107 s.ct. 683 for educational use only page 1 479 u.s. 272,...

Supreme Court of the United StatesCALIFORNIA FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN

ASSOCIATION, et al., Petitionersv.

Mark GUERRA, Director, Department of Fair Em-ployment and Housing et al.

No. 85-494.

Argued Oct. 8, 1986.Decided Jan. 13, 1987.

Pregnant worker's employer, joined by trade associ-ation of employers and another organization repres-enting businesses in state, brought suit seeking de-claration that California statute requiring employersto provide leave and reinstatement to employeesdisabled by pregnancy was preempted by Title VII.The district court granted summary judgment intheir favor, and the Court of Appeals for the NinthCircuit reversed, 758 F.2d 390. Certiorari was gran-ted. The Supreme Court, Justice Marshall, heldthat: (1) Pregnancy Discrimination Act does notprohibit employment practices favoring pregnantwomen; (2) California statute is not inconsistentwith, and thus is not preempted by, Title VII asamended by Pregnancy Discrimination Act; and (3)even if PDA prohibited favorable treatment of preg-nant workers, California statute would not requireemployers to violate Title VII.

Affirmed.

Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in partand concurring in the judgment.

Justice Scalia filed an opinion concurring in thejudgment.

Justice White filed a dissenting opinion in whichChief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Powell joined.

West Headnotes

[1] States 360 18.3

360 States360I Political Status and Relations

360I(B) Federal Supremacy; Preemption360k18.3 k. Preemption in General. Most

Cited CasesWhen acting within constitutional limits, Congressis empowered to preempt state law by so stating inexpress terms.

[2] States 360 18.7


360I(B) Federal Supremacy; Preemption360k18.7 k. Occupation of Field. Most

Cited CasesCongressional intent to preempt state law in partic-ular area may be inferred where scheme of federalregulation is sufficiently comprehensive to makereasonable the inference that Congress “left noroom” for supplementary state regulation.

[3] States 360 18.5


360I(B) Federal Supremacy; Preemption360k18.5 k. Conflicting or Conforming

Laws or Regulations. Most Cited CasesIn areas where Congress has not completely dis-placed state regulation, federal law may nonethelesspreempt state law to extent it actually conflicts withfederal law; such conflict occurs either becausecompliance with both federal and state regulationsis physical impossibility, or because state lawstands as obstacle to accomplishment and executionof full purposes and objectives of Congress.

[4] States 360 18.3


360I(B) Federal Supremacy; Preemption

107 S.Ct. 683 FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY 479 U.S. 272, 107 S.Ct. 683, 42 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1073, 41 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 36,641, 93 L.Ed.2d 613,55 USLW 4077, 7 Employee Benefits Cas. 2657(Cite as: 479 U.S. 272, 107 S.Ct. 683)

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360k18.3 k. Preemption in General. MostCited CasesPreemption of state law by federal law is not to belightly presumed.

[5] States 360 18.49


360I(B) Federal Supremacy; Preemption360k18.45 Labor and Employment

360k18.49 k. Discrimination; Retaliat-ory Discharge. Most Cited CasesCivil Rights Act sections on preemption of statelaw severely limit Title VII's preemptive effect byleaving state fair employment laws where they werebefore enactment of Title VII. Civil Rights Act of1964, §§ 701 et seq., 708, 1104, as amended, 42U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq., 2000e-7, 2000h-4.

[6] Civil Rights 78 1176

78 Civil Rights78II Employment Practices

78k1164 Sex Discrimination in General78k1176 k. Pregnancy; Maternity. Most

Cited Cases(Formerly 78k162, 78k9.14)

Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which specifies thatsex discrimination under Title VII includes discrim-ination on basis of pregnancy, is a floor beneathwhich pregnancy disability benefits may not drop,not a ceiling above which they may not rise. CivilRights Act of 1964, §§ 701 et seq., 701(k), asamended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq., 2000e(k).

[7] Civil Rights 78 1176

78 Civil Rights78II Employment Practices

78k1164 Sex Discrimination in General78k1176 k. Pregnancy; Maternity. Most

Cited Cases(Formerly 78k162, 78k9.14)

Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which provides thatdiscrimination on basis of pregnancy is sex discrim-

ination under Title VII, does not prohibit employ-ment practices that favor pregnant women. CivilRights Act of 1964, §§ 701 et seq., 701(k), asamended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq., 2000e(k).

[8] States 360 18.49



360k18.49 k. Discrimination; Retaliat-ory Discharge. Most Cited CasesCalifornia statute requiring employers to provideleave and reinstatement to employees disabled bypregnancy is not inconsistent with, and thus is notpreempted by, Title VII as amended by PregnancyDiscrimination Act. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§701 et seq., 701(k), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2000e et seq., 2000e(k); West's Ann.Cal.Gov.Code§ 12945(b)(2).

[9] States 360 18.49



360k18.49 k. Discrimination; Retaliat-ory Discharge. Most Cited CasesEven if Pregnancy Discrimination Act prohibitsemployment practices favoring pregnant women,California statute requiring employers to provideleave and reinstatement to employees disabled bypregnancy would not require employers to violate,and thus would not be preempted by, Title VII, asCalifornia statute leaves employers free to givecomparable benefits to other disabled employees,not to treat pregnant workers better than other dis-abled employees, and thus does not prevent em-ployers from complying with both federal and statelaw. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701 et seq.,701(k), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq.,2000e(k); West's Ann.Cal.Gov.Code § 12945(b)(2).

**685 *272 Syllabus FN*












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FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of theopinion of the Court but has been preparedby the Reporter of Decisions for the con-venience of the reader. See United States v.Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499.

The California Fair Employment and Housing Actin § 12945(b)(2) requires employers to provideleave and reinstatement to employees disabled bypregnancy. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of1964, which prohibits employment discriminationon the basis of sex, as amended by the PregnancyDiscrimination Act (PDA), specifies that sex dis-crimination includes discrimination on the basis ofpregnancy. A woman employed as a receptionist bypetitioner California Federal Savings & Loan Asso-ciation (Cal Fed) took a pregnancy disability leavein 1982, but when she notified Cal Fed that she wasable to return to work she was informed that her jobhad been filled and that there were no similar posi-tions available. She then filed a complaint with re-spondent Department of Fair Employment andHousing, which charged Cal Fed with violating §12945(b)(2). Before a hearing was held on the com-plaint, Cal Fed, joined by the other petitioners,brought an action in Federal District Court, seekinga declaration that § 12945(b)(2) is inconsistent withand pre-empted by Title VII and an injunctionagainst its enforcement. The District Court grantedsummary judgment for petitioners, but the Court ofAppeals reversed.

Held: The judgment is affirmed.

758 F.2d 390, affirmed.

Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of theCourt with respect to Parts I, II, III-B, III-C, andIV, concluding that § 12945(b)(2) is not pre-emptedby Title VII, as amended by the PDA, because it isnot inconsistent with the purposes of Title VII nordoes it require the doing of an act that is unlawfulunder Title VII. Pp. 691-695.

(a) Title VII's purpose is “to achieve equality of

employment opportunities and remove barriers thathave operated in the past to favor an identifiablegroup of ... employees over other employees.”Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-430,91 S.Ct. 849, 852-853, 28 L.Ed.2d 158. Rather thanlimiting Title VII principles and objectives, thePDA extends them to cover pregnancy. Section12945(b)(2) also promotes equal employment op-portunity. By requiring employers to reinstate wo-men after a reasonable *273 pregnancy disabilityleave, it ensures that they will not lose their jobs onaccount of pregnancy. Pp. 691-695.

(b) Section 12945(b)(2) does not prevent employersfrom complying with both the federal law (as con-strued by petitioners to reject California's “specialtreatment” approach to pregnancy discriminationand to forbid an employer to treat pregnant employ-ees any differently than other disabled employees)and the state law. This is not a case where compli-ance with both the federal and state laws is a phys-ical impossibility. Section 12945(b)(2) does notcompel employers to treat pregnant employees bet-ter than other disabled employees; it merely estab-lishes benefits that employers must, at a minimum,provide to pregnant workers. Pp. 694-695.

Justice MARSHALL, joined by Justice BREN-NAN, Justice BLACKMUN, and JusticeO'CONNOR, concluded in Part III-A that both §§708 and 1104 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964severely limit Title VII's pre-emptive effect byleaving state fair employment laws where they werebefore Title VII was enacted. Pp. 689-691.

Justice STEVENS concluded that, for purposes ofholding that § 12945(b)(2) is not pre-empted byTitle VII, it is not necessary to reach the questionwhether § 1104 applies to Title VII or whether §708 is the only provision governing Title VII's pre-emptive scope. P. 696, n. 1.

Justice SCALIA concluded that the only provisionwhose effect on pre-emption need be considered is§ 708 of Title VII, **686 which prohibits pre-emption unless a state law requires or permits the



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doing of an act outlawed by the PDA. Because §12945(b)(2) does not require or permit the doing ofan act outlawed under any interpretation of thePDA, it is not pre-empted. Accordingly it is unne-cessary to decide how the PDA should be inter-preted. Pp. 696-697.

MARSHALL, J., announced the judgment of theCourt and delivered the opinion of the Court withrespect to Parts I, II, III-B, III-C, and IV, in whichBRENNAN, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, andO'CONNOR, JJ., joined, and an opinion with re-spect to Part III-A, in which BRENNAN, BLACK-MUN, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J.,filed an opinion concurring in part and concurringin the judgment, post, p. ---. SCALIA, J., filed anopinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. ---.WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in whichREHNQUIST, C.J., and POWELL, J., joined, post,p. ---.Theodore B. Olson argued the cause for petitioners.With him on the briefs were Willard Z. Carr, Jr.,Pamela L. Hemminger, Paul Blankenstein, and JanE. Eakins.

*274 Marian M. Johnston, Deputy Attorney Gener-al of California, argued the cause for respondents.With her on the brief were John K. Van de Kamp,Attorney General, Andrea Sheridan Ordin, ChiefAssistant Attorney General, and M. Anne Jenningsand Beverly Tucker, Deputy Attorneys General.*

* Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filedfor the United States by Solicitor General Fried,Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, Deputy Soli-citor General Geller, Deputy Assistant AttorneyGeneral Carvin, Richard J. Lazarus, Brian K.Landsberg, David K. Flynn, and Mary E. Mann;and for the Equal Employment Advisory Councilby Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, andLorence L. Kessler.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filedfor the State of Connecticut et al. by Joseph I.Lieberman, Attorney General of Connecticut, Clar-ine Nardi Riddle, Deputy Attorney General, Brian

J. Comerford, Assistant Attorney General, Philip A.Murphy, Jr., Corinne K.A. Watanabe, AttorneyGeneral of Hawaii, Michael Greely, Attorney Gen-eral of Montana, and Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Attor-ney General of Washington; for the American Fed-eration of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organ-izations by Laurence Gold and Marsha S. Berzon;for California Women Lawyers et al. by CherylHouser, Janet M. Koehn, and Lorraine L. Loder;for Equal Rights Advocates et al. by Judith E. Kur-tz, Nancy L. Davis, and Herma Hill Kay; for Hu-man Rights Advocates et al. by Richard F. Zieglerand Andrew Weissmann; for the National Confer-ence of State Legislatures et al. by Benna Ruth So-lomon, Todd D. Peterson, and Barbara E. Etkind;and for Lillian Garland by Joan M. Graff, RobertBarnes, and Patricia Shiu.

Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the AmericanCivil Liberties Union et al. by Joan E. Bertin, Isa-belle Katz Pinzler, George Kannar, and Charles S.Sims; for the Chamber of Commerce of the UnitedStates by Robin S. Conrad; for the Coalition forReproductive Equality in the Workplace et al. byChristine Anne Littleton and Judith Resnik; and forthe National Organization for Women et al. bySusan Deller Ross, Sarah E. Burns, and WendyWebster Williams.

Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of theCourt.

The question presented is whether Title VII of theCivil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Preg-nancy Discrimination Act of 1978, pre-empts astate statute that requires*275 employers to provideleave and reinstatement to employees disabled bypregnancy.

I

California's Fair Employment and Housing Act(FEHA), Cal.Gov't Code Ann. § 12900 et seq.(West 1980 and Supp.1986), is a comprehensivestatute that prohibits discrimination in employment





and housing. In September 1978, Californiaamended the FEHA to proscribe certain forms ofemployment discrimination on the basis of preg-nancy. See Cal.Labor Code Ann. § 1420.35, 1978Cal.Stats., ch. 1321, § 1, pp. 4320-4322 (WestSupp.1979), now codified at Cal.Gov't Code Ann. §12945(b)(2) (West 1980).FN1 Subdivision(b)(2)-the provision at issue here-is the only portionof the statute that applies to employers subject toTitle VII. See *276 § 12945(e). FN2 It requiresthese employers to provide female **687 employ-ees an unpaid pregnancy disability leave of up tofour months. Respondent Fair Employment andHousing Commission, the state agency authorizedto interpret the FEHA,FN3 has construed §12945(b)(2) to require California employers to rein-state an employee returning from such pregnancyleave to the job she previously held, unless it is nolonger available due to business necessity. In thelatter case, the employer must make a reasonable,good-faith effort to place the employee in a sub-stantially similar job.FN4 The statute does not com-pel employers to provide paid leave to pregnantemployees. Accordingly, the only benefit pregnantworkers actually derive from § 12945(b)(2) is aqualified right to reinstatement.

FN1. Section 12945(b)(2) provides, in rel-evant part:

“It shall be an unlawful employmentpractice unless based upon a bona fideoccupational qualification:

“(b) For any employer to refuse to allow afemale employee affected by pregnancy,childbirth, or related medical conditions....

“(2) To take a leave on account of preg-nancy for a reasonable period of time;provided, such period shall not exceed fourmonths.... Reasonable period of timemeans that period during which the femaleemployee is disabled on account of preg-

nancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-tions....

“An employer may require any employ-ee who plans to take a leave pursuant tothis section to give reasonable notice ofthe date such leave shall commence andthe estimated duration of such leave.”

Originally, the statute was intended toreverse, as to California employers, therule established by this Court's decisionin General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429U.S. 125, 97 S.Ct. 401, 50 L.Ed.2d 343(1976). At the time, California law pro-hibited school districts from discriminat-ing on the basis of pregnancy, see formerCal. Labor Code Ann. § 1420.2 (1977),now codified at Cal. Gov't Code Ann. §12943 (West 1980). The first version of§ 12945 simply imposed this require-ment on all California employers withfive or more employees. As a result ofemployer opposition, however, themeasure was changed to its present form.

FN2. Aware that legislation on this subjectwas pending before Congress, the state le-gislature added the following section:

“In the event Congress enacts legislationamending Title VII of the Civil RightsAct of 1964 to prohibit sex discrimina-tion on the basis of pregnancy, the provi-sions of this act, except paragraph (2) ofsubdivision (b) ... shall be inapplicableto any employer subject to such federallaw....” 1978 Cal. Stats., ch. 1321, § 4, p.4322.

When Congress passed the PregnancyDiscrimination Act of 1978, this sectionrendered the state law, except subdivi-sion (b)(2), invalid as applied to all em-ployers covered by Title VII. Californiasubsequently adopted subdivision (e),















which provides:

“The provisions of this section, exceptparagraph (2) of subdivision (b), shall beinapplicable to any employer subject toTitle VII of the federal Civil Rights Actof 1964.”

FN3. See Cal. Gov't Code Ann. §§12935(a)(1) and 12935(h) (West 1980).Respondent Department of Fair Employ-ment and Housing is the state agencycharged with enforcing the FEHA. See §12930.

FN4. The parties have stipulated that theCommission's interpretation of §12945(b)(2) is set forth in its proposed reg-ulation as reproduced in App. 47. See alsoMatter of Accusation of Department ofFair Employment and Housing v. TravelExpress, Case No. FEP 80-81 A7-0992sN18709 83-17 (Aug. 4, 1983) (precedentialCommission decision construing §12945(b)(2)).

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e et seq., also prohibits various forms of em-ployment *277 discrimination, including discrimin-ation on the basis of sex. However, in GeneralElectric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 97 S.Ct. 401,50 L.Ed.2d 343 (1976), this Court ruled that dis-crimination on the basis of pregnancy was not sexdiscrimination under Title VII.FN5 In response tothe Gilbert decision, Congress passed the Preg-nancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), 42U.S.C. § 2000e(k). The PDA specifies that sex dis-crimination includes discrimination on the basis ofpregnancy.FN6

FN5. In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,the Court held that an otherwise compre-hensive disability insurance plan did notviolate Title VII because it failed to coverpregnancy-related disabilities. Relying onGeduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 94 S.Ct.

2485, 41 L.Ed.2d 256 (1974), which up-held a similar plan against a FourteenthAmendment equal protection challenge,the Court concluded that removing preg-nancy from the list of compensable disabil-ities was not discrimination on the basis ofsex. 429 U.S., at 133-136, 97 S.Ct., at406-408. The Court further held that “[a]sthere is no proof that the package is in factworth more to men than to women, it isimpossible to find any gender-based dis-criminatory effect in this scheme....” Id., at138, 97 S.Ct., at 409.

Three Members of the Court dissented.See id., at 146, 97 S.Ct. at 413 (opinionof BRENNAN, J., joined by MAR-SHALL, J.); id., at 160, 97 S.Ct., at 420(opinion of STEVENS, J.). The dissent-ing Justices would have held that theemployer's disability plan discriminatedon the basis of sex by giving men protec-tion for all categories of risk but givingwomen only partial protection.

In Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S.136, 143-146, 98 S.Ct. 347, 352-353, 54L.Ed.2d 356 (1977), the Court relied onGilbert to uphold an employer's sick-leave policy that excluded pregnancy.

FN6. The PDA added subsection (k) to §701, the definitional section of Title VII.Subsection (k) provides, in relevant part:

“The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on thebasis of sex’ include, but are not limitedto, because of or on the basis of preg-nancy, childbirth, or related medicalconditions; and women affected by preg-nancy, childbirth, or related medicalconditions shall be treated the same forall employment-related purposes, includ-ing receipt of benefits under fringe bene-fit programs, as other persons not so af-fected but similar in their ability or inab-






























ility to work, and nothing in section703(h) of this title shall be interpreted topermit otherwise.”

The legislative history of the PDA re-flects Congress' approval of the views ofthe dissenters in Gilbert. See NewportNews Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678-679, 103 S.Ct.2622, 2628, 77 L.Ed.2d 89 and nn. 15-17(1983) (citing legislative history).

*278 II

Petitioner California Federal Savings & Loan Asso-ciation (Cal Fed) is a federally chartered savingsand loan association based in Los Angeles; it is anemployer covered by both Title VII and §12945(b)(2). Cal Fed has a facially neutral leavepolicy that permits employees who have completedthree months of service to take unpaid leaves of ab-sence for a variety of reasons, **688 including dis-ability and pregnancy. Although it is Cal Fed'spolicy to try to provide an employee taking unpaidleave with a similar position upon returning, CalFed expressly reserves the right to terminate an em-ployee who has taken a leave of absence if a similarposition is not available.

Lillian Garland was employed by Cal Fed as a re-ceptionist for several years. In January 1982, shetook a pregnancy disability leave. When she wasable to return to work in April of that year, Garlandnotified Cal Fed, but was informed that her job hadbeen filled and that there were no receptionist orsimilar positions available. Garland filed a com-plaint with respondent Department of Fair Employ-ment and Housing, which issued an administrativeaccusation against Cal Fed on her behalf.FN7 Re-spondent charged Cal Fed with violating §12945(b)(2) of the FEHA. Prior to the scheduledhearing before respondent Fair Employment andHousing Commission, Cal Fed, joined by petition-ers Merchants and Manufacturers Association andthe California Chamber of Commerce,FN8 broughtthis action in the United States District Court for

the Central District of California.

*279 They sought a declaration that § 12945(b)(2)is inconsistent with and pre-empted by Title VIIand an injunction against enforcement of the sec-tion.FN9 The District Court granted petitioners'motion for summary judgment. 33 EPD ¶ 34,227, p.32781, 34 FEP Cases 562 (1984). Citing NewportNews Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462U.S. 669, 103 S.Ct. 2622, 77 L.Ed.2d 89 (1983),FN10 the court stated that “California employerswho comply with state law are subject to reversediscrimination suits under Title VII brought by tem-porarily disabled males who do not receive thesame treatment as female employees disabled bypregnancy....” 34 FEP Cases, at 568. On this basis,the District Court held that “California state lawand the policies of interpretation and enforcement... which require preferential treatment of femaleemployees disabled by pregnancy, childbirth, or re-lated medical conditions are pre-empted by TitleVII and are null, void, invalid and inoperative un-der the Supremacy Clause of the United States Con-stitution.” Ibid.FN11

FN7. Cal Fed reinstated Garland in a re-ceptionist position in November 1982, sev-en months after she first notified it that shewas able to return to work.

FN8. Petitioner Merchants and Manufac-turers Association is a trade associationthat represents numerous employersthroughout the State of California. Peti-tioner California Chamber of Commercealso represents many California busi-nesses. Both organizations have membersthat are subject to both Title VII and §12945(b)(2) and have disability-leavepolicies similar to Cal Fed's.

FN9. Petitioners' complaint also allegedthat the California disability-leave statutewas pre-empted by § 514(a) of the Em-ployee Retirement Income Security Act(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). The parties






















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stipulated that petitioners' ERISA claimwould be dismissed without prejudice.App. 9-10, nn. 1, 2.

FN10. In Newport News, the Court evalu-ated a health insurance plan that providedfemale employees with benefits for preg-nancy-related conditions to the same extentas for other medical conditions, butprovided less extensive pregnancy benefitsfor spouses of male employees. The Courtfound that this limitation discriminatedagainst male employees with respect to thecompensation, terms, conditions, or priv-ileges of their employment in violation of§ 703(a)(1) of Title VII. “The 1978 Act[the PDA] makes clear that it is discrimin-atory to treat pregnancy-related conditionsless favorably than other conditions. Thuspetitioner's plan unlawfully gives marriedmale employees a benefit package for theirdependents that is less inclusive than thedependency coverage provided to marriedfemale employees.” 462 U.S., at 684, 103S.Ct., at 2631.

FN11. After the District Court entered itsjudgment, Garland moved to intervene pur-suant to Fed.Rule of Civ.Proc. 24(a)(2).The District Court denied her motion onseveral grounds: untimeliness, lack of a“direct and substantial” interest in the litig-ation, and inadequate representation of herinterests by defendants. Her appeal fromthe order denying intervention was consol-idated with the appeal on the merits. In anunreported order, the Court of Appeals forthe Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of in-tervention; Garland did not seek review ofthat decision here.

*280 **689 The United States Court of Appeals forthe Ninth Circuit reversed. 758 F.2d 390 (1985). Itheld that “the district court's conclusion that section12945(b)(2) discriminates against men on the basisof pregnancy defies common sense, misinterprets

case law, and flouts Title VII and the PDA.” Id., at393 (footnote omitted). Based on its own reading ofNewport News, the Court of Appeals found that thePDA does not “demand that state law be blind topregnancy's existence.” 758 F.2d, at 395. The courtheld that in enacting the PDA Congress intended“to construct a floor beneath which pregnancy dis-ability benefits may not drop-not a ceiling abovewhich they may not rise.” Id., at 396. Because itfound that the California statute furthers the goal ofequal employment opportunity for women, theCourt of Appeals concluded: “Title VII does notpreempt a state law that guarantees pregnant wo-men a certain number of pregnancy disability leavedays, because this is neither inconsistent with, norunlawful under, Title VII.” Ibid.

We granted certiorari, 474 U.S. 1049, 106 S.Ct.783, 88 L.Ed.2d 762 (1986), and we now affirm.

III

A

[1][2] In determining whether a state statute is pre-empted by federal law and therefore invalid underthe Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, our soletask is to ascertain the intent of Congress. See Shawv. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95, 103 S.Ct.2890, 2898, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983); Malone v.White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504, 98 S.Ct.1185, 1189, 55 L.Ed.2d 443 (1978). Federal lawmay supersede state law in several different ways.First, when acting within constitutional limits, Con-gress is empowered to pre-empt state law by sostating in express terms. E.g., Jones v. Rath Pack-ing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 1309, 51L.Ed.2d 604 (1977). Second, congressional intent*281 to pre-empt state law in a particular area maybe inferred where the scheme of federal regulationis sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonablethe inference that Congress “left no room” for sup-plementary state regulation. Rice v. Santa Fe Elev-ator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152,





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91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947). Neither of these bases forpre-emption exists in this case. Congress has expli-citly disclaimed any intent categorically to pre-empt state law or to “occupy the field” of employ-ment discrimination law. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-7and 2000h-4.

[3][4] As a third alternative, in those areas whereCongress has not completely displaced state regula-tion, federal law may nonetheless pre-empt statelaw to the extent it actually conflicts with federallaw. Such a conflict occurs either because“compliance with both federal and state regulationsis a physical impossibility,” Florida Lime & Avo-cado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143,83 S.Ct. 1210, 1217, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963), or be-cause the state law stands “as an obstacle to the ac-complishment and execution of the full purposesand objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz,312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 404, 85 L.Ed. 581(1941). See Michigan Canners & Freezers Assn.,Inc. v. Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Bd.,467 U.S. 461, 478, 104 S.Ct. 2518, 2527, 81L.Ed.2d 399 (1984); Fidelity Federal Savings &Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 156, 102S.Ct. 3014, 3024, 73 L.Ed.2d 664 (1982). Neverthe-less, pre-emption is not to be lightly presumed. SeeMaryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746, 101S.Ct. 2114, 2128, 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981).

This third basis for pre-emption is at issue in thiscase. In two sections of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,§§ 708 and 1104, Congress has indicated that statelaws will be pre-empted only if they actually con-flict with federal law. Section 708 of Title VIIprovides:

“Nothing in this title shall be deemed to ex-empt or relieve any person from any liability,duty, penalty, or punishment provided by anypresent or future law of **690 any State or polit-ical subdivision of a State, other than any suchlaw which purports to require or permit the doingof any act which would be an unlawful employ-ment *282 practice under this title.” 78 Stat. 262,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7.

Section 1104 of Title XI, applicable to all titles ofthe Civil Rights Act, establishes the followingstandard for pre-emption:

“Nothing contained in any title of this Act shallbe construed as indicating an intent on the part ofCongress to occupy the field in which any suchtitle operates to the exclusion of State laws on thesame subject matter, nor shall any provision ofthis Act be construed as invalidating any provi-sion of State law unless such provision is incon-sistent with any of the purposes of this Act, orany provision thereof.” 78 Stat. 268, 42 U.S.C. §2000h-4.

Accordingly, there is no need to infer congressionalintent to pre-empt state laws from the substantiveprovisions of Title VII; these two sections provide a“reliable indicium of congressional intent with re-spect to state authority” to regulate employmentpractice. Malone v. White Motor Corp., supra, 435U.S. at 505, 98 S.Ct., at 1190.

[5] Sections 708 and 1104 severely limit Title VII'spre-emptive effect. Instead of pre-empting state fairemployment laws, § 708 “ ‘simply left them wherethey were before the enactment of title VII.’ ” Shawv. Delta Air Lines, Inc., supra, 463 U.S., at 103, n.24 103 S.Ct., at 2903, n. 24 (quoting Pervel Indus-tries, Inc. v. Connecticut Comm'n on Human Rightsand Opportunities, 468 F.Supp. 490, 493(Conn.1978), affirmance order, 603 F.2d 214 (CA21979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1031, 100 S.Ct. 701,62 L.Ed.2d 667 (1980)). Similarly, § 1104 was in-tended primarily to “assert the intention of Con-gress to preserve existing civil rights laws.” 110Cong.Rec. 2788 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Meader).See also H.R.Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.,59 (1963), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1964,pp. 2355 (additional views of Rep. Meader).FN12

The narrow scope of pre-emption*283 available un-der §§ 708 and 1104 reflects the importance Con-gress attached to state antidiscrimination laws inachieving Title VII's goal of equal employment op-portunity. See generally Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,Inc., 463 U.S., at 101-102, 103 S.Ct., at 2902; Kre-

















































mer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461,468-469, 472, 477, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1890-1891,1892, 1895, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982); New York Gas-light Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 63-65, 100S.Ct. 2024, 2030-2031, 64 L.Ed.2d 723 (1980).FN13 The legislative history of the PDA also sup-ports a narrow interpretation of these provisions,FN14 as does **691 our opinion in Shaw v. DeltaAir Lines, Inc., supra.FN15

FN12. Representative Meader, one of thesponsors of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, pro-posed the precursor to § 1104 as an amend-ment to the Civil Rights Act, see 110Cong.Rec. 2788 (1964), because he fearedthat § 708 and similar provisions in othertitles were “wholly inadequate to preservethe validity and force of State laws aimedat discrimination.” H.R.Rep. No. 914, 88thCong., 1st Sess., 59 (1963), U.S. CodeCong. & Admin. News 1964, p. 2428(additional views of Rep. Meader). Hisversion provided that state laws would notbe pre-empted “except to the extent thatthere is a direct and positive conflictbetween such provisions so that the twocannot be reconciled or consistently standtogether.” 110 Cong. Rec. 2787 (1964).The version ultimately adopted by Con-gress was a substitute offered by Repres-entative Mathias without objection fromRepresentative Meader. Id., at 2789. Thereis no indication that this substitutionaltered the basic thrust of § 1104.

FN13. For example, where state or locallaw prohibits an employment practice, §706(c) requires deferral of federal enforce-ment until state or local officials have anopportunity “to act under such State or loc-al law to remedy the practice alleged.” §2000e-5(d).

FN14. See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 95-331, p. 3,n. 1 (1977) (state laws prohibiting discrim-ination on the basis of pregnancy would

not be pre-empted, “[s]ince title VII doesnot pre-empt State laws which would notrequire violating title VII”), LegislativeHistory of the Pregnancy DiscriminationAct of 1978, p. 40 (1980) (CommitteePrint prepared for the Senate Committeeon Labor and Human Resources)(hereinafter Leg. Hist.); 123 Cong. Rec.29643 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Williams)(state laws that create a “clear conflict”would be pre-empted).

FN15. In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,463 U.S., at 100-104, 103 S.Ct., at2901-2903, we concluded that Title VIIdid not pre-empt a New York statute whichproscribed discrimination on the basis ofpregnancy as sex discrimination at a timewhen Title VII did not equate the two.

In order to decide whether the California statute re-quires or permits employers to violate Title VII, asamended by the PDA, or is inconsistent with thepurposes of the statute, we *284 must determinewhether the PDA prohibits the States from requir-ing employers to provide reinstatement to pregnantworkers, regardless of their policy for disabledworkers generally.

B

Petitioners argue that the language of the federalstatute itself unambiguously rejects California's“special treatment” approach to pregnancy discrim-ination, thus rendering any resort to the legislativehistory unnecessary. They contend that the secondclause of the PDA forbids an employer to treatpregnant employees any differently than other dis-abled employees. Because “ ‘[t]he purpose of Con-gress is the ultimate touchstone’ ” of the pre-emption inquiry, Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435U.S., at 504, 98 S.Ct., at 1189 (quoting RetailClerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103, 84 S.Ct.219, 222, 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963)), however, wemust examine the PDA's language against the back-






















ground of its legislative history and historical con-text. As to the language of the PDA, “[i]t is a‘familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letterof the statute and yet not within the statute, becausenot within its spirit, nor within the intention of itsmakers.’ ” Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,201, 99 S.Ct. 2721, 2726, 61 L.Ed.2d 480 (1979)(quoting Church of the Holy Trinity v. UnitedStates, 143 U.S. 457, 459, 12 S.Ct. 511, 512, 36L.Ed. 226 (1892)). See Train v. Colorado PublicInterest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 10, 96S.Ct. 1938, 1942, 48 L.Ed.2d 434 (1976); UnitedStates v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U.S.534, 543-544, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 1063-1064, 84 L.Ed.1345 (1940).

[6] It is well established that the PDA was passed inreaction to this Court's decision in General ElectricCo. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 97 S.Ct. 401, 50L.Ed.2d 343 (1976). “When Congress amendedTitle VII in 1978, it unambiguously expressed itsdisapproval of both the holding and the reasoningof the Court in the Gilbert decision.” Newport NewsShipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S.,at 678, 103 S.Ct., at 2628. By adding pregnancy tothe definition of sex discrimination prohibited byTitle VII, the first clause of the PDA reflects Con-gress' disapproval of the reasoning in *285Gilbert.Newport News, supra, at 678-679, and n. 17, 103S.Ct., at 2628, and n. 17 (citing legislative history).Rather than imposing a limitation on the remedialpurpose of the PDA, we believe that the secondclause was intended to overrule the holding in Gil-bert and to illustrate how discrimination againstpregnancy is to be remedied. Cf. 462 U.S., at 678,n. 14, 103 S.Ct., at 2628, n. 14 (“The meaning ofthe first clause is not limited by the specific lan-guage in the second clause, which explains the ap-plication of the general principle to women employ-ees”); see also id., at 688, 103 S.Ct., at 2633(REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).FN16 Accordingly,subject to certain limitations,FN17 we agree withthe Court of Appeals' conclusion that Congress in-tended the PDA to be “a floor beneath which preg-nancy disability benefits may not drop-not a ceiling

above which they may not rise.” 758 F.2d, at 396.

FN16. Several commentators have con-strued the second clause of the PDA in thisway. See, e.g., Note, Employment EqualityUnder The Pregnancy Discrimination Actof 1978, 94 Yale L.J. 929, 937 (1985);Note, Sexual Equality Under the Preg-nancy Discrimination Act, 83Colum.L.Rev. 690, 696, and n. 26 (1983).

FN17. For example, a State could not man-date special treatment of pregnant workersbased on stereotypes or generalizationsabout their needs and abilities. See infra, at694-695.

**692 The context in which Congress consideredthe issue of pregnancy discrimination supports thisview of the PDA. Congress had before it extensiveevidence of discrimination against pregnancy, par-ticularly in disability and health insurance programslike those challenged in Gilbert and Nashville GasCo. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 98 S.Ct. 347, 54 L.Ed.2d356 (1977).FN18 The Reports, debates, and hear-ings make abundantly clear that Congress *286 in-tended the PDA to provide relief for working wo-men and to end discrimination against pregnantworkers.FN19 In contrast to the thorough accountof discrimination against pregnant workers, the le-gislative history is devoid of any discussion of pref-erential treatment of pregnancy, FN20 beyond ac-knowledgments of the existence of state statutesproviding for such preferential treatment. See infrathis page. Opposition to the PDA came from thoseconcerned with the cost of including pregnancy inhealth and disability-benefit plans and the applica-tion of the bill to abortion, FN21 not from thosewho favored special accommodation of pregnancy.

FN18. See Discrimination on the Basis ofPregnancy, 1977, Hearings on S. 995 be-fore the Subcommittee on Labor of theSenate Committee on Human Resources,95th Cong., 1st Sess., 31-33 (1977)(statement of Vice Chairman, Equal Em-

















































ployment Opportunity Commission, EthelBent Walsh); id., at 113-117 (statement ofWendy W. Williams); id., at 117-121(statement of Susan Deller Ross); id., at307-310 (statement of Bella S. Abzug).See also Legislation to Prohibit Sex Dis-crimination on the Basis of Pregnancy,Hearings on H.R. 5055 and H.R. 6075 be-fore the Subcommittee on EmploymentOpportunities of the House Committee onEducation and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.(1977).

FN19. See, e.g., 123 Cong. Rec. 8144(1977) (remarks of Sen. Bayh) (legislation“will end employment discriminationagainst pregnant workers”); 124 Cong.Rec.21440 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Chisholm)(bill “affords some 41 percent of this Na-tion's labor force some greater degree ofprotection and security without fear of re-prisal due to their decision to bear chil-dren”); id., at 21442 (remarks of Rep.Tsongas) (bill “would put an end to an un-realistic and unfair system that forces wo-men to choose between family and career-clearly a function of sex bias in the law”);id., at 36818 (remarks of Sen. Javits) (the“bill represents only basic fairness for wo-men employees”); id., at 38574 (remarksof Rep. Sarasin) (Subcommittee “learnedof the many instances of discriminationagainst pregnant workers, as we learned ofthe hardships this discrimination broughtto women and their families”).

FN20. The statement of Senator Brooke,quoted in the dissent, post, at 699, merelyindicates the Senator's view that the PDAdoes not itself require special disability be-nefits for pregnant workers. It in no waysupports the conclusion that Congress in-tended to prohibit the States from provid-ing such benefits for pregnant workers. Seen. 29, infra.

FN21. See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 95-331, p. 9(1977), Leg. Hist. 46 (discussing cost ob-jections), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, pp. 4749, 4765;H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 95-1786, pp. 3-4(1978), Leg.Hist. 196-197 (application ofthe PDA to abortion).

[7] In support of their argument that the PDA pro-hibits employment practices that favor pregnantwomen, petitioners and several amici cite state-ments in the legislative history to the effect that thePDA does not require employers to extend any be-nefits to pregnant women that they do not alreadyprovide to other disabled employees. For example,the House Report explained that the proposed legis-lation “does not require*287 employers to treatpregnant employees in any particular manner....H.R. 6075 in no way requires the institution of anynew programs where none currently exist.” FN22

We do not interpret these references to support peti-tioners' construction of the statute. On the contrary,if Congress had intended to prohibit preferentialtreatment, it would have been the height of under-statement to say only that the legislation would notrequire such conduct. It is hardly conceivable thatCongress would have extensively discussed only itsintent not to require preferential treatment if in factit had intended to prohibit such treatment.

FN22. H.R.Rep. No. 95-948, p. 4 (1978),Leg. Hist. 150, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, pp. 4749, 4752. See alsoS.Rep. No. 95-331, supra, at 4, Leg.Hist.41; 123 Cong.Rec. 7540 (1977) (remarksof Sen. Williams); id., at 10582 (remarksof Rep. Hawkins); id., at 29387 (remarksof Sen. Javits); id., at 29664 (remarks ofSen. Brooke).

**693 We also find it significant that Congress wasaware of state laws similar to California's but ap-parently did not consider them inconsistent with thePDA. In the debates and Reports on the bill, Con-gress repeatedly acknowledged the existence ofstate antidiscrimination laws that prohibit sex dis-








crimination on the basis of pregnancy.FN23 Two ofthe States mentioned then required employers toprovide reasonable leave to pregnant workers.FN24

After citing these state laws, *288 Congress failedto evince the requisite “clear and manifest purpose”to supersede them. See Pacific Gas & Electric Co.v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Devel-opment Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 206, 103 S.Ct.1713, 1723, 75 L.Ed.2d 752 (1983). To the con-trary, both the House and Senate Reports suggestthat these laws would continue to have effect underthe PDA.FN25

FN23. See, e.g., id., at 29387 (remarks ofSen. Javits), Leg. Hist. 67 (“[S]everal statelegislatures ... have chosen to address theproblem by mandating certain types of be-nefits for pregnant employees”). See alsoS.Rep. No. 95-331, supra, at 3, Leg.Hist.40; H.R.Rep. No. 95-948, supra, at 10-11,Leg. Hist. 156-157; 123 Cong.Rec. 29648(1977) (list of States that require coveragefor pregnancy and pregnancy-related dis-abilities); id., at 29662 (remarks of Sen.Williams).

FN24. See, e.g., Conn.Gen.Stat. §31-126(g) (1977), now codified at §46a-60(a)(7) (1985); Mont.Rev.Codes §41-2602 (Smith Supp.1977), now codifiedat Mont. Code Ann. §§ 49-2-310 and49-2-311 (1986). The Connecticut statuteprovided, in relevant part:

“It shall be an unfair employment prac-tice

“(g) For an employer ... (ii) to refuse togrant to [a pregnant] employee a reason-able leave of absence for disability result-ing from such pregnancy.... (iii) Upon sig-nifying her intent to return, such employeeshall be reinstated to her original job or toan equivalent position with equivalent payand accumulated seniority, retirement,

fringe benefits and other service creditsunless, in the case of a private employer,the employer's circumstances have sochanged as to make it impossible or un-reasonable to do so.” Conn.Gen.Stat. §31-126(g) (1977).

The Montana statute in effect in 1977was virtually identical. Both have beenrecodified in current statutory compila-tions, but the leave and reinstatement re-quirements are unchanged. See alsoMass.Gen.Laws § 149:105D (1985)(providing up to eight weeks maternityleave).

The dissent suggests that the referencesto the Connecticut and Montana statutesshould be disregarded, because Congressdid not expressly state that it understoodthat “these statutes required anythingmore than equal treatment.” Post, at 700.However, we are not as willing as thedissent to impute ignorance to Congress.Where Congress has cited these statutesin the House and Senate Reports on thePDA, we think it fair to assume that itwas aware of their substantive provi-sions.

FN25. For example, the Senate Reportstates: “Since title VII does not pre-emptState laws which would not require violat-ing title VII ..., these States would contin-ue to be able to enforce their State laws ifthe bill were enacted.” S.Rep. No. 95-331,supra, at 3, n. 1, Leg.Hist. 40.

[8] Title VII, as amended by the PDA, and Califor-nia's pregnancy disability leave statute share a com-mon goal. The purpose of Title VII is “to achieveequality of employment opportunities and removebarriers that have operated in the past to favor anidentifiable group of ... employees over other em-ployees.” Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,429-430, 91 S.Ct. 849, 852-853, 28 L.Ed.2d 158













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(1971). See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S.69, 75, n. 7, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2234, n. 7, 81 L.Ed.2d59 (1984); Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.,424 U.S. 747, 763, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1263, 47 L.Ed.2d444 (1976); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415U.S. 36, 44, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1017, 39 L.Ed.2d 147(1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411U.S. 792, 800, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1823, 36 L.Ed.2d 668(1973). Rather than limiting existing Title VII prin-ciples and objectives, the PDA extends *289 themto cover pregnancy.FN26 As Senator Williams, asponsor of the Act, stated: “The entire thrust ... be-hind this legislation is to guarantee women the ba-sic right to participate fully and equally in theworkforce, without denying **694 them the funda-mental right to full participation in family life.” 123Cong.Rec. 29658 (1977).

FN26. “Proponents of the bill repeatedlyemphasized that the Supreme Court had er-roneously interpreted congressional intentand that the amending legislation was ne-cessary to reestablish the principles ofTitle VII law as they had been understoodprior to the Gilbert decision.” NewportNews Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.EEOC, 462 U.S., at 679, 103 S.Ct., at 2628.

Section 12945(b)(2) also promotes equal employ-ment opportunity. By requiring employers to rein-state women after a reasonable pregnancy disabilityleave, § 12945(b)(2) ensures that they will not losetheir jobs on account of pregnancy disability.FN27

California's approach is consistent with the dissent-ing opinion of JUSTICE BRENNAN in GeneralElectric Co. v. Gilbert, which Congress adopted inenacting the PDA. Referring to Lau v. Nichols, 414U.S. 563, 94 S.Ct. 786, 39 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974), a TitleVI decision, JUSTICE BRENNAN stated:

FN27. As authoritatively construed by re-spondent Commission, the provision will“insure that women affected by pregnancy,childbirth or related medical conditionshave equal employment opportunities as

persons not so affected.” California FairEmployment and Housing Commission'sProposed Regulation, see App. 49.

“[D]iscrimination is a social phenomenon en-cased in a social context and, therefore, unavoid-ably takes its meaning from the desired endproducts of the relevant legislative enactment,end products that may demand due considerationof the uniqueness of the ‘disadvantaged’ indi-viduals. A realistic understanding of conditionsfound in today's labor environment warrants tak-ing pregnancy into account in fashioning disabil-ity policies.” 429 U.S., at 159, 97 S.Ct., at 419(footnote omitted).By “taking pregnancy into account,” California'spregnancy disability-leave statute allows women,as well as men, to have families without losingtheir jobs.

*290 We emphasize the limited nature of the bene-fits § 12945(b)(2) provides. The statute is narrowlydrawn to cover only the period of actual physicaldisability on account of pregnancy, childbirth, orrelated medical conditions. Accordingly, unlike theprotective labor legislation prevalent earlier in thiscentury,FN28 § 12945(b)(2) does not reflect archa-ic or stereotypical notions about pregnancy and theabilities of pregnant workers. A statute based onsuch stereotypical assumptions would, of course, beinconsistent with Title VII's goal of equal employ-ment opportunity. See, e.g., Los Angeles Dept. ofWater and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 709,98 S.Ct. 1370, 1375, 55 L.Ed.2d 657 (1978); Phil-lips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545,91 S.Ct. 496, 498, 27 L.Ed.2d 613 (1971)(MARSHALL, J., concurring).

FN28. See generally B. Brown, A. Freed-man, H. Katz, & A. Price, Women's Rightsand the Law 209-210 (1977). In the consti-tutional context, we have invalidated onequal protection grounds statutes designed“to exclude or ‘protect’ members of onegender because they are presumed to sufferfrom an inherent handicap or to be innately




































inferior.” Mississippi University for Wo-men v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725, 102S.Ct. 3331, 3336, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982).

C

[9] Moreover, even if we agreed with petitioners'construction of the PDA, we would nonetheless re-ject their argument that the California statute re-quires employers to violate Title VII. FN29 Section12945(b)(2) does not prevent employers from *291complying with both the federal law (as petitionersconstrue it) and the state law. This is not a casewhere “compliance with both federal and state reg-ulations is a physical impossibility,” Florida Lime& Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S., at142-143, 83 S.Ct., at 1217, or **695 where there isan “inevitable collision between the two schemes ofregulation.” Id., at 143, 83 S.Ct., at 1217.FN30 Sec-tion 12945(b)(2) does not compel California em-ployers to treat pregnant workers better than otherdisabled employees; it merely establishes benefitsthat employers must, at a minimum, provide topregnant workers. Employers are free to give com-parable benefits to other disabled employees,thereby treating “women affected by pregnancy” nobetter than “other persons not so affected but simil-ar in their ability or inability to work.” Indeed, atoral argument, petitioners conceded that compli-ance with both statutes “is theoretically possible.”Tr. of Oral Arg. 6.

FN29. Petitioners assert that even if §12945(b)(2) does not require employers totreat pregnant employees differently fromother disabled employees, it permits em-ployers to do so because it does not spe-cifically prohibit different treatment. Ofcourse, since the PDA does not itself pro-hibit different treatment, it certainly doesnot require the States to do so. Moreover,if we were to interpret the term “permit” asexpansively as petitioners suggest, theState would be required to incorporateevery prohibition contained in Title VII in-

to its state law, since it would otherwise beheld to “permit” any employer action it didnot expressly prohibit. We conclude that“permit” in § 708 must be interpreted topre-empt only those state laws that ex-pressly sanction a practice unlawful underTitle VII; the term does not pre-empt statelaws that are silent on the practice.

FN30. Indeed, Congress and the CaliforniaLegislature were each aware in generalterms of the regulatory scheme adopted bythe other when they enacted their legisla-tion. California recognized that many of itsprovisions would be pre-empted by thePDA and, accordingly, exempted employ-ers covered by Title VII from all portionsof the statute except those guaranteeingunpaid leave and reinstatement to pregnantworkers. Congress was aware that somestate laws mandated certain benefits forpregnant workers, but did not indicate thatthey would be pre-empted by federal law.See supra, at 692-693.

Petitioners argue that “extension” of the state stat-ute to cover other employees would be inappropri-ate in the absence of a clear indication that this iswhat the California Legislature intended. They citecases in which this Court has declined to rewriteunderinclusive state statutes found to violate theEqual Protection Clause. See, e.g., Wengler v.Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., 446 U.S. 142,152-153, 100 S.Ct. 1540, 1546, 64 L.Ed.2d 107(1980); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,392-393, n. 13, 99 S.Ct. 1760, 1768, n. 13, 60L.Ed.2d 297 (1979). This argument is beside thepoint. Extension is a remedial option to be exer-cised by a court once a statute is *292 found to beinvalid.FN31 See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443U.S. 76, 89, 99 S.Ct. 2655, 2663, 61 L.Ed.2d 382(1979) (quoting Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.333, 361, 90 S.Ct. 1792, 1807, 26 L.Ed.2d 308(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result)).

FN31. We recognize that, in cases where a






























state statute is otherwise invalid, the Courtmust look to the intent of the state legis-lature to determine whether to extend be-nefits or nullify the statute. By arguing thatextension would be inappropriate in thiscase, however, post, at 701, and citing thisas a basis for pre-emption, the dissentsimply ignores the prerequisite of invalid-ity.

IV

Thus, petitioners' facial challenge to § 12945(b)(2)fails. The statute is not pre-empted by Title VII, asamended by the PDA, because it is not inconsistentwith the purposes of the federal statute, nor does itrequire the doing of an act which is unlawful underTitle VII.FN32

FN32. Because we conclude that in enact-ing the PDA Congress did not intend toprohibit all favorable treatment of preg-nancy, we need not decide and therefore donot address the question whether §12945(b)(2) could be upheld as a legislat-ive response to leave policies that have adisparate impact on pregnant workers.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.Justice STEVENS, concurring in part and concur-ring in the judgment.The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA)does not exist in a vacuum. As Justice WHITE re-cognizes in his dissent, Congress did not intend to“put pregnancy in a class by itself within Title VII,”and the enactment of the PDA “did not mark a de-parture from Title VII principles.” Post, at 698. Butthis realization does not lead me to support JusticeWHITE's position; rather, I believe that the PDA'sposture as part of Title VII compels rejection of hisargument that the PDA mandates complete neutral-ity and forbids all beneficial treatment of preg-nancy.FN1

FN1. Because I agree with the Court thatthe California statute does not conflict withthe purposes of the PDA, and does not pur-port to “require or permit” action incon-sistent with the PDA, I do not reach thequestion whether § 1104 of the CivilRights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4,is applicable to Title VII, or whether, asJustice SCALIA suggests, § 708, 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-7, is the only provision governingTitle VII's pre-emptive scope. Even if §1104 applies, the California statute wouldnot be preempted in this case. Since PartIII-A of Justice MARSHALL's opiniondoes not make clear whether it decides thisissue, or whether it only assumes for thepurposes of the decision that § 1104 ap-plies, I do not join that section. I do,however, join the remainder of the Court'sopinion.

The choice between disposing of thecase through interpreting the preemptionprovisions of Title VII and Title XI asJustice SCALIA does, or through inter-preting the substance of the PDA andthus obviating the need to decide theTitle XI question, is a choice betweentwo grounds of statutory construction.Neither approach is inherently narrowerthan the other. Given the value of havingan opinion for the Court, I have thereforeconcluded that I should choose betweenthe conflicting views of the PDA ex-pressed by Justice MARSHALL andJustice WHITE, even though JusticeSCALIA may be correct in arguing thatthis case could be decided without reach-ing that issue.

*293 **696 In Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S.193, 99 S.Ct. 2721, 61 L.Ed.2d 480 (1979), theCourt rejected the argument that Title VII prohibitsall preferential treatment of the disadvantagedclasses that the statute was enacted to protect. The









plain words of Title VII, which would have led to acontrary result, were read in the context of the stat-ute's enactment and its purposes.FN2 In this case aswell, the language of the Act seems to mandatetreating pregnant*294 employees the same as otheremployees. I cannot, however, ignore the fact thatthe PDA is a definitional section of Title VII's pro-hibition against gender-based discrimination. HadWeber interpreted Title VII as requiring neutrality,I would agree with Justice WHITE that the PDAshould be interpreted that way as well. But sincethe Court in Weber interpreted Title VII to draw adistinction between discrimination against mem-bers of the protected class and special preference infavor of members of that class, I do not accept theproposition that the PDA requires absolute neutral-ity.

FN2. There is a striking similarity betweenthe evidence about the enactment of TitleVII that was available in Steelworkers v.Weber, and the evidence available regard-ing the enactment of the PDA. First, theplain language in both cases points to neut-rality, see ante, at 692-693; 443 U.S., at201, 99 S.Ct., at 2726, although, if any-thing, that language was even less equivoc-al in Weber than it is here. See ante, at691. Second, in both cases the records arereplete with indications that Congress' goalwas to bar discrimination against the dis-advantaged class or classes at issue. Seeante, at 692-693; 443 U.S., at 201-204, 99S.Ct., at 2726-2727. Third, in neither casewas there persuasive evidence that Con-gress considered the ramifications of a rulemandating complete neutrality. See ante, at692-693; 443 U.S., at 204, 99 S.Ct., at2727. Finally, there were statements in thelegislative histories of both provisionsstressing that Congress did not intend torequire preferential treatment, statementsthat undermine the conclusion that Con-gress indeed intended to prohibit suchtreatment. See ante, at 692; 443 U.S., at

204-206, 99 S.Ct., at 2727-2728.

I therefore conclude that Justice MARSHALL'sview, which holds that the PDA allows some pref-erential treatment of pregnancy, is more consistentwith our interpretation of Title VII than JusticeWHITE's view is. This is not to say, however, thatall preferential treatment of pregnancy is automatic-ally beyond the scope of the PDA.FN3 Rather, aswith other parts of Title VII, preferential treatmentof the disadvantaged class is only permissible solong as it is consistent with “accomplish[ing] thegoal that Congress designed Title VII to achieve.”Weber, supra, at 204, 99 S.Ct., at 2727. FN4 Thatgoal has been *295 characterized**697 as seeking“to achieve equality of employment opportunitiesand to remove barriers that have operated in thepast to favor an identifiable group of ... employeesover other employees.” Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,401 U.S. 424, 429-430, 91 S.Ct. 849, 852-853, 28L.Ed.2d 158 (1971).

FN3. I do not read the Court's opinion asholding that Title VII presents no limita-tions whatsoever on beneficial treatment ofpregnancy. Although the opinion doesmake some mention of the “floor” but “nota ceiling” language employed by the Courtof Appeals, see ante, at 691, the Court alsopoints out that there are limitations onwhat an employer can do, even when af-fording “preferential” treatment to preg-nancy. See ante, at 691, n. 17, 694. Indeed,the Court of Appeals also subjected Cali-fornia's statute to the test of “whether thepolicy furthers ‘Title VII's prophylacticpurpose of achieving “equality of employ-ment opportunities.” ’ ” 758 F.2d 390, 396(1985) (quoting EEOC v. Puget Sound LogScaling & Grading Bureau, 752 F.2d 1389,1392 (CA9 1985) (in turn quoting Griggsv. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429, 91S.Ct. 849, 852, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971))).

FN4. The Court has not yet had occasionto explore the exact line of demarcation


























between permissible and impermissiblepreferential treatment under Title VII. Thefactors discussed in Weber are, in myview, merely exemplary, and do not neces-sarily define the outer limits of what aprivate employer or a State may do to in anattempt to effectuate the goals of Title VII.

It is clear to me, as it is to the Court,FN5 and wasto the Court of Appeals,FN6 that the Californiastatute meets this test. Thus, I agree that a Califor-nia employer would not violate the PDA were it tocomply with California's statute without affordingthe same protection to men suffering somewhatsimilar disabilities.

FN5. See ante, at 693-694.

FN6. 758 F.2d, at 396.Justice SCALIA, concurring in the judgment.The only provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964whose effect on pre-emption need be considered inthe present case is § 708 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-7. Although both that section and § 1104, 42U.S.C. § 2000h-4, are described by the majority aspre-emption provisions, they are more precisely an-tipre-emption provisions, prescribing that nothingin Title VII (in the case of § 708) and nothing in theentire Civil Rights Act (in the case of § 1104) shallbe deemed to pre-empt state law unless certain con-ditions are met. The exceptions set forth in the gen-eral § 1104 ban on pre-emption (“inconsisten[cy]with any of the purposes of this Act, or any provi-sion thereof”) are somewhat broader than the singleexception set forth in the Title VII § 708 ban. Be-cause the Pregnancy Disability Act (PDA) is part ofTitle VII, the more expansive prohibition of pre-emption particularly applicable to that Title applies.If that precludes pre-emption of Cal.Govt.CodeAnn. § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980), it is unnecessaryto inquire whether § 1104 would do so.

Section 708 narrows the pre-emptive scope of thePDA so that it pre-empts only laws which“purpor[t] to require or permit the doing of any actwhich would be an unlawful employment*296

practice” under the Title. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7.Thus, whether or not the PDA prohibits discrimin-atorily favorable disability treatment for pregnantwomen, § 12945(b)(2) of the California Code can-not be pre-empted, since it does not remotely pur-port to require or permit any refusal to accord fed-erally mandated equal treatment to others similarlysituated. No more is needed to decide this case.

The majority not only ignores the clear antipre-emptive effect of § 708, but, even proceeding onthe basis of its more generalized pre-emption ana-lysis, decides more than is necessary. Its reasoningis essentially as follows: It is consistent with the re-quirements and purposes of the PDA for a State torequire special treatment for pregnancy disability(Part III-B); and besides, the state law here at issuedoes not require special treatment for pregnancydisability (Part III-C). By parity of analysis, we candecide any issue, so long as the facts before useither do or do not present it. There are proper oc-casions for alternative holdings, where one of thealternatives does not eliminate the jurisdictionalpredicate for the other-though even in that situationthe practice is more appropriate for lower courtsthan for this Court, whose first arrow runs no riskof being later adjudged to have missed its mark.But where, as here, it is entirely clear that an issueof law is not presented by the facts of the case, it isbeyond our jurisdiction to reach it.

I am fully aware that it is more convenient for theemployers of California and the California Legis-lature to have us interpret the PDA prematurely. Ithas never been suggested, however, that the consti-tutional prohibition upon our rendering of advisoryopinions is a doctrine of convenience. I would af-firm the judgment of the Court of Appeals on theground that **698 § 12945(b)(2) of the CaliforniaCode does not purport to require or permit any actthat would be an unlawful employment practice un-der any conceivable interpretation of the PDA, andtherefore, by virtue of § 708, cannot be pre-empted.

*297 Justice WHITE, with whom THE CHIEFJUSTICE and Justice POWELL join, dissenting.









I disagree with the Court that Cal.Govt.Code Ann.§ 12945(b)(2) (West 1980) is not pre-empted by thePregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), 92Stat. 2076, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), and §708 of Title VII. Section 703(a) of Title VII, 78Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), forbids discrim-ination in the terms of employment on the basis ofrace, color, religion, sex, or national origin. ThePDA gave added meaning to discrimination on thebasis of sex:

“The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis ofsex’ [in § 703(a) of this Title] include, but are notlimited to, because of or on the basis of preg-nancy, childbirth or related medical conditions;and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, orrelated medical conditions shall be treated thesame for all employment-related purposes, in-cluding receipt of benefits under fringe benefitprograms, as other persons not so affected butsimilar in their ability or inability to work....” §2000e(k).

The second clause quoted above could not be clear-er: it mandates that pregnant employees “shall betreated the same for all employment-related pur-poses” as nonpregnant employees similarly situatedwith respect to their ability or inability to work.This language leaves no room for preferential treat-ment of pregnant workers. The majority wouldavoid its plain meaning by misapplying our inter-pretation of the clause in Newport News Shipbuild-ing & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678,n. 14, 103 S.Ct. 2622, 2628, n. 14, 77 L.Ed.2d 89(1983). Ante, at 691. The second clause addressesonly female employees and was not directly implic-ated in Newport News because the pregnant personsat issue in that case were spouses of male employ-ees. We therefore stated in Newport News that the*298 second clause had only explanatory or illus-trative significance. We did not indicate in anyway, however, that the second clause does not meanexactly what it says in a situation where it is dir-ectly implicated.

Contrary to the mandate of the PDA, California law

requires every employer to have a disability leavepolicy for pregnancy even if it has none for anyother disability. An employer complies with Cali-fornia law if it has a leave policy for pregnancy butdenies it for every other disability. On its face, §12945(b)(2) is in square conflict with the PDA andis therefore pre-empted. Because the California lawpermits employers to single out pregnancy for pref-erential treatment and therefore to violate Title VII,it is not saved by § 708 which limits pre-emption ofstate laws to those that require or permit an em-ployer to commit an unfair employment practice.FN1

FN1. The same clear language preventingpreferential treatment based on pregnancyforecloses respondents' argument that theCalifornia provision can be upheld as a le-gislative response to leave policies thathave a disparate impact on pregnant work-ers. Whatever remedies Title VII wouldotherwise provide for victims of disparateimpact, Congress expressly ordered preg-nancy to be treated in the same manner asother disabilities.

The majority nevertheless would save the Califor-nia law on two grounds. First, it holds that the PDAdoes not require disability from pregnancy to betreated the same as other disabilities; instead, it for-bids less favorable, but permits more favorable, be-nefits for pregnancy disability. The express com-mand of the PDA is unambiguously to the contrary,and the legislative history casts no doubt on thatmandate.

The legislative materials reveal Congress' plain in-tent not to put pregnancy in a class by itself withinTitle VII, as the majority does with its “floor ... nota **699 ceiling” approach. Ante, at 691. The SenateReport clearly stated:

“By defining sex discrimination to include dis-crimination against pregnant women, the bill re-jects the view that employers may treat preg-nancy and its incidents as sui generis, without re-














gard to its functional comparability to other con-ditions. Under this bill, the treatment of *299pregnant women in covered employment must fo-cus not on their condition alone but on the actualeffects of that condition on their ability to work.Pregnant women who are able to work must bepermitted to work on the same conditions as otheremployees; and when they are not able to workfor medical reasons, they must be accorded thesame rights, leave privileges and other benefits,as other workers who are disabled from work-ing.” FN2

FN2. S.Rep. No. 95-331, p. 4 (1977), Le-gislative History of the Pregnancy Dis-crimination Act of 1978 (Committee Printprepared for the Senate Committee onLabor and Human Resources), p. 41 ----(1980) (Leg.Hist.).

The House Report similarly stressed that the legis-lation did not mark a departure from Title VII prin-ciples:

“It must be emphasized that this legislation,operating as part of Title VII, prohibits only dis-criminatory treatment. Therefore, it does not re-quire employers to treat pregnant employees inany particular manner with respect to hiring, per-mitting them to continue working, providing sickleave, furnishing medical and hospital benefits,providing disability benefits, or any other matter.H.R. 6075 in no way requires the institution ofany new programs where none currently exist.The bill would simply require that pregnant wo-men be treated the same as other employees onthe basis of their ability or inability to work.”FN3

FN3. H.R.Rep. No. 95-948, p. 4 (1978),Leg.Hist. 150 (emphasis added), U.S.CodeCong. & Admin.News 1978, p. 4752. Thesame theme was also expressed repeatedlyin the floor debates. Senator Williams, for

example, the Chairman of the Senate Com-mittee on Labor and Human Resources anda sponsor of the Senate bill, described thebill as follows in his introduction of thebill to the Senate:

“The central purpose of the bill is to re-quire that women workers be treatedequally with other employees on thebasis of their ability or inability to work.The key to compliance in every case willbe equality of treatment. In this way, thelaw will protect women from the fullrange of discriminatory practices whichhave adversely affected their status inthe work force.” 123 Cong.Rec. 29385(1977), Leg.Hist. 62-63.

*300 The majority correctly reports that Congressfocused on discrimination against, rather than pref-erential treatment of, pregnant workers. There isonly one direct reference in the legislative historyto preferential treatment. Senator Brooke statedduring the Senate debate: “I would emphasize moststrongly that S. 995 in no way provides special dis-ability benefits for working women. They have notdemanded, nor asked, for such benefits. They haveasked only to be treated with fairness, to be accor-ded the same employment rights as men.” FN4 Giv-en the evidence before Congress of the wide-spreaddiscrimination against pregnant workers, it is prob-able that most Members of Congress did not seri-ously consider the possibility that someone wouldwant to afford preferential treatment to pregnantworkers. The parties and their amici argued vigor-ously to this Court the policy implications of pref-erential treatment of pregnant workers. In favor ofpreferential treatment it was urged with convictionthat preferential treatment merely enables women,like men, to have children without losing their jobs.In opposition to preferential treatment it was urgedwith equal conviction that preferential treatmentrepresents a resurgence of the 19th-century protect-ive legislation which perpetuated sex-role stereo-types and which impeded women in their efforts to




take their rightful place in the workplace. See, e.g.,**700Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-423, 28S.Ct. 324, 326-327, 52 L.Ed. 551 (1908); Bradwellv. Illinois, 16 Wall. 130, 141, 21 L.Ed. 442 (1872)(Bradley, J., concurring). It is not the place of thisCourt, however, to resolve this policy dispute. Ourtask is to interpret Congress' intent in enacting thePDA. Congress' silence in its consideration of thePDA with respect to preferential treatment of preg-nant workers cannot fairly be interpreted to abrog-ate the plain statements in the legislative history,not to mention the language of the statute, thatequality of treatment was to be the guiding prin-ciple of the PDA.

FN4. 123 Cong.Rec. 29664 (1977),Leg.Hist. 135.

*301 Congress' acknowledgment of state anti-discrimination laws does not support a contrary in-ference. Ante, at 692-693. The most extensive dis-cussion of state laws governing pregnancy discrim-ination is found in the House Report.FN5 It was re-ported that six States, Alaska, Connecticut, Mary-land, Minnesota, Oregon, and Montana, and theDistrict of Columbia specifically included preg-nancy in their fair employment practices laws. In 12additional States, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New York,Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Washington, and Wis-consin, the prohibition on sex discrimination in thestate fair employment practices law had been inter-preted, either by a state court or the state enforce-ment agency, to require equal treatment of pregnantworkers. Finally, five States, California, Hawaii,New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island, had in-cluded pregnancy in their temporary disability lawsunder which private employers are required toprovide partial wage replacement for temporarydisabilities. The Report noted, however, that where-as California, New Jersey, and New York coveredcomplications from pregnancy on the same basis asother disabilities, California, New Jersey, NewYork, and Rhode Island set maximum limits on thecoverage required for disability associated with

normal childbirth. The Report did not in any wayset apart the Connecticut and Montana statutes, onwhich the majority relies, from the other state stat-utes. The House Report gave no indication thatthese statutes required anything more than equaltreatment. Indeed, the state statutes were con-sidered, not in the context of pre-emption, but inthe context of a discussion of health insurancecosts. The House Report expressly stated: “The sig-nificance of this State coverage” is that “many em-ployers are already under a State law obligation toprovide benefits to pregnant disabled workers. Pas-sage of the bill thus has little or no economic im-pact on such employers.” FN6

FN5. H.R.Rep. No. 95-948, supra, at10-11, Leg.Hist. 156-157.

FN6. H.R.Rep. No. 95-948, supra, at 11,Leg.Hist. 157 (emphasis in original),U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, p.4759.

*302 Nor does anything in the legislative historyfrom the Senate side indicate that it carefully con-sidered the state statutes, including those of Con-necticut and Montana, and expressly endorsed theirprovisions. The Senate Report noted that “25 Statespresently interpret their own fair employment prac-tices laws to prohibit sex discrimination based onpregnancy and childbirth,” and Senator Williamspresented during the Senate debate a list of Stateswhich required coverage for pregnancy and preg-nancy-related disabilities, but there was no analysisof their provisions.FN7 The majority seems to in-terpret Senator Javits' acknowledgment that severalstate legislatures, including New York, his ownState, had mandated certain benefits for pregnantemployees as an unqualified endorsement of thosestate statutes. Ante, at 693, n. 23. Later, however,when pressed by Senator Hatch about the fact thatthe New York statute limited the required coverageof disability caused by pregnancy to eight weeks,Senator Javits had no hesitation in expressing hisdisagreement with the New York statute.**701 FN8

Passing reference to state statutes without express
















recognition of their content and without express en-dorsement is insufficient in my view to override thePDA's clear equal-treatment mandate, expressedboth in the statute and its legislative history.

FN7. S.Rep. No. 95-331, at 3, Leg.Hist.40; 123 Cong.Rec. 29648 (1977), Leg.Hist.91.

FN8. 123 Cong.Rec. 29654-29655 (1977),Leg.Hist. 108-110.

The Court's second, and equally strange, ground isthat even if the PDA does prohibit special benefitsfor pregnant women, an employer may still complywith both the California law and the PDA: it canadopt the specified leave policies for pregnancy andat the same time afford similar benefits for all otherdisabilities. This is untenable. California surely hadno intent to require employers to provide generaldisability leave benefits. It intended to prefer preg-nancy and went no further. Extension of these bene-fits to the entire work force would be a dramatic in-crease in the scope of the state *303 law and wouldimpose a significantly greater burden on Californiaemployers. That is the province of the CaliforniaLegislature. See Wengler v. Druggists Mutual In-surance Co., 446 U.S. 142, 152-153, 100 S.Ct.1540, 1546, 64 L.Ed.2d 107 (1980); Caban v. Mo-hammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392-393, n. 13, 99 S.Ct.1760, 1768, n. 13, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979); Craig v.Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210, n. 24, 97 S.Ct. 451, 463,n. 24, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976). Nor can §12945(b)(2) be saved by applying Title VII in tan-dem with it, such that employers would be requiredto afford reinstatement rights to pregnant workersas a matter of state law but would be required to af-ford the same rights to all other workers as a matterof federal law. The text of the PDA does not speakto this question but it is clear from the legislativehistory that Congress did not intend for the PDA toimpose such burdens on employers. As recognizedby the majority, opposition to the PDA came fromthose concerned with the cost of including preg-nancy in health and disability benefit plans. Ante, at692. The House Report acknowledged these con-

cerns and explained that the bill “in no way re-quires the institution of any new programs wherenone currently exist.” FN9 The Senate Report gavea similar assurance.FN10 In addition, legislatorafter legislator stated during the floor debates thatthe PDA would not require an employer to institutea disability benefits program if it did not alreadyhave one in effect.FN11 Congress intended em-ployers to be free to *304 provide any level of dis-ability benefits they wished-or none at all-as longas pregnancy was not a factor in allocating such be-nefits. The conjunction of § 12945(b)(2) and thePDA requires California employers to implementnew minimum disability leave programs. Readingthe state and federal statutes together in this fashionyields a **702 result which Congress expressly dis-avowed.

FN9. H.R.Rep. No. 95-948, at 4, Leg.Hist.150, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News1978, p. 4752.

FN10. S.Rep. No. 95-331, supra, at 4,Leg.Hist. 41.

FN11. 123 Cong.Rec. 7541 (1977),Leg.Hist. 8 (remarks of Sen. Brooke)(“[T]he bill being introduced would notmandate compulsory disability coverage”);123 Cong.Rec., at 8145, Leg.Hist. 19(remarks of Sen. Bayh) (“Under the provi-sions of our legislation, only those com-panies which already voluntarily offer dis-ability coverage would be affected”); 123Cong.Rec., at 10582, Leg.Hist. 25(remarks of Rep. Hawkins) (“[A]n employ-er who does not now provide disability be-nefits to his employees will not have toprovide such benefits to women disableddue to pregnancy or childbirth”); 123Cong.Rec., at 29386, Leg.Hist. 64(remarks of Sen. Williams) (“[T]his legis-lation does not require that any employerbegin to provide health insurance where itis not presently provided”); 123Cong.Rec., at 29388, Leg.Hist. 71
















(remarks of Sen. Kennedy) (“This amend-ment does not require all employers toprovide disability insurance plans; itmerely requires that employers who havedisability plans for their employees treatpregnancy-related disabilities in the samefashion that all other temporary disabilitiesare treated with respect to benefits andleave policies”); 123 Cong.Rec., at 29663,Leg.Hist. 131 (remarks of Sen. Cranston)(“[S]ince the basic standard is comparabil-ity among employees, an employer whodoes not provide medical benefits at all,would not have to pay the medical costs ofpregnancy or child birth”); 123 Cong.Rec.,at 29663, Leg.Hist. 133 (remarks of Sen.Culver) (“The legislation before us todaydoes not mandate compulsory disabilitycoverage”).

In sum, preferential treatment of pregnant workersis prohibited by Title VII, as amended by the PDA.Section 12945(b)(2) of the California GovernmentCode, which extends preferential benefits for preg-nancy, is therefore pre-empted. It is not saved by §708 because it purports to authorize employers tocommit an unfair employment practice forbiddenby Title VII.FN12

FN12. Section 12945(b)(2) does not re-quire employers to treat pregnant employ-ees better than other disabled employees;employers are free voluntarily to extendthe disability leave to all employees. But ifthis is not a statute which “purports to ...permit the doing of any act which wouldbe an unlawful employment practice” un-der Title VII, I do not know what such astatute would look like. See, ante, at 694,n. 29.

Neither is § 12945(b)(2) saved by § 1104of the Civil Rights Act since it is incon-sistent with the equal-treatment purposeand provisions of Title VII.

U.S.Cal.,1987.California Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra479 U.S. 272, 107 S.Ct. 683, 42 Fair Em-pl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1073, 41 Empl. Prac. Dec. P36,641, 93 L.Ed.2d 613, 55 USLW 4077, 7 Em-ployee Benefits Cas. 2657

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