1.5 - szalai, erzsébet - elites and systematic change in hungary (en)

7/30/2019 1.5 - Szalai, Erzsbet - Elites and Systematic Change in Hungary (EN)

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Elites and Systematic Change in Hungary

Elites and Systematic Change in Hungary

by Erzsbet Szalai

Source:

PRAXIS International (PRAXIS International), issue: 1+2 / 1990, pages: 74-79, on www.ceeol.com.
http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/


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ELITES AND SYSTEMATIC CHANGEIN HUNGARYErzsebet Szalai

Radical political changes have been launched essentially by a new elite whichemerged out of the Kadarist institutions in Hungary. They are the famous beatgeneration, the "great generation" - mostly those who are in their forties today- who already occupied the lower and medium levels of the different (state, partyand enterprise) bureaucracies before May 1988. After May 1988 they swiftlyinvaded the power positions in politics and economics. Important decision-makingpositions had already been in their hands; many of them already occupied significantbureaucratic, banking, financial and managerial positions. They have completedthe process of taking power by the removal of the old elite, the advocates of order.Let us call them subsequently traditional new elites.The traditional new elites are characterized by liberalism, especially by anattraction to the market, but their need for democracy does not go much beyond

the support of the freedom of entrepreneurs and managers. Yet as a result of theirsocialization during the Kadar era, the ability of informal bargaining has beeninternalized by them and it significantly weakens or at least may weaken the strengthof their market orientation. In this respect the members of the traditional new eliteare heroes of dual linkages.I. Struggle and movementThe traditional new elite can be regarded as the starter engine of the radicalpolitical movements in Hungary. Yet at the same time still other political eliteshave emerged from the "great generation", primarily through the mediation ofthe new parties, and they also demand their share of power.Those members of the traditional new elite who are in spectacular power position

for the time being have been mostly in their post for a short time. They are notsignificantly responsible for the present economic crisis. Yet probably part of themwill have to leave their post now after the recent elections. This is the directionof the effect of the power aspirations and victory of the new political elite, andalso of the sharpening struggle inside the traditional new elite whereby a scapegoatis sought because of growing economic tensions.The old party bureaucracy has disintegrated, and there have been significantchanges of personnel within the state bureaucracy. The exact direction of the

movement of "cadres" will only be possible to examine with precise empiricalresearch. My suspicion now however is that the individuals quitting the old partyand state bureaucracy orient themselves primarily towards the 'business sphere",and overwhelmingly towards the growing banking sphere within it. Though thePraxis International 10:1/2 April & July 1990 0260-8448 $2. 00


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Praxis International 75members of the old elite can thus also be found among new business elites, theirgreat majority belong to the traditional new elite. In other words, the generallyaccepted view that the old fuling class now converts its erstwhile political powerinto economic power is not a really adequate description of reality according tomy experience and opinion. The leading forces of the old ruling elite now mainlyretire. Those who convert are already the members of a new elite.11. The new political eliteDuring the period prior to the elections the most important two parties of theHungarian oppositionwere theAlliance ofFreeDemocrats and the Hungarian Democratic Forum. The other oppositionparties were grouped around them. It could be seenthat their leading forces would ultimately become part of the new ruling elite.It was the Alliance of Free Democrats which fought most radically for theremoval of the old elite; in the meantime it dissociated itself from the process of"spontaneous" privatization with delay and irresolution. By and large it has offeredalliance to the traditional new elite in power after the removal of the old ruling elite.Initially the Hungarian Democratic Forum was less radical in the struggle againstthe leading forces of the old elite; in the meantime it was opposed to the localoligarchies and the present process of privatization in favor of a more democratic,

open and just reform of ownership. This party has also been looking for theopportunities of developing ties with the traditional new elite.The different motivations of the two big parties mainly derived from differencesin social composition. With some simplification the Alliance of Free Democratsconsists of two elements. Partly it consists of a tough politically and professionallyauthentic leadership brought together during the years of underground activities.The other part consists of the rather undifferentiated majority just beginning todevelop political skills and consciousness (who have joined the Free Democratsnot because of the liberalism of their programme but primarily because of theirradicalism against the old elite). The leading force of the Free Democrats consistsof the Budapest intelligentsia, used to independence and more desirous of beingthe conscience of the nation than of exercising power.I consider the composition of the Democratic Forum more homogeneous. Itstrunk is constituted by the Christian middle class of the interwar period. This isthe social stratum which directly felt the insolence of the local oligarchies andof the bureaucracies of large enterprises, and for whom these middle-level powerpositions are the easiest to reach. This is why its aggression was primarily directedagainst middle-level authorities.While last year the Hungarian Democratic Forum did not exclude the possibilityof entering into a coalition with the state party, the Alliance of Free Democratssharply dissociated themselves from it. At the October congress of the HungarianSocialist Workers Party (HSWP) the state party was dissolved and the politicalweight of the two successor parties significantly reduced. Subsequently the Allianceof Free Democrats launched an even stronger anti-communist campaign, and theplebiscite held in November promoted its popularity by leaps and bounds whilethe attraction of the Democratic Forum calling for a boycott of the plebiscite droppedsignificantly.

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76 Praxis InternationalThe success of the Free Democrats was due to their advocating a radical breakwith the existing system. They succeeded in condensing their program into threeeasily understandable and popular slogans, namely that the ineffective HSWP shouldbe squeezed out of the workplace, should give an account of its wealth, and thatthe Workers' Guard be dissolved. Naming the communists as the main culpritsfor Hungary's present ills was significant. The introduction of this approach hada great role even earlier, particularly in the breaking up of the HSWP (the stateparty). In fact "communists" was a term which totally covered the actual powerand ideological groups within the ruling elite. The major part of the fuling elitesfled headlong from this stigma, and quite understandably so. The function of callingsomebody communist changed with the dissolution of the state party. From thattime onwards the communists' opponents were rather facing a scarecrow, but an

effective one from the angle of short term tactical considerations. Such an imageof the enemy could be maintained with its help; the number of former communistsis quite big, as the informal system of the Kadar era had embraced a large partof society, and a large part of the social actors struck their separate bargains withthe authorities at various levels. Indeed, calling the enemy communist was suitablefor getting separated from the past without having to draw the consequences uponpersonal existence.Frightened by the success of the Free Democrats, the Democratic Forum changedtactics. They abandoned the Hungarian Socialist Party and declared that they werenot prepared to enter into coalition with them after the elections. They started astrong anti-communist campaign in emulation of the Free Democrats and thissubsequently became the main field of competition between the two parties.At the first turn of the spring elections, society voted for the removal of theold ruling elite: the HSWP did not get into Parliament, and it was quite clear thatthe HSWP would be forced into the opposition. The next fortnight witnessed aperiod of sharp struggle between the two victorious opposition parties. Thedifferences in tactics between the two parties was significant although the parties'programs were in fact quite similar. The Democratic Forum promised slow progressand security. In contrast, the Free Democrats continued their earlier tactics bypromising immediate radical changes. It could also have some significance thatthe Democratic Forum, though they did not emphasize it, stood for the principleof self-government and workers' ownership, whereas the Free Democrats advocatedthe necessity of rapid privatization and the predominance of private ownership.Perhaps it was of decisive significance from the angle of social psychology thatthe Democratic Forum could project a fatherly figure, whereas the Free Democratscould not. (The fITst question of the November plebiscite was whether the populationshould directly elect the President of the Republic. The votes cast indicated thata large part of the population required a "father." The Free Democrats eitherdid not draw the necessary conclusion, or recognized but did not want to incorporateit into their election campaign.)Ultimately it can be stated with some simplification that society showed whatit did not want in the plebiscite and at the first turn of the elections; it then madeits choice between the alternatives offered by the two big opposition parties atthe second turn. Once again I would like to stress that a choice was notmade betweenthe written programmes elaborated by experts, but instead between the attitudes


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Praxis International 77radiating from the behaviour of the party leaders. Tactics and not written programsproved key. The majority of voters - perhaps involuntarily - voted for a continuation of petit bourgeois development as started in the Kadar regime and not forrapid and radical westernization. It proved to be a mistake by the Free Democratsto continue to insist that the past 45 years had been a total failure and blind alley,a historical moment to be discarded and radically broken with. In fact there mayhave been many people who could accept this view on a rational level but notemotionally. In particular, this is true of the stratum which was already becomingpetit bourgeois and middle class during the Kadar period with the emergence andexpansion of a second economy. Even though it could not accomplish spectacularmaterial success, it could emotionally experience the total rejection of the past45 years as a challenge to its achievements. Even if it knew that continued slowgrowth could not be safeguarded under the existing system, it thought that a rapidslip down might also come. In their case I presume the occurrence of a commonlyknown psychological phenomenon: uncertainty at the decisive moment. As thefinal hour approached uncertainty grew as to what a radically new future wouldbring. It is one thing to recognize that something has come to an end and thatsomething entirely new would have to be done, and it is another thing to decidefor the commencement of that brand new thing from the very next day onwards.Hence the victory of the Democratic Forum which promised stability. I cannotget rid of the suspicion that the tactics of the Free Democrats were faulty duringthe final phase of the election campaign because their relationship to authority wasambivalent and because many of them did not unambiguously want victory. Inthe background there were attitudes developed during the long period of theirpolitical puberty. The most important of these attitudes was their strong identificationwith an appositional role and their instinctive insistence upon i tIll. Systemic Change?The Kadar era played an enormous role in preparing changes in East Europe andHungary, and it is of decisive significance from the angle of future developmentsas well.The extensive second economy made possible the acquisition of certain marketskills by broad strata of the society. A new elite (the traditional new elite) couldalso develop within the institutions of the old ruling elite, which - sensing thecrisis of the system - did not want to rule in the old manner. During the Kadarera, the germs of a new political elite organizing itself outside the framework oflegal institutions could be born. All this was simultaneously the symptom and catalyst

of the disintegration of the system.On the other hand however, as was already mentioned, a system of informalbargains extended over the entire Kadarist regime. The second economy was closelylinked to the first one in all respects. To give an example: the actors of the secondeconomy had to be on good terms with the bureaucrats of large enterprises supplyingthe needed material, and it was also useful to have good contacts with the statebureaucrats who supplied information. Consequently not only did market skillsdevelop in the actors of the second economy, but also bargaining and lobby skillsas well, and they have become internalized.


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78 Praxis InternationalAs has been mentioned, the characteristics of the traditional new elites are alsodetermined by this dual situation. As they were educated by the old ruling elite,they are heroes of a double attachment to democracy and the market. They arestrongly attached to bargains conducted in the "back room" , and they' have evenbuilt a refined informal network among themselves. As they have no cathartic

experiences, their social empathy is underdeveloped and they almost openly state thatthe idea of a society organized from below is ridiculous idealism. Interestingly, theleading forces of the new political elite are not free from these characteristics either.In all probability there will be an alliance between that part of the traditionalnew elite which would be able to hold on to power and the new political elite (theleaders of the parliamentary parties and advisers). At present it cannot be foreseen how lasting this alliance might prove to be, as it cannot be foreseen whetherthe present structure of the new political elite will withstand the test of time. Despitethese uncertain elements the basic question remains: will there be a real systemicchange affecting the basic structures and deep layers of the society after the changeof the political elite? In my view real change can be realized only if we succeedin creatively building upon the positive elements of the organic process of development that had taken place during the Kadar period, while the negative componentsof this era gradually fade away. In fact the basic problem is: are we going to overcome the old, while finding an organic path for development? In the words ofGyorgy Kondad, it requires both continuity and radicalism. Therefore I wouldhave considered a broad coalition between the Democratic Forum and the FreeDemocrats desirable.Let us look at present conditions in Hungary. The overcentralized, monopolizedstructure of large enterprises constitutes the basis of the informal, non-market bargaining mechanisms which intertwine economy and society. The managers of largeenterprises have significant economic power, and their ownership rights have grownsubstantially during the past two years. This is basically because of the disintegrationof the state party and the considerable weakening of the state bureaucracy. Theumbilical cordbetween state bureaucracy and the large enterpriseshas been weakened,but its place has been taken by relations between the sphere of large enterprises andthe large commercial banks which strongly depend upon state bureaucracy. And theserelations frightfully resemble the informal, non-market bargaining relations thatexisted and still exist with the state bureaucracy. Their basis is the growing interpenetration of ownership in the banking sphere and large enterprises.As far as the future is concerned, I can see two contradictory tendencies. Theessence of the first one is that the leading forces of the new political system willnot be able to overcome the problem of large enterprises with their tremendousarray of power, and the political order will become captive to the sphere oflarge enterprises, as was the case with the old ruling elite. The overcentralizedstructure of large enterprises would remain, together with a system of informal,separate bargains; it might also be partially dismantled, and hence the basicallyfeudal system of Estates would reemerge, only it would have a new and modernwestern face. It would not exclude the possibility of the evolution ofmodern enclaveswith the contribution of Western capital within the economy; however, theirexistence and survival would be uncertain in an environment which lags behindmodern developments.


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Praxis International 79The other possible trend is the dissolution of the overcentralized structure oflarge enterprises, the key issue of which is the radical reform of ownership inthe so-called state sphere. A sharp struggle would ensue - it has already begun

- between foreign capital, the already existing, though as yet still developing nationalbourgeoisie, workers' communities, and local self-governments. This struggle willmanifest itself in the political structure as well, as has already been the case tosome extent. The parties advocating a popular national ideology support ratherthe evolution of the national bourgeoisie, whereas those putting the liberal ideason their banner prefer the import of foreign capital. (It can neither be excludedthat economic interests and power will appear as political power nor that the newpolitical elite will convert part of their political power into economic power.)There will only be real market competition in the economy (and the system ofinformal bargaining eliminated) if the present concentration of economic poweris significantly weakened and no new significant economic concentration is allowedto appear, or at least if forces limiting economic concentration are present. Thesupreme condition of all this is the acquisition of ownership position by the broadestpossible strata, including the development ofworkers' ownership within a certainsphere. Therefore the property reform has to be not only radical but also democratic.In other words, it is desirable to have a large number of actors setting out in

competition for ownership, so that they may start with equal economic opportunitiesas far as possible; only then will competition be decided by the market.The development of a broad layer of owners and the evolution of real marketcompetition are indispensable because of the functioning of the modern economy.These are also preconditions for avoiding the explosion of social tensions. On theother hand these are preconditions for real political democracy in the long run.Whether one or the other of these tendencies dominates the future depends ona number of factors. But the most important of them all is that the new fulingelite, despite the written programme of the victorious party, will not launch ademocratic reform of ownership because of its specific attitude as described earlier.Thus the basic issue is whether there will be social pressure coming from below,a social movement organized independently of parties which forces a democraticreform of ownership. There are certain indications of this trend already. On theother hand the question remains of whether there would be such authentic politicalforces which can hold this movement within the framework of reality and wouldnot utilize it for the demagogic purposes of the extreme left or right. This is reallythe broader question of whether there will be social movements organizedindependently of parties. In my view the evolving party structure will not be ableto correctly reflect the articulation of social interests, views and aspirations withoutthe development of such independent social movements.


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POST-COMMUNTHE CA E

Gyorgy BenceVaclav Ravel's great essay The Power of the Powerless, written in the lateseventies, included a small parable about the butcher who had to put a sign intothe shopwindow, between the sausages and the meat: Long Live the Great Socialist

Revolution ofOctober! The story illustrated how the average citizen who just wantedto make a living became involved in the Great Lie.But there was always an alternative, according to Havel. It was completely withinour power to renounce the game. Ifwe decided not to lie anymore, we could attainthe state of "living in the truth".I must admit that back then, in the seventies, I felt that Havel was demandingtoo much of the poor butcher. Was it not enough if he played the game strictlyaccording to the rules set down by his Communist bosses? If he did nothing morethan he was absolutely required to do?My former scepticism with regard to Ravel's position has evaporated duringthe first months of his presidency. It turned out that he did not draw vindictiveconclusions from his exalted demand of "living in the truth" , a demand to whichonly exceptional people, like Havel himself, could live up. This lofty ideal hasbeen, in fact, a source of tolerance and forgiveness for Havel and his friends. 1

Communism pressed the citizen into active complicity with the system, unless hewas prepared to drop out of normal civil existence. Therefore, it is wrong tocondemn him simply because he t ried to survive. The former dissidents shouldbe the first to understand this, and Havel in fact did.Havel's position implies either a blanket amnesty for representatives of theprevious regime, or strict adherence to due process and the rule of law, even incases involving Communist bosses. According to this position, former leaders shouldnot be indicted simply because they filled high posts in the party or government.Indictments should be based on specific charges, substantiated by evidence, noton membership or rank.There is another story we should keep in mind when speaking of political justice

in post-communist societies, a real one we can see with our own eyes. In the greatdays of the Romanian uprising, the enraged crowd clamored for the blood of theoppressors. Death to the tyrant! Death to the Securitate men! And summary justicewas done, as we watched on television.These are the two extremes defining the limits of political justice in post

communist Eastern Europe. What is going to emerge as a more regular patternwill most likely fall between these two extremes. In Czechoslovakia, the fate offormer Communist leaders will not depend solely on the high morality of Havel.Praxis International 10:1/2 April & July 1990 0260-8448 $2.00

1.5 - szalai, erzsébet - elites and systematic change in hungary (en)

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