviews with the same force to the Soviet Union about its supp l yto Pakistan and that the Soviet Union had reacted positi velyto this warning

On Oc tober 8, the Indians is sued a press statement announcin gtheir protest and indicating that they were not satisfied wit hU . S . explanations for the sale . The statement alleged that ourdecision was against the interest of peace in S outh Asia . I tsaid the resumption of inflow of arms to Pakistan, which ha scommitted aggression against India three times, is of grav econcern ; Pakistan is armed only against India . The statemen tsaid that Pakistan used U . S . arms against India in 1965 despit eU . S . assurances, and the new U . S . special supply is not eve nsubject to any such assurances

While we recognize that because of i nternal politic a lrequirements the GOI had to publicly critici ze our sale, w ebelieve their statement goes far beyond what was necessary They have failed to take into consideration : (1) the limitednature of the sale ; (2) that the sale was a one-time excepti o nto our embargo which remains in effect ; (3) that we are sellin gprimarily replacements or unsophisticated equipment ; (4) tha we are not selling tanks . To the contrary, this statemen tincorrectly refers to the resumption of inflow of arms an dis likely to provoke additional public reaction rather tha ncontrol it . Furthermore the Government of India has reactedmuch more strenuously to our sale offer than it did to th edecisions of the Soviets and the French to supply much large rquantities o f military equipment to Pakistan . We have tol dthe Indians here of our views on their statement and instructe dEmbassy Delhi to express simi lar serious concern about it

Meanwhile, we are proceeding to discuss with the Pakistani sarrangements for carry ing out our sales o ffer, a subject whic hPresident Yahya will probably raise i n general terms wit hPresident Nixon during their bi lateral talks

Clearances :NEA/PAF - Mr . S pengle r

cc : U, J, C

NEA/INC : D T S chneider :jlb :10/9/70 'x 41

NEA - Mr VardIoilen


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TeleconS e c r e t a r y Rogers1 12417 6 :2 p .m. page

R: Y e s , s h e really let her hair down. She said w w e r e against h e rfather and h e r . She s a i d she r esented o u r pressure and o u r activit ies. Is a i d ju s t tell u what you have n mind and w e l l s t p i t . I said it sa l i t t le diff icul t f o r us; we ve been in off ice only 20 months and you a r eholding against us a paranoia going back to John F o s t e r Dul les .

That s good. It s interesting considering h e r f a t h e r w a s thedarl ing of the Am er ican intellectuals.

R: When it w s over I said to the F o re ig n Minis ter let s continue this.So he came over t o my apartment t h i s morning. H e old m e ow they f e e labout out aid. I to ld h im w e a r e not interested in havifng them indebted t o us.I said all w e wan t i s a l i t t le f r iendship; every th ing w get f rom them is a l m o s tacrimonious.

K: I think t h i s will help. They are ust probing until they meet a l i t t leresistance. They have a t e r r i b l e paranoia.

R: I s a i d do you think w e re doing something? I s a i d I don't thinkKeat ing has done i t he s a pre t ty acu te person. It w a s a v e r y interes t ingdisc us s ion. I t ,may g e t a l i t t le bit bet t e r now

K: Once t hey know w h e r e they stand and with whom they re dealing i tm a y ge t a lo t be t t e r . think youl l l have a b e t t e r t ime w i t h them now.

R: I ~ i dive u s a l i s t of speci f ics . I said i f w e are faced only wi thsusp ic ions and animosities f r o m years gone by t he r e s nothing w e can do. esaid our aid mission should be reduced. I said we ve reduced it cons iderablyf rom what it was; don t you know that? e said yes I sa id t h en why don't youthank us instead of just compla ining m o r e .

K: I think it is paranoia . They are suffering because they w e r e the lead-ing non-al igned country and now they r e just another undeveloped one.R: I gave her a going over on Vietnam. She spoke aga ins t us at t h e UN.She o t d r a m a t i c and said I would g ive my l i fe f o r f r e e d o m . I I said w e re

giving our l ives f o r it We ve l o s t h e r i c a n s and m o r ecasua l t ies and w e don't l ike k ~t a t all when you are s o c r i t i c a l about wha twe ve done, I also gave them a going o v e r about cul tura l cen te rs . 1 said youaccu s ed us publicly, you had no evidence , you didn t even speak t o u s pr ivatelybefore you m a d e your ppblic c h a rg e l . I s a i d i t s fa lse and w e resent it.

K: I th ink your relations with t hem are going to improve. f y o u watchthem deal ing wi t h each o ther outs ide they play t h i s m o r a l game, but ins ide


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T leconSecre tary Rogers10 24 70 6:2 p m page

they a r e tough as hen 1 don t n o w what more w c o d d have done f o r themThey get 4 percent of our aid budget. W e penalized Pakis tan with an a r m sembargoR; We ve one everything w could. I went there; the President w n tthere f hings done to her fa ther bug her and she doesn t t r u s t usK Kennedy pract ica l ly s lobbered over her.R I know just thought you d be in te res ted


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February 8, 1971

Dear Mr . -SeI have received the following message from my

President for immediate communication to President Nixon MESSAGE BEGINS :Your Excellency ,

I must tell you of my serious concern over th eturn of events which has resulted in a rapid escalatio nof tension in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent . This hasbeen brought about by what appears to us to be India sdeliberate over reaction to an incident for which Pakistancould not be held responsible Two young men from Indian occupied Kashmi rhijacked an Indian plane flying from Srinagar to Jamm uon 30th January and lande d at Lahore . My Governmen ttook prompt steps to fulfil its obligations under internationa lconventions and arranged repatriation of passengers an dcrew of the hijacked plane to India at the earliest opportunity We also employed every means to have the plane release from the hijackers . Despite our sustained efforts, thi sobject could not be achieved and the hijackers destroyedthe plane on 2nd February Although the hijacking was the result of repressiv emeasures adopted by the Government of India in occupied

Kashmir, my Government deplored the action of thehijackers Instead of appreciating our helpful attitude, th eGovernment of India for its own reasons used th eincident to intensify tension between the two countries Highly provocative statements have been made by responsibleIndian leaders including the Prime Minister blamingPakistan for the incident and threatening retaliatory action The Indian authorities have also been allowing massiv eand violent demonstrations against the Pakistan Hig

Commission in New Delhi which has resulted in damageto property and injuries to personnel of the High Commission

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extraordinary step of banning flights of al lPakistani aircraft over Indian territory . Bytaking this arbitrary measure of stopping direc tflights between the two wings of Pakistan, Indi ahas committed a serious breach of its internationa land bilateral commitments which has resulted i nhightening tensions . A situation has thus beencreated that could lead to developments which w ein Pakistan very much wish to avoid

Considering the degree of interest whic hyour Government has taken in preservation o peace and tranquility in the sub-continent, I fel tyou would be interested in using your good officeswith the Government of India for preventing afurther deterioration of the situation and for bringingit back to normal . I and my Government wouldhighly appreciate any effort that Your Excellenc ymight make in this direction

With kind regards

Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan MESSAGE ENDS

I will be grateful if you could k n ly transmit it to itshigh de stination

With my best personal regards Yours sincerely

A . Hilaly )

The Honourabl eWilliam P. Roger s

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I: 12 April 1971I

iBJECT: 32-71 ' P R ~ P E C T SFOR P KISTW II 1 I , . - . . ,

I i, , I I , II.. .

I~ s ~ u t ea s ~ e s r a c ptercn; and pmsp+cilve r t l t e o fI I 1 ; , I I .

tbb : ~ i k i s t m l v l l war, th role o f ln lr and othac pomrt and, , , . , . I icomponents -- i f the l ~ e n e a ~up

1 I . , .d k l r shwj be put dam f i t r hwld 'iuc cd;- ,1 :

, ; :t I

' ~ eagueAL) a d egain f t tvb control o fI ' I : . ;o t s, i not h o d . They;clmrly d r -. Ic a i c u ~ a t d i o s t of th ~ IAL leaden have been arrested, but 1ou e rI


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MEMORANDUMTHE Wi . uv 3 R WS G

0WASH INGTON MEETING May 2 6 1971May 26 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR DR KISSINGERFROM: Samuel M. Hoskinson KSUBJECT: Indian Guvernment Decisions on Pakistan Cr is i s

1. Refugee Situation: The Indian Ministry of IIorne Affairs reported that:The refugee situation along the East P a k border w a s ecomingdesperatew the mid May figure was over 2 million.

--The financial responsibiLity or the refugees would place an impossibleburden on the Indian economy and infrastructure.

--They recommended the Zndian Government t ke every aCep t o force theGOP o cease pressuring East Pakistanis to f l ee and to force the GOP torepatriate refugees.2 . Bangla esh Government in Ejdle in Calcutta: External Affairs reported that:

--Recognition of Bangla Desh must be considered only in l ight o the specifimaterial help that India was prepared t o make available t o the East Pakistaliberation front.

-Bangla Deeh should o n l y b e recognized when India made the decision to rmilitary action against Pakistan for the liberation of t h e G e tThe E ernal Affairs report stressed the extremely negative reaction

of he third countries (especially Muslim nations) to t h e East Pakistansituation and the wait and see attitude of the major power 8 notablythe U.5. and USSR


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3 Military Situation in East Paldstan and Possible Indian Mi l i t a r y Action:The report from the Defense Ministry, while stressing the preparednessof Indian armed forces and the weakaess of Pakistani armed forces, recom-mended against unilateral Indian military action for the following reasons:a. Inability to determine at what point the Chinese would become involved.b. Willingness of some Mudim countries (Turkey and Iran) t o help Pakistan.e. Indian inability t o assure continuing military supply rom thixd countries(notably USSR) if hdia initiated what could be a long war,d. n invasion o achieve the liberation of the East would involve India in atwo-front war which could create a requirement for the mil ib ry occupatio

of ll of Pakistan.

4. he following decisions were made:a. Defer recognition of Bangla Dash for the immediate future.b. Maintain constant military readiness,c Take every diplomatic step to force t h e major powers to take action toforce the OP to atop the refugee flow and to repatriate those who hav

crossed into India, including hints that M i a might b k e unilateral milaction.

d, Seek financial aid from all sources to temporarily support the refugeeThey also decided to release off-the-record press comments that India isreaching the point where some so r t of action, possibly mil ibry was posif there i a not immediate relief for the refugee problem,

In a follow-up meeting with opposition leaders, Mrs. Gandhi reaffirmed India1priority of putting all possible diplomatic pressure on the major powers to presPakistan to change its palicies, Stressing the gravity of the current cr is is , shpleaded for broad eupport of current Indian policy regardless of where it led.[When queried about possible unilateral M a n actions, she avoided using the wmilitary action. The source reports that qpposition 1 left to right took aline demanding some so r t of military action there were no resolution t o t he rproblem in the immediate future.Comment: s you can see the Indians re engaged in a fairly sophisticated dipmatic and public relations campaign, More importitntly, their decision-ma king


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h s not reached y t the s t g e of war or peace This report would indicateth t Mrs Gmdhi s still moving wit considerable restraint given the circum-stances and th t there is scope for us to reinforce t h i s


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CENTRAL I N T E L L I G E NCE GENCYOFFICE O NATIONAL ESTIMATES

22 September 1971

MEMOR NDUMISUBJECT The Indo-Pakis tan i C r i s i s S i x Months Later

NOTE

nough has happened s ince we l s t pub l i she t o w r r n tanother assessment o f the s i t u a t i o n i n South Asia . I n t h ef o l l o w i n g we discuss the current s i t u a t i o n ; l i k l y develop-ments w i t h respect t o Pak is tan I nd ia and t h e engali i n -surgents; t he roles o f t h e gre t powers t h e contingency o flarger hostil i t i es between I n d i a and Pak i s t an ; and p o s s i b l eresol u t i o ns o f t h e problem

I This memormdwn was prepared by t h e Office of NationuZE s t i m a t e s und coordin ted w i t h i n C I AZ/ S IE 32-71 12 A p r i Z 1971 Prospects for Pakistan; nd

Memorandwn 8 a y 971 Indo-Pakistani Tensicns hepz.in paZ judgments in both remain val id


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he murg en c y1. The s i t u a t i o n i n t he subcont inent , and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n

E a s t P ak i s t an , has become increasingly tense and vol a l i 1e. TheWest Pakistani army and paramilitary security ser v ices i n E a s tBengal now augmented t o around 80,000 men, control the c i t i e sand parts o f t h e countryside a t l e a s t i n the day t ime . They dohave some a1 1 ies among the populace no tab ly t h e 1-2 m i l i o nnon-Bengal rdu-speaking B i ha r i s and some ardently a n t iHindu Bengal i s . Many o f t h e i r supporters have been organ i zedi n t o o f f i c i a l ly appointed Peace Committees which perform somegovernmental f u n c t i o n s

2 B u t t h e military and i t s l l ies have not been a ble t ocrush an insurgency movement operating throughout much o f E a s tPak is tan . Benga l i propaganda such as t h a t f r o m t h e outlawedwam i League ( A L ) leaders now in India,alleges t h a t t h e resis-

tance forces are formidable . Li t t le i s known, however, aboutt h e real capabi i i e s of t h e M u k t i Bah in i t i e r a t i o n F i g h t e r sa term frequently used t o des ignate a l l armed Bengali i n su r g en t s ,o f whatever o r g a n i z a t i o n or po l i t i c a l persuasion, whether basedi n E a s t Pakistan or in India . In I n d i a t h e r e may be a s manyas 50 000 E a s t Bengalis i n some way o r another a s s o c i a t e d w i t ha r e s i s t a n c e f o r c e . Many i ot mo s t o f them fo r mer ly be longed


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t o t he pre-March 1971 Pakistani army and t o t h e paramilitaryBenga l i security service . Perhaps as many as 15 000 cross t h eborder f rom time to tim and carry out g u e r r i l l a operations.

3 . The l a r g e r group t h a t has so fa r stayed i n Ind ia maybe p l an n i n g t o s e i z e and h o l d a g a i n s t P a k is ta n i m i l i t a r y counter-a t t a c k a s i z a b l e chunk o f East Bengal i t rr i tory i n which tcould e s t a b l i s h a functioning independent Bangla Desh a movewhich would be b o t h h i g h l y p r o v o c a t i v e and o f uncer ta in outcome.Or i t may be sirni l a r t o t h e Algerian army based i n Tunisia u n t i l1962 i .e. i n t e n d i n g n o t t o f i g h t irmnediately b u t rather t ow a i t and t a k e o v r th country when the West Pak i s t an i s leave .I t i s a l s o q u i t e p o s s i b l e t h a t dec is ions as t o the use o f t h i sforce have y t t o be made. n any case some e f f o r t has beenmade t o screen i t so as to assure i t s l oy a lt y t o t h e AL-contro l ledBangla Desh government- in-exi le in C a l c u t t a .

4. The p o l i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n o f t h e o p e r a t i ona l guerri 11asthemselves t h e i r e x a c t numbers command structure e t c . aregenerally unknown. But Bengal is are traditionally individualisticeven a n a r c h i c i n character. The i n s u r g e n t s probably i n c l u d e anumber o f d i s p a r a t e even c o n f l i c t i ng groups of di v dual s andbands who operate independent ly o f one another. Those l oya l t o


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the L may make up t h e l a r g e s t number, b u t a t l e a s t some o f thei n s u r g e n t s a r e hard-1 n e extremists s i m i 1a r t o t h e urban guer -r i l l a s in India s s t a t e o f West Bengal .

5. The Mukti B a h i n i have shown an i n c r e a s i n g d eg re e o fsophistication nd e f f e c t i v e n e s s a g a i n s t t h e Pakistanis, thoughn o t so much as they c la im . y b l o w i n g up b r i d g e s , s a b o t a g i n gs h i p s and b o a t s , mining roads and dera i 1 n g t r a i n s th y havebad ly d i s r u p t e d t h e a r e a s t r a n s p o r t a t i o n system. They h veassass inated a number o f Peace Cornmi t t e e members. S t r i k i n gh a r d a t t h e jute industry, Pakistan s p r i n c i p a l e x p o r t e a r n e r ,t h e M uk t i B a h i n i s ac t s o f s ab ot ag e and i n t i m i d a t i o n have h e l p e dt o reduce o u t p u t of jute products to about a q u a r t e r o f t h eformer 1eve1 Casua l t i e s have been i n f1 c t e d on t he P a k i s t a n iarmy, b u t we have no re1 i a b l e i n f or m a t io n on how many. OurC ons u l a t e i n Dacca has reported a number o f e x p l o s i o n s i n t h a tc i t y a t one t i m e o r another t h e ci ty s power system and gassupplies have been p u t o u t o f a c t i o n , and t h e l o b b y o f t h e mostprominent h o t e l destroyed by a bomb. School at tendance, p a r t i c -ul rly i n t he u n i v e r s i t i e s , s v i r t u a l l y a t an e n d . P a c i f i c a t i o nr em a i ns unreal i z e d , t h o u g h Is amabad cont inues t o c l a i m t h es i t u a t i o n i s i n hand.


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6 The r e l a t i o n s h i p between the M u k t i B a h i n i and theIndian government remains a s u b j e c t o f controversy. slamabadclaims t h a t only c t i v e Ind ian back ing and c o l l a b o r a t T o n havep e m i t e d t h e miscreants t o operate; t h a t peacefu l c o n d i t i o n sand t h e end o f t h e refugee f l o w would have been achieved i fo n l y I n d i a had closed t h e border disarmed the i n s u r g e n t s f l e e i n gt o I n d i a and severely r e s t r i c t e d their a c t i v i t i e s . New De7 h irep1 e s w i t h denia l s o such support a n d w i t h arguments t h a tt h e 2 500 m i l e Indian-East P a k i s t a n i b o r d e r i s so long and t h et e r r a i n so d i f f i c u l t a s t o make co n t ro l o f t i m p o s s i b l e . NewD e l h i further c la ims t h a t neither i t nor anyone e l s e can t e l lwhether Benga l is i n the area are fmm E a s t P a k i s t a n or f rom WestBengal h t the insurgency i s a mass p o p u l r uprising i n s i d eEast Bengal i t s e l f and t h t t s unable t o moni tor much l e s ss t o p t h e a i d g i v e n the M u k t i Bahin i y sympathizers i n I n d i a .

7 . There i s some truth i n both se t s o f c l a i m s b u t I n d i a ni n v o l v e m e n t w i t h t h e Mukti B a h i n i s c l e r l y greater than NewDel h i pub1 l y adm i ts .o b s e r v a t i o n by such o u t s i d e r s as Western newsmen i n d i c a t e t h a tt h e I n d i a n m i 1 r y and t h e p r mi 1 ry services r e armingequipping and t r a i n i n g - - as we1 1 as p r o v i d i n g s nc tu ry t o - -E a s t Benga l is i n c o n s i d e r a b l e numbers. Numerous artillery due ls


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and open b o r d e r ski mi shes between r e g u l a r I n d i a n and P a k i s t a n imilitary forces on the border a l s o p o i n t t o d i r e c t I nd i a n s u p p o r to f border crossers. Whi le some p r i v a t e a i d t o the insurgentsi n I n d i a has taken p la c e , n e i t h e r the conventional n o r t h e guer-r i l l u n i t s o f the Mukt i Ba h in i could have a c q u i r e d rms andmunitions i n any q u a n t i t y ex ept from the Indian military.

8 There are a number o reasons why New Del h i i s p u r s u i n gt h i s policy. The Mukti Bahin i I s cause i s enormously popular inI n d i a ; repressive measures aga ins t them would genera te majorp o l i t i c a l backlash. In terms o r e a l p o l i t i k , I n d i a c o n s i d e r si t s sel f terest served by any weakening o t s t r a d i t i onalf o e The Indians may t h i n k e f f e c t i v e o p p o s i t i o n t o Is1 amabad srule i s g r e a t e r t h a n i t a c t u a l l y i s and probably downgrade theac t u a l strength o f t h e est P a k i s t a n i s m i l i t a r y power i n EastBengal A t each stage , they have been w i ing t o arm more guer-r i l l s and t o ab e t more b o r d e r crossings i n the hope t h a t t h i swould finally begin the toppling o f Punjabi military r u l e there,9 I n h e l p i n g t h e insurgents New Del h i a l s o seeks t o

maintain some degree o f c o n t r o l over them India s s t a t e o fWest Bengal has l o n g been a hotbed o f sDme o t h e mo s t v i r u l e n t


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and extreme p o l i t i c a l movements i n the w o r l d , ones which havealready i n f l i c t e d considerable damage on t h a t s t a t e s (andI n d i a s ) urban industr ial economy. Heavy r e p r e s s i v e measureshave so f a r kept these movements under c o n t r o l . The Bengalisof E a s t Pakis tan a r e equally s u s c e p t i b l e to such views ; isuch radicals ever took over c o n t r o l o f an independent BanglaDesh t h e y would pose a formidable threat t o I n d i a n securityI n d eed , I n d i a i s w o r r i e d ab o u t t h e p o l i t i c a l f a l l o u t i n WestBengal even now New Del h i i s probably n o t merely g i v i n g supportt o East Bengal is t regards f a v o r a b l y b u t a lso i s t r y i n g t ocheck t h e e x t r e m i s t s .

he efugees

10. The v i o l e n t a c t s o f b o t h t h e P a k i s t a n i fo r ces and t heM u k t i B a h i n i h e r e p r i s a l s and co u n t e r - r ep r i sals have i n f l ictedg r a v e damage on E a s t Bengal and s peopl e Economic c t i v i yi s now some 30-35 percent of w h a t i t was prior t o March 1971i t h a t . Es t im a te s r e a l l y guesses) say t h a t some 200 000 o rmore r e s iden t s o f t h e area have been ki1led and t h e area hasseen one of the l a r g e s t and o s t r a p i d p o p u l a t i o n transfers i nmodern t i m e s . Since March 1971, over mi l l i o n o f t h e 76 m i l l i o n


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East Pakistanis have f l e d t o I n d i a and t h i s movement co n t i n u e s .The t i d e ebbs nd flows s i n c e i t s peak r a t e i n June when itaveraged 100 000 daily it has rarely f a1 1en be ow 20 000-30 000a day.

11. Probably 80 90 percent o f those f l e e ing have beenHindus. I t may be t h a t the refugee f low i n t o I n d i a will stoponly when nearly a1 the Hindus have f i n a l l y crossed t h e border .Some 6 million p lus have a l r eady l e f t Pakis tan; t h e remafning3-4 million may n o t be far behind. Depending on events i n t h earea this could occur even by t h e end o f the year Moreoveri f East P ak i s t an s u f f e r s severe f o o d shortages i n the n e x t fewmonths t he H i ndus may be joined y add i t i o n a l mi 11ions o f Mus l irns .

12. Why t h i s i n c r e d i b l e movement o f people? There are anumber o f reasons but many i f not rnost of t h e Hindus fled forf e a r o f t h e i r 1 es . t t he beginn ing o f t h e c i v i war GeneralT ikka Khan -- then t h e Governor nd M a r t i a l Law Administrator --apparently cal cul a t e d t h a t he cou ld i n t i m idate h i s recalcitrant

These are Indian stat istCcs but they are generally cor-roborated y outside obseruers including those from theU f l . In addition the Ind im government has appropriatedfmds to take care of th

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province i n t o q u i c k submiss ion . Troops most ly f rom t h e MestPak i s t an i unjab (an a r e a ow almost I pe r cen t M u s l i m andstrongly conmunal i n o u t l o o k ) appear t o have made H i n d u s ,dark ly suspected anyway o f b e i n g I n d i a n sp ies and s e c e s s i o n i s t st h e i r s p e c i a l t a r g e t s . In this v i r u l e n t atmosphere,

o r a t o r s have become accustomed t o m i s t r e a t i n g t h e Hindu re l ig iousminority The t o p le ders i n Islamabad have s i n c e t r ie t s topt h e s e p r a c t i c e s , b u t t h e i r e f f o r t s have sometimes been unavai 1i g.

13. The I nd ians have accepted the refugees and havep r o v i d e d them w i t h the rud imen ts o f subsistence They seemprep red t o c o n ti n u e d o i n g so, a t l e a s t f o r t h e moment. Frome a r l y o n , they hoped t h a t most o f t h e heavy costs would be borneby t h e w e a l t h i e r o u t s i d e powers, To d a t e , t h e s e hopes have beenm o s t l y unava i 1 n g ex tens ions o f f o r e i g n as s i s tanc e f o r t h e r e f -ugees have so f a r amounted t o some 200 m l l o n ( a c t u a l d e l i e r i e shave been much s m a l l e r ) the t o t a l c o s t t o India t h r ough t h en e x t s i x months or so may come t o f i v e times t h a t amount. I n d i a sc o m p a r a t i v e l y c ha r i t ab1e response p robab ly resu l t s 1ess f r o ma 1 r u i s m than from l a c k o f a1 t e r n a t i v e s . o f o r c i b l y d r i v et h e m 11 o n s o f re fugees back across t h e b o r d e r m i g h t resulin t he d ea th o f many i f n o t ost o f them. I f I n d i a p e r m i t t e d


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ret l i a t o r y a c t i o n s against Musl ims i n I n d i a includinge x p e l l i n g them i n t o Pak is tan , i t wou l d r i s k making t s6 million Muslims f a i r game f o r Hindu f a n a t i c s o f whomt h e r e a r e many). Were such t happen and g e t o u t of hand,as t p r ob ab l y would t h e present noes o f Eas t Bengal wouldseem small scal e.

14. In many respects the refugee problem i s the p r i n c i p a lt h r e a t t o peace i n t h e subcon t i nen t . The sheer numbers o frefugees may burden I n d i a beyond i t s capaci ty New De7 h ir n i gh t then conclude t h a t t had no c h o i c e b u t t o invade E a s tP ak i s t an e i t h e r t o i n s t a l l a government t h a t would l t t h erefugees r e t u rn or t s e i z e enough Pakistani t e r r i t o r y t oresett le them. T h i s k i n d o f reason ing i s a t t r a c t i v e t o manyInd ians and pressures for an i n v a s i o n w grow i the exoduscont inues. But t h i s move would probably only make a bad s i t u a t i o nworse -- and t l e a s t some prominent Indian l e a d e r s a r e p r o b a b l yaware o f t h i s . An a t t a c k on Ea s t P ak i s t an w i t h accompanyingheavy f i g h t i n g movements of large armed fo rces e tc . , w o u l dc r e a t e s t i l l another group o f refugees furth r d i s r u p t transpo r t , and destroy crops and s t o r e d food in an area where t h el a t t e r i s already i n s h o r t supply. S i m i l a r l y th se i z ur e o fa Benga l i a rea l rge enough t o r e s e t t l e s e v e r a l m i l l i o n peop le


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cou l d ach i eve i t s purpose o n l y i f many present residents wereexpel ed and made hornel ess themsel v s

15. Most Hindu r e fugees now i n ndia would p r o b a b l y no twant t o r e t u r n t o E a s t Bengal under any c o n d i t i o n s -- thoughI n d i a s re1 u c t a n t l o acknowledge this Hindu proper t i es havebeen parceled o u t t o o the rs memories o f a t r o c i t i e s remainf r esh and H i ndu-Musl i m antagonisms -- a1 though now mutedamongst B e n g a l i s by comnon gr i evance s a g a i n s t t h e West P a k i s t a n i s-- remain s t r o n g B u t whether these n e g a t i v e f a c t o r s will con-t i n u e t o be r ecogn i zed by the Ind i an government i s ano the r mat ter .

amine in a s t Bengal

16. T h i s i s s t i l l u n c e r t a i n . There i s s t i l l t o o l i t t l ehard i n f o r m a t i o n too f w means of f i n d i n g out exac t l y how muchfood t r a n s p o r t o r even how many consumers -- t h e r e w i l l bei n t h e n e x t few months i n E a s t Pakistan. T a k i n g i n t o accountw a r c o n d i t i o n s f l i g h t of f a r m e r s n e g l e c t o f c u l t i v a t i o n andearlier n a t u r a l disasters severe f l o od s i n August 1970 t h ec y c l o n e of November o f t h a t year t h e product ion o f r ice the

. ome million Hindu Bengalis l e f t m t Pa k i s t a n in hhe23 year period eween independen e mtd ear ly 1971


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area s p r i n c i p a l food will of course be down though by howmuch i s unknown. But w i t h t h e flight o f 1 pe r cen t o f t h epopu l a l i o n and t h e probable ava i labi ty of emergency foodshipments from abroad t he s i t u a t i o n may not assume c r i t i c a lp r o p o r t i o n s .

17. T h i s may n o t be the case however f o r i n d i v i d u a lf a m i l i e s villages or larger f ood d e f i c i t a r ea s East P a k i s t a n si n t e r n a l t r a n s p o r t a t i o n network has been c r i p p l e d and movementof food from p o r t s and s u r p l u s a r e a s w i l l be v ry d i f f i c u l toften imposs ib le . Much o the former local administrative andd i s t r i b u t i ve apparatus has d isappeared . In addition there w ibe c o n t i n u i n g o b s t a c l e s of p o l i c a l o r i g i n . Food d i s t r i b u t i o ni s viewed y each s i d e as someth ing t o be used f o r i t s own ad-vantage , or a t least as s o w t h i n g to be denied to the enemy.Thus th r a r e reports of some members o t h e P a k i s t a n i armyand t h e Peace Committees d e l i b e r a t e l y w i t h h o l d i n g food f romHindus. Some M u k t i B a h i n i le ders or t h e i r p a r t have t h r e a t -ened t o a t t a c k and sabotage emergency f ood d i str bution e f f o r t si n c l u d i n g those o f t h e UN because such w i 11 be ultimately runy and f o r t h e i r West P a k is ta n i oppressors. In ny e v e n t , the

food s i t u a t i o n i n E a s t Bengal i s e l y t o remain uncerta in , w i t ht h e p o t e n t i a l f o r a disaster o major magnitude.


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.. . . .

t e i t u d e s o ew eZhi and sZmabad

18. The two governments con t inue t o be h o s t i l e , se l fr i g h t e o u s , and emotional w i t h respec t t o one another PrimeM i n i s t e r In d i r Gandhi ho ot a sweeping e l e c tor a l mandatel a s t s p ri ng , i s c l e a r l y i n charge i n New Delhi. E l e c t e d ona platform p ro mi s i n g a m jor e f f o r t t o reduce unemploymentand to r a i s e 1 v i n g standards she has been compelled i n s t e a dto preoccupy herself w i t h the Pakis tani cr is is . On the whole,she has been force f o r modera t i on, r e s i s t i n g demands for a1 -o u t war from t h e xenophobic Jan Sangh party and other extremis ts .Her policies have so far r ece i ved general p u b support.

19, The Paki stani m i ary continues t o rule a1 1 sectionso f the country th rough i t s strict artial Law Administration MLA) .Whether President Yahya Khan i s absolute boss or simply one o fa number o f generals ruling c o l l e c t i v e l y cannot be e s t a b l i shed .I n any event Yahya and the MLA show almost no s i g n s o f p a r t i s a ndisagreements o r l a c k o f resolve . Z . A . Bhu t to , t h e p o l i t i c i a nwho g o t mos t o f t h e West P a k i s t a n i votes i n t h e December 1970e l e c t i o n s , has s o f a r n o t been p e r m i t t e d t o t a k e o f f i c e . I n h i sfrustration he frequently lashes o u t a t t h e MLA i n p r i v a t e andocc sion lly in p u b l i c , bu t he w i l l remain power less s o long as

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t h e military cont inues to rule. And i n t h e present c r i s i satmosphere t h e r e are few s i g n s t h a t t h e MLA w i l l i n f a c trenounce i t s a u t h o r i t y .

20. The I n d i a n s say t h a t t h e West Pakistanis a c t s i nthe e a s t wi ng a r e n o t on y wrong i n t h a t th y are t r y i n gto negate t h rough m i l i t a r y acts t h A L s e l e c t o r a l mandate --but a l s o doomed t o failure. They probably see t h e degree o fBenga l i resistance as t o o g r e a t for Islamabad ever to s t i f l e ;i n any e v e n t , th y feel morally o b l i g a t e d t o support i t eventhough t h i s p o l y entails obvious r i s k s . They c a l c u l a t e t h a tm oun t i ng c o s t s and continuing failures -- much o f i t resultingf r o m t h e activities o f the Indian-supported Mukt i B a h i n i willeventually fo r c e t h e West Pakistanis to grant autonomy t t h eeast w i n g and probably t o abandon i t entirely The I n d i a n sa1 so seem t o f e e l or hope t h a t t h e s e o b j e c t i v e s may be a c h i e v e dsooner r a t h e r t h a n 1a t e r and w i t oul a f u l l s c a l e Indo-Pakistaniwar

21. Besides aiding t h e i n s u r g e n t s India has a1 so g i v e nasyl urn to many c i v i 1 n AL l e a de r s who were ab l e t o f l East

The o t h e r principal P a k i s t a n i poZiticaZ leader t h e AL sMujibur Rahman remains in prison Pstamabad has announcedt t he s being k r i e d in camera for treason, but has notdzs zosed t h e verdict or s en t ence Even s h e remains overwheZnringZy t h e most popu la r p o Z i t i c i a n i n East BengaZ


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Bengal and has extended considerable a i d t o the Bangla Deshgovernment-in-exi e which t h e s e leaders s e t u p i n C a l c u t t asome months ago. H o s t o f them have proved to be uninspiringfigures w i t h i t t l e s t a t u r e or p o p u l a r i t y i n t h e i r own r i g h t .None can c l a i m s could Muj ibur Rahman t o speak f o r t h eBengal i people. Mrs. Gandhi has s f r res i s ted dom es t i cpol ical pressures t o extend f o r m a l diplomatic r e c o g n i t i o nt o t h i s shadow regime. Such an act would almost certainly l e a dt o a break in rel tions w i t h P a k i s t a n and poss i b l y t o serioush o s t i l i t i e s as w e l l . Were t h e l a t t e r t o e r u p t anyway o r t h einsurgency t o c o n t i n u e for an extended period however t h eo d d s f a v o r i n g recogni i o n woul d grow.

22. F o r h i s part Yahya sincerely be1 ieves t h a t Pakistani s t h e agg r i e v ed p a r t y t h a t i t i s only suppressing a treason-able s e c e s s i o n i s t movement i n o r d e r t o maintain t h e i n t e g r i t yo the country , Because t h e I nd i a n s support t h e B e n g al i insur-gen t s I s lambad a s s e r t s t h a t t he y are the aggressors n d areresponsib le f o r the suffering bloodshed and refugees. Evens o there are occasional rumors of a poss i b l e accommodationb e i n g reached between President Yahya and t h e AL. But t h i swould probably require such major and a t the moment unlikelyconcess i ons y Yahya -- p r t icul r ly t h e release o f Mu j i bur


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Rahman -- as t o make i t improbable. Rather t h e MLA i s likelyt o remain morally and emotionally commi t ted t o i t s presentcourse.

23. That ourse imp1 i s more t h a n j u s t con t inued m i 1 a r yr u l e . Pre s i d e n t Yahya has r e c e n t l y dec la red an amnesty formost Bengalis removed t h e harsh General T i k k a Khan from E a s tPakistan and appo i n t ed a Benga l i c i v i l i a n as governor t h e r e .B u t t h e new governor i s an 01 man not noted for s k i l l de-c i s i veness o r popular appeal He has chosen a c a b i n e t o fcivilians b u t his province continues under mar t i a l l a w andt h u s under army c o n t r o l , About 40 percent o th AL memberselected i n December 1970 t o p r o v i n c i a l and n a t i o n a l assemblieshave een o f f i c i a l l y c l e a r ed t o t a k e t h e i r seats when and i ft h o se bod ies meet; e l e c t i o n s t o replace those proscribed arepromised y t h e end f 1971 B u t t h e M u k t i Bahini w i 11 i n h i b i tmany i o t most o f those who have been c l e a r e d from s e r v i n gand will a l so probably d i s r u p t any new e l e c t i o n s wh ich m i g h tbe he1d . On ba lance , we expect t h a t Yahya s military regimew i l l continue t o seek ways o f b r i n g in g on c i v i l i a n c o n s t i t u -t i o n a l r u l e in a l l p a r t s of P a k i s ta n , but will f i n d t h e obstac lesformidable and t h e goal probably u n a t t a i nab1e Any c i v i l a n


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government e s t a b l i s h e d i n Ea st Pakistan under th e army saegis i s l i k e l y t o be mo r e shadow than substance.

24 . West Pakistan sel has experienced some d i f f i c u l t i e si n t h e p a s t s i x months Military spending i s cutting intodevelopment and s o c i a l s e r v i c e s ; s tock market p r i c e s re t h e1owes i n s years pri vate investment i s near1y non-exi s t en tand t h e r e ar e some pr ss r e p o r t s t h a t p r i c e s a r e r i s i n g . Evenso, West P a k i s t a n has so f r n o t f e l t t h e severe economic p i n c hand consequent po l i t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s wh ich some experts thoughtw o u l r e s u l t from t h e troubles in t he e a s t wing. Urban unemploy-ment has n o t ser ious ly increased. More t h a n 70 percent o f i t sworkers a r e fanners who would no t be much a f f e c t e d by develop-ments i n t h e u rban industrial sector Except f o r o c c a s i o n a lcompla in ts by the f r u s t r a t e d Bhu t to and some o f h i s a s s o c i a t e s ,the re has n o t been much pub1 c unres t or d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t hthe government and i t s po l i c i e s i n th west wing. Yahya smoves have so f r been w ll accepted and probably p o p u l a r thereTh i s l i k e t h e e cono mic s i t u a t i o n m y change, b u t t does notseem 1 e ly t ny t i m e soon.

25. e s t P a k i s t a n s f o r e i g n exchange pos i t ion has remainedconsiderably b e t t e r t han expected. Soon a f t e r the c r i s i s broke,


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Is1 arnabad unilateral ly declared a s i x months moratorium on itsf o r e i g n d e b t payments s a v i n g i t s e l f 60 mi l l ion i n f o r e i g nexchange. Its f a i r l y l a r g e t e x t i l e i n d u s t r y has lost much oft s c a p t i v e market i n t h e e a s t wing, bu t t a p p a re n t l y has been

ab l e t o e x p o r t i t s products elsewhere. t t h e same t ime consumerimpo r t s have been c u t sharply Development spending in t h e eas to f course has been greatly curtailed i f n o t ended e n t i r e l y .Thanks t o these steps Pakistan ' s f o r e i n exchange r e s e r v e s havef a l l e n only from 254 million a ye a r ago t o 217 m i l l i o n . Westernpowers have made no s i g n i f i c a n t new ex tens ions o f f o r e i g n a i ds i n c e March 1971 bu t there i s still enough a i d i n t he p i p e l i n et o l a s t s e v e r a l more months, possibly longer. P a k i s t a n ' s mora-t o r i u m on f o r e i g n d e b t repayments exp i res i n October and t h egovernment i s s e e k i n g more l ibera l repayment terms from i t sc r e d i t o r s . f such a r e not for thcoming Is arnabad could thendec la re a n o t h e r mo ra to r i u m and cont inue a s be fo r e -- though t i swou1d f u r t h e r antagonize a t e a s t some o f i t s f o r e i g n c r e d i tors


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South sia nd the utside mers

26 S ince March 1971, both I n d i a a n d Pak i s t an have o fcourse sought ou ts ide back ing or t h e i r r e s p e c t i r pos i t i on sand have shown considerable concern with f o r e i g n responses t otheir moves. N e i t h e r country has taken i t s case t o t h e UN i nt h i s d i s p u t e , probably in p a r t because n e i t h e r would be likelyt o g e t t h e s t rong endorsement o f any s i g n i f i c a n t g roup o na-t i o n s t h e r e . I n some cases f o r e i gn suppor t , or lack o f it hashad only mar g i na l impact. I n d i a has been disappointed , thoughha r d l y damaged, by t h e support g i v e n t h e P a k i s t a n i s by t h eArabs whom New Delhi has s o l o n g c u l t i v a t e d and endorsed i nt h e i r d is p u te w i t h I s r a e l O f f r g r e a t e r consequence has beenI n d i a s f a i l u r e t o g e t a l l . P a k i s t a n s p r i n c i p a l s o u r c e s o feconomic a i d t o suspend t h e i r ass i s t an ce pending a p o l i t i c a ls o l u t i o n i n East Bengal Bu t the two South Asian c o u n t r i e s haveconcentrated most o f t h e i r e f f o r t s n seeking t h e backing, v a r i -o u s l y , o f t h e U S , t h e USSR nd China.

a hina

27 , Peking has n o t i n v o l v e d i t s e l f much i n t h e c u r r e n t Sou t hAs i a n cr i s i s a t l e a s t not openly and d i r e c t l y . E a r l y on i td i d send a n a s t y i f somewhat equ ivoca l note t o t h e Indian


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< ~ W ~ ~ . , , . ., ,-; - ; .> , :,.z- ,A . ..., . .

HTgovernment t e l l i n g t he l a t t e r n o t t o i n t e r f e r e i n t h e a f f a i r so f o the rs , bu t i t has s i n c e been generally s i l e n t on t h e c i v i lwar i n E a s t Benga l o f a r s we know, t i e s w i t h t h e I s l amabadgovernment remain co r d i a l , and China s s u b s t a n t i a1 economic andm i l t a r y a i d programs w i t h P a k i s t a n appear t o c o n t i n u e as b e f o r e .Well before March 1971, Peking had begun t o mute i t s normallyharsh a n t i - I n d i a n pos tu re . Dur ing t h e p a s t y ea r o r so i t hasmade no p o l e m i c a l a t t a c k s on Mrs Gandhi, and has a p p a r e n t l yceased t s propaganda support o f the smal I r i b a l i n s u r g e n c i e si n nor theas te rn I n d i a Indeed t h e r e are numerous rum ors i nIndia t h a t major moves i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of a d e t e n t e w i Pekinga r e i n t h e o f f i n g .

28 I n any case China remains an i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r i n b o t hIslamabad and New Del h i ; h e c o n t in g e n c y o f a j o i n t P a k i s t a n i -Chinese a t t a c k on i t remains a p r i n c i p a l I n d i a n b uga boo . T h i shas been even more t h e case s i n c e t h e I n d i a n s 1earned o f M r .K i s s i n g e r s t r i p f r o m P a k i s t a n t o P ek ing and o f P r e s i d e n t N i x o n simpend ing t r i p t o China. E v e r s u s p i c i o u s a n d - p r o n e o fe rt h e worst many i n l n d i a sunnise t h a t they f ace n o t merely t h ec o o r d i n a t e d hos ti i y o f t h e i r t w o t r a d i t i o n a l enemies , bu t f e a rt h a t b o t h w i l l h a v e t h e b a c k i n g o f t he US. We c o n t i n u e t o es -t i m a t e t h a t t h e Chinese p r o b a b l y would not j o i n i n an Indo-

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P a k i s t a n i c o n f l t -- t h o u g h i n c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s theym i g h t engage i n such t h r e a t e n i n g ges tu res as maneuvering t r oopsnea r t h e Chinese- Ind ian border. We a l so be1 e v e t h t t h e I nd i ansthemselves p r o b a b l y do n o t cons ide r t h Chinese l o be an a c tua li m n i nen t t h r e a t . Nonetheless t h ey are uneasy and c o n t i n u et o seek ways b oth o f s t r e n g t h e n i n g themse lves m i 1 i t r i ly ando f f i n d i n g s u p p o r t e r s a g a i n s t a . p u t a t i ve US-China-Pakis t a n co-a l i o n a g a in s t them.

b he USSR

2 9 These f ea rs have been a m a j o r f a c t o r i n I n d i a s de-velopment o f even c l o s e r t i e s w i t h t h e USSR. Moscow has n o tbacked I n d i a c o n s i s t e n t l y a n d u n c r i t i c a l ly s ince t h e Bengalcri s i s erupted I t has c o n t i n u e d . d e l v e r i e s under s eco-

any o f t h e o t h e r great powers t h e USSR h a s l i n e d up w i t hI n d i a s i n c e March 1971; i n New D el h i s eyes t remains ab a s t i o n a g a i n st any t h r e a t real o r imagined t o an I n d i a i s ol a t e d f r o m o r h o s t i l e t o t h e other p r i n c i p a l powers . TheFr iendsh i p T re at y o f August 1971 f u r t h e r cements and f o rma l esI ndo - Sov ie t t i e s I t r e a f f i r m s mutual f r i e n d s h i p . i n c o r p o r a t e s


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promises not t o a s s i s t one another s enemies i n case o f an a t t a c kby a t h i r d party a nd agrees t o mutual c on su l t a t i o n i n t h e evento f such an a t t a c k or a t h r e a t of one. How much enhanced i n f l u e n c eo r c o n t r o l , i any say t h r o u h s e r e t unders tand ings - -t h i s t r e a t y actually gives t h e Russians over t h e I n d i a n s i n f o r -e i g n p o l i c y matters i s s t i l l unc lea r . A t t h e very l e a s t t p r o -v i d e s some s a t i s f a c t i o n t o t he S o v i e t s i n f o r m a l i z i n g t h e i r pres-e n t s a t i s f a c t o r y p o s i t i o n i n I n d i a . It appears likely t h a t t h e yapprove and support t h e present l i n e s o ndian p o l i c y , and t h a tth y n i l con t lnue th ir efforts t o p re ve n t New Del h i from h e a t i n gup t h e s i t u a t i o n and p a r t i c u l a r l y fmrn ' l aunching an all-out w a r .

30. The t r e a t y has a1 r eady had a con s ide ra b le i m p a c t on b o t ht h e I n d i a n s and t h e Pakistanis. In what can e cons t rued as t h ef i r s t f r u i t s of c o n s u l t a t i o n , I n d i a a f f i r m e d , i n a j o i n t s t a t e -ment o f t h e I n d i a n and S o v i e t Foreign inisters a few days a f t e rt h e t r e a t y w s s igned t h a t t h e r e can be no military s o l u t i o nand considered t h a t urgent steps be taken i n E as t Pakistan forachievement o f a p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n . . . . . hether this impliesa permanen t renunc ia t i on o f I n d i a n use o f f o r c e i n East Bengalas well a s a condemnation o f P a k i s t a n s a c t s t h e r e remains t o beestab l ished . However a la ter reference i n the j o i n t s ta tement t o


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t h e se t t l n g o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l probl ems by p e a c e f u l n e g o t i a t i o n sdoes p o i n t i n t h a t d i r e c t i o n .

31 A t l e a s t up t o now, the t r e a t y has served s a sta-b i l i z i n g f a c t o r , muting t h e mil i t a n cy wh ich had p r e v i o u s l yraised i t s v o i c e th roughout much o f I n d i a Hawks have foundi t more d i f f i c u l t t o g e t t h e government t o listen t o the ir de-mands fo r f o r c e f u l a c t i o n aga i ns t Pakistan or t o a t t r a c t mucho f a popu l a r following. Over t i m e , t h e t r e a t y may have widerran g ing consequences i n o t h e r areas . I t i s s t i l l t early tt ll however, whether t h e t r e a t y m i g h t l e ad t o g r e a t e r I ndo -S o v i e t : c o o p e ra t i o