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NATO Parliamentary Assembly

DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE

THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY CAMPAIGNS AGAINST DAESH

REPORT

Attila MESTERHAZY (Hungary)Rapporteur

Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation

www.nato-pa.int 19 November 2016

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................1

II. THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR AND THE DAESH DILEMMA.........................................................1A. THE RISE OF DAESH.....................................................................................................2B. CONTINUED SOURCES OF POWER............................................................................2C. LEFT TO FESTER FOR TOO LONG..............................................................................3

III. THE US-LED CAMPAIGN AGAINST DAESH..........................................................................4A. DRIVERS OF THE US CAMPAIGN AGAINST DAESH..................................................4B. OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE..............................................................................4C. 2016 CHANGE OF STRATEGY AND PRIORITY...........................................................5D. IRAQ................................................................................................................................6E. SYRIA..............................................................................................................................7F. COOPERATION WITH PARTNERS AND NATO RESPONSE.......................................7

IV. RUSSIA’S INTERVENTION......................................................................................................9A. DRIVERS OF RUSSIAN INTERVENTION....................................................................11

V. RESULTS OF THE CAMPAIGNS...........................................................................................12A. RUSSIA.........................................................................................................................12B. US-LED COALITION.....................................................................................................12C. TROUBLING IRANIAN VARIABLE...............................................................................12

VI. OTHER CAMPAIGNS AGAINST DAESH – AFGHANISTAN AND LIBYA.............................13A. DAESH IN AFGHANISTAN (ISIL-K)..............................................................................13B. POTENTIAL LIBYAN FRONT.......................................................................................14

VII. DAESH’S SHIFTING PROPAGANDA AND THE PROSPECTS OF DAESH 3.0...................14

VIII. CONCLUSIONS......................................................................................................................15

BIBLIOGRAPHY.....................................................................................................................17

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. Peaceful civil protests started in Syria in March 2011 in parallel to the wave of civil uprising washing over the Middle East in late 2010 and early 2011. Very quickly the people in the streets of various Syrian cities, chanting for political reforms and freedom from oppression, encountered a harsh crackdown by the internal security services of the Assad regime; imprisonment and rubber bullets were soon swapped for the use of lethal force. The quick escalation of the use of force by the regime in Damascus spurred on the creation of the Free Syrian Army, initially to protect civilian protests and then to push back against the increasingly counter-insurgency-like campaign of the regime.

2. Soon the violence of the counter-insurgency campaign by the government spiralled into a complex civil war unprecedented in the country’s history for its sectarianism and extremism, elements of the war urged on by the Assad regime as a means of bolstering domestic minority support and to shore up external military aid. The most locally, regionally, and, now, globally disruptive phenomenon to arise out of the rampant extremism and sectarianism of the Syrian civil war is Daesh1.

3. Daesh’s rapid and unexpected rise allowed it to conquer vast swathes of northern and eastern Syria, and, by the summer of 2014, it was able to break out to overtake large territories of the Iraq Sunni heartland moving down the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, knocking over the ill-prepared Iraqi forces in its way. By 10 September, the United States had mounted a regional coalition of the willing to begin, in the words of President Obama to, “degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL”. US-coalition airstrikes were coordinated with efforts on the ground to build the capacity of local forces in Iraq and Syria to clear and hold recaptured territory.

4. A year later Russia announced a parallel air campaign in support of the Assad regime and its allies’ fight against what it deemed “terrorist” forces destabilising the region and threatening the stability of the “legitimate” government in Damascus. Russian air support had an immediate impact on the ground, restoring the balance of forces back in favour of the regime.

5. The entanglement of Russian and US-allied regional and local forces in the Syrian civil war added yet another layer of complexity to the most violent and destabilising conflict seen yet this century. This report seeks to break down the various entangling alliances and understand the international military campaigns against Daesh. After a brief review of the Syrian civil war today and the impact Daesh has had upon the region, the report will give an overview of the respective campaigns by the United States and Russia and the respective outcomes they are seeking. The report will also highlight the roles each of the respective alliance’s proxy forces are currently playing. It will conclude with an insight into the ever-elusive prospects for peace and interim conclusions for parliamentarian consideration.

II. THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR AND THE DAESH DILEMMA

6. Earlier committee reporting has covered the evolution of the Syrian civil war and its effect on the region, therein examining a potential role for NATO member states individually as well as the Alliance as a whole. Two years later, the Syrian civil war continues to be plagued by seemingly intractable variables complicating the possibility for any clear pathway to a lasting peace. The conflict seems mired in its status of an intractable regional and global proxy war.

7. Five years into the Syrian civil war, approximately 500,000 people are dead, 6.6 million Syrians have been displaced internally, and another 4.6 million have fled the country as refugees – representing over half the pre-war population of about 21 million (UNOCHA). Much of Syria’s

1 Arabic acronym of the terrorist organisation Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

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infrastructure and cultural heritage has been reduced to rubble by the increasingly violent campaigns between a spectrum of rebel forces and the Syrian Arab Army and its allies running across mountains, plains, and deserts. Perhaps the most devastating outcome of the war has been the rapid rise and regional outbreak of Daesh.

A. THE RISE OF DAESH

8. A powerful non-state armed group, Daesh seized significant swathes of territory in Syria and Iraq, proclaiming a new caliphate in the region. Moving from eastern Syria out of its operating capital of Raqqah, Daesh fighters moved down the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers, toppling US-trained Iraqi forces in their path, filling in the Sunni lands of Eastern Syria and Western Iraq. Along the way, the group captured significant war booty in the form of oil fields, Iraqi Central Bank cash reserves and antiquities which it could sell on the black market.

9. Daesh was perhaps able to field an army of in excess of 50,000 fighters2 during its heyday in the Levant in the autumn of 2014 – high levels of recruitment allowed the group to replenish their ranks relatively quickly in 2014 and 2015, even in the face of high battlefield losses and desertions. The group’s farthest regional expansion allowed it to control territory equivalent to roughly the size of the United Kingdom with a little over 6 million people under its control: 2.25 million in Syria and another 4 million in Iraq. The international campaigns against Daesh beginning in September 2014 continue to steadily roll back the group’s presence in the Levant.

10. As it continues to battle to hold onto its conquered territories in the Levant, Daesh has been able to expand its presence globally – largely through the success of its brand of extreme salafism mixed with ultra-violent tactics that it displays via a sophisticated propaganda network. Since its June 2014 breakout from Syria, Daesh has established presences in Yemen, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Egypt, Algeria, Somalia and Afghanistan.3 In some of these countries affiliation to Daesh is not much more than a nominal gesture of pledged loyalty to Daesh’s leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, while in others, such as Libya4, it is being promoted as a new front to which Daesh recruits are being told to go (Wehrey and Lacher, 2016).

B. CONTINUED SOURCES OF POWER

11. Daesh’s principal sources of power are its ability to generate revenue in its conquered territory and an unprecedented ability to recruit foreign fighters. At its peak, Daesh earned an approximately USD1.25 million per day from its seized oil and gas fields (Hussein et al., 2014). The group was also able to seize the equivalent of USD430 million in cash reserves from the Iraqi central bank in Mosul5 (Cooper, et al., 2016). Additional revenue is generated from taxation and extortion schemes in the territories it holds; much of the taxation comes in fact from the Iraqi and Syrian governments’ continued payment of salaries to public sector employees trapped inside of Daesh territory. Only relatively recently, for example, did the Syrian government stop paying the salaries of its citizens inside Daesh-held territory; Iraq only gradually squeezed off this revenue stream throughout the fall of 2015 after significant wavering about the humanitarian effects of such decisions (Coles, 2015).

2 Accurate estimates on the size of Daesh’s army are very hard to come by, and often unreliable. This estimate is drawn from various sources including the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the Economist, and New York Times reporting.

3 The DSC Special Report on NATO’s Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan 2016 [164 DSC 16 E bis] explores the expansion of Daesh into Afghanistan, known there as the Wilayat Khorasan, more closely. The principal finding is that the group has been having a hard time gaining traction in the country due to the deobandi tribal code, which favours loyalty to the Taliban.

4 For further information, see the 2016 GSM Report [063 GSM 16 E rev.1] 5 As much as an additional USD500 million has been seized in other plundering acts as well, bringing

the total to about USD1bn.

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12. Daesh has been able to amass a significant stockpile of arms through seizure, black market purchasing, as well as international donation sources. Weaponry ranges from basic small arms to advanced systems such as shoulder-fired Stinger missiles, 155mm Howitzers, rocket launchers, battle tanks, American APCs (Armoured Personnel Carriers) – even at one point as many as six Black Hawk helicopters, and a number of aged Russian MiG fighter jets (The Economist, 2014).6

The ability to seize and utilise such firepower and to manoeuvre allowed Daesh to seize and hold the territories spanning the Sunni regions of the Levant.

13. The dramatic rise in power and expansion of Daesh in the Middle East fuelled the group’s strong ability to recruit foreign fighters. Through sophisticated recruiting networks, fuelled by propaganda streams across various social media platforms, Daesh has been able to recruit nearly 40,000 fighters from more than 120 different countries around the world (Schmitt, 2016). At least 6,900 of these recruits have come from the West.

C. LEFT TO FESTER FOR TOO LONG

14. Another factor fuelling Daesh’s rise, though sometimes overlooked in analyses of the group’s trajectory, is the fact that the group was largely spared by the early assaults of the Assad regime’s military efforts in the war. The rationale behind this policy was simple enough at the time: by letting the more extremist elements of the rebellion thrive, the conflict became increasingly radicalised.

15. In a country like Syria, which in many ways resembled an ethnic and confessional mosaic before the war, this is important, as an array of minorities from Christians to Druze to Alawites worried about the rise of an extremist Sunni insurgency that might topple the Assad regime and impose an unwelcoming future for their group. As such, the Assad regime hoped to benefit from the subsequent rally-around-the flag effect the minorities would likely feel in the face of growing extremism.

16. Amnesties issued by the Assad regime in 2011, releasing approximately 1,000 prisoners linked to jihadist networks from high-security prisons, were critical to the growing extremism of the Syrian rebellion (Lister, 2016). The seeds of Daesh’s rise in Syria were planted when the Islamic State of Iraq sent operatives into the country to exploit the relative lawlessness existing in northeastern Syria. Over 2012 the group morphed into a formidable armed group known for its extremely violent tactics.

17. All the while, the regime’s military efforts remained focused on the more moderate forces of the Free Syrian Army and its affiliates as a means of attempting to winnow the field of forces remaining in the fight. As such, the regime could point out to non-extremist Syrians, still the vast majority of the population, that it was better to stick with the Assad regime, lest you find yourself with a future ruled by groups like Daesh.

18. By 2014, Daesh had distinguished itself as the most extreme and violent non-state armed group operating in the increasingly failed regions of northern Syria. After a spring 2014 struggle with the Al Qaeda-aligned Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al Nusra) in the areas east of Aleppo toward Raqqah and Deir al-Zour, Daesh managed to consolidate its position as the sole occupying force in the region. From this launching pad, and rife with domestic and foreign recruits drawn to its ranks by its battlefield successes and extremist ideology and tactics, Daesh was prepared to break out of Syria to begin to fulfil what it preached was its ultimate destiny: the re-establishment of a caliphate in the Levant and beyond.

6 For a more complete list of Daesh’s potential arsenal, see: http://www.militaryfactory.com/smallarms/weapons-of-isis.asp. For a report on Daesh’s small arms seizures, see:http://www.conflictarm.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Dispatch_IS_Iraq_Syria_Ammunition.pdf.

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19. The group’s brutal beheadings of captured, principally Western, aid workers or journalists, disseminated globally throughout 2014 raised serious public concern about the rise of this group that had previously been relatively unknown outside the conflict. In addition, the alarming rate of the group’s progress in Iraq – its quick seizure of Mosul and then rapid advances south – finally managed to draw in the US military to engage in a campaign to eliminate Daesh’s ‘tooth and tail’ (to use a military term), eventually rolling up the entire operation’s presence in Iraq and even Syria.

III. THE COALITION-LED CAMPAIGN AGAINST DAESH

20. On 10 September 2014, President Obama announced a new US plan to “degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL”. The US and its Allies and partners’ plan would involve air strikes in Iraq and Syria as well as efforts to train, advise, assist and equip Iraqi forces and select Syrian rebel groups on the ground to retake and hold territory seized by Daesh. The United States also looked to enlist the support of its regional allies in the fight, as a means of bolstering the legitimacy of the new US military action in the region.

A. DRIVERS OF THE COALITION CAMPAIGN AGAINST DAESH

21. There are three principal drivers to the US decision to align a military campaign against Daesh. First, as stated above, the United States seeks to degrade and ultimately destroy Daesh. The ability for a non-state armed group to capture and hold territory to the degree Daesh has been able to do is largely without precedent in the modern political arena. While destroying the idea of Daesh will likely prove elusive, undermining its ability to hold territory to generate revenue and expand its power base is essential, particularly in a region already plagued by weak state structures.

22. Second, US intervention in the Syrian conflict against Daesh in Iraq and Syria will give the United States the ability to have a say in the eventual political settlement of the Syrian civil war. The United States has made it clear that it does not see long-term peace and stability in Syria with President Assad as part of the political power structure. As a result, the United States has given varying degrees of diplomatic, financial, and military support to what it deems moderate political groups operating on the ground in Syria.

23. Third, the US position as the principal external power broker in the Middle East has come into question over the past decade, particularly vis-à-vis the post-2008 US policy of dramatically reducing its footprint in the region at all levels. As such, the United States' entry into the fray of the Syrian quagmire can also be seen as a move to reassure regional allies (particularly Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey, and the smaller Gulf monarchies) through a renewed diplomatic, financial, and military push. More visible support of its regional allies’ interests has been well received in the region, particularly in the wake of the recent Iran nuclear agreement, which many long-time US regional allies firmly reject.7

B. OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR)

24. In the weeks following President Obama’s announcement to move against Daesh, the United States, Jordan, Bahrein, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE began an air campaign against Daesh targets, including weapons stores, amassed forces, training facilities, and oil and gas facilities. Initial successes soon thinned out as Daesh militants began evaporating into urban areas and changing convoy and supply strategies. The United States also feared a too aggressive strategy against the oil and gas infrastructure and convoys would cause unacceptable amounts of collateral civilian casualties. Further, it was clear that air strikes alone would not be sufficient and

7 For further information, see the 2016 Science and Technology Committee Report The Iranian Nuclear Programme: How to Build Upon the Deal [176 STC 16 E rev. 1 fin]

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local ground forces would be needed to clear and hold territory in coordination with a supporting air campaign.8

25. During 2015, the United States worked to rebuild Iraqi military capacity that had performed so poorly in the face of Daesh’s forces in the summer and autumn of 2014. In the move to seize Mosul, for example, approximately 1,000 Daesh fighters were able to overrun an area controlled by 30,000 Iraqi forces. Instead of putting up a fight, the vast majority of the Iraqi forces, abandoned by their officers, deserted their positions, leaving behind a substantial amount of US-provided high-end military hardware.

26. Despite losses in central Iraq and northern Syria, Daesh was still able to make some strategic advances in 2015, perhaps the most significant being the ancient city of Palmyra in the eastern Syrian desert, and a crucial supply line link into its possessions in Iraq. In addition, it was clear that insufficient progress was being made in the effort to curtail Daesh’s revenue sources. As such, Operation Tidal Wave II was launched as a parallel air campaign in October 2015, specifically targeting Daesh oil refinement and distribution capacities (Gordon and Schmitt, 2015).

C. 2016 CHANGE OF STRATEGY AND PRIORITY

27. New US FY (Fiscal Year) 2017 defence funding announcements targeting the dual-flank challenge facing its European NATO Allies were announced in February 2016. In addition to the USD3.4 billion announced to focus on the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI)9, USD7.5 billion was asked for the ongoing campaign against Daesh. The focus of the new funding will be directed towards increased US assets on the ground, in the air, and at sea in the theatre of operations, as well as for the additional equipment and supporting civilian personnel.

28. During the autumn and winter of 2015-2016, the United States adapted its strategy against Daesh. The principal change was the relatively significant addition of ground support from US military advisors to Iraqi forces as they move to retake and hold territory under Daesh control, the ultimate aim being to recapture the major cities of Mosul in Iraq and Raqqah in Syria. As Defense Secretary Ashton Carter noted on 13 January 2016, “Our campaign’s plan map has got big arrows pointing to both Mosul and Raqqah” (Tilghman, 2016). As such, at the time of writing, there are roughly 5,000 US service members in Iraq (Schmidt, 2016). The following is an overview of the campaign strategy in the first half of 2016.

29. It has become clear to US defence planners that the most effective way to roll back Daesh (in Syria or Iraq) for the US-led coalition is to lead a multi-pronged fight. As a defence official noted to the visiting Committee delegation in Washington in January 2016, the core of the US strategy is “fighting along every leading edge”, which implies hitting Daesh everywhere simultaneously as a means of avoiding a ‘whack a mole’ suite of tactics. This will lead Daesh to be disrupted in their activities, he noted, and force them to retreat from their offensive efforts.

8 As noted in the 2014 DSCTC report on Regional and Global Implications of the Syrian Civil War: What Role for NATO? [193 DSCTC 14 E rev. 1 fin] , the United States had begun an earlier train and equip programme with Syrian rebels out of training bases in Jordan beginning back in 2011. Over the years after its inception, however, the programme was never really able to get substantial traction due to the self-imposed rigid framework the United States was using to vet and accept rebels for its programme. As a result, the train and equip programme dwindled into insignificance, eventually being cancelled after only several dozen fighters were deemed battle ready, but then immediately captured or killed by extremist forces on the ground in Syria after their re-entry into the Syrian civil war battle theatre.

9 US additional ERI funding is explained in detail in the 2016 DSC General Report NATO New Deterrence Posture: from Wales to Warsaw [161 DSC 16 E bis].

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D. IRAQ

30. The year 2015 saw a lot of positive momentum in the US-coalition’s campaign to roll back Daesh’s presence in Iraq, and it is carrying it forward in 2016. In the first six months of 2016 Daesh lost 12% of its remaining territory, meaning the group has lost over 50% of the amount of territory it once held in Iraq. These territorial losses have also reduced the number of people living under Daesh control (HIS Jane’s). Combined US and coalition forces airstrikes and concerted efforts on the ground by Iraqi forces (both Kurdish peshmerga and Iraq regulars) significantly hamper the terrorist group’s ability to launch offensives, putting them principally on a defensive footing in Iraq.

31. The momentum of the counter-Daesh campaign in Iraq has seen significant advances in 2016. Forces loyal to the Iraqi government retook the city of Fallujah in June, Qayyarah city and its air base, as well as the Al-Waleed Iraqi-Syrian border crossing by August. The seizure of Qayyarah is a significant step forward for the campaign’s ultimate prize of liberating Mosul, as the area can be used as a strategic base from which to launch the future operation. In parallel, the Khalidiyah desert region (between Fallujah and Ramadi) was cleared of Daesh militants by joint Iraqi national forces and government-aligned Shia militias. In addition to constraining Daesh’s footprint in Iraq and its attendant impact on the group’s ability to collect revenue and manoeuvre in the region, OIR’s success against the group has significantly hindered its ability to replenish its fighting ranks as the flow of foreign fighters into the area are estimated to have dropped by 90% (Gibbons-Neff, April 2016).

32. As the campaign continues to move up the Euphrates toward Mosul, there are no illusions about the difficulties the fight for Iraq’s second largest city will pose for coalition forces and their Iraqi counterparts. Daesh-occupied Mosul still has in the order of about 1.5 million inhabitants and the difficulties of clearing and holding the city, in what will likely be a challenging urban engagement, are clear when considering the still relatively beleaguered state of the Iraqi military. Coordinating command and control among the Iraqi forces on the ground is also posing a challenge for Bagdad for the capture and control of Mosul, as much of the fighting done in the recent recapture of territories was done by shia militias rather than Iraqi government forces, which poses longer term political challenges on the ground (Laud, August 2016). In light of this and the challenges that lie ahead, the Obama administration announced in July that it will deploy a further 560 troops for the Mosul offensive which will bring the total number of US troops in Iraq to 4,647 (Suster).

33. Along the way, US and partner forces are working to rebuild Iraqi capacity. The government in Bagdad at least gives the United States, its partners, and international organisations operating in the state a partner with which to work as they focus on stabilisation efforts. Steep challenges still lie ahead. For example, while the recapture and rebuilding efforts begun in Tikrit can be viewed as a relative success, Ramadi and Sinjar remain uphill battles; particularly due to the level of destruction left by Daesh and the ensuing battle to remove them: the damage is enormous. The estimated reconstruction costs for Ramadi are likely to be over USD40 million.

34. The humanitarian scope of the crisis in Iraq, though overshadowed by its Syrian neighbour’s, is massive. The needs of more than 3 million IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons), for example, must be met. This dynamic has the potential to destabilise the Kurdish region in particular, as they do not have the resources to take care of these populations, particularly in the wake of the collapse of their oil revenues.

35. US-led collation successes against Daesh in Iraq must now begin strategising as to what happens after the hopeful liberation of Mosul. Even if Daesh loses its territorial control, its ideological sway will remain across swathes of disaffected Sunni communities, a disaffection likely fuelled by the humanitarian and rebuilding challenges that will follow a major combat operation. Daesh seems to be planning for this already, as evidenced by a statement released by the group

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claiming Daesh does not “fight for territory” but is instead ready to return to guerrilla tactics while appealing to followers to attack the group’s enemies abroad (The Economist, July 2016).

E. SYRIA

36. Greatly aiding the US air campaign in Syria has been the permission to use Turkish bases since July 2015, and the presence of the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower carrier group in the Gulf. The USS Harry Truman, which was replaced on the US OIR campaign in June 2016, set the flattop record for sorties and bombs dropped in the fight against Daesh, completing 2,054 combat sorties during its eight-month mission (LaGrone, 2016).

37. Northeast Syria is a particular focus, as the Coalition moves to isolate Daesh in Raqqah. Particularly important to the coalition’s continued efforts is the ability to restrict Daesh militants’ movement across the Euphrates River, and between Syria and Iraq. In July Manbij, a central Daesh command node in Syria and critical for its access to the Turkish border, was cleared. Coalition Airstrikes, alongside sustained fire and artillery support from the Turkish Armed Forces from February to July 2016, resulted in significant Daesh casualties and loss of materiel, which were instrumental in the success of the Manbij operation. The seizure of Manbij severed the last remaining supply lines available to Daesh in north-eastern Syria.

38. Daesh’s Raqqah stronghold is currently facing mounting pressure as both the US-led coalition and pro-regime forces advance into its surrounding countryside. This developing pincer movement forced Daesh to withdraw from its frontlines in Northern Aleppo Province in August to prioritise the defence of its core terrain in Raqqah. This permitted coalition gains in the province including the key border town of Al-Rai. Daesh’s degraded strategic position is unlikely to bring calm to these regions, however, but instead may ignite further conflict between local and regional actors jeopardising future coalition successes. Terrains vacated by the group will likely host renewed competition between Syrian Kurds, opposition groups, and pro-regime militia forces as well as a geopolitical struggle between the US-led coalition and the Russia-led campaign in support of the Syrian Arab Army. Such conflicts could strain the international anti-Daesh coalition’s further progress in Syria (Kozak, June 2016).

39. At the end of August Turkish armed forces with US air support entered Syria to roll back Daesh successes close to the border town of Jarabulus. Beyond routing Daesh the Turkish move also sought to remove from its borders the Kurdish forces which it saw as having potential links to Turkish domestic Kurdish forces, which Turkey views as terrorist organisations. Principal complicating variable to this, however, is the degree of support the United States continues to give to these same Kurdish groups in Syria (Arango et al.).

40. In total, Daesh has lost approximately 20% of its territory in Syria since its peak in 2015.

F. COOPERATION WITH PARTNERS AND NATO RESPONSE

41. In addition to its military efforts, the United States has been waging a strong diplomatic mission over the past two years to line up additional forces against Daesh across the globe. As the US Central Command notes: “[Operation Inherent Resolve] also symbolizes the willingness and dedication of coalition members to work closely with friends in the region and apply all dimensions of national power necessary – diplomatic, informational, military, economic – to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL.” US efforts to engage partner countries in its anti-Daesh campaign have progressed along three levels: working with regional allies; through the UN (via the United Nations Security Council and other organs); as well as through core allies (principally NATO).

42. Since the beginning of its efforts, the United States has been able to engage 40 different countries in its anti-Daesh coalition. All NATO member states are contributing in some form or another, some more than others. For example, in the wake of the November 2015 terrorist attacks

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in Paris, French President, François Hollande, announced France would be sending the Charles de Gaulle carrier group (carrying 26 fighter jets) to begin a much higher tempo of anti-Daesh operations above the skies of Iraq and Syria, naming its new mission Operation Chammal. The United Kingdom launched Operation Shader in September 2014, which moved its air campaign inside of Syria as well. Turkey joined the global coalition with Operation Martyr Yalçin.

43. In 2016, almost all have agreed to step up their contributions to the US-led effort, particularly France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and Canada. US Secretary of Defense, Ashton Carter, noted in February, that the United States was looking for further contribution from allies in terms of air support, assistance with the training, advising and assistance efforts of Iraqi forces, and in financial resources needed to rebuild destroyed cities.

44. Almost immediately, NATO Defence Ministers endorsed the idea of employing a scheme for using NATO AWACS to assist some NATO Allies to free up their own AWACS as a means of better controlling the airspace above Iraq and Syria for the air campaigns. NATO also noted that it would increase its Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assistance to Turkey to better control the 912km border it shares with Syria.

45. NATO has a regional defence capacity building effort underway in locations in both Jordan and Turkey. Current efforts to assist Iraq concentrate along five lines of effort: counter-IED (Improvised Explosive Device) /demining, civil military planning, civil emergency planning, security sector reform, and cyber defence. Current Iraqi assistance efforts are working with 350 Iraqi military officers in Jordan. In addition, the Kingdom of Jordan requested NATO support to improve its crisis management structures and procedures, for which an additional Advisory Support Team has been deployed.

46. The Warsaw Summit noted NATO’s intention to start a capacity-building effort in Iraq as well. While the notional plan has been confirmed by NATO Heads of State and Government at Warsaw, the specifics of the mission will likely be worked out during the October Defence Ministerial, wherein the discrete capacity-building lines of effort will be given guidance and authorisation. NATO’s decision to become more heavily involved in security sector reform efforts in places like Iraq was welcomed by many member states taking leading roles in OIR.

47. As of August 2016, the coalition has conducted 14,198 airstrikes; 9,411 of those in Iraq and the balance (4,787) in Syria (BBC, August 2016). By 31 May 2016, 26,374 targets had been destroyed. The United States has spent USD7.5 billion on counter-IS military operations since 8 August 2014, with an average daily cost of USD11.7 million (McInnis, August 2016). In July 2016 US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter met with all OIR coalition defence ministers to discuss the upcoming campaigns to take the two pivotal Daesh cities of Mosul and Raqqah. During the meeting several coalition members agreed to step up their contributions to the fight, and discussions centered on stabilisation and governance plans in the aftermath of Daesh’s defeat. Secretary of State John Kerry hosted a separate conference at the State Department in July to raise at least USD2 billion in humanitarian aid from donor nations to help Iraq in the rebuilding process in the wake of Daesh’s withdrawal (Tilghman). The US State Department announced it had raised USD2.1 billion, and that the United States offered USD310 million additional funding (Baldor, July 2016).

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IV. RUSSIA’S INTERVENTION

48. Over the first half of 2015, after four years of intense fighting on multiple fronts, the Syrian Arab Army was on the defensive and in consistent incremental retreat. As a result, the Assad regime made what Russia termed as a formal request to Moscow for direct military assistance. Russian military intervention began on 30 September 2015 with the deployment of a contingent of 30 fixed-wing aircraft and 20 helicopters (transport and attack) with the goal of providing the Assad Regime and its allied forces10 on the ground with the necessary air support to retake the offensive. By the end of the month, a joint information centre was set up by the governments of Iran, Iraq, Russia and Syria to coordinate the operations in the battle theatre11 (CNN, 2015).

49. Prior to its intervention, Russia had been providing the Syrian Government and Army with financing, weapons as well as diplomatic support. On 11 October 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the driver of Russia’s direct military intervention in Syria is to “stabilise the legitimate power and create the conditions for political compromise” (Shakdam, 2016). According to Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov, Russia had invited the United States to take part in its campaign, but had received an “unconstructive response” (RT, 2015; Parfitt, 26 October 2015; Al-Arabiya 2016).

50. The first series of Russian attacks occurred on 30 September 2015 in areas around Homs and Hama, targeting opposition groups. Russian warplanes attacked rebel positions in Homs, Hama and Quneitra Provinces (BBC News, 2015; Reuters, 2015a). Russian airstrikes also hit Daesh positions in the Raqqah governorate (Reuters, 2015b). In parallel, Russian air strikes hit the positions of the Free Syrian Army and other US-supported moderate forces in and around Aleppo, eliciting protest from Washington about Russian targeting (Mekhennet, 2014).

51. By mid-October 2015 Russia doubled the size of its air group operating in Syria to 60. As a result, the Russian tempo of operation increased from about 20 sorties per day to 100 by mid-November. By mid-November, Russia also began deploying strategic assets, such as long-range bombers from southern Russia, including the Tu-22M3, Tu-160 and Yu-95 (Bodner, 2015). The official explanation to introduce the bombers into the Russian area of operations was driven by the 31 October downing of a Russian commercial airliner over Egypt, which Daesh claimed was punishment for Russian intervention in Syria. Further, following the 24 November downing of a Russian Su-24M by a Turkish F-16 in Turkish air space, Russia deployed S-400 air defence systems to Latakia to give its forces an air defence range covering most of Syria.

52. In addition, Russia sent navy ships to operate off the coast of Syria. Included in the naval contingent is the Moskva guided missile cruiser, which contains sophisticated air defence systems covering most of Syria and part of Turkey. In addition, Russia fired Kalibr cruise missiles on targets in Syria from the Rostov-on-Don submarine in early December (Bodner, 2015).

53. On 1 December 2015, The Times reported that Russia was preparing to expand its military operations in Syria by opening the al-Shayrat airbase near the city of Homs (Parfitt, 1 December 2015). The role of Moscow was said to be crucial in the Syrian government’s capture on 24 January 2016, of the town of Rabia, the last major town held by rebels in the Latakia Province (BBC News, 2016). This last offensive threatens rebel supply lines from Turkey.

54. Throughout February 2016, Russian airstrikes helped Syrian government forces and Iran-backed militias seize territory from opposition groups north of Aleppo, largely severing a supply route from Turkey to the opposition groups in Aleppo. Syrian government forces have gained territory south and east of Aleppo, as well as north, surrounding the city.

10 Hezbollah, Iranian Quds and Revolutionary Guard Forces, allied-foreign Shi’a militias, and local Syrian forces operating in rebel-held territory

11 Lebanese Shia militia Hezbollah also supports the operations.

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55. On 14 March 2016, the eve of the renewed peace talks in Geneva, Russian President Vladimir Putin called an end to the Russian operation in Syria. President Putin estimated that the total cost of the operation was USD480 million, or about USD3 million per day. Funding for the operation was drawn principally from the training budget of the armed forces. Despite the official end to the Russian operation, Russia has kept its infrastructure in place inside and outside of Syria to be able to return to the theatre of operations quickly. President Putin stated that: “If necessary, literally within a few hours, Russia can build up its contingent in the region to a size proportionate to the situation developing there and use the entire arsenal of capabilities at our disposal” (Bodner, 2016).

False Withdrawal

56. Since March, Russian intervention in Syria has become a dichotomous display of false promises of withdrawal and ceasefire mixed with the reality of a continued and expanded military campaign. Russian intervention in Syria continues with air strikes, military advice, training, improved military infrastructure and a recent agreement between the two allies to continue Russian aviation activities in Syria indefinitely.

57. Russia did recall a handful of aircraft in March but its footprint in Syria remains heavy. The Kremlin retained its naval presence at Tartus, dozens of jets at its Khmeymim air base close to Latakia, approximately 1,000 military advisers and a new air base in Palmyra home to the sophisticated Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft system, attack helicopters and supply depots. The powerful S-400 anti-aircraft missiles remain at the Latakia base, can be deployed at a moment’s notice and maintain a considerable air-defence perimeter in the eastern Mediterranean. Beyond its considerable infrastructural presence, Russia also appears to have taken charge in Syrian-Russian joint missions that operate on “Russian terms” (The Economist, May 2016).

58. Through April and into May Russia continued air and naval support to pro-regime forces. Russia began to reshape its military deployment at this time, withdrawing certain airframes from the Khmeymim airbase near Latakia while deploying additional rotary wing aircraft, particularly in the Aleppo offensive, and developing a new base near Palmyra. In Aleppo, Russia provided support to regime forces attempting to encircle and besiege Syrian opposition (Casagrande, 2016). Despite this, between 4 May and 11 May Russia presented itself as a constructive international arbiter to the conflict through a series of Russian and US-brokered partial ceasefire deals. When ceasefires expired on 12 May, airstrikes resumed. Attacks continued in areas including Ghouta in the Syrian capital and Idlib where strikes appeared to target hospitals (Ensor). In May Russian air raids also occurred in Latakia, in response to increasing Daesh presence there. Russia said it was targeting “terrorists,” a broad definition befitting the regime’s blanket description of all Assad's opponents.

59. At the end of June, the Obama administration issued a proposal for a military partnership with Russia in Syria. The deal called for the United States to conduct a coordinated air campaign against Daesh and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. In exchange, Russia reportedly agreed to push the regime to stop striking areas held by US-supported oppositions groups (Rogin, 2016). This kind of delineation in Syria is difficult to achieve given that extremist and opposition groups often share the same territory. The agreement is problematic in many other ways, such as its language which fails to make clear which methods of attack are prohibited, escape clauses in cases of “imminent threat” and “other circumstances” and failure to outline consequences of non-compliance (Rogin, 2016). Its utility in the conflict is therefore questionable, indeed in June and July Russia continued its air campaign against the Syrian opposition across Western Syria with a particular focus on Aleppo. The target was the opposition’s last remaining supply line into the city. Also in June, it was reported that Russia was caught releasing incendiary bombs (RBK-500 ZAB 2.5SM) across Syrian cities, a flagrant abuse of Russia’s commitments under international humanitarian law, particularly as many of the injured were civilians (Ensor).

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60. The tempo of Russian attacks slowed by mid-July, however targeted strikes and incendiary munitions continued in support of the regime’s Aleppo campaign. By 28 July Russia enabled pro-regime forces to complete the encirclement of Aleppo, isolating the primary region of non-jihadist opposition forces in northern Syria. Such gains threatened the long-term survival of mainstream opposition groups that could serve as potential partners against Daesh and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (Kozak, July 2016). This undercuts Russia’s supposed campaign justification for fighting Daesh. Russia also intensified bombing in Homs and the eastern outskirts of Palmyra, which will prove key for the regime in launching future operations into Eastern Syria.

61. On 6 August, the siege of Aleppo was broken by opposition forces, which reportedly led to renewed use of incendiary weapons in Idlib (HRW, 2016). On the 9 August Putin submitted a Syrian-Russian agreement on deploying a Russian Air Force aviation group in Syrian territory to the State Duma for ratification. The agreement was concluded for an indefinite period and permits Russia to import and export from Syria any weapons, munitions, equipment, and materiel needed for the accomplishment of the aviation group's missions and to guarantee the security and vital activities of the personnel. The agreement reserves the right for Russia to use the Latakia air base free of charge and in perpetuity and will likely lead to the expansion of the currently temporary Russian infrastructure in Latakia. On 16 August Russia announced a deal to use Iranian airbases to shorten distance flown by long-range bombers, enabling it to bring more firepower to the Syrian conflict, and far greater military flexibility. This privilege has since been cut short by Tehran after allegations Moscow was indiscrete about the deal. 62. At the time of writing another ceasefire was brokered between Russia and the United States in light of the military agreement announced by the Obama administration in June. It was due to come into effect in mid-September. It remains to be seen the level to which any party will respect the deal.

A. DRIVERS OF RUSSIAN INTERVENTION

63. The drivers of Russian intervention are relatively clear. First, Russia views the maintenance of a friendly regime in the Middle East as essential to its power projection in the region, and its interest to be a global power broker. Supporting the Assad regime allows Russia to have a hand in the outcome of the most pressing international issue of the day. Second, Russia is able to build a coalition of regional powers in the Middle East decidedly against a US hegemonic position in the region, thereby undermining US influence in other key issues emanating from the region. Third, Russia has been able to use the intervention in Syria to test the newly modernised Russian forces along with their more expeditionary-focused doctrine. Russia maintained a high-tempo joint operation for 167 days, the first one at distance from its borders since the Soviet Union. Fourth, Russia was able to showcase its new equipment to potential new buyers; hence the rationale of sending in long-range bombers and firing cruise missiles over 1,000 km into a battle space that hardly called for such measures. Fifth, while a secondary priority in its battle in Syria, eliminating Daesh and the sway it carries in Russia’s northern caucuses was significant for Russia’s Syria campaign. Between June 2014 and December 2015 foreign fighters joining Daesh from Russia and Central Asia rose by 300% (Soufan Group, 2015) and is estimated to stand currently at 2,700 people; Russia’s deputy foreign minister Oleg Syromolotov says 160 Russian nationals have died in Syria and Iraq while fighting for Daesh (Radio Free Europe, 2016). This is deeply concerning for the Russians who fear further impetus to the insurgency in its majority Muslim North Caucasus.

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V. RESULTS OF THE CAMPAIGNS

A. RUSSIA

64. The Russian campaign appears to have been quite effective in achieving its goal of bolstering the position of the Assad regime. Since the start of the Russian intervention the balance of power has swung back in favour of Damascus, with the Syrian government controlling about 40% of territory, while Kurdish groups, Daesh, and other insurgent groups each hold about 20% (Zraick, 2016). While the United States repeatedly stated that there is no military solution to the conflict in Syria, but instead only a political one, Russia’s intervention on the side of Assad seems to have tipped the balance in favour of the regime as peace talks continue to seek a stable political outcome.

B. US-LED COALITION

65. To date, US airstrikes alone have killed approximately 25,000 Daesh fighters in Syria and Iraq, 50% of Daesh-captured territory in Iraq has been retaken, as well as 25% in Syria. Airstrikes targeting cash stocks have also blown up (and, therefore, burned) tens of millions of dollars-worth of cash seized by the group in at least ten different cash depots – forcing the group to reportedly cut fighter’s salaries by as much as half (Cooper, 2016). In addition, strategic supply lines between the group’s principal operating centres in Syria have been retaken.

66. The effects of Operation Tidal Wave II on Daesh’s have cut Daesh’s oil revenues by a third. Adding to the financial difficulties of Daesh has been the decline of oil prices globally. The loss of control of key crossing points on Syria’s border with Turkey has been very costly for the group.

67. In addition, US-coalition targeted attacks in March killed Daesh’s second-in-command and its “minister” of war and in August killed Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, a founding member of the group and public face of the organisation’s propaganda campaign as part of the US effort to eliminate Daesh’s “cabinet of ministers” (Muñoz, 2016). In fact, a recent US intelligence estimate notes that the number of Daesh fighters in Iraq and Syria has fallen by at least 20% due to deaths and desertions. As a result, Daesh is searching for different operational theatres to which it can send its forces.

C. TROUBLING IRANIAN VARIABLE

68. In recent months Russia and Iran have worked increasingly closely in their campaigns in support of the Syrian regime. Their cooperation reached its zenith in August when Iran permitted Russian use of its Hamadan air base for its military campaign in Syria. This is the first time Iran has permitted another country such privileged access to Iranian soil since the Second World War.

69. The strategic interests of both countries align in maintaining Assad’s position in Syria. Helping maintain Assad’s position in Syria creates a geopolitical reality benefiting Iranian interests directly, while undercutting those of the United States. Much like Russia, Iran desires a multipolar world with a decidedly reduced American footprint. Iranian alignment with Russia and Syria reflects this.

70. Further, Iranian support to Syria has a long history, dating back to the early days of the Iranian Revolution. A strong ally in Damascus allows Tehran a direct conduit for weapons and funds to its regional proxy in Lebanon, Hezbollah, which, by extension gives it a say in the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict (Milani, 2016). Furthermore, Tehran’s support to Syria is part of Iran’s regional ambitions to offset Saudi Arabian regional supremacy and support its own arc of influence among Shia groups. With allies in Damascus, Beirut, and Baghdad, Iran can balance against Saudi influence in the Gulf. This “Shia crescent” would be significantly compromised if Assad were to fall. To fulfil these strategic goals and prop up Assad coordinating with Russia is therefore essential.

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Assad’s opponents are backed by powerful nations such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey and Russia represents a significant counterweight to this.

71. Iranian coordination with Russia increased recently partially as a result of Iranian frustration at the slow progress on implementation of the nuclear deal signed between Iran and P5+1 (the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany) last year. While Iran has made efforts to dismantle its reactors and permit inspectors at its nuclear facilities, Teheran perceives the removal of sanctions against it as cumbersome and still deters foreign investment. Such disparities feed a growing Iranian perception that the United States is using its remaining sanctions to stop Iran from receiving its reward for meeting its nuclear obligations (The Economist, 2016). If slow progress continues Iran may look for alternatives to détente with the United States, especially if the moderates in Iran who backed the nuclear deal are discredited in the face of the deal’s apparent failure to provide rewards.

72. This complicates Iran’s position in the fight against Daesh. The United States and Iran both share a strategic interest in defeating Daesh and both have expressed interest in cooperation to do so. This has yet to be seriously capitalised on however; Iran is not involved in the international coalition against Daesh and has been excluded from international conferences on how to tackle the group (Esfandiary and Tabatabi, 2015). It has instead allied with Russia and Syria, neither of whom see Daesh as the primary enemy. Indeed, some analysts claim Assad assisted by Russia are aiding the rise of Daesh so that by comparison Assad’s rule is the moderate and preferred option (Tierney, 2015). The NATO Allies would do well to reverse these trends to ensure Iran sees the benefits of its nuclear deal and stem Iran’s further diplomatic tilt towards Russia while exploring areas for cooperation against Daesh, which is key to the group’s final defeat.

VI. OTHER CAMPAIGNS AGAINST DAESH – AFGHANISTAN AND LIBYA

A. DAESH IN AFGHANISTAN (ISIL-K)

73. In January 2015, calling itself ISIL-Khorann (ISIL-K), Daesh established a limited presence in the four to five districts of Nangarhar, reportedly carrying out suicide bombings, small arms attacks and kidnappings against civilians and the Afghan national forces (UN, 2015).

74. By October 2015, the concern over ISIL-K increased significantly, with the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) and USFOR-A Commander, John F. Campbell, claiming the group had transitioned from “nascent” to “operationally emergent” (US DoD, 2015). As such, in early 2016, President Obama granted USFOR-A additional authorisation to conduct offensive operations against Daesh in Afghanistan. The US air campaign over areas with Daesh presence in Afghanistan increased substantially as a result.

75. The success of ISIL-K in securing the defection of some high-level Taliban commanders has gathered attention. Two high-level Taliban commanders, Rauf Khadem and Hafeez Saeed Khan joined the group: the former was appointed as the governor of the so-called Khorasan province, while the latter was appointed as the deputy governor. The two worked together to open up recruiting cells in Nangarhar (Osman, 2015). However, soon after its establishment, ISIL-K suffered a major setback when Khadem was killed by a US drone strike. Daesh’s presence in Afghanistan has mostly been confined to foreigners and a small group of former Taliban fighters, though some of its attacks have been relatively high profile. As in other regions of operation, Daesh in Afghanistan has focused its attacks on sectarian targets. In July 2016, 80 Afghan Hazaras, a Shia ethnic group in Afghanistan, were killed in a bombing. The attack was the deadliest so far in Afghanistan by ISIL-K. The attack came amid a major assault by the Afghan army and US Special Forces on the group’s stronghold in eastern Afghanistan. This assault is a reflection of the increased US Special Forces presence in Afghanistan since July. At least in the

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eastern provinces of Afghanistan this renewed US push has reduced the Islamic State’s numbers from about 3,000 to approximately 1,500 (Suster).

B. POTENTIAL LIBYAN FRONT

76. There is considerable momentum to open up a new front in the international campaign against Daesh in Libya. According to US Defense Department officials, the number of Daesh fighters operating in Libya has been multiplying very rapidly, noting in February 2016 that the total stood between 5,000-6,500 fighters, a figure that had doubled in only a few months. Daesh is reportedly telling new recruits to head to Libya, rather than Syria or Iraq, to help establish the group’s presence there (The Economist, July 2016). To help organise and expand the group’s new presence in Libya, Daesh has apparently sent several top lieutenants to the country (Wehrey, 2016).

77. In the Spring Daesh controlled a little over 100km of Libyan coastline surrounding Sirte and had operational presences in the capitals of the two opposing governments in the country based in Tripoli and Benghazi, as well as every other major Libyan city. As rival governments on opposite ends of the Libyan coast continue to fail to find common ground and unite the country, Daesh is feeding on the instability created by the lack of stable governance, executing a sophisticated multi-front campaign against Libya’s oil facilities (Gambhir, 2016). In April, concerns Daesh’s Libyan presence was growing in size and beginning to threaten Tunisia led United Nations special envoy to Libya, Martin Kobler, to call for western forces to help combat Islamic State in partnership with the country's new government. His call came in response to a stepped up Daesh offensive against Libya’s oilfields. At this time Daesh presence was felt in Fida, Maradah and Zillah in the Sirte Basin as well as the south-western town of Awbari (Stephen and Wintour).

78. In August, Libya's UN-backed unity government requested US air support for an offensive against the city of Sirte by Libyan forces. The operation successfully recaptured the last stronghold of Daesh in Libya. US drones and fighter jets carried out 29 strikes, targeting several Daesh emplacements and a gun-mounted pick-up truck. This came in addition to successful fighting to recapture the western city of Sabratha in February. The group still remains in control of residential neighbourhoods of Sirte however, where Libyan forces have previously found it difficult to advance in house-to-house fighting.

79. The fall of Sirte is a major setback for Daesh, and a huge boost for the UN-backed government in the country which has struggled to impose its authority and faces continuing resistance from armed group (Al Jazeera, August 2016). As with Iraq and Syria, however, coalition successes against Daesh bring a far more complex question to the fore: What to do after Daesh? The insidious ideology of the group will be more difficult to beat than its territorial control and requires a more considered approach. Daesh is still recruiting in North Africa and is “creating a real African jihadi army” (Stephen and Willsher). These recruits are difficult to stem as they use the same routes as migrants. Similarly, the UN-backed Government of National Accord must consider its tactics post-Daesh and be careful to use these victories to establish its authority using state police and army rather than relying on militias who have developed a poor reputation in the past five years of fighting.

VII. DAESH’S SHIFTING PROPAGANDA AND THE PROSPECTS OF DAESH 3.0

80. Daesh’s propaganda and organisational methods are undergoing a transition, partly in response to the significant territorial and leadership losses the group experienced in recent months. Over 40% of Daesh’s territory in Iraq has been recaptured including the cities of Fallujah, Ramadi, Tikrit and Sinjar. In Syria Daesh continues to lose territory by the day; in August, the group’s hold on the Syria-Turkish border around Jarabulus was broken. It is estimated that Daesh

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has lost between 20 and 30% of its territory in Syria (Michaels, 2016). The group’s “back-up” capital Sirte in Libya has also been recaptured.

81. Beyond geographical losses the group suffered a serious setback in August when its chief of external operations and spokesperson Abu Mohammad al-Adnani was killed in a US airstrike. Adnani was a key leader within the group and was reportedly tipped for leadership in the case of Al-Baghdadi’s death. He played an important role in identifying European recruits who could be groomed and sent back to carry out attacks. It was Adnani who called for lone-wolf attacks against Western targets which was thought to inspire the Orlando, Istanbul, Nice, Dhaka and Baghdad attacks during Ramadan this year. This hole in the group’s leadership will be difficult to fill and may have negative consequences for Daesh’s ability to maintain recruitment numbers, which have already been falling this year.

82. In light of these setbacks and the likely defeat of Daesh in the near future there has been a clear shift in the group’s rhetoric and tactics. Even before Adnani’s death the spokesperson articulated a change in Daesh’s tactics when he announced the group do not fight for territory and are preparing to revert to guerrilla tactics. He instructed Daesh followers “the smallest action you do in their heartland is better and more enduring to us than what you would [do] if you were with us” (The Economist, July 2016).

83. The change in tactic highlights a serious long-term challenge for NATO Allies. If and when Daesh capitals of Mosul and Raqqa fall it will not herald the end of the group. Rather the threat will then come from a more disperse global jihadist group, which, as the fight against Al-Qaeda has proved, is difficult to target and eliminate. The ideology behind the group will not disappear when its territory does, which poses myriad domestic counter-terrorism challenges in the face of the efforts the remnants of the group will make to re-boot Daesh 3.0.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

84. Eventual battlefield victory is not expected to come until 2017 at the earliest. In addition, long-term peace and stability prospects in both Syria and Iraq are far from promising. In the case of Syria, the string of tenuous ceasefires appears likely to continue to collapse, given the exclusion of key spoilers from their frameworks. In addition, the rebuilding process in Iraq (both of the armed forces and of damaged infrastructure) requires significant continued long-term investment. What forces will be able to maintain the territory once it is back in the hands of the central government in Baghdad? The degree of loyalty to the state of Iraq in an increasingly ethnically divided state will be difficult to assess, and only real political level reform will allow for unified military working to secure a united territory.

85. Still there are several considerations for members of the Defence and Security Committee.

Making Defeating Daesh a #1 Priority – Recent momentum aside, the fact remains that a direct intervention by capable Western military forces would certainly be the most effective means of defeating Daesh in the short-term. There is, however, no political will to get involved in yet another large-scale intervention in the Middle East by the West. Direct military intervention aside, it is clear that members of the US-aligned coalition against Daesh have the ability to coordinate and bring to bear much more of their national power at all levels – diplomatic, informational, military, and economic.

Cracking Down on Illicit Trafficking – Allies can certainly invest many more resources to interdict the illicit smuggling routes furbishing Daesh with cash, fighters, and weaponry. Investing in increased ISR over the entire region will give a clearer picture, and coordinated intelligence (HUMINT, ELINT, SIGINT [human, electronic, and signals intelligence]) will certainly help squeeze off the spigot of support that continues to flow into Daesh’s hands.

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Let’s Think Creatively About Countering Radicalisation – Despite their current efforts thousands of citizens from NATO member states continue to join the ranks of Daesh in the battle theatre or attempt, and, unfortunately sometimes, succeed in doing its dirty work at home. The examples of the terrorist attacks on Belgium, France, and Turkey are reminders of the high price larger populations can pay for the drift into radicalisation by a marginalised few. Understanding the current programmes in place to counter radicalisation at all levels is essential. Only then can lawmakers think more creatively about new solutions.

Investing in the NATO Capacity Building Initiatives – Allies must increase their efforts to advise and train forces on the ground in Iraq. It is clear that the experience in Afghanistan can serve as a model for Iraq and, eventually, even Syria. The declarations of intent to begin a new capacity-building programme in Iraq by NATO Heads of State and Government are an excellent start; the work to fill out the contours of this programme are still ongoing. There are three proposals currently on the table: the first is to send advisory teams to work inside Iraqi ministries directly, as well as deploying military and police trainers on the ground. It took NATO almost one and a half years to respond to a request from the Iraqi government to support the training of their forces; such delays are far too long. NATO can expand its cooperation with regional organisations, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, to step up its train, advise and assist programmes (TAA) in the region in general, which could forestall the manifestation of Daesh 3.0 in the aftermath of its defeat on the ground in Iraq and Syria.

86. Finally, NATO can certainly use its regional cooperation platforms to expand its efforts in counter-terrorism operations, energy, and maritime security.

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