1.1 epistemology: key concepts - suny...
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Wedis<nguishphilosophicalclaimsfromthoseindifferenttotruth
• Mar<nHeidegger(1889-1976):claimedthatmosttalkisidletalk.
• HarryFrankfurt(1929-):introducearelatedconcep<onofbullshit.
• Victorianwriterscalledit“humbug.”
Heidegger’sIdleTalk
Because[Idletalk]haslostitsprimaryrela<onship-of-beingtowardstheen<tytalkedabout,orelsehasneverachievedsucharela<onship,itdoesnotcommunicateinsuchawayastoletthisen<tybeappropriatedinaprimordialmanner,butcommunicatesratherbyfollowingtherouteofgossipingandpassingthewordalong.Whatissaid-in-the-talkassuch,spreadsinwidercirclesandtakesonanauthorita<vecharacter.Thingsaresobecauseonesaysso.
Whatistruth?
• Correspondencetheory:trueclaimshaveakindofpicture-likerela<onshiptotheworld.
• Aristotle’sbeingtheory:truthisexistence.• Defla&onarytheory:“P”istrueifandonlyifP.
Wewilltaketruthataprimi<ve!
WhatisKnowledge?
• Tradi&onaldefini&on:jus<fiedtruebelief.• Reviseddefini&on:properlyjus<fiedtruebelief.
What(properly)jus<fiesabelief?Threeviews.
• Founda&onalism(aboutx):theviewthatbeliefs(aboutx)arejus<fiediftheyareconsequencesof(orotherwisemademorelikelytobetrueby)afounda<onofindubitable(oratleastverylikelytrue)beliefs.
• Coheren&sm(aboutx):theviewthatbeliefs(aboutx)arejus<fiediftheycoherewithone’sotherbeliefs.
• Sa<sfac<onofthescien&ficmethod.
Howdowegetknowledge?Threeviews.
• Ra&onalism(aboutx):theviewthatknowledge(aboutx)isgainedprimarily(orsome<mes:only)throughreason.Ra<onalistsalsotendtobelievethat:– Wehavesomeimportantinnatebeliefs– Wecanaccuratelyjudgeourownmentalstates
• Empiricism(aboutx):theviewthatknowledge(aboutx)isprimarily(orsome<mes:only)gainedthroughexperience.Empiricistsalsotendtobelievethat:– Wedonothaveimportantinnatebeliefs– Ourjudgmentsaboutourownmentalstatesarejustasfallibleasour
judgmentsabouttheexternalworld– Welearnabouttheworldprimarilybyiden<fyingregulari<esinour
experiences• Scien&ficmethod.
Besuretodis<nguishthesemetaphysicalviews!
• Idealism:theviewthattheworldismadeofideas.
• Materialism/Physicalism:theviewthattheworldismadeofmaterialorphysicalthings.
Extremeproper<esthatsomeepistemologicaltheorieshave
• Rela&vism(aboutx):havinglowepistemicstandards(aboutx),sothatmany(andperhapsevencontradictory)statements(aboutx)arebelievedtobetrue.
• Skep&cism(aboutx):havinghighepistemicstandards(aboutx),sothatfewstatements(aboutx)arebelievedtobetrue.
Anexampleofafamousskep<calargument(DavidHume(1711-1776))Itappears,then,that[the]ideaofanecessaryconnexionamongeventsarisesfromanumberofsimilarinstanceswhichoccuroftheconstantconjuc<onoftheseevents….Butthereisnothinginanumberofinstances,differentfromeverysingleinstance,whichissupposedtobeexactlysimilar;exceptonly,thatacerarepe<<onofsimilarinstances,themindiscarriedbyhabit,upontheappearanceofoneevent,toexpectitsusualadendant,andtobelievethatitwillexist.Thisconnexion,therefore,whichwefeelinthemind…isthesen<mentorimpressionfromwhichweformtheideaofpowerornecessaryconnexion….Thefirst<meamansawthecommunica<onofmo<onbyimpulse,asbytheshockoftwobilliardballs,hecouldnotpronouncethattheoneeventswasconnected:butonlythatitwasconjoinedwiththeother.Acerhehasobservedseveralinstancesofthisnature,hethenpronouncesthemtobeconnected….Whenwesay,therefore,thatoneobjectisconnectedwithanother,wemeanonlythattheyhaveacquiredaconnexioninourthought….
NOTE:onecanholdtheseviewsinalimitedway
• Forexample,itisconsistenttobe,allatonce:– Ara<onalistaboutethics– Anempiricistaboutphysics– Anidealistaboutmathema<cs– Amaterialistaboutmindandbody– Arela<vistaboutaesthe<cs– Askep<cabouttheology….
• Thatsaid,manyphilosopherstendtodefendtheseviewsinamoreglobalway.
Ibn-Sinaaka“Avicenna”(980-1037AD)FromOnTheSoul(Fi'-Nafs):Letussuppose…thatapersoniscreatedinanadultstate,butinsuchacondi<onthatheisborninavoidwherehisbodycannottouchanythingandwherehecannotperceiveanythingoftheexternalworld.Letusalsosupposethathecannotseehisownbodyandthattheorgansofhisbodyarepreventedfromtouchingoneanother,sothathehasnosense-percep<onwhatsoever.Suchapersonwillnotaffirmanythingoftheexternalworldoreventheexistenceofhisownbodybutwill,nevertheless,affirmtheexistenceofhisselfasapurelyspiritualen<ty.Now,thatwhichisaffirmediscertainlynotthesameasthatwhichisnotaffirmed.Themindis,therefore,asubstanceindependentofthebody.
We’vediscussedfounda<onalism
• Founda&onalism(aboutx):theviewthatbeliefs(aboutx)arejus<fiediftheyareconsequencesof(orotherwisemademorelikelytobetrueby)afounda<onofindubitableoratleastverylikelytruebeliefs.
Butwhatisa“consequence”?
• SupposeAandBaregroupsofoneormoresentences.
• WesayBisaconsequenceofAjustincase:ifallthesentencesofAaretrue,thenallthesentencesofBmustbetrue.
• Thisisalsosome<mescalled“entailment.”
Analterna<vetofounda<onalism
• Coheren&sm(aboutx):theviewthatbeliefs(aboutx)arejus<fiediftheycoherewithone’sotherbeliefs.
“Coherence”defined(inthestrongestway)
• By“contradic<on,”wemeantwosentencesthatcannotbothbetrue.Forexample:TomisnowinParisandTomisnotnowinParis.Therearealsosinglesentencesthatarecontradictory(thesearesentencesthatcannotbetrue):TomisandisnotnowinParis.
• AsetofsentencesAiscoherentifthereisnocontradic<oninA(orintheconsequencesofA).
• TwosetsofsentencesAandBarecoherentwitheachotherifthereisnosentenceinA(orconsequenceofthesentencesinA)thatcontradictsasentenceinB(orconsequenceofsentencesinB),andviceversa.
• (NOTE:definedinthisway,itisunclearwhatitmeanstosaysomethingis“morecoherent”or“lesscoherent.”Perhapsitmeansitisharderoreasiertoiden<fyacontradic<on,orthatcontradic<onsarelessormorelikelytoariseinawaythatmaderstoyourwork.)
Thedata
• DeathsofmothersinchildbirthintheFirstDivision:– 1844:8.2%– 1845:6.8%– 1846:11.4%
• DeathsofmothersinchildbirthintheSecondDivision:– 1844:2.3%– 1845:2.0%– 1846:2.7%
Source:“,”byCarlHempel.
TheHypotheses
• Atmosphericcosmictelluricchanges• Overcrowding• Roughexamina<ons• Thefrighteningpriest’sbell• Layingontheirbacks(nottheirsides)• Theautopsies
TheScien<ficMethod(simplified)• Formulateahypothesis.• Iden<fyapar<culartestableconsequenceofthehypothesis,andobserve
ifthispredic<oncomestrue.(Thetestmustbesuchthatyoucansharetheresultswithothers.)
• Rejectthehypothesisifthepredic<onprovesfalse,andcon<nuetotestthehypothesisifthepredic<onprovestrue.
• Betweendifferenthypothesesnotyetrefuted,chose(inorderofpreference):– Theonewiththemostpredic<vepower– Theonethatismostproduc<ve– Theonemostcoherentwithyourothertheories– Thesimplestone
NOTE:Noscien<fictheoryisnecessarilytrue.Eachscien<fictheorymustbefalisifiable.Whatwecansayinsteadisthatsomeofourscien<fictheoriesaretestedandhavebeenshowntobeourbestexplana<ons.
Mysteriesremain.Forexample,math.
• Wearenotsureabouthowwelearncrea<venewstepsinmathema<calmethods.
• Maybera<onalismistrueofmathema<cs?• Orsomethingelse?But!Althoughwedon’tknowhowweunderstandthemethodsofmathema<csandlogic,weconsistentlygetreliableresultsfrommathandlogic.Sothemysterydoesnoharm.
Wait!Dophilosophersagreeonanything?
• Mostphilosophersagreethat:– Scien<ficmethodisareliableguidetolearningaboutmanyphysicalphenomena
– Mathema<calresultsarereliable– Logicalmethodsarereliable.
• (Thereisgreatdisagreementaboutwhatscience,math,andlogicare,however.)
• Considertheconsequencesofthisconsensus:epistemologyismostimportantwhenweeither- askaboutthingsthatscienceormathcannotaloneexplain,or- askaboutwhatscienceandmathandlogicareandwhytheywork.