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DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES IN THE U.S. FILM AND

PHOTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT INDUSTRIES:

DISRUPTION OR DIVERSIFICATION?

Submitted to the Industry Studies Association annual conference 2012, Pittsburgh.

Disruptive Technologies in the U.S. Film and Photographic Equipment

Industry: Disruption or Diversification?

John Clarry, Rutgers University

Innovation is an essential process of competition in many industries, but different types of innovation can

have distinct effects mediated by industry structures. Normal or sustaining innovation focuses on current

customers, while disruptive innovation can create new technologies and customer segments. The concept

of disruptive technology does not explain when or why there is disruption, but requires more industry and

corporate research to discover patterns of market change or strategic responses. This paper examines the

recent history of two sectors of the photographic equipment industry, which exhibit different rates and

processes of change in response to the adoption of digital cameras over film cameras. Industry factors of

market structure concentration and related diversification strategies are emphasized as moderating

variables to explain the different patterns of disruptive and sustaining innovations. A resource based

strategy of sustainable innovation explains disruptive technologies more than static industry structures.

Key words: disruptive technologies; innovation; digital photography; diversification strategies

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Innovation is an essential competitive process in many industries, but there are also different types of

innovation with distinct consequences. Normal or “incremental” innovation may be oriented to needs of

existing customers, and has been characterized as “sustaining” innovation based on current technologies;

but such sustaining strategies with established technologies may not be effective in sustaining long-term

growth or returns. By contrast, “disruptive” or radical innovation is not oriented to current customers, but

can develop new technologies and entrepreneurial opportunities for customers that disrupt the existing

market structures of industries (Christensen, 2000; Dyer et al., 2011; Anthony et al., 2008). Hence, an

innovator’s dilemma or paradox is whether to focus on current customers or create inferior new products.

The concepts of “disruptive” innovation and technologies have challenged the theories of new product

development and innovation management; but the validity and applicability of disruptive concepts raises

new research questions. What makes a new technology “disruptive”, and when do disruptive innovations

actually disrupt markets (Adner, 2002; Schmidt and Druehl, 2008; Govindarajan et al., 2006)? How can

firms with older technologies respond to new technology threats (Adner and Snow, 2010), or adapt their

strategies to a world of constant disruption and continuous innovation (Hagel et al., 2008)? How are the

processes and effects of disruptive innovation affected by corporate level strategies to diversify revenue

streams or create new industry segments that “cannibalize” their existing markets (Lange et al., 2009)?

In this paper, we will address some of these questions of disruptive technologies and innovations in more

specific industry contexts. We contend that industry settings and market structures matter in analyzing the

potential and competitive strategies of disruptive innovation; many examples of disruptive technologies

cited by Christensen (2000) and others are from research oriented industries, where technological change

is normal, and even intentional. The transition from film to digital photography is the first industry cited

by Christensen (2000: xxv) as an example of disruption; cases about the problems of Eastman Kodak are

also mentioned as disruptive (Gavetti et al., 2004). However, in this paper, we compare two segments of

the photographic equipment industry to analyze the variations in patterns, timing, and direction of digital

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technology disruptions; the motion picture sector was slower to adopt or respond to digital cameras than

the professional photography sector. We conclude that industry factors and diversification strategies have

affected the forms and responses to disruptive technologies, thus moderating the processes of disruption.

Innovation and Disruptive Technologies

Innovation can represent normal or incremental product development to sustain established customers, or

radical and “disruptive” technologies that attract new customers or create new market segments (Yu and

Hang, 2011; 2010). The definition of a disruptive technology or innovation can vary by authors, but the

distinction from sustaining technologies that just add new features is one indication of radical innovation.

As defined by Christensen (2000; 2006), disruptive technologies correspond to new products that might

be simpler, smaller, less complicated, or better performing on some marketing criteria. However, some

new disruptive technology products, like disk drives or welding equipment, are initially sold to smaller

market niches, or novel and emerging markets of “non-customers” that have been ignored or neglected.

The initial quality of disruptive technologies may be quite different from and inferior to existing products,

and hence be less appealing to established customers or even to conventional stock market investors. New

products that are disruptive may also be more expensive to produce initially, at least until production is

scaled up when or if the disruptive innovations are diffused and accepted by larger market segments. But

in the uncertain transition, disruptive innovations can be risky or unprofitable investments for many firms.

There are also questions of how disruptive technologies are diffused throughout existing product markets.

How can a product performance be defined to appeal to a broader or newer customer base? If disruption is

successful, the established firm’s sustaining technologies may be rendered inferior or obsolete, but the big

companies that have economies of scale may still be able to compete and survive with older technologies.

Nonetheless, the processes of disruptive innovation may require new management or leadership (Tellis,

2006; Sood and Tellis, 2011), or a development of new corporate resources to support new technologies.

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Technological Disruption or Diversification?

The imagery of technological disruption is powerful, but may be difficult to measure or explain without

reference to other strategic and industry variables. The potential for disruption may occur if the product

technologies are simpler, smaller, cheaper to produce, more convenient to use, and possibly even better

performing; but initially, disruptive technologies may be associated with inferior products that don’t meet

the needs or demand of existing customers for traditional products. Hence, there are risks in offering any

disruptive technologies that may lack a current demand or be rejected by existing distribution channels. A

management problem is how to define valid metrics that evaluate the market potential for any disruptive

technologies, such as online music media (Ganguly et al., 2010), or timing decisions (Govindarajan et al).

Christensen (2006) and his colleagues (Dyer et al., 2011) tend to use unique or historical cases of good

companies that failed to stay on top of the leading positions in their industries. Examples from the disk

drive, electronic, chemical, and retail service industries were cited as illustrations of the general pattern of

leading incumbent firms which were oriented to “sustaining” technologies that served existing customers.

However, the competitive situation of many firms in these industries may be threatened with disruption,

regardless of their aggressive innovation strategies or technological trajectories. Hence, the entire set of

incumbent firms in an industry can be threatened by innovations from outside the boundaries of their own

current industry structure, or be trying to reduce their mutual risks by investing in continuous innovation

that will deliberately threaten to disrupt or “cannibalize” their current market structures and positions.

Some leading firms in technologically oriented industries may also be affected by the corporate level

strategies of diversification into multiple businesses, whether related or not. For example, Lange et al.

(2009) found that corporate parents can endorse or support disruptive technologies into new industries,

such as personal computers, yet fail to support or promote their own offspring sufficiently. The parent

firm may have a portfolio of new and mature businesses with different cash flow qualities; if the profits

from a mature business are invested into a new emerging business, the corporate diversification may

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create a disruptive technology for their offspring that is not adequately supported, but “cannibalizes” the

cash flows from their mature business. Hence, disruption is a paradoxical effect of such diversification.

P1. Diversified firms are more likely to create disruptive technologies than are stand-alone firms.

Another alternative explanation is that innovative firms in certain industries deliberately and intentionally

disrupt markets by continuous new product development, which anticipates strategic imitation and their

eroding effects. Some industries, like electronics, may have the inherent technological potential and cost

necessity to diversify into related markets. The leading firms in such R&D oriented industries tend to

have high fixed costs, and incentives to diversify into new products by constant innovation. Hence, the

managers of innovative firms may be motivated to identify revenue gaps and harness disruptive potential

disruptive technologies and opportunities (Anthony et al., 2008). Hence, disruption is a firm’s leverage.

P2. Disruption is a normal process of new product development in industries with high R&D spending.

The choice of industry to analyze is important to study the potential strategies and trajectories of any

disruptive technologies. There have been previous studies of the transition to digital technologies in the

photographic industry, but some disagreement on the processes and responses to potential disruption. For

example, many observers have concluded that Eastman Kodak was a victim of disruptive technologies in

their film camera business, even though the company developed and sold digital cameras (Gavetti et al.,

2004; Nohria et al., 2002). Other camera and imaging companies besides Kodak have been challenged by

disruptive digital technologies, but managed to respond and survive, or to diversify into related markets.

The Swedish high-end camera firm “Hasselblad” also struggled to adapt to the same disruptive threats of

emerging digital technologies, but had limited resources and capabilities to respond effectively (e.g.

Sandstrom, 2011; Sandstrom et al., 2009). Nonetheless, in industries with many product segments and

constant new product innovations as normal, we would expect variations in the responses and outcomes.

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A Case Study of the Photographic Equipment Industry

Industry matters in the study of disruptive technologies; but the exact delineation, scope, structure and

boundaries of industries may be difficult to define. The more technologically complex or dynamic an

industry is, the more challenging and longitudinal should be the research methodology. In this paper, we

focus on the “photographic equipment industry”, which can be defined as comprising the total sales of

cameras, camcorders, photographic equipment, optical instruments and accessories (Datamonitor, 2010).

A broader definition includes related products and retail channels, but we focus on equipment suppliers.

When photographic processes were based on traditional analog technologies and chemically developed

films, earlier photo equipment suppliers relied on related chemical or electronic suppliers for processing

materials in the U.S. and Europe (e.g. Jenkins, 1975). However, as digital imaging technologies emerged

in the 1950s, the optical and electronic industries became more involved in photographic equipment, and

diffused their new devices; but photographic markets have also been shaped by corporate diversification.

The overlapping cluster of optical and electronic industries combined with a large supply of electrical

engineers and demanding consumers to foster the development of a digital photography industry in Japan;

the intense rivalry amongst entrants added to the competitiveness and technological innovation of

Japanese firms (Porter, 1990; Porter et al. 2000). There was still rivalry between analog film camera

makers like Eastman Kodak and Fuji, which often dominated consumer market segments at the lower end

of individual camera users (Gavetti et al., 2004; Swasy, 1997). Older Japanese camera makers made the

transition from initial optical products to analog cameras, then to digital technologies and applications

faster than other firms; many firms are still changing their corporate strategic focus (Cavasin, 2006). For

example, the Japan Camera Industry Association (JCIA) changed its name to the Camera & Imaging

Products Association in 2002, to reflect the diversified industries of their related electronic members.

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The current oligopolistic structure of the photographic equipment industry is relatively concentrated, and

dominated by a small number of large diversified firms, often based in Japan, but operating at a global

scale. Most German (except Leica) and non-Japanese camera firms have been disrupted or displaced.

Table 1 lists the leading global digital camera vendors in 2010; Canon and Nikon were the market leaders,

and dominated the sale of DSLR reflex cameras in 2010. Yet other firms were slowly losing market

shares from the growth of Korea’s Samsung “chaebol”, and the decelerations of 2008 and 2009. Global

markets had grown at over 4% annually in 2006-2007; but growth slowed to only 1.8% in 2009.

******** Table 1 here **********

Digital cameras were only one product in the portfolio of many diversified equipment firms; their own

corporate strategies had identified new technologies and related market opportunities, to be financed by

revenues from maturing businesses, such as older analog cameras. The camera sector was the largest

product segment of the $22 billion global photographic industry, accounting for 65% of market value in

2009. But there are many segmented product and national markets downstream in the global camera

market, which were also being disrupted. Sales growth was shifting from the maturing Europe and U.S.

markets to emerging Asia-Pacific markets, such as China. Hence, the landscapes for camera technologies

and national photographic markets are changing; but do such technological changes constitute disruption,

sustainability, or another form of corporate diversification in a discontinuous innovation environment?

In order to address these technological questions, we will shift our focus from the broad level of global

vendors to the specific changes within narrower sectors of the photographic equipment industry. Camera

demand historically has often been heterogeneous, as market segments have evolved with industry growth

and more technological innovation. However, we need to distinguish diversification from disruption.

Rather than focus on the larger end-market segment of individual photographic consumers, we will

examine two specialized, more professionally oriented segments of the U.S. camera equipment industry:

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motion pictures and the commercial photography markets. While the sophisticated cameras in these two

segments tend to be more specialized and expensive than most consumer cameras, they also exhibit

different forms of technological disruption and change from distinct sources of industry innovation.

Hence, we expect the impact and diffusion of digital technologies to vary between these two segments.

Motion Picture Photography (Cinematography)

The motion picture sector is likely to be a more professionally oriented and technologically specialized

photography business; but this sector has been impacted by the increased costs of movie production, a

decline in film projects, and the diffusion of digital cameras. The demand for specialized film making

equipment is often a function of the number and types of creative products being made. Demand

for equipment increased since 2001, when the number of new films being made increased. But

by 2009-2010, the number of film projects and advertising expenditures were both in decline.1

Films are a major sector of the movie and entertainment industry; but all of these entertainment

industries have been shrinking and changing in 2009-2010. The global movie and entertainment

industry shrank -3.7% in 2009, but recovered to shrink -1% in 2010 to $87 billion (Datamonitor,

2011a). The U.S. and North America are the biggest national and regional markets of the global

industry; but they also shrank by -8% and -6.8% respectively in 2010, to only $30 billion and

$33 billion. The U.S. movie industry had been in decline from 2006 to 2010, with a compound

annual rate of change (CARC) of -5%, and forecast to shrink -4% by 2014 (Datamonitor, 2011b).

The motion picture equipment market is only a small segment within a larger U.S. photographic

industry, but had been somewhat insulated from problems of the camera equipment industry. The

motion picture cameras tended to be more complex than consumer cameras, based on film, and

often sold or leased to large enterprises in markets where quality and reliability outweighed cost.

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The market leader in a vertically integrated Hollywood film industry was Panavision, which had

a majority market share in the equipment segment, leasing their 35mm analog film cameras and

bundles of related supplies (Jonson and Ollivier, 2007). Panavision’s position was based on close

business ties and long-term relationships with the television and motion picture industries in

Hollywood.2 Panavision also developed the “Genesis” digital cameras in partnership with Sony;

but Panavision has still been at a competitive disadvantage from their legacy of traditional film

camera equipment, inventories, and high debt levels.3 Private owners (Perlman) were forced to

sell Panavision to settle huge debts; new top management emerged in 2011 for strategic changes

against more digital camera rivals, but the firm has struggled to restructure to digital cameras.4

Other established film camera makers also had problems competing in the motion picture and

TV industries, after the diffusion of digital cameras. The Germany based Arnold & Richter Cine

Technik GmbH’s ARRI subsidiary claims to be the world’s largest motion picture equipment

and camera supplier.5 ARRI’s business model and vertical integration resembles Panavision’s

own strategy; but ARRI buys some of their camera lenses from another German imaging firm

(Carl Zeiss), rather than manufacturing their own, and has also been one of Panavision’s better

customers for other filming equipment. However, ARRI is trying to make the digital transition.

ARRI’s “ALEXA” digital movie camera is their fastest selling state-of-the-art product, and has

added the Cypress CMOS image sensor portfolio to outperform ARRI’s more traditional CCD

and other rivals in this growing market segment.6 Thus, ARRI has diversified their product lines.

A third film camera rival is the French owned Technicolor (formerly known as “Thomson S.A.),

which acquired electronic brands and the Grass Valley digital film equipment business, but was

also as globally and technologically diversified as Panavision in the entertainment media sector.

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However, like Panavision, Technicolor suffered financial problems in 2008-2009, and decided to

sell their digital film equipment product line from Grass Valley’s division. Technicolor is still

involved in the film technologies industry, but more as a service provider than a camera maker.

New rivals have been entering the once concentrated structure of the U.S. film camera industry.

A private sun glass maker founded Red Digital Cinema in 1999 to reinvent the camera industry.7

Their “Red One” is an affordable digital video camera, which matches the detail and richness of

traditional analog camera film. The Red One is much cheaper and easier to use, which threatens

to make the 35-mm movie film obsolete; it is now being used in many movie productions for

higher resolution, and can be adapted for interchangeable lens with similar control over focus.

Another new camera start-up is P&S Technik, based in Germany and started by a former ARRI

designer. P&S introduced its new PS-Cam X35-mm digital camera in California in 2011, and

hopes to compete against the Red One and other professional cameras for TV or advertising.8

There are also other digital movie cameras offered by diversifying Japanese based imaging firms,

as extensions of their smaller camcorders. Sony developed its first “Mavica” video camera in the

1980s, and has a variety of professional motion picture cameras (F23, F65) to complement their

other electronic products. Sony is now one of the leading U.S. vendors of High Definition (HD)

video cameras at upper segments, and an inexpensive “Webbie” camcorder at lower ends.9 But

when Cisco acquired Pure Digital’s rival portable “Flip” video camera to diversify their markets

and compete on lower segments, they realized that profits were limited and closed the business.10

Canon offers several high definition video cameras as well, and recently upgraded their EOS 5D

Mark II digital SLR to capture more multi-media digital still imagery.11

Panasonic has developed

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some of the industry’s first affordable high-definition video cameras, the AG-AF100, and the

handheld HXP-250 for professional film makers.12

JVC developed another affordable 4K camera

for film and TV production.13

Fujinon offers a line of professional digital cameras, and has also

developed a more cost-effective HD telephoto lens (XA 50X9.5B ESM-D) for smaller venues.14

Nikon and South Korea’s Samsung have also been developing digital cameras for professional

motion pictures, which are more flexible in video projects and post-production editing (Lelyveld

and Jonson, 2009). Hence, there are many digital video cameras and camcorders competing on

the motion picture market now, but disruptive effects on motion picture markets were delayed.

While digital cameras have become cheaper and more technologically sophisticated, the firms

that previously supplied traditional film cameras for U.S. motion pictures have tried to adapt by

developing their own digital cameras, with uneven success. In the meantime, Panavision, Arri,

Aaton, and other analog vendors stopped production of film cameras in 2011, as uneconomical.15

Commercial Photographers

Commercial photography is a large $6 billion eclectic and fragmented market of over 13,000

companies and many self-employed professionals in the U.S.; most professional photographers

now use digital cameras.16

The U.S. commercial photography market could grow to $10.7 billion

globally by 2015, and advertising is one of the key drivers of the industry at higher ends, in a

variety of media (GIA, 2010). There are also many other commercial U.S. photography niche

segments, such as weddings and portraits, which have switched faster to mainly digital cameras.

While the commercial photography market growth slowed in 2008-2009, the competition and

innovation pressures among vendors have increased. The market recovered in 2010, as the mean

number of digital images pros captured increased (Infotrends, 2011). However, the commercial

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camera markets tend to be segmented by “megapixels” (details) and special applications, and

there are no dominant vendors or brands across all U.S. market segments. Professional photo

markets in the U.S. are larger than the motion picture industry discussed above, but are also more

fragmented and competitive for technology vendors, who must offer many new camera models.

Canon, Sony and Nikon are the market leaders in many professional segments; but they also face

stiff competition at the lower ends of the market from other rivals. The technological change to

adopt digital cameras has occurred faster and sooner than in the motion picture industry, but the

newer camera models and constant innovation have often reduced prices and profit margins

across most professional market segments. Some lower share digital camera makers have

diversified into other technologically related imaging businesses, such as the Olympus expansion

into medical devices. Other imaging companies have merged to become more competitive, as

Konica and Minolta did in 2003, before deciding to exit the camera business entirely in 2006,

diversifying into photocopiers. Electronic and computer companies, such as Hewlett-Packard,

Kyocera and Sanyo Electric, also decided to exit the camera business and refocus their strategies.

The patterns of technological change in the U.S. professional photography market have varied

from the shifts in motion picture and television production industries. The shift to more digital

cameras was sooner and faster, as price competition and constant product innovation drove the

professional market to adopt the new technologies for easier development and editing. However,

digital cameras did tend to disrupt the lower end segments of professional photography as more

amateurs and part-time photographers could increase their own capabilities and image quality.

The NPD Group’s surveys (PMA, 2010) found that professionals and consumers could now buy

higher megapixel cameras for lower prices, and can continue to upgrade their digital cameras.

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The traditional film camera makers like Eastman Kodak and Fuji have not been able to adapt as

well to the digital camera transition, either for professionals or for consumers. While both firms

tried to compete in digital markets, their strategies and legacy investments were still based more

on silver halide film or copier paper.17

Kodak has tried to survive by selling its last technological

patents, and by expanding their printing businesses; online and home printing increased in 2010.

Other camera firms have increased their sales of professional photographic accessories and more

interchangeable lenses, or by selling cheaper disposable cameras for one-time use (OTU); but

OTU sales have also declined in 2010 (PMA). Thus, the professional photography equipment

market has been changing in the U.S. and globally; but the disruptive patterns are different from

the motion picture camera segment, and associated more with diversification or cannibalization.

New Informal Technological Threats: Disruption or Diversification?

Apple was one of the earlier computer makers to diversify into photography markets when it developed

the first mass-market color digital cameras in 1994, the “QuickTake 100.” Apple’s early cameras were

relatively expensive and had limited functionality, but they did complement their own Mac computers and

pointed the way for future opportunities. By the mid-1990s, Apple and other diversifying electronic

companies began to develop and market a variety of “smart phones” with photographic capabilities. With

the exception of Finland’s Nokia, most of the cell phone cameras were developed by Japanese companies

that were diversifying from electronics, such as Sharp and Kyocera, or camera firms diversifying into

phones, such as Canon. In any case, the sales of camera phones grew faster than most separate cameras,

reaching over 1 billion globally in 2010, and smart phones are beginning to displace or erode the shares of

compact cameras at the lower photo market segments (NPD Group). Thus, the disruption associated with

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digital technologies is continuing beyond the photographic equipment markets, but often lead by the same

incumbent firms diversifying and cannibalizing their own product lines through continuous innovations.

Discussion and Conclusions

Innovation is an essential competitive process in many industries, but there are different forms of

innovation with distinct patterns and consequences. Normal or “sustaining” innovation is defined as

focusing on existing customers and needs, whereas radical or “disruptive” innovation can create new

technologies that disrupt market structures or reinvent entire industries (e.g. Christensen, 2000; 2006).

Despite the imagery and appeal of the disruptive technology theory, there are still questions of what

constitutes a “disruptive” technology, when does disruption occur, which firms are likely to be more

involved, and what strategic responses or alternatives are possible in potentially disrupted industries?

Some less innovative firms may be able to survive by a bold retreat to niches (Adner and Snow, 2010).

Most examples of disruptive technologies are cited in research oriented industries, but there has been

insufficient study of the effects of industry structure or diversification strategies on disrupted markets.

This paper examined the effects of digital cameras on the photographic equipment industry, but argues

that structural and corporate strategic factors moderated the disruption processes and responses to the

adoption and diffusion of digital technologies. We compared the impact of digital cameras on the motion

picture and professional photography segments, but found that adoption rates and disruption timing were

later and slower in the more concentrated and vertically integrated U.S. motion picture market segments.

We proposed and showed that diversified firms were more likely to introduce disruptive digital cameras,

but were not always willing to support their subsidiary offspring or continue to compete in the newly

emerging industry niches; this pattern confirms the effects of corporate strategies argued by Lange et al.

(2009), but in a somewhat different industry than computers. Hence, while there is ample and recent

evidence of disruptive technologies in the photographic equipment industry, the pace and patterns of

disruption seem to vary by industry segment, customer base and product demand.

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There is a need for more cross-industry and longitudinal study of disruptive innovation and technological

change, beyond the specific photographic equipment segments we focused on. A comparative framework

would be able to analyze the moderating effects of different industry structures and corporate strategies in

a larger sample. There are also questions about the diffusion rate and disruptive processes of technologies

from different countries and corporate parent nationalities; Japanese firms may respond differently than

large U.S. or smaller firms. Thus, a general theory of disruptive technologies may be less useful and valid

than a series of more detailed industry case studies, with industry and strategic level variables interacting.

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TABLE 1

Global Digital Camera Market Shares, By Vendors

Corporate Parent 2010 2009 DSLR Reflex Share

Canon 19% 19% 44.5%

Sony 16.4% 17.9% 11.9%

Nikon 12.6% 11.1% 29.8%

Samsung 11.1% 10.9% na

Panasonic 7.6% 7.6% na

Kodak 7.4% 8.5% na

Others 6.7% 6.7% na

Olympus 6.1% 6.2% na

Fuji 4.9% 5.1% na

Casio 4.0% 4.5% na

Pentax 1.5% 1.6% na

Vivitar 1.2% 1.0% na

Leica >1.0% >1.0% na

Source: International Data Corporation (2010) (na= not available)

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Footnotes

1 T.L. Stanley (2010). “2010 forecast: Studio/entertainment ad forecast,” MediaWeek, Vol. 20, 1 (Jan. 4).

2 www.fundinguniverse.com. (2010). “Panavision, Inc.: Company history.”

3 Richard Verrier (2009). “Panavision’s future is in need of focus,” Los Angeles Times (July 20).

4 Los Angeles Times (2011). “Panavision replaces CEO with former chief operating officer,” (June 22).

5 www.arri.com.

6 R. Singh Chaudhary (2010). “Gadgets—ARRI ALEXA digital movie camera includes Cypress CMOS image sensor,”

Gadgets (Dec. 22). www.tmcnet.com.

7 Michael Behar (2008). “Analog meets its match in Red Digital Cinema’s ultrahigh-res camera,” Wired (Aug. 18).

8Anonymous (2011). Broadcast Engineer.

9 David Birdy (2008). “High-def video cameras come of age,” Broadcast Engineering (January), pp. 63-67.

10 Sam Grobart and Evelyn M. Rusli (2011). “For Flip video camera, four years from hot start-up to obsolete,” New

York Times (April 12).

11 Broadcast Engineering. (2010). “Canon upgrades EOS digital SLR cameras for multimedia use.” (May 14).

12 The Pak Banker (2010). “Panasonic delivers AG-AF100, the affordable larger imager cinema camera,” (Dec. 28).

13 George Winslow (2011). “As technology improves, camera prices retreat,” Broadcasting & Cable (Jan. 2), p. 29.

14 Robert Goldrich (2009). “HD essentials,” SHOOT, Vol. 50, Issue 7 (August 14).

15 Devin Coldewey (2011). “The world’s movie camera makers have all quietly stopped production of film

cameras,” (October 14) www.techcrunch.com.

16 TrendWatch Graphic Arts (2010). U.S. Photo Studios and Commercial Photography. www.infotrends.com.

17 Tony Jackson (2011). “Kodak fell victim to disruptive technology,” Financial Times (October 2).