October 27, 2010 Via Certified US Mail

Jan Brewer Governor, State of Arizona 1700 West Washington Phoenix, Arizona 85007 Terry Goddard Attorney General, State of Arizona 1275 West Washington Phoenix, Arizona 85007 Charles Ryan Director, Arizona Department of Corrections 1601 West Jefferson Phoenix, Arizona 85007 Ray Di Ciccio State Risk Manager Arizona Department of Administration 100 N. 15th Ave., Suite 301 Phoenix, Arizona 85007 Risk Management Section 100 N. 15th Ave., Suite 301 Phoenix, Arizona 85007 Robert Patton ADC Division Director of Offender Operations 1601 W. Jefferson Phoenix, Arizona 85007 Wade Woolsey Former Operations Director, Contract Beds, ASP-Kingman 12341 W. Scotts Drive Phoenix, Arizona

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David Lee Former Associate Deputy Warden, ASP-Kingman Address To be determined Scott Marquardt, President, CEO & Board Chair Management and Training Corporation 500 N. Marketplace Centerville, UT 84014 Al Murphy, Vice President-Regional Operations Corrections Management and Training Corporation 500 N. Marketplace Centerville, UT 84014 Dawn M. Call, Vice-President, General Counsel Management and Training Corporation 500 N. Marketplace Centerville, UT 84014 Michael Herzog, Esq. The Herzog Law Firm, P.C. 14350 N. 87th Street, Suite 180 Scottsdale, AZ 85260 Re: Personal injuries and wrongful deaths of Gary and Linda Haas

NOTICE OF CLAIMS PURSUANT TO A.R.S. §12-821.01 AGAINST THE STATE OF ARIZONA

AND THE ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, GOVERNOR JAN BREWER; CHARLES RYAN, DIRECTOR OF THE ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;

ROBERT PATTON, DIVISION DIRECTOR OF OFFENDER OPERATIONS; WADE WOOLSEY, FORMER OPERATIONS DIRECTOR-CONTRACT BEDS AT ASP-KINGMAN

AND DAVID LEE, FORMER ADC DEPUTY WARDEN OF ASP-KINGMAN

I. CLAIMANTS AND RESPONDENTS

Pursuant to A.R.S. §12-821.01 and Arizona Rules of Evidence Rule 408(a)(1) and (2),

on behalf of Linda Haas, (1) Cathy Byus, individually, as sole surviving child of Linda Haas;

(2) Cathy Byus and Talford Perkins, as Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of Linda

Haas, deceased; (3) Lovie Perkins, individually, as surviving mother of Linda Haas;

(4) Talford Perkins, individually, as surviving brother of Linda Haas; (5) William Perkins,

individually, as surviving brother of Linda Haas and (6) Sandra Roden, individually, as

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surviving sister of Linda Haas; and, on behalf of Gary Haas, (1) Cathy Byus, individually, as

sole surviving child of Gary Haas and (2) Cathy Byus, on behalf of the Estate of Gary Haas,

deceased (hereafter collectively referred to herein as “Claimants”), hereby give notice of

claims and offers to compromise to (1) the State of Arizona (“State”), (2) the Arizona

Department of Corrections (“ADC”), (3) Governor Jan Brewer, (4) Charles Ryan, Director of

the ADC; (5) Robert Patton, Division Director of Offender Operations for the ADC; (6) Wade

Woolsey, Operations Director, Contract Beds at ASP-Kingman and (7) David Lee, former

Deputy Warden at ASP-Kingman (collectively referred to herein as “Respondents”) for the

wrongful deaths and severe personal injuries arising out of the kidnappings, tortures and

deaths of Gary and Linda Haas in New Mexico in August 2010.

To the extent Management and Training Corporation (“MTC”) claims or is found to

be an agent (actual, ostensible or otherwise) of the State of Arizona, this Notice of Claims

shall also be construed as notice to MTC of claims from the Respondents for wrongful

deaths and personal injuries arising out of the kidnappings and deaths of Gary and Linda

Haas pursuant to A.R.S. §12-821.01. Claimants assert that MTC, as a private party, is liable

for punitive damages relating to the horrific deaths of Gary and Linda Haas.

Claimants assert the gross negligence of Respondents and/or their agents and/or

employees led to the escape of three inmates (John McCluskey, Tracy Province and

Daniel Renwick) from the Arizona State Prison in Kingman, Arizona (“ASP-Kingman”) on

July 30, 2010. Claimants further assert that as a direct result of the gross negligence of the

Respondents and/or their agents and/or employees, on or about August 2, 2010, two of the

escaped inmates, along with an accomplice, Casslyn Welch, kidnapped at gunpoint,

unlawfully held against their will, tortured and brutally murdered Gary and Linda Haas.

II. FACTUAL SUMMARY

On July 30, 2010, three (3) prisoners within the control and custody of the

Respondents were allowed to escape from ASP-Kingman, a state prison operated by MTC

under contract with the State/ADC. At sometime between 8:30 p.m. and 9:15 p.m., as a

result of numerous repeated, flagrant and shocking errors and omissions on the part of the

Respondents and MTC, the prisoners were allowed to carry out an escape plan, receive

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cutting tools and guns from an accomplice outside the prison, cut a hole in the prison’s

perimeter fence, breach the prison’s perimeter, evade prison security and easily escape the

prison complex and campus and access I-40.

After the escape and during the time period the inmates remained outside of the

captivity of the State of Arizona, on or about August 2, 2010, two (2) of the escaped inmates

and an accomplice kidnapped at gunpoint, held unlawfully, tortured and brutally murdered

Gary and Linda Haas, a couple who had just recently retired, were in the prime of their lives

and were traveling from their home in Tecumseh, Oklahoma, to their annual vacation in

Pagosa Springs, Colorado.

On August 2, 2010, Gary and Linda were stopped at a rest stop off I-40 in

Quay County, New Mexico when the escaped inmates and their accomplice abducted

Gary and Linda at gun point, forced them into their truck and forced them to drive

westbound on I-40 and then north to a secluded desert area between Tucumcari and

Santa Rosa, New Mexico. There, the inmates led Gary and Linda inside their camping

trailer, where one of the inmates viciously shot Gary Haas once in the head and shot

Linda Haas multiple times in the torso. The inmates and their accomplice then proceeded

to drive the Haases’ truck and trailer, which contained the couple’s bodies, to a remote

location in Guadalupe County, New Mexico, where they unhitched the camping trailer from

the Haases’ truck, doused it in liquor and lit it on fire. The bodies of Gary and Linda Haas

were burned beyond recognition.

The Respondents, collectively and/or individually, are directly responsible for the

prison escapes that led to the kidnappings and brutal killings of Gary and Linda Haas.

A long series of egregious errors and omissions of gross negligence on the part of the

Respondents and MTC set the stage for and permitted the careless and slipshod security

environment at ASP-Kingman that allowed for the escapes of three inmates and ultimately

the kidnapping and horrific murders of Gary and Linda Haas.

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III. LIABILITY CLAIMS AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS

Respondents had non-delegable duties to maintain a safe, secure and orderly prison

and to protect the public and Gary and Linda Haas from dangerous prisoners escaping

ASP-Kingman. Respondents were grossly negligent in the performance of their duties and

responsibilities in several respects, including but not limited to, the following:

1. Failure to provide proper oversight, supervision, control and monitoring at ASP-Kingman; 2. Failure to provide adequate training and supervision of State/ADC

employees assigned to monitor ASP-Kingman;

3. Failure to ensure MTC employees had an adequate number of competent and properly trained security staff at ASP-Kingman; and 4. Failure to ensure ASP-Kingman met security requirements of a medium security prison before transferring violent and dangerous offenders to ASP-Kingman.

To the extent not specified herein, Claimants also include as a basis for their claims,

and incorporate by reference, the numerous deficiencies and failures of Respondents

(and/or MTC) as set out in the two reports issued by the State of Arizona relating to the

escapes at issue: (1) Arizona Department of Corrections Offender Operations, Security

Assessment-ASP-Kingman Hualapai Unit/August 4-6, 2010 Final and (2) Arizona Department

of Corrections Inspector General’s Office Administrative Investigations Unit, Confidential

Report dated August 30, 2010, Investigative Report 2010-1033.

1. Failure to provide proper oversight, supervision, control and monitoring at ASP-Kingman The Respondents had a duty to monitor, supervise and provide oversight of the

contract inmate beds at ASP-Kingman in order to protect the general public, including

Gary and Linda Haas. More specifically, Associate Deputy Warden David Lee (“ADW Lee”),

an employee of the State/ADC at the time of the escape, had a duty to observe and report

any deficiencies at ASP-Kingman to his supervisors and to the State/ADC and to discuss

these deficiencies with MTC to ensure corrective action. Wade Woolsey (“Woolsey”), the

ADC Operations Director for Contract Beds, (“ODCB”), an employee of the State/ADC at the

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time of the escape, had a duty to supervise ADW Lee and to ensure ADW Lee and other

State/ADC employees/monitors at ASP-Kingman were adequately fulfilling their job duties

and responsibilities. Woolsey also had a duty to ensure appropriate monitoring and

oversight of the operations and security by the State/ADC monitors at ASP-Kingman. ADW

Lee, Woolsey and the State/ADC failed to perform their duties as required and, more

specifically, breached their duty to monitor and provide proper oversight at ASP-Kingman.

The Respondents’ conduct and breaches created an unreasonable risk of physical

harm to members of the public, including Gary and Linda Haas, which was substantially

greater than the risk involved in ordinary negligence. Respondents knew that violent

offenders, including murderers, attempted murderers, rapists, child abusers, sex offenders,

kidnappers and other violent convicts were incarcerated at ASP-Kingman and that an

escape of such inmates created a substantial risk of harm or death to members of the

public. Despite this knowledge, Respondents ignored their duties, lacked knowledge of

their duties, failed to perform their duties to monitor and oversee the security system at

ASP-Kingman, failed to ensure MTC complied with its contract with the State/ADC and

failed to ensure MTC’s compliance with State/ADC policies and procedures,

laws and regulations.

It was common knowledge among MTC staff that there was an ongoing, continuous

problem with the perimeter security alarm system at ASP-Kingman. Officer David Ward,

a MTC employee who worked in the Control Room, stated to State/ADC investigators that

everybody knew about the longstanding perimeter alarm problems at ASP-Kingman.

Lieutenant David Heppler, a MTC employee, told State/ADC investigators that the alarm

system at ASP-Kingman had been an ongoing problem for over 2 years. According to

Mr. Heppler, false alarms would go off at Kingman 200-300 times a shift. According to MTC

Associate Deputy Warden (“ADW”) Richard Ramsey, who was also the former MTC Chief of

Security at ASP-Kingman, problems with false alarms had been an issue for a long period of

time at ASP-Kingman but had worsened over the past year. Jim Packer, Assistant Physical

Plant Manager for MTC at ASP-Kingman and former Information Tech for MTC, told

State/ADC investigators that perimeter zone alarms go off hundreds of times per day at the

prison. Other MTC employees interviewed by State/ADC investigators also confirmed the

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significant and ongoing perimeter alarm system problems at ASP-Kingman in the time

period leading up to the escape.

Despite the obviously dangerous problems with the alarm system at ASP-Kingman,

memorandum submitted by State/ADC monitoring team members at ASP-Kingman to the

ADC from April 2009 to June 2010 indicated no problems with the perimeter security

alarm system whatsoever. In fact, during this time period, Woolsey directed ADW Lee to

stop submitting the required monthly reports to him at all. In the few reports ADW Lee did

submit to Woolsey (October 2009 and February 2010), ADW Lee did not report any

problems with the perimeter security alarm system at the prison. Captain Judi Green,

who was also part of the ADC monitoring team at ASP-Kingman, stated she was unaware of

any perimeter alarm system problems there. Clearly, the Respondents flagrantly ignored

on-going serious and dangerous perimeter security alarm system problems at

ASP-Kingman and failed to act in a timely and proper manner to address such problems.

After the inmates escaped, ADW Lee claimed to have been unaware of problems

with the perimeter alarm system at ASP-Kingman, although ensuring an adequate

perimeter alarm system was part of his duties and despite the well-known and

long-standing problems with the perimeter alarm system at ASP-Kingman. In fact,

ADW Lee admittedly did not even understand how the perimeter alarm system operated.

Captain Green, like ADW Lee, also did not know how the alarm system at ASP-Kingman

worked, even though it was part of her duties. ADW Lee was aware that zone alarm lights

regularly activated for no apparent reason at the prison and were more active in the

summer months. ADW Lee simply ignored these obvious perimeter alarm system

problems and never notified his supervisor, Woolsey, of any such deficiencies at

ASP-Kingman. ADW Lee also failed to address these glaring and dangerous perimeter

alarm problems with MTC.

More than 2 years before the escape that led to the kidnapping and horrific killings

of Gary and Linda Haas, MTC unlawfully cancelled its alarm system maintenance contract

with its third-party perimeter alarm system maintenance vendor. This too was in direct

violation of the ADC/MTC Contract. As a result, at the time of the escapes, the perimeter

alarm system at ASP-Kingman had not been checked or calibrated by a qualified alarm

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system maintenance company for more than 2 years. According to Lt. Heppler, a MTC

employee and shift commander at ASP-Kingman, the hundreds of false alarms that would

go off on a given shift were a result of an on-going maintenance problem. Robert Patton,

Director of Offender Operations for the ADC, informed investigators that after the escape,

an outside vendor inspected the ASP-Kingman alarm system (for the first time in over 2

years) and discovered 8 out of 8 sensors in the alarm system were bad, and the entire

perimeter alarm system at ASP-Kingman had to be replaced.

ADW Lee and Woolsey never reported MTC’s failure to have a qualified vendor

maintaining and servicing the security alarm system at ASP-Kingman to Woolsey or the

State/ADC. Nor did ADW Lee or Woolsey ever discuss this substantial non-compliance

issue with MTC. As a result of the hundreds of false alarms and continuous alarm

problems, MTC personnel disregarded perimeter security alarms on a regular basis.

Perimeter alarms at the prison became second nature to the employees. In fact, MTC

personnel regularly failed to timely check and clear alarm zones, “cleared” zones without

actually checking them and often times just totally ignored perimeter alarms altogether.

Respondents had a duty to ensure that MTC complied with its contract with the State/ADC,

including having the perimeter alarm system maintained by a third party. Respondents

clearly breached this duty.

In another example of a blatant security deficiency, the doors leading to the dog area

behind Dorm 2 at ASP-Kingman were routinely allowed to remain propped open.

ADW Lee never reported this security deficiency to his supervisors or the State/ADC and

never addressed this clear breach in security with MTC. Furthermore, the 9 foot fence

behind Dorm 2 at ASP-Kingman did not have razor wire on top of it, as required.

ADW Lee never voiced any concerns about this obvious security breach to his supervisor or

anyone at the State/ADC and never addressed this issue with anyone at MTC. The inmates

climbed and jumped this fence on the way to their simple escape from ASP-Kingman.

More troubling, ADW Lee apparently did not even know the security requirements

for a medium security prison, although ASP-Kingman had been reclassified to include

medium custody inmates. At the time of the escape, nearly half of the inmates at

ASP-Kingman were medium security inmates and over 40% were violent offenders.

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In fact, the 3 inmates that escaped on July 30, 2010, were all violent offenders and all had

been convicted of murder or attempted murder.

Shockingly, the ADC Engineering Division, which is/was charged with conducting

regular inspections of the security systems at Arizona prisons, never inspected

ASP-Kingman to ensure it met medium security prison requirements, but only inspected it

as a minimum security prison. Even more outrageous is the fact that the previous

ADC administrative officials told the ADC Engineering Division personnel “not to worry”

about the fact that ASP-Kingman was changing to a medium security prison and adding

hundreds of dangerous inmates, effectively overlooking the need to ensure a proper

transition from minimum to medium custody requirements occurred at ASP-Kingman.

Robert Patton, Offender Operations, Division Director for the ADC, and Woolsey’s

supervisor, told State/ADC investigators that following the escape he toured the

ASP-Kingman facility and within 5 minutes was able to identify several security and other

deficiencies that were never reported to him or addressed by State/ADC staff. Mr. Patton

told State/ADC investigators that the State/ADC clearly failed to have a checks and

balances system in place to identify and timely and appropriately address security issues

and problems at ASP-Kingman—a clear gross breach of the Respondents’ duties.

2. Failure to provide adequate training and supervision of State/ADC employees assigned to monitor ASP-Kingman

The Respondents had a duty to provide adequate training and supervision of

State/ADC employees who were assigned to ASP-Kingman and to ensure that such

employees were capable and competent in performing their job duties. Respondents also

had a duty to ensure that MTC fully and substantially complied with the terms and

conditions of the contract between the State/ADC and MTC, ADC policies and procedures

and state and federal laws and regulations in operating ASP-Kingman. The Respondents

breached these duties in that Lee, Woolsey, Patton and others all failed to effectively

perform their job responsibilities and failed to ensure compliance with the contract

between the State/ADC and MTC.

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The Respondents failed to ensure that State/ADC officials, like ADW Lee, knew and

understood their job duties and responsibilities and adequately and appropriately carried

out their job duties. For example, ADW Lee had never read the contract between the

State/ADC and MTC at the time of the escape, although it was his responsibility to ensure

that MTC complied with the terms and conditions of the contract and despite the fact that

he had been on the job for more than a year. According to ADW Lee, he only received 1 day

of on-the-job training before becoming the Associate Deputy Warden (“ADW”) at

ASP-Kingman, and the individual who trained him “didn’t tell him squat.” ADW Lee was

unaware of many of his primary job duties and/or lacked training and knowledge on how

to fulfill his responsibilities. Specifically, ADW Lee was ignorant of how the perimeter

alarm system worked; was never provided a written copy of his job duties and

responsibilities; was unaware that he needed to walk the perimeter zones to ensure the

security system was adequate and functioning properly and did not have working

knowledge of the post orders at ASP-Kingman so he could ensure MTC’s compliance with

the contract and ADC policies and procedures.

ADW Lee admitted that he had never even read the contract between the State/ADC

and MTC. Indeed, ADW Lee admitted to investigators that he was not aware that he should

have read the contract. Further, ADW Lee was not familiar with the Tech Manual

applicable to ASP-Kingman, specifically with regard to the perimeter alarm system. ADW

Lee also agreed that, since he never read the contract, it was impossible for him to perform

his job duties given that he could not know what violations or what parts of the contract

were not being adhered to by MTC. ADW Lee’s response to investigators regarding his

complete lack of knowledge of the contract and other errors was:

“Gentlemen, I know I screwed up, my priorities were not where they should be…”

The Respondents also failed to ensure that ODCB Woolsey knew and understood his

job requirements and failed to ensure that he adequately and appropriately carried out his

duties. The ADC employees working under Woolsey at ASP-Kingman admitted to being

unclear about their job requirements and the scope of their employment duties.

Administrative Service Officer II Joseph Profiri, who was one of the State/ADC monitors for

private prisons under the supervision of Woolsey, told State/ADC investigators that

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Woolsey never informed him of his duties as a monitor. He also stated that Woolsey never

instructed him to read the contract between the private prison and the State/ADC or the

ADC Tech Manual or other policies.

ADC Offender Operations, Division Director Robert Patton (Woolsey’s ADC

supervisor) stated that he relied on Woolsey to manage his job duties, keep him informed

and raise any problems or issues to him to be resolved regarding ASP-Kingman. He also

noted that he expected Woolsey to tour his facilities, maintain contact with his staff,

provide the staff with guidance and support, inform staff what he expects from them and

then brief him regarding any issues. Woolsey had a duty to hire, educate, train, supervise

and oversee the State/ADC monitors at ASP-Kingman. Thus, it is clear that Woolsey failed

to perform his job duties appropriately and demonstrated a pattern of indifference to his

job duties with the State/ADC in properly and fully training and educating his employees

and supervising their work at ASP-Kingman. Woolsey’s failures resulted in an atmosphere

of ineptitude at the prison and a culture of indifference that threatened the safety of the

public, including Gary and Linda Haas.

3. Failure to ensure MTC had an adequate number of competent and properly trained security staff at ASP-Kingman

The Respondents had a duty to ensure that MTC had an adequate number of

competent and properly trained security staff at ASP-Kingman to protect the public.

Respondents breached this duty. Specifically, one of ADW Lee’s duties was to ensure

MTC staff was receiving proper training before being assigned to the prison yard, including

service training, weapons qualifications and other important security training, as directed

by the ADC. ADW Lee did not fulfill these responsibilities. ADW Lee did not even know

what the curriculum was for the officers at ASP-Kingman. Further, Captain Green, another

ADC monitor at ASP-Kingman, was unaware that one aspect of her duties was to monitor

the training of officers working for MTC at ASP-Kingman. Thus, she failed to do so.

On the night of the escape, Officer Phillip Shannon, a MTC employee, was working

his first full shift as a perimeter officer. He had only worked 4 hours on the perimeter

before the night of the escape and had no training. More shockingly, he had never worked

in a prison facility with perimeter alarm fencing before ASP-Kingman. In addition,

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Officer Weaver, who was one of the 2 MTC employees working in the main control room at

the time of the escape, was only a trainee on day 2 of his instruction in the control room

and was clearly not proficient or capable of handling the job duties of a control room officer

at ASP-Kingman. In fact, Lieutenant Heppler, who was supervisor of swing shift at

ASP-Kingman on the date of the escape, stated that the majority of security officers at

ASP-Kingman at the time of the escape were new officers “who had not been trained and

brought up to speed.” Interviews of staff by State/ADC investigators confirm this, as the

majority of Officers on duty the night of the escape had less than 2 months experience at

the facility and little to no experience handling dangerous prison inmate populations.

More concerning, the State/ADC investigation of the ASP-Kingman escapes shows

that MTC was not sufficiently staffing the perimeter during various shifts throughout the

day and night at the facility, MTC had shift change procedures in place that left the entire

perimeter unmanned for extended periods of time, had predictable perimeter security

patrol patterns and zone alarm clearing procedures, had insufficient security equipment on

the perimeter patrol including lighting, weapons, etc; and, most concerning, had improper

and ineffective procedures in place for checking and clearing perimeter zone alarms due to

the high number of false alarms and the air of complacency and neglect amongst security

and MTC executive staff. Yet, State/ADC personnel assigned to ASP-Kingman to ensure

proper training and competency were oblivious to these security problems or chose to

ignore them altogether.

The security problems at ASP-Kingman were not limited to the security officers and

control room officers but included their supervisors at MTC. Captain Smith, the Chief of

Security (“COS”) at ASP-Kingman at the time of the escapes was wholly incompetent,

careless, not effective in his role and not respected by the prison staff. Almost all

MTC employees interviewed by the ADC, including the MTC Complex Administrator

Darla Elliott and the Warden Lori Leider, expressed concerns over Captain Smith’s

promotion to COS and stated that he was ineffectual, lacked attention to detail and had an

overall “lackadaisical attitude” regarding his job duties. Further, MTC Warden Leider

stated she was aware of the poor performance of her COS but did nothing to address the

issues. (Warden Leider, Administrator Elliott and Captain Smith were all fired by MTC

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shortly after the July 30, 2010, escape.) Yet, the State/ADC on-site monitors and personnel

ignored the incompetency of MTC personnel or were so incompetent themselves that they

could not recognize the obvious incompetency of MTC personnel.

There was insufficient staff in the control room at ASP-Kingman the night of the

escape. There were only two MTC employees working in the control room and one of them

had virtually no experience or training in the operations of the perimeter security system.

More than 2 employees were required to be in the control room in order to provide

adequate monitoring and security at the prison. Further, the employees in the control

room the night of the escape had many more duties than just monitoring the perimeter

and, thus, were unable to provide appropriate monitoring of the prison. In addition,

Respondents had no effective method in place to ensure adequate staffing and training of

the MTC staff to safely and effectively operate ASP-Kingman and, instead, relied on faulty

procedures and unqualified and unskilled security staff.

It is also apparent from the factual information gathered by the State/ADC during its

investigations that Officer Labbe, the perimeter patrol officer on graveyard shift on the

night of the escape, was unfamiliar with his job duties and was neither properly trained nor

competent. Officer Labbe apparently “cleared Zone 9” after the escape had taken place

there. He reported a clear perimeter to Lieutenant Ogle when, in fact, a large hole had

already been cut in the fence at Zone 9 through which the inmates had easily exited.

It wasn’t until several minutes later, when he apparently rechecked the area, that he first

identified the hole cut in the perimeter fence, the cutting tools and the resultant easy

escape of the inmates. This delay in recognition and notification led to further delay in

reporting and timely addressing the perimeter breach and is vivid evidence of the overall

level of incompetence that pervaded ASP-Kingman on July 30, 2010. Officer Labbe resigned

from his position with MTC shortly after the escape of July 30, 2010. Labbe clearly lacked

the competence and diligence necessary to maintain a safe and secure perimeter for a

prison housing violent offenders and murders. Respondents had a duty to ensure MTC’s

staff was properly trained and adequately staffed. Respondents clearly breached this duty.

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4. Failure to ensure ASP-Kingman met the security requirements of a medium security prison before transferring violent and dangerous offenders to ASP-Kingman The Respondents, specifically, but without limitation, by and through the

ADC Engineering Division and/or its monitoring staff, had a duty to inspect the

ASP-Kingman facility to ensure it met security requirements for medium custody prisons in

the State of Arizona before filling the facility to its capacity with violent and dangerous

medium custody inmates. The evidence shows the perimeter security alarm system at

ASP-Kingman was malfunctioning for several years (amongst other things) in the time

period leading up to the inmate escapes of July 30, 2010, and was therefore not medium

custody compliant. Thus, the Respondents apparently never inspected the perimeter

and/or the security system at ASP-Kingman to ensure it met medium custody prison

requirements before loading and housing murderers, sex offenders, child molesters and

other violent criminals there. This is a gross breach of Respondents’ duty to public safety.

The State/ADC had a duty under the laws of Arizona to give notice to the

Legislature, the Mohave Board of Supervisors and the public regarding the change in the

inmate population of ASP-Kingman from DUI offenders to non-DUI offenders and regarding

the assignment of murderers and other violent offenders to ASP-Kingman. The State/ADC

unlawfully failed to give appropriate notice. This was a clear breach of the State/ADC’s

duties to the public, the Legislature and the Mohave Board of Supervisors.

The failure to give notice to the public, the Legislature and others who might object

to the change in the prison population at ASP-Kingman from that of DUI offenders to

violent offenders, including murderers, sex offenders, child abusers and other violent

criminals, occurred in a political climate in which Governor Jan Brewer favored a

substantial expansion of the privatization of the Arizona Prison System. As a result, under

Governor Brewer’s administration, MTC was allowed to increase its inmate population at

ASP-Kingman by thousands of prisoners, including violent offenders, resulting in

millions of dollars in revenue to MTC. The expansion of ASP-Kingman and agreements

reached by the State/ADC and MTC by Governor Brewer’s administration were done

without the statutorily mandated notice to the public. As a result, the State/ADC enabled

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MTC to increase its inmate population at ASP-Kingman by 2,000 inmates, bringing the total

population to 3,400 (capacity) and included violent and homicidal criminals such as the

3 inmates who escaped ASP-Kingman on July 30, 2010, leading to the killings and

kidnappings of Gary and Linda Haas.

Further, in October 2009, Charles Ryan, Director of the ADC (“Director Ryan”),

determined that the MTC Cerbat Unit (the new 2,000 bed unit) did not have a perimeter

consistent with medium custody requirements and re-designated it as a minimum custody

unit only. At this time, Director Ryan also re-designated the Hualapai Unit at ASP-Kingman

(the original 1,400 bed unit) a medium custody unit since it supposedly had a medium

custody compliant perimeter and “experience managing a medium custody population.”

This was an error of epic proportions on the part of Director Ryan and the State/ADC which

was facilitated by Governor Jan Brewer’s agenda to expand the privatization of prisons in

Arizona and maximize profits for one of her biggest political allies.

IV. WITNESSES

1) Cathy Byus

2) Justin Byus

3) Lovie Perkins

4) Talford Perkins, Jr.

5) Sandra Roden

6) William Perkins

7) Vivian Haas

8) Linda Jean Rook

9) Frank Rook

10) Steve Walker

11) Jay Dee Patrick

12) Erma Patrick

13) Jan Brewer, Governor- State of Arizona

14) Charles Ryan, Director-Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC)

15) Robert Patton, ADC Division Director-Offender Operations

16) Wade Woolsey, Former ADC Operation Director Contract Beds

17) Joe Profiri, Acting ADC Operation Director Contract Beds (ASO II)

18) David Lee, Former ADW ASP-Kingman

19) Judi Green, Captain ASP-Kingman

20) Melissa Anderson, CO III ASP-Kingman

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21) Ralph Mellecker, ADC Engineer/Construction Manager ASP Kingman

22) Captain Smith, MTC Chief of Security

23) MTC Sergeant King

24) Perimeter Officer Labbe

25) CO Moore

26) CO McGee

27) Lt. Jones

28) Richard Ramsey, Former MTC ADW ASP-Kingman

29) Lori Leider, Former Warden ASP-Kingman

30) Darla Elliott, Former Complex Administrator ASP-Kingman

31) Therese Schroeder, ADC Security Operations Administrator

32) Richard Haggard, Major ASPC-Safford

33) Thomas Higginson, Major ASPC-Eyman

34) Edwin Lao, Major ASPC-Florence

35) Ron Lawrence, Captain ASPC-Lewis

36) Dennis Bool, Captain ASPC-Perryville

37) Sherri Ogle, Lieutenant ASP-Kingman

38) David Heppler, Lieutenant ASP-Kingman

39) Lt. Winkler, Lieutenant ASP-Kingman

40) Ricky Bussart, Sergeant ASP-Kingman

41) Bernard Weaver, Captain ASP-Kingman

42) Christopher Day, Officer ASP-Kingman

43) Phillip Shannon, Officer ASP-Kingman

44) Scott Henry, Officer ASP-Kingman

45) Christopher Gould, Officer ASP-Kingman

46) David Ward, Officer ASP-Kingman

47) Ruth Anzalone, Officer ASP-Kingman

48) Richard Riley, Officer ASP-Kingman

49) John Palmer, Officer ASP-Kingman

50) Sherice Honse, Officer ASP-Kingman

51) Joseph Esquiville, Officer ASP-Kingman

52) Richard Ripley, Officer ASP-Kingman

53) MTC Officer Torres

54) Jim Packer, Assistant Manager Physical Plant, ASP-Kingman

55) Jessie Clipston, MTC Information Systems Technician

56) Tracy Province, Escaped Prisoner ASP-Kingman

57) John McCluskey, Escaped Prisoner ASP-Kingman

58) Captain Curt Duggan

59) ADW Richard Gabusi

60) Daniel Renwick, Escaped Prisoner ASP-Kingman

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61) Casslyn Welch, Accomplice to Escaped Inmates

62) Anne Longo, Assistant Attorney General

63) Lacy Scott, ADC

64) Mike Smarik, ADC

65) Dora Chriro, Former Director ADC

66) E. Pierson, Former ADC Contract Beds Administrator

67) San Sublett, Former ADC Division Director

68) Al Murphy, MTC VP of Regional Operations-Corrections

69) Denel Pickering, ADC Procurement Officer

70) Odie Washington, MTC Sr. VP of Corrections

71) Richard Sullivan, Deputy Warden and On-Site Monitor ASP-Kingman

72) Greg Lauchner, Inspector General Arizona

73) Ernest Barragan, Investigator-Administrative Investigations Unit

74) Russ Broduer, Investigator-Administrative Investigations Unit

75) Stacy Crabtree, Offender Services Bureau Administrator

76) Zada Shafer, CIU Investigator

77) Lisa Yanez

78) Former ADC Director Dora Schriro

79) Former ADC Division Director John Hallahan

80) Former ADC Offender Operations Director Charles Goldsmith

81) Any and all other witnesses identified as this matter progresses

V. DOCUMENTS AND EVIDENCE

All documents and evidence referenced in the two State/ADC reports referred to

herein and/or relevant to Claimants’ allegations. All documents and evidence gathered in

any and all criminal investigations/prosecutions arising out of the escapes and/or the

resultant kidnappings and murders of Gary and Linda Haas. Further, Claimants reserve the

right to amend and supplement this notice as more information becomes available.

VI. SUMMARY OF DAMAGES

Linda Haas is survived by her only adult child, Cathy Byus (formerly Haas);

her mother, Lovie Perkins; two adult brothers, Talford Perkins and William Perkins, and

one adult sister, Sandra Roden. Gary Haas is survived by his only adult child, Cathy Byus;

his mother, Vivian Haas and one adult sister, Linda Jean Rook.

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Gary and Linda Haas were high school sweethearts. They grew up in Southwest

City, Missouri, where they met at MacDonald High School and fell in love. They were

married in 1969. Gary served in the United States Air Force. Following his military service,

Gary worked in the construction industry. Meanwhile, Linda earned her teaching degree

from Missouri Southern State University. After graduating, Linda taught second grade for

several years in Missouri.

In 1978, Gary and Linda moved to Oklahoma. After moving to Oklahoma, both

Gary and Linda worked at the General Motors (“GM”) Plant in Oklahoma City until it closed

in 2006, Gary as an electrician and Linda as a tool and die specialist. Linda also trained and

educated GM employees, who had not completed high school, to receive their GED.

Gary and Linda loved life. They had always enjoyed one another’s company, but

now they were retired and in the prime of their lives, enjoying living to its fullest.

Gary enjoyed rebuilding tractors, trucks, boats and dune buggies. He also enjoyed fishing,

watching NASCAR and dirt track racing. Linda had a passion for photography and the

outdoors. Both Gary and Linda loved to travel. They especially loved the outdoors,

enjoying the beauty of nature. Camping was their favorite pastime. Everyone loved Linda’s

cooking, especially campsite meals cooked in her cast-iron skillets; they were a favorite of

family and friends.

For the past 11 summers, Gary and Linda made an annual trip to Pagosa Springs,

Colorado, where they loved to vacation and camp along the way. Typically, they would

stop off at Santa Rosa Lake State Park in New Mexico, where they would camp near the lake

a night or two before heading north to Colorado.

Gary and Linda were ecstatic and overjoyed about the coming arrival of their first

grandchild. Their only child, Cathy Byus, is expecting her first child in November 2010.

Unfortunately, Gary and Linda will not be able to enjoy their grandchild nor will their

daughter, Cathy, be able to see the joy Gary and Linda would have brought to her child.

Instead, Gary and Linda’s beautiful lives were tragically cut short as a result of the

gross negligence and incompetency of the Respondents and MTC in allowing dangerous,

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homicidal inmates to, without difficulty, escape ASP-Kingman, resulting in the kidnappings

and brutal deaths of Gary and Linda Haas.

A. Choice of Law

1. New Mexico law determines damages

Damages in this case should be determined under the laws of New Mexico.

New Mexico law clearly applies to the type of damages available in this case, whether the

case is filed in Arizona or New Mexico. If Claimants file in New Mexico, the court would

apply New Mexico choice of law rules to determine whose law to apply on the issue of

damages. New Mexico has adopted the “place of wrong” rule in determining whose law

applies in torts. See Witkowski v. State, 103 N.M. 526, 710 P.2d 93 (N.M. App. 1985);

see also Torres v. State, 119 N.M. 609, 894 P.2d 386 (1995). The “place of wrong” rule

provides that the location of the last act to complete the injury governs. Id. In this case,

the last act to complete the injury (the kidnappings and deaths) occurred in New Mexico.

There would be no wrongful death and no survival claim without injury and death.

Gary and Linda’s injuries and horrific trauma, suffering and deaths occurred in

New Mexico. Therefore, New Mexico law regarding damages for survival and wrongful

death claims apply to this case.

If Claimants file their lawsuit in Arizona, the court would apply Arizona choice of

law rules to determine whose law to apply on damages. Arizona has adopted the

Restatement (Second) of Conflicts. See Bryant v. Silverman, 146 Ariz. 41, 703 P.2d 1190

(1985). The Restatement §175, provides that “[i]n an action for wrongful death, the local

law of the state where the injury occurred, determines the rights and liabilities of the

parties unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant

relationship under the principles of §6…” Under the principles set out in §6 of the

Restatement §175, Arizona clearly does not have a more significant relationship to the

claims than New Mexico considering that the kidnappings and killings occurred in New

Mexico and considering the fact that the decedents were not residents of Arizona and,

in fact, never entered the State of Arizona. They were kidnapped and murdered in New

Mexico; thus, New Mexico law applies to the case.

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2. New Mexico Damages Law

Under New Mexico law, the personal representative of the estate may recover

damages, compensatory and exemplary, as the jury deems fair and just having regard to the

aggravating circumstances attending the wrongful act or neglect. N.M.S.A. §41-2-3.

The New Mexico survival statute and case law allow the personal representative of

the estate of a deceased to recover damages for the pain and suffering of the deceased.

See Romero v. Byers, 117 N.M 422, 872 P.2d 840, 848 (1994); see also, Stang v. Hertz

Corporation, 81 N.M 69, 463 P.2d 45 (1970). Thus, in this case, Cathy Byus and Talford

Perkins, as co-personal representatives of the estate of Linda Haas, and Cathy Byus, on

behalf of the estate of Gary Haas are entitled to recover damages for the physical pain and

mental suffering of Gary and Linda Haas prior to their deaths. The physical pain and

mental suffering that Gary and Linda Haas endured in this case is hard to comprehend.

On August 2, 2010, Gary and Linda were at a rest area off of I-40 in New Mexico on

their annual vacation to Colorado. Gary was in his truck and Linda was walking back from

the camping trailer when escaped inmates McCluskey and Province, along with their

accomplice, forced Linda into the front passenger seat of the pickup truck at gunpoint.

Both McCluskey and Province then held Linda and Gary at gunpoint, got in the back seat of

the pick-up and ordered Gary to drive. See Affidavit of Support of Criminal Complaint of FBI

Special Agent Marcus B. McCaskill; United States of America v. John Charles McCluskey;

United States District Court of New Mexico; Case No. 10-MJ-2298. The escaped inmates

forced Gary to drive to a secluded area in New Mexico near Santa Rosa. There, escaped

inmate McCluskey then forced Gary and Linda into their camper trailer at gunpoint while

inmate Province and the escaped inmates’ accomplice, Welch, stayed outside the trailer.

Multiple gunshots were fired by McCluskey.

The escaped inmates and their accomplice then took the pick-up and trailer to get

fuel and other supplies, with the bodies of Gary and Linda still in the trailer. The escaped

inmates then drove the truck and trailer to another remote area in New Mexico, doused the

trailer with liquor and burned the trailer with Gary and Linda inside. The burned remains

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of the trailer and Gary and Linda Haas were later discovered by authorities along with 2 of

the couples 3 dogs, who were still alive and covered with blood.

The evidence shows that escaped inmate McCluskey shot Gary first and then shot

Linda. Linda watched in horror as McCluskey shot her husband in the head and then

turned the gun on her. Linda was shot multiple times in the torso. Linda did not die

instantly. McCluskey shot Gary and Linda with their own guns, which they had in the

camper trailer. Words cannot begin to describe the mental suffering and horror that

Gary and Linda experienced during their horrific kidnapping and slaying. They were

kidnapped at gunpoint, forced to drive to a secluded area, forced at gunpoint into their own

camper and shot and murdered with their own guns. Moreover, Linda was forced to watch

her husband of more than 40 years be shot in the head at close range in front of her,

knowing that her own life was about to be taken from her. If MTC and the Respondents had

not been grossly negligent and ignored obvious security failures at ASP-Kingman,

McCluskey and Province would have been inside a secured prison on August 2, 2010,

where they belonged, and not in New Mexico, performing these dastardly and heinous

crimes. Fair and just compensation for the pain and mental suffering of Gary and Linda

Haas is significant and is the responsibility of MTC and the Respondents.

New Mexico law allows damages for the value of life in a wrongful death action.

The New Mexico Supreme Court has held that “the value of life itself is compensable” in a

wrongful death action. Romero v. Byers, 117 N.M 422, 424, 872 P.2d 840, 842 (1994).

As described above, at the time of their terrible deaths, Gary and Linda were in the prime of

their lives and had so much to look forward to and enjoy in their lives, including their

first grandchild. However, because of the gross negligence of both MTC and the

Respondents, Gary’s and Linda’s lives were forever cut short in one of the most gruesome

manners imaginable.

Cathy Byus, the only child of Gary and Linda, has suffered great grief and loss,

anxiety, stress, shock and loss of her parental love and guidance. She was an only child and

was very close to her parents, Gary and Linda. But, it was not only their death that caused

grief but also the manner in which they died and the horror they experienced that Cathy

must live with for the rest of her life. Of course, Cathy’s expectant child will never have the

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love and affection of his grandparents. Instead, Gary and Linda’s grandchild will only know

them through photographs and stories. Cathy will never be able to experience the joy of

her child being loved by Gary and Linda. This is a tremendous loss to Cathy. Cathy has also

lost the parental guidance she would have received from Gary and Linda to help her with

the upbringing of her child. As an only child, Cathy suffered not only the loss of one parent

but of both, and in one of the most shocking ways possible.

New Mexico law also allows damages for siblings and parents for loss of consortium.

Fitzjerrell v. City of Gallup, 134 N.M. 492, 79 P.3d 836 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003). Lovie Perkins,

Linda’s mother, was very close with Linda Haas and her son-in-law, Gary. When Lovie’s

husband passed away in 1990, Gary and Linda moved Lovie to their acreage in Tecumseh,

Oklahoma, where she lived in her motor home. Gary and Linda felt this was a bit small so

they bought her a 32 foot trailer and set it up with telephone, electricity, gas and water

services. They then poured her a concrete patio and made it into a home. Gary and Linda

took Lovie to all of her medical appointments. They even helped her buy a car and never

once asked for anything in return. Lovie didn’t have much, but Gary and Linda made her

life better than it would have been otherwise. They took care of her car insurance and

medical insurance and filled out all the government forms for her to apply for assistance.

Linda saw Lovie every single day she was in town. Even when they were going somewhere,

Linda would call and check on Lovie. Lovie has experienced deep loss and grief as a result

of not only the death of Linda, but as a result of the horrific manner in which she died.

Talford Perkins, William Perkins and Sandra Roden were all very close to their

sister, Linda Haas. Linda kept the family together and hosted the holiday festivities.

They have forever lost a relationship with their sister and a brother-in-law. Their children

have forever lost a loving aunt and uncle and god-parents. Most tragically, they have lost

true and steadfast friends. A severed sibling relationship is compensable under New

Mexico law. See Fitzjerrell v. City of Gallup, 134 N.M. 492, 79 P.3d 836 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003).

There is no statutory cap on compensatory damages in New Mexico. Nor is there a

statutory cap on punitive damages. While Claimants recognize that punitive damages may

not be recoverable against Respondents, such damages are recoverable against MTC.

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3. Arizona Damages Law Although Claimants assert that New Mexico law applies to the type of compensatory

damages recoverable in this case against the Respondents, Claimants’ claims are clearly

compensable under Arizona law also. It is noteworthy that even if pain and suffering

damages and value of life damages are not available under Arizona law, evidence

pertaining to the manner of death is admissible at trial under Arizona law, as it is relevant

to the mental anguish the wrongful death beneficiaries suffered as a result of the manner of

death. See Girouard v. Skyline Steel, Inc., 215 Ariz. 126, 158 P.3d 255 (App. Div. 1 2007).

Further, the anguish, sorrow, stress, mental suffering, pain and shock that the Claimants

have suffered as a result of the deaths of Gary and Linda Haas are also clearly recoverable.

B. Claimants Offer to Compromise their Claims against Respondents.

Claimants would settle all claims against Respondents for the personal injuries and

wrongful deaths of Gary and Linda Haas for $40,000,000.00, more specifically, as follows:

Cathy Byus, as sole surviving daughter of Linda Haas, for emotional distress, grief,

shock, horror, loss of parental relationship, loss of consortium, and other such

damages available under the wrongful death and survival statutes and laws of

Arizona and New Mexico in the amount of $10,000,000.00.

Cathy Byus, as sole surviving daughter of Gary Haas, for emotional distress, grief,

shock, horror, loss of parental relationship, loss of consortium, and other such

damages available under the wrongful death and survival statutes and laws of

Arizona and New Mexico in the amount of $10,000,000.00.

Cathy Byus and Talford Perkins, as Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of

Linda Haas, for the following damages: value of the loss of Linda Haas’ life; for the

physical pain and suffering, emotional distress and shock and horror, suffered by

Linda Haas as a result of her and her husband’s kidnapping, her torture, her

observation of the shooting and murder of her husband, Gary Haas, funeral

expenses, and such other damages available under the wrongful death and survival

statutes and laws of Arizona and New Mexico in the amount of $7,000,000.00.

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Cathy Byus, on behalf of the Estate of Gary Haas, for the following damages: value of

the loss of Gary Haas’ life; for the physical pain and suffering, emotional distress and

shock and horror, suffered by Gary Haas, his torture, his funeral expenses, and such

other damages available under the wrongful death and survival statutes and laws of

Arizona and New Mexico in the amount of $5,000,000.00.

Lovie Perkins, as surviving mother of Linda Haas, for emotional distress, grief,

shock, horror, loss of relationship, loss of consortium and other such damages

available under the wrongful death and survival statutes and laws of Arizona and

New Mexico in the amount of $5,000,000.00.

Talford Perkins, as surviving brother of Linda Haas, for loss of sibling relationship

and other such damages available under the laws of Arizona and New Mexico in the

amount of $1,000,000.00.

Sandra Roden, as surviving sister of Linda Haas, for loss of sibling relationship and

other such damages available under the laws of Arizona and New Mexico in the

amount of $1,000,000.00.

William Perkins, as surviving brother of Linda Haas, for loss of sibling relationship

and other such damages available under the laws of Arizona and New Mexico in the

amount of $1,000,000.00.

VII. CONCLUSION AND SPECIFIC SETTLEMENT DEMAND

The conduct of the Respondents, as more specifically set out above, was grossly

negligent for which Claimants are entitled to the damages requested. As discovery is

continuing in this case, Claimants reserve the right to amend and/or supplement their

claims against Respondents.

At this time, Claimants are prepared to settle all claims against the Respondents

relating to the escape of inmates at ASP-Kingman which led to the kidnappings and deaths

of Gary and Linda Haas for $40,000,000.00.

If the above-named entities are not parties within the meaning of A.R.S. §12-821.01,

or do not have power to accept this claim, or believe this notice of claims is in any way

insufficient, the undersigned respectfully requests immediate notification.

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Sincerely,

Glendell Nix Glendell Nix

Jacob Diesselhorst NIX LAW GROUP, PLLC and Frank Powers HARRIS, POWERS & CUNNINGHAM, PLLC