Republic of the PhilippinesSSuupprreemmee CCoouurrtt

ManilaFFIIRRSSTT DDIIVVIISSIIOONN

BBOONNAAVVEENNTTUURREE MMIINNIINNGG GG..RR.. NNoo.. 117744991188CCOORRPPOORRAATTIIOONN,,

Petitioner,Present:PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus - CARPIO,CORONA,AZCUNA, andLEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

JJ.

VV..II..LL.. MMIINNEESS,, IINNCCOORRPPOORRAATTEEDD,,RReepprreesseenntteedd bbyy iittss CCoorrppoorraattee PPrroommuullggaatteedd::SSeeccrreettaarryy,, RROOXXAANNNNAA SS.. GGOO,, AAuugguusstt 1133,, 22000088

Respondent.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- x

DD EE CC II SS II OO NN

PPUUNNOO,, CC..JJ..::

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules ofCourt filed by the petitioner Bonaventure Mining Corporation (BMC),to set aside the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated August 29,2006 (CA Decision) which reversed the Decision[2] of the MinesAdjudication Board (MAB) and reinstated the Decision[3] of thePanel of Arbitrators upholding the EPA-IVA-63 of respondent V.I.L.

Mines, Incorporated (VMI), and canceling the EPA-IVA-72 ofpetitioner BMC.

This case involves a conflict over mining claims between BMCand VMI over a mountainous section that transcends the commonboundaries of the provinces of Quezon and Camarines Norte,specifically within the municipal jurisdictions of Tagkawayan andGuinigayangan in Quezon, and Labo and Sta. Elena in CamarinesNorte.[4]

The facts are of record.On February 20, 1995, Tapian Mining Corporation (now

Greenwater Mining Corporation [Greenwater]) filed an application fora Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with theCentral Office of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) coveringapproximately 100,000 hectares in Tagkawayan, Quezon as well as inthe provinces of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur. Before thattime, Greenwater had already filed other FTAA applications,specifically in Marinduque, covering 73,000 hectares, and in theBulacan, Quezon and Rizal provinces totaling another 100,000hectares.[5]

On March 3, 1995, Republic Act No. 7942 (R.A. No. 7942),otherwise known as The Philippine Mining Act of 1995, was passedby Congress. It provided for the maximum allowable area that maybe granted a qualified person under a FTAA, viz:

SECTION 34. Maximum Contract Area. The maximumcontract area that may be granted per qualified person, subject torelinquishment shall be:(a) 1,000 meridional blocks onshore;(b) 4,000 meridional blocks offshore; or(c) Combinations of (a) and (b) provided that it shall notexceed the maximum limits for onshore and offshore areas.

On March 12, 1996, the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources (DENR) issued the implementing rules andregulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 7942 in the form of DepartmentAdministrative Order No. (DAO) 95-23. It gave FTAA applicants adeadline of one (1) year from its date of effectivity within which todivest or relinquish from their applications areas exceeding themaximum provided by R.A. No. 7942. Section 257 of DAO 95-23provides:

Section 257. Non-impairment of ExistingMining/Quarrying Rights.

x x xAll pending applications for MPSA/FTAA and exploration

permits issued prior to the promulgation of these implementingrules and regulations shall be governed by the provisions of theAct and these implementing rules and regulations; Provided,however, that where the grant of such FTAA application/proposalswould exceed the maximum contract area restrictions contained inSection 34 of the Act, tthhee aapppplliiccaanntt//pprrooppoonneenntt sshhaallll hhaavvee oonneeyyeeaarr,, ffrroomm tthhee eeffffeeccttiivviittyy ooff tthheessee iimmpplleemmeennttiinngg rruulleess aannddrreegguullaattiioonnss,, ttoo ddiivveesstt oorr rreelliinnqquuiisshh aapppplliiccaattiioonnss oorr ppoorrttiioonnsstthheerreeooff wwhhiicchh,, iiff ggrraanntteedd,, wwoouulldd eexxcceeeedd tthhee mmaaxxiimmuummccoonnttrraacctt aarreeaa aalllloowwaannccee pprroovviiddeedd uunnddeerr tthhee AAcctt; Provided,finally, that this provision is applicable only to all FTAAapplications filed under DAO 63 prior to the approval of the Act.(Emphasis supplied)

x x x

On August 27, 1996, Section 257 of DAO 95-23 was amendedby DAO 96-25 giving FTAA applicants an extension of one (1) yearwithin which to divest or relinquish excess areas from theirapplications, viz:

Section 257. Non-Impairment of ExistingMining/Quarrying Rights.

x x xAll pending applications for MPSA/FTAA covering forest

land and other government reservations shall not be required tore-apply for exploration permit pprroovviiddeedd,, tthhaatt wwhheerree tthhee ggrraanntt ooffssuucchh FFTTAAAA aapppplliiccaattiioonnss//pprrooppoossaallss wwoouulldd eexxcceeeedd tthheemmaaxxiimmuumm ccoonnttrraacctt aarreeaa rreessttrriiccttiioonnss ccoonnttaaiinneedd iinn SSeeccttiioonn 3344 oofftthhee AAcctt,, tthhee aapppplliiccaanntt//pprrooppoonneenntt sshhaallll bbee ggiivveenn aann eexxtteennssiioonnooff oonnee yyeeaarr,, rreecckkoonneedd ffrroomm SSeepptteemmbbeerr 1133,, 11999966,, ttoo ddiivveesstt oorrrreelliinnqquuiisshh iinn ffaavvoorr ooff ggoovveerrnnmmeenntt,, aarreeaass iinn eexxcceessss ooff tthhee

mmaaxxiimmuumm aarreeaa aalllloowwaannccee pprroovviiddeedd uunnddeerr tthhee AAcctt. (Emphasissupplied)

On December 19, 1996, DAO 96-40, the revised IRR of R.A.No. 7942, was issued. Among other provisions, DAO 96-40 reiteratedthe deadline of one (1) year from September 13, 1996, or untilSeptember 13, 1997, within which FTAA applicants may divest orrelinquish certain areas in their applications which exceed themaximum allowable area under R.A. No. 7942. Section 272 of DAO96-40 provides as follows:

SSeeccttiioonn 227722.. NNoonn--IImmppaaiirrmmeenntt ooff EExxiissttiinnggMMiinniinngg//QQuuaarrrryyiinngg RRiigghhttss..

x x xAll pending applications for MPSA/FTAA covering forest

land and Government Reservations shall not be required tore-apply for Exploration Permit: Provided, That where the grant ofsuch FTAA applications/proposals would exceed the maximumcontract area restrictions contained in Section 34 of the Act,, tthheeaapppplliiccaanntt//pprrooppoonneenntt sshhaallll bbee ggiivveenn aann eexxtteennssiioonn ooff oonnee ((11))yyeeaarr,, rreecckkoonneedd ffrroomm SSeepptteemmbbeerr 1133,, 11999966,, ttoo ddiivveesstt oorrrreelliinnqquuiisshh ppuurrssuuaanntt ttoo DDeeppaarrttmmeenntt AAddmmiinniissttrraattiivvee OOrrddeerr NNoo..9966--2255 iinn ffaavvoorr ooff tthhee GGoovveerrnnmmeenntt,, aarreeaass iinn eexxcceessss ooff tthheemmaaxxiimmuumm aarreeaa aalllloowwaannccee pprroovviiddeedd uunnddeerr tthhee AAcctt. For thispurpose, a Special Exploration Permit of limited applications andactivities shall be issued by the Secretary upon therecommendation of the Director, subject to the terms andconditions specified in the Permit and pertinent provisions ofChapter V hereof: Provided, That an area permission shall begranted likewise by the Secretary to undertake limited explorationactivities in non-critical forest reserves and forest reservations andsuch other areas within the jurisdiction of the Department. In otherareas, however, the applicant/proponent shall secure the necessaryarea clearances or written consent by the concerned agencies orparties, as provided for by law: Provided, further, That the timeperiod shall be deducted from the life of the MPSA/FTAA andexploration costs can be included as part of pre-operating expensesfor purposes of cost recovery should the FTAA be approved:Provided, finally, That this provision is applicable only to allFTAA/MPSA applications filed under Department AdministrativeOrder No. 63 prior to the effectivity of the Act and theseimplementing rules and regulations. (Emphasis supplied)

x x x

On August 27, 1997, the DENR issued Department

Memorandum Order No. 97-07 (DMO 97-07), entitled Guidelines inthe Implementation of the Mandatory September 15, 1997 Deadlinefor the Filing of Mineral Agreement Applications by Holders of Validand Existing Mining Claims and Lease/Quarry Applications and forOther Purposes. DMO 97-07 provides, among others, for thefollowing: (1) the deadline for the relinquishment of excess areasshall be on September 15, 1997 (September 13, 1997 falling on aSaturday);[6] (2) all applicants of FTAA applications filed under DAO57 and DAO 63 with insufficient compliance of the mandatoryrequirements shall submit, on September 15, 1997, a Status Reportindicating the requirements that have not been complied with and aLetter with the undertaking that the said requirements will becompletely complied with on or before October 30, 1997;[7] and (3)the deadlines prescribed shall not be subject to extension.[8]

On September 17, 1996, St. Joe Mining Corporation filed anExploration Permit Application, denominated as EPA-IVA-24, with anarea of 11,340 hectares situated in Tagkawayan, Quezon whichoverlaps the FTAA application of Greenwater.

On September 26, 1997, pursuant to DMO 97-07, Greenwaterfiled a Letter of Intent[9] dated September 10, 1997 with the MGBstating its intention to retain its first FTAA application in Marinduqueand to relinquish the areas in excess of the maximum allowable81,000 hectares covered by its other FTAA applications includingthose which cover areas of Quezon Province and Camarines Norte.

On October 22, 1997, OIC-Regional Director Reynulfo Juansent a letter[10] to Greenwater stating that the latter has fifteen (15)days from receipt of the letter to submit the technical descriptions ofthe areas Greenwater intends to relinquish with a warning that failureto do so would cause the denial of the FTAA application in thoseareas.

On November 10, 1997, VMI filed an Exploration PermitApplication,[11] denominated as EPA-IVA-63, with an area of 11,826hectares. VMIs application covers areas included in GreenwatersFTAA application in Quezon Province and Camarines Norte.

On December 8, 1997, MGB Region IV rejected EPA-IVA-24of St. Joe Mining Corporation on the ground that it was filed at thetime that Greenwaters FTAA application was still valid and existing.

On February 23, 1998, OIC-Regional Director Reynulfo Juansent another letter[12] to Greenwater stating that due to failure tocomply with the directives in the letter dated October 22, 1997,Greenwaters FTAA applications are deemed to have beenrelinquished as provided for under DENR Memorandum Order No.97-07.

On May 4, 1999, BMC filed an Exploration PermitApplication,[13] denominated as EPA-IVA-72, with an area of 9,794hectares which almost completely overlaps the area covered by VMIsapplication.

On October 4, 1999, VMI filed a petition for the cancellation ofBMCs exploration permit application claiming that it overlaps withits prior and existing application. The petition was later amended onFebruary 28, 2000, to include the cancellation and confirmation of thenullity of St. Joe Mining Corporations EPA-IVA-24.

On March 22, 2002, the Panel of Arbitrators rendered itsDecision[14] upholding the validity of VMIs exploration permitapplication and declaring BMCs and St. Joe Mining Corporationsapplications as null and void.

On July 5, 2002, BMC filed a Notice of Appeal andMemorandum of Appeal with the MAB. On August 24, 2004, the

MAB rendered its Decision,[15] modifying the decision of the Panelof Arbitrators. The MAB gave due course to BMCs application foran exploration permit but allowed VMIs application to proceed, sansthe areas covered by BMCs application.

From this decision, VMI filed its Petition for Review with theCourt of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside thedecision of the MAB and reinstated the decision of the Panel ofArbitrators.

Hence, BMC now comes to this Court raising the following issues:A.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AGRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THATFAILURE TO COMPLY WITH DENR MEMORANDUMORDER NO. 97-07 ON RETENTION REQUIREMENTSWOULD CAUSE THE CANCELLATION OF THE FTAAAPPLICATION BY OPERATION OF LAW.

B.WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AGRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THATTHE DISPUTED AREA IS OPEN FOR MININGAPPLICATIONS AFTER 30 OCTOBER 1997 ANDCONSEQUENTLY UPHOLDING THE MINING APPLICATIONOF RESPONDENT AND CANCELING PETITIONERS.[16]

VMI, however, questions the timeliness of the filing of thepetition. Hence, before we can consider the merits of the case, it isimperative that the Court address this issue in view of the proceduralstricture that the timely perfection of an appeal is both a mandatoryand jurisdictional requirement.

In its Comment, VMI contends that BMC received a copy ofthe CA Decision on September 5, 2006 and not on October 9, 2006 asalleged by BMC.[17] To support its claim, VMI presented aCertification[18] from the Makati Central Post Office dated October5, 2005 stating that a copy of the CA Decision was served by LetterCarrier Larry Lopez to BMCs counsel on September 5, 2006 but thesame was returned by the Letter Carrier to the sender, the Court ofAppeals, for the reason that counsel for BMC had allegedly MOVEDOUT of his address of record. Thus, the filing of the Petition onlyon October 23, 2006 is out of time.

In its Reply, BMC alleges that the office address of its counsel,

Atty. Fernando Pearroyo (Atty. Pearroyo), is and has always been atUUnniitt 220011 Orient Mansions, Tordecillas St., Salcedo Village, MakatiCity and at no time has Atty. Pearroyo ever transferred or moved outof the said address.[19] BMC and Atty. Pearroyo further contendthat they are perplexed on how the alleged Letter Carrier from theMakati Central Post Office could have delivered a copy of the CADecision on September 5, 2006 and be informed that Atty. Pearroyohad moved out.[20] To prove the said allegations, BMC presented thefollowing: 1) affidavit[21] of Ms. Eloisa M. Josef, BuildingAdministrator of Orient Mansions; 2) pertinent portion of the securitylogbook[22] of Orient Mansions; and 3) affidavit[23] of Mr. JeffreyA. Dalisay, the guard on duty on September 5, 2006.

According to VMI, the CA Decision which was received onOctober 9, 2006 was the copy sent to BMC, whose address is at UUnniitt220011 Orient Mansions, Tordecillas St., Salcedo Village, Makati City.Atty. Pearroyos office address is, however, at LL//22 Orient Mansions,Tordecillas St., Salcedo Village, Makati City, which is the sameaddress used by the Court of Appeals when it mailed the CA Decisionto him and the same address stated in the Makati Central Post OfficeCertification.[24]

BMC counters, however, that the fact that the copy of the CADecision received on October 9, 2006 was addressed to BMC and notto Atty. Pearroyo is of no significance since they actually share thesame office address.[25]

We hold that the petition was filed out of time.Well-settled is the rule that when a party is represented by

counsel of record, service of orders and notices must be made uponsaid attorney.[26] Accordingly, it is the date of service on counsel of

record of the notice of judgment which is considered the starting pointfrom which the period of appeal prescribed by law shall begin torun.[27]

TThhee rreeccoorrddss ooff tthhiiss ccaassee cclleeaarrllyy sshhooww tthhaatt AAttttyy.. PPeeaarrrrooyyoossaaddddrreessss ooff rreeccoorrdd uusseedd iinn tthhee pprroocceeeeddiinnggss bbeellooww iiss LL//22 aanndd nnoottUUnniitt 220011 aatt tthhee OOrriieenntt MMaannssiioonnss.

In the proceedings before the Panel of Arbitrators, theResolution[28] denying BMCs Motion for Reconsideration, fromwhich BMC filed a Notice of Appeal, was furnished to Atty.Pearroyo at L/2 Orient Mansions.

In the proceedings before the MAB, the Notice of Issuance ofAn Order[29] informing the parties that a decision has been renderedwas likewise furnished to Atty. Pearroyo at L/2 Orient Mansions.

In the proceedings before the Court of Appeals, the Notice ofResolution[30] informing the parties of the resolution ordering BMCto comment on the petition for review filed by VMI indicates thatAtty. Pearroyos address is at L/2 Orient Mansions. This wasreceived by him since in compliance he filed a Comment in which heused the same address.[31] Likewise, CA Form No. 1[32] informingthe parties of the resolution directing them to file their respectivememoranda was sent to him at L/2 Orient Mansions. This wasreceived by him for in compliance he filed a Memorandum in whichhe used the same address.[33] It was only in the Petition filed beforethis Court did Atty. Pearroyo use Unit 201 as his address after VMIhad already filed a Manifestation[34] questioning the alleged date ofreceipt of the CA Decision. In fact, in the Reply, where he allegedthat his address of record has always been at Unit 201, he still

indicated L/2 as his address below his signature.[35]

Hence, we cannot give credence to Atty. Pearroyos claim thathis address is and has always been at Unit 201. The fact that bothaddresses refer to the same building does not obliterate the fact thatthey are two different addresses. BMC and Atty. Pearroyo cannotexpect the public to assume that both addresses are one and the sameand neither can they be used interchangeably. It was incumbent uponhim to inform the Court of Appeals of the change of his address ofrecord from L/2 to Unit 201 at the Orient Mansions. His failure to doso bears consequences which bind BMC.

The rule is that clients are bound by the actions of their counselin the conduct of their case. If counsel moves to another addresswithout informing the court of that change, such omission or neglectis inexcusable and will not stay the finality of the decision. The courtcannot be expected to take judicial notice of the new address of alawyer who has moved.[36]

In brief, the service of the CA Decision on September 5, 2006at his address of record per the Makati Central Post OfficeCertification should be the reckoning point from which BMCs periodto file the petition begins to run. Thus, the assailed CA Decisionbecame final and executory.

Nevertheless, we have reviewed the records and find that evenon its merits the instant petition is destined to fail for reasons we shalldiscuss briefly.

Section 12 of DMO 97-07 reads:SECTION 12. Divestment/Relinquishment of Areas in

Excess of Maximum FTAA Contract AreaAll FTAA applications filed prior to the effectivity of the

Act which exceed the maximum contract area as set forth inSection 34 of the Act and Section 51 of the IRR mmuusstt ccoonnffoorrmm ttoossaaiidd mmaaxxiimmuumm oonn oorr bbeeffoorree SSeepptteemmbbeerr 1155,, 11999977. For this

purpose, all applicants who have not otherwise relinquished ordivested any areas held in excess of the allowable maximum bySeptember 15, 1997 mmuusstt rreelliinnqquuiisshh//ddiivveesstt ssaaiidd aarreeaass oonn ssuucchhddaattee in favor of the Government by filing a Declaration of AreasRelinquished/Divested, containing the technical description ofsuch area/s, with the Bureau/concerned Regional Office. Theconcerned applications shall be accordingly amended and areasrelinquished/divested shall be open for Mining Applications.

x x xFailure to relinquish/divest areas in excess of the maximum

contract area as provided for in this section wwiillll rreessuulltt iinn tthheeddeenniiaall oorr ccaanncceellllaattiioonn ooff tthhee FFTTAAAA aapppplliiccaattiioonn aafftteerr wwhhiicchh,,tthhee aarreeaass ccoovveerreedd tthheerreebbyy sshhaallll bbee ooppeenn ffoorr MMiinniinnggAApppplliiccaattiioonnss.. (Emphasis supplied)

BMC contends that based on the foregoing provision, theinability of the FTAA applicant to submit the required documents isonly a ground for the MGB or the DENR to cancel or revoke itsFTAA application and an executive action is needed before the areabecomes open for mining applications.[37] Accordingly,Greenwaters FTAA applications were cancelled and the areascovered thereby became open to mining applications only fifteen daysafter its receipt of the February 23, 1998 letter of OIC-RegionalDirector Reynulfo Juan informing it that its FTAA applications havebeen cancelled.

We find no merit to BMCs contention.It is undisputed that Greenwater filed its Letter of Intent only on

September 26, 1997 or 11 days after the September 15, 1997mandatory deadline set by Section 12 of DMO 97-07.

Section 12 of DMO 97-07 provides for the effect of failing torelinquish excess areas within the deadline, that it will result in thedenial or cancellation of the FTAA application. No furtherexecutive action is necessary since DMO 97-07 itself alreadyprovided for the sanction of failing to meet the deadline. Anyexecutive action beyond the deadline would be a mere superfluity.

Section 12 of DMO 97-07 must be read in conjunction withSection 14 which states that the deadlines therein are not subject toextension, viz:

SECTION 14. No Extension of PeriodsThe deadline set at September 15, 1997 pursuant to Section

4 hereof and all other periods prescribed herein sshhaallll nnoott bbeessuubbjjeecctt ttoo eexxtteennssiioonn. (Emphasis supplied)

DMO 97-07 was promulgated precisely to set a specific date forall FTAA applicants within which to relinquish all areas in excess ofthe maximum prescribed by law. Accordingly, the deadline cannot beextended or changed except by amending DMO 97-07. OIC-RegionalDirector Reynulfo Juan had no authority to extend the deadline set byDMO 97-07. We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals:

The language of the memorandum order is plain, preciseand unequivocal the period cannot be extended. Beyond that, thepending FTAA applications could no longer be officially actedupon as they were deemed to have expired. DDMMOO 9977--0077 ccoouullddoonnllyy bbee eexxtteennddeedd bbyy aannootthheerr mmeemmoorraanndduumm oorrddeerr oorr llaawwssppeecciiffiiccaallllyy aammeennddiinngg tthhee ddeeaaddlliinnee sseett ffoorrtthh tthheerreeiinn.. NNooggoovveerrnnmmeenntt ooffffiicceerr oorr eemmppllooyyeeee ccaann ddoo ssoo..

x x xIt is Our considered view that the FTAA application of

Greenwater ipso facto expired when it did not take any step tocomply with the order. TThheerree wwaass nnoo nneeeedd ffoorr aannyypprroonnoouunncceemmeenntt oorr ooffffiicciiaall aaccttiioonn.. IIff eevveerr tthheerree wwoouulldd bbee aannyyeexxeeccuuttiivvee aaccttiioonn,, iitt wwoouulldd oonnllyy bbee ttoo cceerrttiiffyy tthhaatt tthheeaapppplliiccaattiioonn wwaass aallrreeaaddyy ccaanncceelllleedd aass OOIICC--RReeggiioonnaall DDiirreeccttoorrRReeyynnuullffoo JJuuaann ddiidd wwhheenn,, oonn JJaannuuaarryy 2233,, 11999988 ((ssiicc))[[3388]],, iittwwrroottee GGrreeeennwwaatteerr tthhaatt iittss aapppplliiccaattiioonn oovveerr tthhee eexxcceessss aarreeaasswwaass ccaanncceelllleedd.. No executive action can stretch the deadlinebeyond what was stated in the memorandum order, DMO 97-07..

OOIICC--RReeggiioonnaall DDiirreeccttoorr RReeyynnuullffoo JJuuaann vviioollaatteedd DDMMOO9977--0077,, wwhheenn iinn hhiiss OOccttoobbeerr 2222,, 11999977 LLeetttteerr,, hhee ggaavveeGGrreeeennwwaatteerr aa ppeerriioodd bbeeyyoonndd tthhee ddaattee ooff tthhee ddeeaaddlliinnee wwiitthhiinnwwhhiicchh ttoo ssuubbmmiitt tthhee tteecchhnniiccaall ddeessccrriippttiioonnss ooff tthhee aarreeaass iittwwaanntteedd ttoo rreelliinnqquuiisshh.. By giving Greenwater a period extending

beyond October 30, 1997, he was in effect extending the deadlineset forth in Section 13 of DMO 97-07. That he could not lawfullydo.

HHee hhaadd nnoo aauutthhoorriittyy eexxtteennddiinngg tthhee ddeeaaddlliinnee bbeeccaauussee tthheemmeemmoorraanndduumm oorrddeerr wwhhiicchh hhee wwaass ssuuppppoosseedd ttoo iimmpplleemmeennttssttaatteedd tthhaatt tthhee ppeerriioodd pprreessccrriibbeedd hheerreeiinn sshhaallll nnoott bbee ssuubbjjeecctt ttooeexxtteennssiioonn.. Beyond October 30, 1997 all FTAA applicationswhich failed to comply with the memorandum order expired andwere deemed cancelled by operation of law.[39] (Emphasissupplied)

Finally, even equitable considerations do not favor thepetitioner. It is clear from the outset that Greenwater had already lostinterest in pursuing its FTAA application. After being given two (2)years to comply with the requirements, Greenwater only filed itsLetter of Intent belatedly and did not take any further action norcontested the letter dated February 23, 1998 of OIC-Regional DirectorReynulfo Juan informing it that its FTAA applications have beendeemed relinquished. It must be emphasized that Greenwater and thepublic were aware of the deadline and the consequences of failing tomeet the same. Accordingly, VMI cannot be faulted for relying on thefact that Greenwater did not comply with the requirements within thedeadline set by DMO 97-07 and had already lost interest, for allintents and purposes, in the area it wished to apply for. VMI filed itsapplication on November 10, 1997, or almost 2 years ahead thanBMCs application which was filed on May 4, 1999. To rule now thatit is BMCs application which should be given due course on analleged technicality which has no clear basis in law or in the rules willbe highly inequitable.

IINN VVIIEEWW WWHHEERREEOOFF,, the petition is DENIED. The decisionof the Court of Appeals is affirmed. Costs against petitioner.

SSOO OORRDDEERREEDD.

RREEYYNNAATTOO SS.. PPUUNNOO

Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

AANNTTOONNIIOO TT.. CCAARRPPIIOO

TTEERREESSIITTAA JJ.. LLEEOONNAARRDDOO--DDEE CCAASSTTRROOAssociate Justice

CC EE RR TT II FF II CC AA TT II OO NN

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certifythat the conclusions in the above decision had been reached inconsultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinionof the Courts Division.

RREEYYNNAATTOO SS.. PPUUNNOOChief Justice

[1] Rollo, pp. 52-70; penned by Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, concurred in

Associate Justice

RREENNAATTOO CC.. CCOORROONNAA AADDOOLLFFOOSS.. AAZZCCUUNNAA

Associate Justice AssociateJustice

by Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion and Sesinando E. Villon.[2] Id. at 91-105; dated August 24, 2004.[3] Id. at 76-89; dated March 22, 2002.[4] Id. at 6.[5] Id. at 436.[6] Section 12 of DENR Department Memorandum Order No. (DMO)

97-07, August 27, 1997.[7] Id. at Section 13.[8] Id. at Section 14.[9] CA rollo, p. 43.[10] Id. at 44.[11] Id. at 45.[12] Id. at 47.[13] Id. at 48-49.[14] Rollo, pp. 76-89.[15] Id. at 91-105.[16] Id. at 16. (Boldfaced in the original)[17] Id. at 110.[18] Id. at 222.[19] Id. at 244-245.[20] Id. at 245.[21] Id. at 253-254.[22] Id. at 255-266.[23] Id. at 267-268.[24] Id. at 450.[25] Id. at 246-247.[26] Karen and Kristy Fishing Industry v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.

172760-61, October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA 243, 250.[27] Cubar, et al. v. Hon. Mendoza, etc., et al., 205 Phil. 672, 676 (1983).[28] CA rollo, pp. 232-240; dated June 11, 2002.[29] Id. at 319; dated August 30, 2004.

[30] Id. at 446; dated August 18, 2005.[31] Id. at 479.[32] Id. at 515; signed by Zamita T. Mationg, Acting Division Clerk of

Court of the Special Sixteenth Division of the Court of Appeals.[33] Id. at 609.[34] Id. at 663 to 670; dated October 23, 2006.[35] Rollo, p. 250.[36] Supra note 26 at 249.[37] Rollo, pp. 326-329.[38] Should be February 23, 1998.[39] Rollo, p. 66.