11-1 tacit negotiations and social dilemmas chapter 11

11-111-1

Tacit Negotiations and Social Dilemmas

CHAPTER 11

11-2

Exhibit 11-1: Two Major Types of Negotiation Situations

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Instructor’s Manual with Overheads to accompany Copyright ©2012 Pearson Education, The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator 5/e (Thompson) Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall

11-3

Exhibit 11-2: The Prisoner’s Dilemma

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Louise

T: 1 yrL: 1 yr

T: 0 yrsL: 15 yrs

T: 15 yrsL: 0 yrs

T: 10 yrsL: 10 yrs

A

C

B

D

Do not confess(remain silent)

Confess

Thelma

Do not confess(remain silent)

Confess

NOTE: Entries represent prison term length: T = Thelma’s term length; L = Louise’s term length


11-4

Effectiveness of Tit-for-Tat

• Not envious

• Nice

• Tough

• Forgiving

• Simple

• Extremely stable

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11-5

Recovering from Defection

• Make situational attributions

• One step at a time

• Getting even and catching up

• Make your decisions at the same time

• Superrationality

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11-6

Social Dilemmas versus Prisoner’s Dilemmas

• Behavior more competitive in social dilemmas– Size difference

– Costs of defection spread out

– Social dilemmas are riskier

– Social dilemmas provide anonymity

– Less control over the situation

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11-7

Exhibit 11-7: Different Kinds of Social Dilemmas

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Taking Contributing

Internal (intraorganizational)

Resources (e.g., money, real estate, staffing)

Committee work Recognition

Budget fudging

External (interorganizational)

Price competitionBrand competitionOverharvestingPollution

Paying taxesPublic television


11-8

How to Build Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: Structural Strategies

• Align incentives

• Monitor behavior

• Regulation

• Privatization

• Tradable permits

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11-9

How to Build Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: Psychological Strategies

• Psychological contracts and the norm of commitment

• Superordinate goals

• Communication

• Personalize others

• Social sanctions

• Focus on benefits of cooperation

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11-10

How to Encourage Cooperation When Parties Should Not Collude

• Keep your strategy simple

• Signal via actions

• Do not be the first to defect

• Focus on your own payoffs, not your payoffs relative to others

• Be sensitive to egocentric bias

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11-11

Exhibit 11-9: Escalation of Commitment

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Questionable or Negative Outcomes

Reexamination of Current Course of Action

Perceived Utility of Current Course of Action

Perceived Utility of Withdrawal and/or Change

Commitment to Current Course of Action

Withdrawal and Assumption of Losses

Continued Failure

Low

High

Source: Adapted from Staw, B. M. & Ross, J.(1987). Behavior in escalatin situations: Antecedents, prototypes, and solutions. In L.L. Cummings & B.M. Straw (Eds.), Research in organizational behavior (Vol. 9, p.45). Greenwich, CT: Jai Press inc.


11-12

Avoiding the Escalation of Commitment

• Set limits

• Avoid decision myopia

• Recognize sunk costs

• Diversify responsibility and authority

• Redefine the situation

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11-13

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• Copyright ©2012 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall

CHAPTER 11

11-1 tacit negotiations and social dilemmas chapter 11

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