14-51311 - eeoc amicus brief in support of plaintiff-appellant
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Case No. 14-51311
____________________________
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
____________________________
LORETTA I. EURE,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
THE SAGE CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee
__________________________________________________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
No. 5:12-CV-1119, Hon. David A. Ezra, Presiding
__________________________________________________
BRIEF OF U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT LORETTA EURE AND REVERSAL
__________________________________________________
P. DAVID LOPEZ U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
General Counsel OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of General Counsel
CAROLYN L. WHEELER 131 M St. NE, Fifth Floor
Acting Associate General Counsel Washington, D.C. 20507
(202) 663-4699LORRAINE C. DAVIS [email protected]
Assistant General Counsel Attorneys for amicus curiae
U.S. Equal Employment
ANNE W. KING Opportunity Commission
Attorney
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SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF INTERESTED PARTIES
Loretta Eure v. The Sage Corporation,
Case No. 14-51311, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
Case No. 5:12-CV-1119, U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas
The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following listed persons
and entities as described in the fourth sentence of 5th Cir. R. 28.2.1 have an
interest in the outcome of this case. These representations are made in order that
the judges of this court may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal.
1. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Amicus Curiae
2. P. David Lopez
Carolyn L. Wheeler
Lorraine C. Davis
Anne W. King
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission
s/ Anne W. King___________
Attorney of record for the
Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF INTERESTED PARTIES ........................... i
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iii
STATEMENT OF INTEREST .................................................................................. 1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ................................................................................. 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..................................................................................2
I. Statement of Facts ............................................................................................2
II. District Court Decision .....................................................................................8
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ......................................................................10
ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................11
I. Discrimination against transgender persons is cognizable as discrimination
because of sex under Title VII. .............................................................................11
II. Plaintiffs asserting transgender discrimination need not provide specific
evidence of gender stereotyping. ..........................................................................16
III. A jury could conclude that Sage discriminated against Eure because
of his sex ............................................................................................................... 23
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................28
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
ECF CERTIFICATE
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Alvarado v. Tex. Rangers,
492 F.3d 605 (5th Cir. 2007)…………………………………………………26, 27
Barnes v. City of Cincinnati,
401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005) ……………………………………………………..13
Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales,
49 F. Supp. 3d 1163 (N.D. Ga. 2014) …………………………………………….15
Corley v. La. ex rel. Div. of Admin.,
498 F. App’x 448 (5th Cir. 2012) ………………………………………………...24
Doe v. Dekalb Cnty. Sch. Dist.,
145 F.3d 1441 (11th Cir. 1998) …………………………………………………..24
Doe v. United Consumer Fin. Servs., No. 1:01 CV 1112,
2001 WL 34350174 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 2001)…………………………………...15
EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., L.L.C.,
731 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2013) ………………………………………..8, 5, 18, 22, 23
Etienne v. Spanish Lake Truck & Casino Plaza, L.L.C.,
778 F.3d 473 (5th Cir. 2015) ……………………………………………………..25
Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth.,
502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007) ………………………………………………13, 21
Finkle v. Howard Cnty.,
12 F. Supp. 3d 780 (D. Md. 2014) ………………………………………………..14
Glenn v. Brumby,
663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011) ………………………………………12, 15, 16, 23
Hart v. Lew,
973 F. Supp. 2d 561 (D. Md. 2013) ………………………………………………15
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Hinson v. Clinch Cnty., Ga. Bd. of Educ.,
231 F.3d 821 (5th Cir. 2000) ……………………………………………………..24
Jones v. Robinson Prop. Grp., L.P.,
427 F.3d 987 (5th Cir. 2005) ……………………………………………………..25
Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist .,
325 F. App’x 492 (9th Cir. 2009) ………………………………………………...13
Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Grp., Inc.,
542 F. Supp. 2d 653 (S.D. Tex. 2008) ……………………………………………14
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973) ………………………………………………………...……26
Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm, Inc., No. Civ.A. 05-243,
2006 WL 456173 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2006) ……………………………………...15
Myers v. Cuyahoga Cnty.,
182 F. App’x 510 (6th Cir. 2006) ………………………………………………...13
Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enters., Inc.,
256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001) …………………………………………………22, 23
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Oil Servs., Inc.,
523 U.S. 75 (1998) ………………………………………………………...……..18
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228 (1989) ……………………………………………………8, 11-12, 18
Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co.,
214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000) ……………………………………………………...13
Schroer v. Billington,525 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2007) ………………………………………………..19
Schroer v. Billington,
577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008) ………………………………14, 19-20, 21, 22
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Schwenk v. Hartford ,
204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000) ……………………………………………13, 17, 20
Smith v. City of Salem,
378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004) ……………………………………………..15, 16, 18
Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc.,
667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982) ……………………………………………………..17
Thompson v. City of Waco,
764 F.3d 500 (5th Cir. 2014) ……………………………………………………..24
Tronetti v. TLC HealthNet Lakeshore Hosp., No. 03-cv-375E(SC),
2003 WL 22757935 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2003) …………………………………15
Ulane v. E. Airlines,
742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984) ……………………………………………………17
Willis v. Cleco Corp.,
749 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2014) …………………………………………………26, 27
Young v. City of Houston,
906 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1990) ……………………………………………………..25
Statutes
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.………………………………………………………....1
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) ………………………………………………………..11
Administrative Materials
Lusardi v. McHugh, Appeal No. 0120133395
(EEOC Apr. 1, 2015) ………………………………………………………..........16
Macy v. Holder , Appeal No. 0120120812,
2012 WL 1435995 (EEOC Apr. 20, 2012) ………………………….........16, 17, 23
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STATEMENT OF INTEREST
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC” or
“Commission”) is the primary agency charged by Congress with administering,
interpreting, and enforcing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e et seq. This appeal raises the issue of whether disparate treatment of an
employee because he is transgender is discrimination “because of … sex” under
Title VII. The district court concluded that individuals alleging discrimination
based on transgender status must provide additional evidence of gender
stereotyping, which conflicts with the Commission’s view of Title VII. This appeal
also raises further questions relating to the merits of Appellant’s Title VII claim.
Because these issues are important to the effective enforcement of Title VII, the
Commission respectfully offers its views to the Court. See Fed R. App. P. 29(a).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether a reasonable jury could determine that Appellee Sage Corporation
discriminated against Appellant Lorenzo (Loretta) Eure because he is transgender.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Statement of Facts1
Appellant Lorenzo Eure, formerly known as Loretta Eure, was an instructor
at Appellee Sage Corporation’s (“Sage”) San Antonio, Texas truck driving school,
beginning around December 2010. ROA.326; ROA.664 (RE.T5) (Eure Dep.
43:11-19; Eure Decl. ¶ 2). He was paid on an hourly basis, and his responsibilities
included conducting classroom training and providing on-the-road training in truck
driving. ROA.326 (Eure Dep. 43:16-25). Eure worked part time, about 26 to 28
hours a week, but he was told he would soon receive additional hours when the
San Antonio school launched expanded services for Sanjel, Inc., a long-time client
of Sage. ROA.239; ROA.326-27 (Campanian Aff. ¶ 6; Eure Dep. 43:20-44:11).
Eure is transgender: his gender identity (male) is different from the sex
assigned to him at birth (female). ROA.665 (RE.T5) (Eure Decl. ¶ 4). When Eure
worked at Sage, he presented as a male and he had taken steps towards
transitioning from female to male (including a hysterectomy, mastectomy, and
testosterone therapy) before starting at Sage. ROA.309-10; ROA.355; ROA.392;
ROA.665 (RE.T5) (Eure Dep. 26:3-27:9; 72:13-24; Eure Dep. Ex. 1; Eure Decl. ¶
1 Except for the record citations, the Statement of Facts is nearly identical to the
Statement of Facts in the EEOC’s amicus brief in Brandon v. The Sage
Corporation, No. 14-51320 (5th Cir.).
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4). Eure was known as “Loretta Eure” when he worked at Sage and later changed
his name to “Lorenzo Eure.” ROA.288-89 (Eure Dep. 5:8-6:2).
Margie Brandon, Eure’s supervisor, was School Director for Sage’s San
Antonio school, beginning in May 2010. ROA.670 (RE.T7) (Brandon Decl. ¶ 1).
Brandon interviewed Eure for the instructor position and recommended hiring him.
ROA.460-62; ROA.568 (Brandon Dep. 42:16-44:9; 150:11-20). Sage’s Safety
Manager approved Eure’s hire based on a background check and a Department of
Transportation assessment. ROA.569; ROA.671 (RE.T7) (Brandon Dep. 151:1-25;
Brandon Decl. ¶ 3).
In March 2011, Sage’s Carmella Campanian visited the San Antonio school
in conjunction with Sage’s expansion of driver training services for the Sanjel
company. ROA.239 (Campanian Aff. ¶ 6). Campanian introduced herself to the
San Antonio school staff as Sage’s co-founder and Vice President. ROA.496;
ROA.667 (RE.T6); ROA.670 (RE.T7) (Brandon Dep. 78:10-15; Solis Decl. ¶ 4;
Brandon Decl. ¶ 2). Campanian, who is located in Montana, served as the National
Project Director in charge of the Sanjel driver training program. ROA.238-39
(Campanian Aff. ¶¶ 2, 6). Sage has provided driver training services to Sanjel since
1994, and in June 2010 Sage entered into an expanded contract with Sanjel, which
included launching driver training for Sanjel at the San Antonio school. ROA.239
(Campanian Aff. ¶¶ 6-7) (describing “multi-million dollar expansion”). Before
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Campanian’s visit, Brandon spoke to Campanian by phone on one occasion, and
found her “pushy” and “abrasive” to a degree that made Brandon “uncomfortable.”
ROA.487-93 (Brandon Dep. 69:22-75:1). Brandon reported her impression of
Campanian to her own supervisor, Barbara Blake. ROA.488 (Brandon Dep. 70:8-
14). Blake acknowledged that Campanian “is very difficult to work with,” but
warned Brandon, “You’re on your own on that one.” ROA.488 (Brandon Dep.
70:8-14).
Brandon testified that Campanian expressed animosity towards Eure soon
after her arrival at the San Antonio school, on March 29. ROA.494-96; ROA.671
(RE.T7) (Brandon Dep. 76:5-78:9; Brandon Decl. ¶ 3). Campanian was looking
outside the Sage office when she exclaimed, “What the hell is that? What the hell
is that out there?” ROA.494; ROA.671 (RE.T7) (Brandon Dep. 76:5-19; Brandon
Decl. ¶ 3). Brandon realized that Campanian was referring to Eure, who was
working with a student on a truck. ROA.494-95; ROA.671 (RE.T7) (Brandon Dep.
76:20-77:1; Brandon Decl. ¶ 3). Brandon responded that it was Loretta Eure, a
Sage instructor. ROA.494-95 (Brandon Dep. 76:20-77:1). Campanian declared,
“We don’t hire cross-genders in this company,” and asked who made the decision
to employ Eure, inquiring, “[W]ho the hell hired that?” and querying whether
Brandon herself hired Eure. ROA.495; ROA.671 (RE.T7) (Brandon Dep. 77:2-18;
Brandon Decl. ¶ 3). Brandon responded that Eure was qualified for the instructor
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position and explained that Sage’s safety department approved the hire. ROA.495;
ROA.671 (RE.T7) (Brandon Dep. 77:5-8; Brandon Decl. ¶ 3).
Campanian indicated that Brandon would face consequences for employing
Eure, asserting, “[W]e will deal with you seriously for hiring that.” ROA.495;
ROA.671 (RE.T7) (Brandon Dep. 77:2-10; Brandon Decl. ¶ 3). Maria Solis,
Brandon’s administrative assistant, witnessed this exchange and confirmed
Brandon’s account. ROA.667-68 (RE.T6) (Solis Decl. ¶¶ 5, 7, 9). Afterwards,
Brandon called Blake, her supervisor, to report Campanian’s comments about
Eure. ROA.499-500 (Brandon Dep. 81:20-82:8).
On March 30, Campanian continued berating Brandon, repeating the
admonishment that, “[W]e’re going to deal with you seriously for hiring” Eure,
and emphasizing that, “I told you yesterday we don’t hire cross-genders.”
ROA.507-08 (Brandon Dep. 89:17-90:4). Brandon asked how Campanian planned
to “deal with” her, and Campanian responded, “I haven’t made the decision yet. I
have to talk to [Sage President Gregg] Aversa. He’s still traveling, and I can’t get a
hold [of] him.” ROA.508 (Brandon Dep. 90:5-10).
After this conversation, Campanian made some phone calls; Brandon
assumed that she spoke with Aversa, and Campanian acknowledged speaking to
Aversa that day. ROA.247; ROA.508 (Campanian Aff. ¶ 26; Brandon Dep. 90:11-
12). Then, Campanian called Solis, Brandon’s administrative assistant, into
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Brandon’s office and told Brandon and Solis to sit down. ROA.508; ROA.668
(RE.T6); ROA.671-72 (RE.T7) (Brandon Dep. 90:11-14; Solis Decl. ¶ 13;
Brandon Decl. ¶ 5). Campanian asked Brandon her salary, and Brandon—shocked
that Campanian had raised a highly personal question in front of Solis—did not
immediately respond. ROA.508; ROA.668 (RE.T6); ROA.671-72 (RE.T7)
(Brandon Dep. 90:15-21; Solis Decl. ¶ 13; Brandon Decl. ¶ 5). Campanian then
announced, “[O]ur decision to deal with you seriously is to cut your pay in half.”
ROA.508; ROA.668 (RE.T6); ROA.671-72 (RE.T7) (Brandon Dep. 90:23-25;
Solis Decl. ¶ 13; Brandon Decl. ¶ 5). Brandon protested that cutting her pay would
be illegal. ROA.509; ROA.668 (RE.T6); ROA.671-72 (RE.T7) (Brandon Dep.
91:1-6; Solis Decl. ¶ 13; Brandon Decl. ¶ 5).
Also on March 30, Campanian created a schedule for the San Antonio
school instructors that incorporated the Sanjel students. ROA.512-13; ROA.672
(RE.T7) (Brandon Dep. 94:22-95:22; Brandon Decl. ¶ 6). Brandon reviewed this
schedule and told Campanian there was a mistake: Campanian failed to include
Eure on the schedule. ROA.513; ROA.672 (RE.T7) (Brandon Dep. 95:3-10;
Brandon Decl. ¶ 6). Campanian retorted, “Are you stupid? … I’m not putting her
on the schedule. Those Sanjel people, they’ll eat her up alive.” ROA.513 (Brandon
Dep. 95:11-14). Brandon asked Campanian if she was firing Eure. ROA.513
(Brandon Dep. 95:15). Campanian said no, but clarified, “We’re just not going to
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give her any hours. Just won’t put her on the schedule.” ROA.513 (Brandon Dep.
95:15-18). Then, Campanian asked Brandon whether she understood the
consequences she faced for hiring Eure. ROA.672 (RE.T7) (Brandon Decl. ¶ 2).
When Eure saw the schedule, he asked Brandon why he was excluded from the
schedule and whether he had been fired. ROA.513-14 (Brandon Dep. 95:23-96:5).
Documentary evidence corroborates Brandon’s account that Campanian
reduced Eure’s hours. One version of the instructor schedule for April 4 through
April 10 reflects that Eure was scheduled to work six shifts, while a second version
of that week’s schedule omits all of Eure’s shifts. Compare ROA.414 with
ROA.415. Also, one version of the instructor schedule for March 28 through April
3 reflects possible shifts for Eure on March 31 and April 3, while a second version
of that week’s schedule allots those shifts to another instructor. Compare ROA.412
with ROA.413.
Sage acknowledged that Campanian created an instructor schedule and
reduced Eure’s hours but provided a different explanation of Eure’s exclusion from
the schedule. Campanian claimed that, on March 31, she scheduled a meeting for
the next morning (April 1) to determine instructors’ availability for the following
week. ROA.249-50 (Campanian Aff. ¶ 29). According to Campanian, Eure had
called Campanian earlier on March 31 to report that he had the stomach flu.
ROA.249 (Campanian Aff. ¶ 28). Campanian claimed that she tried to contact Eure
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at home the afternoon of March 31 to apprise him of the instructors’ meeting, but
could not reach him. ROA.249-50 (Campanian Aff. ¶ 29). Campanian asserted that
she posted the schedule for the following week late on April 1, and that she
excluded Eure from the schedule because she could not confirm his availability.
ROA.249-50 (Campanian Aff. ¶ 29).
Both Brandon and Eure resigned as a result of Campanian’s conduct.
Brandon did not return to work on March 31 and submitted a formal resignation to
Sage President Aversa, while Eure resigned on April 4. ROA.343-44; ROA.520-22
(Eure Dep. 60:22-61:1; Brandon Dep. 102:19-104:20).
II. District Court Decision
The district court granted summary judgment to Sage on Eure’s sex
discrimination claim on the rationale that Eure could not show that Sage
discriminated against him “because of … sex.” The parties’ summary judgment
briefing had not even raised this issue, see ROA.844 n.7 (RE.T4), but the district
court found it dispositive.
The district court acknowledged that, under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228 (1989), “[i]t is well established that ‘a plaintiff can satisfy Title VII’s
because-of-sex requirement with evidence of a plaintiff’s perceived failure to
conform to traditional gender stereotypes.’” ROA.840 (RE.T4) (quoting EEOC v.
Boh Bros. Constr. Co., L.L.C., 731 F.3d 444, 454 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc)). The
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district court further recognized that transgender plaintiffs have successfully relied
on Price Waterhouse to bring sex discrimination claims under Title VII. ROA.842
(RE.T4).
However, the district court concluded that Eure was required to provide
additional evidence of gender stereotyping to bring a Title VII claim. ROA.842
(RE.T4). The district court asserted that courts applying Price Waterhouse “have
generally required evidence of gendered statements or acts that target a plaintiff’s
conformance with traditional conceptions of masculinity or femininity.” ROA.841
(RE.T4). Along the same lines, the district court stated that “courts have been
reluctant to extend the sex stereotyping theory to cover circumstances where the
plaintiff is discriminated against because [of] the plaintiff’s status as a transgender
man or woman, without any additional evidence related to gender stereotype non-
conformity.” ROA.842 (RE.T4).
In this case, the district court asserted, “[a]ll of the testimony that Eure has
presented related to Campanian’s animus couches Campanian’s alleged
discrimination in terms specifically related to Eure’s status as a transgender person,
not in terms related to [Eure’s] conformance with gender stereotypes.” ROA.844
(RE.T4). The district court viewed Eure’s evidence as consisting of two items: 1)
Brandon’s testimony that Campanian asked “What is that and who hired that?”
when she saw Eure; and 2) Brandon’s testimony that Campanian asked whether
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she (Brandon) understood the consequences for hiring a “cross-gender.” ROA.844
(RE.T4). The district court held that, “[b]ecause Eure has failed to present evidence
showing that the discrimination was motivated by her [Eure’s] failure to act as a
stereotypical woman would, Eure has not presented a cognizable gender
stereotyping claim and cannot succeed in showing that the discrimination … claim
that she [Eure] presents is ‘because of sex’ as Title VII requires.” ROA.845
(RE.T4).
Having resolved Eure’s sex discrimination claim on that basis, the district
court did not reach the merits of his claim. However, the district court determined
that Campanian’s reduction of Eure’s hours—and Eure’s corresponding reduction
in income—could be a materially adverse action for Eure’s retaliation claim
(which is not at issue in this appeal). ROA.850-52 (RE.T4).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In granting summary judgment to Sage on Eure’s disparate treatment claim,
the district court incorrectly interpreted the scope of Title VII’s protections against
discrimination “because of … sex.” In the Commission’s view, Title VII
encompasses discrimination against transgender persons because the statute
provides that gender must not play a role in employment decisions. The district
court erred in holding that no reasonable jury could find that Sage discriminated
against Eure based on his non-conformance with gender stereotypes. The district
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court also erred in determining that transgender plaintiffs must present additional
evidence of gender stereotyping in order to establish a cognizable Title VII claim.
Gender stereotypes inherently drive discrimination against transgender persons, so
it is not necessary to identify specific evidence of stereotyping.
Here, the record presents genuine issues of fact as to whether Sage
discriminated against Eure “because of … sex.” A jury could reasonably infer that
Campanian reduced Eure’s work hours because he is transgender—or “cross-
gender” in Campanian’s words. Or, a jury could determine that Campanian
reduced Eure’s hours because she believed he failed to conform with his assigned
sex, and preferred that he look and act female rather than present as male.
ARGUMENT
I. Discrimination against transgender persons is cognizable as
discrimination because of sex under Title VII.2
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, sex, or national origin.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The Supreme Court has clarified that the phrase “because
of … sex” means “that gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions.” Price
2 The EEOC understands the term “transgender” to refer broadly to a person whose
gender identity or expression is different from the sex assigned to him or her at
birth.
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Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240. The plaintiff in Price Waterhouse was a female
senior manager who was being considered for partnership in an accounting firm.
Id. at 231-32. There was evidence that she was denied partnership because she was
considered not feminine enough in dress and behavior. Id. at 235. Her evaluators
suggested that she could improve her chances for partnership if she were less
“macho” and learned to “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.” Id. The Court
held that the evaluation amounted to prohibited sex stereotyping, explaining that
“[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex,
Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men
and women resulting from sex stereotypes.” Id. at 251 (citations omitted). The
court held that Title VII barred not just discrimination because the plaintiff was a
woman, but also discrimination based on the employer’s belief that she was not
acting like a woman. Id. at 250-51.
After Price Waterhouse, the courts of appeals have recognized that a
transgender plaintiff may state a claim for discrimination because of sex if the
defendant’s action was motivated by the plaintiff’s nonconformance with a sex
stereotype or norm. See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011)
(stating that “discrimination against a transgender individual because of her
gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination, whether it’s described as being on the
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basis of sex or gender”); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572-73 (6th Cir.
2004) (holding that an adverse action taken because of transgender plaintiff’s
failure to conform to sex stereotypes concerning how a man or woman should look
and behave constitutes unlawful gender discrimination); Schwenk v. Hartford , 204
F.3d 1187, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that a transsexual prisoner had
stated a viable sex discrimination claim under the Gender Motivated Violence Act
because “[t]he evidence offered … show[s] that [the assault was] motivated, at
least in part, by Schwenk’s gender—in this case, by her assumption of a feminine
rather than a typically masculine appearance or demeanor” and noting that its
analysis was equally applicable to claims brought under Title VII);3 but see Etsitty
v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1222-24 (10th Cir. 2007) (declining to adopt
3 See also Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist ., 325 F. App’x 492, 493 (9thCir. 2009) (concluding that, after Price Waterhouse, “it is unlawful to discriminate
against a transgender (or any other) person because he or she does not behave in
accordance with an employer’s expectations for men or women”); Myers v.
Cuyahoga Cnty., 182 F. App’x 510, 519 (6th Cir. 2006) (concluding that “Title VII
protects transsexual persons from discrimination for failing to act in accordance
and/or identify with their perceived sex or gender”); Barnes v. City of Cincinnati,
401 F.3d 729, 733, 736-39 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that the demotion of a
“preoperative male-to-female transsexual” police officer because he did not
“conform to sex stereotypes concerning how a man should look and behave” stateda claim of sex discrimination under Title VII); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co.,
214 F.3d 213, 214-15 (1st Cir. 2000) (applying Price Waterhouse to conclude,
under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, that plaintiff stated a claim for sex
discrimination because “it [was] reasonable to infer” that bank refused to provide a
loan application because plaintiff’s “traditionally feminine attire” “did not accord
with his male gender”).
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a per se rule that transgender discrimination always amounts to sex discrimination
“at this point in time and with the record and arguments before this court,” but not
reaching whether Title VII protects “transsexuals who act and appear as a member
of the opposite sex”).
Additionally, numerous district courts, including one from within the Fifth
Circuit, have concluded that transgender discrimination is cognizable under Title
VII. See, e.g., Finkle v. Howard Cnty., 12 F. Supp. 3d 780, 788 (D. Md. 2014)
(holding that an officer’s claim that she was discriminated against because of her
transgender status was a “cognizable claim of sex discrimination”); Schroer v.
Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 305-06 (D.D.C. 2008) (“While I would therefore
conclude that Schroer is entitled to judgment based on a Price Waterhouse-type
claim for sex stereotyping, I also conclude that she is entitled to judgment based on
the language of the statute itself.”); Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic
Grp., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 653, 659-61 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (“Title VII and Price
Waterhouse … do not make any distinction between a transgendered litigant who
fails to conform to traditional gender stereotypes and an ‘effeminate’ male or
‘macho’ female who, while not necessarily believing himself or herself to be of the
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opposite gender, nonetheless is perceived by others to be in nonconformity with
traditional gender stereotypes.”).4
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit, outside the transgender discrimination context,
has recognized that “a plaintiff can satisfy Title VII’s because-of-sex requirement
with evidence of a plaintiff’s perceived failure to conform to traditional gender
stereotypes.” Boh Bros., 731 F.3d at 454 (same-sex harassment case). In reaching
its holding, the en banc court relied in part on two transgender discrimination
cases, Smith, 378 F.3d at 573, and Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1316. See Boh Bros., 731
F.3d at 454 n.4.
4 See also Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, 49 F. Supp. 3d 1163 (N.D. Ga.2014) (“Because Title VII protects discrimination based on gender stereotypes,
Plaintiff can assert a sex discrimination claim because Plaintiff was transitioning
from a male to a female, and Plaintiff essentially claims that the failure to conform
to male stereotypes caused Plaintiff’s termination.”); Mitchell v. Axcan
Scandipharm, Inc., No. Civ. A. 05-243, 2006 WL 456173, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 17,
2006) (transgender plaintiff may state a claim for sex discrimination by “showing
that his failure to conform to sex stereotypes of how a man should look and behave
was the catalyst behind defendant’s actions”); Tronetti v. TLC HealthNet
Lakeshore Hosp., No. 03-cv-375E, 2003 WL 22757935, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26,2003) (transsexual plaintiff may state a claim under Title VII “based on [] alleged
discrimination for failing to ‘act like a man’”); Doe v. United Consumer Fin.
Servs., No. 1:01-cv-1112, 2001 WL 34350174, at *2-5 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 2001)
(termination based on non-conformity with gender expectations is actionable under
Title VII); cf. Hart v. Lew, 973 F. Supp. 2d 561, 579 (D. Md. 2013) (assuming
without deciding that Title VII protects transsexual individuals).
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II. Plaintiffs asserting transgender discrimination need not provide specific
evidence of gender stereotyping.
Plaintiffs alleging that their employers discriminated against them because
they are transgender need not provide specific evidence of gender stereotyping
because “consideration of gender stereotypes will inherently be part of what drives
discrimination against a transgendered individual.” Macy v. Holder , Appeal No.
0120120812, 2012 WL 1435995, at *8 (EEOC Apr. 20, 2012); see also Lusardi v.
McHugh, Appeal No. 0120133395, at *11 n.6 (EEOC Apr. 1, 2015) (explaining
that “ Macy [] held that discrimination on the basis of transgender status is per se
sex discrimination” and found “that a plaintiff need not have specific evidence of
gender stereotyping”). As the Eleventh Circuit has emphasized, “[a] person is
defined as transgender precisely because of the perception that his or her behavior
transgresses gender stereotypes. [T]he very acts that define transgender people as
transgender are those that contradict stereotypes of gender-appropriate appearance
and behavior.” Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1316 (citations omitted) (second alteration in
original). And, as the Sixth Circuit explained, discriminating against an individual
because of his or her transgender status inherently entails sex-based considerations.
See Smith, 378 F.3d at 574-75 (“[D]iscrimination against a plaintiff who is
transsexual—and therefore fails to act and/or identify with his or gender—is no
different from the discrimination directed against Ann Hopkins in Price
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Waterhouse, who, in sex-stereotypical terms, did not act like a woman.”).
Therefore, “[w]hen an employer discriminates against someone because the person
is transgender, the employer has engaged in disparate treatment ‘related to the sex
of the victim.’” Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *7 (quoting Schwenk , 204 F.3d at
1202).
In this case, the district court erred in holding that plaintiffs who allege
transgender discrimination are required to provide specific evidence of gender
stereotyping. The district court maintained, “[C]ourts have been reluctant to extend
the sex stereotyping theory to cover circumstances where the plaintiff is
discriminated against because [of] the plaintiff’s status as a transgender man or
woman, without any additional evidence related to gender stereotype non-
conformity.” ROA.842 (RE.T4). However, in the Commission’s view, “evidence
of gender stereotyping is simply one means of proving sex discrimination” in
transgender discrimination claims under Title VII. Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *8.
Moreover, the opinions on which the district court relied do not squarely illustrate
courts’ “reluctan[ce]” to apply Title VII to discrimination based on the plaintiff’s
status as a transgender person.
First, the district court relied on two opinions, Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742
F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), and Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748
(8th Cir. 1982), which pre-date Price Waterhouse. The Supreme Court has since
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rejected the two rationales these courts used to decline to extend protections to
transgender individuals—a narrow definition of “sex” and a refusal to expand
protections beyond the protected groups originally considered by Congress. To
begin, as noted, Price Waterhouse makes clear that Title VII does not simply
prohibit discrimination based on biological sex, but also “the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.” 490 U.S. at
251 (citations omitted); see also Smith, 378 F.3d at 573 (“[T]he approach in []
Sommers[] and Ulane … has been eviscerated” by Price Waterhouse’s holding that
“Title VII’s reference to ‘sex’ encompasses both the biological differences
between men and women, and gender discrimination, that is, discrimination based
on a failure to conform to stereotypical gender norms.”). Moreover, in Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Oil Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), in ruling that same-sex
harassment is actionable, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the notion that
Title VII only proscribes types of discrimination specifically contemplated by
Congress. Id. at 79-80 (explaining that “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the
principal evil [they were passed to combat] to cover reasonably comparable evils,
and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of
our legislators by which we are governed”); see also Boh Bros., 731 F.3d at 454
(same).
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Second, the district court cites Schroer v. Billington, Schwenk v. Hartford ,
and Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority to support its position, but the court’s reliance
on those opinions is misplaced. As described above, Schroer held that a
transgender plaintiff was “entitled to judgment based on a Price Waterhouse-type
claim for sex stereotyping” and “based on the language of the statute itself”; that is,
because discrimination predicated on an individual’s transgender status is
“discrimination … because of sex.” 577 F. Supp. 2d at 305-06. The district court
quoted the following language from Schroer :
While I agreed with the Sixth Circuit [in Smith v. Salem] that []
transsexuality is not a bar to a sex stereotyping claim, I took the position that
‘such a claim must actually arise from the employee’s appearance or conduct
and the employer’s stereotypical perceptions.’ In other words, ‘a Price
Waterhouse claim could not be supported by facts showing that [an adverse
employment action] resulted solely from [the plaintiff’s] disclosure of her
gender dysphoria.’
ROA.843 (RE.T4) (quoting Schroer , 577 F. Supp. 2d at 304 (quoting Schroer v.
Billington, 525 F. Supp. 2d 58, 63 (D.D.C. 2007) (emphasis and third and fourth
alteration in original)). However, the district court neglected to explain that, in the
quoted passage, the Schroer court is describing the position it took in a prior
opinion. The Schroer court makes clear that it subsequently changed its position
based on “the development of the factual record that is now before me.” 577 F.
Supp. 2d at 304. Schroer goes on to conclude, “Ultimately, I do not think it matters
for purposes of Title VII liability whether [the employer] withdrew its offer of
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employment because it perceived Schroer to be an insufficiently masculine man,
an insufficiently feminine woman, or an inherently gender-nonconforming
transsexual.” Id. at 305. In summary, the district court failed to acknowledge that
the Schroer court revised its understanding of Title VII and determined that a
transgender plaintiff may state a claim “based on the language of the statute itself.”
Id. at 305-06.
Similarly, the district court quotes language from Schwenk without
acknowledging its full context, citing a passage that states, “[w]hat matters, for the
purpose of this part of the Price Waterhouse analysis, is that in the mind of the
perpetrator the discrimination is related to the sex of the victim: here, for example,
the perpetrator’s actions stem from the fact that he believed that the victim was a
man who ‘failed to act like’ one.” ROA.842-43 (RE.T4) (quoting Schwenk , 204
F.3d at 1201-02). But, as explained previously, Schwenk held that a prisoner stated
a cognizable sex discrimination claim under the Gender Motivated Violence Act
by alleging that an assault was “motivated, at least in part, by [her] gender,” that is,
“by her assumption of a feminine rather than a typically masculine appearance or
demeanor.” 204 F.3d at 1202; see also id. (explaining that the same reasoning
applies under Title VII). Schwenk makes clear that discrimination based on a
plaintiff’s “assumption of a feminine rather than typically masculine appearance or
demeanor” is equivalent to discrimination based on a “belie[f] that [a plaintiff] was
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a man who ‘failed to act like’ one.” Therefore, Schwenk does not support the
district court’s position that a transgender plaintiff must provide “additional
evidence related to gender stereotype non-conformity,” ROA.842 (RE.T4), to
establish a sex discrimination claim.
Moreover, Etsitty is weak support for the district court’s position. While
Etsitty declined to adopt a per se rule that transgender discrimination is
discrimination “because of … sex,” the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that other
courts had relied on Price Waterhouse to “recognize a cause of action for []
transsexuals claiming protection under Title VII,” although it did not reach that
question itself. 502 F.3d at 1223-24. Further, Etsitty relied on decisions rendered
before Price Waterhouse and Oncale —including Ulane and Sommers —which, for
the reasons discussed above, see supra at 17-18, are no longer viable. See Etisitty,
502 F.3d at 1221.
Additionally, underpinning the Etsitty court’s rejection of a broader per se
rule was its interpretation of Title VII as prohibiting discrimination against men or
women, but not against individuals who change their sex. See 502 F.3d at 1222
(emphasizing a “traditional binary conception of sex” and “two starkly defined
categories of male and female”). The court’s reasoning is flawed, as the Schroer
decision highlights that discrimination against someone for changing genders is
itself evidence of sex discrimination. 577 F. Supp. 2d at 305-06. Schroer
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analogized to a religious conversion: an employer that fires an individual for
converting from Christianity to Judaism, and that harbors no bias against
Christians or Jews but only converts, has discriminated “because of religion.” Id. at
306. The court concluded that “[n]o court would take seriously the notion that
‘converts’ are not covered by the statute. Discrimination ‘because of religion’
easily encompasses discrimination because of a change of religion.” Id. (emphasis
in original). It follows that discrimination against transgender individuals—those
who have changed their gender expression—“is literally discrimination ‘because of
… sex.’” Id. at 302.
The district court also maintained that “courts have generally required
evidence of gendered statements or acts that target a plaintiff’s conformance with
traditional conceptions of masculinity or femininity.” ROA.841 (RE.T4). To
support its assertion, the district court relied on EEOC v. Boh Brothers and Nichols
v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001), which both
involved Title VII claims alleging male employees were harassed because they
failed to conform to the harassers’ gender stereotypes. See Boh Brothers, 731 F.3d
at 449; Nichols, 256 F.3d at 869. It is certainly accurate that both Boh Brothers and
Nichols involved “evidence of gendered statements or acts that target[ed] [the]
[employees’] conformance with traditional conceptions of masculinity.” But in
those cases, such evidence was integral to demonstrating that harassment occurred
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“because of … sex.” See Boh Bros., 731 F.3d at 457; Nichols, 256 F.3d at 874. It
does not follow from Boh Brothers and Nichols that a transgender individual—who
is “defined as transgender precisely because of the perception that his or her
behavior transgresses gender stereotypes,” Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1316—must provide
such evidence. Again, “evidence of gender stereotyping is simply one means of
proving sex discrimination” in transgender and other sex discrimination claims.
Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *8.
III. A jury could conclude that Sage discriminated against Eure because ofhis sex.
The record evidence presents a genuine dispute of fact as to whether Sage
discriminated against Eure “because of … sex.” A reasonable jury could infer that
Campanian correctly understood that Eure was transgender, given Campanian’s
disparagement of “cross-genders” in reference to Eure. ROA.495. Or, a reasonable
jury could infer—also based on Campanian’s stated animus towards “cross-
genders”—that Campanian perceived Eure as non-conforming with his assigned
sex (female), and that Campanian expected or preferred that Eure look and act
female, rather than dressing and otherwise presenting as male. See ROA.309-10;
ROA.355; ROA.392; ROA.495; ROA.665 (RE.T5).
To begin, a jury could determine that Eure experienced an adverse
employment action. For example, as Brandon testified and Campanian
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acknowledged, Campanian entirely excluded Eure from the instructor schedule,
eliminating his work hours. ROA.249-50; ROA.414-15; ROA.512-13; ROA.672
(RE.T7). The district court also recognized that the record indicated that
Campanian reduced Eure’s work hours. ROA.850-52 (RE.T4). Eure was paid by
the hour, ROA.326, so the reduction in hours was an adverse employment action
that directly affected his compensation. See Thompson v. City of Waco, 764 F.3d
500, 503 (5th Cir. 2014) (“[A]dverse employment actions consist of ‘ultimate
employment decisions’ such as … compensat[ion].”); see also Hinson v. Clinch
Cnty., Ga. Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 821, 829 (5th Cir. 2000) (reduction in pay is
adverse) (citing Doe v. Dekalb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir.
1998)); Corley v. La. ex rel. Div. of Admin., 498 F. App’x 448, 450 (5th Cir. 2012)
(treating “reduction in pay equal to a one-day suspension” as an “ultimate
employment decision”). Eure’s removal from the schedule may also be
characterized as a “loss of job responsibilities . . . [that is] so significant and
material that it rises to the level of an adverse employment action.” Thompson, 764
F.3d at 504.5
5 Sage argued at summary judgment that Eure’s EEOC charge references only
termination—not a reduction in hours—as an adverse employment action.
ROA.168. Eure’s charge states, “Since on or about March 30, 2011, I was taken off
the schedule and have not been allowed to return to work.” ROA.411. Eure’s
reduction-in-hours claim is readily inferred from that statement, and, at a
minimum, falls within “the ‘scope’ of the EEOC investigation which can
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Eure may rely on direct or circumstantial evidence to show that Campanian
discriminated against him by reducing his hours based on his gender-
nonconformity. Campanian’s statements maligning transgender individuals—and
Eure in particular—provide direct evidence of discrimination because they were
“(1) related to the plaintiff’s protected characteristic; (2) proximate in time to the
challenged employment decision; (3) made by an individual with authority over the
challenged employment decision; and (4) related to the challenged employment
decision.” Etienne v. Spanish Lake Truck & Casino Plaza, L.L.C., 778 F.3d 473,
476 (5th Cir. 2015). Here, Campanian’s admonishment to Brandon that “we don’t
hire cross-genders in this company” is directly related to Eure’s protected
characteristic: his gender. ROA.495. A supposed ban on employing “cross-
genders” “prove[s], ‘without inference or presumption, that [gender] was a basis in
employment decisions’” at Sage. Etienne, 778 F.3d at 476 (quoting Jones v.
Robinson Prop. Grp., L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 993 (5th Cir. 2005)). The record
indicates that Campanian expressed hostility towards Eure and his gender shortly
before reducing Eure’s hours. ROA.495; ROA.512-13. Campanian had authority
over the decision to reduce Eure’s hours; in fact, she created the schedule that
reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge.” Young v. City of Houston, 906
F.2d 177, 179 (5th Cir. 1990); see id. (observing that the court’s “scope of inquiry
is not [] limited to the exact charge brought to the EEOC”) (emphasis in original).
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omitted Eure’s hours. ROA.249-50; ROA.512-13. Finally, Campanian’s statements
are related to the reduction in Eure’s hours. Campanian expressed hostility to
employing transgender individuals, exclaiming, “Who the hell hired that?” and
telling Brandon she would “deal with her seriously for hiring that.” ROA.495;
ROA.671 (RE.T7). Campanian’s statements made at the time she reduced Eure’s
hours reflected this same hostility to employing transgender persons: “We’re just
not going to give [Eure] any hours. Just won’t put [Eure] on the schedule.”
ROA.513.
Alternatively, Eure may rely on circumstantial evidence under the burden-
shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04
(1973). Under McDonnell Douglas, Eure may create an initial presumption of
intentional discrimination by establishing a prima facie case. Alvarado v. Tex.
Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 2007). On this record, Eure easily satisfies
the four prongs of the prima facie case. See Willis v. Cleco Corp., 749 F.3d 314,
320 (5th Cir. 2014). First, for the reasons explained above, see supra at 23, Eure is
“a member of a protected group” based on his gender. Willis, 749 F.3d at 320.
Second, Eure “was qualified for the [instructor] position”—a fact Sage does not
seriously contest. Id. Third, Eure “suffered [an] adverse action”: a reduction in
hours and pay. Id. Fourth, by reducing Eure’s hours, Sage “treated [Eure] less
favorably than other similarly situated employees outside the protected group …
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under nearly identical circumstances.” Id. The other San Antonio school instructors
held the same position as Eure, and their hours were listed on the same schedule.
See, e.g., ROA.412-14.
Assuming Sage meets its burden of articulating a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory justification for reducing Eure’s hours, Eure may rebut Sage’s
justification in one of two ways. Alvarado, 492 F.3d at 611. First, Eure may show
that even if Sage’s explanation were true, discrimination also motivated Sage. Id.
Here, given Campanian’s insistence that Sage does not hire “cross-genders,” a jury
could determine that Eure’s gender (or non-conformance with gender stereotypes)
motivated Campanian’s decision to reduce his hours, regardless of any other
justification Sage provides. Second, Eure may establish that Sage’s reason is
pretext for discrimination. Id. For example, if Sage asserts that Campanian omitted
Eure from the schedule because Eure did not attend the alleged April 1 scheduling
meeting, Eure could call that justification into question by pointing out that
Campanian only scheduled the meeting the day before (when Eure was not
present), and emphasizing that a jury could doubt Campanian’s assumption that
Eure was not available to work the following week. At a minimum, Brandon’s and
Campanian’s divergent descriptions of how Campanian excluded Eure from the
schedule raise a genuine issue of material fact supporting Eure’s pretext argument.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Commission respectfully urges this
Court to reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
P. DAVID LOPEZ s/ Anne W. King_____
General Counsel ANNE W. KING
Attorney
CAROLYN L. WHEELER U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
Acting Associate General Counsel OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of General Counsel
LORRAINE C. DAVIS 131 M St. NE, Fifth FloorAssistant General Counsel Washington, DC 20507
(202) 663-4699
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on April 22, 2015, I electronically filed the foregoing
with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit by using the CM/ECF system, which will transmit a Notice of Electronic
Filing to all participants in this case, who are all registered CM/ECF users.
s/ Anne W. King_____
ANNE W. KING
Attorney for the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of General Counsel
131 M St. NE, Fifth Floor
Washington, DC 20507
(202) 663-4699
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
This brief complies with the type-volume limitations of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(7)(B) and Fed. R. App. P. 29(d), because this brief contains 6,282 words,
excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii).
This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because this
brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word
2007 in 14-point Times New Roman font in the body and footnotes of the brief.
s/ Anne W. King___________
Attorney for the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission
Dated: April 22, 2015
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ECF CERTIFICATE
Undersigned counsel certifies that required privacy redactions have been
made pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 25.2.13; the electronic submission is an exact copy of
the paper document pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 25.2.1; and the document has been
scanned for viruses with the most recent version of a commercial virus scanning
program and is free of viruses.
s/ Anne W. King___________
Attorney for the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission
Dated: April 22, 2015
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Uni ted States Cour t of AppealsFIFTH CIRCUIT
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
LYLE W. CAYCE
CLERK
TEL. 504-310-7700
600 S. MAESTRI PLACE
NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130
April 28, 2015
Ms. Anne Warren KingU.S. Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOffice of General Counsel/Appellate Services131 M Street, N.E.Washington, DC 20507
No. 14-51311 Loretta Eure v. Sage Corporation
USDC No. 5:12-CV-1119
Dear Ms. King,
The following pertains to your Amicus Curiae briefelectronically filed on April 22, 2015.
You must submit the seven (7) paper copies of your brief requiredby 5TH CIR. R. 31.1 within five (5) days of the date of this noticepursuant to 5th Cir. ECF Filing Standard E.1.
Sincerely,
LYLE W. CAYCE, Clerk
By: _________________________Nancy F. Dolly, Deputy Clerk504-310-7683
cc:Ms. Demoya R. GordonMr. John Thomas HawkinsMr. Glenn Deutsch LevyMr. Peter C. RennMr. Joe Anthony RiveraMr. Kenneth Dale Upton Jr.Mr. Larry D. Warren
Case: 14-51311 Document: 00513023155 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/22/2015