13.4.ivanova

The Contested Legacy of Rio + 20

Maria Ivanova

Global Environmental Politics, Volume 13, Number 4, November 2013,pp. 1-11 (Article)

Published by The MIT Press

For additional information about this article

Access provided by University of Auckland (7 Nov 2013 04:28 GMT)

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/gep/summary/v013/13.4.ivanova.html

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/gep/summary/v013/13.4.ivanova.html

1

The Contested Legacy of Rio�20 Maria Ivanova

Special Forum on Rio�20

The Contested Legacy of Rio�20•

Maria Ivanova*

In June 2012, nearly ªfty thousand people gathered in Rio de Janeiro forthe largest-ever global environmental summit—the UN Conference on Sustain-able Development (Rio�20). Long before the conference started, observerswere predicting its failure. “Designed with a wide range of objectives, the confer-ence seems destined to fail,” noted Michel Rocard, former prime minister ofFrance. “Without consensus, no action can be taken, and consensus will be im-possible,” he further remarked.1 Indeed, as soon as Brazil’s president DilmaRousseff declared the conference closed, analysts pronounced it a “colossal fail-ure of leadership and vision”2 and said it showed that “governments have givenup on the planet.”3 Many activists also criticized the ªfty-page outcome docu-ment, entitled The Future We Want, as weak and lacking vision. Greenpeacedubbed it “the longest suicide note in history.”4

Indeed, high hopes and expectations for bold commitments by govern-ments to a new, ambitious, collective global vision and concrete action re-mained unfulªlled. Governments renewed their political pledges to sustainabledevelopment but stopped short of concrete and comprehensive targets andtimetables. They committed ªnancial, technological, and institutional re-sources, but not at the scale necessary to address persistent global problems.Progress seemed more palpable on the sidelines of Rio�20 as hundreds of vol-untary commitments sprang up and pledges of over $513 billion poured in. Wasthis global conference another wasteful talk shop or the causal mechanism be-hind aggregate shifts in international politics? What happened at Rio that repre-sented a real change in the context of global environmental governance?

* The author would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their suggestions, as well asMarija Bingulac, Munyaradzi Chenje, Natalia Escobar-Pemberthy, Stanley Johnson, BriceLalonde, Tse Yang Lim, and Ambassador John W. McDonald for comments on earlier drafts.

1. Rocard 2012.2. Leape 2012.3. George Monbiot. “After Rio, We Know. Governments Have Given up on the Planet.” The Guard-

ian, June 25, 2012.4. Kumi Naidoo, Executive Director of Greenpeace International, quoted in Time, June 26, 2012.

Leape 2012.

Global Environmental Politics 13:4, November 2013, doi:10.1162/GLEP_e_00194© 2013 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

In this article, I offer an assessment of the Rio�20 conference grounded ina historical perspective and reºect on its results and consequences. I argue thatthe conference’s impacts are subtle, yet signiªcant. Three main areas stand out:reform of international institutions, sustainable development goals (SDGs),and participation as principle and practice. The global decisions in these do-mains and the unprecedented local engagement provide critical junctures likelyto shape global environmental governance for the next two decades.

The Road to Rio

Rio�20 marked the culmination of forty years of global environmental gover-nance. In 1972, under the motto “Only One Earth,” 113 governments came to-gether for two weeks at the UN Conference on the Human Environment inStockholm. They agreed on a set of global principles, outlined an action agenda,and formed a new UN body to promote international cooperation in the ªeldof the environment—the UN Environment Programme (UNEP).5 Since then,three further “mega-conferences” have deªned the ªeld, created its institutions,and shaped the global narrative:6

• The 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (Rio EarthSummit), with 172 governments and 108 heads of state in attendance.

• The 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (JohannesburgSummit), with 181 governments and 100 heads of state.

• The 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio�20), with188 governments and 105 heads of state.

The title and venue of Rio�20 led many to expect another Rio Earth Sum-mit. In 1992, just after the end of the Cold War, governments outlined a broad,comprehensive vision for sustainable development through the Rio Declarationon Environment and Development; jump-started approval processes for whathave come to be known as the Rio Conventions on Climate, Biodiversity, andDesertiªcation, and agreed on Agenda 21, a 350-page voluntary action plan.They also created a new institution, the Commission on Sustainable Develop-ment, to monitor and report on Agenda 21’s fulªllment.

In the two decades since Rio 1992, global problems have increased innumber and complexity, their interconnectedness requiring collective action atmultiple scales. Yet, while global goals have proliferated, they are rarely met,and multiple environmental indicators show decline. Of the ninety most im-portant global environmental goals, only four showed progress in 2012.7 Mean-while, states have focused on a multitude of domestic and regional problemsmaking global consensus markedly more difªcult. In the run-up to Rio�20,

2 • The Contested Legacy of Rio�20

5. UNGA 1972.6. O’Neill 2007, Seyfang and Jordan 2002.7. UNEP 2012a; 2012b.

Europe was engrossed in the euro crisis; the US was wrestling with economicchallenges following the ªnancial crisis and was embroiled in the 2010 presi-dential elections; the Middle East was in political turmoil, and China and Indiawere experiencing growth and stability concerns. Countries’ visions for the mul-tilateral system have diverged sharply, and political commitment to a shared vi-sion for an economic, social, and environmental future has become increas-ingly difªcult, or perhaps impossible.

Against this backdrop, Rio�20 did not seek to repeat the Rio Earth Sum-mit’s achievements. Instead, its intention was “to secure renewed politicalcommitment for sustainable development, assessing the progress to date andthe remaining gaps in the implementation of the outcomes of the major sum-mits on sustainable development and addressing new and emerging chal-lenges.”8 Seeking to integrate and balance environment, economy, and society,sustainable development remains an aspirational concept with multiple mean-ings for multiple constituencies. It also underscores the reality that there is nosingle overarching solution to contemporary environmental, economic, or so-cial problems—much less so to all of them collectively. The ambiguous ªnaloutcome of Rio�20, The Future We Want, has been perceived both as a mean-ingless potpourri of issues and as a successful outcome of a global gatheringmany considered doomed to failure.

Rio 20: Rapid Assessment

Over the two years preceding Rio�20, governments gathered at three prepara-tory committee meetings (PrepComs), three intersessional meetings, and fourinformal consultations.9 Riddled with political tensions, suspicion, and mis-trust, negotiations were excruciatingly slow. The draft text ballooned from 20 to200 pages, with numerous brackets denoting disputed proposals or concepts.Just days before heads of state were to arrive in Rio, only 37 percent of the draftoutcome document was agreed. Obstacles persisted throughout the negotia-tions in Rio, until the host country stepped in and within twenty-four hoursproduced a revised outcome document. The revisions, mostly decided inclosed-door consultations, eliminated many contentious points and introducedcompromise language for others. This approach contributed to the rapid con-clusion of the negotiations and consensus around the ªnal outcome document.It also, however, raised concerns about the speed with which it was revised and,hence, the requisite sacriªce of transparency and consultation.

On June 22, 2012, political leaders from around the world signed on tothe outcome document. The Future We Want does not present a grand trans-formative vision but reafªrms past political commitments. It covers every possi-

Maria Ivanova • 3

8. UNGA 2010.9. All meetings were held in New York except the third PrepCom, which took place in Rio de Ja-

neiro just before Rio�20.

ble concern under the broad rubric of sustainable development. The documentlists twenty-six thematic areas including biodiversity, climate, water, and energy,environmental and social costs of production and consumption, jobs, social ex-clusion, and equity, among others. While the document highlights the intercon-nectedness among issues that cut through the environmental, economic, andsocial classiªcations, it offers no targets, timelines, or speciªc objectives. Inclu-sive of every possible topic within sustainable development, it does not pri-oritize any areas or express a particular sense of urgency. Its most importantachievement, some observers lamented, was simply that it did not regress.

Yet The Future We Want did achieve what the authorizing resolution(64/236) called for in securing renewed political commitment for sustainabledevelopment. It outlined the reform of environment and sustainable develop-ment institutions; authorized new political processes, including a process on ar-ticulating SDGs; brought a broad spectrum of issues within the sustainable de-velopment mandate; and offered a wide range of actors license to move towardsolving them. Despite signiªcant political constraints and predictions of immi-nent failure, Rio�20 set the agenda of the next two decades for global environ-mental and sustainability governance. As of June 2013, three UN General As-sembly resolutions operationalized the results of Rio�20: 67/203 on Rio�20follow-up, 67/213 on UNEP, and 67/L.72 on the high-level political forum onsustainable development. Another resolution, 67/246, provided a budget ofabout $10 million for follow-up in 2013. Two processes are still in negotiation:on sustainable development goals and on a ªnancing strategy for sustainabledevelopment. The key to understanding Rio�20’s impact lies in discerning thedetail in the broad political statements and the numerous ofªcial and unofªcialactivities that constituted the conference.

Reform of International Institutions

Rio�20’s most important legacy is the reform of the international institutionsfor environment and sustainable development; it altered UNEP’s institutionalform and agreed to abolish the Commission on Sustainable Development. Re-form of UNEP had been the subject of government deliberations for over a dec-ade. Beginning with the 1997 Rio�5 Summit at the UN headquarters, these dis-cussions continued with the preparatory meetings for the 2002 World Summiton Sustainable Development, and subsequently under various auspices in theUN General Assembly and UNEP’s Governing Council.10 Despite systematicpressure from the European Union and a number of scholars to transformUNEP from a subsidiary organ of the UN General Assembly into a specializedagency, governments decided that a dramatic change in UNEP’s institutionalform was neither necessary nor sufªcient for UNEP to fulªll its mandate. Rather,they committed to “strengthen and upgrade” UNEP by expanding its governing


10. Ivanova 2013 (forthcoming).

council from ªfty-eight countries to universal membership; by increasing itsªnancial resources through greater contributions from the UN regular budget;and by expanding its role in capacity building and implementation. The out-come document, UNEP Governing Council decision 27/2 on institutional ar-rangements, and UN General Assembly resolutions 67/213 of December 21,2012, and 67/251 of March 13, 2013, explicitly afªrmed UNEP’s leadership rolein environmental governance. These documents accord UNEP some key at-tributes of a specialized agency—universality, more stable and predictableªnances, and formal authority—without the limitation of a lengthy treaty nego-tiation process.

As a result of Rio�20, UNEP became the only UN subsidiary organ withuniversal membership, as its governing council transformed into the UN Envi-ronment Assembly. This change is expected to grant UNEP greater legitimacyvis-à-vis member states and multilateral environmental agreements. Universalmembership in the environment assembly will formally involve all UN mem-ber states in decision-making, thus according its decisions greater legitimacy. Itwill also allow UNEP greater ability to engage in the work of the conventions.With conferences of the parties comprising from 116 to 197 members, the con-ventions have reportedly been reluctant to accept UNEP as an authority. How-ever, even the UN General Assembly holds no formal authority over the conven-tions, and a specialized agency status would not grant UNEP authority over theconventions without signiªcant amendments to their existing structures. Ulti-mately, UNEP has to earn the necessary inºuence to coordinate and oversee thework of the conventions and produce a coherent response to environmentalchallenges.

Financially, UNEP also emerged in a stronger position. Afªrming the needfor “secure, stable, adequate and predictable ªnancial resources for UNEP,” Res-olution 67/213 committed contributions from the UN regular budget in a man-ner that adequately reºects the organization’s administrative and managementcosts.11 This is an explicit return to Resolution 2997 (XXVII) of December 15,1972, which created UNEP. The new resolution noted that “the costs of servic-ing the Governing Council and providing the small secretariat . . . shall be borneby the regular budget of the United Nations and that operational programmecosts, programme support and administrative costs of the Environment Fundshall be borne by the Fund.”12 Importantly, Resolution 67/213 also requests theUN Secretary-General to ensure that the budgetary resources UNEP receives cor-respond to the scope of its work program, which will increase the share of UNregular budget resources from the current 4 percent of UNEP’s total budget (or$6 million per year).13 Contributions from the UN regular budget to UNEP’score operational needs would serve a role similar to that of assessed contribu-

Maria Ivanova • 5

11. UNGA 2013b.12. UNGA 1972.13. Scanlon 2012, p. 3.

tions in specialized agencies, a stable and predictable amount providing cer-tainty for a core budget. UNEP could then raise program resources through en-trepreneurial means. Indeed, support for UNEP at Rio�20 went beyondrhetoric and came from unexpected quarters. China’s premier and Brazil’s presi-dent announced contributions of $6 million each, putting them among UNEP’stop twenty donors.14

Through the renewed political commitment to UNEP, countries formallyafªrmed the organization’s mandate in its entirety—from the initial General As-sembly resolution to the latest political declaration. They emphasized that itwas important for UNEP to enhance its voice and ability to realize its coordina-tion mandate, by increasing its engagement in key coordination bodies and byleading efforts to formulate UN system-wide strategies on the environment. Im-portantly, governments afªrmed a greater role for UNEP in helping nation statesto build capacity and implement environmental commitments, a role thatwould bring the organization closer to on-the-ground activities.

In a rare institutional reform move, governments decided to abolish theCommission on Sustainable Development (CSD)—the central institutionaloutcome of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit—and replace it with a high-level inter-governmental political forum. Despite several attempts to revamp its programof work and its format, the CSD had failed to catalyze sufªcient political com-mitment and action. Its futile negotiations (such as in 2007 on energy and cli-mate change) illustrated the “fundamental disagreements between states on thenature, scope and ambition of the sustainable development agenda and therole, relevance and value of the CSD itself.”15 Unable to address contemporaryglobal challenges and add value to existing processes, the CSD had come to beseen as ineffective and even counterproductive. Moreover, opposition to theCSD came from many UN agencies, which saw its efforts as duplicative, particu-larly in the environmental ªeld.

The core functions of the new high-level political forum are to provide po-litical leadership for sustainable development, follow up and review progress inimplementation of sustainable development commitments, enhance integra-tion of the three dimensions of sustainable development in a holistic and cross-sectoral manner at all levels, and provide an action-oriented agenda, ensuringdue consideration of new and emerging challenges.16 The forum will convene atthe heads of state level in the General Assembly every four years beginning in2014, and annually at the ministerial level in the Economic and Social Council.The ambitious mandate carries the power for more effective coordination andintegration of sustainable development at all levels. It also poses the peril ofvacuous promises if not properly operationalized and executed.

Rio�20’s outcome document and the General Assembly resolution creat-


14. Ivanova 2011.15. IISD 2007.16. UNGA 2013a, para 2.

ing the forum set out a comprehensive vision for a new UN institution, but theydo not provide a clear division of labor between the environment and sustain-able development institutions. Thus the potential for overlap, duplication, andcompetition between the new forum, UNEP, other UN institutions, and multi-lateral environmental agreements remains signiªcant and threatens to perpetu-ate the dynamic that led to the institutional reform in the ªrst place.

Sustainable Development Goals

Many observers agree that one of the most important outcomes of Rio�20 wasthe agreement to set global SDGs.17 Inspired by the millennium developmentgoals (MDGs), which are set to expire in 2015, the SDGs will focus on priorityareas for sustainable development and apply to both developed and developingcountries. The MDGs have underscored the power of a global vision. They havemobilized political attention, fostered public awareness, harnessed resources,and induced governments and others to collect and produce new data and in-formation. The SDGs, suggested by Colombia and Guatemala and supported bymultiple international scientiªc and political panels, have similarly gained po-litical center stage. Envisioned as comprehensive and universal, the SDGs willseek to frame the nexus between basic human needs, environmental sustain-ability, social equity, and governance tools.

To develop the goals, governments established a new intergovernmentalprocess, overseen by the UN General Assembly and open to all stakeholders. OnJanuary 22, 2013, the UN General Assembly adopted a decision (67/555) to es-tablish the open working group on SDGs, which the Rio�20 outcome docu-ment envisioned as comprising thirty representatives from the ªve UN regionalgroups, nominated by member states. Selecting thirty countries, however, hasproven more difªcult than expected, as most member states demand to be en-gaged in the process, which they perceive will shape the new global goals. Oncedeveloped, the goals will likely chart the course of sustainable development forthe coming decades. They are also likely to inºuence ofªcial development assis-tance priorities, much like their predecessors, the MDGs. The ªnal compositionof the group has therefore grown from thirty to seventy countries. Chaired byHungary and Kenya, the group expects to deliver results in February 2014.

Participation as Principle and Practice

Rio�20 called for increased global engagement in environmental governance.The outcome document reºected the evolving global norm for participation—from the “full and effective participation of all countries in decision making

Maria Ivanova • 7

17. Interview with André Correa do Lago. Center for Governance and Sustainability at University ofMassachusetts Boston, in Nairobi Kenya, February 19, 2013; Evans and Steven 2012; LouiseGray. “Rio�20 Agree to ‘Sustainable Development Goals’ Says, Caroline Spelman.” The Tele-graph, June 20, 2012; Griggs et al. 2013; Iguchi et al. 2012; Melamed and Ladd 2013.

processes” to enhancing the participation and “effective engagement” of civilsociety in multiple governance aspects.18 Paragraphs 42 to 55 of the outcomedocument afªrm the commitment to engage non-state actors in “processes thatcontribute to decision-making, planning and implementation of policies andprogrammes for sustainable development at all levels.” While a broad norm ofparticipation had been in existence, governments began to apply it more force-fully after Rio�20. In negotiations during the ªrst universal UNEP governingcouncil in 2013, some governments insisted, in the face of opposition, that civilsociety participation in deliberations on environmental matters be explicitly re-quired within the new UN Environment Assembly. This norm has also beenadopted in the new high-level political forum on sustainable development,where it extended beyond the traditional nine major groups to explicitly in-clude academic institutions and other stakeholders.19

During the 10 days of the conference, 4,000 side events took place in Rio,500 of them at the ofªcial conference center. Myriad local initiatives havesprung up in cities and on campuses across the planet. Governments, busi-nesses, civil society groups, and universities registered over 600 voluntary com-mitments in energy, transport, green economy, disaster reduction, desertiªca-tion, water, forests, agriculture and more, and mobilized over $513 billion tomeet them. The “people’s summit”—organized as a counter-conference acrossthe city—brought together 15,000 people looking for alternatives to the ofªcialgovernment processes under the banner, “Come re-invent the world.”

Meanwhile, acknowledging the feebleness of previous commitments fromthe private sector, two hundred CEOs met in their own parallel event—the Busi-ness Action for Sustainable Development Conference—to encourage businessto implement change at scale. Leaders of thirty-seven banks, investment funds,and insurance companies signed on to the Natural Capital Declaration, com-mitting to “help build an understanding of their impacts and dependencies onnatural capital; embed natural capital into their products and services; reportor disclose on the theme of natural capital; and account for natural capitalin accounting frameworks.”20 Thirty prominent insurance companies worthover $5 trillion launched the Principles for Sustainable Insurance, aiming to greenthe sector and provide insurance tools for risk management. Hundreds ofjudges, chief justices, and prosecutor generals gathered at the World Congresson Justice in Rio to articulate the role of courts in environmental policy. Thou-sands of students and faculty from across the world engaged in Rio�20 asthinkers and doers, articulating education and sustainability goals and initia-tives in campuses and communities worldwide.

Civil society engagement in articulating a new global vision for sustain-able development has continued beyond the conference. UN Secretary-General


18. UNGA 2012, para 76(e), 76(h).19. UNGA 2013a, para 16.20. Natural Capital Declaration 2012.

Ban Ki-moon convened a high-level panel to advise on the global developmentagenda beyond 2015 and “prepare a bold yet practical development vision . . .for a global post-2015 agenda with shared responsibilities for all countries andwith the ªght against poverty and sustainable development at its core.”21 Co-chaired by the presidents of Indonesia and Liberia and the prime minister of theUK, the panel includes eminent people from government, academia, NGOs,and business and has engaged in a sustained dialogue with civil society aroundthe world.

Rio 20’s Legacy

Mega-conferences have been both criticized as wasteful talk shops,22 and laudedas the causal mechanisms behind aggregate shifts in international politics.23

Commentators question the utility of global conferences as political gatheringsbut acknowledge their power to draw together large numbers of people with thenecessary commitment, energy, and enthusiasm to make a change in their com-munities and around the world. Rio�20 looks to have proven both correct.

Under the banner of sustainable development, Rio�20 could not zero inon a handful of issues; it had to tackle all. The long list of concerns, lack of clearpriorities, and reafªrmation of past principles created a sense of endless andeven meaningless discussion. Though verbose and cautious, The Future We Wantafªrmed that the problems of today are similar to those the world faced in pre-ceding decades but bigger and more interconnected. Despite its ºaws, Rio�20brought together political capital in ways that would not have been possiblewithout the focus of the conference. As a result, governments completed thelong-standing institutional reform process, offered options for rethinkingªnancing, recommended the creation of SDGs, and conªrmed participation as acore principle and practice.

While it may be too soon to assess Rio�20’s results for global affairs, itsimpact on Rio de Janeiro offers a glimpse into what is possible when global po-litical gatherings catalyze political action. The conference brought sustainabilityinto the mainstream media and into everyday conversations in the host city; itcatalyzed grass-roots political activism and national political leadership. Apublic opinion survey showed that 74 percent of Rio residents knew about theconference and its goals. An estimated 200,000 people ºowed through the Hu-manity 2012 exhibit near Copacabana Fort that showed a possible model of de-velopment integrating economic prosperity, social inclusion, and environmen-tal stewardship.24 Rio’s municipal government issued permits for twenty-threedemonstrations, the largest of which brought together thousands of protestersconcerned about the lack of progress on sustainability and global justice. At the

Maria Ivanova • 9

21. UN 2012.22. Fomerand 1996.23. Haas 2002, 74.24. The Christian Science Monitor, June 24, 2012.

same time, Brazilian governors signed the 2012 Rio Declaration, committing to20-percent reduction in energy consumption in public buildings and emissionsfrom transportation by 2020. Rio’s City Hall proposed tax incentives for greenconstruction. Banco do Brasil announced a large loan to clean up the lagoons inBarra da Tijuca. And the Brazilian government announced the creation of Rio�Centre, the World Centre for Sustainable Development, which will engagein knowledge creation and dissemination locally and globally. In essence,Rio�20’s lasting legacy will likely be subtle yet signiªcant through the institu-tions it reformed, the values it reafªrmed, the global goals it launched, and thelocal initiatives it inspired. Indeed, it might just be the critical juncture catalyz-ing the formation of a new group of leaders, the adaptive, perceptive leaders oftomorrow attuned to local realities, globally.

ReferencesEvans, Alex, and David Steven. 2012. Sustainable Development Goals—A useful outcome

from Rio 20. New York, NY: NYU Center of International Cooperation.Fomerand, Jacques. 1996. UN Conferences: Media Events or Genuine Diplomacy? Global

Governance 2 (3): 361–375.Griggs, David, Mark Stafford-Smith, Owen Gaffney, Johan Rockström, Marcus C.

Öhman, Priya Shyamsundar, Will Steffen, Gisbert Glaser, Norichika Kanie, and IanNoble. 2013. Policy: Sustainable Development Goals for People and Planet. Nature495 (7441): 305–307.

Haas, Peter. 2002. UN Conferences and Constructivist Governance of the Environment.Global Governance 8 (1): 73–91.

The Hufªngton Post. 2012. Rio�20 Conference: Hopes and Expectations Before UNSummit June 14. Available at http://www.hufªngtonpost.com/2012/06/14/rio-20-conference-hopes-expectations_n_1593171.html, accessed January 29, 2013.

Iguchi, Masahiko, Simon Hoiberg Olsen, and Ikuho Miyazawa. 2012. Current Outlookon the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): A Brief Analysis of Country Posi-tions. Tokyo, Japan: Tokyo Tech / IGES / UNU-IAS.

IISD (International Institute for Sustainable Development). 2007. Summary of the Fif-teenth Session of the Commission on Sustainable Development: 30 April–11 May.Earth Negotiations Bulletin 5 (254).

Ivanova, Maria. 2011. Financing International Environmental Governance: Lessons from theUnited Nations Environment Programme. Governance and Sustainability Issue BriefSeries: Brief 1. Center for Governance and Sustainability: University of Massa-chusetts Boston. Available at http://www.umb.edu/cgs/publications/issue_brief_series, accessed May 2, 2013.

———. 2013. Reforming the Institutional Framework for Environment and SustainableDevelopment: Rio�20’s Subtle but Signiªcant Impact. International Journal of Tech-nology Management & Sustainable Development. 12 (3): forthcoming.

Leape, Jim. WWF (World Wide Fund for Nature). 2012. Statement to the United NationsConference on Sustainable Development. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Available at:http://wwf.panda.org/?205343/WWF-Rio20-closing-statement, accessed June 11,2013.


Melamed, Clare and Paul Ladd. 2013. How to Build Sustainable Development Goals:Integrating Human Development and Environmental Sustainability in a NewGlobal Agenda. Research Report. London, UK: Overseas Development Institute.

Natural Capital Declaration. 2012. 37 Finance CEOs Announce Commitment on NaturalCapital at Rio�20. Available at http://www.naturalcapitaldeclaration.org/2012/06/37-ªnance-ceos-announce-commitment-on-natural-capital-at-rio20/, accessedJanuary 29, 2013.

O’Neill, Kate. 2007. From Stockholm to Johannesburg and Beyond: The Evolving Meta-Regime for Global Environmental Governance. Unpublished paper presented atthe Amsterdam Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global EnvironmentalChange, Amsterdam, Netherlands.

Rocard, Michel. 2012. Don’t Blame it on Rio. February 22. Available at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/don-t-blame-it-on-rio, accessed January 29,2013.

Scanlon, John E. 2012. Enhancing Environmental Governance for Sustainable Development:Function-Oriented Options. Governance and Sustainability Issue Brief Series: Brief 5.Center for Governance and Sustainability: University of Massachusetts Boston.Available at http://www.umb.edu/cgs/publications/issue_brief_series, accessedMay 2, 2013.

Seyfang, Gill, and Andrew Jordan. 2002. The Johannesburg Summit and Sustainable De-velopment: How Effective Are Environmental Conferences? In Yearbook of Interna-tional Co-operation on Environment and Development 2002/2003, edited by OlavSchram Stokke and Øystein B. Thommessen, 19–39. London: Earthscan Publica-tions.

UN (United Nations). 2012. UN Secretary-General Appoints High-Level Panel on Post-2015 Development Agenda. Note to Correspondents. July 31. Available at http://www.un.org/sg/offthecuff/index.asp?nid�2455, accessed May 2, 2013.

UNEP (United Nations Environmental Programme). 2012a. Global Environmental Out-look (GEO-5). Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations.

———. 2012b. Measuring Progress: Environmental Goals & Gaps. Nairobi, Kenya: UnitedNations Environment Programme.

UNGA (United Nations General Assembly). 1972. Resolution 2997 (XXVIII): Institu-tional and Financial Arrangements for Environmental Cooperation, December 15.

———. 2010. Implementation of Agenda 21, the Programme for the Further Implementa-tion of Agenda 21 and the Outcomes of the World Summit on Sustainable Devel-opment. A/64/236.31, March 31.

———. 2012. The Future We Want. A/66/L.56, July 27.———. 2013a. Format and Organization aspects of the high-level political forum on sus-

tainable development. A/67/L.72, June 27.———. 2013b. Report of the Governing Council of the United Nations Environment

Programme on its twelfth special session and the implementation of Section IV.C,entitled Environmental pillar in the context of sustainable development, of theoutcome document of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Develop-ment. A/RES/67/213, March 15.

Maria Ivanova • 11

13.4.ivanova

Documents