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What the Polls Tell Us

Levada, IU. A. (IUrii Aleksandrovich)Campbell, Alex.

Journal of Democracy, Volume 15, Number 3, July 2004, pp. 43-51 (Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press

DOI: 10.1353/jod.2004.0047

For additional information about this article

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WHAT THE POLLS TELL US

Yuri A. Levada

The 7 December 2003 parliamentary elections have sparked a heateddebate concerning the future of democracy in Russia. Some among the

countrys politicians and social scientists say that hopes for a true demo-

cratic system have been utterly dashed since the United Russia party

(created by President Vladimir Putin) cruised to a landslide win. This was

compounded by the failure of the two most Western-oriented, liberal

partiesGrigory Yavlinskys Yabloko and Boris Nemtsovs Union ofRight Forces (SPS)to meet the 5 percent threshold for parliamentary

representation. This electoral blow to democratic aspirations was hardly

surprising, and neither was Putins 14 March 2004 reelection to a second

four-year term as chief executive. The results of these elections were

consistent with sociopolitical trends that have been emerging in Russia

for at least the past decade.

Why is it proving so hard for democracy and liberal values to take

root in Russia? When one compares Russias history to those of coun-

tries where liberal democracy has been long and firmly established, one

notes that democracys advent was never quick or easy even for the

most developed Western countries. In Europe, the transition from feu-

dal autocracy to a stable democratic order took a century or more. The

path to democracy began with the spread of liberal valuesindividual-

ism, human rights, and religious toleranceamong educated elites. While

eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Western Europe and North America

saw the progress of liberal modernization and democratic institutions,

Yuri A. Levada is director of the Yuri Levada Analytical Center for

opinion polling. He was head of the state-owned but independent All-

Russian Center for Public Opinion and Market Research (VTsIOM) untilthe Russian government took it over by force in September 2003. At

that time Levada and his staff set up the private polling agency VTsIOM-

A, now known as the Levada Center. The following essay was translated

from the Russian by Alex Campbell.

Journal of Democracy Volume 15, Number 3 July 2004

Russian Democracy in Eclipse

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Journal of Democracy44

Russia lay under the sway of a rigid Czarist regime that attempted top-

down authoritarian modernization while furiously rejecting individual

freedom, human rights, and other liberal ideals. The Bolsheviks whoruled Russia for most of the twentieth century pursued the same project

in an even harsher form.

When the Bolsheviks Soviet system finally collapsed between 1989

and 1991, Russia found itself in a situation different from that of many

other former Soviet countries. Whereas the Czechs, Poles, Hungarians,

Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians had all at one time or another at

least experimented with democracy, Russians had never known any-

thing but autocracy. The last Soviet ruler, Mikhail Gorbachev, had

promoted a program ofperestroika (restructuring) that relied on certain

liberal ideas. Perestroika helped to speed the downfall of communism

and then fed a short-lived popular infatuation with democracy, but could

do little more. Post-Soviet Russias democratic order, such as it was, did

not arise from a broad political struggle involving competing elites andbroad-based popular movements. Instead, it came to light as the feeble

concoction of scheming elements at the top echelons of power. In short,

democracylike modernization earlierwas imposed on Russians from

above by the state.

During the transitional period, the institutions in charge of carrying

out reforms were those that previously had upheld the authoritarian

system. Institutions with such deep authoritarian ties could of course

not be counted on to replace the system that had created them. The

liberal reforms of the early 1990s helped to restructure the economy,

but did little to bring real democrats to power.Disappointment soon set

in, and democracys brief honeymoon ended before democratic politi-

cal forces could coalesce. A February 2004 poll of 1,600 respondents

by our survey organization indicates that 49 percent of Russians cur-rently believe that their countrys course since 1985 was artificially

imposed, while only 37 percent view the process as having been natu-

ral and unavoidable. There is a sharp divis ion among age groups: Those

under forty lean toward the latter answer, while those over forty consis-

tently choose the former response.

The Problem of Pluralism

Soviet communism nurtured a Potemkin-village simulacrum of par-

ticipation in public life: Political activities were matters of orchestrated

mass behavior. The population at large was assigned the role of a theat-

rical claque, ritually applauding as the leaders performed. This frame of

mind carried over into the transitional period. Polls found that in 1989

the most popular television program was the proceedings of the Con-

gress of Peoples Deputies. But watching democratization play out

onscreen and actually taking part in politics are different things, and

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Yuri A. Levada 45

few Russians ever did much of the latter. Perestroika had failed to pro-duce real pluralism. There were numerous political parties and blocs,

but no coherent multiparty system with solidly differentiated party ide-

ologies and interests. The main game in the political arena was the

competition between the former party of power and its successor, a con-

tention that could be traced back to the split between conservatives and

reformists in the Gorbachev-era Communist Party of the Soviet Union

(CPSU). Rivalry between the factions was at its highest in 1993 and

1996, when both sides were trying to win voter support. This left little

room for nuance on the political spectrum. Despite the existence of

rough political divisions, the main player would become the state appa-

ratus itself. Elections in Russia today are mere decorations on a

democratic system which is itself a faade.

Of all the changes made during the post-Soviet period, political plu-ralism and multiparty elections rank lowest in public esteem. In August

2003, only 29 percent of those polled considered multiparty elections a

useful exercise, while 40 percent thought that they brought more harm

than good. Given that context, it also does not come as a surprise that

there has been no serious opposition to Putins recent moves to under-

cut political pluralism. The table above shows how democracy was

perceived by Russian citizens in 2000 and 2004, that is, at the begin-

ning and at the end of Putins first term as president.

A high proportion of those surveyed, more than 30 percent in both

2000 and 2004, equate democracy with economic prosperity. For sev-

eral years, survey participants were asked whether they agreed with the

statement: First we must achieve material prosperity, and only then

can we start thinking about democracy. In 1998, 85 percent of respon-

dents agreed, up gradually but steadily from 83 percent in 1997, 79

percent in 1996, and 78 percent in 1995. In the public mind, economic

prosperity is a more important criterion for democracy than are multi-

TABLEWHAT ISTHE MEANINGOF DEMOCRACY? (1,600 RESPONDENTS)

JANUARY 2000 FEBRUARY 2004

Freedom of speech, press, religionThe countrys economic prosperity

Strict observance of the laws

Order and stability

Election of all state leaders

The ability to do as you please

Subordination of the minority to the majority

Guaranteed minority rights

Anarchy and lawlessness

Idle talk

Other

Dont know/Hard to say

37%33

29

28

15

10

6

5

6

10

1

8

44%31

24

29

18

6

3

6

6

11

1

7

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party elections and political pluralism. In February 2004, 41 percent of

the respondentsmainly elderly peoplecalled the Soviet system the

best political system, while 23 percent favored Western-style democ-racy and 20 percent said they preferred the current system. The majority

of respondents considered the era of CPSU first secretary Leonid

Brezhnev (196482) the most prosperous in Russias history.

It is a token of the instability of democracy in Russia that every

presidential election since communism fell has taken place in radically

different circumstances. In 1991 and 1996, the elections were (at least

officially) carried out under the banner of a power struggle between

CPSU holdovers and their democratic opponents. In 1991, Boris Yeltsin

assumed the role of a radical democrat, more on the basis of political

ambitions than ideological motives, but by 1996 he had already cast off

that role. By the time of the 2000 presidential elections, the commu-

nists-versus-democrats division had diminished. Now the state apparatus

itself was the leading player in democratic politics. Thus voters putan obscure ex-KGB functionary named Vladimir Putin into the chief

executives office not because of any political or ideological stance he

took, but because Yeltsin had chosen the younger man as his successor

and even stepped down to let him serve as acting president for several

months before election day.

Putin arrived at the 2004 elections with little to show for his first four

years in office. His principaland questionableachievements were

strengthening presidential power, depoliticizing Russian politics, and

asserting complete presidential control over the state administration.

He succeeded so well at all these dubious tasks, in fact, that the only

thing which could have stymied his march to reelection would have

been an unconstitutionally low turnout of less than 50 percent of regis-

tered voters. Worried about the possible effects of threatened oppositionboycotts, the Putin apparatus made huge efforts to mobilize voters, some

of whom received cut-rate groceries or even vodka after going to the

polls.

Shortly after he had come to power in 2000, Putin had proclaimed that

while he supported democracy, he believed that Russia could do better

than adopt the allegedly unruly model of Western-style democracy.

The alternative he proposed was what he called managed democracy.

In practice, this means that a strong executive atop an effective state

bureaucracy will see to it that orders are followed. Political decisions are

to be made behind the scenes. The people may vote, but those in power

will, if need be, correct the peoples choice. Parliament remains, but is

sidelined. The administrative apparatus does not represent any definite

ideology, but instead borrows pragmatically from othersright and left,

Westernizing and nationalist alikein ways that bring the government

achievements (or at least accolades), even if the whole process under-

mines pluralism by so freely coopting so many different ideas.

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Yuri A. Levada 47

Managed democracy leaves no room for more than a nominal exist-

ence of the traditional mechanisms of democratic governance. Instead,

policy is made and Russia is run by direct decrees, appointments, direc-tives, and other bureaucratic instruments. Authority belongs to the

bureaucracy; the political arena is reduced to a cipher. By nature, such

an ultimate form of bureaucracy diffuses responsibility, and allows all

blame to be put on the system. This serves Putins purposes because it

allows him to shift responsibility and so preserve his image as the presi-

dent of hope, separate from the bureaucracy and its common corruption.

Under true democracy, the leader coordinates and aggregates the in-

terests of various factions in the polity. A democratic leaders effectiveness

is tied to the ability of the various branches of government to cooperate

while remaining separate from one another, as well as to the universality

of the rule of law and safeguards for rights and liberties . Under managed

democracy, by contrast, such considerations are irrelevant. Power takes

the form of a pyramidal bureaucracy. The leaders status comes not frompersonal skills or accomplishments, but from sitting atop and command-

ing the official pyramid. It is precisely this position that allows the

leader to posture as the embodiment of popular hopes and expectations,

and perhaps to pile up high approval ratings as well.

Popular President, Infamous Officialdom

For those who voted for him on 14 March 2004, Vladimir Putin re-

mains the president of hope. Among them, 30 percent explained their

decision by saying that the president successfully governed the coun-

try for the last four years, 39 percent hoped that during the next term

he can deal with the problems Russia is facing, and 29 percent said that

there is no one else to put hopes on. Before the elections, 49 percentof the respondents felt that Putin had lived up to the expectations that

they had been entertaining since the 2000 election, 32 percent said that

he had not, and 14 percent said that they never had any expectations.

The period between the two elections saw Putins approval ratings rise

modestly: The share of respondents calling him completely trustwor-

thy went from 15 percent in 2000 to 19 percent four years later. The

percentage that was more likely than not to trust the president went

from 48 percent in 2000 to 57 percent in 2004, and the share of respon-

dents professing complete distrust fell from 24 to 16 percent.

Putins relative popularity stands in contrast to the infamy of the

bureaucracy that he heads. When asked in a February 2004 survey how

they would characterize public officials, 53 percent of the 1,600 people

who were polled answered that they are interested in their own material

prosperity and career advancement, 14 percent considered them hon-

est, but weak people, who cannot properly use authority and provide

order and stability, 13 percent said that they are a good team of politi-

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cians, who are leading the country in the right direction, and 9 percent

characterized them as honest but not competent to lead Russia out of its

economic crisis. In a related survey done in January, 30 percent of therespondents said that the level of corruption in the highest echelons of

power had increased, and only 13 percent said it had decreased.

In the years of political instability under first Gorbachev and then

Yeltsin, an embryonic pluralism, as well as relative freedom for media

and public discourse, was instrumental in propping up the democratic

faade of Russian politics. But Putin sees no such need. As has been

proven by the fate of all opposition parties since 1999, and in the De-

cember 2003 Duma elections in particular, the opposition is now merely

struggling to mark its presence in the political arena. With 300 of 450

seats, the pro-Putin United Russia party and its allies even have the

two-thirds majority needed to pass constitutional amendments.

The 2003 parliamentary elections marked the success of the adminis-

trative system that Putin spent his first term building. Devoid of its ownideology, United Russia had appropriated significant parts of its oppo-

nents political programs, taking with it part of their electorate. While

the resulting drainage of votes from either end of the political spectrum

toward United Russia may have surprised some, it was in fact the in-

tended result of Putin-engineered depoliticization, which includes

assaults on the very legitimacy of political opposition as such. Most

voters could see that United Russias triumph had depended heavily on

Putin and his administrative resources (a phrase that is sometimes

used as a euphemism for pressure from local officials as well as bribes

and threats). In January 2004, 60 percent of survey participants agreed

that United Russias success could be attributed to the presidents di-

rect support, and 17 percent of the respondents said the partys success

was a result of its administrative resources. Only 13 percent believedUnited Russias victory to be attributable to its policy platform.

The December elections also showed that Putins administrative style

meets no effective resistance from rival political forces, the media, or

public opinion. In February 2004, before the presidential elections, 77

percent of the respondents agreed that the presidential administration

should control the Dumas activities. In March, after the elections, 68

percent agreed with the statement that concentration of power in the

hands of Vladimir Putin will be good for the welfare of Russia, and 54

percent said that a government completely subordinate to the presi-

dent and his administration will be more effective. Only 32 percent of

those asked preferred a government that can independently make deci-

sions and be held responsible for its actions. Even with this support,

however, United Russia did not significantly exceed the combined vote

share won in 1999 by FatherlandAll Russia and the Unity Party of

Russia (the two formations that merged under the United Russia name

in 2001). It was only with the help of deputies elected in single-man-

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Yuri A. Levada 49

date districts, and from other parties, that United Russia received a con-

stitutional majority in the Duma.

Vladimir Zhirinovskys extreme right-wing grouping, oddly misnamedthe Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), is a holdover from the

days of the Soviet twilight, and has long played a quasi-oppositional

role. The LDPR is a completely artificial entity, which manages to gather

the potential for social protest and transform it into support for the party

of power.The LDPR acts as a useful foil, routinely taking extreme posi-

tions that allow United Russia to posture as a paragon of stability and

centrist respectability. Now, however, the ruling party has such a lock on

the Duma that Zhirinovsky and his faction seem hardly needed.

As we have seen, 2003 marked the first time in the post-Soviet era

that neither of Russias pro-Western and liberal-democratic parties could

pass the 5 percent barrier needed to gain proportional seats in the Duma.

Compared to the 1999 elections, Yabloko and the SPS each lost about

half its electorate. Behind this debacle lay tactical, organizational, andpolitical mistakes, including the parties failure to join forces during

the campaign. But the crisis of Russian political pluralism is by no

means limited to this particular failure: The two democratic parties had

no realistic prospects of gaining enough seats to affect the Dumas char-

acter, nor would less bungling by party leaders have changed the overall

political situation in any decisive way.

No Place for Democrats?

In Vladimir Putins Russia today, there is no place for democrats.

While Yeltsin needed the backing and advice of prominent democrats

to push through his reforms, Putins government needs professionals,

functionaries, and bureaucrats, not charismatic democratic leaders whostand for liberal ideas and liberal ideals. S imilarly, Putin does not need

to appeal to the world by making democratic proclamations; unlike

Yeltsin in the early 1990s, Putin does not need to make promises of

greater democracy in order to attract foreign businesses or preserve

Russias status as a top player in world affairs. Under his administra-

tion, all the country needs are the pragmatic efforts of the president

and his professional lieutenants.

During the period of emotional democracy that lasted from 1989

to 1992, the young and the better educated were the main supporters of

democratic ideals. A decade later, in the 2003 elections, 46 percent of

first-time voters (18 to 22 years old), cast their ballots in support of

United Russia, and 20 percent chose the LDPR. Only 6 percent voted for

Yabloko and 5 percent for the SPS. A postelection survey of 1,600

respondents revealed that among those with at least one university de-

gree, 35 percent voted for United Russia; 12 percent for Motherland; 9

percent for Yabloko and LDPR, respectively; and 8 percent for SPS. In

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fact, the democratic parties had already lost their following by the sec-

ond half of the 1990s, when their paths split and the SPS began to set

itself up as Putins democratic counselor while Yabloko lapsed intobootless opposition, never managing to create a support base for its

agenda. Voters who wanted democratic reform thus faced an unsatisfy-

ing choice between political irrelevance (Yabloko) and tutelage to

presidential power (SPS). The collapse of support for these two parties

should not be surprising.

The liberal-democratic parties lost much of their support in the 1999

and 2003 elections: Polling data indicate that only 27 percent of the

SPSs 1999 voters stuck with that party in 2003, while 19 percent pre-

ferred United Russia, and 7 percent crossed over to Yabloko, 6 percent

to the Pensioners Party, and 5 percent to Motherland. Another 3 per-

cent voted for the LDPR, 1 percent voted against all, and the remainder

did not take part in the elections. Of those who voted for Yabloko in

1999, 28 percent chose the same party in 2003, while 16 percent insteadvoted for United Russia, 11 percent for Motherland, and 5 percent for

SPS and LDPR, respectively. Twelve percent went to smaller parties, 3

percent voted against all, and 20 percent did not participate in the

elections. The LDPR and the Communist Party fared better, retaining 41

and 39 percent of their voters, respectively.

Perhaps thanks to Yeltsins skillful maneuvering, many voters al-

ready saw Vladimir Putin as Russias democratic leader at the time of

the 2000 presidential election. Soon after he had been elected for the

first time, 29 percent considered him the leader of the countrys demo-

cratic forces. In a May 2000 poll of 1,600 respondents, only 16 percent

saw Yablokos Grigory Yavlinsky as the leading democrat, and only 12

percent attributed that role to Sergei Kirienko, who was then the leader

of the SPS. During the March 2004 presidential election, 47 percent ofthose who had voted for SPS in the December 2003 parliamentary elec-

tions, and 28 percent of those who had voted for Yabloko, cast their

ballots in support of Putin. A mere 11 percent of SPSs voters decided to

support the democratic candidate, Irina Khakamada. The obvious con-

fusion that seized the leaders of the two democratic parties when the

election results were made public supports the notion that what has

happened in Russia is not just a temporary electoral setback for liberal

democrats, but rather is the sign of a complex political and moral crisis

that is gripping Russias democratic forces as they exist today.

The December 2003 parliamentary elections triggered a lively de-

bateamong scholars, politicians, and the public at largeon the fate

of liberal values and democratic mechanisms in Russian politics. In a

February 2004 opinion survey that asked respondents to assess the pros-

pects of democracy in Russia in light of the December elections, 24

percent agreed that Yabloko and SPS are doomed, but it is possible

that some new democratic party or movement will emerge and win suf-

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Yuri A. Levada 51

ficient support, while 19 percent argued that in several years, both

these democratic parties will get stronger and assume their proper place

in the countrys political life. Thirteen percent of the respondents agreedthat the real protector of democracy in Russia is President Vladimir

Putin, and that is why no oppositionist should consider himself a demo-

crat. Even worse, 10 percent agreed that democracy is alien to the

Russian model of political life, and 6 percent said that democracy

and democrats in Russia are over and done with. Twenty-eight percent

responded either that it was hard to say or that they did not know what

to think about the countrys prospects for democracy.

It is worth noting that few respondents saw no prospects for democ-

racy in their country, and that the number inclined to associate Russian

democracy with Putin was similarly small. While almost a quarter of

those polled hoped for the emergence of a new democratic party, it is

doubtful that they will see their hopes fulfilled anytime soon. At the

time of this writing in early May 2004, there are only two efforts tocreate democratic organizations different from the old democratic

parties. These are former presidential candidate Irina Khakamadas Free

Russia, and the Committee 2008: Free Choice, led by former world

chess champion Gary Kasparov. These movements are searching for

popular support and a political venue so that they can mount political

opposition to Putins brand of bureaucratic authoritarianism.

Ultimately, Russian democracys fate will be determined less by lead-

ers skills or the scale of mass support than by the condition of the countrys

political space itself. It remains to be seen whether Putins machine can

sustain its bureaucratic grip on Russian political life indefinitely. Per-

haps the president and his apparatus will eventually prove unequal to the

internal and external challenges facing the countrychallenges that re-

main huge despite all efforts at management by the masters of manageddemocracyand Putin will realize the limitations of the system that he

has created. Perhaps a new opening and an opposition revival could en-

sue. Surely then the embers of the democratic idea could begin stirring to

renewed life beneath the ashes of managed democracy.

NOTE

All the opinion surveys quoted in this article that date from before September2003 were carried out on the basis of representative sampling by the All-RussianCenter for Public Opinion and Market Research (VTsIOM). Polls dating fromanywhere in the period between September 2003 and March 2004 were carried outby the Analytical Service VTsIOM (VTsIOM-A), and after March 2004 by the YuriLevada Analytical Center (for more information, see www.levada.ru).

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