7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

1/36

Cayetano v. Monsod

G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991

Facts:

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received bythe Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991.Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does notpossess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice oflaw for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed thenomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, hetook his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman ofthe COMELEC.Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission onAppointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer,filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that saidconfirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of theCommission on Elections be declared null and void.

Issue:

Whether the appointment of Chairman Monsod of Comelec violates Section 1(1), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution?

Held:

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C, that there shallbe a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and sixCommissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, atthe time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of acollege degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective positionin the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof,including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have

been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed thebar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been dues payingmember of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for morethan ten years.

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

2/36

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, ascommonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in thebusiness of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone areoften called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The

firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners.Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the memberscalled shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are theexperienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or moreinexperienced salaried attorneys called "associates."

Hence, the Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the publichearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessedthe necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered bythe Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyondjudicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearlyshown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In theinstant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's correctivepower, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that wouldamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance ofthe writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, he Courtsaid that, Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be

performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, theonly condition being that the appointee should possess the qualificationsrequired by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on theground that there are others better qualified who should have beenpreferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdomwhich only the appointing authority can decide.

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

3/36

Cayetano v. Monsod

FACTS

Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of Chairman of

the COMELEC on April 25, 1991. Cayetano opposed the nomination becauseallegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having beenengaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Challenging the validityof the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsodsnomination, petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition prayingthat said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod asChairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void becauseMonsod did not meet the requirement of having practiced law for the last tenyears.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requirement of the position of Chairmanof the COMELEC.

HELD:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person isalso considered to be in the practice of law when he: . . . for valuableconsideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associationsor corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in arepresentative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending orprospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,

committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settlecontroversies. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law,or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside ofcourt for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed thebar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a duespaying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer formore than ten years. Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he hasbeen engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

4/36

RENATO L. CAYETANO vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD

September 3, 1991 | G.R. No. 100113

Facts:

- President Corazon Aquino Appointed Christian Monsod as the chairman ofCOMELEC.- Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination because according to him, therespondent fall short of the ten year requirement for the position.- The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and sixCommissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, atthe time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of acollege degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective positionin the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof,including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who havebeen engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasissupplied)- June 5, 1991: COA approved the appointment.- June 18, 1991: Monsod took his oath and assumed office.- Petitioner prayed for certiorari and prohibition against Monsod.

Issue: Whether or not Monsod is engaged in the practice of law for morethan ten years.

Held:

Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator ofcontracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verilymore than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has beenengaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the publichearings on Monsods confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessedthe necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by

the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyondjudicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearlyshown shall the Court interfere with the Commissions judgment. In theinstant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Courts correctivepower, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

5/36

amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance ofthe writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires theapplication of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Toengage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which arecharacteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give noticeor render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in anydegree of legal knowledge or skill.

CAYETANO VS. MONSOD

comelec practice of law

Christian Monsod was nominated by President Cory as Chairman ofComelec.

Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does notpossess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practiceof law for at least 10 years.

According to the Consti, members of Comelec must have been engaged inthe practice of law for at least 10 years

The CA nevertheless confirmed the nomination of Monsod. He took hisoath of office and assumed office as Chair.

Cayetano, as citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for Prohibition, prayingtha the confirmation and appointment of Monsod be declared null andvoid.

ISSUE: Whether Monsod possessed the qualification that he had engaged in

the practice of law for at least 10 years?

SC: YES.

The practice of law is defined as the rendition of services requiring the

knowledge and application of legal principles and techniques to serve the

interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or

advising or assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

6/36

preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special

proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments, and the

giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all

actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is

also considered to be in the practice of law when he for valuable

consideration engages in the business of advising persons as to their rights

under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in

proceedings pending or prospective before any court, commission, referee,

board, body committee, etc, and in such representative capacity performs

any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their

clients under the law. As long as the work done involves the determinationby the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions, then it is

a practice of law.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the

application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To

engage in the practice of law is to perform the acts which are characteristics

of the profession. Generaly, the practice of law is to give notice or render

any kind of service which requires the use in any degree of legal knowledgeor skill.

PRIVATE PRACTICE = means an individual or organization (firm) engaged in

the business of delivering legal services. But most lawyers do not only spend

time in litigation or courtrooms. Substantially more legal work is transacted

in law offices than in courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both

litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find

themselves spending more time business counseling rather than tryingcases.

Background of Atty Monsod:

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

7/36

After graduating from UP College of Law, he worked in the law office of his

father. He then worked for the World Bank as operations officer in Costa Rica

y Panama. After returning to the Philippines, he worked with Meralco, served

as CEO of bank, and subsequently of a business conglomerate. In 1986, he

has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economicconsultant or adviser. He was also Sec-Gen and Chairman of Namfrel, and in

fact appeared before the Comelec during the hearing for accreditation. He

became a member of the Davide Commission, a quasi-judicial body

investigating on the coup detats. He was a member of the Con-Com, and

Chairman of its Committee of Accountability of Public Officers.

Interpreted in the light of the modern concept of law practice, and taking

into account the liberal construction of the Constitution, Atty Monsods pastexperience as lawyer-economist, lawyer-manager, lawyer-entrepreneur,

lawyer-negotiator, lawyer-legislator, verily more than satisfy the

constitutional requirement. He has engaged in the practice of law for at least

10 years.

Padilla Dissenting:

Practice of law is commonly understood as actual performance or actual

application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of

knowledge. It connotes active, habitual, repeated or customary action.

It would be like a doctor who is employed and habitually performing the

tasks of a nurse, he cannot be said to be in the practice of medicine. Just as

a CPA who works as a clerk, cannot be said to be practicing his profession as

an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business

executive or corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of the legal

department, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.

Gutierrez Dissenting:

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

8/36

To be engaged in the practice of law requires committed participation in

something which is the result of ones decisive choice. It means that one is

occupied and involved in an enterprise, one is obliged or pledged to carry it

out with an intent and attention. The practice envisioned is active and

regular, not isolated, occasional. Seasonal, intermittent, or extemporaneous.

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

9/36

MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO

comelec temporary appointments

President GMA appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman,3

and Borra4 and Tuason5 as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term ofseven years and all expiring on February 2, 2008. They all took their oathof office and assumed the positions. The Office of the President submittedto the Commission on Appointments the ad interim appointments ofBenipayo, Borra and Tuason for confirmation.6 However, the Commissionon Appointments did not act on said appointments.

President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borraand Tuason to the same positions and for the same term of seven years.They took their oaths of office for a second time. The Office of the

President transmitted their appointments to the Commission onAppointments for confirmation.

Congress adjourned before the Commission on Appointments could act ontheir appointments.

In his capacity as Comelec Chair, Benipayo issued a Memorandum,reassigning Matibag to the from the Education Department to the LawDepartment

Matibag sought reconsideration, arguing that transfer and detail ofemployees are prohibited during the election period, both by the ElectionCode and a Civil Service Memorandum

Matibag filed an administrative and criminal case against Benipayo. Matibag also questioned the appointment and the right to remain in officeof Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of theCOMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interimappointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutionalprovisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on theprohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments of itsChairman and members.

Petitioner posits the view that an ad interim appointment can bewithdrawn or revoked by the President at her pleasure, and can even bedisapproved or simply by-passed by the Commission on Appointments.

For this reason, petitioner claims that an ad interim appointment istemporary in character and consequently prohibited by the last sentenceof Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. The rationale behindpetitioners theory is that only an appointee who is confirmed by theCommission on Appointments can guarantee the independence of theCOMELEC. A confirmed appointee is beyond the influence of the Presidentor members of the Commission on Appointments since his appointment

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

10/36

can no longer be recalled or disapproved. Prior to his confirmation, theappointee is at the mercy of both the appointing and confirming powerssince his appointment can be terminated at any time for any cause.

Petitioner also agues that assuming the first ad interim appointments andthe first assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are

constitutional, the renewal of the their ad interim appointments and theirsubsequent assumption of office to the same positions violate theprohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of theConstitution. Petitioner theorizes that once an ad interim appointee is by-passed by the Commission on Appointments, his ad interim appointmentcan no longer be renewed because this will violate Section 1 (2), ArticleIX-C of the Constitution which prohibits reappointments. Petitionerasserts that this is particularly true to permanent appointees who haveassumed office, which is the situation of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason iftheir ad interim appointments are deemed permanent in character.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuasonon the basis of the ad interim appointments issued by the Presidentamounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), ArticleIX-C of the Constitution;

2. Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and the first assumptionof office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are legal, whether or not the

renewal of their ad interim appointments and subsequent assumption ofoffice to the same positions violate the prohibition on reappointmentunder Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution;

SC:

1. MATIBAG IS WRONG.

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes

effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once

the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject toconfirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its

permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim

appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved

by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of

Congress.

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

11/36

Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such

disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be

withdrawn or revoked by the President. The fear that the President can

withdraw or revoke at any time and for any reason an ad interim

appointment is utterly without basis.

2. An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or

failure of the Commission on Appointments to organize is another matter. A

by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the

merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of

Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to

give or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the

Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the adinterim appointment of a by-passed appointee. Thus, a by-passed

appointment can be considered again if the President renews the

appointment.

In short, an ad interim appointment ceases to be effective upon

disapproval by the Commission, because the incumbent can not continue

holding office over the positive objection of the Commission. It ceases, also,

upon "the next adjournment of the Congress", simply because the President

may then issue new appointments - not because of implied disapproval of

the Commission deduced from its inaction during the session of Congress,

for, under the Constitution, the Commission may affect adversely the interim

appointments only by action, never by omission. If the adjournment of

Congress were an implied disapproval ofad interim appointments made prior

thereto, then the President could no longer appoint those so by-passed by

the Commission. But, the fact is that the President may reappoint them,

thus clearly indicating that the reason for said termination of the ad interim

appointments is not the disapproval thereof allegedly inferred from said

omission of the Commission, but the circumstance that upon said

adjournment of the Congress, the President is free to make ad interimappointments or reappointments."

The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the

Constitution applies neither to disapproved nor by-passed ad interim

appointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be revived by

another ad interim appointment because the disapproval is final under

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

12/36

Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not because a reappointment

is prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. A by-

passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim

appointment because there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article

VII of the Constitution, and such new appointment will not result in theappointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years.

Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution provides that "[t]he

Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed x x x for a term of

seven years without reappointment." (Emphasis supplied) There are four

situations where this provision will apply. The first situation is where an ad

interim appointee to the COMELEC, after confirmation by the Commission on

Appointments, serves his full seven-year term. Such person cannot be

reappointed to the COMELEC, whether as a member or as a chairman,

because he will then be actually serving more than seven years. The second

situation is where the appointee, after confirmation, serves a part of his

term and then resigns before his seven-year term of office ends. Such

person cannot be reappointed, whether as a member or as a chair, to a

vacancy arising from retirement because a reappointment will result in the

appointee also serving more than seven years. The third situation is where

the appointee is confirmed to serve the unexpired term of someone who died

or resigned, and the appointee completes the unexpired term. Such person

cannot be reappointed, whether as a member or chair, to a vacancy arising

from retirement because a reappointment will result in the appointee also

serving more than seven years.

The fourth situation is where the appointee has previously served a

term of less than seven years, and a vacancy arises from death or

resignation. Even if it will not result in his serving more than seven years, a

reappointment of such person to serve an unexpired term is also prohibitedbecause his situation will be similar to those appointed under the second

sentence of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. This provision

refers to the first appointees under the Constitution whose terms of office

are less than seven years, but are barred from ever being reappointed under

any situation. Not one of these four situations applies to the case of

Benipayo, Borra or Tuason.

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

13/36

To foreclose this interpretation, the phrase "without reappointment"

appears twice in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the present Constitution. The

first phrase prohibits reappointment of any person previously appointed for a

term of seven years. The second phrase prohibits reappointment of any

person previously appointed for a term of five or three years pursuant to the

first set of appointees under the Constitution. In either case, it does not

matter if the person previously appointed completes his term of office for the

intention is to prohibit any reappointment of any kind.

However, an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the

Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office. The

period from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it

lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. To hold otherwisewould mean that the President by his unilateral action could start and

complete the running of a term of office in the COMELEC without the consent

of the Commission on Appointments. This interpretation renders inutile the

confirming power of the Commission on Appointments.

The phrase "without reappointment" applies only to one who has been

appointed by the President and confirmed by the Commission on

Appointments, whether or not such person completes his term of office.

There must be a confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the

previous appointment before the prohibition on reappointment can apply. To

hold otherwise will lead to absurdities and negate the Presidents power to

make ad interim appointments.

In the great majority of cases, the Commission on Appointments

usually fails to act, for lack of time, on the ad interim appointments first

issued to appointees. If such ad interim appointments can no longer be

renewed, the President will certainly hesitate to make ad interim

appointments because most of her appointees will effectively be disapproved

by mere inaction of the Commission on Appointments. This will nullify theconstitutional power of the President to make ad interim appointments, a

power intended to avoid disruptions in vital government services. This Court

cannot subscribe to a proposition that will wreak havoc on vital government

services.

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

14/36

The prohibition on reappointment is common to the three

constitutional commissions. The framers of the present Constitution

prohibited reappointments for two reasons. The first is to prevent a second

appointment for those who have been previously appointed and confirmed

even if they served for less than seven years. The second is to insure thatthe members of the three constitutional commissions do not serve beyond

the fixed term of seven years.

As to the transfer of Matibag

COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 does not require that every transfer or

reassignment of COMELEC personnel should carry the concurrence of theCOMELEC as a collegial body. Interpreting Resolution No. 3300 to require

such concurrence will render the resolution meaningless since the COMELEC

en banc will have to approve every personnel transfer or reassignment,

making the resolution utterly useless. Resolution No. 3300 should be

interpreted for what it is, an approval to effect transfers and reassignments

of personnel, without need of securing a second approval from the COMELEC

en banc to actually implement such transfer or reassignment.

The COMELEC Chairman is the official expressly authorized by law to

transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel. The person holding that office, in a

de jure capacity, is Benipayo. The COMELEC en banc, in COMELEC Resolution

No. 3300, approved the transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel

during the election period. Thus, Benipayos order reassigning petitioner

from the EID to the Law Department does not violate Section 261 (h) of the

Omnibus Election Code.

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

15/36

Matibag vs Benipayo

GR No. 149036April 2, 2002

Maria J. Angelina G. Matibag questions the constitutionality of theappointment by President Arroyo of Benipayo (Chairman of the Commission

on Elections), and Bora and Tuason (COMELEC Commissioners). Shequestions the legality of appointment by Benipayo of Velma J. Cinco asDirector IV of the Comelecs EID and reassigning her to the Law department.

Issues:1. Instant petition satisfies all requirements2. Assumption of office by Benipayo, Bora and Tuason; ad interim

appointments amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Sec 1 (2),Article IX-C of the Constitution

3. Renewal of ad interim violated the prohibition on reappointment under Sec1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution

4. Benipayos removal of petitioner is illegal5. OIC of COMELECs Finance Services Department acting in excess

jurisdiction

Matibags Argument:1. Failure to consult for reassignment2. Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No 7; transferring and

detailing employees are prohibited during the election period beginningJanuary 2 until June 13, 2001

3. Reassignment violated Sec 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC

Resolution No. 32584. Ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Bora and Tuason violated the

constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC5. Illegal removal or reassignment6. Challenges the designation of Cinco7. Questions the disbursement made by COMELEC8. No ad interim appointment to the COMELEC or to Civil Service Commission

and COA9. Sec 1 (2) of Article IX-C; an ad interim appointee cannot assume office

until confirmed by the Commission on Appointments

Benipayos Argument:1. Comelec Resolution No. 33002. Petitioner does not have personal interest, not directly injured3. Failure to question constitutionality of ad interim appointments at the

earliest opportunity. She filed only after third time of reappointments4. Ad interim is not the lis mota because the real issue is the legality of

petitioners reassignment.

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

16/36

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

17/36

17. The petitioner is acting only temporary because a permanent appointmentcan be issued only upon meeting all the requirements.COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 refers only to COMELEC field personnel not to

head office personnel.

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

18/36

PANGILINAN VS. COMELEC

jurisdiction of comelec

Kiko Pangilinan and Sonny Belmonte were both candidates forcongressman in the 4th District of QC during the 1992 elections.

Cadano, as registered voter, filed a petition for disqualification againstBelmonte, for allegedly violating Sec 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, bygiving money and other material consideration to influence, induce orcorrupt the voters. (that Belmonte gave sack of rice, medicine, P5000cash, free trip for 2 to HKG)

Kiko and Cadano filed an urgent motion to suspend the canvassing and/orproclamation of Belmonte, so that their petition for disqualification wouldnot become moot and academic.

During the Canvass, Kiko objected to over 120 election returns beingcanvassed, alleging that they were tampered, altered or spurious.

The City Board of Canvassers overruled the objections of Kiko. Thereason was that under Sec 15 of Ra 7166, pre-proclamation controversiesare not allowed in the election of Congressmen. Thus the canvassingcontinued.

Thus, Kiko assailed the constitutionality of RA 7166, disallowing pre-proclamation controversies in the election of Congressmen. Kiko arguesthat this is violative of Sec 3, Art IX-C of the Constitution which vests inthe Comelec the power to hear and decide pre-proclamation controversies

without distinction as to whether the controversy involved the election ofCongressmen, or local elective officials. According to him, the phrasepre-proclamation controversies in Art IX-C embraces all kinds of pre-proc controversies such as those of the election of Congressmen.

ISSUE; Does the Comelec have jurisdiction over pre-proclamation

controversies for the election of Congressmen?

SC: NO JURISDICTION.

Sec 2 of Art IX-C vests in the Comelec exclusive original jurisdiction over all

contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of all elective

REGIONAL, PROVINCIAL, AND CITY OFFICIALS. It has no jurisdiction over

contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of Members of

the House. Under Article VI, it is the HRET who is the sole judge of all

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

19/36

contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of Members of the

House.

Thus the phrase pre-proc controversies in Art IX-C, should be construed asreferring only to those falling within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of

Comelec, that is, election pertaining to regional, provincial and city officials.

RA 7166 is still VALID.

Since Sonny Belmonte has already been proclaimed winner, and has taken

oath and assumed office, the remedy of Kiko was to file an electoral protestwith the HRET.

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

20/36

SARMIENTO VS. COMELEC

comelec pre-proc controversies/ division vs. en banc

This is a consolidated special civil action for certiorari seeking to set asidethe various Comelec Resolutions in special cases. Among the resolutionswere:

o Ordering the exclusion of election returns from the canvasso Dismissing petitioners opposition to the composition of the Board of

Canvasserso Rejecting the petitioners objection to certain election returns.

Petitioners claim that these decisions were in gadalej, and that theComelec sitting en banc, took cognizance of the cases without firstreferring them to any of its divisions.

Petitioners claim that under Sec 3, Art IX-C, election cases shall be heardand decided in divisions, provided hat MR of the decisions shall bedecided by the Commission en banc.

ISSUE: Whether the pre-proclamation controversies should be decided first

by division

SC:

It is clear from the provision of the constitution that election cases included

pre-proclamation controversies, and all such cases must first be heard and

decided by a Division of the Comelec. The Commission, sitting en banc, does

not have the authority to hear and decide the same at the first instance.

Under the Comelec Rules of Procedure, with respect to pre-proc

controversies, the 2 Divisions of the Comelec are vested with the authority

to hear and decide those special cases. It is recognized that the appealsfrom the rulings of the Board of Canvassers are cognizable by any of the

Divisions, to which they are assigned, and not by the Commission en banc.

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

21/36

A MR on the decision of the Division may be filed within 5 days from its

promulgation, after which the clerk of court will notify the Presiding

Commissioner, who shall certify the case to the Comelec En Banc.

Here, the Comelec En Banc acted in gadalej when it resolved the appeals of

petitioners in the special cases without first referring them to any of its

Divisions. Said resolutions are therefore null and void. Consequently, the

appeals are deemed pending before the Commission for proper referral to a

Division.

**Note the cases have been rendered moot and academic because RA 7116

provides that all pre-proc controversies pending shall be deemed terminatedonce the term of office has begun. The term of office involved in the special

cases commenced at noon of June 30, 1992. Thus, the petitions are

dismissed.

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

22/36

ATIENZA vs. COMELEC Case Digest

ATIENZA vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 108533, Dec. 20 1994

Facts:Private respondent Antonio G. Sia was elected mayor of the Municipality ofMadrilejos, Cebu in the 1998 local elections. Following Sias proclamation,petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court questioningthe results of the elections in a number of precincts in the municipality.Consequently, in the revision ordered by the lower court, petitioner obtaineda plurality of 12 votes over the private respondent. The Regional Trial Courtrendered its decision declaring petitioner the winner of the municipalelections and ordering the private respondent to reimburse petitioner theamount of P300,856.19 representing petitioners expenses in the electionprotest. Private respondent appealed.

Meanwhile, the Regional trial Court granted petitioners motion for executionpending appeal, which was opposed by respondent. The Comelec issued apreliminary injunction stopping the enforcement of the order of execution.The Comelec, en banc, on April 7, 1992 issued an Order setting aside thepreliminary injunction and thereby allowing petitioner to assume as mayor ofthe Municipality of Madrilejos pending resolution of his appeal. However,following the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992, the PresidingCommissioner of the Comelecs Second Division issued an Order dated July18, 1992 dismissing petitioners appeal for being moot and academic.

Issue: Whether or not the Comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion inreversing the lower courts judgment.

Held: The dismissal of an appeal in an election protest case for havingbecome moot and academic due to the election of new municipal officialsreferred only to that part of the appealed judgment which was affected bythe election and not to that portion relating to the award of damages.However, it would appear virtually impossible for a party in an electionprotest case to recover actual or compensatory damages in the absence of alaw expressly providing for situations allowing for the recovery of the same.This, petitioner has been unable to do. The intent of the legislature to doaway with provisions indemnifying the victorious party for expenses incurredin an election contest in the absence of a wrongful act or omission clearlyattributable to the losing party cannot be gainsaid in fine, Section 259 ofthe Omnibus Election Code merely provides for the granting of actual andcompensatory damages in accordance with law. The intent, moreover, todo away with such provisions merely recognizes the maxim, settled in law

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

23/36

that a wrong without damage or damage without wrong neither constitutes acause of action nor creates a civil obligation.

Atienza vs. Comelec

FACTS:

Private respondent Antonio G. Sia was elected mayor of the Municipality ofMadrilejos, Cebu in the 1988 local elections obtaining a plurality of 126 votesover his nearest rival, herein petitioner Lou A .Atienza.

Following Sia's proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers,petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Courtquestioning the results of the elections in a number of precincts in themunicipality.

Consequently, in the revision ordered by the lower court, petitionerobtaineda total of 2,826 votes, a plurality of 12 votes over theprivaterespondent.

On April 12, 1989 the Regional Trial Court rendered its decisiondeclaring petitioner the winner of the municipal elections and ordering theprivate respondent to reimburse petitioner the amountof P300,856.19representing petitioner's expenses in the election protest.Private respondent appealed the trial court's decision to the COMELECraising as errors 1) the computation of the number of votes received by thecandidates; and 2) the alleged award of "excessive damages" in favor of thepetitioner.

The case was docketed and assigned to the COMELEC's Second Division.The COMELEC,en banc, issued an Order setting aside the preliminary injunction and therebyallowing petitioner to assume as mayor of the Municipality of Madrilejospending resolution of his appeal.

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

24/36

However, following the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992, thePresiding Commissioner of the COMELEC's Second Division issued an Orderdated July 18, 1992 dismissing petitioner's appeal for being mootand academic pursuant to the Commission's decision in Resolution No. 2494

declaring the election protest and appeal cases as well as petitions forspecial relief arising out of the January18, 1988 elections dismissed andterminated as of June 30,1992.On January 28, 1993, respondent Commissionen bancreleased its questioned resolution, the dispositive portion of which states:PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission RESOLVED, as it herebyRESOLVES, that the dismissal of the appeal by the Commission(Second Division ) f or be ing moo t an d a cademic bec ause ofth eexpiration of the term of office of the contested position did notthereby revive the vacated judgment of the Regional Trial Court, saidappealed judgment to remain vacated, not having been resolved on themerits by the Commission for or against any of the parties; and thejudgment directing the protestee-appellant to reimburse the protestant-appellee the amount of P300,856.19 representing his expenses in theelection protest, is hereby REVERSED , said judgment not being inaccordance with law in the absence of any evidence of any wrongful , ornegl ige nt ac t or om issi on on the par t of the protestee appellant tojustify the award.

ISSUE(S)/HELD:Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it issuedits Resolution of January 28, 1993 reversing the lower court's judgmentawarding damages to herein petitioner after it had earlier dismissed forbeing moot and academic.NO.RATIO:The Omnibus Election Code provides: Actual or compensatory damages maybe granted in all election contests or in quo warranto proceedings inaccordance with law.

Provisions for actual or compensatory damages under the lawareembodied in various Civil Code articles allowing claims for damagesunder specific circumstances. Thus, Article 2176 provides: Whoever by actor omission causes damage to another, there being fault ornegligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault ornegligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

25/36

parties is called a quasi delict , and is governed by the provisionsof thischapter.Specifically, Article 2199 of the Civil Code mandates that: Exceptasprovided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate

compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has dulyproved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatorydamages.Given this setting, it would appear virtually impossible for a party in anelection protest case to recover actual or compensatory damages in theabsence of the condit ions specified under Artic les 2201 and2202 ofthe Civil Code,or in the absence of a law expressly providingfor situations allowing forthe recovery of the same. It follows,naturally, that in most election protest cases where themonetary claim does not hinge on either a contract orquasi-contract or atortious act or omission,the claimant must be able to point out to a specif ic provis ion of lawauthor izing a money claim for election protest expenses against thelosing party. This, petitioner has been unable to do.Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code merely provides for thegranting of actual and compensatory damages in accordance with

law. That i t was the intent of the legis lature to do awaywithprovisions indemnifying the victorious party for expenses incurred in anelection contest in the absence of a wrongful act or omission clearlyattributable to the losing party cannot be gainsaid. The intent ,moreover,to do away with such provisions merely recognizes themaxim,settled in law that a wrong without damage or damage without wrongneither constitutes a cause of action nor creates a civil obligation.

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

26/36

MISON VS. COA

coa decisions

Mison was the Commissioner of Customs. He declared the seizure of aJapanese vessel, MV Hyojin as invalid. He thus ordered the release of saidvessel.

However, the vessel was not released. It sank while in the custody of theBureau of Customs

Chan then filed a claim with the COA for the value of the sunken vessel.($50,000)

By authority of the Acting Chair, Mr. Espiritu (who was the Manager of theTechnical Services), denied the claim.

The claimants thus questioned the authority of Mr. Espiritu in denying the

claim. Thru their lawyer Atty David, moved for the reconsideration, writing a

letter to the Acting COA Chair Tantuico. He argued that the decision inthe case was rendered only by the Manager, and not by the ActingChairman, much less the COA itself. He contends that the decision is voidbecause the matter should be acted upon only by the COA dulyconstituted (ie, by the Chair and the 2 Comm.) (at this time, the COA isnot yet fully constituted)

Acting COA Chair Tantuico denied the claim as well. Tantuico adopted theEspiritu decision.

Again, Atty David moved for reconsideration, now arguing that ActingChair Tantuico also had no authority to act on the case. He requested thatthe same be submitted for resolution by the COA itself, after theappointment of 2 commissioners.

Later, the COA was finally fully constituted. Atty David still wrote another letter, for the payment of their claims. In a 4th Indorsement, Chairman Domingo, acting for the Commission,

reconsidered the decision of Acting Chairman Tantuico. ChairmanDomingo granted the claim. He forwarded the decision to grant the claimto Mison.

Mison now sought clarification on the legal implication of the 4th

Indorsement. He contends that the first COA decision, although signedonly by a Manger Espiritu, was ratified or made valid because it wasadopted in toto as a decision of the COA in the subsequent letters.

SC: INVALID.

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

27/36

In the first place, the decision by the Manager Espiritu was void ab initio. As

Manager of the Technical Services, Mr. Espiritu obviously had no power to

render or promulgate a decision of or for the Commission. Even the

Chairman alone, had not that power. As clearly set out in the Constitution,

the power was lodged in the COA, composed of a Chairman and 2Commissioners, to decide any case brought before it.

Hence, the adoption or ratification of the Espiritu decision by Acting Chair

Tantuico was inconsequential. Ratification cannot validate an act void ab

initio because it was done absolutely without authority. The act has to be

done anew by the person or entity duly endowed with authority to do so.

Further, no proper ratification or validation could have been effected by

Acting Chair Tantuico, since he was not the Commission, and he himself had

no power to decide any case brought before the COA. That power, is lodged

on the in the COA itself, a collegial body.

(it was argued that how about the hundreds of decisions signed by Acting

Chair Tantuico alone since at that time there was an interval during which

only he had been designated and no other Commissioner had beenappointed.. what would happen to those decisions?)

SC: The principle should logically apply only to those particular instances

where there was a timely and specific challenge to the authority of the

Acting COA chair in the exercise of adjudication. It should not affect all other

cases where the parties expressly or by implication accepted the

adjudicative authority of the Acting COA Chair.

(Mison further argued that Atty David already waived the objection on lack

of collegiality when he failed to raise it in his MR. His MR merely reiterated

the arguments on the merits of the claim, but did not raise the ground of

lack of collegiality)

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

28/36

SC: No waiver. Atty David in fact reiterated his challenge to Tantuicos

authority in his subsequent letters. He insisted that the same should be

submitted for resolution by the COA, only after full constitution of the COA.

Also, it must be made clear that the Espiritu decision was not merely

technically invalid for lack of collegiality. IT WAS SUBSTANTIVELY VOID AB

INITIO. It was rendered without jurisdiction, Hence, it has an essential and

inherent defect which could not have been waived.

(Finally, Mison argued that the 4th INdorsement should also be invalid

because COA Chair Domingo was the only one who signed it).

SC: 4th INdorsement VALID.

When the 4th Indorsement Decision was rendered, there were already 2

Commissioners (meaning the COA was fully constituted already), clearly a

number sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirement for collegialaction. Even so, the 4th Indorsement made it clear that it was the Decision of

the Commission, when Chairman Domingo placed FOR THE COMMISSION

in the decision. Records also show that the other commissioners concurred

in the decision.

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

29/36

Mison vs COA

Section 1: Purpose, composition, appointmentDoctrine: COA as a collegial bodyCase:Mison v COA

Facts:The case is about customs case no. 813 where the commissioner ofcustoms,MIson, declaring illegal the seizure by elements of the PhilippineNavy of the M/V"Hyojin Maru" a vessel of Japanese registry, and ordered therelease of the vessel andits cargo to the claimants, Chan Chiu On andCheung I.However, the vessel was never released because it sank while inthe custody ofthe bureau of customs and it could not be salvaged. Theclaimants filed a claim with theCommission on Audit for the payment of thevessel.Acting thereon "(b)y authority of the Acting Chairman," Mr. Rogelio B.Espiritu,Manager, Technical Service Office of the COA, denied the claim forthe reasons setforth in his registered letter to the claimant's lawyer datedNovember 3, 1977-captioned"Decision No. 77-142."In a letter dated May 10, 1978, claimants counsel, Mr. David replied thatsaid Decision No. 77-142-rendered only by the Manager, Technical ServiceOffice of theCOA, and "not (by) the Acting Chairman, much less . . . theCommission on Audit" was void because the matter could validly be actedupon only by "the Commission onAudit duly constituted, by the appointmentand qualification of its Chairman and twoCommissioners," "as specificallyprovided by Section 2, Article XII-D of the (1973)Constitution. In a 4thIndorsement dated June 22, 1987 addressed "to the Auditor,Bureau ofCustoms," Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo, acting "FOR THECOMMISSION,"

reconsidered Decision No. 77-142 of Acting Commissioner of AuditTantuico,supra.He declared that the vessel sank while in illegal custody of the BureauofCustoms, which "should have pre-eminently taken adequate measures topreserve" itbut did not.; hence, he declared that "this Commission willinterpose no objection" to theinstant claim, subject to the usual auditing andaccounting requirements." Petitionerseasonably filed with this Court apetition forcertiorarito nullify said COA Decisionspursuant to Section 7, Article IX of the 1987Constitution.Issues:Whether or not the decision to reverse the EspirituDecision was proper?

Decision:In the first place the "Espiritu decision" was voidab initio. As manager of theCOA Technical Service Office, Mr. Espirituobviously had no power whatever to renderand promulgate a decision of orfor the Commission. Indeed, even the Chairman, alone,had not that power.

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

30/36

As clearly set out in the Constitution then in force, the power waslodged inthe Commission on Audit, "composed of a Chairman and woCommissioners."20 It was the Commission, as a collegial body, which then as now, hadthejurisdiction to "(d)ecide any case brought before it within sixty days from thedate ofits submission for resolution," subject to review by the Supreme

Court on certiorari.21Hence, the adoption or ratification of the Espiritu decision by the ActingCOAChairman was inconsequential. Ratification cannot validate an act voidab initio because done absolutely without authority. The act has to be doneanew by the personor entity duly endowed with authority to do so.Moreover,even conceding the contrary, no proper ratification or validation couldhavebeen effected by the Acting Chairman since he was not the Commission, andhehimself had no power to decide any case brought before the Commission,that power, torepeat, being lodged only in the Commission itself, as acollegial body. it must be madeclear that the Espiritu Decision was notmerely "technically invalid," as the petitionerdescribes it. It wassubstantively void ab initio, because rendered without jurisdiction. Ithad anessential inherent defect that could not be cured or waived.

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

31/36

PHIIL OPERATIONS VS. AUDITOR GENERAL

Coa accounts and money claims

PhilOps entered into a barter agreement with the Bureau of Prisons,

where it agreed to deliver to the Bureau a sawmill, complete with dieselengine and a saw, and other accessories. While the Bureau was to deliver70,000 feet of lumber

The receipt that the employee of the Bureau of Prisons issued for theitems disclosed that there were unsatisfactory conditions on the items(three was no belt in the main saw, broken frames, lack of hooks, no ropecables, worn out rusty, etc)

The Bureau of Prisons claim that when the barges were examined,PhilOps were advised verbally about the defects therein, and so were theywith respect to the parts of the sawmill when it was found.

Around a year later, it became evident that it was not feasible for the

Bureau of Prisons to deliver lumber. PhilOps proposed to obtain surplusfrom the Surplus Property Commission in lieu of the lumber so as tofinally liquidate the obligation contracted with the Bureau of Prisons.

It turned out however that no equipment could be found in theCommission which could be usable by PhilOps, so it proposed that thecorporation be credited with an amount of P70,000 and be allowed to bidin future surplus offerings.

PhilOps later filed a claim with the Auditor General. The Bureau of Prisons offered to deliver the first installment of the

lumber. But this was rejected by PhilOps on the ground that the offer

came too late, and that it demanded payment of cash. The Auditor General denied PhilOps claim for payment. It was mentioned

that the Auditor General did not have jurisdiction. PhilOps appealed to the SC. The Auditor General claims that the Commonweal Act 327 which imposed

upon the Auditor General the duty of acting and deciding on casesinvolving the settlement of accounts or claims other than those ofaccountable officers, does NOT authorize or empower the Auditor Generalto pass upon the PhilOps claim for P105,000 because the term claimsused in the said Act can refer to no other than liquidated claims. (Inshort, the Auditor General claims that it has jurisdiction only over

liquidated claims) PhilOps on the other hand contend that the Auditor General had been

granted additional power upon any money claim involving liability arisingfrom contract which could serve as a basis for civil action between theparties. It also argued that assuming that the Auditor General hasjurisdiction only over liquidated claims, the claim of P70,000 should beconsidered liquidated, since this has been accepted by both parties.

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

32/36

SC:

AUDITOR GENERAL HAS NO JURDXN FOR UNLIQUIDATED CLAIMS.

The reason for denying jurisdiction over unliquidated claims for breach of

contract is because these claims often involve a broad filed of investigation

and require the application of judgment and discretion upon the measure of

damages and the weight of conflicting evidence.

The term used in the Commonwealth Act is moneyed claims or only

liquidated claims. An account is something which may be adjusted or

liquidated by arithmetic process. But Treasury officials cannot pass upon

accounts where the amount is not the result of a numerical computation.

Claims for unliquidated damages require for their settlement the application

of the qualities of judgment and discretion. They are frequently sustained by

extraneous proof. The results to be reached in such cases is not merely an

account and are not committed by law to the contro and decision of

Treasury officers.

Another reason why the AG cannot entertain unliquidated damages is

because the liability or non-liability of the government is put in issue. In

these cases, the most important question to be deterined are judicial in

nature, involving the examination of evide and the use of judicial discretion.

An administrative officer like the AG cannot assume this jurisdiction, because

it would amount to an illegal act, a delegation of judicial power to an

executive officer.

An examination of the provisions of the Constitution fails to disclose any

power vested in or granted to the AG to consider these claims. All that is

vested in the AG is the SETTLEMENT OF ACCOUNTS (see earlier definition of

Accounts).

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

33/36

INSURANCE COMPANY VS. REPUBLIC

money claims

The Plaintiff Insurance Company filed an action for recovery of P86,000

the insured value of 82 cartons of goods, allegedly lost in the custody ofthe carrier, US Lines, or the vessel operator, Luzon Stevedore, or thearrestre operator, the Bureau of Customs (an agency of the Republic)

The Republic of the Philippines filed a MTD, claiming the State immunityfrom suit.

CFI denied the MTD. However later, the case was dismissed against the Republic and the

Bureau. Plaintiff appealed.

ISSUES: Suability of the RP and the BOC

SC: The BOC in operating the arrastre service, does so in the performance of

a necessary incident to the prime governmental function of taxation. Thus it

is not suable for alleged loses resulting therefrom. Thus, neither is the

Republic suable for said activity.

ISSUE: It is claimed that the money claims that may be filed with the

Auditor General (AG) under Act 3083, are only those which are subject toliquidation by an arithmetic computation and only where the liability of the

government is no longer an issue. (a prior case of Tabacos was cited)

SC: It is precisely for the AG to determine whether the same claim is tenable

or not, and if not, to deny the same. The ruling in the Tabacos case cannot

apply in this case, since there, the issue was the offsetting of an

unliquidated claim for damages against a specific liquidated debt. The ruling

in Tabacos was that offsetting cannot be made. Here, there is no question of

offsetting. The only issue was simply that of allowing or disallowing a specific

and liquidated claim against the government.

Since in the present case, the amount of claim is already fixed and readily

determined from the bill of lading and other shipping papers, they can be

filed with the AG. Thus, we sustain the power of the Ag to take cognizance of

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

34/36

the claim, for if the same be found in order and allowable, the amount

recoverable is fixed and liquidated, as determined or readily determinable

from the papers and invoices available to him,

Stated otherwise, where the existence of a specific and fixed debt is the

issue, the AG has the power to act on the claim, but when not only the

existence but also the amount of the unfixed and undetermined debt is

involved, the AG has no competence to consider such claim.

- in short, the dismissal of the case against the Republic and the BOC was

proper because the claim should have been filed with the AG.

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

35/36

Section 2: Power and Functions Examine and audit government revenuesExamine andaudit government expenditures Doctrine: post-audit authority Case: Blue Bar Coconut

Phils v Tantuico

Facts:Sometime in 1976, the respondent Acting Chairman of the Commission onAudit initiated a special audit of coconut end-user companies, which includeherein petitioners, with respect to their Coconut Consumers StabilizationFund levy collections and the subsidies they had received. As a result of theinitial findings of the Performance Audit Office with respect only to thepetitioners, respondent Acting COA Chairman directed the Chairman, theAdministrator, and the Military Supervisor of PCA and the Manager of theCoconut Consumers Stabilization Fund, in various letters to them (AnnexesG-2 H, I, J, L and Nof petition) to collect the short levies and overpaidsubsidies, and to apply subsidy claims to the settlement of short leviesshould the petitioners fail to remit the amount due.

Issues:Whether or not the respondent COA Chairman may disregard the PCA rulesand decions have become moot.

Decision:In the case at bar, the petitioners have failed to show that acts were donewithgrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Case

dismissed. Petitioners contend that they are outside the ambit ofrespondents' "audit" power which is confined to government-owned orcontrolled corporations. Section 2 (1) of Article IX-D of the Constitutionprovides that "The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority andduty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenuesand receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned orheld in trust by or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions,agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlledcorporation with original charters, and on a post-audit basis. ... (d)such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity directly or

indirectly from or through the Government which are required by law or thegranting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy orequity ." (Emphasis supplied) The Constitution formally embodies the longestablished rule that private entities who handle government funds orsubsidies in trust may be examined or audited in their handling of said fundsby government auditors. n view of the above considerations, we apply theprinciple o fprimary jurisdiction:In cases involving specialized disputes, thetrend has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special

7/27/2019 10.01 Consti

36/36

competence. As early as 1954, theCourt in Pambujan Sur United MineWorkers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc. (94 Phil.932,941), held that under thesense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction ... the courtscannot or will not determine a controversy involving aquestion which iswithin the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal prior to the decision of

that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demandsthe exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the specialknowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal todetermine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of rulingis essential to comply with the Purposes of the regulatory statuteadministered." Recently, this Court speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice ClaudioTeehankee said that "In this era of clogged court dockets, the need forspecialized administrative boards or commissions with the specialknowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptlydisputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject tojudicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become wellnighindispensable." The court reminds us that The legal presumption is thatofficial duty has been duly performed.