109455899 p systems theory according to luhmann

Systems Theory According to Niklas Luhmann: Its Environment and Conceptual StrategiesAuthor(s): Dietrich SchwanitzReviewed work(s):Source: Cultural Critique, No. 30, The Politics of Systems and Environments, Part I (Spring,1995), pp. 137-170Published by: University of Minnesota PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1354435 .Accessed: 14/05/2012 06:14

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Systems Theory According to Niklas Luhmann Its Environment and Conceptual Strategies

Dietrich Schwanitz

Readers who encounter systems theory for the first time may find that an understanding of this theory seems to lie behind

a string of forbidding barriers, together forming a near-impene- trable bramble hedge. The first of these barriers is due to the fact that the term "system" has acquired so many negative connotations as to cast an evil spell on the open mind. No doubt, the term "system" has forfeited its good name by falling into bad company with associations and concepts of dubious repute, such as rigidity, con- straint, impenetrability, insensitivity, inhumanity, and other villain- ous elements in the fields of semantics with which one invariably associates a requirement to view one's own spontaneity as a fairly insignificant part of some evil mechanism. For our purposes, we shall have to rehabilitate the term "system" by purging it of any traces of compactness and compulsiveness. A system must not be regarded as a structure that appropriates free-floating elements from the outside; rather the system and its elements come into being simultaneously via the reproduction of the system's internal differentiations. There is no system without difference. The fact

? 1995 by Cultural Critique. Spring 1995. 0882-4371/95/$5.00.

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138 Dietrich Schwanitz

that the system is closed ensures that it may react to its environment while the arbitrary, complex, and concrete remain inaccessible.

The second barrier to understanding systems theory cancels out the first. In systems theory, human beings are not part of the

system of society but part of its environment (Luhmann, "How Can the Mind"). Therefore, there is no danger of their being enslaved as elements of the social system and subjected to its rationality. In- stead they are made homeless. This enables us to disconnect social

theory from the idea of the human being. Like Michel Foucault's

theory of discourse, Niklas Luhmann's systems theory is decidedly post-humanist in the sense that society is no longer conceived as

anthropocentric, and the human being is no longer regarded as the measure of society. As a closed system of communication, soci-

ety is well able to look after itself. In exchange, the individual is

given more freedom to be less sensible and less moral without au-

tomatically becoming a menace to society as a whole. Having been driven out of paradise, all individuals are now free to sin as much as they like (without upsetting the balance of things).

The third barrier to accepting systems theory is connected with what Luhmann borrows from Talcott Parson's structural functionalism, namely, an approach to society based on its main functions. Seen in conjunction with the evolutionary category of self-preservation, this led some to regard systems theory as an affirmative theory of the neo-conservative kind, the prime object of which is to give socio-technological guidelines for stabilizing ex-

isting social structures. The concept of function, however, is meant to break down the concept of causality, replacing it with a technique of comparing functionally equivalent alternatives. In this perspective, the cause (or effect) is fixed and serves as a point of reference for comparisons within the field of contingent, i.e., functionally equivalent causes (or effects). Function, therefore, means a reduction of alternatives, and taken in this sense, criticism, revolution, or alternative cultures may also be functional. Accordingly, the concept of preserving the status quo does not apply to the structure of society but to its autopoiesis (Essays 9). In systems theory, the concept of structure is of subordinate importance; systems theory is not a form of structuralism.

Systems Theory According to Niklas Luhmann 139

1. Luhmann

The architecture of systems theory becomes apparent in the description of the theory if one treats it as a system in itself. Sys- tems have their own environments, and the environments surrounding systems theory consist of other theories. These constitute the nutrient solution that feeds the organism we call "systems theory." A large chunk within this solution is made up of traditional sociology from Max Weber to Talcott Parsons, because systems theory as developed by Luhmann is to be understood as a theory of society. However, the major category of systems theory is not action (as in traditional sociology), but the difference between action and communication (Essays 6). In this respect, systems theory is closer to Saussure's linguistics, where linguistic values are defined by their difference from other terms within the language system.

This difference-oriented approach serves to break down and assimilate a further chunk of theory from the nutrient solution, namely, the philosophy of the subject in German idealist philosophy. The system's self-constitution against the environment emulates Fichte's self-positing of the self against the non-self, although here the connection with self-consciousness is severed and instead applied to the system's mode of operation. There- fore, self-referentiality must be regarded as the concurrent self- referentiality of the operation, the reflexivity of the process, and only in the last instance as the system's reflection on its own identity. This mode of operation is again divided into the operation itself on the one hand and the observation of this operation on the other hand, the latter equally constituting an operation. Luhmann has borrowed the model of this operation from Humberto Matu- rana's neurobiology, whereas the model of the observation of the operation is to be found in the logical calculus of George Spencer Brown, who was discovered for the field of neo-cybernetic epistemology by Heinz von Foerster. The link between neurobiology and subjective idealism is then provided by Edmund Husserl's concept of meaning (Essays 21-79). This concept allows Luhmann to explain why it is possible that operationally closed systems should make contact with their environment. Meaning enables both social systems and systems of consciousness to re-internalize the differ-


ence between themselves and their environment and to use it in organizing their relations with the environment. These systems are therefore able to observe their own selectivity. Luhmann reconstructs Husserl's concept of meaning accordingly, making use of the pre-linguistic intentionality of experience and action and defining meaning as a processed differentiality of actuality and contingency (Essays 83). The concept of meaning thus replaces the subject, and this allows self-referentiality to be applied to systems other than the system of consciousness. It may be said in some respect that by doing so Luhmann performs the transition from subjective to objective idealism (or from Kant to Hegel), but unlike Hegel he does not subsume the unfolding of spirit once more under the identity of the absolute spirit.

Since Luhmann abandons the concept of the identity of the subject, he also replaces history by evolution. Accordingly, the theory of evolution is a further ingredient in the nutrient solution surrounding systems theory. As historical sociology-a research program to which systems theory owes much of its prestige-it no longer reconstructs causal connections but rather analyzes the conditions for the cooperation of the three evolutionary mechanisms (i.e., variation, selection, and stabilization). As a consequence, epistemology becomes natural or evolutionary epistemology, and the adaptation of the human cognitive capacity to reality is itself described as a form of ever-increasing knowledge. This explains the theory's affinity with neurobiology and posits the problem of reality in radical constructivism in a new way; if the brain's construction of reality is based to the greatest extent on self- perception and on self-established differences that have no actual equivalent in reality, then the question remains: how real is reality? The traditional approach to the problem operates with related terms such as signifier and signified, equivalence and correspondence. Luhmann on the other hand redefines reality in that he no longer describes the signified as "real" as opposed to the signifier, nor is the object more "real" than its name. According to Luhmann it is the difference used in the operation that is real ("Cognitive Program").

Thus, the basic distinction between observation and operation suggested by Luhmann replaces the traditional epistemologi- cal distinction between cognition and object, transcendental and


empirical, thought and being. In natural epistemology, as defined

by Quine, an operation is the reverse of a Kantian transcendental constitution. The point of reference of all knowledge is relocated from the subject back into reality until self-reflexive phenomena make their appearance. As soon as self-referentially constructed

knowledge hits a self-referential object, a new kind of reality emerges, a reality that is neither attributable to cognition nor to the object of cognition. Thus, the concept of self-referentiality replaces any ultimate foundation. This establishes a method of theoretical self-control by comparison and self-observation; as a self-referential system, science may compare itself to other self- referential systems that are its objects. With a view to its own self- referential structure, science is no longer in a position to formulate its findings on economic or psychic systems without accepting the

validity of these findings for itself. The comparative approach en- forces systems theory's high level of abstraction. Any statement made about systems in general must also be applicable to ma- chines, organisms, and social and psychic systems, and it must maintain such a level of abstraction as to ensure that the significant differences between types of systems can be formulated on the same level: e.g., there are some types of system that use the con-

cept of system's self-reflexivity, whereas others do not, and psychic and social systems may be characterized by meaning, whereas ma- chines and organisms may not. At the same time, the autological structure of self-inclusion reveals the whole point of the theory of evolution, namely, that evolution itself becomes self-referential and realizes itself in systems theory, the latter also being a product of evolution. But in opposition to Hegel, here the realization of evolution is not identical with evolution itself. Thus, the asymmetrical difference inherent in every self-reference must remain unre- solved (Essays 123-43).

The concept of self-reference, which is central to systems theory, brings the theory into close proximity with those theoretical traditions dealing with the problem of paradox. Here Luhmann avoids two possible extremes: one of the extremes is Russell's Theory of Types, which denies self-reference the right to exist within the logical universe and treats the paradox just as Perseus treated the Medusa-it uses the sharp sword named difference between level and meta-level to decapitate self-reference. Decon-


struction, on the other hand, tied to the concept of structure, treats the distinction between signifier and signified, presence and absence, original work and commentary, as a third distinct category in logical terms and then celebrates the resulting paradoxes of attribution in a never-ending carnival of subversion and displacement. Luhmann argues against Russell and in favor of the un-

folding of paradoxes, and equally against Derrida and in favor of an asymmetrical view of the paradox, because boundaries are part of the system and not part of its environment ("Stenographie"). These boundaries are established by the system, and they must be

regarded as barriers regulating the different levels of complexity between the system and its environment. This ensures that the attribution of events to the inside and outside will be accomplished by the system itself and by its own means, avoiding any possible self-obstruction. The decision as to what may be regarded as communication and what may not is reached only via communication.

System boundaries serve to interrupt self-reference and thereby to avoid paradoxes and self-obstruction. With regard to the act of differentiation, this means that the differentiation may only reap- pear on one side of the system boundary and not on the other. The same applies to the sign, which contains the difference between signifier and signified and as such marks the re-entry of the difference into that which is to be differentiated on the side of the signifier and not on the side of the signified. In other words, the difference between self-reference and outside reference is decided by means of self-referentiality. Instead of waving the magic wand of rationality to ward off this phenomenon of re-entry, Luhmann argues that we should allow ourselves to be epistemologically inspired by the self-referential worlds of irony, mathematics, schizo- phrenia, imagination, and literature.

2. Emergence of Functionally Differentiated Society

Luhmann developed his systems theory in two phases, which explains a certain duality in the theory's architecture. The first part is inspired by Ludwig von Bertalanffy's general systems theory and comes under the heading of "systems differentiation." Here, we are concerned solely with the system's architecture and

Systems Theory According to Niklas Luhmann

not with its elements. Internal differentiation takes place only within the same type of system. This means that social systems will bring forth only social and not organic or psychic subsystems, and this presupposes the boundary between the system and its environment. The environment of every system, including society, is invariably more complex than the system itself. In relation to the system, the environment may be regarded both as a complex web of other system-environment relationships and as unity. This unity is created by the system, it is relative to the system, and it corresponds with the unity of the system. But unlike the system, the environment is defined by unlimited horizons and not by boundaries. The system compensates for its relative lack of complexity by employing selective strategies that enable it to reduce the complexity of the environment. However, this does not mean that compos- ite reality is reduced to simple units. Reducing complexity means tranforming complex relations into less complex ones; this excludes any form of reductionism. Selection must not be seen as analogous to action, as if it were guided by a superior will to order. Selection is a process without a subject that is triggered by difference and takes place by autocatalysis. Toward the inside, the system boundaries secure a kind of domesticated area, a sort of special environment with reduced complexity, thereby enabling the formation of subsystems to take place by internal differentiation. In other words, once the process of system formation via autocatalysis has gotten under way it becomes reflexive, because the process of system differentiation repeats the process of system formation within itself. In its historical development until the present day, society has undergone three different types of system differentiation (the transitions from one type to another may be regarded as evolutionary thresholds) (see Differentiation 232-38):

1. Archaic societies are organized according to the principle of segmentary differentiation-that is, they are divided into a se- ries of equivalent elements such as tribes, clans, kinship groups, or families. Within these segments, inequality of its members prevails, but between these segments there is structural equality. To understand the structure of a single tribe is to understand society as a whole. This explains the universal distribution of archaic semantics: namely, the structure of myth. In this type of society, interac- tion and society are to a large extent congruent with one another.

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2. In advanced civilization, which is characterized by the emergence of large cities and written culture, this is no longer true. The new organizing principle of this type of society is the principle of differentiation into different levels or strata within a hierarchy. Equality within each stratum contrasts with the inequality between one stratum and another within the hierarchical order. The pressures on society produced by this asymmetrical order are compen- sated for by the invention of the next world to complement this world. In a hierarchy, the focus is invariably directed to the top. Accordingly, the principle of social self-observation is representation. The absolute monarch, the court, and the culture of the up- per classes represent society as a whole. In archaic societies as well as in hierarchical societies, the relationship between society and its members is defined by total inclusion. Personal identity and social position are one. Everyone may belong to one stratum only.

3. With the emergence of modern society, the principle of social differentiation can no longer be based on dividing "whole per- sons" into distinct groups; instead, this principle becomes auton- omous. It is no longer groups of people that are differentiated but types of communication. Society thereby increases its systematicity, tight- ening its borders toward the systems in its environment, above all the systems of consciousness. In other words, not until the modern age does society find its principle of differentiation in itself. Only at this point is it possible to realize that society and consciousness are two distinct systems. This recognition solves the traditional dif- ficulty produced by the dual perspective by which society was regarded both as unity and as the sum of its parts, i.e., its individuals. This raised the problem of how the whole should be realized on the level of the individual. As a solution the human being was required to realize sociality in himself, which, in turn, could be defined as education, rationality, enlightenment, duty, etc. In systems theory, for the first time, society is no longer regarded as the sum of its parts, but as a combination of system-environment differentiations, each of which reconstructs the overall system as a unity of the respective subsystem and its specific environment according to the internal boundary of the subsystem. For this modern type of society, Luhmann coins the term "functionally differentiated society." The different forms of communication that emerge from this point onward are related to central social functions.


The development of such special forms of communication is induced by their improbability (Essays 86-98). The more complex a society becomes, the more improbable the forms of communication required by it. The range of what may still be regarded as

acceptable is considerably extended. It is unlikely, for example, that we should take something to be true that is neither concrete nor plausible, but this is exactly what science persuades us to do. It is equally unlikely that we should be willing to accept decisions that go against us, but the legal system makes such decisions ac-

ceptable to us. Similarly, there is no apparent reason why we should want to learn things that have no bearing on our everyday lives, but the education system encourages us to do so. All these constellations react to increased levels of complexity. Different functions such as the domination of nature, the regulation of con- flicts, and socialization serve as points of reference for the development of so-called functional subsystems such as science, law, education, economics, intimacy, etc. These subsystems are regulated via

binary "media codes" such as true/false, right/wrong, to have/to have not. The individual human being belongs to each of these

functionally differentiated subsystems for only short periods of time with only limited aspects of his person depending on his respective role as a voter, pupil, reader, patient, or litigant. It is his fundamental exclusion from society that allows the occasio- nal re-entry of the individual under particular circumstances. Whereas premodern societies take the concept of the individual to imply that a person and his qualities are well known while they do not count strangers as members of society at all, modern society develops a semantics of individuality that regards the individual as alien, unfamiliar, unpredictable, and free.

Following the example of Parsons's structural functionalism, Luhmann calls these functionally specified types of communication "generalized media" or "media-codes" (Soziale Systems 220-25; Essays 89-92). These media-codes facilitate improbable communication by reducing the selectivity of communication to a single binary opposition. Like a laser beam, they focus the grounds for rejection on just one aspect, thereby rendering all other negative possibilities pointless. For example, the opposite of "true" is "un- true" and not "ugly" or "immoral." A true statement may not be refuted simply because it is immoral; in this binary system, the se-


lectivity of the code merges with the motivation to accept a communication, and the success of the code in turn increases its plausibil- ity. These media codes are stabilized by systems differentiation, which establishes the corresponding subsystems such as economics, the law, science, intimacy, education, etc.

3. Autopoiesis

With the publication of Soziale Systeme (1984), Luhmann more than doubled the body of his theory at one blow. This second, more extensive part of systems theory comes under the heading of "Autopoiesis." To use an analogy, systems differentiation corresponds to the floor plan of a house with its division into bathroom, hall, bedroom, drawing room, kitchen, etc., whereas in autopoiesis we are concerned with the construction of the house from bricks, timber, mortar, and beams. In the first case we are dealing with the combination of elements, in the second case with their constitution. A system differs from its environment by its elements, and it is further differentiated by recombination of these elements. It was Luhmann's problem to project the concept of autopoiesis onto society and to find equivalents there for the entire ensemble of system, element, self-description, self-reference, etc. The strategic question was as follows: What are the elements that make it possible for social and psychic systems to constitute themselves by referring to themselves in their fundamental operations? By including the dimension of time, Luhmann reached the decisive break- through. Thus, the idea was born that the elements that constitute social and psychic systems must be events. Here we have the first germ of systems theory, its genetic code, and its own law of reproduction. It now becomes clear that systems theory is anything but mechanistic. On the contrary, systems theory develops an approach that reveals the finest grains of sand running through the hour glass and the ticking of the seconds on the clock to be the essence of our social and spiritual life.

How is it that events constitute systems? The answer may be found by reversing the perspective. It is their transitoriness and their continuous disintegration that enable the events to build up systems (Essays 9). The question of contingency-"what happens


next?"-provokes the answer of indefinite complexity-"not everything may be combined with everything else"-which leaves us with the solution, "we are forced to make a choice." Accordingly, two forms of establishing order are available, namely structure and process. A process is a sequence of irreversible events, each event serving as a premise for the selectivity of the following event. A structure absorbs time because it reduces the indefinite complexity of universal combinability by selecting sequences of events that are repeatable and therefore may be expected to happen. Therefore, only such structures develop that are able to link passing and coming events. Structures and events select one another. A process may be likely or unlikely to happen, whereas a structure constitutes a reference system of expectations, which confronts the events with the alternative of conformity or deviation. From the wild dance of events, there emerges an ordered pattern of expectations that serves as a means of orientation for the events. In systems theory, this concept is to be found in many variations. For example, complexity and contingency bring about their reduction; the potential for continuous conflict and mutual misunderstanding brings forth the rules for their avoidance; the unpredictability of other peoples' behavior generates expectations; the impenetrability of consciousness (even for consciousness itself) necessitates communication. The stability achieved by these means is of a dynamic nature. It needs to be fed constantly with fresh disorder, fresh dissent, fresh unpredictability, and fresh impenetrability, if it is not to collapse (Soziale Systeme ch. 8).

For the system, the advantage of surrendering to the transitoriness of events lies in the fact that events finally disintegrate, thus enabling the system to replace them by events that are better adapted to the environment. The system reproduces itself by means of the continuous disintegration and reproduction of the events and is therefore in a position to inscribe time into the system. If, for example, our observations and thoughts refused to dis- appear to make room for new ones, we would remain caught in the past forever. This is the reason why ideas change, prices go up and down, and communication buzzes. Temporalized systems never age. They can adapt to the irreversibility of time and swing along with it. The indeterminateness of each event with regard to the next moment in time may be exploited by the system as a de-


vice for searching the environment for information relevant to its continuance. On the other hand, its internal structure makes the system independent of its environment in terms of time. Sys- tems generate their own internalized time by doing without overall round-the-clock synchronicity with their environment in favor of establishing their own temporal dispositions within the system. This is made possible by internal simulation of outside events, anticipation, preparing for eventualities, deferring reactions, and

keeping the past accessible in the shape of memories. System boundaries, therefore, are also time boundaries (Differentiation 289-323).

By reorienting itself toward time, systems theory reacts to the modernization of society in general. In founding his "New His-

tory" on the historicization of time, Reinhart Koselleck has shown how temporal horizons are increasingly broadened and differentiated in accordance with growing social differentiation in the 17th and 18th centuries. Within this context, there is a 17th-century forerunner to Luhmann's idea of the continuous disintegration of events. Faced with the breakdown of ontological security, so that the problem of explaining the world's continued existence becomes questionable, Descartes presents the following solution: Second by second the world disintegrates, and every second it is newly created by God. This notion, which became known under the title of creatio continua, marks the transition from the concept of preservation by God to Hobbes' idea of self-preservation. With Luhmann, creatio continua becomes autopoiesis. Here we have one of systems theory's basic characteristics; it frequently reaches back through the philosophy of the subject to the cosmological and theological ideas of early modern or medieval periods (possibly with a penchant for gnostic heresies!).

In a biological context, autopoiesis refers to self-referentially closed systems. In order to be able to combine the closed circuit of self-referentiality with openness toward the environment, Luh- mann borrows the term "meaning" (Sinn) from Husserl's Phenome- nology. By doing so, Luhmann brings about a union between the humanist tradition of "Geisteswissenschaften" and the concept of the system developed in cybernetics and biology, the main point being that both psychic and social systems work with meaning. Meaning, too, is constituted temporally as the difference between


actuality and possibility. Anything actual is meaningful only within a context of other possibilities. This dependence on other possibilities renders all actuality unstable and replaces it by a contiguous possibility. Seen in this light, meaning is a self-advancing process of actualization and virtualization. By implying a horizon of possibilities, meaning makes each selection conscious of its own selectiv-

ity and therefore reproduces complexity. For this reason, only those systems that use meaning are able to reintroduce their difference from the environment into the system in order to be able to use it internally. Using a term coined by George Steiner, we could best describe meaning as "alterity." Meaning is the recognition of

contingency, of the potential for being otherwise. For each event, meaning holds a horizon of possibilities when it comes to choosing a follow-up event. The differences with which meaning operates are not fixed in advance, but are only established by meaning itself. Meaning is a self-referentially closed circuit, insofar as meaning can only refer to other meanings. This makes it impossible to ne-

gate meaning since negation presupposes meaning. As soon as "time" and "meaning" are paired off, Luhmann is

able to proceed with transferring the concept of autopoiesis to his

theory of society. For this purpose, it is necessary to reconstruct, as

operational differences in the self-constitution of the system by self-observation, the entire string of distinctions between system and environment, complexity and reduction of complexity, unpredictability and expectation, and order and disorder. As a consequence, the observing and the observed elements of a system must be set at different levels. At this point, Luhmann leaves the path of traditional sociology by defining the observing elements of the social system as communications, whereas the observed elements are defined as actions. Communications represent creative disorder, whereas actions represent order. With this strategic decision in favor of the asymmetrical, Luhmann establishes a conjunction with the theory of observation inspired by George Spencer Brown's "calculus," which presupposes a difference between an act of observation and the observation of this act. Here we have the starting point for a theory of second-order observation.

Luhmann also opens up systems theory toward the theory of symmetry refraction, as it is developed in mathematical models of physical and biochemical processes. If we visualize this symmetry


refraction by the "little difference" that makes the inequality between man and woman so provokingly obvious against their back-

ground of near perfect symmetry, then we may say that systems theory is permeated by a Nietzschean dualism between Dionysian femininity and Apollonian masculinity. Here we see the "ur- difference" in systems theory, exemplified not in the structures of

femininity and masculinity but in the autopoiesis of their difference. The circular symbol of systems theory's androgynous dual-

ity is the ouroboros, the snail biting its own tail, which stands for the alternative of treating this sexual dualism as either identity or difference.

4. Communication

To understand society, it is necessary to recall the disorder of communication, which alone enables us to comprehend the forms brought forth by communication. Like many theorists, Luh- mann-in this case referring to Buhler-regards communication as triadic. According to him, communication is made possible by a combination of three different points of reference for selectivity, the first being information about the world, the second whatever the utterance betrays about the speaker, and the third being the

understanding by the addressee. The recipient is responsible for the difference between information and utterance. He bisects each utterance by submitting it to double entry bookkeeping. On the one hand, there is the information that he relates to the world; on the other hand, the recipient will find further clues for interpre- ting this message in the speaker's characteristics, interests, and motives. Only thus is he able to distinguish between truth and truth- fulness. All three forms of selectivity are on an equal level, which means that each one may dominate the others for a certain time. At times, information will be the most important, at other times, the need to express oneself, and at still other times communication will depend on the recipient's capacity for understanding. There is constant fluctuation among the three forms of selectivity. In this

way, communication ensures that there is constant stimulation by an influx of meaning into the system (Soziale Systeme 195-98).

But the problem is that on this basis communication cannot


treat itself as a process in which one form of selectivity is the pre- condition for another. Therefore, communication is simplified by self-observation in describing itself as action. The manipulative operation of self-observation that brings about this change is called "attribution." Via attribution, self-description makes the sender responsible for the act of communication that is attributed to him as an action and thereby given a direction from sender to recipient. It is only by means of simplification that the utterance becomes an event that is fixed in time. The combination of asymmetry and the status of an event now determines the follow-up action in such a way that the answer to the message is regarded as a new communication by the recipient. Within the flow of continuous self- reproduction, communication and action are thus submitted to a different punctuation. In communication, the responsibilities for the utterance, the information, and understanding are constantly being reallocated. The question as to whether it is the speaker, the situation, or the hearer who is responsible for what happens during communication is reopened with each new act of communication. Because of this, there is a constant requirement for new punctuations and attributions. Communication revolves, pulsates, and oscillates around these three points of reference in a decidedly Dionysian way. In order to give this aimless fluctuation the Apol- lonian shape of a process, communication is constantly reat- tributed and understanding is then defined as reaction. By this fluctuation, communication sets itself the never-ending task of attribution. In other words, communication imports contingency for its own use, only to reduce it again.

Communication is the basic unit for self-constitution, and action is the basic unit for self-observation. It is only via the difference between the two that communication may be conditioned as a sequence of events that assumes ego's action as a premise for alter's reaction. Whereas communication maintains reversibility, action copies irreversibility into the system. At the same time, it is this phenomenon alone that establishes the alternative between acceptance and rejection of an act of communication. It is communication's self-description as action that enables a continuous reproduction of the central reference problem of society: "double contingency." Contingency is doubled because of its relation to both ego and alter. Alter may either accept or reject whatever ego

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happens to be expressing, but ego can do the same with alter's communicative gambits. Systems of consciousness are black boxes, and as such they are unfathomable to one another. Because of this, the systems are unable to predict one another's behavior. Each system operates on the assumption that the other system is also independent, and this underlying insecurity helps the system to control its own behavior by stabilizing it through expectations. Thus, behavior is not free by nature, but is only made to be so through expectations. As soon as one knows what these expectations are, one is given the alternative to either confirm or disappoint them. In this way, double contingency builds up expectations, which in turn may be expected themselves, and this process reproduces double contingency. According to Luhmann, society feeds on its homemade pressure of problems created by double contingency, thereby stimulating its own continual existence. Without this pressure, society would simply implode. Systems need problems; they constantly create new ones for themselves and then feed on them. Constantly renewed dissensus is one of these problems. This Heraclitian idea was at the center of Luhmann's controversy with Habermas that attracted so much interest in the early seventies (see Habermas and Luhmann, Theorie der Gesellschaft). Habermas postulated a rationally justified consensus-achieved in a communicative situation free from domination-as a criterion for the critique of society. Luhmann by contrast argued that without the benefit of constantly renewed dissensus society would be doomed to end in a paralyzing consensus, eventually to die of the thermody- namic immobility of social entropy.

The improbability of communication's success is threefold. First, the communication must reach the addressee; second, the addressee must be able and willing to understand it; and third, he must make the sender's communication the starting point for his own reaction. This triple improbability is the point of reference for the development of symbolically generalized media of communication or "media codes." The development and subsequent differentiation of these codes are accomplished by means of self-referentiality. For example, constitutionalism enables power to control power, positive law legalizes the creation of new law by leg- islation, the economy defines itself by an exchange of exchange values (money), science alone defines the meaning of science (by


its methods and theories), taste can only be judged in terms of taste, and love alone may motivate love. The media codes ensure that the subsystems remain self-referentially closed by prohibiting their combination with one another. Scientific facts may not be suppressed by legal verdict, love may not be bought for money, and neither law nor politics may submit to the power of love. All these codes are linked to certain aspects of human psycho-physical individuality and constitute symbiotic mechanisms such as violence, consumption, sexuality, and perception. These media of communication develop in irregular interrelations with each other and exert a constant evolutionary pressure on our cultural semantics, a phenomenon that was first analyzed by systems theory. At this point, the theory of systems differentiation and communications theory converge with the theory of social evolution.

5. Systems Theory and Deconstruction

It may be rewarding to look more closely at the similarities and differences between systems theory and the theory that seems to be most closely related to it, namely, deconstruction (for Luh- mann on Derrida, see "Deconstruction"). Both theories make difference their basic category, both temporalize difference and reconstruct meaning as a temporally organized context of displacement and deferral. Both regard their fundamental operation (i.e., writing or communication, respectively) as an independent process that constitutes the subject rather than lets itself be constituted by it. Both theories mark the end of an era of Western thought, and both make the figure of self-referentiality a privileged concept within their constructions.

In deconstruction, writing plays the same role as communication in systems theory. By writing, Derrida means the use of signs in every form. All is writing, and all is text. By internal differentiation and framing, the basic text of our communicational practice is divided into disciplines, types of discourse, and semantic fields, the boundaries of which are constantly being subverted due to the undercurrents of differance. The phonocentrically privileged logos organizes a world of rigid hierarchies, fixed semantic definitions, and discourse patterns. Writing, on the other hand, acts as the


agent for continuously renewed dispersion, displacement, deferral, dissemination, and supplementation. The duality of presence and absence in the re-presentation posits temporal differentiation as the form that makes it possible for the use of science to

emerge in the first place. Thus, both systems theory and deconstruction use time as the fundamental category for the theory's architecture. As in Heidegger, "Being" becomes "Time."

In systems theory, meaning, defined as the difference between actuality (presence) and potentiality (absence), is equivalent to Derrida's differance. On the basis of meaning, every actual reference is characterized as selective against the horizon of other possibilities and therefore refers not only to itself but to other things. At the bottom of the abyss of this difference lies the re-actualization of the reference in the sense of its own iterability. Thus, there

emerges a continuously renewed displacement of reference that is indeed similar to what Derrida defines as differance. Like Derrida's

continuously renewed dispersion of significance, meaning in the context of systems theory is unsettled and unstable because of its inherent temporality and its need to undergo re-actualization and

re-generation. The generation of meaning by the continuous recombination of the actual and the possible is an autopoietic process that is constituted by self-constituted differences.

This central difference of actuality and potentiality may take the form of the difference between event and structure. Communi- cations and actions are actual events. By disappearing and making room for other events, they keep the system in a state of actuality. Thus, they copy time into the system and synchronize it with its environment. At the same time, the transitoriness of events forces the system to develop restrictive structures with which to connect the events. Accordingly, systems are constituted via the difference between structures and events. The structures that condition the combination of events are expectations. As such, they, too, are temporally defined. The concept of event and the concept of structure are related in such a way as to cover the temporal difference between the iterability and the singularity of the transitory event.

It is at this point that Derrida emerges as a structuralist. A structuralist's perspective blurs the distinction between the analyti- cal model and the model of self-description used by the examined reality. Because of the improbability of order, structure already


seems to be a proof of reality. In accepting this, one assumes that reality is already ordered, whereas this order is in fact a reaction to the pressure produced by the problems of complexity and con-

tingency. Structuralism, therefore, shows a marked preference for

self-description, for the text, the myth, discourse, symbolic order, etc. The term "structure" represents a concept in which the objects and the preconditions for their cognition seem to coincide. For this reason, Derrida reverses the relation between disorder and order. According to him, the level of order consists of the text of Western metaphysics that is brought about by a fundamental attribution of meaning to the simultaneity of the idea and the use of signs. In terms of systems theory, constative language is a kind of self-simplification of writing for the benefit of logos; to put it differently, logos-the scientific language of fact, cognition, and

philosophy-is the self-description of language. On the other hand, writing, as the basic differentiation within the use of signs that is also inherent in the spoken word, undertakes a permanent renewal of complexity and contingency through dissemination and dispersion, which in turn is again reduced by logocentric self- simplification. According to Luhmann, however, the paradox of self-referentiality comes first and the asymmetry produced by temporality comes second. The opposite is true for Derrida. The "ille- gitimate" asymmetry as a form of domination comes first and is then dissolved in the paradox of time.

Other differences aside, this reversal of aspects mirrors the symmetrical opposition between the problems posed by systems theory and deconstruction. Systems theory asks, "what makes social order possible?," on the assumption that order is improbable in the face of the general contingency and complexity of all possibilities. In systems theory, the foremost experience is surprise at the fact that order exists at all despite an unlimited horizon of other possibilities, and the theory's answer to this problem is circular: it is overwhelming contingency and complexity which forces the system to establish an order that in turn reproduces the system's own disorder. This emphasis on the fragility of order seems to imply a conservative attitude, but what we are really concerned with is "phenomenological reduction." In other words, order is no longer regarded as "normal," but as improbable.

The exact mirror image of this relation is shown by decon-

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struction, whose main point of reference is the discourse of West- ern metaphysics, seen as the reduced order of phonetically moti- vated logocentrism. Here, the starting point and fundamental

experience is the order of structure that posits the master question: "how is the subversion of this structure made possible?" Here, too, the answer is circular: the subversion of the structure is made

possible by the means of order itself, i.e., by deconstruction. If we reconstruct this deconstruction in terms of the theory of

observation that Luhmann adapted from George Spencer Brown, the complex relation of parallels and differences between systems theory and deconstruction may become more obvious. The first instruction of what Luhmann regards as an operational theory of observation is to draw a distinction and indicate one side of the distinction. Observations are therefore defined as distinction- based indications. There is one point, however, where observation fails: it is unable to observe the distinction on which it bases its own observation. This is observation's "blind spot." Therefore, observation is also unable to see whatever has been excluded from observation by its distinction. If observation is to be made observable, it is necessary to bring about a change of distinction, a displacement of the difference-in other words, a kind of deconstruction. The observed observation is one side of a second distinction, which in turn is equally unable to observe its own distinction. Luhmann describes this displacement as second-order cybernetics. In first-order cybernetics, we are dealing with the observation of objects, whereas in second-order cybernetics we are concerned with the observation of observations.

It is obvious that deconstruction is also a form of second- order observation. Now, an observer of observation may exempt himself from second-order cybernetics and therefore demand a correction of the first-order observation, whose blind spot he is able to see. He is then convinced that his own observation is correct and comprehensive. While he attributes the observed observation and its limitations to an observer, he attributes his own observation to reality. From then on he differentiates between objective observations, dependent on reality, and subjective perceptions, which he attributes to the observer. In this way, the observation of observation constitutes itself as critique. The other alternative for the observer is to subsume his own observation under second-order


cybernetics and regard all observation as indication based on distinction, accepting at the same time that no observation, itself in- cluded, is able to observe its own distinction. This alternative is tantamount to the decision as to whether one would want to fall back on a critique tied to an ontological matrix or instead to advance toward second-order cybernetics with all its implications.

Now it seems that deconstructionists try to evade this decision. Deconstruction turns second-order cybernetics into a procedure by breaking it down into two steps. In the first step, the deconstructive critique develops the internal contradiction of an observation by submitting to it and at the same time ignoring its

dependence on the submission. The criteria for critique are drawn from the criticized concept itself, and the observer makes himself

part of the observed observation and turns the latter into a self- contradiction. The subversion of the observed difference makes this discovery look like critique. By this procedure, he hides the fact that he can only observe this difference by means of a second difference. Miraculously, this second difference seems to emerge as the result of the internal critique. This is the second step of deconstruction, which leads the observer to discover the indissoluble difference between the observed observation and the observation observing it. It makes him realize that second-order cybernetics is a continuous displacement of differences. Thus, deconstruction seems to be able to combine a critique that depends on ontological premises with the abolition of ontology by generalizing second- order observation. For it is quite in accordance with Derrida that observation of observation may be understood as a never-ending process of displacement from observation to observation, and hence as a displacement from distinction to distinction. At the same time, the first step of inverting an a-symmetrical difference (such as signified/signifier, male/female) is made to look like critique, especially by Derrida's feminist followers. By displacing the critical difference, however, deconstructionists are able to downplay the fact that in the last instance critique remains bound to precisely the same ontological pattern that they wish to leave behind. By contrast, in systems theory, critique becomes part of the concept of the function, and this leads to a paradox that reminds one of Mar- cuse's "repressive tolerance." Critique primarily refers to hierar- chically organized power. However, it only reaches its peak during


the transition toward the functionally differentiated society. This is understandable, because alternatives themselves constitute the

principle of functionality-i.e., the language of functionality is the

language of critique. Functionality at the same time encourages and absorbs critique. The criticism that is levelled against modernism at the same time is an intrinsic part of modernism. On the other hand, there is no alternative to functionality. But this insight may not be gained by a critique that continues to hold onto the

ontological dualism of objective and subjective observations. With regard to one specific question, systems theory and de-

construction have opted for opposite alternatives. There is nothing outside the text, says Derrida. In society, there is nothing outside communication, says Luhmann. Both text and communication constitute the horizons that cannot be transcended in deconstruction and systems theory. In order to explain what he means by text or writing, however, Derrida starts with a special case of communication: the paradox of self-affection in speaking. Without using any exterior signifier outside the range of his own spontaneity, the

speaker experiences the pure ideality of the signified in listening to his own voice. This ideality of the signified is essentially other-

worldly and transcendental. In its greatest purity, this experience is described as the experience of "being," which establishes the idea of the presence of logos in the spoken word of "the spirit." In Western culture, the simultaneity of speaking and self-affection is then perpetuated by the invention of phonetic writing.

Derrida develops this idea in a critique of Husserl's concept of pure intuition. In doing so, he combines what in systems theory is separated by a rigorous cut and attributed to different systems: consciousness and communication. In systems theory, self-

perception and intuition are phenomena of consciousness, and as such they are inaccessible to communication. The separation of consciousness and communication removes the problem that has

provoked Derrida to develop his critique of Western metaphysics: the foundation of the ideality of meaning on the direct internal

self-perception of pure transcendental subjectivity unmixed with baser matter. According to Derrida, this acoustic illusion can only be dissolved by writing. Writing reminds us of the fundamental

substitutionary nature of all semiosis, which, from the point of view of the presence of logos, appears as repetition, doubling, and de-


ferral. Symbolic representation is thus reconstructed as a process of temporalization.

For systems theory, communication may be imbedded in perception, but it cannot "perceive." Perception is only accessible to it via further communication. If one follows Jakobson in describing the poetical function of language with reference to the self- referential thematization of the signifier, Derrida's analysis focuses

just on the poetical dimension of symbolization. This, however, need not necessarily be seen as the basic paradox of "Seins-

geschichte." From the point of view of systems theory, Derrida reconstructs the special function of literature in relating communication and perception. By manipulating the signifier and adjusting it to semantics, by blurring communication through ambivalence, ambiguity, and techniques of producing opacity, and by recasting the poetic act of communication as "experience" in a semantics of re-attribution (sensibility, taste, genius, inspiration, enthusiasm, etc.), literature makes communication sensitive to the abysmal dimension, the inaccessibility, of consciousness. In bringing perception and communication closer together and relating one to another, literature enhances the tension between immediate

presence and temporal difference, which is taken by deconstructionists to be at the heart of our logocentric illusion. If this, however, is viewed as the specificity of literature, one is not surprised to find that deconstructive reading strategies seem to uncover the same structure in all texts: namely, their poetic dimension.

Here Luhmann proposes to reconstruct the way in which literature relates perception to communication by introducing the terms "medium" and "form." A medium is characterized by the loose coupling of its elements. Elements are self-constituted units. Loose coupling means a high potential of contingent combinabil-

ity. By contrast, form is characterized by the strict coupling of elements. In this sense, noise is the medium for words, words constitute the medium for sentences, sentences are the medium for verses, etc. In this way, there may be a graduation of medium/ form-relations, with one form becoming a medium for the next. In doing so, form uses the contrasts of perception and relates them to the oppositions of semantics ("Form of Writing").

The relation between medium and form is temporal. They can only co-exist in the mode of simultaneous actuality. On the


other hand, media are stable and forms are variable. The medium is only reproduced by a change of forms. This change regenerates the medium by coupling and uncoupling its elements, thus repro- ducing its stability. The stability of the medium survives the forms in the same way that oblivion survives memory-an opposition that is reproduced in the mnemo-technic imagery of water (for oblivion) and architectural topology (for the rhetorical ars mem- oriae).

This has induced Luhmann to see temporality itself as a combination of form and medium. Structural coupling, which combines consciousness and communication (but excludes operational coupling), is the way in which system and environment co-exist

simultaneously. It is the living space of the actual. It is here that the operation of distinction takes place, including the distinction between before and after. This opens the dimension of temporality. This distinction has to de-synchronize itself by treating that which is not actual as actual-or (to use the terminology of Derrida) by treating the absent as present. Time emerges as the result of a self- induced paradox. It is the basis for a continuously displaced distinction between before and after, which an observer may neither

identify with the succession of the calendar nor his own actuality. Therefore, the observer who uses this distinction disappears in the

abyss of this difference and becomes invisible for himself.

6. A New Constructivist Epistemology

Second-order observation in its new cybernetic form abandons the distinction between the subjective and the objective, or the transcendental and the empirical. There is no such thing as a subject equipped with a special ontic quality called "reflection." Rather, the subject's operations are more readily understood if one defines them by the fact that the subject himself is an observer. Thus, the difference between the object and the subject is no longer explained by reference to reality, but is proven to be of use in the actual practice of observation. The observation of observation, therefore, is an emergent phenomenon. What we are dealing with here is a self-supporting construction. The observing observa-


tion is in no way superior and by no means in the position of being critique beyond critique.

With the help of this reconstruction, Luhmann is able to dispense with externally defined meaning (such as the "self- realization of the human species" or "nature") for his concept of rationality. The 18th century was the century of natural philosophy, natural religion, natural rights, and natural morality, and Luhmann sees this recourse to nature as an attempt to exorcise rationalism's reflexivity. The new criterion for rationality is instead re-entry, i.e., the fact that the distinction is repeated within the distinction, just as the difference between the system and the environment is repeated within the system. The system is now in a position to observe itself, and this is made possible by meaning. Here, we have the link between the phenomenological concept of meaning and the "constructivist turn." Traditional epistemology used contact, proximity, and intimacy between subject and object as models to illustrate knowledge, whereas radical constructivism reverses its perspective. While traditional epistemology grappled with the problem of how knowledge reaches the object even though the object is only given as knowledge, constructivism, by contrast, transforms this "though" into a "because." Knowledge is possible precisely because consciousness has no direct access to reality, and because the brain functions independently of the environment. Ac- cordingly, Luhmann suggests that the difference between the subject and the object should be replaced by the difference between the system and the environment. But this, in turn, means that every distinction on which observation is based must be asymmetrical. The model of unity constructed by the system must be differentiated from the system itself. The self-reference of the asymmetrical then emerges as "natural epistemology" ("Cogni- tive Program").

The question as to whether systems theory is an heir to idealism is thus put in a different, more probing light. Idealism tried to solve the question of how the difference between knowledge and the object is constituted as unity. The neo-cybernetic theory of knowledge then regards this difference as a distinction that is constructed by the observer, and its unity is the blind spot that serves as a means for constructing his observation. That the act of differ-


entiation is a real operation taking place in a real world is then

presupposed. Knowledge is no longer defined as reaching out into the field of reality; rather it is redefined as an effort undertaken

by the system to transform environmental restrictions into preconditions for an increase of internal complexity. In this sense, ratio-

nality means reflecting the unity of the difference between the system and the environment within the system. This leads to the

following paradox: at the precise moment in history when the

unity of global society is established, its description falls apart into a plurality of systemic discourses. This paradox must be resolved with the help of the difference between observation and operation. By means of operation, a system excludes itself from the environment, whereas by means of observation it includes itself in the environment by reflecting the unity of the difference between the

system and the environment within itself. This reflection is linked to the respective subsystems. As a consequence, rationality is reconstructed in accordance with the various subsystems and not with society as a whole, a fact that calls for a polycontextual concept of rationality.

Although the systems theory of society comes under the head-

ing of sociology, it is more than traditional sociology. By claiming universality, systems theory replaces philosophy without really try- ing to act the part itself. According to Luhmann, philosophy in the classical sense is really part of what he calls "Old Europe" and its two philosophical paradigms: the cosmological-ontological paradigm based on the correspondence between being and meaning, and the modern-bourgeois paradigm that accompanies the transition from the stratified to the functionally differentiated society and replaces the concept of the cosmos with the concept of the subject. Luhmann seems to regret that the view of the totality of Being was given up and replaced by critique with the help of which the subject's view is inflated to regain its universality. This description would include the Frankfurt School, which is considered to be part of the paradigm of "Old European" philosophy. Luhmann by contrast gives up all ideas of an ultimate, foundational philosophy. By doing so, he finds himself in company with Richard Rorty and Wilfried Sellars. The renunciation of any a priori transcendental- ism or ultimate foundation marks the difference between systems theory and traditional forms of philosophy. If one looks at what


happens to the basic categories of traditional modern discourse, one will realize that these are either replaced or transformed into something else. For instance, the concept of causality becomes part of the concept of function. Causality exists only in the exceptional case of the reduced function, where cause and effect are fixed. The differences between the subject and the object, the transcendental and the empirical, are replaced by the difference between the system and the environment. The subject loses its monopoly on self- referentiality and reflection. The concept of ideology becomes part of the concept of second-order observation and is generalized in much the same way as in the sociology of knowledge. Ideology thereby loses its function of critique. Luhmann argues that oppositions such as affirmative/critical belong to a transitional semantics that has not yet been adapted to modern society. To call this "post- modern" Luhmann regards as a result of literary inbreeding. As to social structure, Luhmann sees uninterrupted continuity in the modernization process, a continuity that is based on the money- dependency of the economy, positive law, the autonomy of science, the development of intimacy, etc. Therefore, Luhmann regards what is called post-modern as a symptom of the acknowledgment of modernity. He also argues that the inflation of critique and the

preoccupation with texts instead of realities (as well as theory's re- turn to the history of its own classical authors) are sure signs that these semantics are exhausted and have become outdated. The difference "affirmative/critical" conceals the fact that the basic characteristics of modern society give reason to fear the worst and yet are irreplaceable at the same time. Luhmann does take seriously the ecological dangers inherent in technological progress, but he also argues that there is no alternative to curbing these dangers with the help of technology itself (see Ecological Communication).

7. Luhmann and "Sociological Enlightenment": Germany and Beyond

Many a member of the republique des lettres has entered the limelight of publicity locked in a fight with his adversary. In view of the dualistic structure of his theory, it seems fitting that this should have happened to Luhmann as well. He was first noticed


by the academic world at large because of his controversy with Ha- bermas in 1971, which was published under a title inspired by Ha- bermas: Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie-was leistet die

Systemforschung? (Habermas and Luhmann). In the meantime, we have seen the star of neo-Marxism rise in its luminous glory and then cease glowing and die. During that time, Luhmann was able to unfold his Grand Theory in over 40 books and 300 articles while giving the Frankfurt School a wide berth. Today, we are all able to see what 20 years ago was known only to a few insiders: Luhmann's radical rejection of the "Old European" tradition makes his theory seem decidedly more avant-garde than that of Habermas. When, in 1985, Habermas again accused Luhmann of

being "neo-conservative" in his The Philosophical Discourse of Moder-

nity, Luhmann refrained from reacting at all, since the term "neo- conservative" seemed to him a contradiction in terms, even as Ha- bermas's refusal to give up time-honored utopian ideals appeared to be increasingly conservative itself as time went on.

Inasmuch as Luhmann's own theory is part of the society that it describes, the duality of society as a super system and an ensemble of subsystems is reflected by Luhmann's policy of publication. There is one central publication that outlines the fundamental principles of the social theory as a whole and that is available under the title Soziale Systeme: Grundrifi einer allgemeinen Theorie, and there is also at least one important book on each of the subsystems of law, science, art, economics, love, education, and religion. Be- cause the social differentiation of the subsystems is repeated in the distinctions between the academic disciplines, Luhmann became a sort of power house feeding other disciplines with the energy generated by his socio-cultural analyses, which he put on the mar- ket under the heading of "sociological enlightenment."

Sociological enlightenment goes hand in hand with a claim to enlighten enlightenment about itself. Enlightenment has always referred to the latent, i.e., to an area of nonknowledge that protected structures from the pressures of contingency. With the es- tablishment of public opinion in the 18th century, enlightenment was defined as an "invisible power," and hence the latent con- verged with the manifest. For this reason, it is precisely the enlightenment that establishes itself as a paradox, because, as functional analysis, it discovers the function of latency, and therefore dis-


covers its own limits, about which sociological enlightenment may then proceed to enlighten.

Although in today's post-Marxist discourse the claim to eman- cipation is connected with the Frankfurt School and Habermas, "sociological enlightenment" seems to have a Mephistophelean air about it, a sort of knowledge after the fall. Luhmann's ironical and distant attitude, together with his whole-hearted embrace of the effects of" Verfremdung," have surely contributed to this impression. In this context, the following aspects seem to be the most im-

portant: man's expulsion from the paradise of society that allows him to commit sins without endangering society as a whole; the renunciation of any kind of privileged perspective (be it the perspective of God or the good, of Being or the subject); the dare- devil approach to those paradoxes of self-referentiality that seem to have such a paralyzing effect on others (this brings Luhmann's

theory into a certain proximity with ancient theology); and a skep- tical and distant attitude toward morality. Luhmann regards mo-

rality as dangerous and argues in favor of a paradoxical moraliza- tion of morality, implying that it may well be immoral to corner

somebody by moral argument ("Paradigm Lost"). If one follows Luhmann's own recommendation to observe him as an observer of society, then there is only one image that seems to be fitting: Luhmann Lucifer.

Such diabolical changes of theoretical perspective produce considerable aesthetic fascination, locking Luhmann's opponents and followers into a "unity of difference." With its anti-intuitive attitudes, systems theory is in accordance with the methodological instruction given by phenomenology, namely to think against "common sense." This lends the theory an air of avant-garde art. Like modern art, the theory "defamiliarizes" commonly held attitudes and breaks with old habits of thinking by using the technique of "Verfremdung." It is not for no reason that "contingency" is its main concept. As the "Mann ohne Eigenschaften" redivivus, Luhmann emphasizes the fact that everything might be quite different from what it is and that God preferably employs the conjunctivus potentialis to communicate with the world. The "Luhmann ohne Eigen- schaften" regards himself as the observer of God and therefore as the diabolus. Where transcendence is concerned, God's place is now filled by the individual human being exiled from society. He is the

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rearview mirror of society and as such gives society the illusion of being able to observe itself internally from the outside. The un- prejudiced observer will see the impact of a deep inspiration in all of this. It is nurtured by the experience of a fresh perspective, by the image of society turned upside down. To some, this experience is liberating-because in it the consequences of modernity are ac- cepted-whereas others will be upset by it for precisely the same reason.

Systems theory emphasizes the formative power and priority position of society as the source of artificiality and alienation in all relationships between the individual and society, identity and role, living environment and system, nature and culture, body and language, man and woman. The theory's foremost orientation lies toward creating distance, demarcating boundaries, and making distinctions. A restrained and ironical style corresponds with this orientation, a fact that is interpreted as a sign of unfeeling coldness by many critics. One may be justified in finding a pattern of deja vu in this constellation. In Germany in the twenties, the youth movement's pretensions of directness and expressionism's pathos of emotional violence provoked a reaction that called itself "Neue Sachlichkeit" and took up again the key ideas with which Max Weber had characterized the modern age: demystification and ra- tionalization. In parallel with the Bauhaus and functionalist move- ments in art, the followers of "Neue Sachlichkeit" turned away from any attempt to exorcise the spirit of modernity by the charms of "Gemeinschaft" and opted in favor of modernity under the mottos of the "cold persona," the mask, and the "Mann ohne Eigenschaften." Musil, Serner, Brecht, Ernst Junger, Carl Schmitt, Karl Buhler, and Helmuth Plessner-all gravitated around the "Neue Sachlich- keit" movement. A phrase from Carl Schmitt's Glossarium might serve as a motto for systems theory: "distinguo, ergo sum." Musil's "Moglichkeitsmensch," with whom God speaks in the cunjunctivus potentialis, may almost be an inhabitant of systems theory. Karl Biihler's "theory of expression" finds its way directly into Luh- mann's "communications theory," and Serner's "Handbrevier fur Hochstapler" and Brecht's "Lesebuchfiir Stadtbewohner" replace morality by a code of behavior for the modern age. Jiinger's "Impas- sibilite" concerning the focusing of observation anticipates the


"cold regard" of Luhmann's theory of observation, where the object is constructed as a "slide preparation" through differentiation. And Carl Schmitt's famous friend/foe differentiation as a definition of the essence of politics seems already designed toward the sort- ing and distinguishing technique of the media code. With the help of models of circulation and traffic, the followers of "Neue Sachlich- keit" describe a society that has become independent of its individuals, a closed system of movement, thereby anticipating the dynamic independence of autopoiesis.

But it is above all in Plessner's anthropology of eccentric positionality that we find many motives and ideas that re-emerge in

systems theory. In the polarity between "tribal brotherhood" and "universal otherhood," Plessner polemically distances himself from the German cult of inwardness and celebrates the aristocracy of distance, the form of communication brought forth by politeness and tact, and the self-objectivation and socio-cultural artificiality of man as the fundamental anthropological condition. Plessner works out his concept of eccentric positionality as "a unity of difference," and, as in Luhmann's understanding of "meaning," Plessner sees man as characterized by the repetition of the difference between the system and the environment within the system itself. It is only by referring to his own boundaries that the human being is able to find the duality of inside and outside, subject and object, of being a body and having a body, as the basis of his own position. Commu- nication does not take place in direct expression, but in a state of indirectness. As a frontier guard, the "I" directs its social persona by impression management, and distinguishes sharply between its mask, its natural bodily existence, and the unprotected psyche. With this anthropology, Plessner breaks with the German cult of

authenticity and anticipates the concept of the social role. More- over, Plessner, like Richard Sennett after him, lays the foundations for an anti-Roussauean theory of the theatricality of public life, with ridiculousness as the regulating agent. By doing so, Plessner releases the image of man from the antinomy between the in-

wardly directed subject and the materialistically determined crea- ture of instinct; he then reworks this image as a free-floating construction of the social equilibrist, who only constitutes himself through forms of communication, without regret for the loss of


roots and authenticity. Plessner goes further in anticipating the "American" other-directed type described by Riesman than anyone else in Germany who voiced his approval of modernity.

It is in this specifically German context of debate that Luh- mann's systems theory resurrects the tradition of "Neue Sachlich- keit"-a tradition of opposition against the cult of inwardness and "Gesinnungsethik," against the condemnation of the public sphere as the sphere of inauthenticity and alienation, and against those cultural critics who reject "American" modernity. All of which helps to explain most of the "allergic" reactions coming from neo- Marxism and feminism. These are reactions against the ironical attitude of aristocratic elegance and distant superiority adopted by Luhmann when arguing in favor of objectivity each time he is accused of emotional coldness and a lack of moral gestures. It is this opposition that provokes his slightly Luciferean attitude. But if one looks at systems theory's affinity with deconstruction, one will realize that the accusation of coldness does not so much apply to its structure as to the atmospheric climate and style of thought created by it. And this again says more about the environment of discourse surrounding systems theory in the Federal Republic than about the theory itself.

However, systems theory has profited from the intellectual re- alignments and readjustments made necessary by the breakdown of socialism and the reunification of Germany. The old camps of right and left are beginning to dissolve, and the fermentation of ideas produces a new need for fresh approaches and "Neue Sach- lichkeit." Meanwhile, the interdisciplinary impact of systems theory has begun to show results in a variety of disciplines such as theology, law, pedagogics, administration studies, economics, political studies, and especially in social history and historical sociology. This is also true for the study of literature. Research projects concerned with a systems theoretical approach to literature in one way or another have been developed at the Universities of Siegen, Bie- lefeld, Bochum, Hamburg, and Leiden (Holland), and many individual scholars are attracted by the universalist range and comparative possibilities of systems theory and are eager to test its intellectual potential by concrete application.


Note

I should like to thank Joseph Tabbi for discussing the problems covered in this article with me and for making so many valuable suggestions.

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