Prepared by: BERMEJO, NONABELG.R. No. L-9878 December 24, 1914Plaintiff-appellee: THE UNITED STATESDefendant-appelant: FRANK TUPASI MOLINAPonente: JOHNSON,J.:Facts of the Case: On the 10th day of September, 1912, the defendant Frank Tupasi Molina signed a petition to be permitted to take the examination for the position of municipal policeman in Vigan, Ilocos. Said petition was signed by the defendant and sworn to by him before a notary public. Said petition contained a number of questions which the applicant was required to answer. Among other questions we find that No. 5 was as follows: Have you ever been indicted, tried, or sentenced in any court for violation of any law, ordinance, or regulations, or have you ever been tried or sentenced for violation of regulations of the Army, Navy, of the Constabulary, in any court martial of the Army or of the Constabulary, or in any other court? To said question the defendant answered: "No, sir; I cannot remember any." On the 6th day of February, 1914, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Ilocos Sur filed a complaint against the defendant charging him with the crime of perjury on the ground that he took an oath to state the truth, and signed to the examination for a municipal policemen regardless of the fact that he knew he was indicted twice for disturbance of public peace. The defendant made the false declaration previously mentioned after he had sworn before Lucas Magno, notary public, authorized by law to administer oaths, that he would state the truth; and said false declaration made under the oath taken by the defendant, as above stated, concerned a fact of such importance that without it he would not have been admitted to said examinations prescribed for the municipal police service. The prosecution cited Sec. 3, Act No. 1697, which states that Any person who, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the Philippine Islands authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition or certificate by him subscribed is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty or perjury, and shall be punished, etc. Act No. 2169 of the Philippine Legislature, which is an Act to provide for the reorganization, government, and inspection of municipal police of the municipalities or provinces and subprovinces organized under Act No. 83, provides for the reorganization of the municipal police of the municipalities or provinces and subprovinces organized under Act No. 83. Said Act further provides that, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce and Police, the Director of Constabulary shall prepare general regulations for the good government, discipline, and inspection of the municipal police, "compliance wherewith shall be obligatory for all members of the organization." Said Act further provides for an examining board for the municipal police. It further provides that, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce and Police, the Director of Constabulary shall prepare an examination manual, prescribing, at the same time, suitable rules for the conduct of the examination. Said Act (No. 2169) also provides for the time and place for holding said examinations. Section 9 of said Act provides that: "To be eligible for examination, a candidate shall have the following requirements: . . . (6) Have no criminal record." In accordance with the requirements of said law, the Director of Constabulary prepared an examination manual, prescribing at the same time rules for conducting examinations, which examination manual was approved by the Secretary of Commerce and Police, and thereby was given the force of law. Said manual prescribed a form in blank, known as "Municipal Form No. 11," which form each applicant was required to fill, in order to be permitted to take said examination. Said application required the applicant to swear to the facts stated therein. We have, therefore, a law which authorizes the administration of an oath in the present case. During the trial of the cause the prosecuting attorney presented Exhibits B, C, and D. Exhibit B shows that one Francisco Tupasi and others, on the 8th day of February, 1911, had been arrested by an order of the justice of the peace of the municipality of Tayum, Province of Ilocos Sur, and charged with disturbing the public peace, were found guilty, and sentenced, on the 20th day of February, 1911, to be imprisoned for a period of fifteen days, and each to pay a fine of 25pesetas, and to pay the costs. Exhibit C shows that Francisco Tupasi, on the 18th day of May, 1911, had been arrested and taken before the justice of the peace of the municipality of Tayum, Province of Ilocos Sur, charged with the crime of "injurias graves," and was sentenced on the 22d day of May, 1911, to be imprisoned for a period of fifteen days and to pay a fine of 75pesetasand the costs. Exhibit D is the certificate of the clerk of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Ilocos Sur and shows that the Honorable Dionisio Chanco, on the 26th day of April, 1911, in an appealed case for disturbing the public peace, sentenced the said Francisco Tupasi and others to pay a fine of 60pesetas, in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs. Exhibit A was the sworn petition presented by the defendant for permission to take the examination. Said petition was signed by Frank Tupasi y Molina. It was shown during the trial of the cause, by the admission of the defendant himself, that he was the same person accused and sentenced in Exhibits B, C, and D. After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the Honorable Francisco Santamaria, judge, found the defendant guilty of the crime charged, and sentenced him to be imprisoned for a period of two months and to pay a fine of P100, in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of the law, and to pay the costs. The defendant was further sentenced to be disqualified from holding any public office or from giving testimony in any court in the Philippine Islands until such time as the sentence against him is reversed. From that sentence, the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court and argued that the trial court erred in holding section 3 of Act No. 1697 to be applicable in this case because its purpose was not intended to cover cases like the present. He argues that said Act was an Actonlyauthorizing the appointment of commissioners, to make official investigations, fixing their powers, for the payment of witness fees, and for the punishment of perjury in official investigations.Issue: Whether or not a violation of a regulation prescribed by an executive officer of the Government in conformity with and based upon a statute authorizing such regulation, constitutes an offense and renders the offender liable to punishment in accordance with the provisions of law.

Ruling: Yes, a violation of a regulation prescribed by an executive officer of the Government in conformity with and based upon a statute authorizing such regulation, constitutes an offense and renders the offender liable to punishment in accordance with the provisions of law. (United Statesvs.Bailey, 9 Pet., 238, 252, 254, 256; Cahavs.United States, 152 U. S., 211, 218; United Statesvs.Eaton, 144 U. S., 677.) Of course, the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid. In the very nature of things in many cases it becomes impracticable for the legislative department of the Government to provide general regulations for the various and varying details for the management of a particular department of the Government. It therefore becomes convenient for the legislative department of the Government, by law, in a most general way, to provide for the conduct, control, and management of the work of the particular department of the Government; to authorize certain persons, in charge of the management, control, and direction of the particular department, to adopt certain rules and regulations providing for the detail of the management and control of such department. Such regulations have uniformly been held to have the force of law, whenever they are found to be in consonance and in harmony with the general purposes and objects of the law. Many illustrations might be given. For instance, the Civil Service Board is given authority to examine applicants for various positions within the Government service. The law generally provides the conditions in a most general way, authorizing the chief of such Bureau to provide rules and regulations for the management of the conduct of examinations, etc. The law provides that the Collector of Customs shall examine persons who become applicant to act as captains of ships for the coastwise trade, providing at the same time that the Collector of Customs shall establish rules and regulations for such examinations. Such regulations, once established and found to be in conformity with the general purposes of the law, are just as binding upon all of the parties, as if the regulations had been written in the original law itself. (United Statesvs.Grimaud, 220 U. S., 506; Williamsonvs.United States, 207 U. S., 425; United Statesvs.United Verde Copper Co., 196 U. S., 207.)Dispositive: We are of the opinion that the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause clearly shows that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged and therefore the sentence of the lower court should be and is hereby affirmed with costs.G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992Petitioner: PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC.Respondents: HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor & Employment, and JOSE N. SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATIONPonente: GRIO-AQUINO,J.Facts of the Case: PASEI is the largest national organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA, to engaged in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino landbased workers, including domestic helpers. On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong" (p. 30,Rollo). The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers. In view of the need to establish mechanisms that willenhance the protection for Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong,the recruitment of the same by private employment agencies ishereby temporarily suspendedeffective 1 July 1991. As such, the DOLE through the facilities of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration shall take over the processing and deployment of household workers bound for Hong Kong, subject to guidelines to be issued for said purpose. In support of this policy, all DOLE Regional Directors and the Bureau of Local Employment's regional offices are likewise directed to coordinate with the POEA in maintaining a manpower pool of prospective domestic helpers to Hong Kong on a regional basis. Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1991, dated July 10, 1991, providing GUIDELINES on the Government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers. On August 1, 1991, the POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong. On September 2, 1991, the petitioner, PASEI, filed a petition for prohibition with temporary restraining order to prohibit and enjoin the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or POEA) from enforcing and implementing DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991 and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong and vesting in the DOLE, through the facilities of the POEA, the task of processing and deploying such workers. PASEI argued that: (1) the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars; (2) that the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and (3) that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register were not complied with.Issue: Whether or not an administrative rule or regulation with the purpose to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation becomes legally invalid, defective and unenforceable with the absence of power publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 saying that Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazatte unless it is otherwise provided. Ruling: Yes, an administrative rule or regulation becomes invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide: Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided. . . . (Civil Code.)Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. The Department of Labor and other government agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) daysafter announcement of their adoptionin newspapers of general circulation. (Emphasis supplied, Labor Code, as amended.)Sec. 3. Filing. (1)Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above providedunless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987). It is stated in Taada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 that: . . . Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. (p. 447.) Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. (p. 448.) The publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws. (p. 448.) For lack of proper publication, the administrative circulars in question may not be enforced and implemented.Dispositive:WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition is GRANTED. The implementation of DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991, by the public respondents is hereby SUSPENDED pending compliance with the statutory requirements of publication and filing under the aforementioned laws of the land. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-7636, June 27, 1955Petitioner: ASIA STEEL CORPORATIONRespondents: WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND ISMAEL CARBAJOSAPonente: BENGZON, J.Facts of the Case: Ismael Carbajosa, a native of Negros Occidental, came to Manila on March 31, 1951, to look for a job. On April 5, 1951, he met an aquaintance, Pablo Sesia, whose aid sought in the matter of securing employment. Sesia, who was employed in the Asia Steel Corporation as a mechanic, promised to take Carbajosa to his employer. Upon previous arrangement with Sesia, therefore, Carbajosa went to respondent's nail factory at Grace Park, Caloocan, Rizal, on April 9, 1951. Sesia introduced the claimant to Mr. Kim, in charge of the factory. During the interview, Kim told the claimant that he, (Kim) would take up the matter with the manager, and Carbajosa would know the manager's decision as soon as he (the claimant) returned. The next morning, Carbajosa came back to the factory and was told by Kim to begin working as an apprentice. It was further agreed that claimant's wage would be determined upon the arrival of materials which the manager ordered from Japan. Carbajosa assumed work on the same day, doing odd jobs under the direction of Sesia. It also appears that Kim lived in the factory. Pablo Sesia was also lodging in the factory and permission was secured from Kim in order that the Carbajosa might live in the factory with Sesia. On April 16, 1951, while working in said Corporation's steel factory in Grace Park, Manila, Carbajosa tapped the belt of a running machine to tighten it, but his hand was caught accidentally by the belt. The force of the moving belt caused claimant to lose his balance. He was dragged to the other end of the machine. His feet were smashed by the iron shaft and he was pinned under the machine itself. His two feet were so seriously injured that they had to be amputated at the Chinese General Hospital where he was rushed immediately after the mishap. Hospitalization were paid by the corporation Thereafter Carbajosa claimed for compensation. The referee, having found that he was employed as apprentice, and that the accident arose out of employment, required the Asia Steel Corporation to indemnify in the total sum of two thousand two hundred forty six pesos and forty centavos (P2, 246.40) and to pay the costs. Asia Steel Corporation filed an instant petition to review the order of the Workmen's Compensation Commission approving the award of its referee in favor of the laborer Ismael Carbajosa, against his employer Asia Steel Corporation. The instant petition for review rests on two major propositions: (1) Ismael Carbajosa was not an employee or laborer and (2) the accident was "occasioned by" his "own fault and negligence". This second issue, however, was not tendered in the Corporation's motion to dismiss, Annex B, filed with Workmen's Compensation Commission, and neither the referee nor the Commission made findings on such question of negligence. Anyway it is no excuse for the employer: it merely reduces the compensation. (Art. 1711 New Civil Code.) Nevertheless, on close examination the contention turn out to be founded on the reasoning that being a strangerin the premises -not an employee- Carbajosa had no right, and therefore was careless, to touch the machines of the factory.Issue: Whether or not the claim for compensation or indemnity under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the Labor Codes applicability requires the existence of an employer-employee relationship.Ruling: Yes, the existence of employer-employee relationship is the jurisdictional foundation without which an indemnity is unauthorized. Schneider p. 569-570.) It is often difficult of determination, because purposely made so by employers bent on evading liability under the Compensation Acts. Hence, if the object of the law is to be accomplished with a liberal construction[3], the creation of the relationship should not be adjudged strictly in accordance with technical legal rules, but rather according to the actualities and realities of industrial or business practice. A laborer is told to work for the establishment by the person-in-charge, who in turn represented he had consulted with the manager. If the by-laws of the corporation had provided that no laborer may be hired unless with the written consent of the board of directors, would it be consonant with justice to deny such laborer compensation for injuries, upon the ground of lack of written authority? If so, a loophole has thereby been created in the Workmen's Compensation Law. That is perhaps the reason why apparent authority has been considered enough, what with the principles of estoppel lending persuasive support. (Schneider op. cit. Vol. I p. 623.) A parallel situation arose in Flores et al. v. La Compaia Maritima, 32 O. Gaz. No. 21 pp. 406-407. The heirs of Graciano Paninsoro demanded compensation because he died by reason of injuries received while working on the ship "Albay" belonging to and operated by the Compaia Maritima, a corporation. The facts were: "About the last week of the month of October, 1929, the defendant's boat, Albay, dropped anchor in the port of Cebu where the captain thereof, through a contractor or agent, recruited laborers who were to board the ship for the purpose of unloading her cargo upon arrival at the next port of call, Davao, and loading cargo for various ports of call on her return trip. Among those laborers was the appellant Eusebia Flores' husband, Graciano Paninsoro, who was earning a daily wage of P1.50 including subsistence." The defendant contended on appeal that Paninsoro was not its employee. This Court held, "There is not a least shadow of a doubt that the deceased was a laborer in the legal sense. He had been recruited by order of the captain of the ship and he was engage in a task of unloading the ship's cargo at the time of the accident. There can be no dispute that this kind of work is included in the business in which the appellee is engaged. That the deceased had been recruited or engaged by a contractor is of no moment because the latter, for purposes of the law, was in turn, represented the appellee." (Flores et al. v. La Compaia Maritima, 32 O. Gaz. No. 21 pp. 406-407.) It should be observed in the above litigation that neither the board of directors nor the President nor the manager of the defendant corporation had hired the laborer Paninsoro. It was the captain of the ship, thru an agent, that employed him. Now then, in this case as the person-in-charge of the factory (Kim) hired Carbajosa, the contract of employment should be upheld. Yu Kong Tiong was the president of the corporation and Sy Te the manager; but Yu Kong Tiong was permitted actually to manage its affairs, (it being a "family" corporation) by remote control from his office in Manila thru Kim who was "in charge" of the factory in Caloocan. It also declared that Kim was allowed by Yu Kong Tiong to employ Carbajosa as apprentice. From such circumstances, the conclusion flows inevitably that Carbajosa was, at the time of the occurence, an employee of the petitioning corporation. Of course it is undeniable that as president and manager Yu Kong Tiong could legally employ, by himself, manual laborers to work in the factory. And there is nothing to prevent him from employing Carbajosa, thru his agent Kim, as the latter did. In fact it may even be held that in default of proof establishing Yu Kong Tiong's assent to the employment, inasmuch as Kim the person actually in charge of the factory represented to Carbajosa that he was authorized by the manager to engage his (Carbajosa's) services, there was apparent authority of Kim, sufficiently ample to create the relationship of employer and employee for the purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Law. "It may be stated as a general rule that an agent, who with authority express, implied, apparent or actual, employs help for the benefit of his principal's business, therby creates the relationship of employer and employee between such help and his principal." (Schneider, Workmen's Compensation (Permanent Ed.) Vol. I p. 617, citing many cases.) "It has been held: that where a driver, employed to solicit sales of beer and make delivery, was permitted to employ helpers, a helper who was injured while in the performance of his duty was entitled to compensation from brewery; that an expert, hired by a factory owner to supervise the installation of machinery, who hired assistants, paid by the owner, one of such assistants being injured while so engaged was entitled to compensation from the factory owner; that workmen hired by an agent of the company, which took over the logging work of an independent contractor, became the employees of the company." (Schneider, op. cit. p. 619.) There is further circumstance, implying ratification of the employment, that the acting manager of the corporation Atty. Mercado directed the payment by the corporation of Carbajosa's hospital expenses, amounting to P2,000.00. Mercado's explanation that he did it out of pity, was not, and could not be accepted since the Asia Steel Corporation is not a charitable institution.Dispositive: In view of the foregoing, and the petitioner not having questioned the amount of compensation, the order of the Commission, should be, as it is hereby, affirmed with costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-75038 August 23, 1993Petitioner: ELIAS VILLUGA, RENATO ABISTADO, JILL MENDOZA, ANDRES ABAD, BENJAMIN BRIZUELA, NORLITO LADIA, MARCELO AGUILAN, DAVID ORO, NELIA BRIZUELA, FLORA ESCOBIDO, JUSTILITA CABANIG, and DOMINGO SAGUITRespondents: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION) and BROAD STREET TAILORING and/or RODOLFO ZAPANTAPonente: NOCON,J.Facts of the Case: Petitioner Elias Villuga was employed as cutter in the tailoring shop owned by private respondent Rodolfo Zapanta and known as Broad Street Tailoring located at Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. As cutter, he was paid a fixed monthly salary of P840.00 and a monthly transportation allowance of P40.00. In addition to his work as cutter, Villuga was assigned the chore of distributing work to the shop's tailors or sewers when both the shop's manager and assistant manager would be absent. He saw to it that their work conformed with the pattern he had prepared and if not, he had them redone, repaired or resewn. The other petitioners were either ironers, repairmen and sewers. They were paid a fixed amount for every item ironed, repaired or sewn, regardless of the time consumed in accomplishing the task. Petitioners did not fill up any time record since they did not observe regular or fixed hours of work. They were allowed to perform their work at home especially when the volume of work, which depended on the number of job orders, could no longer be coped up with. From February 17 to 22, 1978, petitioner Villuga failed to report for work allegedly due to illness. For not properly notifying his employer, he was considered to have abandoned his work. In a complaint dated March 27, 1978, filed with the Regional Office of the Department of Labor, Villuga claimed that he was refused admittance when he reported for work after his absence, allegedly due to his active participation in the union organized by private respondent's tailors. He further claimed that he was not paid overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for work done on rest days and holidays, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay. Petitioners Renato Abistado, Jill Mendoza, Benjamin Brizuela and David Oro also claimed that they were dismissed from their employment because they joined the Philippine Social Security Labor Union (PSSLU). Petitioners Andres Abad, Norlito Ladia, Marcelo Aguilan, Nelia Brizuela, Flora Escobido, Justilita Cabaneg and Domingo Saguit claimed that they stopped working because private respondents gave them few pieces of work to do after learning of their membership with PSSLU. All the petitioners laid claims under the different labor standard laws which private respondent allegedly violated. On May 28, 1979, Labor Arbiter Ernilo V. Pealosa rendered a decision ordering the dismissal of the complaint for unfair labor practices, illegal dismissal and other money claims except petitioner Villuga's claim for 13th month pay for the years 1976, 1977 and 1980. The complaint insofar as the other eleven (11) complainants are concerned should be, as it is hereby dismissed for want of jurisdiction. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the questioned decision in a resolution dated May 12, 1986. Hence, petitioners filed this instant certioraricase on the following grounds: (1) That the respondent National Labor Relations Commission abused its discretion when it ruled that petitioner/complainant, Elias Villuga falls within the category of a managerial employee; (2)when it ruled that the herein petitioners were not dismissed by reason of their union activities; (3) when it ruled that petitioners Andres Abad, Benjamin Brizuela, Norlito Ladia, Marcelo Aguilan, David Oro, Nelia Brizuela, Flora Escobido, Justilita Cabaneg and Domingo Saguit were not employees of private respondents but were contractors, (4) when it ruled that petitioner Elias Villuga is not entitled to overtime pay and services for Sundays and Legal Holidays; and (5) when it failed to grant petitioners their respective claims under the provisions of P.D. Nos. 925, 1123 and 851.Issues:1. Whether or not a rank and file employee whose functions involve execution of approved and established policies should be regarded as a person with supervisory or managerial status and therefore be benefited under the Labor Code with what is due the said status.2. Whether or not the employers lack of power to control the employee's conduct in its work and payment of wages signifiy the absence of an employer-employee relationship which is necessary to be benefited under the Labor Code.Ruling:1. No, mere execution of approved and established policies should not be regarded as an indication that an employee has a supervisory or managerial status. Under Rule 1, Section 2(c), Book III of the Implementing Rules of Labor Code, to be a member of a managerial staff, the following elements must concur or co-exist, to wit: (1) that his primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to management policies; (2) that he customarily and regularly exercises discretion and independent judgment in the performance of his functions; (3) that he regularly and directly assists in the management of the establishment; and (4) that he does not devote his twenty per cent of his time to work other than those described above. Applying the above criteria to petitioner Elias Villuga's case, it is undisputed that his primary work or duty is to cut or prepare patterns for items to be sewn, not to lay down or implement any of the management policies, as there is a manager and an assistant manager who perform said functions. It is true that in the absence of the manager the assistant manager, he distributes and assigns work to employees but such duty, though involving discretion, is occasional and not regular or customary. He had also the authority to order the repair or resewing of defective item but such authority is part and parcel of his function as cutter to see to it that the items cut are sewn correctly lest the defective nature of the workmanship be attributed to his "poor cutting." Elias Villuga does not participate in policy-making. Rather, the functions of his position involve execution of approved and established policies. In Franklin Baker Company of the Philippines v.Trajano,it was held that employees who do not participate in policy-making but are given ready policies to execute and standard practices to observe are not managerial employees. The test of "supervisory or managerial status" depends on whether a person possesses authority that is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but one that requires use of independent judgment. In other words, the functions of the position are not managerial in nature if they only execute approved and established policies leaving little or no discretion at all whether to implement said policies or not. Consequently, the exclusion of Villuga from the benefits claimed under Article 87 (overtime pay and premium pay for holiday and rest day work), Article 94, (holiday pay), and Article 95 (service incentive leave pay) of the Labor Code, on the ground that he is a managerial employee is unwarranted. He is definitely a rank and file employee hired to perform the work of the cutter and not hired to perform supervisory or managerial functions. The fact that he is uniformly paid by the month does not exclude him from the benefits of holiday pay as held in the case ofInsular Bank of America Employees Union v.Inciong. Villuga did not abandon his work. For abandonment to constitute a valid cause for dismissal, there must be a deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. Mere absence is not sufficient, it must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore.In the case at bar, however, considering that petitioner Villuga absented himself for four (4) days without leave and without submitting a medical certificate to support his claim of illness, the imposition of a sanction is justified, but surely, not dismissal, in the light of the fact that this is petitioner's first offense. In lieu of reinstatement, petitioner Villuga should be paid separation pay where reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the long passage of time or because of the realities of the situation.But petitioner should not be granted backwages in addition to reinstatement as the same is not just and equitable under the circumstances considering that he was not entirely free from blame.2. No, Supreme Court disagree with the finding of respondent Commission that the eleven petitioners are independent contractors. A basic factor underlying the exercise of rights and the filing of claims for benefits under the Labor Code and other presidential issuances or labor legislations is the status and nature of one's employment. Whether an employer-employee relationship exist and whether such employment is managerial in character or that of a rank and file employee are primordial considerations before extending labor benefits. For an employer-employee relationship to exist, the following elements are generally considered: "(1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal and (4) the power to control the employee's conduct." Noting that the herein petitioners were oftentimes allowed to perform their work at home and were paid wages on a piece-rate basis, the respondent Commission apparently found the second and fourth elements lacking and ruled that "there is no employer-employee relationship, for it is clear that respondents are interested only in the result and not in the means and manner and how the result is obtained." Respondent Commission is in error. The mere fact that petitioners were paid on a piece-rate basis is no argument that herein petitioners were not employees. The term "wage" has been broadly defined in Article 97 of the Labor Code as remuneration or earnings, capable of being expressed in terms of money whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece or commissionbasis." The facts of this case indicate that payment by the piece is just a method of compensation and does not define the essence of therelation. The petitioners were allowed to perform their work at home does not likewise imply absence of control and supervision. The control test calls merely for the existence of a right to control the manner of doing the work, not the actual exercise of the right.In determining whether the relationship is that of employer and employee or one of an independent contractor, "each case must be determined on its own facts and all the features of the relationship are to be considered." Considering that petitioners who are either sewers, repairmen or ironer, have been in the employ of private respondent as early as 1972 or at the latest in 1976, faithfully rendering services which are desirable or necessary for the business of private respondent, and observing management's approved standards set for their respective lines of work as well as the customers' specifications, petitioners should be considered employees, not independent contractors.Independent contractors are those who exercise independent employment, contracting to do a piece of work according to their own methods and without being subjected to control of their employer except as to the result of their work. By the nature of the different phases of work in a tailoring shop where the customers' specifications must be followed to the letter, it is inconceivable that the workers therein would not be subjected to control.InRosario Brothers, Inc.v.Ople,16this Court ruled that tailors and similar workers hired in the tailoring department, although paid weekly wages on piece work basis, are employees not independent contractors. Accordingly, as regular employees, paid on a piece-rate basis, petitioners are not entitled to overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday/rest day and service incentive leave pay. Their claim for separation pay should also be defined for lack of evidence that they were in fact dismissed by private respondent. They should be paid, however, their 13th month pay under P.D. 851, since they are employees not independent contractors.Dispositive:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reasons, the assailed decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby MODIFIED by awarding in favor of petitioner Villuga, overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, service incentive leave pay and separation pay, in addition to his 13th month pay; and in favor of the rest of the petitioners, their respective 13th month pay. The case is hereby REMANDED to the National Labor Relations Commission for the computation of the claims herein-above mentioned. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-59229 August 22, 1991Petitioner: HIJOS DE F. ESCAO INC., and PIER 8 ARRASTRE AND STEVEDORING SERVICES, INC.Respondents: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF WORKINGMEN (NOWM) PSSLU-TUCP and ROLANDO VILLALOBOSPonente: FELICIANO,J.Facts of the Case: Private respondent National Organization of Workingmen (NOWM) PSSLU TUCP is a labor organization that counts among its members a majority of the laborers of petitioner Pier 8 Arrastre and Stevedoring Services. Inc. On 31 July 1978, NOWM PSSLU TUCP and about 300 stevedores filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal against Pier 8 A&S. PSSLU TUCP amended its complaint to include petitioner Hijos de F. Escano, Inc, as respondent. Manila Integrated Services, Inc. (MISI) and San Nicolas Stevedoring and Arrastre Services, Inc. (SNSASI), formerly serviced vessels docking at Pier 8 merged to form the Pier 8 Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc. Pier 8 A&S is a corporation providing arrastre and stevedoring services to vessels docked at Pier 8 of the Manila Harbor. On July 11, 1972, the Philippine Port Authority (PPA) was created pursuant to the policy of the State to implement an integrated program of port development of the entire country. PPA issued AO No. 1377 adopting the policy that one pier, one arrastre and/or stevedoring company. In 1978, Hijos de Escano, Inc., had transferred berth to Pier 16 with the approval of the PPA, Pier 8 A&S then started to encounter problems, it found business severely reduced with only Compania Maritima Vessels to service. Even if it had wanted to continue servicing the vessels of Escano at Pier 16, it was not possible because there was another company exclusively authorized to handle and render arrastre and stevedoring services at Pier 16. Because of its resulting manpower surplus, PIER 8 A&S altered the work schedule of its stevedores by rotating them. The rotation scheme was resisted by the stevedores, especially those formerly assigned to service Escao vessels. It appears that the employees formerly belonging to MISI continued to service Escao vessels in like manner that those employees formerly belonging to SNSASI continued to service Compania Maritima vessels, although MISI and SNSASI had already merged to form PIER 8 A&S The affected stevedores boycotted Pier 8 leading to their severance from employment by PIER 8 A&S on 10 August 1978. Their refusal to work continued even after they were served with a return-to-work order. The stevedores claim that since they had long been servicing Escao vessels, i.e. from the time Escao was exclusively serviced by MISI until the time MISI was merged with SNSASI to form PIER 8 A&S they should also be considered as employees of Escao. Escao disclaimed any employment relationship with the stevedores.Issue:1. Whether or not coercion on the choice of affiliation and dismissing employees in the absence of proof of indispensability, agency or at least the inclusion of a special kind of service in a business renders the employer guilty for unfair labor practice.2. Whether or not the Constitution and the Labor Code protects self-organization of employees.

Held: 1. Yes, the acts mentioned contributes to illegal labor practice. The Court affirms that there is an error in the conclusion reached by the Labor Arbiter that stevedoring is an indispensable activity of the business of Escano. Escano is engaged in inter island shipping business. It was not alleged nor has it been shown that Escano or any other shipping company is also engaged in arrastre or stevedoring services. Stevedoring is not ordinarily included in the business of transporting goods. It, being a special kind of service involves the loading unloading of cargo on or from a vessel on port. It consist in handling of cargo from the hold of the ship to the dock, in case of pier side unloading, or to a barge, in case of unloading at sea. The loading on a ship of outgoing cargo is also part of stevedoring work. On the other hand, arrastre involves the handling of cargo deposited on the wharf or between the establishment of the consignee or shipper and the ship tackle. Considering that a shipping company is not normally or customarily engaged in stevedoring and arrastre activities either for itself or other vessels, it contracts with other companies offering those services. The employees, however, of the stevedoring and/or arrastre company should not be deemed the employees of the shipping company, in the absence of any showing, that the arrastre and/or stevedoring company in fact acted as an agent only of the shipping company. No such showing was made in this case.Although the record does not show that the stevedores had submitted any evidence to fortify their claim that PIER 8 A&S is a labor only contractor, the Labor Arbiter simply conceded that claim to be factual. The Labor Arbiter added that the business of PIER 8 A&S is "desirable and indispensable in the business of Hijos de F. Escao and without [the stevedores], its vessels could not be operated." The Court is unable to agree with the conclusion reached by the Labor Arbiter, particularly that portion where the Labor Arbiter supposed stevedoring to be an indispensable part of the business of Escao. Escao is a corporation engaged in inter-island shipping business, being the operator of the Escao Shipping Lines. It was not alleged, nor has it been shown, that Escao orany other shipping companyis also engaged in Arrastre and stevedoring services. Stevedoring is not ordinarily included in the business of transporting goods, it (stevedoring) being a special kind of service which involves the loading unloading of cargo on or from a vessel on port. It consists of the handling of cargo from the hold of the ship to the dock, in case of pier-side unloading, or to a barge, in case of unloading at sea. The loading on a ship of outgoing cargo is also part of stevedoring work.8Arrastre, upon the other hand, involves the handling of cargo deposited on the wharf or between the establishment of the consignee or shipper and the ships tackle.9Considering that a shipping company is not normally or customarily engaged in stevedoring and arrastre activities either for itself or other vessels, it contracts with other companies offering those services. The employees, however, of the stevedoring and/or arrastre company should not be deemed the employees of the shipping company, in the absence of any showing, that the arrastre and/or stevedoring company in fact acted as an agent only of the shipping company. No such showing was made in this case.The Labor Arbiter believes that respondents are guilty as charged. The unfair labor practice acts of the respondents started when they came to know that the petitioners have organized themselves and affiliated with the NOWM Subsequent acts of the respondents like requiring the petitioners to disaffiliate with the NOWM and affiliate with the General Maritime Stevedores Union and later on to Independent Workers Union, requiring them to sign applications for membership therein, they were threatened and coerced, are all acts of unfair labor practices. Thereafter, the petitioners' working schedules were rotated when the respondent Hijos de F. Escao transferred to Pier 16 through the alleged approval of the Philippine Port Authority and later on the said petitioners were left without work, were all in furtherance of such unfair labor practice acts. ...2. Yes, both the Constitution and the Labor Code guarantee to the stevedores a right to self-organization. It was unlawful for PIER 8 A&S to deprive them of that right by its undue interference. The Constitution (Article III, Section 7) expressly recognizes the right of employees, whether of the public or the private sector, to form unions. Article 248 of the Labor Code provides: Art. 248.Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall beunlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice: To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self- organization; To require as a condition of employment that a person or an employee shall not join a labor organization or shall withdraw from one to which he belongs; To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization; To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizations or supporters; To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.Not only was PIER 8 A&S guilty of ULP; it was also liable for illegal dismissal. PIER 8 A&S did not obtain prior clearance from the MOLE before it dismissed the stevedores, as required by the law then in force which read:Section 1.Requirement for shutdown or dismissal. No employer may shut down his establishment or dismiss any of his employees with at least one year of service during the last two years, whether the service is broken or continuous, without prior clearance issued therefor in accordance with this Rule. Any provision in a collective bargaining agreement dispensing with the clearance requirement shall be null and void.Section 2.Shutdown or dismissal without clearance. Any shutdown or dismissal without prior clearance shall be conclusively presumed to be a termination of employment without a just cause. The Regional Director shall, in such case, order the immediate reinstatement of the employee and the payment of his wages from the time of the shutdown or dismissal until the time of reinstatement.11B.P. Blg. 130 amended the Labor Code on 4 September 1981 by abolishing the requirement of prior clearance from the MOLE but since the dismissal of the stevedores was effected prior to the promulgation of B.P. Blg. 130, PIER 8 A&S was then bound to comply with the old law. The Court, interpreting Sections 1 and 2 above quoted, has consistently held that a dismissal without said clearance shall be conclusively presumed a termination without just cause.12The record is bare of any evidence that could compel the Court to overturn the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter on this point.Dispositive:WHEREFORE, considering the absence of an employer-employee relationship between Hijos de F. Escao, Inc. and private respondents, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 28 February 1980 in NLRC Case No. RB-IV-2326-79 and the Decision of the NLRC dated 11 November 1981 are hereby MODIFIED so that only Pier 8 Arrastre & Stevedoring Services, Inc. shall be liable for reinstatement and payment of backwages. As so modified, both Decisions are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. L-59229 August 22, 1991HIJOS DE F. ESCAO INC., and PIER 8 ARRASTRE AND STEVEDORING SERVICES, INC.,petitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF WORKINGMEN (NOWM) PSSLU-TUCP and ROLANDO VILLALOBOS,respondents.Beltran, Beltran & Beltran for petitioners.Bautista, Santiago & Associates for private respondents.FELICIANO,J.:pPetitioners seek to set aside the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") dated 11 November 1981, which affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 28 February 1980.Private respondent National Organization of Workingmen ("NOWM") PSSLU-TUCP is a labor organization that counts among its members a majority of the laborers of petitioner Pier 8 Arrastre & Stevedoring Services, Inc. ("PIER 8 A&S") consisting, among others, of stevedores, dockworkers, sweepers and forklift operators (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the stevedores"). On 31 July 1978, NOWM PSSLU-TUCP and about 300 stevedores filed with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment ("MOLE") a complaint1for unfair labor practice ULP and illegal dismissal against PIER 8 A&S.On 8 September 1978, NOWM PSSLU-TUCP amended its complaint to include the monetary claims of the stevedores for overtime compensation, legal holiday pay, emergency cost of living allowance, 13th month pay, night shift differential pay, and the difference between the salaries they received and that prescribed under the minimum wage law. The complaint was also amended to implead petitioner Hijos de F. Escao, Inc. (Escao) as respondent before the MOLE.2The MOLE Director in the National Capital Region certified for compulsory arbitration only the claims for illegal dismissal and ULP Considering that NOWM PSSLU-TUCP wanted to include as well the other issues it had raised in the amended complaint, it filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied because money claims, according to the MOLE Director, should be brought against Escao and PIER 8 A&S in a separate complaint.On the basis of the position papers submitted by the parties and the annexes attached thereto, the case was considered submitted for resolution. On 28 February 1980, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision3with the following dispositive portion:WHEREFORE, consonant with the foregoing premises, the respondents Hijos de F. Escao and Pier 8 Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc. are hereby found guilty of committing acts of unfair labor practice and are ordered to jointly and severally reinstate all of the petitioners named in the amended complaint, with payment of full backwages counted from the time they were illegally dismissed which was on August 10, 1978 up to March 27, 1979, inclusive, when the petitioners admitted having received return to work notice from the respondent but refused to comply in view of the pendency of the present case, based on their individual rate at the time of their dismissal or on the minimum wage then prevailing whichever is more beneficial to them.For purposes of this decision, the Socio-Economic Analyst of this branch is hereby directed to compute the backwages of the individual petitioners as mandated herein, and to submit his report within ten 10 days from receipt hereof which shall form part of this award.SO ORDERED.Petitioners appealed to the NLRC which, however, affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter.The instant Petition for certiorari imputes grave abuse of discretion to the NLRC in upholding the finding of the Labor Arbiter that the stevedores are employees not only of PIER 8 A&S but also of Escao. Petitioners also assail that portion of the Decision which directed them to reinstate the dismissed stevedores with the obligation to pay backwages from 10 August 1978 to 27 March 1979.In his Decision, the Labor Arbiter took the view that PIER 8 A&S was a labor only contractor and held that Escao was the principal employer of the stevedores. For that reason, the Labor Arbiter adjudged the petitioners solidarily liable for payment of backwages to the stevedores as well as for reinstatement.While petitioner PIER 8 A&S does not dispute that the stevedores were its employees, petitioner Escao denies the existence of an employer-employee relationship between it and the stevedores. Escao therefore contends that liability, if any, should attach only to PIER 8 A&S.PIER 8 A&S is a corporation providing Arrastre and stevedoring services to vessels docked at Pier 8 of the Manila North Harbor. Prior to the incorporation of PIER 8 A&S two (2) stevedoring companies had been servicing vessels docking at Pier 8. One of these was the Manila Integrated Services, Inc. MISI which was servicing Escao vessels, then berthing at Pier 8. The other was the San Nicolas Stevedoring and Arrastre Services, Inc. (SNSASI) which was servicing Compania Maritima vessels. Aside, of course, from MISI and SNSASI there were individual contractors known as the "cabos" who were operating in Pier 8.On 11 July 1974, the Philippine Port Authority ("PPA") was created pursuant to the policy of the State to implement an integrated program of port development for the entire country.4Towards this end, the PPA issued Administrative Order No. 1377 specifically adopting the policy of "one pier, one Arrastre and/or stevedoring company." MISI and SNSASI merged to form the Pier 8 Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc.Sometime in June 1978, Escao had transferred berth to Pier 16 with the approval of the PPA. PIER 8 A&S then started to encounter problems; it found its business severely reduced with only Compania Maritima vessels to service. Even if it had wanted to continue servicing the vessels of Escao at Pier 16, that was simply not possible as there was another company exclusively authorized to handle and render Arrastre and stevedoring services at Pier 16.Because of its resulting manpower surplus, PIER 8 A&S altered the work schedule of its stevedores by rotating them. The rotation scheme was resisted by the stevedores, especially those formerly assigned to service Escao vessels. It appears that the employees formerly belonging to MISI continued to service Escao vessels in like manner that those employees formerly belonging to SNSASI continued to service Compania Maritima vessels, although MISI and SNSASI had already merged to form PIER 8 A&S The affected stevedores boycotted Pier 8 leading to their severance from employment by PIER 8 A&S on 10 August 1978. Their refusal to work continued even after they were served with a return-to-work order.The stevedores claim that since they had long been servicing Escao vessels, i.e. from the time Escao was exclusively serviced by MISI until the time MISI was merged with SNSASI to form PIER 8 A&S they should also be considered as employees of Escao. Escao disclaimed any employment relationship with the stevedores. In its Position Paper, Escao alleged that the stevedores are included in the payroll of PIER 8 A&S and that the SSS and Medicare contributions of the stevedores are paid by PIER 8 A&S as well.It is firmly settled that the existence or non-existence of the employer-employee relationship is commonly to be determined by examination of certain factors or aspects of that relationship. These include: (a) the manner of selection and engagement of the putative employee; (b) the mode of payment of wages; (c) the presence or absence of the power of dismissal; and (d) the presence or absence of a power to control the putative employee's conduct.5The Court notes that in finding against PIER 8 A&S and Escao the Labor Arbiter relied solely on the position paper of the parties. The record of the case is bare of evidence tending to support such allegations; what is found in the record instead are the self-serving statements from both parties. It is not clear to the Court from examination of the record which entity paid the salaries of the stevedores. While the stevedores attached to their amended complaint a list of their daily wages set forth opposite their individual names under the heading "Hijos de F. Escao Inc. and/or Pier 8 Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc.6apparently to show that they are paid for their services by either or both of petitioners, they did not submit direct evidence, e.g., copies of payrolls and remittances to the SSS and Medicare, establishing this fact. Further, the stevedores failed to substantiate their allegation that the supervisors of Escao had control over them while discharging their (stevedores') duties. On the contrary, their Position Paper submitted to the Labor Arbiter disclosed that the supervisors of Escao "merely supervised" them.The record includes letters written by the National President of NOWM PSSLU-TUC to which the stevedores belong-relating to collective bargaining and other operating matters, were all addressed to the management of PIER 8 A&S indicating that they recognized PIER 8 A&S as their employer. Specifically, in the letter dated 21 May 1977, the stevedores proposed that PIER 8 A&S recognize their union as the sole and exclusive representative of the stevedores for the purpose of collective bargaining. They also sought to submit for collective bargaining with PIER 8 A&S such other labor standard issues as wage increases, 13th month pay and vacation and sick leave pay.7The stevedores, however, now contend that PIER 8 A&S is not an independent contract but a labor only contractor. In their Amended Complaint and Position Paper, the stevedores alleged that:(1) They perform their duties or work assignments under the close supervision of supervisors of respondent Hijos de F. Escao Inc.;(2) The machineries, equipment, tools and other facilities complainants used, while in the performance of their jobs, are owned by respondent Hijos de F. Escao, Inc.;(3) The jobs they were performing from the time they were first employed, until their dismissals, are principal phases of respondent's operations; and(4) The so-called Pier 8 Arrastre & Stevedoring Services, Inc. is a mere middleman; its vital role is purely one of supplying workers to respondent Hijos de F. Escao, Inc. in short, a mere recruiting agent. Plainly, said contractor can be categorized as an agent of respondent Hijos de F. Escao, Inc. as it performs activities directly related to the principal business of said Hijos de F. Escao, Inc.Although the record does not show that the stevedores had submitted any evidence to fortify their claim that PIER 8 A&S is a labor only contractor, the Labor Arbiter simply conceded that claim to be factual. The Labor Arbiter added that the business of PIER 8 A&S is "desirable and indispensable in the business of Hijos de F. Escao and without [the stevedores], its vessels could not be operated."The Court is unable to agree with the conclusion reached by the Labor Arbiter, particularly that portion where the Labor Arbiter supposed stevedoring to be an indispensable part of the business of Escao. Escao is a corporation engaged in inter-island shipping business, being the operator of the Escao Shipping Lines. It was not alleged, nor has it been shown, that Escao orany other shipping companyis also engaged in Arrastre and stevedoring services. Stevedoring is not ordinarily included in the business of transporting goods, it (stevedoring) being a special kind of service which involves the loading unloading of cargo on or from a vessel on port. It consists of the handling of cargo from the hold of the ship to the dock, in case of pier-side unloading, or to a barge, in case of unloading at sea. The loading on a ship of outgoing cargo is also part of stevedoring work.8Arrastre, upon the other hand, involves the handling of cargo deposited on the wharf or between the establishment of the consignee or shipper and the ships tackle.9Considering that a shipping company is not normally or customarily engaged in stevedoring and arrastre activities either for itself or other vessels, it contracts with other companies offering those services. The employees, however, of the stevedoring and/or arrastre company should not be deemed the employees of the shipping company, in the absence of any showing, that the arrastre and/or stevedoring company in fact acted as an agent only of the shipping company. No such showing was made in this case.We turn next to the stevedores' contention that PIER 8 A&S is guilty of ULP. In this respect, the Labor Arbiter had found that:Now comes the issue of unfair labor practice. This Labor Arbiter believes that respondents are guilty as charged. The unfair labor practice acts of the respondents started when they came to know that the petitioners have organized themselves and affiliated with the NOWM Subsequent acts of the respondents like requiring the petitioners to disaffiliate with the NOWM and affiliate with the General Maritime Stevedores Union and later on to Independent Workers Union, requiring them to sign applications for membership therein, they were threatened and coerced, are all acts of unfair labor practices. Thereafter, the petitioners' working schedules were rotated when the respondent Hijos de F. Escao transferred to Pier 16 through the alleged approval of the Philippine Port Authority and later on the said petitioners were left without work, were all in furtherance of such unfair labor practice acts. ...10Both the Constitution and the Labor Code guarantee to the stevedores a right to self-organization. It was unlawful for PIER 8 A&S to deprive them of that right by its undue interference. The Constitution (Article III, Section 7) expressly recognizes the right of employees, whether of the public or the private sector, to form unions. Article 248 of the Labor Code provides:Art. 248.Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall beunlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice:(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self- organization;(b) To require as a condition of employment that a person or an employee shall not join a labor organization or shall withdraw from one to which he belongs;(c) To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization;(d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizations or supporters;(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.xxx xxx xxx(Emphasis supplied.)Not only was PIER 8 A&S guilty of ULP; it was also liable for illegal dismissal. PIER 8 A&S did not obtain prior clearance from the MOLE before it dismissed the stevedores, as required by the law then in force which read:Section 1.Requirement for shutdown or dismissal. No employer may shut down his establishment or dismiss any of his employees with at least one year of service during the last two years, whether the service is broken or continuous, without prior clearance issued therefor in accordance with this Rule. Any provision in a collective bargaining agreement dispensing with the clearance requirement shall be null and void.Section 2.Shutdown or dismissal without clearance. Any shutdown or dismissal without prior clearance shall be conclusively presumed to be a termination of employment without a just cause. The Regional Director shall, in such case, order the immediate reinstatement of the employee and the payment of his wages from the time of the shutdown or dismissal until the time of reinstatement.11B.P. Blg. 130 amended the Labor Code on 4 September 1981 by abolishing the requirement of prior clearance from the MOLE but since the dismissal of the stevedores was effected prior to the promulgation of B.P. Blg. 130, PIER 8 A&S was then bound to comply with the old law. The Court, interpreting Sections 1 and 2 above quoted, has consistently held that a dismissal without said clearance shall be conclusively presumed a termination without just cause.12The record is bare of any evidence that could compel the Court to overturn the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter on this point.WHEREFORE, considering the absence of an employer-employee relationship between Hijos de F. Escao, Inc. and private respondents, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 28 February 1980 in NLRC Case No. RB-IV-2326-79 and the Decision of the NLRC dated 11 November 1981 are hereby MODIFIED so that only Pier 8 Arrastre & Stevedoring Services, Inc. shall be liable for reinstatement and payment of backwages. As so modified, both Decisions are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.SO ORDERED.Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.