(114287633) romania country report

8/13/2019 (114287633) Romania Country Report

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BTI 2012 | Romania Country Report

Status Index 1-10 8.17

# 16 of

Political Transformation 1-10 8.55 1! of 128

"conomic Transformation 1-10 #.#$ 1$ of 128

Management Index 1-10 6.3

5

# 2% of

128

scale& 1 'lo(est) to 10 '*i+*est) score ran, tren

T*is report is part of t*e Bertelsmann tiftun+/s Transformation Ine 'BTI)

2012. T*e BTI is a +loal assessment of transition processes in (*ic* t*e

state of emocracy an mar,et economy as (ell as t*e uality of political

mana+ement in 128 transformation an e3elopin+ countries are e3aluate.

4ore on t*e BTI at * tt p & ( ( (.t i-p r o ec t. o r+

Please cite as follo(s& Bertelsmann tiftun+7 BTI 2012 Romania Country

Report. 9:terslo*& Bertelsmann tiftun+7 2012.

; 2012 Bertelsmann tiftun+7 9:terslo*
http://www.bti-project.org/http://www.bti-project.org/


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BTI 2012 | Romania2

Key Indicators

Population mn. 21 142

Pop. +ro(t*1 ?


3/28

BTI 2012 | Romania8

El crecimiento del P3B cay# del :9 al =9 , y el consumo interno y los in"resos *iscales se redu+o

sustancialmente .

Por lo tanto , las opciones del "obierno se han reducido < De repente , los "obiernos utili)an para repartir

privile"ios de entrada a la clientela y hacer populistas "estos pre 7 electorales a los principales "rupos

interesados tuvieron que en*rentar decisiones di*ciles entre el "asto y hacer las medidas de austeridad

inmediatas para restablecer el equilibrio *iscal, mientras se empu+a a trav$s de lar"o estrate"ias a lar"o pla)o

para la recuperaci#n econ#mica .

El espectro de *iesta en Rumania lo"r# desarrollar ms all de la vie+a dicotoma de post7 comunistas y laoposici#n democrtica , y los lderes del partido de las personas y su entorno se volvi# menos importante que

el per*il socioecon#mico y una mayor pertinencia social de las partes. %in embar"o , la crisis no lo"r#

impulsar a las partes a la acci#n con+unta y la responsabilidad .

6 pesar de las decisiones polticas de la poblaci#n eran bastante estables , los lderes polticos del PD( y la

politiquera pre*erido P%D y el partido los intereses de la elaboraci#n de una estrate"ia nacional de crisis.

Durante el apo"eo de la crisis , Rumania *ue "obernada por una coalici#n P(D 7P%D caracteri)ado por las

luchas internas , un "obierno en minora y un d$bil "obierno interino . >o hubo casos de in+erencia poltica

de mano dura del presidente , la politi)aci#n de los tribunales constitucionales y el uso de todos los

instrumentos polticos permitidos por la onstituci#n 7 y al"unos otros

7 Para el en"randecimiento de las propias partes. Esto proporcion# ni la "esti#n de crisis tan necesaria ni una

me+ora en el mnimo hist#rico de la con*ian)a p-blica en la poltica. En este contexto , es mila"roso que

partidos extremistas no "anaron terreno.

En 2 se llev# a ayuda *inanciera , orientaci#n sustancial de poltica y presi#n por parte de las

instituciones *inancieras internacionales y de la /ni#n Europea para hacer el cambio de rumbo del "obierno

rumano y promul"ar polticas serias para *renar la corrupci#n , re*ormar el poder +udicial y la administraci#n

y la adopci#n de al"unas medidas de austeridad impopulares . 4isi#n poltica , el cora+e y la responsabilidad

eran no peque;a parte inducida por los socios externos y por una sociedad civil cada ve) ms *irme .


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BTI 2012 | Romania?

6 pesar de una estrate"ia de avance despu$s de la toma del poder comunista en !?@ 7 !?: , el sistema

poltico de pos"uerra ha perpetuado al"unos de los d$*icits de la $poca anterior a la "uerra , especialmente

durante la -ltima d$cada del r$"imen de >icolae eausescu . /na ve) ms , un modelo externo de la

moderni)aci#n se in+ert# en una realidad rumana. (as elites polticas continuaron a percibir el Estado y el

aparato burocrtico como de su propiedad y no como un instrumento de poltica. Esto dio como resultado el

nepotismo rampante, estatismo y las re*ormas simuladas , incluso en el ms liberal d$cada si"uiente

!A@ . 6 principios de != , la combinaci#n de una poltica exterior aut#noma y m$todos estalinistas a la

moderni)aci#n y el control interno ha se"uido su curso , lo que resulta en la movili)aci#n nacionalista y ladecadencia econ#mica.

>o hubo oposici#n abierta e in*luyente , en parte porque el clan eausescu monopoli)# movili)aci#n

nacional &ista ' y reprimi# cualquier disidencia or"ani)ada o voces independientes dentro del partido. (a

revoluci#n de !=! *ue esencialmente una lucha de poder entre los di*erentes se"mentos de la nomenclatura

ms que el comien)o prometedor de una trans*ormaci#n poltica. Por lo tanto , a pesar de Rumania *ue el

-nico pas de Europa entral y del Este para presenciar un *inal violento hacia el comunismo , el resultado

neto *ue "eneralmente considerado como ms de una 5revoluci#n de palacio5 en la nomenclatura de una

clara ruptura con el pasado. 6l ser altamente descon*iados de la economa de mercado y la democracia

pluralista , y *rente a al"unas claras desventa+as en comparaci#n con la mayora de los otros pases europeos,

la /E y Estados adherentes del Este , Rumania cada ve) ms se qued# atrs en el proceso de re*orma.

uando la oposici#n democrtica , *inalmente, "an# las elecciones presidenciales y parlamentarias en

!!A , las expectativas eran elevados. El nuevo "obierno de centro7derecha del presidente

onstantinescu y la onvenci#n Dem#crata de Rumania & DR ' inici# la reestructuraci#n de la industria

pesada y la minera , los a"u+eros ne"ros econ#micos liquidados , consolidaron el sistema bancario, la

privati)aci#n de varias "randes empresas de propiedad estatal, la liberali)aci#n de la mayora de los precios

de los insumos y establecieron la plena convertibilidad de la Rumania de moneda. 6 medida que los distintos

"obiernos DR diri"idas carecan de coordinaci#n poltica y no lo"raron resolver sus di*erencias polticas

internas , que perdi# la presidencia y la mayora en el Parlamento en 2. Este perodo tuvo un me+or

re"istro de la dinmica de re*orma de la e+ecuci#n real. 3on 3liescu *ue ele"ido &de nuevo ' como presidente y

un "obierno minoritario del P%D liderado por 6drian >astase, entr# en la o*icina con el apoyo de la /D1R .

omo resultado , aquellos que haban tomado el poder tras la cada de eausescu en la revoluci#n de

diciembre !=! estaban de vuelta en la o*icina . (a poltica de a*icionado del presidente onstantinescu y la

onvenci#n Dem#crata de centro7derecha &!!A 7 2' cre# la re*orma *ati"a y poltica desencanto entre el

electorado . (a impresi#n "eneral de *racaso de la poltica era s#lo parcialmente +usti*icada , pero a;ade a la

incertidumbre extrema y las privaciones entre los que perdieron en las re*ormas.

1ientras que muchos polticos de la primera y se"unda presidencia 3liescu &!! 7 !!A' volvieron al poder

5 ms triste y ms sabio 5 en 2 despu$s de cuatro a;os en la oposici#n , la mayora de los partidos

polticos cuentan ahora con la "esti#n de ms +oven , por primera ve) desde la revoluci#n de diciembre de

!=!. (a estabilidad del sistema poltico , sin embar"o, ha sido en"a;osa y est basado en el control astuto y

clientelismo en lu"ar de una cultura constructiva de elaboraci#n de polticas. Re*ormas simuladas , estatismo

, la ret#rica nacionalista y distinciones borrosas entre el Estado , los partidos y el sector privado si"uen

siendo


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BTI 2012 | Romania@

muy presente en Rumania. En "eneral , el nuevo "obierno de i)quierda ha hecho me+or que la mayora de los

analistas predicen , probablemente debido a que las expectativas populares se encontraban en su punto ms

ba+o de todos los tiempos y porque el proceso de inte"raci#n de la /E prest# asistencia muy necesaria , as

como el marco bsico y los incentivos para la re*orma. (a "esti#n de los equilibrios macroecon#micos *ue

especialmente 7 y hasta cierto punto sorprendente 7 (as prestaciones de re 7 etiquetado P%D , y un buen

control sobre el "asto p-blico abandon# el pas con muy ba+o d$*icit a *inales de 2? . Tambi$n lo"raronconcluir todos los captulos del acervo ne"ociados con la /ni#n Europea , aunque con notables se;ales de

alerta sobre el poder +udicial, la lucha contra la corrupci#n y la preparaci#n institucional para los *ondos de

la /E.

(as re*ormas econ#micas de Rumana su*rieron al"unas condiciones marco que limitan , incluida la "esti#n

errtica y vacilante apoyo popular para la trans*ormaci#n econ#mica y poltica. El tama;o de la economa

nacional y el predominio de una a"ricultura poco mecani)ada, por una parte , y deteriorado , los comple+os

industriales obsoletas , por otra parte , han hecho de la trans*ormaci#n particularmente di*cil. eausescu

in*li"ido mucho da;o en su b-squeda de la autarqua , mediante el pa"o de la deuda externa a costa del

consumo interno y la inversi#n en bienes de equipo .

(a mayora de los "obiernos han sido reacios a poner en marcha re*ormas que impondran di*icultades

temporales y con ello hacerlos impopulares , mientras que el !!A 7 2 DR coalici#n y la

2 los "obiernos se destacan como excepciones.

(a primera d$cada de la transici#n *ue parali)ado por dudas sobre la liberali)aci#n de precios y la reducci#n

del empleo, la producci#n de los le"ados de mal cr$dito, los retrasos en la privati)aci#n a "ran escala y el

desempleo oculto. (os cambios de "obierno y la ausencia de un plan coherente con su*iciente apoyo p-blico

y poltico se han traducido en polticas trans*ormadoras errticas , especialmente con respecto a la

privati)aci#n y sus leyes en constante cambio y los marcos institucionales. Esto ha hecho que tanto la

poblaci#n rumana y los inversores internacionales extremadamente cauto. En "eneral, las dudas sobre la

participaci#n en una pro*unda trans*ormaci#n ha sido autodestructiva . (os recursos crticos de las polticas

constructivas se han a"otado por la p$rdida del impulso inicial y la *alta de competitividad para la inversi#n

occidental en el anti"uo bloque del Este. inalmente , la crisis de

2! 7 2 lo"r# me+orar la disciplina de re*orma en Bucarest.


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BTI 2012 | RomaniaA

"l BTI comina el anHlisis e teto y e3aluaciones numricas. @a puntuaciGn ecaacuestiGn se proporciona por eao e su respecti3o tFtulo. @a escala 3a e 10

'meor) a 1 'peor).

"stao e TransformaciGn

I. transformaciGn polFtica

1 " Statenesspre+unta

puntuaciGn

El monopolio del Estado sobre el uso de la *uer)a es indiscutible en todo el

territorio. Discurso autonomista y secesionista entre al"unos representantes de la

minora h-n"ara ha entrado en el debate poltico, pero no representa una amena)a

para la soberana del Estado. El extremista Partido vico 0-n"aro &P0' si"ue

siendo una *uer)a poltica mar"inal ya que la mayora de los rumanos h-n"aros

voto para el establecimiento /D1R.

"l monopolio

el uso e la

fuerJa

10

Por tradici#n hist#rica , el concepto rumano del estado7naci#n se de*ine con *uer)a en

t$rminos de ori"en $tnico . (a onstituci#n rumana de*ine la naci#n en t$rminos

$tnicos & 5 la soberana nacional reside en el pueblo rumano 5' y o*rece las "arantas

normales del constitucionalismo liberal. (os intentos de introducir un concepto cvico

de identidad que incluye la *uerte h-n"aro y minoras romanes hasta ahora han

*racasado en encontrar la aceptaci#n ms all de los textos le"ales *ormales . (a

inte"raci#n de los romanes , en particular, se ve obstaculi)ada por los estereotipos

"enerali)ados y prcticas discriminatorias. %oporte para nacionalista extremista,

abiertamente partidos y movimientos antisemitas y xen#*obos han ido disminuyendo

desde hace al"unos a;os &por e+emplo , los extremistas , xen#*obas y antisemitas

Partido de la Cran Rumania & PR1 ' recibi# 8 9 de los votos en las elecciones de

2? , pero s#lo 8 9 y nin"-n esca;o en las elecciones parlamentarias de 2= ' . (a

evidencia de la vida p-blica y la ret#rica poltica , sin embar"o, indica que las

percepciones sociales de la ciudadana puede estar *uera de sintona con las

estipulaciones constitucionales que "aranti)an los derechos civiles y que las actitudes

discriminatorias arrai"adas a-n persisten en la sociedad.

%in embar"o, la onstituci#n del Estado y la ciudadana o*icial no son directamente

desa*iados, y el apoyo a los extremistas polticos absolutos parece estar

disminuyendo< El PR1 lo"r# lle"ar a la se"unda vuelta de las elecciones

presidenciales de 2, pero en el 2= elecciones parlamentarias tanto en el PR1

y el partido *ascista de >ueva Ceneraci#n Dem#crata ristiana &P>CD' no pudo

pasar el umbral del @9. (a Ret#rica Poltica y la prctica cotidiana lo hacen, sin

embar"o, se desvan sustancialmente de conceptos inclusivistas de la naci#n y los

derechos civiles. 6 pesar de esto, hay que se;alar que el /1DR ha desempe;ado un

papel relativamente importante y estable en la poltica rumana.

la ientiael "stao

$


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BTI 2012 | Romania:

Desde el *in del comunismo, la 3"lesia rtodoxa de Rumania se ha mantenidoindependiente de la poltica, y el do"ma reli"ioso no ha tenido un impacto en la

poltica de los Estados. (as leyes sobre el re"istro contin-an siendo obstculos para

denominaciones menores, al i"ual que la distinci#n del "obierno entre las i"lesias

reconocidas y no reconocidas. El n-mero de incidentes en los que la inter*erencia se

produce a pesar de la libertad "aranti)ada por la onstituci#n de la reli"i#n parece

estardisminuyendo.o *ay

interferencia e

los o+mas

reli+iosos

$

Rumania ha re*ormado sus instituciones estatales desde !=! con el aumento de la

asistencia y orientaci#n de la /E. (as estructuras administrativas y la asi"naci#n

de recursos abarcan todo el pas. El proceso de adhesi#n a la /E y la situaci#n de

Rumana como miembro de la /E a partir de 2: tienen la administraci#n bsicaconsolidarse y las *unciones del Estado en todo el pas. De*iciencias locales se

mantienen, pero la cobertura y la calidad est me+orando

"radualmente

.aministraci

Gn Hsica

1

0

2 " artici$aci%n o&'tica

(as elecciones en el perodo ob+eto de examen comprenden las elecciones

parlamentarias en noviembre de 2= , las elecciones europeas en +unio de

2! y las elecciones presidenciales en noviembre de 2! & "an# por un

estrecho mar"en por el Basescu corresponde ' . Todos *ueron reportados como

libres y +ustas, pero los in*ormes sobre el *raude , las campa;as y la

manipulaci#n poco $tica , as como incriminaciones mutuas eran per+udiciales

para la situaci#n de las instituciones democrticas . (a radio y la ses"ada

cobertura televisiva de varias elecciones se critic# una ve) ms. bviamente ,

la 6utoridad Electoral Permanente reci$n creado no como un supervisor

independiente. (as elecciones presidenciales , en particular, se determinaron

por los escndalos y la polari)aci#n . %in embar"o , el hecho de que las

elecciones y los procesos de *ormaci#n de coaliciones posteriores

*uncionaban sin ries"os que se presentan en el sistema de representaci#n

democrtica muestra que el panorama poltico rumano se ha consolidado y los

procedimientos democrticos han sido aceptadas , a pesar de todo el da;o

causado a la con*ian)a p-blica en poltica. >o hay restricciones relevantes de

+ure al su*ra"io , y nin"-n "rupo se les impide la e+ecuci#n de sus derechos

electorales pasivos o activos . %#lo los altos umbrales para *iestas & @ 9' y de

alian)as polticas & = 9 7 9 ' han sido criticadas por ser ses"ada a *avor de

los los principales contendientes , lo que resulta en una p$rdida sustancial de

votos .

@as elecciones liresy 6ustas

$

Democratically elected rulers do have e**ective poFer to "overn. >o political

enclaves exist, althou"h some interest "roups and staGeholders have

disproportionate political in*luence and may be vieFed as possessin" limited veto

poFers. 1ana"ers *rom state and private corporations and trade unions have the

poFer to blocG re*orm processes, meanin" that Romania ranGs hi"h in state capture

indices. Because democratically elected representatives and institutions tend to

"ffecti3e po(er to

+o3ern

$


8/28

bloquean entre s, parte de la responsabilidad por la continuidad y la "obernabilidad se ha despla)ado a

los escalones ms ba+os de la ener"a en el centro &en lu"ar de ser descentrali)ado'. 6dhesi#n a la /E

requiere un alto nivel de poder "ubernamental e*ectiva y la no7 existencia de enclaves de poder de veto.

!! onstituci#n de Rumania "aranti)a las libertades civiles y polticas habituales ,

incluida la libertad de expresi#n , asociaci#n y reuni#n . En la prctica , la asociaci#n

de la sociedad civil y los derechos de monta+e se ven obstaculi)ados por la va

administrativa , y las actividades de los no deseados, las or"ani)aciones no

"ubernamentales crticos estn obstruidas , tanto a nivel local como nacional. (os

partidos polticos y or"anismos "ubernamentales han tratado recientemente de cooptar

o emplear representantes de la sociedad civil, particularmente crticas o las >C . Por

otra parte, tratan de desacreditar a las campa;as de despresti"io reali)adas a trav$s de

medios de comunicaci#n polticamente ses"adas. En 2= se aprob# una ley

retroactiva de las disposiciones poco claras que requieren las asociaciones y

*undaciones que se disuelven si al"uien considera que su nombre censurable. 6unque

la ley *ue modi*icada a principios de 2! , esto es un si"no de la constante presi#n que

los "rupos crticos tienen que vivir en Rumania. 3r#nicamente , los partidos de

oposici#n actualmente parecen ms preocupados que la "obierno limitando la sociedad

civil.

sociaciGn 5

los erec*os emonta6e1

0

(as libertades de opini#n y de prensa son "eneralmente prote"idos

adecuadamente. 6unque la mayora de los medios de comunicaci#n si"uen

teniendo una pre*erencia poltica clara, la cultura de la in*ormaci#n poltica est

cambiando, y la inter*erencia poltica abierta est disminuyendo. En t$rminos de

anlisis en pro*undidad y el inter$s p-blico en la alta poltica, se puede

ar"umentar que la in*ormaci#n poltica se ha deteriorado rpidamente en los

-ltimos a;os.

(as medidas adoptadas no han lo"rado cambiar el hecho bsico de que el

pro*esionalismo periodstico es a menudo recha)ada por los intereses creados y

las a*iliaciones polticas de los propietarios de los medios de comunicaci#n. El

hecho de que varias or"ani)aciones no "ubernamentales clave priori)an la

libertad de prensa y el acceso a la in*ormaci#n indica que no todo est bien en los

medios rumanos. Del mismo modo, el hecho de que el onse+o de De*ensa>acional identi*ica los medios de comunicaci#n como una amena)a a la

se"uridad en su proyecto de estrate"ia de 2 no au"ura nada bueno para la

libertad de los medios de comunicaci#n como un derecho *undamental.

@ierta eepresiGn

8

3 " (stado de )erec*o

(os poderes del Estado en Rumania son independientes, la onstituci#n establece la

separaci#n de poderes y los controles y equilibrios en el sistema poltico. 6l i"ual

que la anterior tira y a*lo+a entre el presidente y el primer ministro cohabitaci#n, el

nuevo remolcador de la "uerra entre el P%D y el PD( ha comprometido seriamente

la separaci#n de poderes, la posici#n aut#noma del Parlamento y la posici#n del

Tribunal onstitucional *uera de la politiquera. Esto es, una ve) ms indicativo de

la *alta de respeto de la $lite poltica de la separaci#n de poderes y el

procedimient

o

democrtico

adecuadocomo un

valor en s

mismo.

onversely,

the political


9/28

equilibrium has contributed to the onstitutional ourt @a separaciGn epoeres


10/28

$

si no se toma una posici#n ms imparcial, apoltico, a veces *allando a *avor de los

partidos en el poder, a veces a *avor de la oposici#n. Por e+emplo, el tribunal *all#en contra de al"unos captulos de la ley de creaci#n de la 6"encia >acional de

3nte"ridad &6>3' en abril de 2 y decret# la pensi#n del @9 redu+o la

inconstitucionalidad en +ulio de 2.

El actual con*licto entre los poderes e+ecutivo y le"islativo , por un lado , y los

poderes de la +udicatura ms de persecuci#n contra la corrupci#n , por otro, ha

amena)ado la independencia del poder +udicial y ha ido en detrimento de la

con*ian)a p-blica. (a re*orma muy tarda de los c#di"os de procedimiento civil y

penal *ue *inalmente decidida por el Parlamento en +unio de 2. %in embar"o ,

la crisis poltica posterior , una ve) ms retrasar la aplicaci#n e*ectiva de las

re*ormas de la /E 7 demandados . El Parlamento ha tomado medidas drsticas

contra la independencia de la 6>3 en la b-squeda de estrate"ias de lucha contra

la corrupci#n desde que la orte onstitucional declar# al"unos de sus

competencias inconstitucional. El poder +udicial es institucionalmente

di*erenciado , pero los procedimientos y otra ve) estn su+etos a modi*icaci#n por

motivos polticos y la politiquera &por e+emplo , las elecciones al conse+o

superior de la ma"istratura ' . En 2!, la elecci#n de un nuevo *iscal "eneral

tambi$n se vio envuelta en la arena poltica. En "eneral , sin embar"o , el poder

+udicial puede ser +u)"ado como ms independiente que antes debido a los altos

*uncionarios de los partidos "obernantes *ueron investi"ados y condenados por

primera ve) . 6dems , los ma"istrados del ms alto nivel *ueron investi"ados 7

otra novedad y una se;al de cambio en la pro*esi#n. %in embar"o, la corrupci#n

de los ma"istrados se mantiene un problema "rave.

.istema 6uicialinepeniente

8

Durin" the period under revieF, politicians in Romania Fere cau"ht betFeen the

priority attached by the public, vocal national >Cs and the European /nion to the

*i"ht a"ainst corruption and their oFn Fariness o* a stron" and independent a"ency.

onsequently, anti7corruption o*ten *eatured in political pro"rams and speeches, but

the onstitutional ourt and parliament Fere quicG to curb the competencies o* the

>ational 6nti7orruption Directorate &restored under pressure *rom the European

ommission' and the 6>3. These institutions nevertheless developed public trust

and a pro*essional ethos o* their oFn as Fell as a substantial tracG record in dealin"

Fith cases o* corruption and abuse o* public o**ice. Pro"ress in this respect seems

structural, but political bacGin" remains hal*7hearted at best. onversely, media

accusations o* corruption by the main parties are detrimental to the credibility o*

anti7corruption a"ency, but also indicative o* the increasin" authority and reach o*

these institutions in the political sphere.

Prosecution of

office ause

#

3n line Fith E/ norms, all *ormal le"al "uarantees *or a *air process *or equal

treatment and non7discrimination le"islation are in place. 0oFever, E/ monitors

have critici)ed the arbitrariness and incoherence o* court verdicts and the bacGlo" o*

court cases. 0uman ri"hts or"ani)ations, moreover, continue to report cases o*, *or

example, police violation o* basic human ri"hts and "enerally inhuman and

de"radin" treatment in Romanian penitentiaries. 6s underlined by E/ reportin",

Ci3il ri+*ts

$


11/28

Roma communities continue to su**er *rom various *orms o* social and ethnic

discrimination.

4 " Sta+i&ity o, )emocratic Institutions

The ability o* democratic institutions &"overnment, president and parliament' to

ForG to"ether has been severely compromised. 3n the immediate a*termath o* E/

accession, politicGin" produced embarrassin" deadlocGs in decision7maGin" and

re*orm strate"ies. (ater in the period under revieF, the enmity betFeen the PD(

president and the competin" P%D brou"ht le"islation to a "rindin" halt. Despite the

impact o* the "lobal economic crisis and consistent criticismH"uidance *rom the

European /nion, all ma+or parties *ocused on politicGin" and populist measures

rather than +oint crisis mana"ement and democratic cooperation. The "rand

coalition resultin" *rom the >ovember 2= elections Fas characteri)ed by endless

in*i"htin" and its demise in %eptember 2! resulted in a succession o* caretaGer,

minority and FeaG "overnments unable to deal Fith the crisis and, moreover,

sabota"ed by the other parties throu"h votes o* no7con*idence. Iuite remarGably,

the Eurobarometer 2 indicates that Romania is the E/ country Fith the hi"hest

con*idence amon" citi)ens that the national "overnment &rather than the E/' Fill

solve the economic crisis. ne explanation *or this trust may be *ound in the *act

that despite all obstruction and politicGin", the crisis and E/ pressure have *orced

"overnments to taGe some unpopular decisions &e."., pension cuts' and initiate

ma+or re*orms &e."., education re*orm or the restructurin" o* parliament to

unicameralism by re*erendum in >ovember 2!'.

Performance of

emocratic

institutions

8

6lthou"h political actors do accept the democratic institutions in principle, they are

not above bendin" the democratic principle o* the separation o* poFers or the rules

o* democratic procedure. 6ll relevant political players occasionally resorted to the

abuse o* democratic instruments *or party interests and to the use o* strate"ies o*

doubt*ul democratic quality, ran"in" *rom populist measures, the use o* media

outlets and incriminations that obstructed democratic decision7maGin" to

re*erendums and the abuse o* the onstitutional ourt *or political interests. These

abuses, hoFever, re*er to political culture rather than to the *ormal democratic rules.

The *requent votes o* no7con*idence, the re*erendum on unicameralism initiated by

the president and the involvement o* the onstitutional ourt in the education bill

are Fithin the limits o* democratic political procedure.

Commitment to

emocratic

institutions

$

5 " o&itica& and Socia& Integration

The chan"es in the electoral system *ailed to *ully produce the expected positive

e**ect on the political landscape. irstly, the parliamentary and presidential elections

Fere separated by prolon"in" the presidentJs term o* o**ice to *ive years &in 2?'.

Party system

8


12/28

This attempt to de7politici)e procedures *ailed as the narroF victory in the

presidential elections o* >ovember 2! nevertheless tri""ered a "overnment crisis

a*ter less than one year o* PD(KP%D coalition. %econdly, the shi*t *rom a

proportional to a mixed electoral system Fas intended to enhance the societal roots

o* the political parties, but any e**ects Fere lar"ely o**set by the "larin" politicGin"

durin" the economic crisis, the on"oin" clientelism and populist measures as a

ne"ative *orm o* responsiveness to voters. Due to the hi"h threshold, party

*ra"mentation is loF, Fith only *ive parties in the 8@7seat hamber o* Deputies.

The leader7driven aspect o* these parties is still relatively hi"h, Fith a *eF Fell7

GnoFn politicians taGin" most o* the inner7party and national decisions. Despite

voter volatility, the results o* the European, presidential, local and parliamentary

elections o* the past tFo years su""est a *airly stable constituency *or each o* thema+or parties, althou"h the cross7party mi"ration o* individual member o*

parliament is still an issue.

The party system has increased its responsiveness to societal constituencies and the

ma+or parties are increasin"ly rooted in society rather than bein" leader7driven.

0oFever, the political elite continues to be Fary o* %s that channel public

interests and act as Fatchdo"s. orrespondin"ly, the political system lacGs

incentives and points o* access to alloF >Cs and societal interest "roups to +oin

the decision7maGin" process. %ome >Cs and their civil7ri"hts a"endas have

enou"h international bacGin" and domestic standin" to in*luence politics to somede"ree. Both the lar"est political parties ea"erly create >Cs, thinG tanGs and

pollin" institutes to occupy this increasin"ly important political arena. onversely,

Gey democratic interest "roups such as trade unions are FeaGly developed,

politically bound and by no means stron" social partners in their oFn ri"ht.

Interest +roups

#

The *allin" popularity o* anti7democratic, extremist parties continues, and

demonstrates the consolidation o* democratic institutions and a democratic political

culture. >evertheless, polls indicate that the "eneral level o* trust in these very

institutions is loF. (iGeFise, althou"h there have been some recent improvements,

public trust in national political institutions remains loF. 6 sprin" 2

Eurobarometer report re"istered an avera"e trust o* 9 *or the "overnment and

29 *or parliament &Fith a clear ne"ative trend' K a European loF. The ratin"s *or

political parties are similar. 6 never7endin" series o* corruption scandals and public

in*i"htin" "oes a lon" Fay explains the ebb in political trust, but it apparently does

not translate into support *or anti7system parties or movements.

ppro3al of

emocracy

$

%s tend to advocate the interests o* speci*ic social "roups, Fhereas lar"er,

internationally connected >Cs tend to be quite isolated *rom constituencies in

Romanian society, althou"h it may be assumed that constituencies and aFareness at

least in the urban middle class are "roFin". Due to the countyJs lon" socialist

tradition, people are more inclined to resort to state assistance and "uidance than to

societal sel*7or"ani)ation "roups or K in the case o* the Finners in the

.ocial capital

6


13/28

trans*ormation process K to opt *or a hi"hly individualistic approach. 6dvocacy

or"ani)ations and civil society coalitions tend to *ocus &Fith increasin"

e**ectiveness and in*luence' on sin"le issues, most prominently anti7corruption, the

environment or con*lict o* interest and transparency durin" the 2= parliamentary

elections. onversely, the role o* broad, "eneral7purpose >Cs Fith substantial

national andHor international *undin" and expertise seems to have declined alon"

Fith E/ accession &and thus the replacement o* pre7accession European

ommission *undin" Fith structural pro"rams administered by national ministries,

Fho pre*er LtameM pro+ects, not Fatchdo" or activist >Cs'. Typically, social

capital is interpreted as traditional netForGs o* solidarity belon"in" to rural

environments, not to the dynamic urban circles o* the service sector,

internationali)ation and prosperity.

II. "conomic Transformation

6 " -ee& o, Socioeconomic )ee&o$mentKuestion

core

Due to "roFin" urbanKrural disparities in the processes o* socioeconomic

trans*ormation and European inte"ration, social exclusion is structurally in"rainedin Romania. Cender is scarcely a *actor, as the CD3 is close to 9 o* the 0D3,

but other />DP poverty7related indices indicate that poverty, thou"h not extreme,

is a serious and substantial problem. D3 and economic "roFth are stron"ly *ocused

on the capital, a hand*ul o* ma+or cities and the Nestern re"ions, Fhereas rural

underemployment persists as a structural problem. >ation7Fide, the steady increase

o* li*e expectancy su""ests improvements overall. onversely, the 0D3 has not

increased over the past three years &2=< .:A@, 2< .:A:', but neither has it

declined despite the crisis. ne indicator< The Norld BanG applauded Romania *or

its achievements in poverty reduction in the years prior to the economic "lobal

crisis. The situation o* the Roma community deserves special re*erence. Their

access to education and health services &and less so to Fel*are support' continue to

be serious issues.

.ocioeconomic

arriers

#


14/28

(conomic indicators 200#

2008

200$

2010

9=P +ro(t* ? 6.0 $.! - 0./

Inflation 'CPI) ? !.8 #.8 5.6 6.1

Anemployment ? 6.! 5.8 6.$

"port +ro(t* ? #.8 1 - 1

Import +ro(t* ? 2 1 - 1

Current account alance > mn. -2%080

-2%#1$

-6$55

6480

"ternal et > mn. 8!16 102!8 11800 12150

Total et ser3ice > mn. 11568.1

1812%.2

162$!.5

18545.2

Ta re3enue ? of 1 1 -

9o3ernment consumption ? of 1 1 1 1

Pulic epn. on eu. ? of !.% - -

Pulic epn. on *ealt* ? of 5.2 5.! 5.!

RL= epeniture ? of 0. 0. -

4ilitary epeniture ? of 1.5 1.5 1.!

ources& T*e Dorl Ban,7 Dorl =e3elopment Inicators 2011 | International 4onetary Eun 'I4E)7Dorl "conomic Mutloo, 2011 | toc,*olm International Pease Researc* Institute 'IPRI)7 4ilitary"peniture =ataase 2011.

7 " rganiation o, t*e Maret and om$etition

Nith E/ accession, the institutions o* a marGet economy are in place and include

the *reedom o* trade and currency convertibility. Nhereas in the *irst phases o* the

trans*ormational process, Romania Fas ri"htly critici)ed *or reservin" too lar"e a

role *or the state in economic development, since then le"acies o* overre"ulation

exist in parallel Fith virtually unhampered *orms o* business practice beyond the

4ar,et-ase

competition

8


15/28

control o* the authorities and re"ulations. (e"al and ille"al emi"rant ForGers and

their remittances contribute substantially to the subsistence o* *amilies bacG home.

Nhile *ormal re"ulations prohibitin" monopolies do exist, the ompetition ouncil

and other marGet arbiters K thou"h *ully in line Fith the acquis chapters K are still

FeaGer and more timid in reality than they should be. 3n 2 the ompetition

ouncil tooG on a more active role K especially in the Gey area o* the restructurin"

o* the national ener"y marGet, Fhere there Fas a real dan"er o* one company

achievin" a dominant position. The ompetition ouncil also handed out a ma+or

*ine to the Romanian Post *or abuse o* its dominant position. 3n recent years,

economic matters includin" competition laFs have not *eatured in the E/ reports on

Romania. 3n 2!, the ompetition ouncil adopted a more proactive stance and

initiated cooperation Fith a thinG tanG to investi"ate monopoly issues in vulnerable

sectors o* the economy &banGin", retail, pharmacy, liberal pro*essions, ener"y,

concessions and the taxi sector'.

nti-monopoly

policy

$

Nith E/ accession, Romania has become a *ull member o* the common marGet. 6ll

restrictions imposed by tari** and non7tari** trade barriers have thus been abolished.

The banGin" sector has been restructured to European standards. Predictably,

1oodyJs assessment o* the "eneral outlooG *or the Romanian banGin" sector in

2! Fas ne"ative because o* the "lobal *inancial crisis. 6*ter several pro*itable

years, the solvency o* Romanian banGs Fas not an issue, but loan delinquencies

increased and the banGs shunned risGs in business credits. 6s the banGs Fere

already overly cautious they avoided insolvency risGs, but contributed little to the

recovery o* the economy.

@ieraliJation of

forei+n trae

10Ban,in+ system

$

8 " urrency and rice Sta+i&ity

Evidently, investors consider Romania a risG country in the current situation. D3

has declined sharply, and the *orei"n exchan"e rate reacts to political events such as

the autumn 2 no7con*idence vote. verall, the exchan"e rate o* the (eu is

declinin", and depreciation is liGely to continue *or some time. &(on"7term *orei"n

currency ratin"< 1oodyJs Baa8 and BBO accordin" to %P and itch'. Nith

"overnment austerity measures implemented, in*lation increased sharply, especially

in connection Fith the @9 rise on 46T.

nti-inflation

fore policy

$

The Romanian "overnment clearly lived beyond its *inancial means, relyin" on a

continuation o* the 28 K 2= boom and exacerbatin" the *iscal and external

balance by lavish spendin" on Gey constituencies and "overnment apparatus +ust

be*ore the 2= elections. 6s a consequence, 33s and the European /nion had to

bail Romania out Fith a substantial assistance pacGa"e o* some Q2 billion *or2!H2 Fith strict conditionalities. The "overnment had to decide on a drastic

4acrostaility

8


16/28

rise in 46T, a 2@9 cut in state salaries and pain*ul reductions in state7*unded social

bene*its. %till, external balance and *iscal balance have not been attained. The

European ommissionJs latest *i"ures predict a public bud"et balance o* 7:.89 o*

CDP *or 2 and 7@.@9 current account balance. The upFard turn, moreover, is

expected to taGe lon"er than in most other E/7countries &Fith the exception o*

(atvia'. CDP contraction and risin" unemployment Fill a**ect the tax in*loF in

2. ut o* pure necessity, "overnment policies are noF *ocused on

macroeconomic stability, but the past tFo years have demonstrated their tendency

to "ive in to populist pressures and electioneerin" strate"ies.

/ " riate ro$erty

6lthou"h Romanian le"islation on the acquisition and protection o* property ri"hts

is "enerally in line Fith the E/ acquis, there are still de*icits in the protection o*

intellectual and industrial property ri"hts despite stepped7up e**orts to prosecute

copyri"ht7related crimes &e."., e**orts made by the >ational ustoms 6uthority'.

verall, Romania is "radually becomin" more business7*riendly in terms o*

procedures and their duration. The restitution o* property nationali)ed by the

communist re"ime also remains an issue, thou"h less severe than in the past decade.

Property ri+*ts

$

6s an E/ member state, RomaniaJs in*rastructure *or *acilitatin" private enterprise

is *irmly in place. The state even o**ers competitive taxation re"imes *or *orei"n

investors. 0oFever, as *ar as the number o* o**icial procedures required to start a

business are concerned, Romania is not risin" on the Norld BanGJs Doin" Business

ranGin"s. The country ranGed @? in 2 and @A in 2, thou"h it should be noted

that this places it not *ar beloF the re"ional avera"e. The post7communist

privati)ation process is lar"ely over. 3n strate"ic sectors &ener"y', privati)ation

plans have stalled *or some years, but are lar"ely in line Fith the principles o*

marGet economy.

Pri3ate enterprise

$

10 " e&,are egime

%ocial security is or"ani)ed by the state and covers all relevant risGs in principle. 6s

the incidence o* poverty indicates, social security *unctions on a subsistence level

throu"hout the country. %imilarly, althou"h health care is available *or all citi)ens

throu"hout the state territory, it is inadequate, especially in rural settlements. 1ore

importantly, social disparities and inequality in access to health care and basic

services continue to exist. RomaniaJs health care system has been ne"atively

a**ected by E/ accession< Romania has one o* the loFest health bud"ets &and

hi"hest death rates' in the E/7, +eopardi)in" access to medicines *or all citi)ens.

6s Romania +oined the E/ marGet, pharmaceutical prices rose and patients are noFo*ten *orced to pay hal* or more o* the costs o* vital treatments. 6dditionally,

.ocial safety nets

#


17/28

Romania has been less active than most other E/ countries in dealin" Fith the

upcomin" retirement o* the baby7boomer "eneration. Early retirement has been

Fidely used, and the employment rate in 2! Fas only @!9 &Eurostat *i"ures'.

%ocial sa*ety nets are pretty comprehensive, but many components are poorly

tar"eted. The system is over7extended by comparison Fith the resources made

available to it and promises more than it can deliver.

3n 2!H2 the "overnment started to address this imbalance, but the direction

Fas not one Fay< 1any bene*its Fere reduced, but the Lminimum pensionM Fas put

in place to extend assistance to the poorest cate"ories o* elderly people.

ne Gey e**ort concerned the controversial 2 pension re*orm that introduced a

uni*orm pension a"e, causin" clashes both Fithin parliament and betFeen

parliament and president.

Romanian society retains elements o* hetero"eneity and discriminatory access.

Education, basic social security and health care o**er limited compensation *or

social inequality. E"alitarian attitudes are Fidespread in the state7provided services,

but a lacG o* resources is paramount. 3n the lon" run, the main threat to state Fel*are

services is represented by a "radual depletion o* assets and a decay o* in*rastructure

maintenance. The />DP "ender7related indices and other relevant indicators no

lon"er su""est pro"ress but rather sta"nation. Disparities are *irst and *oremost

socioeconomic, and Fhile the existin" policies and institutions are consolidatedenou"h to prevent socioeconomic deterioration, they are not poFer*ul enou"h to

compensate *or "ross social di**erences and to achieve equality o* opportunity. The

/>DP "ender7related indices shoF that Romania still banGs on past equal7

opportunity policies and some recent transition trends< Nomen are not

disadvanta"ed in education and are even overrepresented in hi"her education, but

may earn less in similar positions. 6s an illustration< The present parliament

consists o* almost 8 male and a mere 8= *emale deputies. RomaniaJs success in

Norld7BanG7"uided poverty reduction may be o**7set by the current crisis, Fhich is

bound to hit the FeaGest in society *irst and hardest. The pli"ht o* the Roma

communities in terms o* access to health care and education indicates a FeaGness in

the Romanian state7provided services.

"2ual opportunity

#

11 " (conomic er,ormance

RomaniaJs economic per*ormance in the "lobal crisis has been relatively poor. The

crisis has revealed the structural FeaGnesses and vulnerabilities underneath the

substantial "roFth rates o* the past *eF years. 6*ter several years o* @9 K 9

CDP "roFth, 2! ended Fith 7=.@9. >et D3 in*loF had increased seven7*old

*rom 28 to 2=, but dropped to 2@Js level in one sin"le year o* the crisis K hal*the level o* 2=. %imilarly, remittances had climbed steeply since 2?, but halved

Mutput stren+t*

#


18/28

in 2= to an amount similar to D3. The crisis a**ected imports rather than exports

and all three economic sectors Fere hit to a comparable de"ree. 3n*lation dropped

*rom .A9 to A.@9 and unemployment did not increase dramatically &*rom @.=9

2= to A.!9 2!'. The European /nion and 31 put pressure on the Romanian

"overnment&s' to *ace the consequences o* excessive spendin" and to restore order

in public *inances by addressin" *iscal imbalances and taGin" unpopular measures

&e."., reducin" pensions, raisin" 46T, cuttin" salaries o* state employees etc'. ne

structural FeaGness related to the re"ional and urbanHrural disparities remainsevertheless, in relative terms pro"ress has

been substantial on the "round. The "overnment has clearly become more aFare o*

and more proactive about environmental issues as a result o* E/ accession

ne"otiations, althou"h many initiatives are still pushed by international

or"ani)ations &e."., the />DP' and %s. oncerns about a reliable and clean

Fater supply and promotin" ener"y conservationHe**iciency are bein" addressed in

compliance Fith E/ environmental standards and international conventions. 3n

>ovember 2=, the Romanian "overnment also endorsed a comprehensive national

strate"y *or sustainable development. RomaniaJs Environmental Per*ormance 3ndex

score is Fell Fithin in the ran"e o* the E/7 countries.

"n3ironmental

policy

8

The main problems in RomaniaJs education system and RD investments concern

not the "eneral level o* education, but the uncontrolled mushroomin" o* non7

accredited institutions o* hi"her education. (iGeFise, althou"h "overnment

spendin" on education has improved the allocation o* resources is sGeFed in *avor

o* &public' hi"her education. verall, state controls on quality la" behind, althou"h

a laF adopted in late 2 may address this issue. Economic competitiveness and

the closure o* the urbanKrural quality "ap require substantial investment in

improvin" primary education throu"hout the country. Public spendin" on RD is

*ar beloF E/ and ED avera"es and it remains to be seen Fhether the

incremental "roFth Fill continue despite the economic crisis. The basics are in

place< hi"h literacy rates, primary and secondary education throu"hout the country.

The reversal o* the *emale to male ratio K close to 9 in primary and secondary

education, but 8?9 in tertiary education K is typical *or post7communist countries,

especially in %outh7eastern Europe. (i*e7lon" trainin" has not yet been establishedCs only Fhen necessary as a result o*

Nestern pressure or the particular >CJs increasin" popularity, or Fhen the state

administration itsel* lacGs the required competence. verall, the "overnment does

not appear to Felcome a broader policy dialo"ue Fith %s. Expediency

considerations prevail over broader consultation Fith or"ani)ations such as trade

unions or churches. 6t best, politicians cooperate Fith an elite o* not necessarily

representative thinG tanGs and >Cs. The "radual increase in career permeability

betFeen the "overnment bureaucracy and political7representative institutions, on

the one hand, and civil society and advocacy or"ani)ations, on the other hand, may

be considered a positive trend. /n*ortunately, some o* the *eF critical voices have

been e**ectively silenced by co7optation into administrative and political

responsibilities. The remedy *or this problem is a lon"7term process based on the

di**erent outlooG and competencies and % bacG"roundHnetForGs o* middle

echelon politicians and civil servants.

Ci3il society

participatio

n

6

Ever since the bloody revolution o* !=!, Romania has been exceptional in its

handlin" o* its Far7time past &as an ally o* >a)i Cermany' and its communist past.

eausescuJs nationalistic denial o* any Romanian involvement in o**ensive Far*are,

Far crimes or the 0olocaust continued in much public debate a*ter !=!. 0istorical

revelations scarcely reached the public debate. Eventually, *ormer communist and

President 3on 3liescu partly broGe the taboo.

The more pressin" issue o* communist repression and expropriation also never*ound much o* an echo in Romanian public and political debate. The activists and

civil society "roups callin" attention to the crimes o* communism are relatively

small and mar"inal. 3n 2@, the Romanian "overnment eventually set up a ondul

Proprietatea to compensate victims o* expropriations *rom a stocG *und Forth some

Q? billion at the time o* its establishment. 6ccordin" to several reports, the *und has

since been mismana"ed since and its listin" at the stocG marGet delayed. Due to the

crisis, the shares o* the *ormer victims have dFindled to a *raction o* their nominal

value, Fhereas marGet speculators have reaped the pro*its. 1eanFhile, the *und has

been run by the respected international asset mana"ement *irm ranGlin Templeton

3nvestment 1ana"ement since %eptember 2. The *irm taGes actions &evena"ainst the "overnment' to increase its share value and brin" it to the stocG marGet.

Reconciliation

#


26/28

6part *rom the *und, there has also been in7Gind restitution &land, buildin"s,

industrial assets', thou"h the process Fas lon" and protracted.

17 " Internationa& oo$eration

verall, Romania has made e**ective use o* international support *rom the

European /nion, the European BanG *or Reconstruction and Development &EBRD',

the 31 and the Norld BanG in the current crisis, but its main strate"ies Fere

dictated by the international or"ani)ations themselves. 3n policy *ields beyond hi"h

politics, Romanian is becomin" increasin"ly competent and quali*ied in mana"in"

the resources made available by international cooperation, especially Fithin the

European /nion. %ince E/ accession, Romania has become a partner in an endless

array o* E/ or E/7related or"ani)ations and netForGs in policy *ields ran"in" *rom

anti7corruption to environmental protection.

"ffecti3e use of

support

8

The international credibility problem o* Romania as a partner is *our*old. irst,

inevitably is the ne"ative ima"e o* Romania amon" European citi)ens. 6mon"

international or"ani)ations and the E/ in particular, populist rhetoric and

enlar"ement *ati"ue amon" voters has an indirect impact. President Basescu in

particular has been detrimental to RomaniaJs reputation as a constructive and

reliable international partner by occasionally &ab'usin" international *orums to roll

our populist rhetoric *or domestic audiences and crude statements &more in 2!

than in 2'. 6dditionally, his unFillin"ness to end the political stalemate and

nominate a neF prime minister a*ter the "overnmentJs collapse in ctober 2!

prior to his oFn re7election in December certainly Fas detrimental to RomaniaJs

international reputation. 6 dramatic lacG o* coordination and cooperation betFeen

president and "overnment or amon" cabinet members has been as detrimental as the

insu**icient e**orts to synchroni)e national initiatives Fith international strate"ies

&a"ain, mainly in 2!'.

The "overnment itsel* has lar"ely been cooperative, but the many chan"es in

"overnments and recurrin" phases o* coalition buildin" and interim "overnmentshave been detrimental to the belie* o* international or"ani)ations and 33s in

RomaniaJs policy7maGin" poFer. 6 positive development< ivil servants in the

ministries and a"encies have "ained experience in international cooperation and

quali*ications overall, thus creatin" a bacGbone o* international credibility and

reliability.

3n 2, RomaniaJs readiness to cooperate Fith international partners and

international or"ani)ations and 33s increased marGedly. onversely, some E/

member states obstructed RomaniaJs accession to %chen"en *or political and

domestic reasons rather than on the basis o* the criteria set by the European /nion.

Creiility

8


27/28

1eanFhile, Romania has become more e**ective and Fillin" in implementin" 31

recommendations and criteria *or bud"etary sustainability.

Civen the economic crisis and its oFn political instability, Romania seems to have

"iven up on most o* its ambitions to play the role o* a re"ional leader in

southeastern Europe and the BlacG %ea re"ion. verall, noF that E/ membership

has been achieved, re"ional cooperation has marGedly declined as a political

priority. Relations Fith nei"hborin" 1oldova constitute an exception. Nith the

chan"e o* "overnment in hisinau in mid72!, Bucharest has taGen a more active

stance as 1oldovaJs advocate Fithin the E/. verall, Romania lacGs the political

capacity to play a more substantial role in the European /nion, unliGe some other

E/7 states. orei"n and European policies require hi"h7level politics rather than

competent administrators and diplomats.

Re+ional

cooperatio

n

$


28/28

trate+ic Mutloo,

Nhereas the risGs Romania *aces in the economic *ield are, on the on hand, structural le"acies,

and on the other hand, part and parcel o* the "lobal economic and *inancial crisis, the countryJs

political risGs are predominantly sel*7in*licted.

Economically, the underdevelopment o* the a"ricultural sector constitutes a heavy load.

onsequently, the economic "roFth o* the past *ive to six years has been re"ionally uneven.

Partly because o* political instability, D3 is relatively loF and sensitive to smaller or lar"er

crises, internationally or domestically. The same applies to mi"rant ForGersJ remittances &eventhou"h they dropped less than expected durin" the crisis'. onsequently, domestic consumption

Fill be the Gey issue in economic recovery in the next *eF years. Romania &and Bul"aria' are

expected to be sloFer in recovery than the other E/7 countries. Due to the austerity pro"ram

the "overnment had to implement a*ter overspendin", the recovery process cannot banG on

domestic consumption &Fhich is partly dependent on remittances', but has to hope *or investors

and export. 3n sum, there is next to )ero *iscal space *or creative solutions beyond *olloFin"

recommendations and conditions set by European /nion and 33s.

RomaniaJs main option *or serious improvement is political in nature and at the same time its

main risG *or the near *uture. Public trust and turnout at elections are loF. Politicians o* the mainparties are time and a"ain draFn bacG to a style o* politics that lacGs public transparency &and

access *or %s', is hi"hly centrali)ed, prone to populist rhetoric, &ab'use o* democratic

instruments *or party politics and short on political coura"e to unite to tacGle Gey problems. The

checGered record o* political re*orm and economic development has not translated into political

&extremist' alternatives. onsiderin" the developments in nei"hborin" transition countries &and

many E/7@ countries *or that matter', it is merely a matter o* time until a modern ri"ht7Fin"

populist movement replaces the antiquated PR1.

(114287633) romania country report

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