Leopoldo Nuti

The Role Model? Italy and US Armed Forces, 1945-1963*

(in U.S. Forces in Europe: the early years, ed. S Duke and W. Krieger, Boulder, Colorado, 1993)

In November 1957, at the end of an inspection of US military installations in Europe, US

Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank Nash noted that "the usual irritations associated with the

presence of US forces on foreign countries have been conspicuously absent in Italy", to the point

that "the methods of achieving this success in Italy may well be studied for adaptation wherever

possible in other areas".(*) A repetition of this success, however, was highly improbable, as the

story of the deployment of US forces in Italy shows an almost unparalleled integration between

the strategic needs of the United States and the Italian willingness to go a long way to

accomodate them. In order to explain how this came about, this essay analyzes three phases of

US military presence in Italy: 1) the shrinking presence of the occupation troops, May 1945 -

December 1947. This was the time when the conceptual basis of the relationship were developed.

2) A transitional phase, which can be defined as the search for cooperation, 1948 -1954. During

these years a military relationship between Italy and the United States was formalized by the

coming into existence of the Atlantic Alliance, and some attempts were made to establish a

planning cooperation with the Allied occupation troops stationed in Austria and in the stillborn

Free Territory of Trieste. This phase was also characterised by the signature of a number of

agreements related to the use of Italian military facilities by the US armed forces. 3) The nuclear

* * I wish to express my thanks to Wolfgang Schl÷r for his comments on an early version of this paper, and to Michael Yaffe for both his willingness to discuss with me the database of the Nuclear History Program and some useful information about the timing of the deployment of US nuclear warheads in Europe.

* * United States Overseas Military Bases, Report to the President by Franck C. Nash. Country Studies: Italy, November 1957, in Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), 1990 # 2284.

comeback, 1955-1963, when US units equipped with nuclear delivery means were stationed in

the Northeastern part of the country.() The article dedicates particular attention to this episode as

it is highly explicative of the importance attached by the Italian government and the Italian

military even to a symbolic presence of US troops on Italian soil.

1) A conceptual background.

Histories of contemporary Italy generally begin their narration since the signature of the

armistice between Italy and the Allied powers on September 3, 1943, as that date is assumed as a

conceptual watershed of fundamental importance to any understanding of postwar Italian

policies. Among its many consequences, in fact, the armistice also sanctioned the final demise of

the attempt to assert Italy's presence in the international arena by the use of force. The magnitude

of the disaster in 1943 seemingly persuaded the next generation of Italian policymakers that

never again should Italy try to emphasize military force as a key element of its foreign policy.

The impact of the two years of "cobelligerence" which followed the armisitice was also a

deep and lasting one. The collapse of Italian institutions after the armistice was announced on

September 8 did not spare the country's military structure. In spite of the many brave attempts to

organize centers of resistance against the German reaction, most military units either disbanded

or were captured and transferred to POW camps in Germany. What was left of the Italian armed

forces struggled to rebuild a token force in order both to continue the war alongside the Allies,

and create a core around which a postwar reconstruction could be organised. Italian military

leaders, however, quickly realized that at least in the short term foreign help was crucial to this

( 1963 is here assumed as a possible endline of convenience mainly because of a significant reduction in the number of US troops deployed in Italian territory, but should not be interpreted as having any other particular meaning. See infra, section 3.

endeavour, and pleaded for Allied military assistance. This was eventually granted in 1944, and

allowed the Italian government in the part of the country under Allied occupation to organize a

small Army and an Air Force, equipped and supplied mostly with Allied material.()

The armistice and the cobelligerence had therefore a twofold consequence on Italian

military thinking, as they revealed both Italy's powerlessness and a possible solution to the

country's predicament. First, the Italian military leadership was persuaded by this turn of events

that the postwar reconstruction of the armed forces was possible only if the United States and

Great Britain would continue to provide the necessary equipment.() Equally important was the

second conclusion, namely that in the future Italy could not resist any major aggression without

the help of powerful allies. Until the Cold war split Europe in two opposing camps, Italian

General Staff documents referred, somewhat vaguely, to the United Nations as to the

organization which would ultimately guarantee the country's security in a major military

confrontation. It was clear, however, that it was the British, and even more the American, help

that the Italian military were looking for.()

At the same time, Allied military leaders in Italy quickly grasped the importance of

helping Italy to rebuild her armed forces and of retaining Allied forces in the peninsula until the

Italian government could stand on its own feet. Supreme Allied Commander in the

( For the relationship with the Allies see Norman Kogan, Italy and the Allies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956); David Ellwood, Italy 1943-1945 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1985); James E. Miller The United States and Italy, 1940-1950. The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1986). For the origins of military cooperation see mine L'esercito italiano nel secondo dopoguerra, 1945-1950. La sua ricostruzione e l'assistenza militare alleata (Rome: Ufficio Storico Stato Maggiore Esercito, 1989), chapter 1.

( According to Italian military thinking in 1945-46, Italy could and should endow itself with limited armed forces, which would enable her to cope with small-scale military threats: the necessary equipment for these forces, however, could come only from Allied military assistance, since the war-torn Italian economy had to concentrate on the more urgent priority of rebuilding the nation's key activities.

( For a more detailed analysis of postwar Italian military thinking, see Nuti, L'esercito italiano, cit., pp. 47-58.

Mediterranean Field Marshal Harold Alexander and Chief Allied Commissioner Rear Admiral

Ellery W. Stone repeatedly stressed the necessity of maintaining a large number of Allied

occupation troops until a viable, stable democratic government could be established. In the

turbulent political atmosphere of the early postwar months, with Yugoslavia threatening to take

over Trieste and the attitude of the former Communist partisans an unknown variable, Allied

troops could play a crucial role in steering Italy in the desired direction when she might be at the

crossroads between "democracy and a new totalitarianism".() Nevertheless this call for

maintaining a strong military posture and making Italy "a bulwark of democracy" in the

Mediterranean contrasted sharply with pre-established demobilization plans. Thus the

suggestions of the Allied authorities in Italy were largely unheeded, and the number of Allied

occupation troops was drastically reduced between May 1945 and the Summer of 1947. Already

by late 1945 only the 56th British division and the US 88th infantry division were left in Italy,

with the Polish Corps soon to be redeployed in Great Britain.()

The importance of the remaining Allied occupation troops, however, became evident to

all parties concerned in the Summer of 1946. As the Paris Peace conference dragged on without

being able to produce a solution for the contested area of Trieste, the tension around the city rose

quickly. When two American planes were shot down by some trigger-happy Jugoslav soldiers, a

military showdown in the area seemed imminent. The Supreme Allied Commander in the

Mediterranean, Major General Sir William D. Morgan, had already begun planning Allied

( Future Policy toward Italy, memorandum by Chief Commissioner Ellery Stone, June 23, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) 1945, vol.I, pp.688-694.

( The Polish Corps, based on two divisions and an armoured brigade, caused some embarassment to the Allies as most of its trooos refused to return to an increasingly Communist Poland. For more information about Allied demobilization plans, see the exchange of letters between Churchill and FM Alexander, on June 17 1945, in Public Record Office (PRO), War Office, 193/280.

reactions for such a contingency, and there is little doubt that the presence of the Allied troops

was crucial in preventing a further deterioration of the situation.() In spite of the fact that Allied

strength was hardly sufficient to deter major aggression (as the early American war plans

confirm) the Italian Army Staff quickly concluded that their presence on Italian soil made limited

aggressions unlikely because it might trigger a major confrontation which would also involve the

Allies.()

As for the reconstruction of the Italian armed forces, Italy suffered some military

restrictions that were imposed on her by the peace treaty signed on February 10, 1947.

Nevertheless, during the period between 1945 and 1947 the Italian services survived mainly

through the provision of military surplus supplied by the British and American occupation

troops. The Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean had feared widespread

disturbances of public order at the end of the war, if not an all-out revolutionary uprising of the

Greek kind, and in order to spare the Allied troops from having to enforce law and order, he had

asked for the authorization to rearm the Italian army, so as to allow it to cope with internal

turmoil. A CCS decision of late 1945 authorised the Supreme Allied Commander in the

( The SACMED quickly realised the importance of military cooperation with the armed forces of Italy if he had to resist a Jugoslav aggression. In June 1946, therefore, General Morgan formally requested the CCS authorisation for integrated planning, which was granted, with some delay, later on during the year. SACMED to CCS (NAF 1160), Use of Italian Army in the Event of Hostilities in North East Italy, June 19, 1946, in NAW, Record Group 165, ABC 091.711 Italy (5 April 1944), Sec.2.

( The first postwar American plan related to the Italian peninsula was based on the strategic concept set forth in the general plan "Pincher", and was codenamed "Cockspur": see JWPC 464/1, "Cockspur" (20 December 1946), in Steven T. Ross and David Alan Rosenberg (eds.), America's Plans for War Against the Soviet Union, 1945-1950, vol.3, Pincher: Campaign Plans, Part 1 (London, New York: Garland 1989). Its dire conclusions envisaged the eventual evacuation of the whole peninsula and the retention of Sicily alone. For an Italian military speculation of the possibility of a Jugoslav aggression in 1946, see the study by the Operation Division of the Italian Army Staff, Colpo di mano jugoslavo su Trieste, in AUSSME (Archivio Ufficio Storico Stato Maggiore Esercito), I/5 (Carteggio Classificato Ufficio Operazioni), 1946.

Mediterranean to dispose of Allied surplus material to help rebuilding the Italian Army.()

Thus the years 1945-1947 shaped the attitude of the Italian military towards the Allies

(and viceversa). Although a tangible evidence of the Italian defeat, the occupation troops

provided the only available guarantee that Italy would not be attacked by Jugoslavia in an attempt

to solve the issue of Trieste by force.() Perhaps even more important was their role in preventing

a possible Communist insurrection. In spite of the decision to rearm the Italian army, in fact, it

was undoubtedly the Allied military presence which ultimately deterred any large scale

disturbance of public order, let alone an insurrection.

The Peace Treaty between Italy and the Allied powers was eventually signed on February

10, 1947, and ratified by all parties concerned by September 15. This entailed the withdrawal of

all the occupation troops within 90 days, and the Allies actually planned to complete it by early

December.() During the interval between the signature of the treaty and its ratification, however,

it seemed possible that some of the governments who had signed the treaty, and in particular the

Jugoslav government, might not ratify it, and that there might occur an "indefinite delay" in the

( The Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 3 (NAF 1051) and August 22 (NAF 1059) 1945; CCS to SACMED (FAN 621), September 30, 1945, in NAW, RG 165, ABC 420 Italy (30 Oct.1943), Sec 1-B.

( On Trieste, see: Diego De Castro, La questione di Trieste: l'azione politica e diplomatica italiana dal 1943 al 1954, 2 voll., Trieste, LINT, 1981; Anton Giulio de' Robertis, Le grandi potenze e il confine giuliano, 1941-1949, Bari, Laterza, 1983; Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Le Conflit de Trieste, 1943-1954 Brussels, Institut de Sociologie de l'UniversitÞ Libre de Bruxelles, 1966; Bogdan Novak, Trieste 1941-1954.The Ethnic, Political and Ideological Struggle, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970; Giampaolo Valdevit, La questione di Trieste 1941-1954: Politica internazionale e con testo loca le , Milano, Angeli 1986; Roberto G.Rabel, Between East and West. Trieste, the United States, and the Cold War, 1941-1954, Durham, Duke University Press, 1988.

( By mid-1947 US forces in Italy proper (i.e., not counting those deployed in Trieste), amounted to one tank battalion (the 752nd) and one infantry division (the 88th), while the British had six tactical units (unbrigaded infantry battalions) for a total of 5.000 men, and supply and amministrative units for a total of 7.800, plus a military mission of about 500 men. For the data about US troops, see Hans Jurgen Schraut (with Joan D. Hefferman, Alexander M. Karber, Phillip A. Kerber and Michael D. Yaffe), The United States Army in Europe, 1945-1955 (Nuclear History Program, 1990).; for the data about the British troops, Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee to the JSSC on Estimates of the Situation on Greece and Italy, "Estimates of the situations in Greece and Italy", in NAW, RG 165, A.B.C. 370.5 Greece Italy (20 Aug 47) (Sect 1-A).

conclusion of the peace settlement. As tension with Belgrade grew again in the middle of the

Summer, the British embassy in Washington quietly informed the State Department that for

financial and manpower reasons the British government must immediately withdraw all of its

troops from Greece and Italy. The British initiative aroused an outcry of protest among the US

military in the field and at the State Department, which noted that the presence of Allied troops

in Italy had prevented a Communist uprising supported by Jugoslavia, and that "the removal of

present forces in Italy would facilitate Jugoslav assistance to Communists in Italy if the latter

should attempt a coup against the Italian government". Subsequently, however, the US concluded

that "the withdrawal would not affect the situation in Italy and in Venezia Giulia to a substantial

degree", but they also estimated that it would "place on the United States the entire burden of

providing a stabilizing influence on the Italian and Greek governments".() The ratification of the

peace treaty by the Jugoslav government on August 15 eventually brought the creeping crisis to

an end, but not without having made clear to the American government the vacuum of power that

the withdrawal of the occupation troops would create. A CIG special evaluation concluded that

the

withdrawal would seriously affect US interests and security in Italy by: a)throwing open to Communist pressure the important area of Northern Italy where the proximity of Jugoslav Communists makes it possible for the USSR to create a situation on the border similar to that prevailing in Northern Greece; and b) leaving the entire country and the weak De Gasperi government ill-prepared to cope with the powerful Communist party in the national elections scheduled for April 1948.()

( Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee to the JSSC on Estimates of the Situation on Greece and Italy, "Estimates of the situations in Greece and Italy", in NAW, RG 165, A.B.C. 370.5 Greece Italy (20 Aug 47) (Sect 1-A).

( Consequences of Allied Troop Withdrawals from Italy, Central Intelligence Group Special evaluation no. 30, 16 September 1947, in Declassified Documents Reference System, (DDRS) 1976, 16 D.

For the Italian government to openly request the continued presence of the occupation

troops "would amount to political suicide", the document continued, and the only realistic

alternatives were seen in the strengthening of the Italian security forces and in the reaching of an

agreement which would allow the US to use certain port and railway facilities "in order that

maintenance and supply troops may protect the lines of communication from the Free Territory

of Trieste to the US zone [in] Austria". It was argued by the CIG that "the presence of these

troops [....] would lend the moral support greatly needed by the anti-Communist forces, and

would greatly strengthen the non-Communist Italian Government by enabling it to cope with the

critical period leading to the national elections". As a stop-gap measure, the US government

decided to examine the opportunity of strengthening the Italian armed forces with a program of

military assistance, and shortly after the conclusion of the ratification process, an American

military mission under Colonel Charles R. Bathurst toured Italy to find out how to bolster the

Italian government and strengthen its military posture.()

The significance of the withdrawal was clear for the Italian government as well. As the

domestic political situation had been quickly deteriorating since the late spring of 1947, the

Italian Prime Minister, Alcide De Gasperi, was becoming more and more concerned about what

would happen after the Allied troops were gone. By early December, therefore, he made a strong

plea for the continuation of Allied military assistance in order to enable the Italian security forces

to cope with any internal uprising, and also asked the Allies to delay the departure of the

occupation troops to the last possible moment.() At midnight of December 14, 1947, when the

( US Military Assistance to Italy. Report by the US Army Survey Group to Italy, October 13, 1947, in NAW, RG 319, P and O 091 Italy TS (Oct 13, 1947), Sec. 1, Case 1, Part 1.

( Note of Record, Delay in Departure of US Forces from MTO, November 28, 1947, in NAW, rg 319, P and O 384 (Sec. VII), Cases 91/103. The plea for military assistance to the Italian security forces in The Ambassador in Rome (james Dunn) to the State Department, December 7, 1947, in FRUS, 1948, vol. III, pp.738-739.

final departure of the occupation troops eventually occurred, it was staged as a spectacular

demonstration meant to impress upon the Italian Communists the might and strength of the

Allies.()

2) Integrated planning and bases agreements.

After the departure of the occupation troops, the Italian military placed great importance

on coordinating their defensive planning with the Allied forces deployed both in Austria and the

Free Territory of Trieste. Without the physical counterinsurance provided by the presence of

British and American soldiers on Italian soil, cooperation with Western forces stationed in

nearby countries was regarded as necessary not only because of the military support they could

provide in case of an emergency, but also because it seemed to guarantee Allied assistance in a

broader sense.() The limited size of the occupation troops, that never amounted to more than a

handful of units, seems to confirm that the Italians appreciated this cooperation for its political,

more than for its strictly military, consequences.() These "relatively minor strategic advantages"

( Lovett to Royal, November 28, 1947, in FRUS, 1948, vol. III, p.729. On that very day the US Congress passed a bill providing Interim Aid for France and Italy as a stop-gap measure before the Marshall Plan begun to be implemented: Miller, The United States and Italy, cit., p.236.

( Office of the Military Attache, American Embassy in Rome, to Director of Intelligence, GSUSA, Dept. of the Army: Italian General Staff Studies, Function of Italy in the Anglo-American Strategic Plan For the Mediterranean, 28 April 1948, in NAW, RG 319, P and O 091 Italy TS, Box 17 - Tab 21 - STAT. (Document released through the FOIA). See also Ministero della difesa. SME. Uff. Op., sez. 2^. Memoria operativa n.4. La difesa del nostro territorio verso oriente. February 1948, in AUSSME, H-6, racc. n. 27. For a more extensive discussion of Italian planning in 1948, see Leopoldo Nuti, "The Italian Military and the Atlantic Pact", in Ennio DI NOLFO, ed., The Signature of the Atlantic Pact Forty Years Afterwards: A Historical Reappraisal, Proceedings of the International Conference Held In Florence, April 3-5, 1989, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, forthcoming).

( From 1949 to 1954, for instance, US forces in Austria amounted to 1 Infantry Regiment, 1 Recon Battalion, and 1 Field Artillery Battalion; in Trieste there was the 351st Infantry Regiment. Hans Jurgen Schraut (with Joan D. Hefferman, Alexander M. Karber, Phillip A. Kerber and Michael D. Yaffe), The United States Army in Europe, 1945-1955 (Nuclear History Program, 1990).

were also appreciated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who regarded the presence of Allioed troops in

Trieste as "at least in some degree a stabilizing influence on Italy and France and a deterrent to

Communist penetration into Italy and to Communist covert operations".()

In the second half of 1948 the issue of integrated planning became strictly related to the

broader problem of the relationship between Italy and a Western defensive pact. In December

1948 the Chief of Staff of the Italian Army, General Efisio Marras, met at the Pentagon with

some American military representatives in order to discuss the possibilities offered by a formal

security linkage between Italy and a future Western alliance. The American military made clear

that the safest way to ensure the cooperation desired by the Italians was for Italy to become a part

either of the Brussels Pact or of the future Atlantic pact.() The inclusion of Italy in the Atlantic

Pact, however, was by no means a foregone conclusion, and it caused a protracted discussion

ended only by President Truman's favorable decision in early March of 1949.

The debate about whether Italy should be included in the Atlantic pact centered about the

strategic value of the Italian peninsula. Eventually it was probably the French insistence on

Italian membership, partially backed up by the American military, that made possible for Italy to

( The JCS also believed that "from the strategic viewpoint, the Allied part of the FTT is suitably located for Anglo-American intelligence activities, and for covert psychological warfare and special operations in Southern Europe". Joint Chiefs of Staff - Decision on JCS 1383/47, "A Report by the JSSC on POlicy on Status of Troops in the Free Territory of Trieste", 22 September 1949, in Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part 2, 1946-1953, section D, Europe and NATO, Reel 3, # 0534.

( Chief of Army Staff General Marras first broached the issue of coordination with US Commander in Chief, European theater, General Lucius P. Clay, at the same time when Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Maugeri discussed it with the French General Revers. Marras then discussed the subject more in detail during his crucial conversations with key Pentagon representatives in December. For the Marras-Clay meeting, see Clay to Bradley, October 5th, 1948, and Clay to Marshall, October 15th, 1948, in The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, edited by Jean Edward Smith, (London/Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), pp.891-892 and 906-907 respectively; for the Maugeri-Revers talks, see Quaroni a Zoppi, October 4th, 1948, in ASMAE, Ambasciata di Parigi, 1948, b.405, f.1. See also Franco Maugeri, Ricordi di un marinaio (Milano: Mursia, 1980), pp.289-293. For Marras' Pentagon meetings, see my "La missione Marras,2-22 dicembre 1948", in Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali, 1987, n.2.

be one of the founding countries of the Alliance.() After the signature of the North Atlantic

Treaty, however, there was no immediate effort to coordinate defence plans for the troops

deployed along Italy's borders for almost a year. Formally, Allied troops in Austria and Trieste

were not assigned to the Atlantic Pact: they remained under the direct command of the Combined

Chiefs of Staff, and initially had no relationship with the Pact's Planning Groups.() The

Commanders of the occupation troops, moreover, envisaged many different courses of action in

case of Soviet aggression, including a quick withdrawal to regroup and fight in the central

European front, and were therefore reluctant to disclose these options to the Italians.()

The outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950 suddenly made preparations for a general

war much more realistic, and persuaded the Allied military of the necessity to integrate the plans

for the occupation troops with Italian military authorities. Shortly after the outbreak of the war,

the Italian General Staff was for the first time officially notified of the existence of the Allied

plans for a coordinated withdrawal of the Western troops of occupation from Austria and Trieste

into Italy, with the purpose of redeploying them along Italian forces.()

In the following years Western planning for an integrated defense of the region bordering

with the NorthEastern border of Italy was, at best, little more than tentative.() Serious differences

( Elisabeth D. Sherwood, Allies in Crisis. Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), p.17. For the inclusion of Italy in the Atlantic Pact, see also Timothy E. Smith, "The Fear of Subversion: the US and the Inclusion of Italy in the North Atlantic Treaty", in Diplomatic History, VII, n.2 (1983) pp.139-155;

( Only later, when the military structure of the Alliance was completed, it was made clear that in case of war they would be placed at the orders of SACEUR.

( Integration of Allied Planning for Evacuation of Trieste in an Emergency with Planning by the Italian High

( Extract of meeting of Principal Staff Officers of the EMMO Region on 13th July, PRO, DEFE 11/23.

( See L. Nuti, Italy and the Defence of NATO's Southern Flank, in Norbert Wiggershaus (ed.), Die Nordatlantische Bundnis, 1949-1956 (Freiburg: Militõrgeschitliches Forschungsamt, 1991)

existed between the occupying Allied powers as to whether it would be feasible, in case of Soviet

aggression, to try to defend the whole of Austrian territory, or whether the troops should be

withdrawn into Italy and defend the Italo-Austrian passes. Furthermore, the option of

withdrawing them from this theater of operations and redeploying them elsewhere was never

entirely eliminated, and reappeared time and again.

The task to develop coordinated planning for the region was given to AFSOUTH, the new

Headquarter set up by NATO in June 1951, and its first commander in Chief, Admiral Carney,

tried to foster a common defense effort.() By the end of 1952, however, the idea of a forward

strategy in Austria was eventually dismissed and definitively replaced with the plan for the

defense of the Alpine passes. In late 1953 the British and the French reduced their occupation

troops to such an extent as to make it impossible for them to play any meaningful military role,

and the strategic task of defending the Alpine passes was practically left to the US troops in

Austria, which in case of war would be reinforced for this purpose by the other US forces

stationed in Trieste.() This remained their mission until their final withdrawal.

The documentation available from the Italian military archives does not shed much light

on how the Italian judged this cooperation. They might have had some doubts about its military

efficacy, but obviously they regarded it as crucial from the political point of view. The strategic

counterinsurance provided by these troops, moreover, was strenghtened by the fact that in those

same years the US and Italy entered a number of legal agreements which created a network of

( Generale di brigata Guido Bertoni [Italian liaison officer at SHAPE] al Capo di SM Difesa, Gen. Marras, 18 December 1952, in AUSSME, I-5, 1952.

( Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: United Kingdom and French forces in Austria, 11 September 1953, enclosure to JCS 1685/57, Note by the Secretaries to the JCS on UK and French Forces in Austria, 15 September 1953, in Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part 2, 1946-1953, section D, Europe and NATO, Reel 1, # 313.

military relations between the two states.() In June 1951 both governments signed in London the

NATO Status of Forces agreement, which regulated the status of NATO troops deployed in the

territory of other member countries. Shortly afterwards, bilateral negotiations with the US began

to define the use by US troops of a number of facilities in Italian territory. In particular, it was

agreed that the new NATO Command for the NATO Southern Region would have its

Headquarters in Naples, and the two governments also discussed the use by US forces of the port

of Leghorn and the creation of a large depot near the city, which would be used to resupply the

occupation troops in Austria.() In June, however, rumours about the negotiations were used by

the Communist opposition to stage an attack against the Government in the Italian Senate. () The

vehement reaction of the left made the Italian government very cautios, and when the first US

ship docked at Leghorn with the material needed to build the new US supply base "there were six

truckloads of Italian riot police waiting nearby" ready to charge against any Communist

demonstrators.() A first general agreement between the two governments was not signed until

January 7, 1952, and it took the form of an exchange of notes in order to avoid parliamentary

scrutiny. Its text, moreover, was couched in very vague terms in order to make it as incospicuous

as possible. The agreement simply binds the Italian government to "fulfill the military obligations

which it has assumed under multilateral or bilateral agreements or treaties to which the United

( For the sake of brevity, this part of the article omits any reference to the issues related to the Mutual Security Program.

( It might be worth recalling that in the CIG Report of September 1947 the deployment of troops for logistical purposes had been recommended to strengthen the western orientation of the Italian government.

( Atti parlamentari, Senato della Repubblica, Legislatura I, 1951, pp.25865-25873.

( New York Times, August 12, 1951, 20:4. In 1952, several bombing attacks were staged against the cars of US soldiers in the Leghorn area, without any casualty.

States is a party". Other specific arrangements were left to be defined at a later time.() In Paris, on

August 28, 1952, the US and the Italian governments signed a multilateral NATO Protocol on

the Status of the International Headquarters of the Alliance.() In November 1952 the large depot

of Camp Darby, near Leghorn, was officially inaugurated as the Logistical Command which

would supervise the transshipment of supplies for the US occupation troops in Austria.() Thus, in

spite of the fact that the details of the general cooperation agreement were yet to be defined, and

that the London convention had not yet been ratified by the Parliament, US command and

logistical structures were already being set up in Italian territory.()

The ratification of these agreements, however, was a long and rather convoluted process,

and the same happened to the formalization of the arrangements for the use of the facilities in

Naples and Leghorn. The bill for the ratification of the London convention was introduced to the

Foreign Affairs Committee of the Italian Chamber of Deputies in October 1951, which approved

it in January of 1952. That being a preelectoral year, the sensitive bill was left dormant until after

the elections of June 1953. The results of the elections, however, gave un enexpected twist to the

ratification process as well as to the pace of the negotiations for formalizing the facilites

arrangements. In the newly elected Italian Parliament a slightly more rightwing majority showed

a strong inclination to use whatever weapons were available in order to reach a favorable solution

for the problem of the Free Territory of Trieste. After the elections, therefore, the Italian

( TIAS, Agreement effected by the exchange of notes signed at Rome, 7 January 1952.

( TIAS 2978, Protocol on the Status of International Military Headquarters set up pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, August 28, 1952.

( New York Times, November 15, 1952, 27:5.

( It may be worth noting that a clause of article 16 of the Paris Protocol allowed "the authorities of a receiving state and a Supreme HQ may agree to give effect, by administrative means in advance to ratification, to any provision " of the protocol, thereby empowering the governments to circumvent parliamentary opposition.

government took a course of action which was less supportive of NATO, and conditioned its

return to a straightforward Atlantic policy to a settlement for Trieste. () In May 1954, when US

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles asked the new Italian PM Mario Scelba "when he thought

he could sign the facilities agreement, which [had] been in negotiation for 15 months", he was

told that the reason for the delay was the need to be sure that the government "could sign an

executive agreement and not have to pass through Parlaiment".() Before and after his meeting

with Dulles, however, Scelba made clear to US Ambassador Claire Luce that the deterioration of

the Italian international position, due to the prospect of a negative solution of the Trieste issue,

left "no hope at all for an early signature of the military facilities agreement". Piqued at the

Italian resistence, Ambassador Luce recommended to the State Department that the negotiations

be broken off.()

Both governments knew that an agreement would be eventually reached, as both regarded

it in their mutual interest. Scelba, however, was merely fencing in order to improve the Italian

bargaining position before a final solution for Trieste was achieved, and US diplomats countered

by threatening to break off the negotiations.() This game of veiled threats and subtle feints,

( On April 18, 1954, the Italian PM Scelba explicitly told Ambassador Luce that "if the US wishes Italy to make real progress against the Communist Party and on other US programs (facilities, Status of Forces) Trieste will have to be settled". The US Ambassador (Luce) to the Under Secretary of State (Bedell Smith), April 18, 1954, in FRUS,1952-1954, Vol. VI, Western Europe and Canada, pp.1671-75.

( The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department of State, May 4, 1954, in FRUS, 1952-1954, vol.VIII, Eastern Europe, pp.419-422.

( "Draft Statement of Policy proposed by the Planning Board of the NSC", March 12, 1954, in FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. VI, Western Europe and Canada, pp. 1656-1660; for Ambassador Luce's suggestion, see Note 3, p.443, in

( Eisenhower, for instance, told John Foster Dulles that "oftentimes we would get better results by seeming to be less demanding and indicating that if the Italians did not want us there, we would gladly adjust oyr plans accordingly". Memorandum of Conversation with the President, July 11, 1954, in John Foster Dulles Papers, White House Correspondence and Memoranda Series, Reel 1, box 1, 0668.

therefore, lasted until a final settlement for Trieste was in sight. When this condition was met,

Scelba promised Ambassador Luce that he would deliver the agreement in a matter of days, and

he kept his world.() By October 20, 1954, only a few weeks after the signature of the

Memorandum of Understanding about Trieste, the US and the Italian government signed the

facilities agreement.() Again, it took the form of an exchange of notes that did not require

parliamentary approval. Emboldened by the solution of the Trieste problem, however, the

government decided shortly afterwards to accelerate the procedure for the approval of the bill

ratifying the London Status of forces agreement and the Paris Protocol. After a tumultuous

parliamentary debate which saw sharp attacks from the Leftwing opposition, the Senate passed

the bill on February 4, 1955, and the Chamber of Deputies followed suit in the following

November.()

By the time the London convention had been ratified, however, the Italian strategic

position had been seriously altered by the signature of the Austrian state treaty.

3) The nuclear comeback.

The Italian reaction at the prospect of the removal of the occupation troops in Austria and

( Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, August 7, 1954, and The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department of State, October 6, 1954, in FRUS, 1952-1954, vol.VIII, Eastern Europe, p. 489 and pp. 577-578.

( In later documents, it will be referred to as "Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Italy regarding bilateral infrastructure". The text of the agreement remains secret to this day, but from later documents it can be established that it authorised the US to operate agreed installations in accordance with its provisions and, in a section denominated "Document II", listed all the installations to which the agreement applied. It also contemplated that it could be made applicable to additional installations by subsequent agreements to add them to the list. See Memo to the Acting Secretary of State, "Negotiations to bring additional installations within 1954 agreement with Italy", March 15, 1956, in National Archives, Washington (NAW), RG 59, 765.5/3-1556 (box 3619). Further details about the negotiations for the agreement can be collected in the State Department File 711.56365, from 9-1654 to 10-2054, in NAW, RG 59.

( Senato della Repubblica, Atti Parlamentari, Legislatura II-1955, Discussioni, pp. 9824-9909; Camera dei Deputati, Atti Parlamentari, Legislatura II, Discussioni, pp. 22064-22092.

the Free Territory of Trieste provides a sort of a contrario demonstration of their importance for

Italian defense. In October 1954 the signature of the London memorandum of understanding

between the Italian and the Jugoslav government settled the issue of Trieste, and led to the

removal of British and American occupation troops from the city. The enthusiastic reaction of

the Italian population at the return of Trieste to Italian sovereignty obscured the military

consequences of the withdrawal. The removal of the Allied troops, moreover, was compensated

for by the fact that the settlement seemed to open the prospect of a better relationship between

Italy and Jugoslavia which, in due time, could be extended to military cooperation. When in early

1955 the chance of an Austrian treaty began to materialize, however, the Italian reaction was very

different.

In early May 1955, when the Austrian state treaty was being debated in the North Atlantic

council, the Italian Foreign Minister, Gaetano Martino, made clear that the treaty was for Italy a

matter of serious concern. The Italian government was worried about the exact meaning of

Austrian neutrality, Martino remarked, because it believed that Austria must be allowed to be

part of the existing international organizations, and to cooperate with other countries in social

and economic issues. In particular, Martino feared that, from the military point of view, Austrian

neutrality might have an impact for the defence of Italy's Eastern frontier, and affect the Italian

contribution to NATO.()

The signature of the Austrian State Treaty on May 15, 1955, pledged Austria to a policy

of neutrality, forced the withdrawal of all the occupation troops from its territory, and opened a

( Telegram from the United States Delegation at the NAC Ministerial Meeting to the Dept. of State, May 10, 1955, in FRUS, 1995-1957, vol. IV, Western European Security and Integration, pp.10-14. It goes without saying that Austrian neutrality carried along not just the withdrawal of the occupation troops but also the likely removal of the Camp Darby logistical base in Leghorn, that was the main supply depot for those troops.

gap in the Western defense system. For Italian military planners, this meant that all ties to

NATO's Central European sector, no matter how flimsy and hypothetical, were severed at once.

For the first time since the end of the war, no Allied troops would be conveniently deployed near

the Italian territory, ready to cooperate in the event of an aggression.() This change posed some

serious problems and spurred the Italian Defence Ministry to take the initiative. Defense Minister

Paolo Emilio Taviani explained to Dulles that in view of these events, he thought necessary to

strengthen the defense of NATO's southern flank, which now rested on Italy alone; advanced

military planning against a Soviet attack through the Balkans and Northern Italy, in particular,

was essential. Taviani revised with Dulles the story of the previous Italian attempts to seek

cooperation with Jugoslavia for the purpose of joint defence planning, and of their thorough lack

of success. Thus, he concluded, it was of crucial importance to build up greater NATO strength

in the area.()

What the Italian Defense Minister had in mind became clear in a later conversation with

State Department Counselor Douglas MacArthur, when Taviani proposed to establish a new

NATO command near Venice. The new Headquarter was to be subordinate to NATO's

CINCSOUTH, with an American or British commander. This was regarded as necessary, Taviani

specified, in case operations had to be carried out in Jugoslav territory, "in view of the attitudes

of the Slovenes toward Italy". The new command was to include at least three allied divisions

( A good retrospective analysis of the crisis of mid-summer of 1955 can be found in Programma Off-Shore per l'esercizio 1955, October 1955, in AUSSME, I/5, Carteggio Classificato Ufficio Operazioni.

( Taviani told Dulles that the Italians had also sounded out the Austrian government for establishing defense cooperation, in particular in the matter of joint planning, and that this effort had apparently had more positive results. The author regrets not being able to locate more specifically the time of this and of the following discussion between Taviani and the US diplomats, but the only document mentioning them that he has been able to found so far is a later State Department recollection of the events of mid-1955, which does not provide any specific timing: The State Department to the Embassy in Rome, August 15, 1962, in JFK Presidential Library, NSF, Countries: Italy, box 120, folder Italy General 6/6/62-6/30/62.

stationed in NorthEast Italy, as well as a naval base at Ancona connected to the sixth Fleet.()

The Italian plea was based, as US Ambassador to Rome Frederick Reinhardt wrote a few

years later, "on the military, political and psychological need for the presence of US forces in

Italy's Northeast sector".() The American response came with the decision to redeploy the

American troops of occupation in Austria to Italy. Between May and July 1955 SHAPE studied

alternative deployment scenarios for US forces in Austria, and in early July it reached the

conclusion that Italy would offer the optimum location. On July 7, 1955, the Italian Ambassador

in Paris Pietro Quaroni notified the Chief of Defense General Staff, General Mancinelli, that after

listening to the favourable declarations of both the American and the Italian representatives, the

North Atlantic Council had approved the proposals contained in SHAPE's study number 282-55.

According to the Italian ambassador, the study suggested moving to Italy some of the US troops

deployed in Austria, but it also envisaged a further step beyond the redeployment of the

occupation troops, since it also recommended to strengthen the Italian Army with "ground-

launched atomic weapons".()

The available documentation does not allow to make clear whether nuclear delivery

means had been first deployed in Austria and then moved into Italy together with the occupation

forces, or whether the redeployment of the US troops from Austria was used as a ploy to quietly

smuggle into Italy nuclear-capable rocket artillery at a later time. What is clear, however, is that

by the Summer of 1955 the US and Italy had agreed to station American units equipped with

( The State Department to the Embassy in Rome, August 15, 1962, in JFK Presidential Library, NSF, Countries: Italy, box 120, folder Italy General 6/6/62-6/30/62.

( The Ambassador in Italy (Reinhardt) to the Department of State, june 25, 1962, in JFK Presidential Library, NSF, Countries: Italy, box 120, folder Italy General 6/6/62-6/30/62.

( Entry of July 6, 1955, in AUSSME, Diario Storico Stato Maggiore Difesa (DS SMD) [Historical Diary of the Defense General Staff]

nuclear capable rocketry in Italian territory.

Shortly after his meeting with Ambassador Quaroni, in fact, the Chief of Defense General

Staff ordered to accelerate staff studies about the contribution that atomic weapons could make to

the defence of the NorthEastern frontier of Italy. The possibility that American troops armed with

tactical nuclear weapons might be deployed in Italian territory seemed to be confirmed in early

August, when the Defense General Staff received from the US "confidential" information about

both the Honest John and the Corporal, the two weapons systems that the American units in Italy

were expected to be equipped with.()

The deployment in Italy of an American contingent was debated twice by the Italian

Council of Ministers in early August. During the first meeting Foreign Minister Martino told the

Cabinet that "no concrete initiative" could be taken towards the Balkan alliance of Jugoslavia,

Greece and Turkey because of the recent, more neutralist course of Jugoslav foreign policy, and

obviously the impossibility of cooperating with the neighbouring state made the Italian

government all the more interested in alternative ways of strengthening the defence of the

Northeastern frontier. During the debates, however, Prime Minister Antonio Segni added that

foreign troops should not be stationed in sensitive areas such as Bolzano or Trieste, and that it

was important that they be classified as a NATO unit, thus downplaying their national identity

and stressing their presence as a symbol of international cooperation. Segni told his colleagues

that he had mentioned these two points to the American ambassador, and that an agreement had

been reached.() While there was a general consensus within the Council of Ministers, however,

( Entries of July 6 and August 1st, 1955, in AUSSME, DS SMD.

( Meetings of August 2 and August 6, 1955, in Archivio Centrale dello Stato (ACS), Verbali delle Riunioni del Consiglio dei Ministri. The issue was also probably debated by the Supreme Defense Council, which met on August 2. The minutes of that meeting are not open to research, but some information can be gathered in the American Ambassador in Rome to the Secretary of State, Meeting of the Supreme Defense Council, August 4, 1955, in NAW,

the choice of the location for the deployment of a large foreign contingent was not accomplished

without some difficulties. Fears of Communist demonstrations and of possible incidents with the

local population complicated the matter, and when an agreement was initially reached on the

town of Bassano del Grappa, a place strictly connected with nostalgic reminescences of the

Italian spirited resistance against the Austrians in the First World War, it was eventually rejected

by the Army as likely to arouse nationalistic reactions. The military, however, were also

concerned that in case of prolonged difficulties the United States might transfer "the special

weapons" to Germany, and not to Italy, and that therefore it was in Italy's interest to come up

with a solution as quickly as possible. It was therefore decided to accept the American request for

an area east of the city of Verona, by offering a range of possibilities in the area included

between the towns of Palmanova, Vicenza and Treviso.() Defense Minister Taviani has claimed

as his own the proposal of Vicenza, a quiet, conservative Christian Democratic stronghold that

has proved to be an ideal place as it has never caused any serious problems between the

population and the US troops.() By the end of August a general agreement was reached, and

shortly afterwards the first US troops began to cross the Brenner pass and redeploy around

Vicenza.() On October 3, 1955, the final draft of the agreement was signed by the commander of

the US unit, General Allen, and by the vice-Chief of the Italian Army Staff General Fornara.

According to it, the SETAF, or Southern European Task Force, was granted the right to use three

RG 59, 765.5/8-455 (box 3619).

( Promemoria: Dislocazione in Italia del contingente USA proveniente dall'Austria, in AUSSME, I-5, Carteggio classificato Ufficio Operazioni, 1955.

( Interview with Taviani.

large barracks in the Vicenza-Verona area, together with some training facilities.()

Shortly after the conclusion of the negotiations, the Italian cabinet decided to attach the

text of the pact to the general NATO Status of Forces agreement, which was yet to be ratified by

the Italian parliament. This was eventually done on November 11, 1955, after a rather heated

debate during which the Communist opposition sharply criticised the agreement because it

regarded it as an infringement upon Italian territorial sovereignty. Scant attention, however, was

paid to the deployment of the new American unit, whose special character might not have been

entirely realized by most of those who took part in the debate. From the point of view of the

chain of command, SETAF was placed under the orders of COMLANDSOUTH, i.e. of the

Italian general who, under CINCSOUTH, was in charge of the land forces defending Italy's

north-eastern frontier. This made SETAF ultimately dependent upon SHAPE, but under

immediate command of an Italian military authority.

From the military point of view, however, SETAF did not acquire a full nuclear capability

until sometime later. Initially the Task Force consisted of just a test unit, the 85th Field Artillery

Battalion, armed with the 762mm rocket Honest John. During 1956, however, this unit was

converted into the 510th Field Artillery Battalion, which was regarded as effective since the 20th

of August. In June 1956 the Italian Defense General Staff also approved the American proposal

to include within SETAF two battalions (comprising around 250 personnel each) of WAC

Corporal missiles, thus bringing the unit to its full strength. The warhead detachments necessary

to arm the weapons with their nuclear ordnance, however, do not seem to have been deployed in

( Some technical details, relative to the definition of the use of training facilities, were slightly more difficult to be resolved, the Italians blaming the Americans for trying to escape too rigid a definition of their rights.

( Promemoria: Dislocazione in Italia del contingente USA proveniente dall'Austria, in AUSSME, I-5, Carteggio classificato Ufficio Operazioni, 1955.

Italy until some time later.()

The arrival of the SETAF was an obvious spur to a rapid completion of the reformulation

of both national strategy and the Army's tactical doctrine. In 1956 the Army's summer

manoeuvres were entirely dedicated to the verification of the main tenets of some new theories,

and the main exercises included simulated use of atomic weapons. The Army Chief of Staff,

General Liuzzi, remarked that the exercises had shown: first, the necessity to prevent enemy

penetration of the Po valley, and therefore the need to stop him and defeat him on the Alps or in

the Alpine passes; second, the opportunity to give the Army a dual structure, enabling it to fight

both a conventional and a nuclear war.()

The reformulation of the army's tactical doctrine went along with the redefinition of the

overall strategy for the defence of the north-eastern frontier, replacing the former plans of

cooperation with the Allied occupation units in Austria. SETAF units could be used for both

close and distant interdiction of movements, at the very time when the Soviet forces were being

gathered for an offensive on the other side of the Alps. Nuclear weapons were to be used only in

the initial phase of the hostilities, because of their presumed limited availability. The impact of

these weapons was expected to be very disrupting, thus providing the necessary breathing spell

that the Italian armed forces needed in order to complete their mobilization. The potential use of

SETAF's missiles to obstacle enemy movements on the other side of the Alps explains why the

Italian Defence Staff was more interested in the WAC Corporal, a rather cumbersome and not

very flexible weapon, than in the more advanced Honest John: the Corporal, in fact, had a longer

( NHP Data Collection - Italy; The United States Army in Europe - warhead detachments, pp.000835.

( Esperimenti sull'azione difensiva con procedimenti conseguenti all'impiego delle armi atomiche nel campo tattico. Commento all'esercitazione Monte Bianco 1. June 23, 1956, in AUSSME, I-5, 1956.

range and could hit targets as far away as the Klagenfurt valley.() When in 1957 the US proposed

to replace one battalion of Corporals with another one of Honest Johns, the Italian Defense

General Staff expressed reservations, which eventually prevailed, thus ensuring that SETAF

would continue to have Corporals at its disposal.() As a result, one more battalion of Honest

Johns was added to SETAF, but no Corporals were withdrawn, at least for the time being.

In short, the Italian military adjusted rather smoothly to the introduction of tactical

nuclear weapons, without questioning too deeply the feasibility of their use in case of war. The

importance of SETAF, however, must be gauged in a larger context, and not just from a military

point of view, and the events following the initial deployment provide further insight into the

rationale behind Italian support for this unit. In late 1957 the JCS, the Department of Defense and

the Department of State debated whether the US should propose to the Italian government the

"indigenization" of SETAF, turning over to the Italian services the manning of the missiles and

retaining only the custody of the warheads.() However, when in August 1958 the US minister

Jernegan met with the Secretary General of the Italian Foreign Office, Alessandrini, to discuss

the reorganization of SETAF, he was told that "President Gronchi, Fanfani, Segni and others on

highest level urge and insist [that] the US recondider the plan", that the government of Italy

"would greatly deplore any reduction [in] US strength SETAF or elsewhere and [that] it instead

( For a description of the technical differences between the two delivery systems, see Prince Hubertus zu Lowenstein and Volkmar von Zuhlsdorff, NATO and the Defense of the West. [Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1975 (reprint of the original 1957 edition)], pp.279-281.

( Diario Storico SMD, AUSSME, November 11th, 1957 and December 4th, 1957; interview material with General Rovighi.

( Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the JCS on Proposal to the Italian Government regarding indigenization of the Southern European Task Force (JCS 1808/48), 4 October 1957, in DDRS, 1981, 64 C.

prefers US troop totals to be increased".() Eventually the US element in SETAF was cut back

from 6.000 to 4.000: US troops remained to operate the Corporals, while the Honest Johns were

handed over to the Italians, after they were adequately trained on the new weapons. In June 1959

the III Italian Missile brigade became an operational element of SETAF.()

Thus in 1959 a part of SETAF was turned over to the Italian army. For the Americans "it

was only natural that the Italian army assumed gradually certain of the responsibilities borne by

the US army", since SETAF's mission was to support the Italian armed forces. The Italians, in

turn, were as interested in the effectiveness of SETAF's nuclear weaponry as they were in the

reassuring presence of the American troops. Thus, instead of welcoming the opportunity to

bolster the prestige of its armed forces with the acquisition of the new weapons, the Italian

government pressured the Eisenhower administration not to withdraw all US forces from Italy.

Something similar happened again in 1963, when the Italian government was appraised of

the US intention to further reduce the American component of SETAF. The WAC Corporal had

by then become a thoroughly obsolete weapon, and the US Army had decided to replace it with

the more modern Sergeant missile, which featured "striking improvements and advantages over

its predecessor".() The replacement of the weapons seemed to offer an opportunity to reduce US

( For the Jernegan-Alessandrini talks, see The Ambassador in Rome to the Secretary of State (# 498), August 9, 1958, in NAW, RG 59, 765.5612/8-958. See also The Ambassador in Rome to the Secretary of State (# 375), July 30, 1958, in NAW, RG 58, 765.5612/7-3058 (box 3622). It might be worth pointing out that in early 1957 Defense Minister Taviani had already sounded the US military attachÞ in Rome about asking formally to the Pentagon whether the US could deploy more troops in Italian territory, specifically one division either in Sicily or Sardinia and some air units in Tuscany. The request found SACEUR interested only if it could be met without sacrificing any of the units already deployed in Germany, and could not be satisfied. US NMR in Paris (General Schuyler) to the Office of the Secretary of Defence, for ISA, 1 February 1957, in DDRS, 1981, 145 B.

( "in January 1959, 44 selected Italian artillerymen moved into SETAF's Ederle Caserme at Vicenza to be trained on the Honest John Rocket [....] Shortly afterward, SETAF's two Honest John battalions were inactivated as two like Italian units became operational, thus strengthening Italy's contribution to NATO defenses. The United States Army in Europe, cit., pp.000039.

( The US Army in Europe, cit., p.000311.

involvement in SETAF, and possibly turn it over completely to the Italians. At the same time as

the replacement was being discussed, in fact, the US and the Italian government were negotiating

a complex agreement aimed at offsetting an estimated $ 100 million per year in US expenditures

in Italy. The ensuing agreement involved a reallocation of Italian expenditures by an increase in

Italian purchases of US-manifactured hardware; furthermore, the US State-Defense-Treasury

special group in charge of the negotiations believed that the agreement could also possibly

include a possible phasedown of the US element of SETAF as well as other economies in all US

installations in Italy.() US Ambassador to Rome Frederick Reinhardt, however, warned against a

dramatic reduction of US SETAF personnel:

[the] proposal for SETAF phasedown entails political psychological factors of possibly vital importance to maintenance of American position in Italy, and perhaps even affecting entire orientation of Italian foreign policy.

The Ambassador remarked that both the Italian Defense Minister, Giulio Andreotti, and

the Italian general commanding LANDSOUTH, Bernabo, had recently inquired about rumors of

SETAF phaseout. They expressed their concern over this matter, and stated their hope that the

"rumors were not true and that no such question would arise for many years". () Reinhardt did not

rule out completely the possibility of a limited phasedown, especially if the Italians were given

the new Sergeant missiles and not the obsolete Corporals, but he cautioned that the negotiations

were to be handled very carefully in order not to give the impression that the US was lessening

its military commitment in Italy.() Eventually, however, there was no removal of the US

( The Ambassador in Rome (Reinhardt) to the Secretary of State (No. 3342, section one of two), June 25, 1962, in JFK Library, NSF Countries: Italy, box 120, folder Italy General, 6/6/62-6/30/62.

( The Ambassador in Rome (Reinhardt) to the Secretary of State (No. 3343, section two of three), June 25, 1962, in JFK Library, NSF Countries: Italy, box 120, folder Italy General, 6/6/62-6/30/62.

( Ibidem.

component of SETAF: in December of 1963 the two Corporal battalions were deactivated and

were replaced with one battalion equipped with the new Sergeant missiles, "a one-for-two trade

also practiced by US forces in Germany".() Until they were withdrawn in the mid-70s, the

Sergeants continued to be manned by US troops.

Conclusions

The smoothness of the deployment and the functioning of SETAF did not escape the

attention of both the Italian and the American governments. Officials on both sides lavished

praises on the integrated command and commended the good relationship between SETAF and

the local populace. Taviani was extremely pleased to host the new unit in Italy, and in the

December 1956 session of the North Atlantic council openly declared that "Italy hopes there will

be more such units in central south sectors".() In late 1957, US Army Brigadier General James

Strumond and US Representative Major General LeRoy Anderson made an extended tour of US

installations in Europe, and in Italy they were "impressed with the fine relations existing between

our armed forces and the Italian people".() A few years later, in 1962, Ambassador Reinhardt

noted that SETAF was "unique and entirely harmonious" as an integrated command.

The reasons for this success were described with remarkable insight by Assistant

Secretary of Defense Frank Nash in 1957, after he concluded a tour of American military basis in

( The new US army Order of Battle included therefore: US Army SETAF HQ, 1st US Army Missile Command (Medium), 5th Missile battalion Sergeant (30th Artillery Regiment). NHP Database, 000090.

( Telegram from the United States Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State, December 14, 1956, in FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. IV, Western European Security and Integration, p.151.

( "Active duty European trip", report by Brig. General James Strom Thurmond, n.d. [ca. October 1957], in DDRS, 1984, 000871.

Europe. In his final report, Nash concluded that

Italy is one of the most enthusiastic supporters of NATO and is a strong advocate

of collective security. Even stronger is the desire for cooperation with the United

States as the most powerful member of NATO for leadership as well as material

support. The majority of Italians, chastened by their experience of the last 30

years, believe that their own survival depends upon a close association with other

and stronger nations; the United States is therefore an ideal ally if Italy is to be

protected and assisted. Psychologically, ties with the United States are strong;

there is a long tradition of friendship with America and Americans, and a sense of

gratitude exists for the US part in the liberation of Italy in World War II.

Nash observed that there was always potential for trouble arising from the perennial

instability of the Italian political scene and from the Communist opposition, but he added that the

general outlook remained favorable:

The presence of American forces symbolizes security in the Italian mind and there is considerable economic advantage connected therewith. Our economic and military aid has and will continue to play an important part in enabling a strong Italy to withstand disrupting pressures and play an important role in Italy.

Compared with the attitude in most countries toward the presence of US forces, the reaction in Italy is paradoxical. Instead of desiring a reduction, the Italians have gone on record as wanting additional units. Officially, the reason given was the increased instbility in the Middle East, the dangers this holds for NATO, and Italy's favorable strategic position from which to deploy forces as necessary. Equally important factors behind this decision were, however, the knowledge of the very important economic contribution by the US forces, and the feeling that the greater the number of US personnel stationed in Italy, the greater the call Italy would have on US Protection and assistance.()

The rationale behind the "paradoxical" Italian behavior should be appraised by taking into

account the almost obsessive sense of insecurity of western-oriented Italian politicians. They

( United States Overseas Military Bases, Report to the President by Frank C. Nash. Country Studies: Italy, November 1957, in Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), 1990 # 2284.

perceived the main threat to the Western orientation of the country as a complex mixture of

external and domestic menaces. Domestically there was the chance of a perfectly legal electoral

victory of the Communist party and, externally, the possibility of Soviet aggression in a full-scale

armed confrontation across Europe. Somewhere in between the two extremes lay, at least until

the schism between Moscow and Belgrade, the possibility of an armed Communist uprising

supported by Jugoslavian forces. With the passing of time some of these possibilities diminished,

but they never totally disappeared. For the time period under consideration, however, they were

certainly influential in shaping Italian defense policies.

The narrow parliamentary majorities enjoyed by the pro-Western parties explain the

sensitivity of the Italian government to this threat in all its facets, and therefore its willingness to

host American troops in Italian territory. US forces were regarded as playing a useful role against

each aspect of the complex threat to the pro-western orientation of the government. They had the

primary purpose to deter an external invasion by threatening US nuclear retaliation against the

aggressor, and therefore they fulfilled what was primarily a strictly military role.

The US military presence also meant that the Italian government could allocate to the

defence budget a more limited portion of its finances than would have otherwise been the case.

This left Italy free to concentrate the bulk of its spending on economic growth which, Italian

politicians tirelessly repeated to their American counterparts, was the best way to defeat

Communism. In certain areas, the presence of US troops also had some direct economic benefits,

related both to their influence on local commerce and to their employment of a certain amount of

Italian manpower. Finally, and perhaps most important of all, the presence of US troops was a

deep psychological reassurance that Italy was firmly tied to the West. The available

documentation does not say whether it had ever been planned to use any of the US troops in case

of a Communist uprising, (which seems highly unlikely, given their equipment, training and

specialization) but this is not the point: Italian politicians probably thought that such an uprising

was all the more unlikely as long as any American forces were stationed in Italy, and they also

expected that their presence would affect the electoral behavior of the Italian population by

explicitly representing the American commitment to Italian security. The Secretary General of

the Foreign Office made this point quite clear when he said to a US diplomat that

only Italians can fully appreciate [the] political significance in Italy of [the]

presence [of] US troops for a) internal stability, b) psychological impression on

populace of US strength and protection.()

To sum up, American forces in Italy were regarded as a deterrent against external aggression but,

to a certain extent, also against the degeneration of domestic political stability.

A final assessment of the relationship engendered by this arrangement is rather

challenging. It is difficult to conceive how Italy could have dedicated more of its limited

resources to defense expenditures without seriously compromising its "economic miracle",

which, with all it limits, has managed to complete the modernization of a large part of the

country. On the other hand, it seems only fair to conclude that the inclination of the Italians to

rely on the powerful American ally for all defense purposes has sometime degenerated in a lack

of national responsibility for security problems, and in a sort of happy-go-lucky attitude which

refuses to give the necessary priority to security concerns. This problem may become more

serious if the present trend in international relations is confirmed, as in a post-Cold war Europe

there might be an urgent need to rethink most of the previous security arrangements, and to

redefine defense policies along different lines.

( The Ambassador in Rome to the Secretary of State (# 498), August 9, 1958, in NAW, RG 59, 765.5612/8-958.

NB: the following acronyms have been used throughout the text:

ACS, Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome;

ASMAE, Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Rome;

AUSSME, Archivio Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore Esercito, Rome;

DDRS, Declassified Documents Reference System, Research Publications, Connecticut;

FRUS, Foreign Relations of the United States;

JFK Library, John Fitzgerald Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts;

NAW, National Archives, Washington D.C.;

NYT, New York Times;

PRO, Public Record Office, Kew, Great Britain;

TIAS, Treaties and other International Agreements of the United States.

Dr. Wolfgang KriegerDr. Simon DukeStiftung Wissenschaft und PolitikEbenhausen, Munich Florence, August 19, 1991

Dear Wolfgang, Dear Dr. Duke:

here is the edited copy of the paper with all the corrections (in red, as requested) that I would like to see included. I also attach a note on sources as well as a new printout of how the paper should look like in its final version (although even this new draft has a few last minute hand-written corrections in it).

I hope everything is clear enough. Please let me know if there are any problems. Looking forward to hearing from you,

yours sincerely

Leopoldo Nuti

Note to the Editors:

1) The page numbers in your comments do not match either the numbers of my original draft or those of the edited copy - thus making it hard for me to find the exact point they refer to. However, I hope I have made all the recommended corrections in red on your edited copy, and I have added a few changes here and there. When the changes were too complicated I added a separate "attached sheet", numbered, after the page where the change must be included.

2) On your specific point #1, in your letter:

the contradiction is made explicit in the text, when I write that ".... nevertheless this call for maintaining a strong military posture and making Italy "a bulwark of democracy" in the Mediterranean contrasted sharply with pre-established demobilization plans". To make the contrast more visible I substituted "early" with "pre-established" in this new draft, and I added something to the following sentence.

3) Specific point #2:

I argue that it was the way in which the departure was staged (with ships' horns blowing, airplanes circling over major cities, and so forth-although I did not include this in the text) that was meant to impress the Communists, and not the departure itself.

4) Specific point #11:

The only document I know which could explain SHAPE's decision is SHAPE's study 282-55, quoted as such in the text. Obviously I do not have a copy of it: I only know from the Historical Diary of the Defense General Staff that it was supposed to support the redeployment of US troops from Austria to Italy.

I wish to express my thanks to Wolfgang Schl÷r for his comments on an early version of this paper, and to Michael Yaffe for both his willingness to discuss with me the database of the Nuclear History Program and some useful information about the timing of the deployment of US nuclear warheads in Europe.

Hans Jurgen Schraut (with Joan D. Hefferman, Alexander M. Karber, Phillip A. Kerber and Michael D. Yaffe), The United States Army in Europe, 1945-1955 (Nuclear History Program, 1990).

Please add to footnote # 22, after "p.17":

For the inclusion of Italy in the Atlantic Pact, see also Timothy E. Smith, "The Fear of Subversion: the US and the Inclusion of Italy in the North Atlantic Treaty", in Diplomatic History, VII, n.2 (1983) pp.139-155; and the rich Italian bibliograph: Mario Toscano, "Appunti sui negoziati per la partecipazione italiana al Patto Atlantico", in Idem, Pagine di Storia Diplomatica Contemporanea, vol. II, Origini e vicende della seconda guerra mondiale (Milano: GiuffrÞ, 1963), pp.445-519; Pietro Pastorelli, "La politica europeistica di De Gasperi"and "L'adesione dell'Italia al Patto Atlantico", in Idem, La politica estera italiana del dopoguerra (Bologna: Il mulino, 1987), pp.145-208, and 209-321; Antonio Varsori, "La scelta occidentale dell'Italia", in Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali, I, n. 1 pp.95-159, and n.2, pp.303-368 (1985); Alfredo Breccia, L'Italia e la difesa dell'Europa. Alle origini del "Piano Pleven" (Roma: Istituto di Studi Europei A. De Gasperi, 1984); Brunello Vigezzi, "De Gasperi, Sforza, la diplomazia italiana tra patto di Bruxelles e patto atlantico (1948-1949)", in Storia Contemporanea, XVIII, n.1 (1987), pp.5-43. See also my "La missione Marras", cit., and "The Italian military and the Atlantic Pact", cit.

Please add to footnote #26:

in N. Wiggershaus (ed.), Die Nordatalantische Bundnis, 1949-1956 (Freiburg: Militõrgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, forthcoming).

Please modify footnote #42 as follows:

In later documents, it will be referred to as "Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Italy regarding bilateral infrastructure". The text of the agreement remains secret to this day, but from later documents it can be established that it authorised the US to operate agreed installations in accordance with its provisions and, in a section denominated "Document II", listed all the installations to which the agreement applied. It also contemplated that it could be made applicable to additional installations by subsequent agreements to add them to the list. See Memo to the Acting Secretary of State, "Negotiations to bring additional installations within 1954 agreement with Italy", March 15, 1956, in National Archives, Washington (NAW), RG 59, 765.5/3-1556 (box 3619). Further details about the negotiations for the agreement can be collected in the State Department File 711.56365, from 9-1654 to 10-2054, in NAW, RG 59.

Please add at the end of footnote #51:

The issue was also probably debated by the Supreme Defense Council, which met on August 2. The minutes of that meeting are not open to research, but some information can be gathered in the American Ambassador in Rome to the Secretary of State, Meeting of the Supreme Defense Council, August 4, 1955, in NAW, RG 59, 765.5/8-455 (box 3619).

Please substitute from "In 1958 the United States proposed...." to "an operational element of SETAF" with the following:

In late 1957 the JCS, the Department of Defense and the Department of State debated whether the US should propose to the Italian government the "indigenization" of SETAF, turning over to the Italian services the manning of the missiles and retaining only the custody of the warheads.() However, when in August 1958 the US minister Jernegan met with the Secretary General of the Italian Foreign Office, Alessandrini, to discuss the reorganization of SETAF, he was told that "President Gronchi, Fanfani, Segni and others on highest level urge and insist [that] the US recondider the plan", that the government of Italy "would greatly deplore any reduction [in] US strength SETAF or elsewhere and [that] it instead prefers US troop totals to be increased".()

( Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the JCS on Proposal to the Italian Government regarding indigenization of the Southern European Task Force (JCS 1808/48), 4 October 1957, in DDRS, 1981, 64 C.

( For the Jernegan-Alessandrini talks, see The Ambassador in Rome to the Secretary of State (# 498), August 9, 1958, in NAW, RG 59, 765.5612/8-958. See also The Ambassador in Rome to the Secretary of State (# 375), July 30, 1958, in NAW, RG 58, 765.5612/7-3058 (box 3622). It might be worth pointing out that in early 1957 Defense Minister Taviani had

Eventually the US element in SETAF was cut back from 6.000 to 4.000: US troops remained to operate the Corporals, while the Honest Johns were handed over to the Italians, after they were adequately trained on the new weapons. In June 1959 the III Italian Missile brigade became an operational element of SETAF.()

Please substitute footnote #58 with the following:

For a description of the technical differences between the two delivery systems, see Prince Hubertus zu Lowenstein and Volkmar von Zuhlsdorff, NATO and the Defense of the West. [Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1975 (reprint of the original 1957 edition)], pp.279-281.

already sounded the US military attachÞ in Rome about asking formally to the Pentagon whether the US could deploy more troops in Italian territory, specifically one division either in Sicily or Sardinia and some air units in Tuscany. The request found SACEUR interested only if it could be met without sacrificing any of the units already deployed in Germany, and could not be satisfied. US NMR in Paris (General Schuyler) to the Office of the Secretary of Defence, for ISA, 1 February 1957, in DDRS, 1981, 145 B.

( "in January 1959, 44 selected Italian artillerymen moved into SETAF's Ederle Caserme at Vicenza to be trained on the Honest John Rocket [....] Shortly afterward, SETAF's two Honest John battalions were inactivated as two like Italian units became operational, thus strengthening Italy's contribution to NATO defenses. In June 1959 the III Italian missile Brigade became an operational element of SETAF". NHP Data Collection - Italy; The United States Army in Europe - warhead detachments, pp.000039.

Please add at the end of footnore #60, after DDRS, 1981, 64 C:

See also The Ambassador in Rome to the Secretary of State (# 375), July 30, 1958, in NAW, RG 58, 765.5612/7-3058 (box 3622).

Please modify the text before footnote #61 as follows:

"proposed instead that [US] forces be increased": when the US minister Jernegan met with the Secretary General of the Italian Foreign Office, Alessandrini, to discuss the reorganization of SETAF, he was told that "President Gronchi, Fanfani, Segni and others on highest level urge and insist [that] the US recondider the plan", that the government of Italy "would greatly deplore any reduction [in] US strength SETAF or elsewhere and [that] it instead prefers US troop totals to be increased".(61)

also add to footnote #61, at the end of the existing footnote (i.e., after DDRS, 1981, 145 B):

For the Jernegan-Alessandrini talks, see The Ambassador in Rome to the Secretary of State (# 498), August 9, 1958, in NAW, RG 59, 765.5612/8-958.

Please add in the last page, three lines from bottom, right after "security":

The Secretary General of the Foreign Office made this point quite clear when he said to a US diplomat that

only Italians can fully appreciate [the] political significance in Italy of [the]

presence [of] US troops for a) internal stability, b) psychological impression on

populace of US strength and protection.(71)

footnote #71: The Ambassador in Rome to the Secretary of State (# 498), August 9, 1958, in

NAW, RG 59, 765.5612/8-958.

Please note that the following paragraph is entirely missing from my version of the edited copy,

and that I think it is rather important to conclude the whole article, which otherwise looks

truncated quite abruptly:

A final assessment of the relationship engendered by this arrangement is rather

challenging. It is difficult to conceive how Italy could have dedicated more of its limited

resources to defense expenditures without seriously compromising its "economic miracle",

which, with all it limits, has managed to complete the modernization of a large part of the

country. On the other hand, it seems only fair to conclude that the inclination of the Italians to

rely on the powerful American ally for all defense purposes has sometime degenerated in a lack

of national responsibility for security problems, and in a sort of happy-go-lucky attitude which

refuses to give the necessary priority to security concerns. This problem may become more

serious if the present trend in international relations is confirmed, as in a post-Cold war Europe

there might be an urgent need to rethink most of the previous security arrangements, and to

redefine defense policies along different lines.

A note on sources.

As it happens with most of postwar Italian military history, this article had to face the

problem of a limited availability of sources. The main military source was the Archivio Ufficio

Storico dello Stato Maggiore Esercito (Archives of the Historical Office of the Army Staff),

which has some files open up to the mid-fifties and contains a few records from the files of the

Defense General Staff as well. One document in particular, (Promemoria: Dislocazione in Italia

del contingente USA proveniente dall'Austria, in I-5, Carteggio classificato Ufficio Operazioni,

1955) has been particularly useful, as it sums up some of the technical aspects of the negotiations

for the deployment of SETAF. The Historical Diary of the Defense General Staff was also of

some help. Access to this files, however, is usually restricted to the Office's own historians and

collaborators.

The Defense Ministry and the Defense General Staff neither have their own archives open

to research nor do they store their records at the Archivio Centrale dello Stato (State's Central

Archives), thus making any reconstruction of Italian military policy incomplete at best. The

Ministry of Foreign Affairs is now declassifying its own files for the 1950s, but at the time when

this article was written very little was available. As for the ACS, it offers the minutes of the

Cabinet meetings which, sketchy as they usually are, sometime provide some insight in the

government's activities. The published volumes of the Atti Parlamentari (Parliamentary Debates)

allow a rich and detailed reconstruction of parliamentary activities.

The situation is somewhat brighter from the US point of view. Both the Military and the

Diplomatic Branches of the National Archives have plenty of material on US-Italian relations,

especially for the early postwar years. The State Department Decimal Files also contain relevant

records related to the negotiations for the facilities agreements, and to the 1958 attempt to reduce

US role in SETAF. The facilities agreement itself, however, remains classified to this day.

Finally, the J.F. Kennedy Presidential Library contains, in the National Security Files/Country

Files of President Kennedy's papers, some key documents to understand the 1963 initiative to

reduce the US component of SETAF.

Other sources must be briefly mentioned as well. The Declassified Documents Reference

System has provided scattered pieces of information which have proved very helpful in filling

certain gaps of the narrative. The same is true for the microfilmed collections of J.F. Dulles

papers and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Foreign Relations of the United States series does not

usually deal with military issues too much in detail, but the VIII volume of the 1952-1954 series

offers a good understanding of the connection between the Trieste problem nad the negotiations

about the facilities. The Foreign Office and War Office files at the British Public Record Office

have helped to clarify some of the issues.

Last but not least, the NHP database. Altough in a still informal version, it has proved to

be of the utmost utility in corroborating my own scattered data with a solid referential structure.