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C I V I L- M I L I TA RYWO R K I N G PA P E R S10 / 2 010

TIMOR-LESTE: TRANSITION FROM PEACEKEEPING TO PEACEBUILDING – A TIMORESE PERSPECTIVEAgio Pereira1

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Disclaimer:

The views expressed in this Civil-Military Commentary/Civil Military Working Paper/Civil-Military Occasional Paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of APCMCOE or of any government agency. Authors enjoy the academic freedom to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues.

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ISBN: 978-1-921933-09-7

Published 2011.

ii Timor-Leste: Transition from Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding – a Timorese perspective 1

ABSTRACTTimor-Leste, which includes the enclave of Oe-Cusse Ambeno in the Western part of Timor Island, has an area of 14,919 square kilometers and is administratively divided into 13 districts and 67 sub-districts. The last census, concluded in 2010, determined that the total population was about 1, 114 534. Both Portuguese and Tétum are the official languages. In April 1974, the Portuguese empire crumbled and for Timor-Leste the time had come to gain independence. The withdrawal of the Portuguese military and government allowed for the full-scale invasion by the Indonesian Armed Forces on the 7th of December 1975 and the stage was set for a long and bloody war. In the first three years of warfare the structure of Fretilin was almost totally destroyed. Under the revitalised struggle led by Xanana Gusmão it was concluded that there was a need to adopt maximum flexibility through genuine guerrilla warfare. Two decades of growing unity and common purpose led to the vote of independence on 30 August 1999 and the subsequent total withdrawal of Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) from the territory on 1 November 1999, marking the end of 24-year war. After almost ten years of nationbuilding, the identification of national priorities and successful implementation of strategies to move ahead, constitute a trademark of Timorese governance.

Key Words: Timor-Leste, guerrilla warfare, Xanana Gusmao, peacekeeping, nationbuilding

Ágio PereiraFrom 1999–2001 Agio Pereira was member of National Political Commission of CNRT (National Council of Timorese Resistance). From 1991–1999 he was executive Director of ETRA Inc. East Timor Relief Association Incorporated), an Australian-based international humanitarian organisation supporting the independence of East Timor, providing humanitarian aid to the Timorese inside East Timor and in Indonesia fighting for independence. From 1999–2000 he was head of National Emergency Commission, a body established to respond to the emergency situation in East Timor caused by militia violence after the result of the Popular Consultation was announced by the United Nations on 4th September 1999. From 2000–2001 he was member of the National (Legislative) Council, the body established by the United Nations to phase out UNTAET according to the Security Council mandate. He was elected Deputy Speaker and also President of the Standing Committee on Budget and Finance and Vice-President of the Standing Committee of Political Affairs. From 2002 2007 he was Chief-of-Staff of the President of the Republic of Timor-Leste, Mr. Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão. From 2007–Present he has been Secretary of State for the Council of Ministers; also responsible for Mass Communication and Parliamentary Affairs. He trained in Environmental Biology and holds a Master Degree in Criminology and Criminal Justice.

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INTRODUCTIONTimor-Leste has an area of 14,919 square kilometers, which includes the island of Jaco to the East, the island of Ataúro in the North and the enclave of Oe-Cusse Ambeno in the Western part of Timor Island. Administratively, the territory is divided into 13 districts and 67 sub-districts; Díli, situated in the Northern coast facing the island of Ataúro, is the capital. The last census, concluded in 2010, determined that the total population was about 1, 114 534. Both Portuguese and Tétum are the official languages but, according to the Constitution, the State of Timor-Leste must develop and recognise the importance, not only of Tétum, but ‘all other national languages’.2 English and Indonesian are attributed the status of working languages of Timor-Leste, to be used in public administration, for ‘as long as deemed necessary.’3 In April 1974, the Portuguese empire crumbled. For Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique, S. Tomé and Príncipe, and Cape Verde and Timor-Leste4, the time had come to gain independence. The so-called Carnation Revolution ended the Empire’s colonial possessions, allowing for the Portuguese military to return to Portugal. In a broader context, the Carnation Revolution was also a result of the weakening of the grip of the regime of Salazar, as it became almost a 50-year old dictatorship, which was losing sight of reality. By then, the regime of Salazar and that of Franco of Spain were the last relics of Western European fascism, standing in the periphery of the development of a European Community that was already influenced by social democracy.

When the Carnation Revolution took place,5 Timor-Leste, the most distant colonial possession, was also distant from the occurrence in Portugal due to a lack of effective media and access to modern communications. Albeit a revolution with world historical significance, this was the era of the Cold War, black and white television6 and, the colony of Timor-Leste had no television, only limited access to winding up telephones. Hence, the international political impact was very limited. As a result of the successful Carnation Revolution, a Council of National Salvation was established in Portugal and a Decolonisation Commission was charged with managing the transfer of powers from the new Portugal to the national liberation movements. Timor-Leste was, however, never in a state of guerrilla warfare with the Portuguese Empire, so the transfer of power was not straightforward. Within the new ‘provincial’ government, the representatives of the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement had the upper hand, making political decisions; including how and when power should be transferred. Political parties were formed and agendas for reform and independence or otherwise, were put forward. Timor-Leste, as an ignored and far removed colony, for the first time it became alive, it now existed! Nevertheless, powerful regional interests started to make moves to find ways to throw it back into the labyrinth of oblivion; ‘It’s the oil stupid!’ scenario, evolving the interference in national politics, with patriotism, money, expansionism and international law mixed to become part of an agenda affecting the future of the territory. The process led to Indonesian illegal land border incursions and the killing of six news men from the Australian media, a civil war and the withdrawal of the Portuguese military and government. Ultimately, the desire to totally isolate the territory, allowing for the full-scale invasion by the Indonesian Armed Forces was achieved, on the 7th of December 1975 - the day Indonesia initiated the complete blockade of Timor-Leste7 for a genocidal warfare.

The stage was set for a long and bloody war, with the blessing of U.S. President Gerard Ford and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.8 In the first three years, between December 1975 and 1978, even with fighting with courage and patriotism, the structure of Fretilin was almost totally destroyed. The capture of President

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Francisco Xavier do Amaral,9 the destruction of the last base of support in Mount Matebian10 and the death of the second President Nicolau Lobato on 31st of December 1978, hindered further the capacity of the resistance to survive the attacks of the Indonesian military. Until March 1981, the patriotic struggle of East Timor was, indeed, perceived as having been thrown deep into oblivion; but it was not entirely so. Unknown to many, Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão and his surviving comrades, started a crusade from the Eastern tip of the island towards the enclave of Oe-Cusse Ambeno, to determine what was left behind after the ‘holocaust’ caused by the Indonesian military with the connivance of the United States of America and Australia. The aim of Xanana Gusmão was to see what chances the Timorese people still had available to reconstruct the apparatus of its national resistance.11 Bit by bit, the building blocks of the National Resistance were drawn together on March 3, 1981, when the very first National Congress took place in the territory, deep into the highlands,12 bringing about a new structure, but modeled according to that which the previous leadership had already conceived. The ultimate goal then was to counter the challenges of the present as well as to ensure a sustained progress of the national liberation struggle towards a future, which no one then could say how long it would take. This involved constructing the head of the structure – the Command – along with the limbs and the other part deemed necessary to ensure success.13

The revitalised struggle, however, required a new philosophy. And so it was necessary that the appraisal of the struggle to date was objective and the path towards the future realistic. Led by Xanana Gusmão, the appraisal concluded that there was a need to adopt maximum flexibility through a genuine guerrilla warfare and move away from the ‘liberated zones’ strategy. The entire country, therefore, was to become, from the maximum mobility guerrilla perspective, a liberated zone. Xanana Gusmão identified the need to work together and not to compartmentalise the forces, because this compartmentalisation was what allowed the enemy to concentrate its strength to attack each liberated zone and destroy, one-by-one, until the last support base of Mt. Matebian.14 The Command of the Struggle was to be supra-partisan.15 Having determined the way forward clear, what remained to be done was the allocation of key responsibilities to able cadres. This turned out to be extremely difficult. Not only had most senior cadres been killed or surrendered, but the younger generation was not equipped to immediately assume high-level responsibilities. Readiness, however, was not the vital ingredient. What was most needed was to keep a Command of the Struggle16 functioning and give time to time. As the resistance matured and embracing the new resistance paradigm, built and nurtured by Xanana Gusmão, new developments strengthened it further which included the emerging movement of the youth in Timor-Leste, as well as in Indonesia, Australia and Portugal, adding strength to the national struggle. The diplomatic front supported by an international solidarity movement; the increasingly more pro-active Church leaders, both in the country and abroad - all helped to maintain a high guerrilla combat spirit. The mottos ‘The Struggle Continues on Every Front’ and ‘To Resist is to Win’, gained renewed momentum. Capitalising on the new sense of national unity and reconciliation, national pride was revitalised and further efforts to overcome drawbacks and eliminate barriers to independence were undertaken. This new sense of unity and common purpose, growing within two decades, led to the vote of 30 August 1999 and the subsequent total withdrawal of Indonesia from the territory. The last Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) left East Timor on November 1, 1999, marking the end of 24-year war. The event was ‘marked by a farewell ceremony attended by members of the Indonesian Task Force on East Timor, TNI, United Nations officials and Timorese resistance leader and President of the National Council of East Timorese Resistance (CNRT) Xanana Gusmão.’17 The dream finally has come true!

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UN TRANSITION AND RESTORATION OF INDEPENDENCE Restoration of independence holds that Timor-Leste was declared an independent state on 28 November 1975 by the leadership of Fretilin. This event was controversial due to the civil war that preceded the declaration and which continues to bear some influence today in national politics, alliances and rivalries. Overall, however, in the spirit of national reconciliation, Timor-Leste has overcome many barriers, in favor of a forward looking spirit. The consolidation of national independence is what unites the State. Transition refers to the phase evolving from the vote of 30 August 1999, known as the Popular Consultation, implemented on the basis of the May 5 Accord,18 towards overcoming structural security issues and reaching the intertwined phase of national development.19 The Accord allowed for the UN to take over the administration of the territory, regardless of the outcome of the vote, in a transitional arrangement, to ensure a peaceful transfer of power. To implement the May 5 Accord, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1246 (1999) at its 4013th meeting, on 11 June 1999, creating UNAMET,20 to carry out all tasks deemed necessary to implement the substance of the Accord.

As soon as the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced the result of the vote,21 widespread violence erupted, forcing more than two hundred thousand people to Indonesia and up to fifty thousand to leave Díli towards the highlands in the southern part of the capital to escape violence. On September 12, 1999, through Resolution 1264, the UN Security Council authorised INTERFET to start its mission, as a multinational force under a unified command structure and led by Australia.22 The aim was to bring about stability to the territory, before the UN Transitional Administration took over as planned. Having INTERT’s mission accomplished with total success the stage was set for the UN to bring about the much-valued successful transition. With the arrival of the late Sergio Vieira de Mello as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and also UN Transitional Administrator, UNTAET began to function,23 ‘endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and…empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice.’24 The National Council of National Resistance (CNRT)25 became practically a NGO, the guerrilla forces FALINTIL continued to be confined to limited movement, but soon subjected to a DDR26 process and subsequently transformed into FDTL.27 The structure for a successful transition began to gain form and essence, including the establishment of a national police force, the PNTL. The National Consultative Council (NCC) made up of 15 Timorese from the independence movement as well as those who were previously pro-Indonesian integration, was established on December 2, 1999, acting as a consultative body ‘through which the representatives of the people of East Timor can actively participate in the decision-making process during the transition period.’28

A year later, the First Transitional Government was in place, followed by the second Transitional Government until May 19, 2002. The same transitional government, ‘appointed under UNTAET Regulation No. 20012/28’29 remained in office and, as expected, was subsequently appointed by the newly elected President of the Republic, Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão.30 The First Constitutional Government was born, albeit without being a product of a legislative election.31 The Police Force of East Timor (PNTL)32 and the Defence Forces of Timor-Leste (FDTL)33 were in place. This process was undertaken through regulations adopted by the transitional legislative body known as the National Council, established to discuss and approve the legal framework and politics towards phasing out UNTAET and the embryonic foundation of the State of Timor-Leste. This was the process that led to the first electoral law which was passed and an 85-Member Constituent Assembly was elected,34 on August 30, 2001, to develop the proposed Constitution for an independent Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. The Constitution was subsequently signed and enacted by Sergio Vieira de Mello and, based on that Constitution,

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the first election for the President of the Republic was held. Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão was overwhelmingly elected. On May 20, 2002, the Constitution finally entered into force, after the declaration of the restoration of independence and the simultaneous swearing-in ceremony of President Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão. The entire historical event was broadcasted via radio and nationally televised and it took place in the presence of the then Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan, former President Bill Clinton and the late Richard Holbrooke,35 as well as a number of other important international dignitaries. As the shining light of the dawn of May 20 began, every Timorese woke up to enjoy the new status, that of citizens of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, which had also began to become a liberal democracy and a State governed by the Rule of Law. With that, came also the hope of the beginning of the end of negative labels such as traitors, integrationists or autonomists, to allow all citizens to be governed by the pillars of sovereignty, with rights, duties and objectives enshrined in the Constitution.36 Of particular importance to the independence ceremony of May 20, 2002, was the attendance of the then President of the Republic of Indonesia, Megawati Sukarno Putri. Her presence highlighted the will of Indonesia to finally walk together, side-by-side with Timor-Leste, on a new path of democracy and reconciliation. It represented the strong will of both countries to nurture reconciliation as the basis for a new and revitalised bilateral relations, State-to-State as well as people-to-people, founded upon mutual respect and support.

THE COMMISSION FOR RECEPTION, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION37

The Constitution of Timor-Leste accepts the continuation of the CAVR and a law was subsequently passed to further regulate its mandate. The mandate of 24 months was later extended to thirty.38 This extension was also extended until July 7, 2005,39 and, lastly, until October 2005.40 CAVR delved deep into the process of the national liberation of Timor-Leste from 1975 until September 1999, identifying not only crimes or abuses committed by the Indonesian occupying forces, but also by Timorese political parties, namely Fretilin and UDT.41 The work of the Commission included healing workshops, obtaining personal signed statements, conducting open and closed-door forums and analysis and reporting. It was a groundbreaking work in terms of reconciliation and human rights and the final Report provided a range of recommendations, including reparation for damages. The recommendations are still under analysis by the current legislature, although many were implemented in due course, as a natural development of the process of governance. With the assistance of international agencies and the United Nations, CAVR also carried out its core mandate of ‘reception’, working on and assisting the return of more than two hundred thousand Timorese who flew to Indonesia soon after the result of the Popular Consultation was announced. The work of the Commission also impacted on political unity and reunification of families, as well as enhancing tolerance against the tendency of revenge. Overall, the work focused to national reconciliation but with reflection on the crimes committed by States.42 At individual and group levels, although the perpetrators had been removed from the country, the expectation was that those who decide to return, to join their families and live in their country of origin, shall be treated fairly by the State of Timor-Leste. The recommendations are highly valued directives towards developing a state free from fear of repression, organised political crimes, violence and corruption.

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FROM NATION TO STATE: CULTURAL RESILIENCE AGAINST ALL ODDSReflecting upon the history of Timor-Leste, it is wise to note that until 20 of May 2002, there was no precedence of living in an environment of sovereign independence, other than a colony, existing in a benign abandonment by colonial Portugal.43 On 28 November 1975, after a brief civil war, forcing hundreds of Timorese into Indonesia, others to Australia and Portugal, independence was declared; but this was short lived because, only nine days later, Indonesia mounted its full-scale invasion, on December 7th, ironically coinciding with the anniversary of Japanese Empire’s Pearl Harbor attack, 34 years earlier, during WWII. Fretilin withdrew to the highlands, organising itself into ‘liberated zones’44 and ‘Bases de Apoio.’45 In what then became the beginning of the war-time period, much of the modus operandi of the resistance reflected national creativity and what was understood, by some leaders, to be the experiences of former Portuguese colonies such as Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau.46 Cambodia, Vietnam and China were also, to some extent, references for the resistance. Faced with a David versus Goliaths war of biblical proportion, with collusion of neighbouring countries such as those in ASEAN as well as Australia,47 the country was facing a bleak future, unless the resilience of the people succeeded in maintaining a long-term struggle and upholding the unalienable right to self-determination and independence.48

When Xanana Gusmão was charged with the responsibility to lead, the philosophy encompassed cultural survival. With this objective in mind, Xanana defined the war as one of ‘co-existence with the enemy’. This led to the understanding that the entire country must be reclaimed as belonging to the Timorese nation, not only the liberated zones.49 This also led to the understanding that any Timorese, regardless of political past or ideological leanings, could join and even lead the struggle for cultural survival. It also led to a broader concept of National Unity.50 Unity was vital because resilience alone could not defeat the enemy. Unity was sine qua non condition for the struggle for national liberation to evolve with a steady pace towards the D-Day, which became 30 of August 1999. The importance of cultural survival also impacted on the certainty felt by the Indonesian forces in East Timor. Combined with the strategy of ‘co-existence with the enemy’, it led to the Indonesian military and intelligence becoming confused about who was who; who were their allies and who were their real enemies. The Indonesian military and intelligence started to tag many Timorese as ‘kepala-dua,’51 hard to trust, but equally hard to eliminate. This was a positive development of the national reconciliation policy of Xanana Gusmão, which in one hand provided space for all to become relevant in the struggle, and on another, narrowed the space for the Indonesian military to feel safe in the territory. From religion to armed struggle, the Timorese step-by-step succeeded in rebuilding the basic structure of the Timorese society, strengthening the sense of oneness. This success allowed for disparity of ideologies and the divergent characterisation of enemies to be overcome, focusing only on the common purpose: to free the country.

The cultural resilience of the Timorese people is well reflected in this secular motto: “Fatuk no Rai, Be no Âhi” (Rock and Land, Water and Fire), the epitome of a principle according to which “from the smallness of each one of us we shall only be able to multiply our forces if we take part in an indestructible whole”, because just as a rock is hard but originated from the soil, and fire can be made to disappear by the smooth beauty of the water, our unity will ensure that our country will emerge from destruction with certainty and hope.52 This ancient metaphor encapsulates well the resilience of thousands of years of civilisation of the people of

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Timor-Leste, filled with wars and peace, foreign invasion and occupation, yet resilience allows for the ongoing survival of the Timorese nation and the breaking of barriers that tend to divide, rather than to unite. Another equally important concept, more contemporaneous and brought into the political struggle by the Timorese revolutionary poet Borja da Costa,53 is the concept of ‘kdadalak ’.54 Since 1975, Borja da Costa warned us on the importance of unity, of the dire necessity for all parties to be united to be able to counteract the strong winds coming from the high sea. It was 24 years later, on 30 August 1999, that early in the morning, including the elderly, the disable and the youth, in their last sacrifice in the 24-year war, walked, not only towards a ballot box but, above all, to their last leg of the long road towards freedom. They knew they were, finally, marching towards national liberation, thereby offering an unequivocal proof of the force of national unity. Only by being united, without ideological or any other form of discrimination, reflecting “Fatuk no Rai, Be no Âhi” and as Borja da Costa warned in “kdadalak”, were the Timorese able to win.55

WITH A FREE COUNTRY; LET’S FREE THE PEOPLE”Succeeded in freeing the country, now the need to free the People” was the motto Xanana Gusmão took to the people in the electoral campaign of 2007. With little more than a month old party, named the Congress for the Reconstruction of Timor-Leste, using the same historical acronym CNRT, Xanana managed to win 18 seats out of 65 and combined forces with other parties with fewer seats to form an alliance of parliamentary majority which allowed for the first elected Government, known officially as the IV Constitutional Government of Timor-Leste. Xanana’s government also presented an extensive Program for the five-year mandate and received the endorsement of the Parliament with a vote of confidence.56 The program includes emphasis on justice and stability, security and institution building. Reconciliation and cultural challenges are also reflected in the program as concerns the young State has to deal with. Reconciliation and cultural challenges also are reflected in the program as critical concerns. It’s nationbuilding with all its challenges, but focusing on building a modern, liberal democratic State, where human rights and economic development flourish, for the sake of the well being of all, also bearing in mind that of future generations.57

Peacekeeping, nationbuilding and national development are intertwined processes. Development can be what Fukuyama articulates as ‘the creation of new institutions and the promotion of sustained economic growth, events that transform the society open-endedly into something that it has not been previously.’ 58 National development of Timor-Leste does reflect the need for such a transformation. Ultimately, the outcome is to ensure peace and stability, thus avoiding the situation of conflict it had experienced previously. In this process, on one hand, it is the nation that is being transformed into a State; its people need to adjust and conform to the expectations of a modern State, built on foundations of social contract which requires cultural adjustments to achieve national development. This adjustment may either be attained by virtue of development strategies or freely adopted by the people. How freely and how forcibly these changes take place affect the dynamics of justice and stability, as well as the process of consolidation of national unity. Institutional capacity building is one of the most challenging processes in a post-conflict environment, demanding shifting in mentality, from one of dependency to one of independency; from fear to self-esteem and innovation, from short-term survival to long-term strategic approaches to nationbuilding; and from learning to fight in a war to learning to build a State by governing. These are all challenges which come with endless complexities, some insurmountable at times. For these challenges, time is the best friend. So give time to time and learning what must be done now and what can be left for later, becomes critically important, particularly, as a central essence of a new process of leadership.

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SECURITY AND NATIONBUILDINGThe concern for security and the emphasis on overcoming major security challenges reflected the crisis during the five-year presidential mandate of then President Xanana Gusmão. Having been the first elected President of Timor-Leste under the Constitution enacted on May 20, 2002, President Xanana Gusmão had to deal with four major crises. The first was December 4, 2002, six months after independence. Bob Lowry describes well this conflict:

“…on 4 December 2002, a demonstration to protest East Timorese police handling of the arrest of a high school murder suspect the previous day turned riotous in the course of which the Hello Mister supermarket was burnt out, the secretariat of Parliament trashed, there (sic) houses of the Alkatiri family, including the PM’s home, were torched and the Government bond

store looted, among other damage. The police were caught totally unprepared to control the riot and UN troops were flown in from the border area next morning to guard against a

repetition of the violence. This incident clearly showed that the only national leader with the moral authority to mix with and try to calm the rioters was the President. For all intents and

purposes the remainder of the civil leadership evaporated.’59

About a year and a half later, July, 2004, veterans led by former guerrilla commander known as L7 or Eli Fohorai Bo’ot,60 organised a protest in front of the government palace,61 placing a coffin in the stairs of the main entrance. The protest turned ugly and violent; many youth taking part were assaulted and wounded by the Police. Less than a year later, April 2005, the influential Catholic Church of Timor-Leste organised a 19-day protest against the Government, demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Alkatiri. The protest ended with a joint statement, signed by the Prime Minister and the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, including criminalisation of abortion. Almost a year later, in April 2006, the so-called ‘peticionários’62 who signed a statement demanding the sacking of some Armed Forces commanders, claiming discrimination against them in terms of promotions, decided to march in the main street in front of Palácio do Governo. The protest caused disorder and damages, precipitating the intervention of the Armed Forces, upon request of Prime Minister Alkatiri. The environment of instability became so serious that the pillars of sovereignty were literally forced to request Australian as well as the United Nations’ assistance.63

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LAW AND ORDER AND THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FORCEThe President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the Parliament, jointly signed, on May 24, 2006, a request for Australia to intervene militarily. Such intervention was successful, resulting in the Australian Forces (and New Zealand) remaining in Timor-Leste until today. The crisis caused by the protests of peticionários also led the United Nations to intervene, upon request of the State of Timor-Leste. The United Nations decided in favour of the United Nation’s Mission Police (UNPOL) to again review the situation of law and order and intervene to overcome institutional shortcomings of the national police, the PNTL.64 There are three agreements pertaining to foreign intervention in Timor-Leste. One is known as the ‘Arrangement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste Concerning the Restoration and Maintenance of Security in Timor-Leste.’ This allowed for the arrival and active intervention of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) in the territory of Timor-Leste, including arrests and detention of renegade soldiers, as in the case of the late Major Alfredo Reinado. In December 1, 2006, an agreement was also signed between the Government of Timor-Leste and United Nations, known as the ‘UNMIT Mission and RDTL Government – Arrangement’ for the restoration and maintenance of public security in Timor-Leste and on assistance to the reform, restructuring and rebuilding of the Timorese National Police (PNTL). This was supplemented by the Ministry of Interior Supplement to the Agreement between the UN and RDTL on the Status of UNMIT. On January 26, 2007, the Memorandum of Understanding between RDTL, the United Nations and Australia, was finally signed to complete the entire triangle of agreements necessary to integrate all the measures pertaining to law and order as well as restoration of national stability.

The UK statement to the UN Security Council acknowledges that:

UN involvement in Timor-Leste has the potential to be a beacon of success, modeling how peacekeeping operations can be drawn down as civilian peace builders continue their vital work. The United Kingdom encourages the United Nations to seize this opportunity.

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Similarly, the statement of Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão to the same session of the UN Security Council, noted that:

The UN has been present from the moment our Nation started to be built, and as such I urge you to remain with us in solidarity, so that we may fulfill the dreams of our people.

Today, those dreams are about peace and development.65

The ongoing process of transforming the country, moving away from the peacekeeping of INTERFET and PKF to peacebuilding, which is a long term process of capacity building and development strategies, already show sound basis to warrant much more than just been considered a beacon of success. No other developing country, particularly one with ‘the physical, moral and psychological damage caused by a war that lasted 24 years’66 proved its ability to supplant political crisis, such that Timor-Leste has endured since the restoration of independence - nine years ago – with peace and development. The transitional phase is ongoing. Sectors such as justice and security require special attention. Strengthening justice institutions and effective accountability mechanisms have been identified by the UN as important steps for the justice sector.67 Police and the security sector also is receiving special attention by the UN, including the total transfer of policing command duties from UNPOL to PNTL, which is expected to be on the 11th anniversary of PNTL, 27 March this year. 68 This final transfer of command will be supplemented with ongoing UN assistance in the form of advisory specialists, as well as policing for the elections of 2010.69

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THE 11 FEBRUARY CRISES: SHOOTING TO KILL THE PRESIDENTA year later, there was a shooting attack to kill the President, which took place in Díli, in the President’s own backyard, where he was shot and wounded, but ultimately survived. During an almost simultaneous attack, the Prime Minister was shot at, but was not wounded and survived the assassination attempt. Shock and surprise took over. It was a surprised for everyone and a huge lesson for the Timorese intelligence and security community. It was almost two years since the 19-day public protest of the Catholic Church – and only six months after the IV Constitutional Government of Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão took office. The immediate reaction of the Government was to ensure public calm and avoid panic. The media, the Parliament and the Government and all other institutions displayed extraordinarily maturity. The main and immediate concern was the health of the President, the Head of the State. President Ramos-Horta was treated by doctors of the Australian military hospital in Díli and, as soon as was possible, was evacuated to Darwin Private Hospital, where he was assisted by highly experienced Australian medical doctors. Shortly, news came that he was stable and would survive the assassination attempt, in spite of being seriously wounded. The assassination attempt was led by Alfredo Reinado, with an armed group, who was killed on the spot of the attack, in the private residence of the President, in the early morning of February 11. As Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão was travelling to Díli that same morning, he was also attacked by Reinado’s group, with this attack led by Gastão Salsinha.

These assassination attempts70 prompted the fledging State of Timor-Leste to activate, for the first time, emergency measures pertaining to a State of siege or state of exception.71 This unexpected crisis also led to the establishment of a joint command—Military and Police—to search and capture the surviving members of Alfredo Reinado’s group, led by Gastão Salsinha, who after the death of Reinado, declared a willingness to continue to fight: ‘We won’t give up’, said Gastão Salsinha to SBS Dateline reporter Mark Davis.72 The Joint Command, acting on the order not to shoot, unless in self-defence, succeeded in bringing them all to surrender and to submit to the Timorese system of justice; and the mission was accomplished without a single bullet being fired. After the Court proceedings being concluded and the respective sentences attributed, the President of the Republic, Dr. José Ramos-Horta, decided to use his constitutional powers to grant pardon to all the members of Gastão Salsinha’s group, allowing them to be free. As crisis is truly opportunity, the days following these incidents were lived in a State of siege, until March 23, 2008, followed by a period of state of emergency. These are known as states of exception73 and were declared for the first time since the restoration of independence. The Joint Command of PNTL and F-FDTL that was legally established to capture the remaining elements of Reinado’s group to bring them to justice, continued for some time, appealing to the population to hand over whatever weapons they may have, for the sake of peace and stability. Such operation was successful because it not only enhanced the sense of citizenship and peace, but it also showed the much-needed trust of the people on their institutions of law enforcement and defence. Once again, the nation and the international community witnessed the maturity of the Timorese people, their State institutions and leadership, at the most challenging of times.

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NATIONAL PRIORITIES: THE WAY FORWARDThe IV Constitutional Government led by Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão established the Directorate of National Priorities under the Ministry of Finance. This directorate manages these priorities and work closely with all the development partners.74 The same priorities are reflected in the annual budget of Timor-Leste, thus allowing for the allocation of budget accordingly. Through the government’s program, apart from infrastructures, the emphasis has also been meeting the targets of the Millennium Development Goals.75 At the time of taking office, Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão defined the following priorities:

• Solving national security issues, namely IDPs, petitioners and Alfredo Reinado’s problem – these issues were the reality on the ground when the government led by Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão took office. The importance of these priorities lies in the fact that they are all related to challenges of internal security. Only two and half years later, all these problems were overcome;

• Community development, namely funding for the chiefs of the sucos – this was necessary as increasingly these chiefs were needed to take a more pro-active role at local level, not only in cases pertaining to security matters, as IDPs returned to their original places of residence, but also because after the election of the suco chiefs, the demand for their intervention required conditions, including finance and logistics, to ensure their performance. The Ministry of State Administration and Territorial Management succeeded in developing budgets to address this priority;

• Establishment of community centres was another priority – this not only targeted the interests of the youth but also the necessity to accommodate local needs and interaction. The Secretariat of State for Youth and Sports succeeded in implementing this program;

• Auditing public institutions and agencies – a priority pertaining to transparency and good governance. International auditors were brought in to undertake government audits and review the management systems with the recommendations informing further much-needed good governance reforms remains a strategic goal of Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão. This auditing was undertaken successfully and is now part of the overall and ongoing check-and-balance system of governance;76

• Public service sector reform – beyond security sector and law enforcement, the reform of public service modus operandi was one of the most important strategic priorities. Working in synchrony with the Parliament, the Government succeeded in introducing the Civil Service Commission (CSC) law which the Parliament adopted. The CSC has the mandate to oversee all the processes pertaining to the recruitment, management as well as the professional development;

• Private sector capacity building – complementing the public sector priority is the building of the private sector’s capacity to provide for professionalism and entrepreneur skills. The development of this sector has been a challenging task in terms of human capital and resources, as well as skills to undertake serious and long-term development projects in a competitive manner. This is particularly important if one looks at the urgency, in conjunction with the process of foreign investment, in regard to the context of the Timorese labour market and commercial competition. The government made budget allocations to address this challenge and supported the process of structuring the sector’s leadership, both at district as well as national levels.

12 Timor-Leste: Transition from Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding – a Timorese perspective 13

• Pensions for the war veterans – this priority manifests with strategic relevance to the overall security and stability of the State. This is also a priority Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão has worked on since he took office as President of Timor-Leste, on 20 May 2002, when he issued the first two Presidential decrees to create commissions for veteran affairs as well for Falintil77 cadres. Both commissions worked under the direct supervision of the President with the central goal of compiling database through a process of registration and cross-checking of individual data. This work took five years to complete, allowing for a law to be adopted by the Parliament. However, more details continue to be collected and are being processed under the provisions of the law pertaining to Former Combatants. Based on this work, the Ministry for Social Affairs78 has processed regular payments of subsidies to the veterans. Having addressed this priority, the way was opened to also extend care to the elderly and the disabled;

• Social security legislation – a social security legal framework was declared a priority, but this required baseline work on the implications to the national budget and financial sustainability. The Ministry for Social Affairs undertook registration of the elderly and implemented, upon approval of the Council of the Ministers, the Mothers’ Fund79 which provides support to mothers. Nevertheless, the Base Law for Social Security is still being drafted and the Council of the Ministers will decide the final version prior to sending to the Parliament for approval.

Therefore, in 2007, as soon as the IV Constitutional Government was sworn into office, the above priorities were worked upon and a transitional budget was proposed to the Parliament and approved, enabling the start of all the steps towards resolving the issues pertaining to the above priorities. In 2008, with the new annual budget, some priorities from the transitional period continued and new ones added. Improving public safety, employment and income generation, improving service delivery and good governance policies were brought forward as the priorities to be focused upon.

In the following years, national priorities continued to figure as the main indicator to strike the right balance between the immediate needs of the people and strategic needs of nationbuilding. Public safety, social security youth development employment and income generation, service delivery and good governance were high on the agenda for 2008. The following year, 2009, was declared by the IVCG80 to be the year to kick off infrastructure planning, with emphasis on roads and bridges, ports and airports. Starting to conceive infrastructure plans was the main goal. Apart from the immediate needs such as education, health and clean water, additional strategic goals for 2009 included rural development and the development of human resources, reforming governance system, enhancing food security and public safety and improving access to justice. Infrastructure continued to manifest as a priority in 2010, namely roads, water and electricity. The concern regarding infrastructure development led an emphasis on private sector development, particularly entrepreneurial capacity. Food security continued but emphasis was on productivity. Delivery of services also remained a priority but the focus was on decentralisation of service delivery to enhance effectiveness. Good governance and law and order remain an ongoing priority.

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TRUST: THE ULTIMATE STRATEGIC ASSET OF NATIONBUILDINGWhy these priorities? – First, it is clear that the system of governance and the delivery of services are major annual concerns. They are inherent to social justice, ensuring that the citizens feel well treated. Assistance to the veterans, pensions for the elderly and the disabled also are priorities in accordance with the perspective of social justice; but are not only that. There is the morality of the State, the duty to provide assistance to the veterans and the elderly so that they understand that the sacrifice they gave to the nation in exchange of freedom and independence was worthwhile. This justifies and explains the emphasis on effectiveness in service delivery and the efforts to improve this sector as much as possible. All the priorities converge into two common expected outcomes: enhancing the capacity of the people to actively participate in nationbuilding and bringing about long lasting peace. This also implies the need to achieve a shift in mentality, from one of having a sense of entitlement to government handouts which nurtures a dependency mindset, to one where citizens work hard and sacrifice, in a spirit not dissimilar to that of the struggle for independence, towards a State where productivity levels reflect the free spirit of the country.

Therefore, in the process of nationbuilding in Timor-Leste, consolidating national unity remains a strategic goal of paramount importance. National unity also ought to be conceived as a process, the main foundation for a successful State, which is, after all, the product of a social contract. Timor-Leste’s social contract was initially written in its very first Magna Carta, adopted in the historic Convention of CNRT in Peniche, Portugal in April 1999. The Preamble of this Magna Carta states that:

We, the People of East Timor, Mindful (sic) of our right to self-determination and independence and of our duty to achieve justice, to maintain peace and public order, to promote general well-being, to safeguard freedom and democracy. Mindful of the

urgent need to put an end to the tragedy that has befallen us over the past twenty-three years as a result of the aggression, invasion and illegal occupation of our Homeland

by the Indonesian regime, and of the need to promote peace, democracy and progress; Mindful of our historical, cultural, spiritual and religious heritage and of a cultural

identity that is rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition; Taking into account our many long years of suffering and declaring once again our firm resolve to be courageous and persistent in the Struggle to restore the international rule of law, self-determination and independence, social justice, equal rights and responsibilities between the peoples, in

honour of the memory of the Heroes of our War of Liberation.

14 Timor-Leste: Transition from Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding – a Timorese perspective 15

Such an overriding spirit of freedom and responsibility was reflected in what subsequently became the social contract of an independent Timor-Leste, the current Constitution. However, after almost ten years, even the elite still struggles to understand, in-depth, the concept of a social contract whereby the rights and duties of each person and institution in the country are enshrined in the Constitution, with the need to enjoy rights as well as exercise the duties to work and sacrifice towards nationbuilding.81 Thus, there are problems understanding the role of the Police as the only institution with legal authority to use force on behalf of the State to guarantee law and order; that the military cannot delve into the realms of policing, in the context of law and order, because the military has the central role of defending the territorial integrity of the State; therefore, its role is not the maintenance of law and order, but lies within the realms of national sovereignty. Thus, what is taken for granted in most developed countries, for Timor-Leste is still developing. Above all, social contract remains a cultural challenge, like in most developing countries.

This is why in the daily political life, the Constitution is a constant reference and many even recall a number of articles by memory. However, it is the understanding of the Constitution as a whole that remains a deficit;82 Section 63 of the Constitution states that ‘direct and active participation by men and women in political life is a requirement of, and a fundamental instrument for consolidating the democratic system.’83 And Section 6 provides for the ten objectives of the State. The last two related to harmony and integrated development, and equality of gender opportunities; that the State is ‘to promote the harmonious and integrated development of the sectors and regions and the fair distribution of the national product’84 and also ‘to promote and guarantee the effective equality of opportunities between women and men.’85 Promoting a harmonious and integrated development of all sectors and ensuring equity in the distribution of the benefits is an overriding social justice86 goal of every liberal democratic state. It is related to national stability, long term peace and social harmony. It is vital for the consolidation of national unity. Equality of opportunities for women and men is another overriding goal of every liberal democratic State. It brings with it the question of positive discrimination as a strategy and equal opportunity, not only for access to education, but above all, access to quality education. These are some key and real challenges for the State to implement the spirit of its social contract.87 Ultimately, perhaps reflecting the history of the struggle for independence and particularly how a people living in poverty could have sustained 24 years of war—against a gigantic and neighbouring State—and win it, the morality of the State and the duty to strike a balance between the free market’s greedy and selfish competition and a ‘caring and caregiving’88 society, continues to surface in the democratic processes of Timor-Leste.

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SECURITY AND NATIONBUILDING: FAILURE IS NOT AN OPTIONFailing to perform in the ten key objectives of the State89 can weaken the national security environment. Equally, achieving successful performance in all the ten objectives remains an unrealistic expectation in the current phase of nationbuilding with all the inevitable barriers Timor-Leste has to face. Moving from peacekeeping to peace enforcement and from post conflict reconstruction towards long-term economic and political development90 requires steady security environment and the trust of the international community in terms of economic policies and security for foreign investment. Moreover, national security implies nurturing—with success—its key ingredient which is the trust of the people on the way the country is governed, in spite of serious difficulties. National harmony thus becomes crucial and this demands healthy democracy and long-term strategic plan. Hence, the need to consolidate national unity, the need to work towards making as many people as possible understand the real and complex challenges that lie ahead in the building of a successful State. An effective national strategic development plan for the State is of paramount importance but, even if the plan is well developed and structured, effective communication with the people is still a crucial responsibility for the leaders.91 Making things simple and accessible must be the art of national politics. Defending honesty and transparency at all times ought to be the prerogative of governance. Failing to perform in these realms, can bring about crisis—some more serious than others—but all can contribute towards an environment where the people do not trust the Government and all or some of the four pillars of sovereignty of the State.92 Under such situation, legitimacy becomes weak and stability a real challenge. Failure, therefore, cannot be an option because the much-needed trust of the People in the State will be jeopardised.93

Under the current development trend, nationbuilding in Timor-Leste can be said to adhere to a security paradigm from the perspective of human security. This can be seen from the national priorities outlined above. The world has changed beyond recognition. The polarised security model of the Cold War is no longer. Asymmetric warfare now becomes the main concern, not only of the only remaining global superpower, the US, but also of its allies, both close and distant.94 Hence, the war on terror occupies the priority page in the security agenda of the superpower and its allies.95 Nevertheless, even the U.S.—albeit being the only remaining superpower—cannot achieve its security goals without the support of strategic allies. As Thomas Barnett contends, America can no longer deny the importance of the small threats, small enemies, and small wars and needs to manage the strategic security environment which is globalisation’s gap’96 and, as far as the global war on terrorism is concerned, the US cannot shrink the gap by itself.97 Ideological boundaries remain because of the communist regimes of China, North Korea and Cuba but, the availability of nuclear warheads and economic matters, are central to security concerns. Globalisation and the free market also bring further into the centre of global challenges the element of energy security. Timor-Leste needs to reconcile these elements within its strategic security considerations, if the country is to succeed in delivering the key objectives of the State.

16 Timor-Leste: Transition from Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding – a Timorese perspective 17

Accession to ASEAN is a reasonable step forward, but it is the development of human capital to care for the country’s ability to compete that matters the most. The world is no longer infested with ideologically bound States enemies. The US is no longer worried about the nuclear power of the Soviet Union and the domino effect of communism. Nowadays, States face risks and threats mostly from non-state actors. Thus, preparedness against these threats is the art of security and the challenge is finding an effective way of identifying the real risks and providing solutions to mitigate these risks. Transnational crime, more than ever, is becoming a threat which developed and developing countries alike must work together to eliminate, even as its nature and dynamism as well as integration into the realms of globalisation, makes these crimes complex to eradicate. Technology forms the basis of much of this complexity and even more so, because the approaches and outcomes of successful globalisation can likewise work to enhance the capability of transnational organised crime. In this regard, therefore, security needs to be viewed as internal as well as regional and global. Understanding all the factors pertaining to the complexities of transnational crimes, therefore, becomes a determining step. Weak border control and law enforcement, combined with legislative gaps, potentially can bring about an environment conducive to money laundering, drug, human and illegal arms trafficking—which transnational crime can take advantage.

One added problem for Timor-Leste is reconciliation. Regional security means the need to co-exist effectively with Australia and Indonesia. The mindsets of many still see Indonesia and Australia as foe, not real friends. There is, however, a need to promote ongoing reconciliation processes. This includes training of police and defence personnel, engaging in academic debates as well as providing opportunities for scholarships. Indonesia has contributed, by allowing thousands of Timorese to study in Indonesian universities, charging only domestic fees, rather than international students’ fee. Australia also is contributing in this direction by increasing scholarships for Timorese students, providing training opportunities through defence cooperation arrangements and police training and studies. It’s a process and one may need to adopt a ‘give-time-to-time’ approach, because changing mentality does take time and sometimes generations. From Australia’s perspective, there is the need to enhance further the interaction between both societies, to narrow the gap of cultural prejudice. As for Indonesia, an important step towards better understanding between the two States and politics was the establishment of The Truth of Truth and Friendship, under the auspices of both Heads of States. The conclusion of the work of TFC seen from its report ‘Per Memoriam Ad Spem’98 is a remarkable demonstration of the commitment of both sovereign States to dig deep into the truth of violence and crimes committed at times of conflict. On the former militia groups and also pro-independence groups, for example, on their respective identified crimes, the report reiterates that ‘States have a political and moral obligation to accept responsibility for gross human rights violations committed by groups to which they have a historical connection, even when those institutions no longer exist or have undergone significant transformation.’99 Similar to the Report of CAVR, implementing the recommendations of TFC represent yet another challenge for both States—the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste and the Republic of Indonesia—will have to overcome. In doing so, there is no doubt that long term national security and development interests will be key considerations.

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CONCLUSIONIn his address to the 2010 Development Partners Meeting in Díli, Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão reflected upon the past ten years, saying that ‘having lived in freedom for the past 10 years and independently for the last eight, all Timorese have experienced an arduous period of statebuilding.’100 This arduous road of the statebuilding process of Timor-Leste is a one way street. Failure is not an option because this would mean the possibility of becoming entangled in a cycle of violence and, therefore, hindering opportunities for success. After almost ten years of nationbuilding, the identification of national priorities and successful implementation of strategies to move ahead, constitute a trademark of Timorese governance. The mandate of the current government will end in June 2012101 when new elections will be held. It will be the second general election ever to take place in Timor-Leste. In the previous 2007 election, the outcome was very encouraging, as this about-to-end five-year mandate already testifies. Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão, satisfied with the 2007 election processes, said that ‘while stained by some incidents of violence, the 2007 parliamentary elections102 were nevertheless a demonstration of the political maturity of our people.’ This was certainly the case. The hope is that 2012 will further enhance this maturity so that the Timorese can continue to move forward with certainty, towards the consolidation of independence—the ultimate desire. As this paper is written, discussions on the impact of ending UN Missions in the country are occurring. After the next election when, once again, the Timorese will show undeniable political maturity, it will be hard to argue for the continuation of a UN presence, at least in the form of a mission similar to those already implemented according to Security Council mandates. Nevertheless, successful nationbuilding certainly requires a long-term strategic approach. There is now consensus on this. How to go about it will require a country-specific approach; and Timor-Leste has its own complexities, challenges and virtues. Let’s hope that, if virtue alone cannot make it, international solidarity can still play an important and active role in the years to come. After all, the ultimate dream is not only never to be isolated again, but to be joined by true friends ready to share the heavy burden of nationbuilding.

Endnotes1 Secretary of State for the Council of Ministers; this paper is based on the power point presentation, with the same title, used in the

Civil Military Interaction Seminar 2010, held in the Convention Centre, Darling Harbour, Sydney, Australia, 7–9 December 2010.

2 The Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Section 13, on Official languages and national languages

3 Ibid, Section 159

4 Timor-Leste is the official name of East Timor, adopted since 20 of May 2002, based on its Constitution

5 The Carnation Revolution was the successful move by the Portuguese military to bring down the dictatorship and end the colonial

war. It was led by the Movimento das Forças Armadas (The Armed Forces Movement)

6 Color television broadcast started since 1967; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Color_television. The first Color Broadcast in Lisbon,

Portugal, was made in 1975, with live coverage of the first parliamentary elections after the carnation revolution but, due to

political turmoil and economical situation of the country, the color regular broadcast was delayed several times for nearly five

years. Only in March 1980, regular color television broadcast started in Portugal, with more than 70 per cent of the programmes

being already in color (source: Wikidepia.org) accessed 28 February, 2011, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R%C3%A1dio_e_

Telvis%C3%A3o_de_Portugal

7 L. Oppenhem, ‘Disputes, War and Neutrality’ in H. Lauterpacht (ed.), International Law – A Treatise, Vol. II, 7th Ed., Longmans,

Green & Co Ltd, UK, 1952

18 Timor-Leste: Transition from Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding – a Timorese perspective 19

8 On December 5, 1975, both men arrived in Jakarta. It is widely speculated, with sound basis, that their arrival was to convince the

then President Suharto of Indonesia to give green light for the full scale invasion

9 ‘Reconhecimento do papel Desempenhado pelo SR. Francisco Xavier do Amaral na luta pela Independência Nacional’, Resolução

do Parlamento Nacional No. 10/2007, Jornal da República, 2007, p. 1798

After the restoration of independence, the Parliament, in 2007, decided to adopt the above Resolution, declaring and

acknowledging Francisco Xavier do Amaral as the Proclamador da Independência (The Person who Proclaimed Independence), as

per 28 November 1975, including the status of former President of the Republic

10 The mountain of the ancestry, of those that have passed away

11 Xanana Gusmão reflected upon the experience of transformation of the guerrilla warfare of Timor-Leste during the very first

presidential election campaign in Timor-Leste, in April 2002. This experience was again reflected upon, by Xanana Gusmão, when,

as Prime Minister, he travelled similar guerrilla route from the very Eastern part of the territory until Oe-Cusse Ambeno, between

April and August 2010, to discuss his government’s proposed Strategic National Development Plan

12 The exact place was Mau-Bai in Lacluta, district of Viqueque, in the Eastern part of Timor-Leste

13 The four-day Congress, held between 8-11 March 1981, confirmed Xanana Gusmão as the new national leader, responsible for

devising and implementing political and military strategies to progress and, ultimately, to win the war. In the Congress, Commander

Xanana Gusmão made his keynote address, an in-depth speech, a reflection of the previous years’ resistance to the illegal

Indonesian occupation and the ways to move forward

14 Ibid

15 Meaning not a monopoly of a single party or parties

16 Comando da Luta in Portuguese

17 ‘The United Nations and East Timor – A Chronology’, UNTAET, accessed March 24, 2011, www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/

missions/past/etimor/Untaetchrono.html

18 Full title given to this accord: ‘Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the Question of East

Timor’. This success testifies to the commitment of Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who declared upon taking Office in New York,

that he was going to solve the ‘Question of East Timor’

19 The current Government’s motto ‘Goodbye Conflict, Welcome Development’ is to encapsulate the national goal of eradicating

conflicts and shifting the mindset towards constructive approach to Nationbuilding

20 United Nations Mission for East Timor

21 Announced simultaneously by the SG Kofi Annan on September 3 in New York; and his Special Representative Ian Martin in Díli

22 ‘East Timor – UNMISET – Background’, accessed 28 February 2011, www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmiset/

background.html

23 SRSG and Transitional Administrator, Sérgio Vieira de Mello, took up duties in East Timor on November 17, 1999. For 1999

to 2002 chronology of events pertaining to the United Nations and East Timor, see ‘The United Nations and East Timor – A

Chronology’, www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/Untaetchrono.html

24 The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established in accordance with the Security Council

Resolution 1272 (1999)

25 CNRT was a product of metamorphosis of the 24-year Struggle for National Liberation, evolving from the Revolutionary Council

of National Resistance (CRRN) to National Council of the Maubere’s Resistance (CNRM) which later changed to CNRT – the

National Council of Timorese Resistance. This was not only a process of name-changing; it was an in-depth shift of paradigm,

almost reflecting the way the world has shifted from the USSR Cold War era to what the world is today, bringing about debates

on international security and international relation. It was a shift from ideologically-bound leftist structures to more inclusionary

strategy, bearing in mind the sole interest of the nation as a whole - the survival of the Nation. Therefore, the shift from a

‘revolutionary council’ to one of ‘national council’ but maintaining the concept of Maubere’s patriotism, and later simply to an

ideological ‘neutral’ ‘national council’ was the transformation of minds and behavior which still influences national politics of Timor-

Leste today. This transformation was not smooth or violence neutral. It was a revolution in itself. The success of such an incredible

transformation of mind and political behavior helped made it possible for all the Timorese to reach out to the ballots and defeat

Indonesia. It also influenced the current focus of defending national interests at all costs. So national interest and national unity

became embedded in the Timorese political culture, as a paramount goal for all the Timorese

20CIVIL-MILLITARY WORKING PAPERS

26 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

27 Forças da Defesa de Timor Leste

28 ‘The United Nations and East Timor – A Chronology’

29 Section 168 of the Constitution pertaining to ‘Second Transitional Government’

30 Ibid

31 The Constituent Assembly decided to introduce in the Constitution, under the ‘Final and Transitional Provisions’ the proviso that

the ‘Second Transitional Government’ shall be transformed into the First Constitutional Government (ICG) - see Section 168

of the Constitution of Timor-Leste. In a way, this may have contributed to weaken the legitimacy of the Government when the

non-stop public protests went on in 2006 demanding the resignation of the Prime Minister. The resignation of the Prime Minister

implies necessarily the end of the First Constitutional Government (see Section 112 of the Constitution of Timor-Leste)

32 Acronym in Portuguese, meaning ‘Polícia Nacional de Timor-Leste’

33 Also an acronym in Portuguese, meaning ‘Forças da Defesa de Timor Leste’. After May 20, 2002, the Constitution was enforced,

so the name was changed to FALINTIL – FDTL

34 Faunstino Gomes ‘Atlas Eleitoral: Eleisaun Parlamentar Sira’, Díli, Timor-Leste, 2010, CNE

35 R Holbrooke was then the US Ambassador to Indonesia. On November 22, 1999, Holbrooke travelled to West Timor, to witness

the signing of an agreement between INTERFET and the Indonesian Armed Forces designed to speed up the return of refugees

from West Timor, op. cit., Chronology, www.un.org./en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/Untaetchrono.html

36 Thomas Hobbs, On the Citizen, Richard Tuck & Michael Silverthorne (eds.), Cambridge University Press, UK, 1998

37 Known in Portuguese as Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação, this Commission worked for five years and produced

a final report which continues to be the benchmark of good governance and human rights for the development of the State of

Timor-Leste. Article 162 (1) of the Constitution of Timor-Leste: ‘It is incumbent upon the Commission for Reception, Truth and

Reconciliation to discharge functions conferred to it by UNTAET Regulation No. 2001/10

38 Law No.7/2003 of 24 September, National Parliament of Timor-Leste

39 Law No. 13/2004 of 29 December, National Parliament of Timor-Leste

40 Law No. 11/2005 of 10 of August, National Parliament of Timor-Leste

41 UDT stands for Timorese Democratic Union which had two seats in the Parliament in the Constituent Assembly and first

legislature, but failed to win seats in the election of 2007

42 Penny Green & Tony Ward, State Crime – Government, Violence and Corruption, Puto Press, London, UK, 2004

43 José Ramos-Horta, The Unfinished Saga of East Timor’, The Red Sea Press, 1987

44 Areas occupied by Fretilin and the population, mobilized to fight against the Indonesian military and occupation.

45 Support bases, providing Falintil and the structure of the party with the necessary logistical support

46 These three countries, whilst colonies of Portuguese Empire, were the ones actively pursuing, through both political and armed

struggles, the reaffirmation of their inalienable right to Self-determination and independence

47 Australia’s focus was to take over the oil-rich region of Timor Gap, which became reality through the infamous flight over the

Timor Sea by the then Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and the late Ali Alatas, then the Foreign Minister of Indonesia

48 Paula Escarameia, Formation of Concepts in International Law: Subsumption under Self-determination in the Case of East Timor, Centro

de Estudos Orientais, Fundação Oriente, Lisboa, Portugal, 1993

49 ‘Liberated zones’ were the areas controlled by the resistance freedom fighters

50 National unity was originally understood as a broader front, but strongly influenced by leftist’s selective approach, primarily based

on converted ideological cadres, rather than a neutral ideological conceptualization. As cultural survival and co-existence with the

enemy gained root in the minds and behavior of the people, the struggle for national liberation also gained new and revitalized

momentum, extending to the Diaspora Timorese communities

20 Timor-Leste: Transition from Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding – a Timorese perspective 21

51 Double-headed people, those whose allegiance appeared to be unclear

52 Agio Pereira, “Timor-Leste: the challenges of Nation and State building – Marked in History the Form of My Liberation”, Diário

Nacional, 30 August 2009

53 Luís da Costa, Borja da Costa Selecção de Poemas - Klibur Dadolin, Lidel, Lisboa, Portugal, Setembro 2009

54 ‘Kdadalak’ means streams and in his poem of the same name, Borja da Costa allude to the need to act like the streams of water

coming together and transform into a main river, thus unified and stronger

55 Ibid

56 The political system of Timor-Leste separates the Government from the Parliament, albeit the formation of the Government is

based on majority vote in the Parliament. The Government, therefore, is independent from the Parliament, and if ministers were

elected to the Parliament, they need to resign, before taking office in Government. For a brief history of the Governments of

Timor-Leste, see website www.timor-leste.gov.tl under ‘Government’ and ‘Historical Archive’

57 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, Harvard University Press, USA, 1999

58 Francis Fukuyama posits in ‘Nation-Building and the Failure of Institutional Memory’, Nation-Building – Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq,

F Fukuyama (ed.), John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, USA, 2006, p.5

59 Bob Lowry, ‘Defence and security in Timor-Leste, accessed February 25, 2011, http://devenet.anu.edu.au/timor-beyond%20

crisis%20papers/Lowry.ml.doc

60 Also known as Cornélio Gama

61 Known in Portuguese as ‘Palácio do Governo’, the Office of the Prime Minister

62 Signatories of a Petition handed over to the Parliament, the Government and President of the Republic demanding the sacking

of senior commanders of F-FDTL The Constitution of Timor-Leste, in its Section 48, specifically allows for the ‘Right to petition’,

allowing for ‘Every citizen...the right to submit, individually or jointly with others, petitions, complaints and claims to organs of

sovereignty or any authority for the purpose of defending his or her rights, the Constitution, the law or general interests.’

63 See Liz Jackson, ‘Four Corners’, ABC television, June 19, 2006

64 PNTL is the Portuguese acronym, meaning Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste, responsible for law enforcement in the country. PNTL

also suffered as a consequence of the peticionários. F-FDTL shot and killed eight Police officers, during a ‘surrender negotiated by

representative of the UN mission, UNOTIL

65 Speech of Prime Minister Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão to the UN Security Council, February 22, 2011

66 Ibid

67 ‘UNMIT: Transition – Presentation at the Council of Ministers’, 18 November 2010

68 Speech of Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão, February 22, 2011

69 Ibid

70 The motives of the perpetrators are still unclear, in spite of media reports, endless analysis, accusations and jail sentences

71 The Constitution of Timor-Leste provides for the declaration of a “state of exception”. As Section 24 prescribes, this implies the

suspension of the exercise of fundamental rights, freedoms and guarantees, once a state of siege or a state of emergency has been

declared

72 Mark Davis, ‘Timor – Hunt for the Truth’, Dateline, SBS, April 16, 2008 www.sbs.com.au/dateline/story/transcript/id/544917/n/

Timor-Hunt-for-the-Truth; alternatively see www.etan.org/et2008/4paril/26/16dateline.htm

73 Section 25 of RDTL Constitution provides for the declaration of ‘State of exception’, due to a number of serious threats to the

State, including ‘…serious disturbance or threat of serious disturbance to the democratic constitutional order…’. The exception

means ‘suspension of the exercise of fundamental rights, freedoms and guarantees’

74 Aid donors are now known as development partners to emphasise development processes rather than aid for the sake of

humanitarian assistance

22CIVIL-MILLITARY WORKING PAPERS

75 See ‘Millennium Development Goals 2010 – Where are we now! Where do we want to be in 2015’, a report published by the

Timorese Government, with assistance from the UN Country team, supported by the European Union Delegation in Timor-Leste.

In the Forward by Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão, reference is made to the World Bank’s most recent findings that since 2007

poverty has been reduced by 9 per cent, ‘making the new poverty level in Timor-Leste 41% for 2009.’

76 Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão also spearheaded the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Commission as well as the reform of

the powers and legal framework pertaining to the independence and effectiveness of the Office of the Inspector-General

77 Forças Armadas de Libertação de Timor-Leste (Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor)

78 In Portuguese is Ministério da Solidariedade Social

79 In Portuguese a ‘Bolsa da Mãe’

80 The Fourth Constitutional Government

81 In April 1999, as a result of the first Convention held by the Timorese resistance in the Diaspora, in Peniche, Portugal, with key

representatives from inside Timor-Leste, a Magna Carta was adopted. But this Magna Carta was not properly disseminated.

Perhaps because of 24-year campaign accusing Suharto’s regime for blatant abuse of human rights - as in the final Report of CAVR

- the ability to work on the opposite side of the fence (i.e. in the process of building and embodiment of human rights principles,

one often hears more demands for the rights then the preoccupation with duties. That’s why during the Parliamentary debate

of 2011 Budget, in January 2011, the Speaker of the Parliament, a former political prisoner, after hearing so frequent reference to

the rights of the citizens coming from Members of Parliament, remarked that he will establish one NGO to give emphasis only to

duties – Human Duties’ NGO – because Timor-Leste needs it, he concluded

82 Professor Pedro Bacelar Vasconcelos, expert on Constitutional Law, established a team from University of Minho, northern region

of Portugal, together with a number of other Portuguese with relevant expertise, are concluding an important work pertaining to

the interpretation every single Section of the Timorese Constitution

83 The Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Section 63, p.29, English version

84 Ibid, Section 6 (i)

85 Ibid, Section 6 (j)

86 For in-depth discussion on justice, reflecting much of what is now evolving in Timor-Leste, see Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice,

The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, USA, 2009

87 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Anne Cohler, Basia Miller & Harold Stone (eds. and trans.), Cambridge University Press, UK,

1989

88 Riane Eisler, The Real Wealth of Nations – Creating a Caring Economics, Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc., San Francisco, USA, 2008,

p.34

89 As per Section 6 of the Constitution of RDTL

90 F Fukuyama, 2006, p.232-4

91 This was the reason Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão travelled to all the 65 districts of Timor-Leste to explain, listen to and discuss

directly with the people a national Strategic Development Plan to be implemented until 2030

92 The Constitution enshrines four pillars of sovereignty. By hierarchical order: the President, the Parliament, the Government and

the Courts

93 Nelson Kasfir, ‘Domestic Anarchy, Security Dilemmas, and Violent Predation’, in Robert Torberg (ed.), When States Fail – Causes

and Consequences,

94 Thomas Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map-War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004

95 See the First National Security Statement to the Australian Parliament, by the then Prime Minister of Australia Kevin Rudd, 4

December 2008, where it is stated that “terrorism is likely to endure as a serious ongoing threat for the foreseeable future.

Extremism leading to violence or terrorism continues to pose a direct threat to Australia and Australian security interests” p.18

96 T Barnett, 2004, p.63

97 T Barnett, op.cit., p.58

22 Timor-Leste: Transition from Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding – a Timorese perspective 23

98 ‘Per Memoriam Ad Spam’ is the title of the Final Report of the Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF) Indonesia-Timor-Leste.

The Latin title means ‘Through Memory Towards Hope’, issued in Denpasar, Indonesia, on 31 March 2008.

99 Ibid, p.292

100 Address to the Opening Session of Timor-Leste Development Partners Meeting, Díli, April 7, 2010, p.3

101 The last legislative election was held on 30 June, 2007

102 Meaning both the Presidential as well as the legislative election; the Presidential election went to a second round to decide on the

winner and President José Ramos-Horta was elected