1140460 judge reed's response
TRANSCRIPT
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No. 1140460________________________________________________
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA________________________________________________
Ex parte State of Alabama ex rel. Alabama Policy InstituteAnd Alabama Citizens Action Program
(In re: Alan L. King, in his official capacity as Judge OfProbate for Jefferson County, Alabama, et al.)_______________________________________________
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus
ANSWER AND BRIEF OF RESPONDENT STEVEN L. REED
________________________________________________
Robert D. Segall (SEG003)Copeland, Franco, Screws &Gill, P.A.P.O. Box 347Montgomery, AL 36101-0347Phone: (334) 420-2956Fax: (334) 834-1180
Thomas T. Gallion (GAL010)
Constance C. Walker (WAL144)Haskell Slaughter & Gallion,LLC8 Commerce Street, Suite 1200Montgomery, AL 36104Phone: (334) 265-8573Fax: (334) 264-7944
Samuel H. Heldman (HEL009)The Gardner Firm, PC
2805 31st St NWWashington, DC [email protected] Phone: (202) 965-8884Fax: (202) 318-2445
Tyrone C. Means (MEA003)H. Lewis Gillis (GIL011)Kristen Gillis (GIL078)Means Gillis Law, LLCP.O. Box 5058Montgomery, AL 36103-5058Phone: (334) 270-1033Fax: (334) 260-9396
John Mark Englehart(ENG007)9457 Alysbury PlaceMontgomery, AL 36117-6005Phone: (334) 782-5258Fax: (334) 270-8390
E-Filed02/18/2015 @ 05:44:31 PM
Honorable Julia Jordan Weller
Clerk Of The Court
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Authorities ..............................ii-5
I. INTRODUCTION ............................1
II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ..................4
III. Petitioners Lack Standing to Bring ThisProceeding, and This Court Thus LacksSubject Matter Jurisdiction to Hear It ..4
IV. The absence of standing in this case is notremedied by purporting to sue for the Statein an “ex rel” fashion ..................20
V. This Court lacks original jurisdictionover the petition .......................24
VI. The prerequisites for issuance of the writare absent here .........................35
VII. The Chief Justice’s Administrative Orderdoes not provide a basis for issuance ofthe Writ ................................36
VIII. The fictitiously named Probate Judgesshould be struck from the Petition ......37
CONCLUSION.............................................39
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.................................41
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Case
Ala. DOT v. Harbert Int’l, 990 So.2d 831,
848 (Ala. 2008) ...................................2
Ashley v. State, 109 Ala. 48, 49, 19 So. 917, 918 (Ala.1895) .............................................34
Brogden v. Employees’ Retirement System, 386 So. 2d 1376,1379 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976) ........................ 29,30,31
Cadle Co. v. Shabani, 4 So.3d 460, 462-63(Ala. 2008) .......................................6,7
Chilton County v. Butler , 225 Ala. 191, 142 So. 531 (Ala.1932) .............................................20
Cotton v. Rutledge, 33 Ala. 110 (Ala. 1958) .......29
Denson v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala., 247 Ala. 257,258, 33 So. 2d 714, 714-15 (1945) .................24
Ex parte Ala. Textile Products Corp., 242 Ala. 609, 613,7 So. 2d 303, 306 (Ala. 1942) .....................27-31
Ex parte Aull, 149 So.3d 582, 591 (Ala. 2014) .....5-7
Ex parte Barger , 243 Ala. 627, 628, 11 So. 2d 359,360 (1943) ........................................24
Ex parte Davis, ___ So.3d ___, 2015 Ala. LEXIS 16, *9, *14(Ala. 2015) .......................................3,35
Ex parte Du Bose, 54 Ala. 278, 280-281 (Ala. 1875) 32,33
Ex parte Ferrari, ___ So.3d ____, 2015 Ala.LEXIS 13, *16 (Ala. 2015) .........................32
Ex parte Giles, 133 Ala. 211, 212, 32 So. 167 (1902) .... 24
Ex parte Jim Walter Res., Inc., 91 So. 3d 50Ala. 2012) ........................................27
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(Continued)
Ex parte King , 50 So.3d 1056, 1059-60 (Ala. 2010) ...................................................6,8,14
Ex parte Morgan, 259 Ala. 649, 651, 67 So. 2d889, 890 (1953) ...................................24
Ex parte Pearson, 76 Ala. 521, 523 (1884) .........25
Ex parte Price, 252 Ala. 517, 41 So. 2d 180(Ala. 1949) .......................................25
Ex parte Richey , 255 Ala. 150, 157, 50 So. 2d 441,
447 (1951) ........................................24
Ex parte Russell, 29 Ala. 717 (Ala. 1857) .........25
Ex parte Sasser , 730 So. 2d 604, 605 (Ala. 1999) .. 2
Ex parte Stover , 663 So.2d 948, 951 (Ala. 1995) ...38
Ex parte Town of Valley Grande, 885 So. 2d 768,770 Ala. 2004) ...................................26
Ex parte Tubbs, 585 So. 2d 1301, 1302(Ala. 1991) .......................................24
Franks v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 679 So. 2d214, 216 (Ala. 1996) ..............................27
Hollingsworth v. Perry , 133 S.Ct. at 2662 .........10-18
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n,432 U.S. 342-43 (1977) ................................ 15
Jones v. Black, 48 Ala. 540, 543 (Ala. 1872) .......... 15
Kendrick v. State, 256 Ala. 206, 213, 54 So.2d 442,447 (Ala. 1951) ..................................... 20-23
Kid’s Care, Inc. v. Alabama Dep’t of Human Resources, 843So.2d 164, 165 (Ala. 2002) ........................7,8,14
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61,
(1992) ............................................6
Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Morris, 273 Ala. 117, 120(Ala. 1961) .......................................2
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,811-12 (1985)..........................................39
Ramaguano v. Crook, 88 Ala. 450, 451, 7So. 247 (1890) ....................................25
Russo v. Ala. Dept. of Corrections, 149 So.3d 1079, 1081 (Ala. 2014) .........................31
Searcy v. Strange, No. 14-0208-CG-N (S.D. Ala.) ...35
State Bd. of Optometry v. Lee Optical, 287 Ala.528, 531, 253 So.2d 35, 37 (Ala. 1971) ............23
State ex rel. Chilton County v. Butler ,225 Ala. 191, 142 So. 531 (Ala. 1932) .............20
Strange v. Searcy , No. 14A-840 ....................22,35
Town of Cedar Bluff v. Citizens Caring for Children,904 So.2d 1253, 1256 (Ala. 2004) ..................6-15
Town of Flat Creek v. Alabama By-Products Corp.,245 Ala. 528, 531, 17 So. 2d 771, 772 (1944) ......26
United States v. Windsor ,570 U.S.12 (2013) ........22
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975) .........15
White v. John, 92 So.3d, 737, 2014 Ala.LEXIS 144, *29 (Ala. 2014) ........................2
Wood v. Farnell, 50 Ala. 546 (Ala. 1874) ..........29
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Statutes
Ala. Code 12-2-7(3) ...............................24 Ala. Code § 12-11-30(4) ...........................26Ala. Code § 12-2-7(2) .............................25-26
42 U.S.C. § 1988 ..................................36
Rules
Ala. R. Civ. P. 9(h)...................................37-38Ala. R. Civ. P. 17(a) .............................23
Constitutional Provisions
Art. VI, § 140(b),Const. of Ala. 1901
............24
Art. VI, § 142(b), Const. of Ala. 1901 ............26
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I.INTRODUCTION.
The petition should be dismissed for several reasons,
including that Petitioners have no standing and are not
otherwise proper parties to bring this action on behalf of
the State, that there is no original subject matter
jurisdiction in this Court, and that the prerequisites to
the grant of the requested writ are not satisfied. Those
arguments are addressed below. But even if one leaves
those aside for the moment, still the Petition – both in
what it says, and what it obscures – offers no equitable
reason for this Court to intervene.
The Petition seeks a ruling based only on Alabama law. The
Petition does not ask this Court to rule on the federal
constitutional questions about same sex marriage.
Respondents do not ask this Court to rule on those federal
questions either, and it would be too late for Petitioners
to make such a request in their reply brief.
What Petitioners do not mention, oddly, is that the
Supreme Court of the United States will decide the federal
questions by approximately the end of June, just about four
months from now.
Another thing Petitioners do not mention is the very
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high probability that, if this Court were to issue an order
stopping Respondents from issuing marriage licenses,
Respondents would be sued in federal court. And it is
probable, given the majority view among the federal courts,
that Respondents would be enjoined to issue licenses.
A mandamus petition is either a proceeding in equity,1
or a proceeding at law governed by equitable principles.2
Among those principles are that “equity will not do a vain
thing,”3 and that equity is always mindful of balancing the
respective harms to the parties before issuing a remedy.
The question thus arises: what good, and what harm,
would this Court do by issuing the order that Petitioners
seek?
By granting the requested relief, this Court would not
actually stop any couple from marrying for very long. The
Court, by deciding the issues of state law as Petitioners
1 Ala. DOT v. Harbert Int’l, 990 So.2d 831, 848 (Ala. 2008)(Murdock, J., concurring specially).
2 Ex parte Sasser , 730 So. 2d 604, 605 (Ala. 1999).
3 Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Morris, 273 Ala. 117, 120 (Ala.1961); see also White v. John, 92 So.3d, 737, 2014 Ala.LEXIS 144, *29 (Ala. 2014) (injunction will not issue wherethere is no demonstration that it would actually preventthe allegedly threatened injury).
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request, would simply make Respondents into targets of
federal litigation.
Therefore, if this Court granted the writ that
Petitioners seek, it would put Probate Judges in an
untenable position, even worse than the “angst and
consternation,” “`darned if I do, darned if I don't’
dilemma” that already faces them now. Ex parte Davis, ___
So.3d ___, 2015 Ala. LEXIS 16, *9, *14 (Ala. 2015) (Bolin,
J., concurring).
If a Probate Judge followed this Court’s order (of the
sort that the Petition seeks), a Probate Judge would
subject himself to suit in federal district court, which
would in turn lead to much expenditure of public funds: not
only funds for the defense of the case, but in all
likelihood an award of attorneys’ fees to any plaintiff
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Multiplied across all the various
counties in the State, the cost to the taxpayers would be
enormous at a time when the State can ill afford it.
On the other hand, if a Probate Judge honored the
decision of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Alabama, which both the Eleventh
Circuit and the United States Supreme Court determined
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should not be stayed, then the Probate Judge might be held
in contempt in state court.
This Court should not place Probate Judges in such
unfair and undeserved jeopardy, especially when the legal
battle over same sex marriage is very likely to be
concluded within a few months, and when the order
Petitioners seek from this Court would not settle the
matter, even for a moment.
In short, given the actual circumstances that face the
Court, granting the requested relief would be inequitable –
no matter what one’s view on the federal questions that are
not before this Court for decision.
II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondent Reed adopts the Statement of the Facts set
out in the Joint answer and Brief Respondents King and
Ragland.
III. Petitioners Lack Standing to Bring This Proceeding, and
This Court Thus Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction to
Hear It.
Petitioners, two non-profit organizations “dedicated to
influencing public policy in the interest of … preserv[ing]
… strong families” and “lobbying the Alabama Legislature”
to “promote … pro-family and pro-moral issues,” Petition,
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at 9, 10, have failed to identify any tangible, concrete
interest of their own or their members that is served by
Alabama’s ban on same-sex marriages -- much less any harm
caused to any such interest by the federal court’s
suspension of that ban; how that suspension caused any such
harm; or how this Court’s issuance of an “emergency” writ4
would remedy any harm to any legally protected, personal
interest of petitioners. This lack of standing on the part
of petitioners is a jurisdictional defect, e.g., Ex parte
Aull, 149 So.3d 582, 591 (Ala. 2014), which requires
dismissal of their petition.
4 It is unclear from the petition the precise relief
petitioners seek. An order “giving Alabama probate judgesa clear judicial pronouncement that Alabama law prohibitsthe issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples,”Petition, at 25, would compel nothing, and only restates anabstract principle of Alabama law that no one disputes.Alternatively, petitioners deem it “appropriate for thisCourt to command probate judges’ compliance with [ChiefJustice Moore’s] Administrative Order,” Petition, at 24, --effectively banning either the named respondent judges orall Alabama probate judges from issuing marriage licenses
to same-sex couples. Such a ban would be contrary to thefederal court’s finding that such a ban isunconstitutional, and in direct conflict with an injunctionexpressly prohibiting, at present, one such named probatejudge from enforcing that ban. But, to the extentpetitioners request entry of such an order, they nowhereaddress how that would affect any tangible interest theypersonally enjoy.
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This Court has expressly adopted the same test for
standing applied by the United States Supreme Court. E.g.,
Ex parte Aull, 149 So.3d at 592; Ex parte King , 50 So.3d
1056, 1059-60 (Ala. 2010); Town of Cedar Bluff v. Citizens
Caring for Children, 904 So.2d 1253, 1256 (Ala. 2004).
Under this test, a party establishes standing to sue when
it satisfies three elements:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury
in fact” – an invasion of a legally protectedinterest which is (a) concrete and particularized,and (b) “actual or imminent,” not “conjectural”or ”hypothetical.” Second, there must be a causalconnection between the injury and the conductcomplained of – the injury has to be “fairly …trace[able] to the challenged action of thedefendant, and not … th[e] result [of] theindependent action of some third party not beforethe court.” … Third, it must be “likely,” asopposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury
will be “redressed by a favorable decision.”
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61,
(1992) (citations omitted). The U.S. Supreme Court has
further explained that "[b]y particularized, we mean that
the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and
individual way." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n. 1.
“Standing is the requisite personal interest that must
exist at the commencement of the litigation.” Cadle Co. v.
Shabani, 4 So.3d 460, 462-63 (Ala. 2008) (quotations
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omitted). Standing is a jurisdictional requirement. E.g.,
Ex parte Aull, 149 So.3d at 591. When parties without
standing “’purport[] to commence an action, the trial court
acquires no subject matter jurisdiction.’” E.g., Cadle
Co., 4 So.3d at 463 (quoting State v. Property at 2018
Rainbow Drive, 740 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Ala. 1999)); Kid’s
Care, Inc. v. Alabama Dep’t of Human Resources, 843 So.2d
164, 165 (Ala. 2002)(same). In the absence of subject
matter jurisdiction, the court “can do nothing but dismiss
the action forthwith.” Cadle Co., 4 So.3d at 363.
Petitioners, Alabama Policy Institute (“API”) and
Alabama Citizens Action Program (“ALCAP”), pay only lip
service to demonstrating injury-in-fact, and fail at both
steps. The generalized interests they’ve articulated are
neither sufficiently particularized, concrete, nor personal
to petitioners to be legally protected; nor have
petitioners specified what harm they suffered to their
interests or how.
API as an organization asserts an interest in
“influencing public policy” to “preserv[e] … rule of law,
limited government, and strong families.” Emgergency
Petition for Writ of Mandamus (“Petition”) Petition, at 9-
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10. To the extent arguably relevant here, API pursues that
policy interest by publishing studies showing the benefits
to families of heterosexual marriage and the detriments to
families from same-sex marriages. Id. at 10. ALCAP’s
asserted organizational interests are even more vague:
ALCAP states only that it exists to lobby the Alabama
Legislature on unspecified “pro-life, pro-family and pro-
moral issues” on behalf of “churches and individuals who
desire a family-friendly environment in Alabama.” Id .
But, similarly elusive and abstract interests in
promoting certain values or preferred policy outcomes have
routinely been found by both the United States Supreme
Court and this Court not to qualify as “legally protected
right[s],” e.g., Town of Cedar Bluff , 904 So.2d at 1256;
2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So.2d at 1027, and an alleged harm
or impediment to such a value or policy preference found
not to constitute “injury in fact” or injury to a legally
protected right, e.g., id.; Ex parte King, 50 So.3d at
1060-61 (no right or injury); Kid’s Care, Inc., 843 So.2d
at 166-67 (no injury), as necessary for standing to exist.
For example, in Town of Cedar Bluff , a political
committee (Citizens Caring for Children) and its
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chairperson sued their town and mayor to enjoin a local
option wet-dry election concerning whether to allow the
sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages within the
then-dry town, on the ground that the enabling legislation
that authorized the election was unconstitutional. 904
So.2d at 1255 and n. 2. The trial court allowed the
election to proceed, but later declared the enabling
legislation unconstitutional and the election void; and
enjoined the town from issuing any licenses authorizing the
sale of alcohol. Id. at 1255.
On appeal, this Court found plaintiffs lacked standing
to sue and reversed the trial court’s judgment. Id. at
1259. Plaintiffs made conclusory claims – which are more
specific than petitioners’ assertions here -- that (1)
citizens and voters, including plaintiffs, are injured
“when an invalid election is held as the result of an
unconstitutional statute,” and (2) “the introduction of
alcohol sales into a town like Cedar Bluff … will result in
an injury to the town’s ‘welfare, health, peace and
morals.’” Both were held insufficient to establish the
“actual, concrete and particularized injury in fact” to
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plaintiffs as required to satisfy the first element of
standing. Id. at 1257, 1258-59.
Even more squarely on point, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Hollingsworth v. Perry found that the private intervenors,
even though designated as the official proponents of a
ballot initiative to amend the California state
constitution to define marriage as a union between a man
and a woman, lacked standing to appeal to defend the
constitutionality of the duly enacted constitutional
amendment, after the state Attorney General and other state
official defendants (all of whom had declined to defend the
law in the District Court) chose not to appeal.5 133 S.Ct.
2652, 2662-2664, 2668 (2013).
5 The California attorney general and other state officialschose not to defend the law in the District Court; wereenjoined by the District Court from enforcing the law, whenthat court declared the law unconstitutional; and thenelected not to appeal the District Court’s judgment.
Instead, the private intervenors defended the law in theDistrict Court, appealed that court’s adverse judgment, anddefended the law before the U.S. Court of Appeals for theNinth Circuit. Id . at 2660. Here, Judge Granade hasenjoined the Alabama Attorney General and those acting inconcert and participation with him from enforcing theAlabama marriage statute and constitutional amendment.Exhibit A, at 10; Ex. B, at 4.
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The Hollingsworth intervenors’ only interest in
pursuing an appeal was to “vindicate the constitutional
validity of a generally applicable [state] law.” 133 S.Ct.
at 2662. Here, petitioners’ request that this Court (in a
collateral proceeding) reiterate the requirements of
Alabama law, and then require all state probate judges to
comply with that state law6, also seeks merely to vindicate
enforcement of that law -- even though that law (as with
the Hollingsworth intervenors and the California marriage
amendment) does not affect either API, ALCAP, or any known
or alleged “constituent” in “’a personal and individual
way.’” Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n. 1)(“injury
that affects [the party] in a ‘personal and individual
way’” is required for that party’s standing).
Stated differently, petitioners API and ALCAP claim
“only harm to [their] and every citizen’s interest in
proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seek[]
relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits [them]
6 Even though such an order is inconsistent with a federalcourt’s finding of unconstitutionality, and even thoughcompliance with such an order, for any named defendantprobate judge in that federal court, would violate afederal injunction.
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than it does the public at large.” Hollingsworth, 133
S.Ct. at 2662 (quotation omitted). But, it is well settled
that “such a ‘generalized grievance,’ no matter how
sincere, is insufficient to confer standing.” Id. One can
readily surmise from their mandamus complaint that
petitioners disagree sincerely (and likely strongly) with
the federal court’s order holding the Alabama marriage
statute and marriage amendment unconstitutional, having
requested this Court order all probate judges to comply
with the state statute and amendment regardless (unless and
until, implicitly, the U.S. Supreme Court issues “binding
authority,” see Petition, at 18-19 n. 3). But, “[t]he
presence of a disagreement, however sharp and acrimonious
it may be, is insufficient by itself to meet” standing
requirements. Hollingsworth, 133 S.Ct. at 2661 (quotation
omitted).
Even if petitioners’ full-throated but generalized
interest in the enforcement of the Alabama marriage statute
and marriage amendment were a “legally protected right,”
e.g., Town of Cedar Bluff , 904 So.2d at 1256, their
petition fails to show that interest was injured in fact.
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Indeed, petitioners nowhere allege that they have been or
will be harmed by the challenged acts.7
Petitioners’ only arguable allegations of harm consist
of: 1) a passing reference to “the [unspecified] statewide
injury to the public caused by infidelity to Alabama’s
marriage laws,” Petition, at 23; 2) “confusion and
disarray” resulting from some probate judges issuing, and
others refusing to issue, same-sex marriage licenses,
Petition, at 23, 25; and 3)implicitly, “the [unspecified]
detriments [to families] associated with … same-sex unions”
-- which petitioners have not alleged to have occurred, but
which arguably may be inferred from API’s publication of
studies asserting the existence of such harms. See
Petition, at 10.
7 Petitioners have not specifically identified the acts theychallenge, requiring respondents and this Court tospeculate whether petitioners challenge and seek relieffrom (a) Judge Granade’s order declaring that the marriagestatute and constitutional amendment violate the federal
constitution, and her orders enjoining the Attorney Generalfrom enforcing the statute and amendment, and Mobile CountyProbate Judge Don Davis from refusing to issue marriagelicenses, or from refusing to issue licenses to same-sexcouples; or (b) the decisions by the respondent judges hereto follow Judge Granade’s declaration ofunconstitutionality and issue marriage licenses to same-sexcouples, or (c) both.
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But, none of those allegations asserts that either
petitioner (or even any particular “constituent” or set of
“constituents”) has been, or even will be, harmed itself.
E.g., Ex parte King , 50 So.2d at 1061-62 (no standing where
plaintiffs not personally deprived of right to vote or
denied equal treatment); Town of Cedar Bluff , 904 So.2d at
1258 (failure to allege particular injuries plaintiffs
would suffer). Petitioners’ allegations fail to support
even that anyone else in particular has been or will be
harmed. E.g., Town of Cedar Bluff , 904 So.2d at 1258
(failure to allege particular injuries anyone other than
plaintiffs would suffer). Nothing in petitioners’
complaint shows how or in what manner petitioners or anyone
else has been or will be harmed. E.g., id. at 1257 (failure
to allege in what respect plaintiffs were injured by the
holding of the allegedly unconstitutional local option
election); Kid’s Care, Inc., 843 So.2d at 167 (lack of
allegations how DHR’s failure to perform local market
survey harmed plaintiff).
Even if petitioners had alleged a particular (and not
vague) harm, whether to themselves or others, they failed
to show how and in what respect the respondent probate
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judges’ acts harmed them – in effect, asking this Court to
presume those acts caused them harm. But, as this Court
first made clear over 150 year ago, for standing to exist,
“’injury will not be presumed; it must be shown.’”8 E.g.,
Town of Cedar Bluff , 904 So.2d at 1256 (quoting Jones v.
Black, 48 Ala. 540, 543 (Ala. 1872)). This petitioners
have failed to do.9
8 This showing refers to allegations in the complaint, notevidence. See, e.g., Town of Cedar Bluff , 904 So.2d at1256-57.9 Petitioners’ argument for standing is not advanced by anylegal interest held or any harm suffered by any member ofeither organization. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington StateApple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 342-43(1977)(associational standing); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.490, 511 (1975)(same).
Neither group purports to be a voluntary association or
specifically claims any members, see, e.g., Hunt, 432 U.S.at 342, although both groups purport to have “thousands ofconstituents throughout Alabama.” Petition, at 9-10(emphasis added). But, apart from the unnamed “churchesand individuals” referenced by ALCAP, neither group hasidentified any of those “constituents,” or any particularlegal interest of any such constituent, whether shared withor independent of that group – much less any harm caused toany such “constituent’s” claimed legal interest by thechallenged acts (presumably the issuance of same-sex
marriage licenses).Even if either petitioner organization otherwise
satisfied the requirements for associational standing, thelack of any alleged member who suffered harm to a concrete,particularized, and legally protected interest from thechallenged acts would deprive both petitioner organizationsof standing to bring this action. E.g., Hunt, 432 U.S. at343; Warth, 422 U.S. at 511-12. Absent any injury in fact
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Moreover, the claims by both groups either to have been
a “leading proponent” or to have “vigorously promoted
passage” of the Marriage Act and/or the Marriage Amendment,
Petition, at 10-11, likewise fail to establish the standing
of either to sue. Even if either API or ALCAP had
performed an official role under Alabama law in the passage
of the Act or the Amendment – which neither did –, upon
approval of the Act (by the Legislature) and the Amendment
(by the voters) both measures became duly enacted law. At
that point, both groups lacked any official authority to
enforce either measure. Accordingly, both groups lacked
any “’personal stake’ in defending [either law’s]
enforcement that is distinguishable from the general
interest of every citizen of [Alabama],” as would be
required to have standing to defend those laws here.
Hollingsworth, 133 S.Ct. at 2663.
Furthermore, the Court in Hollingsworth identified
several reasons not to extend standing to private party
“proponents” of a state law to defend its validity or to
to their own legal interests (as is missing here), bothpetitioner organizations lack standing to sue. E.g.,Hollingsworth, 133 S.Ct. at 2663, 2665.
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seek its enforcement, as petitioners seek here. On one
hand, the State of Alabama clearly “has a cognizable
interest in the continued enforceability of its laws that
is harmed by a judicial decision declaring a state law
unconstitutional.” Id. at 2664 (quotation omitted). But,
“[t]o vindicate that interest or any other, [Alabama] must
be able to designate agents to represent it” in court, id.,
which the State has not done with respect to petitioners.
Nor could petitioners (as alleged prominent
“proponents” or “promoters” of the marriage statute and
amendment) claim a cognizable interest in enforcing those
laws as putative agents of the people of Alabama. As a
threshold matter, as with California and the intervenors in
Hollingsworth, Alabama (including its Attorney General,
whom the federal court has enjoined from enforcing those
laws) would have no agency right of a principal to control
petitioners’ actions, if this Court permitted petitioners
to sue. 133 S.Ct. at 2666.
Furthermore, petitioners are not elected officials. If
granted standing, petitioners would be accountable to no
one as to the manner in which they exercise that standing.
Owing no fiduciary obligation to the State of Alabama,
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petitioners would “decide for themselves, with no review,
what arguments to make and how to make them.” Id.
Petitioners would be “free to pursue a purely ideological
commitment to [each] law’s constitutionality without the
need to take cognizance of resource constraints, changes in
public opinions, or potential ramifications for other state
priorities,” id ., -- for example, the financial burdens on
the respondent probate judges and taxpayers of their
counties if this Court opens up each judge to suit in
federal court (by effectively barring all of them from
following the federal court’s order invalidating the same-
sex marriage ban, or from complying with any injunction
against enforcing that state law ban).
Whether viewed in terms of standing or proper parties
to enforce sovereign rights, these considerations all led
the Supreme Court in Hollingsworth to deny the intervenors
the right to sue to defend their generalized interest in
“proper application of the Constitution and laws.” Id . This
Court should do likewise as to petitioners. To hold
otherwise and to find petitioners here have standing would
“place[] [standing] in the hands of ‘concerned bystanders,’
who will use it simply as a ‘vehicle for the vindication of
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value interests.’” Id. (quotations omitted). But, “[n]o
matter how deeply committed petitioners may be to upholding
the [Alabama marriage statute and amendment] or how zealous
[their] advocacy, that is not a ‘particularized’ interest
sufficient to create a case or controversy” so as to find
standing and invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. Id.
(quotations omitted).
In sum, even if petitioners had identified any legally
protected interest in defending the validity of Alabama’s
same-sex marriage ban, they have failed to allege how any
such interest was harmed by lifting of the same-sex
marriage ban; how they personally were harmed; or how an
order of this Court reinstating Alabama’s ban would remedy
any such harm to either petitioner’s personal interest.
Petitioners have not alleged, and cannot show, that they
suffered a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact; the
injury to their personal interest is fairly traceable to
the respondents probate judges’ challenged acts; or it is
likely that their injury-in-fact will be redressed by a
favorable ruling, i.e., any of the elements required to
demonstrate their standing.
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also has some interest in how the law is observed or
whether the executive action was proper. All laws and
executive actions affect the public in some sense, directly
or indirectly. But the rule of cases such as Kendrick must
have a real field of operation: there are matters that
“concern the sovereign rights of the State” such that only
the Attorney General may sue a state officer on the State’s
behalf. Claiming a public “interest” in enforcement of the
law, or an “interest” in how a public official handles a
difficult situation, is not always enough to allow any
private entity to sue a State officer in the name of the
State.
No matter what position one takes on the federal
questions regarding same sex marriage – and again those
questions are not before this Court – one thing is crystal
clear. That is this: that the “matter concerns the
sovereign rights of the State,” and concerns whether the
State’s sovereign right to define marriage is limited by
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
in the way that advocates of same sex marriage contend.
Indeed, Governor Bentley emphasized the connection to
State sovereign rights to the Supreme Court of the United
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States, when he appeared as amicus in support of the
unsuccessful request for a stay of Judge Granade’s orders:
he repeatedly emphasized his view that defining “the
incidents of the marital relation” was a matter of the
State’s “sovereign power.” See Motion of Robert J.
Bentley, Governor of Alabama, in Strange v. Searcy , No.
14A-840 (Supreme Court of the United States, filed February
4, 2015).10
Here, Probate Judges are faced with a complex
situation: i.e., what to do when State laws have been held
unconstitutional by a federal court, and all levels of the
judiciary up to and including the Supreme Court of the
United States have declined to stay that ruling. When a
Probate Judge faces this quandary, the matter concerns
10 This document is currently viewable at
The United States Supreme Court has also recognized that
the definition of marriage and laws related to marriageconcern the sovereign rights of the State. See United States v. Windsor ,570 U.S.12 (2013) where, in the majorityopinion, the Court noted that: “The arguments put forwardby BLAG are just as candid about the congressional purposeto influence or interfere with state-sovereign choicesabout who may be married. . . .”
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questions that highly implicate state sovereignty, as well
as implicating related questions about compliance with
federal law. Under cases such as Kendrick, this is the
very sort of situation in which state officials must not be
subjected to litigation by just anyone who feels strongly
about the issue.
2. There is another more fundamental point, though
given what has been said above, the Court should not have
to reach it. The more fundamental point is this: a private
party purporting to sue “on behalf of” the State, in an “ex
rel” capacity, is a remnant of a bygone era that should be
put to rest. In the modern era, litigation must be brought
in the name of the real party in interest. Ala. R. Civ. P.
17(a). The same should be true in original proceedings in
this Court. Thus this litigation is by the Petitioners,
period. State Bd. of Optometry v. Lee Optical, 287 Ala.
528, 531, 253 So.2d 35, 37 (Ala. 1971) (noting, even before
the Rules of Civil Procedure, that the relator is the real
party in interest). And in the modern era, this Court has
attended with great care to issues of standing – which, as
explained above, include the settled rule that one does not
have standing merely because he has a generalized grievance
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that he would like to see the law enforced as he thinks it
should be.
V. This Court lacks original jurisdiction over the
petition.
This is a court of “very limited original jurisdiction.”
Ex parte Tubbs, 585 So. 2d 1301, 1302 (Ala. 1991); Ex parte
Giles, 133 Ala. 211, 212, 32 So. 167 (1902). This Court does
not have, or should not exercise, jurisdiction here for
multiple reasons.
1. This Court has original jurisdiction “to issue such
remedial writs or orders as may be necessary to give it
general supervision and control of courts of inferior
jurisdiction.” Art VI, § 140(b), Const. of Ala. 1901. This
authority is also reiterated in Ala. Code 12-2-7(3). This
Court, however, will not exercise original jurisdiction in
the issuance and determination of writs of mandamus (and other
extraordinary writs) to inferior courts, such as probate
courts, when there is another court that has jurisdiction to
entertain such writ. Ex parte Tubbs, 585 So. 2d at 1302;
Denson v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala., 247 Ala. 257, 258,
33 So. 2d 714, 714-15 (1945); Ex parte Barger , 243 Ala. 627,
628, 11 So. 2d 359, 360 (1943); Ex parte Morgan, 259 Ala. 649,
651, 67 So. 2d 889, 890 (1953); Ex parte Richey , 255 Ala. 150,
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157, 50 So. 2d 441, 447 (1951); Ex parte Price, 252 Ala. 517,
41 So. 2d 180 (Ala. 1949); Ramaguano v. Crook, 88 Ala. 450,
451, 7 So. 247 (1890); Ex parte Russell, 29 Ala. 717 (Ala.
1857); see also, Ex parte Pearson, 76 Ala. 521, 523 (1884):
By statute, this court is impliedly prohibitedfrom exercising original jurisdiction in the issueand determination of writs of mandamus, in relationto matters of which any other court hasjurisdiction; and from issuing remedial and originalwrits, in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction,except when necessary to give it a general
superintendence and control of inferiorjurisdictions. [Citation omitted] And by Section657, the Circuit Court has authority to exercise ageneral superintendence over all inferiorjurisdictions. By the statutes, the Circuit or CityCourt has jurisdiction of the matter; a generalsuperintendence over the Probate Court of Montgomerycounty. The issue of a mandamus directly from thiscourt, to the Probate Court, is not necessary togive a general superintendence and control. Suchsuperintendence and control are acquired by an
appeal from the judgment of the judge of the Circuitor City Court, as the case may be, on applicationfor the writ of mandamus. For these reasons, theapplication must be dismissed.
Under these cases, this Court does not have – or at least
should not exercise – jurisdiction here.
This Court also has authority to “exercise original
jurisdiction in the issuance and determination of writs of
mandamus in relation to matters in which no other court has
jurisdiction.” Ala. Code § 12-2-7(2). But here, the circuit
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courts do in fact have the authority to issue writs of
mandamus to probate courts. Consequently, § 12-2-7(2) grants
no jurisdiction to this Court here.
The Circuit Courts have “the authority to issue such
writs as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate its
powers, and shall have such other powers as may be provided
by law.” Art. VI, § 142(b), Const. of Ala. 1901. Further,
the Circuit “shall exercise a general superintendence over
all district courts, municipal courts, and probate courts.”
Ala. Code § 12-11-30(4).
This Court has held that to the extent a circuit court
cannot exercise its “general superintendence” over an
inferior court by appeal, the circuit court has the
constitutionally-based authority to exercise such general
superintendence by appropriate writs, such as a writ of
mandamus. Town of Flat Creek v. Alabama By-Products Corp.,
245 Ala. 528, 531, 17 So. 2d 771, 772 (1944) (“[O]rders and
decrees [of the probate court] not within the statute
[authorizing appeals from the probate court] are reviewed by
certiorari, mandamus or writ of prohibition, as the case may
be”); Ex parte Town of Valley Grande, 885 So. 2d 768, 770
(Ala. 2004) (circuit courts have authority to review orders
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of probate courts, either through direct appeal or, when no
statute grants appellate jurisdiction, by review on petitions
for writ of certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition); Franks v.
Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 679 So. 2d 214, 216 (Ala. 1996).
Because the Circuit Court could consider a petition like
the present one, there is no jurisdiction in this Court
arising from § 12-2-7(2).
Ex parte Jim Walter Res., Inc., 91 So. 3d 50 (Ala. 2012),
upon which Petitioners rely, should not be read as rejecting
this argument. The Jim Walter court did not consider or even
refer to the provisions that empower circuit courts to
determine requests for writs (Art. VI, § 142(b), Const. of
Ala. 1901), and to exercise general superintendence over
probate courts (Ala. Code § 12-11-30(4) (1975)).
Petitioners also ask this Court to exercise original
jurisdiction based on a narrow exception used by the Supreme
Court in Ex parte Ala. Textile Products Corp., 242 Ala. 609,
613, 7 So. 2d 303, 306 (Ala. 1942). The exception, framed
around the question whether action by this Court is “necessary
to afford full relief and do complete justice,” id., was
deemed warranted solely on that one occasion, and only under
unusual circumstances not present here.
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Specifically, in Ala. Textile Products, this narrow
exception was held to justify this Court’s exercise of
original jurisdiction over a petition for writ of certiorari
seeking review of a quasi-judicial order of the Alabama
Department of Industrial Relations - not a petition for writ
of mandamus directed to a probate judge. This Court also
reasoned that it should exercise jurisdiction because all
parties consented to such jurisdiction. Id. at 614. Such
consent of the parties is not present in this case.
Moreover, Ala. Textile Products presented a unique
factual and procedural situation that likewise is not present
here. For instance, there did not initially appear to be any
lower court with the authority to review the petition in that
case. There were also significant concerns regarding the
need for an immediate decision which are not present here.
The narrow exception set forth in Textile Products does
not apply here. Enlarging and extending the narrow exception
to this case is not supported by legal authority, and would
lead to undesirable results. Any time an official allegedly
violated a law with state-wide application, Petitioners’
theory would justify the filing of a request for an
extraordinary writ with the Supreme Court. Bypassing the
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circuit courts who have authority to issue such writs would
become commonplace. This Court should not honor the
Petitioners’ request to exercise jurisdiction based on
Textile Products.
2. There is also an alternative basis for holding that
the circuit courts would have jurisdiction and that this Court
has none. This alternative argument proceeds from the premise
that issuing marriage licenses is an administrative, not a
judicial, act. Wood v. Farnell, 50 Ala. 546 (Ala. 1874);
Cotton v. Rutledge, 33 Ala. 110 (Ala. 1958).
Art. VI, § 142(b), Const. of Ala. 1901 provides, in part,
that the “circuit court shall exercise general jurisdiction
in all cases except as may otherwise be provided by law.” As
explained in Brogden v. Employees’ Retirement System, 386 So.
2d 1376, 1379 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976), the circuit courts
possess two types of jurisdiction that are pertinent here:
(1) general subject matter jurisdiction; and (2) supervisory
jurisdiction over inferior judicial bodies, boards,
commissions and officers exercising judicial powers. Id.
Actions challenging the administrative acts of officials fall
within the circuit court’s general jurisdiction, whereas
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actions challenging the judicial acts of inferior courts fall
within the circuit court’s supervisory jurisdiction. Id.
The alternative argument here is that circuit courts
would have jurisdiction, in a case like this one, because the
acts of issuing and denying marriages licenses are
administrative acts, and any action challenging these acts
falls under the general jurisdiction of the circuit courts.
Brogden, 386 So. 2d at 1379. In Brodgen, the court held that
an action for declaratory judgment regarding the
administrative acts of a state official was under the general
jurisdiction of the circuit court. The supervisory
jurisdiction of the circuit court was not invoked because
there was no judicial act of an inferior court involved. Id.
at 1380.
Moreover, because the case falls within the general
jurisdiction of the circuit courts, this Court has no
jurisdiction over the subject petition. This is not a case
invoking the Supreme Court’s general supervisory jurisdiction
over inferior courts because there is no judicial act of an
inferior court that must be supervised. To the contrary, this
is an action challenging the administrative acts of officials.
There is no original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court. See
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Ferrari, ___ So.3d ____, 2015 Ala. LEXIS 13, *16 (Ala.
2015). Those criteria are not met here.
The fourth criterion, a lack of jurisdiction, has been
addressed above and will not be repeated.
As to the third criterion – lack of another adequate
remedy – the proper conclusion is that if Petitioners are
parties with standing to seek any remedy, they should seek
it in Circuit Court as argued above. But more to the
point, they do not have any remedy in any court because
they have no standing. This does not mean that they meet
the third criterion for mandamus. On the contrary, it
means that they are not entitled to any remedy in mandamus
or otherwise, because standing is a jurisdictional point.
As to the first criterion – the “clear legal right in
the petitioner to the order sought” – Petitioners fail in
various ways. They themselves have no right to the order
sought, again because they have no interest that gives them
standing. Furthermore, a court should not issue a writ
that would, “in a collateral manner, decide questions of
importance between parties who are not parties to the
proceedings, and have had no notice or opportunity to
interpose their defense.” Ex parte Du Bose, 54 Ala. 278,
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280-281 (Ala. 1875). Petitioners seek a ruling on issues
that will (at least temporarily) affect those who seek
marriage licenses, yet no such person is a party to this
proceeding. Mandamus is inappropriate under Du Bose.
Moreover, both as to the first criterion (“a clear
legal right in the petitioner to the order sought”) and
perhaps even more importantly the second (“an imperative
duty on the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal
to do so”), Petitioners fail to appreciate the position
that Probate Judges now find themselves in.
According to Petitioners’ view of the situation, the
question of “imperative duty” can be determined in this
case by looking only to state law. (Petition, p. 22).
They properly do not ask this Court to address the
questions of federal constitutional law. But improperly,
they pretend that such questions have no bearing on what a
Probate Judge must, or can, do in this situation.
To put it most plainly, the Court should not place on
Probate Judges an “imperative duty” under the particular
circumstances of this particular case, to take actions
which will cause them to be sued in federal court (or even
possibly to be subject to contempt proceedings in federal
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court), and in all likelihood to lose and incur substantial
expense to the public. Probate Judges, under the
particular circumstances facing them here, should have
discretion as to how to proceed. Ashley v. State, 109 Ala.
48, 49, 19 So. 917, 918 (Ala. 1895) (“the duty of issuing
marriage licenses under our statutes by the probate judge,
though ministerial, is a duty involving discretion,
official and personal”). And if there is discretion, then
mandamus is inappropriate; for mandamus will not issue to
compel the exercise of discretion in a particular manner.
See, e.g., State v. Ellis, ___ So.3d ____, 2014 Ala. LEXIS
162, *36 (Ala. 2014).
The circumstances include at least the following: (1)
A federal District Court has held that the United States
Constitution forbids the denial of marriage licenses to
same sex couples; the Court has held that Alabama laws
which require such denial are unconstitutional. (2) The
federal District Court has further noted that officials who
were not parties to that litigation may certainly follow
her ruling about the demands of the United States
Constitution – and has warned that those who decline are
subject to suit, to injunction, and to adverse financial
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consequences for the public.11 (3) The United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme Court
of the United States refused to stay the District Court’s
order. (4) Probate Judges take an oath to follow both the
State Constitution and the United States Constitution. Art.
XVI, § 279, Const. of Ala. 1901. As Justice Bolin aptly
noted when concurring in Ex parte Davis, Probate Judges
were (as of last week) already in an “untenable position.”
Davis, 2014 Ala. LEXIS 16, *9.
Since that time, the situation has become more
untenable, if anything. Now, the federal District Court
has enjoined Mobile County Probate Judge Davis, “and others
in active concert or participation” with him, from denying
same sex marriage licenses. Some advocates believe that
this new injunction is binding on all Probate Judges, on
the theory that all such Judges act in concert (because,
for instance, Probate Judges do not serve only the
residents of their home counties). Judge Reed does not
vouch for this argument, but it cannot be dismissed out of
hand; and this Court could not resolve the issue, because
11 January 28, 2015, “Order Clarifying Judgment,” (Doc. 65 in
Searcy v. Strange, No. 14-0208-CG-N (S.D. Ala.)) at p. 3.
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it would be a matter for the federal court to decide under
federal law. This is all the more reason to recognize
that Probate Judges must have some discretion, in terms of
which risks they choose to take in this situation.
An important question, then, is whether Probate Judges
in this untenable situation have an “imperative duty” to
ignore the federal court’s ruling about what the United
States Constitution requires – even when the higher federal
courts have declined to stay that ruling, even when that
ruling is in line with a clear majority of other federal
courts, even when most observers predict that the United
States Supreme Court will agree with that ruling, and even
when Probate Judges can surely expect that they too will be
sued in federal court if they resist the ruling.
Judge Reed respectfully suggests that it is important
from both a present and a historical perspective for this
Court to hold that state officials, such as Probate Judges,
have no “imperative duty” to fight against federal court
rulings on the United States Constitution.
VII. The Chief Justice’s Administrative Order does not
provide a basis for issuance of the Writ.
Respondent Reed adopts the argument of Judge Martin on
this issue.
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VIII. The fictitiously named Probate Judges should be struck
from the Petition.
In addition to the four named respondent probate
judges, petitioners listed as fictitiously named
respondents “Judge Does ##1-63,” each representing an
Alabama probate judge “who may issue, or may have issued,
marriage licenses to same-sex couples in Alabama.”
Petition, at 9. Even if pleading fictitious parties were
allowed in this Court, petitioners’ use violates standard
fictitious party requirements, requiring that all the Judge
Does be struck from the petition.
There is no rule (including but not limited to any
Alabama Rule of Appellate Procedure) that by its terms
permits fictitious party practice here. That alone should
require dismissal or striking of all the fictitiously named
judges. Alternatively, even though Alabama Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(h) does not apply by its terms to an original
mandamus petition in this Court, if any fictitious party
practice is allowed in a petition like this, certainly the
principles of Rule 9(h) should apply as a matter of justice
and efficiency. See Ala. R. App. P. 1.
Rule 9(h) provides:
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When a party is ignorant of the name of anopposing party and so alleges in the party'spleading, the opposing party may be designated byany name, and when that party's true name isdiscovered, the process and all pleadings and
proceedings in the action may be amended bysubstituting the true name.
Rule 9(h) is "not meant to excuse ignorance of the
identity of a cause of action, but only ignorance of the
name of the party against whom a cause of action is
stated."
Ex parte Stover , 663 So.2d 948, 951 (Ala. 1995)(quotation
omitted).
Petitioner cannot credibly claim to be ignorant of the
identities of the Judge Does, all of whom are elected
public officials who can readily be identified with minimal
effort.12 Petitioners clearly failed to exercise the due
diligence required under Rule 9(h), e.g., id., to be
allowed to name respondents under fictitious names.
12 Even if it were relevant for Rule 9(h) purposes,petitioners can scarcely even claim they were ignorant of acause of action against the Judge Does, given that asignificant majority of Alabama probate judges have beenissuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples since amatter of days after the stay on Judge Granade’s injunctiveorder expired.
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Although their pleading does not state this expressly,
petitioners presumably seek the same relief against the
fictitiously-named Judge Does ##1-63 as against the named
respondent judges. For these fictitiously-named (but
readily identifiable by petitioners) Judge Does to be bound
to any relief granted or order entered by this Court,
without being personally served, and receiving notice, the
opportunity to appear in person, and to respond to the
petition and otherwise be heard, would violate each such
judge’s right to due process. See, e.g., Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985). And,
any judgment or order entered in violation of due process
would be void. Accordingly, all fictitiously-named Judge
Does ##1-63 are due to be struck from the petition.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained in this brief, and in the
briefs of other Respondents, Judge Reed respectfully asks
that the Court deny the requested writ and dismiss the
petition.
Attorneys for Judge Steven Reed
s/Robert D. SegallRobert D. Segall (SEG003)
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Copeland, Franco, Screws & Gill,P.A.P.O. Box 347Montgomery, AL 36101-0347Phone: (334) 420-2956
Fax: (334) [email protected]
s/Constance C. WalkerThomas T. Gallion (GAL010)Constance C. Walker (WAL144)Haskell Slaughter & Gallion, LLC8 Commerce Street, Suite 1200Montgomery, AL 36104Phone: (334) 265-8573
Fax: (334) [email protected] [email protected]
Samuel H. Heldman (HEL009)The Gardner Firm, PC2805 31st St NWWashington, DC [email protected] Phone: (202) 965-8884Fax: (202) 318-2445
s/Tyrone C. MeansTyrone C. Means (MEA003)H. Lewis GillisKristen GillisMeans Gillis Law, LLCP.O. Box 5058Montgomery, AL 36103-5058Phone: (334) 270-1033Fax: (334) 260-9396
[email protected] [email protected] [email protected]
John Mark Englehart9457 Alysbury PLMontgomery, AL 36117-6005Phone: (334) 782-5258
40
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I efiled the foregoing with theClerk of the Court on this 18th day of February, 2015 and Ihave served the following counsel of record by email:
Attorneys for Petitioner
Mathew D. Staver Email: [email protected]: [email protected]
Horatio G. Mihet Fla. Bar No. 0026581Email: [email protected]
Roger K. Gannam Email: [email protected]
LIBERTY COUNSELP.O. BOX 540774Orlando, FL 32854-0774Phone:(800)671-1776Fax:(407)875-0770
A. Eric Johnston Email:[email protected] 1071200 Corporate DriveBirmingham, AL 35242Phone:(205)408-8893Fax:(205)408-8894
Samuel J. McLureEmail:[email protected] Adoption Law FirmPO Box 2396Montgomery, AL 36102Phone:(334)612-3406
Attorney for Judge TommyRagland
George W. Royer, Jr.(Roy001)Brad A. Chynoweth (CHY001)Lanier Ford Shaver & Payne,P.C.
Attorneys for Judge Robert M.
Martin
Kendrick WebbEmail: [email protected] H. KiddEmail: [email protected] L. ClementsEmail:[email protected] & Eley, PC
P.O. Box 240909Montgomery, AL 36124-0909Phone: (334) 262-1850Fax: (334) 262-1889
Attorneys for Judge Alan King
Jeffrey SewellEmail:[email protected] McMillanEmail:[email protected], Sewell, McMillan, LLC
1841 2nd Ave., Ste. 214Jasper, AL 35501-5359Phone: (205-544-2350Fax: (205-544-2345
Hon. Luther StrangeOffice of the Attorney GeneralEmail: [email protected] P.O. Box 300152Montgomery, AL 36130-0152
Phone: (334) 242-7447
42
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]
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P.O. Box 20872101 West Clinton Avenue,Suite 102 (35805)Huntsville, AL 35804Phone: (256) 535-1100
Fax: (256) 533-9322Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected]
s/Robert D. SegallOf Counsel
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]