18 calero vs carion

8/9/2019 18 Calero vs Carion

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[No. L-13246. March 30, 1960]

FEDERICO CALERO, plaintiff and appellant, vs.EMILIACARRION Y SANTA MARINA, ET AL., defendants andappellees.

PURCHASE AND SALE; PURCHASE BY TWO OR MOREPERSONS; ABSENCE OF INDICATION THATPROPERTY WAS BEING PURCHASED FOR THEBENEFIT OF ALL.Although the original proposal wasfor

the parties to purchase the property jointly, the same wasabandoned and the parties subsequently agreed that thedefendants would buy the property exclusively in theirname and for their own account, to avoid the difficulties tobe encountered in acquiring the property in common.Plaintiff accepted this proposition with the understandingthat the property would be sold as soon as a buyer who canpay P300,000.00 could be found, with the obligation on thepart of the defendants to pay the plaintiff 20% of theproceeds after deducting the purchase price thereof. Held:

Article 1452 of the new Civil Code is inapplicable, becausenothing contained in the agreement would indicate that theproperty was being purchased for the benefit of the plaintiffand the deffendants. The recitals in the contract containingthe obligation assumed by the defendants, merely refer tothe services rendered by the plaintiff as broker whonegotiated the sale of the property to the defendants, andwhich the latter agreed to compensate. The terms of thecontract admit no doubt that the 20% to be paid the plaintiff

is of any amount which may be obtained by the sale of theproperty after deducting the purchase price therefor, whichshall be taken from the liquidated benefit obtained by theowners out of the sale of the said property. Neither is Article1453 of the New Civil Code applicable, because there isabsolutely nothing in the agreement which even remotelyindicates that the property was conveyed to the defendants

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550 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Calero vs. Carrion, et al.

in reliance upon their declared intention to hold it for, ortransfer it to, another or the grantor.

OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; OBLIGATIONSUBJECT TO SUSPENSIVE PERIOD; OBLIGATIONSUSPENDED BEFORE PERIOD IS FIXED.Thedefendant's obligation to sell, being subject to a suspensiveperiod (until a buyer who can pay P300,000.00, could befound), said defendants may not be compelled to act untilthe period is fixed. Before the period is fixed, the obligationis suspended.

ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO HAVE THE PERIOD FIXED,

WHEN BORN; EXTRAJUDICIAL DEMAND, NOTESSENTIAL.But this is not to say that the plaintiff hasno cause of action. His cause of action under the agreementis to have the court fix the period and after the expiration ofthe period to compel the performance of said obligation tosell. And this right to have the period judicially fixed, isborn from the date of the agreement itself which containsthe undetermined period. Extrajudicial demand is notessential for the creation of this cause of action to have theperiod fixed. It exists by operation of law, from the moment

the agreement subject to the undetermined period is enteredinto, whether the period depends upon the will of the debtoralone, or of the parties themselves, or where from thenature and the circumstances of the obligation it can beinferred that a period was intended.

ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION TO HAVE THEPERIOD FIXED; CASE AT BAR.The action to ask thecourt to fix the period for the fulfillment of defendant's

obligation in the case at bar prescribes in ten years from thedate of the aforesaid agreement. (Gonzales vs. Jose, 66Phil., 369; Sec. 43(1), Code of Civil Procedure; Art. 1116,new Civil Code). Since the agreement was executed on May28, 1937, and the complaint to have the period fixed wasfiled on December 21, 1956, plaintiff's action is clearlybarred under the Statute of Limitations.

APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance ofManila. Soriano, J.


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The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.Ramirez & Ortigasfor appellant.Carlos, Laurea&Associatesfor appellees.

BARRERA, J.:

From the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila (inCivil Case No. 31409) dismissing his complaint, on

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VOL. 107, MARCH 30, 1960 551


the ground of prescription, plaintiff Federico Calerointerposed this appeal directly to this Court on questionspurely of law.

On December 20, 1956, plaintiff filed with theabovementioned court a complaint which, in part, reads:

* * * * * * *

Que a principios del ao de 1937, el demandante propuso adon Enrique Carrion, padre de las demandadas, el siguientenegocio: adquirir entre los dos una finca en la Plaza SantaCruz, por al precio de P250,000.00, de los cuales se pagarianP25,000.00 al contado y el resto a plazos, en diez aos; en el

bien entendido de que para pagar la suma de P25,000.00,don Enrique Carrion aportaria P15,000.00 y el demandanteaportaria los P10,000.00 restantes.

Que despues de examinar la finca, don Enrique Carrionacept la proposicin del demandante, y le autoriza cerrar latransaccin, a nombre de sus hijas, es decir, de las dos (2)demandadas principales en este asunto.

Que en el entretanto, don Enrique Carrion se ausent deFilipinas, continuando las negociaciones su apoderado y

administrador, don Santiago Carrion quien tambien era elapoderado y administrador de las demandadas.

Que cuando se fu a preparar la escritura de compra, donSantiago Carrion, como apoderado de las demandadas,explic al demandante que era muy complicado constituiruna communidad de bienes en esa finca, pues habranecesidad de rendir cuentas mensuales, y consultarse encaso de reparaciones, mejoras, etc.

Que para evitar estas dificultades, don Santiago Carrion


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propuso comprar la finca a nombre exclusivo de lasdemandadas, con la obligacin de pagar al demandante elveinte por ciento (20%) de los beneficios, cuando se vendierala finca.

Que el demandante acept esa proposicin, en el bienentendido de que la finca seria vendida tan pronto como seencontrara un comprador por una cantidad no menor de

P300,000.00.Que debido a la confianza que exista entre las partes, eldemandante acept esa proposicin, como ya se ha dicho, ylas partes otorgaron el da 28 de mayo de 1937, un contratoformal, en el cual se hizo constar el ultimo conveniocelebrado por las partes, es decir, quea a la venta de la fincasituada en la Plaza Santa Cruz, las demandadas pagarianal demandante,

'una cantidad equivalente un VEINTE POR CIENTO (20%) decualquier cantidad que se obtenga de la venta de los mencionadosedificios y terrenos, despues de descontar el importe total pagado pordichas demandadas.'

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Que la verdadera intencion de las partes al otorgar elcontrato exhibito 'A' era dar al demandante unaparticipacin del veinte por ciento (20%), en todos losbeneficios, rentas y utilidades de la finca descrita en esecontrato.

Que desde el ao 1937 el demandante ha hecho variasofertas a las demandadas CARRION, para vender esa fincaal precio of recido por los compradores.

Que ahora el demandante tiene un comprador de dichafinca por ]a suma de P1,455,900.00, pero las demandadasCARRION continuan negandose a vender dicha finca porese precio, a pesar de la enorme ganancia que representaesa transaccin.

Que durante todo el tiempo transcurrido desde el ao 1937hasta la fecha, las demandadas CARRION se han lucradocon las rentas de esa finca, sin dar ninguna participacin aldemandante, quien hasta la fecha no ha recibido uncentimo de dicha finca por ningun concepto.


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"16.

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Que debido a los actos de las demandadas CARRION, eldemandante ha sufrido y sigue sufriendo daos y perjuiciosen una cantidad inestimable con certeza, pero que. por lomenos, debe ser el veinte por ciento (20%) de los beneficiosliquidos obtenidos de es finca por las demandadasCARRION.

Que el demandante ha requerido a las demandadas

CARRION a rendir cuentas de la Administracin de esafinca, a lo cual tambien se han negado.

Que si vende esa finca ahora en la cantidad deP1,455,900.00, las demandadas CARRION tendran unbeneficio lquido de P1,205, 900.00, o sea, la diferencia entreel precio de venta antes mencionado y los P250,000.00pagados por dicha finca; y por consiguiente, el demandantetendra derecho a percibir la suma de P241,180.00, o sea, elveinte por ciento (20%) de los beneficios obtenidos, deconformalidad con el contrato exhibito 'A' de esta demanda.

Que las demandadas CARRION se han negado a rendircuentas de los beneficios obtenidos de dicha finca y a pagarla participacin del demandante, a pesar de los repetidosrequerimientos de dicho demandante.

* * * * * * * *

"POR TANTO, el demandante ruega al Hon. Juzgado se sirva dictarsentencia:

"(A) Ordenando a las demandadas CARRION que rindan cuentacompleta y detallada de los ingresos y gastos de la finca mencionadaen el exhibit 'A' desde el dia 28 de mayo de 1937 hasta fecha de laventa, entregando al demandante un veinte por ciento (20%) delproducto lquido de dichas cuentas, en pago de los daos y perjuiciosya sufridos hasta la fecha;

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VOL. 107, MARCH 30, 1960 553


"(B) Ordenando a las demandadas que vendan esa finca descrita enel exhibito 'A', por un precio no menor de P1,455,900.00 en el plazode tres (3) meses, o de lo contrario paguen al demandante lacantidad de P241,180.00, que representa el veinte por ciento (20%)de los beneficios obtenidos, con sus intereses legales desde esta fechahasta su completo pago."


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"(A)

On February 2, 1957, defendants Emilia Carrion, MariaCarrion, Jose Falco, and Manuel Perez Guzman (the lasttwo as husbands, respectively, of the first two), filed a motionto dismiss, on the grounds that (1) the complaint states nocause of action, and (2) the plaintiff's cause of action, if any,is barred by the Statute of Limitations (Sec. 1[e], Rule 8,Rules of Court). To this motion, plaintiff filed an opposition

on March 16, 1957. On June 1, 1957, the court requiredplaintiff to amend his complaint, in an order which, in part,reads:

"* * * inasmuch as plaintiff concedes in his answer (opposition) tothe motion to dismiss that '* * * por tratarse de una obligacin sinplazo fijo, ste debe ser determinado por el Hon. Juzgado', it isplaintiff's duty to amend his complaint to this effect, because thereis nothing either in its allegations or in its prayer asking that thisCourt fix a reasonable period for the sale of the -said property with

a view to having defendants comply with their obligations underthe parties' aforesaid agreement.

"* * * defendants' obligation has not even become demandable inview of the suspensive condition found in the parties' agreement.

"WHEREFORE, it is- ordered that plaintiff amend his complaintwithin twenty (20) days from notice hereof, failing which the samewill be dismissed."

Complying with the above order of the court, plaintiff, onJune 15, 1957, filed an amended complaint which is

identical to the original complaint, except that it containedthe following new Paragraph 15 and a new prayer, to wit:

"15. Que el contrato exhibito 'A' no establece un plazo determinadopara la venta de la finca descrita en el mismo contrato, aunque laintencin de que hubiera un plazo es evidente de la naturaleza,circumstancias y condiciones del mismo contrato; y el Hon Juzgadodebe sealar dicho plazo, de acuerdo con el articulo 1197 del nuevoCodigo Civil."

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"POR TANTO, el demandante ruega al Hon. Juzgado se sirva dictarsentencia:

Sealando un plazo de tres (3) meses para que las


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"(B)

demandadas CARRION vendan la finca descrita, en elexhibito 'A' al precio mas alto en el mercado, pero no menosde la oferta actual de P1,455,900.00;

Ordenando a las demandadas CARRION que paguen aldemandante el veinte por ciento (20%) de los beneficiosobtenidos en la venta de dicha finca; * * *."

On July 18, 1957, defendants renewed their motion todismiss, on the grounds that (1) the amended complaintstates no cause of action, (2) the plaintiff's cause of action, ifany, is barred by the Statute of Limitations (Sec. 1[e], Rule8, Rules of Court), and (3) the plaintiff's original complaintbeing without cause of action, it cannot be amended and/orcured by said amended complaint which changes plaintiff'stheory of the case. In connection with the second groundmentioned, defendants stated:

"Plaintiff's right of action accrued in the year 1937 when the first ofplaintiff's alleged various offers to defendants to sell the property atthe price offered by buyers was refused by defendants (Pars. 13 and14 of Complaint). It is patent, therefore, that plaintiff's cause ofaction, if any, prescribed in the year 1947, that is, ten (10) yearsfrom the year 1937. Considering that plaintiff's complaint was filedon December 21, 1956, plaintiff's cause of action if any, is obviouslyunenforceable and barred by the Statute of Limitations."

To this motion, plaintiff filed his opposition on August 2,

1957, to which defendants filed a rejoinder on August 8,1957. To this rejoinder, plaintiff filed a counter-reply onAugust 12, 1957.

On August 21, 1957, the court issued an order denyingdefendants' motion to dismiss. From this order, defendantsfiled a motion for reconsideration on August 27, 1957, whichwas duly opposed by plaintiff on September 7, 1957. OnSeptember 16, 1957, defendants filed a rejoinder to saidopposition.

On October 1, 1957, the court issued an order dismissingplaintiffs complaint on the ground of prescription, as follows:

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"ORDER

"This Court has before it (1) defendants' MOTION FORRECONSIDERATION of the order of this Court dated August 21;1957, (2) CONTESTACIN DEL DEMANDANTE A LA MOCINDE RECONSIDERACIN, and (3) defendants' REJOINDER TOCONTESTACIN DEL DEMANDANTE A LA MOCIN DERECONSIDERACIN.'

"It is true that heretofore this Court did not entertain defendants'motion to dismiss plaintiff's original complaint; that on June 1,1957, plaintiff was given twenty (20) days to amend his complaint;that on June 15, 1957, the amended complaint was filed; that onJuly 22, 1957, defendants again put in a motion to dismiss the saidamended complaint, and that on August 21, 1957, this Court alsodenied this latter motion to dismiss. Defendants, however, have fileda motion for reconsideration of the order just mentioned 011 theground that plaintiff's action under his amended complaint has

already prescribed, and this Court has to pass upon the said motionfor reconsideration.

"Concretely, defendants now contend that plaintiff's actionasking this Court to fix the period for the fulfillment of defendants'obligation, which is the subject matter of his amended complaint,has already prescribed under the law and the applicable authorities.While this Court in conscience believes that defendants have suchobligation to plaintiff under the express terms and conditions of theparties' agreement Exhibit A, nevertheless it cannot ignoredefendants' aforesaid contention that plaintiff's action asking this

Court to fix a period for the fulfillment of the said obligation has infact already prescribed. For one thing, this action which may bebrought under Article 1197 of the New Civil Code cannot be said tobe imprescriptible. For another, as pointed out by defendants, in thecase of Gonzales vs. Jose, 66 Phil., 369, among others, it waspertinently held that 'The action to ask the court to fix the periodhas already prescribed in accordance with section 43(1) of the Codeof Civil Procedure. This period of prescription is ten years, whichhas already elapsed from the execution of the promissory notes until

the filing of the action on June 1, 1934.' Inasmuch as in the instantcase, the parties' agreement Exhibit A was executed on May 28,1937, plaintiff's action to fix the period for the fulfillment ofdefendants' obligation thereunder should have been filed within ten(10) years? from the date just mentioned, following the said decisionbased on Section 43 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, in relation to

Article 1116 of the New Civil Code. It is plain to see therefore thatplaintiff's present action commenced only on December 21, 1956, isalready long barred by prescription.


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"At page 2 of plaintiff's CONTESTACIN DEL DEMANDANTE A

LA MOCIN DE RECONSIDERACIN, the position is taken that'En este asunto el plazo de prescripcin comienza cuando nace elderecho de accin. Plaintiff's cause of action in the present case is tohave this Court fix the period which the parties had left toconjecture in their agreement Exhibit A, and the said cause ofaction arose right after the execution of said agreement on May 28,1937, and lapsed ten (10) years after said date. Plaintiff furtherstate that 'ademas, en nuestro asunto actual este Hon. Juzgado yaha resuelto que el derecho de accin ni siquiera habia comenzado'.What this Court really said on this point in its order of June 1, 1957

is the following: 'As just intimated, defendants' obligation has noteven become demandable in view of the suspensive condition foundin the parties' agreement'. Reference therefore is clearly made todefendants' obligation to plaintiff under Exhibit A, and not toplaintiff's right to ask for the fixing of the period contemplated bythe parties in the said agreement. Plaintiff finally submits that'para que se acepte una mocin de sobreseimiento, el fundamentodebe ser indubitable, (Seccion 3, Regla 8 del Reglamento de losTribunales.)' and that 'El hecho de que este Hon. Juzgado haya

denegado ya dos mociones de sobreseimientos, es la mejor prueba deque su fundamento espor lo menos muy dudoso'. It may begathered from the record of this case that this Court has all alongbeen inclined to try it on the merits with a view to getting at thetruth and rendering judgment accordingly. However, it now findsitself faced with a defense, namely, prescription, so clear andunanswerable that, to overlook the same, would be to disregardlegal as well as judicial precepts.

"Finding defendants' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ofthe order of this Court dated August 21, 1957 to be meritorious, the

said reconsideration is hereby granted, and plaintiff's amendedcomplaint is hereby dismissed, with costs against him.

"So ORDERED."

From the above-quoted order, plaintiff filed a motion forreconsideration on October 3, 1957, which was duly opposedby defendants on October 18, 1957. On October 23, 1957, thecourt denied said motion. Hence, this appeal.

Plaintiff claims that the lower court erred in dismissinghis complaint, contending that (a) the agreement Exhibit A


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attached to the amended complaint and made an integralpart thereof, created "un fideicomiso implcito" or an impliedtrust, which is not subject to prescription,

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VOL. 107, MARCH 30, 1960 557


and (b) that even admitting the obligation is subject to asuspensive undetermined period (not condition), the actionto have such period fixed by the court has not yetprescribed. In support of his submission that the agreementcreated an implied trust, plaintiff-appellant cites theprovisions of Articles 1452 and 1453 of the new Civil Codewhich read as follows:

"ART. 1452. If two or more persons agree to purchase property andby common consent the legal title is taken in the name of one ofthem for the benefit of all, a trust is created by force of law infavorof the others in proportion to the interest of each."

"ART. 1453. When property is conveyed to a person in relianceupon his declared intention to hold it for, or transfer it to another orthe grantor, there is an implied trust in favor of the person whosebenefit is contemplated."

The contention is without merit, Article 1452 abovequoted isinapplicable to this case for the reason that there isabsolutely no stipulation in the contract, Exhibit A, thatthere would be a joint purchase of the property and that thelegal title thereto was to be placed in the name of thedefendants for the benefit of themselves and herein plaintiff.The recitals in the contracts preceding the paragraphcontaining the obligation assumed by the defendants,merely refer to the services rendered by the plaintiff asbroker who negotiated the sale of the property to the

defendants and which the defendants agreed to compensate.Nothing contained therein would indicate that the propertywas being purchased for the benefit of the plaintiff and thedefendants. The obligation assumed by the defendants isclear and unequivocal in that:

"por y en consideracion, a los trabajos, sugestiones, concejos y ayudahasta ahora prestados por Don Federico Calero en relacion con lacompra de los bienes vendidos a las Sras. EMILIA CARRION TSTA. MARINA Y MARIA DE LAS MERCEDES CARRION Y


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SANTA MARINA y a los trabajos y concejos que dicho seorpromete seguir dando a los apoderados de las mismas en relacioncon ]a venta arriendo. administracion y mejoramiente de losmencionados bienes, por la

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558 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATEDCalero vs. Carrion, et al.

presente, libre y voluntariamente, Don Santiago Carrion, en sucapacidad de apoderado de las mencionadas Da. EMILIA CARRION

Y STA. MARINA y Da. MARIA DE LAS MERCEDES CARRION YSANTA MARINA y de la manera mas solemne como sea necessarioy eficaz en derecho, promete pagar a don Federico Calero sussucesores y cesionarios, una cantidad equivalente a UN VEINTE

POR CIENTO (20%) de cualquier cantidad que se obtenga de laventa de los mencionados edificios y terrenos, despues de descontar

el importe total pagado por /as Sras. EMILIA CARRION Y STA.MARINA Y MARIA DE LAS MERCEDES CARRION Y SANTAMARINA a la duea de los mismos El Hogar Filipino, entendiendoseademas que este veinte por ciento ser tomado de la ganancialiquida que les represente a las nuevas dueas la venta de los bienesmencionados ya seapor mediacion. del.Sr. Calero o sin ella." (par. 5of Exh. A). (Italics supplied.)

The terms of the contract admit no doubt that the 20%to bepaid the plaintiff is of any amount which may be obtainedby the sale of the property after deducting- the purchaseprice thereof, which shall be taken from the liquidatedbenefit obtained by the owners out of the sale of the saidproperty.

Neither is Article 1453 applicable, because there isabsolutely nothing in the agreement which even remotelyindicates that the property was conveyed to the defendants

in reliance upon their declared intention to hold it for, ortransfer it to, another or the grantor.Even the very allegations of plaintiff's complaint clearly

reflect the true nature of the agreement. It appearstherefrom that although the original proposal was for theparties to purchase the property jointly (plaintiff tocontribute P10,000.00 and the defendants to put upP15,000.00 on account of the down payment of P25,000.00),the same was abandoned and the parties subsequentlyagreed that the defendants would buy the property


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exclusively in their name and for their own account because"era muy complicado constituir una comunidad de bienes enesa finca, pues habria necesidad de rendir cuentasmensuales, y consultares en caso de reparaciones, mejoras,etc." and that the plaintiff "acept esa proposicion, en el bien

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VOL. 107, MARCH 30, 1960 559


entendido de que la finca sera vendida tan pronto como seencontrar un comprador por una cantidad no menor deP300,000.00" "con la obligacion (on the part of thedefendants) de pagar al demandante el veinte por ciento(20%) de los beneficios, cuando se vendiera la finca", and

that, lastly, "el demandado acept esa proposicin, como yase ha dicho, y las partes otorgaron el dia 28 de marzo de1937, un contrato formal en el cual se hizo constar el ultimoconveniocelebrado por las partes, es decir, que a la venta dela finca situada en la Plaza Santa Cruz, las demandadaspagarian al demandante,

'una cantidad equivalente a un Veinte Por Ciento (20%) decualquier cantidad que se obtenga de la venta de los mencionadosedificios y terrenos. despues de descontar el importe total pagado por

dichas demandadas.'" (See paragraphs 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of theamended complaint.)

Plaintiff-appellant next contends that the lower court alsoerred in dismissing his complaint on the finding thatplaintiffs right of action to have the period fixed for the saleof the property had already prescribed. It is urged that thetime for enforcing their right of action to have the periodjudicially determined did not begin to run until thedefendants had been formally demanded and they refused

to sell the property. It was only then, it is argued, that theperiod of prescription started to run. This seems to beillogical. Before the period is fixed, the defendants'obligation to sell is suspended and they, therefore, can notbe compelled to act. For this reason, a complaint to enforceimmediately the principal obligation subject to thesuspensive period before this is fixed, will not prosper. Butthis is not to say that the plaintiff has no cause of action. Hiscause of action under the agreement is to have the court fix


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the period and after the expiration of that period, to compelthe performance of the principal obligation to sell. And thisright to have the period judicially fixed is born from the dateof the agreement itself which contains the undetermined

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560 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATEDBacolod Murcia Milling Co., Inc. vs. Henares, etc.

period. Extrajudicial demand is not essential for thecreation of this cause of action to have the period fixed.

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Itexists by operation of law from the moment such anagreement subject to an undetermined period is enteredinto, whether the period depends upon the will of the debtoralone, or of the parties themselves, or where from the nature

and the circumstances of the obligation it can be inferredthat a period was intended.This is the clear intendment of Article 1197 of the New

Civil Code as well as Article 1128 of the Spanish Civil Codeand the applicable doctrine laid down by this Court.

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Andsince the agreement was executed on May 28, 1937 and thecomplaint to have the period fixed was filed on December 21,1956 or after almost 20 years, plaintiff's action is clearly andindisputably barred under the Statute of Limitations.

Wherefore, finding no reversible error in the orderappealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, with costsagainst the plaintiff-appellant. So ordered.

Pars, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo,

Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L.,and Gutierrez David, JJ.,concur.

Order affirmed.

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