1000521 gadamer truth and method.(1)

7/31/2019 1000521 Gadamer Truth and Method.(1)

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導讀者：黃彥文

國立台北教育大學課程與教學研究所博士候選人

[email protected] 敬請指教 ̂ ^

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Truth and Method

Hans-Georg Gadamer

(Gadamer,1975/2006)

Gadamer

Hans-Georg Gadamer（1900-2002）出生於德國馬堡，就學於布雷斯勞、馬堡、弗來堡和慕尼黑大學，攻讀文學、古典語言、藝術史和哲學(洪漢鼎，2002)；1923年拜 Husserl與 Heidegger 為師，受兩人影響甚大，並於 1929

年以《柏拉圖的辯證倫理學》取得教授資格。1939 Gadamer 獲得萊比錫大學教授職，1946年擔任萊比錫校長直至 1968 退休。Gadamer 的學術生涯可分為三個時期：早期研究古希臘的政治和倫理思想，尤其著重於對柏拉圖思想系統性的闡釋。中期注重的是本體論，發展具有濃厚思辯色彩的哲學詮釋學體系。晚期則擺脫了學院式的純思辯色彩，將本體論用於現實社會的問題分析中，發展成一種實踐科學1。

Gadamer 是位多產的作家，主要著作有《柏拉圖的辯證倫理學─〈菲利

布篇〉的現象學解釋》(1931)、《柏拉圖與詩人》(1934)、《真理與方法》(1960)、《短篇著作集》(1967-77)、《黑格爾的辯證法：五篇詮釋學研究論文》(1971)、《我是誰？你是誰？》(1973)、《柏拉圖〈蒂邁歐篇〉裡的理念與實在》(1974)、《科學時代的理性》(1976)、《柏拉圖和亞里斯多德的善的理念》(1978)、《黑格爾的遺產》(1979)、《海德格之路─ 後期著作研究》(1982)、《讚美理論》(1984)等。《伽達默爾全集》共十卷，1986年出版，1995年完成(洪漢鼎，2002)。

1http://www.nhu.edu.tw/~sts/class/class_03_3.htm






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在《真理與方法》的導言中，Gadamer(1975/2006: xx)開宗明義的闡述著：。他指出，理解的現象和理解者正確詮釋的現象，不單單只是人文科學2方法論上的特殊問題。因為，在詮釋學理解的傳統裡，不僅是文本被理解了，而且洞見被把握了，真理被發現了。這並不是

順從於科學知識的方法，而是一種超出科學方法在經驗中尋求真理的自身證明。

Gademer(1975/2006: xxi)也認為，藝術經驗就是對承認自身界限的科學意識最顯著的勸告，進而展現出拒斥了科學的真理概念，並從藝術作品中獲得真理的經驗。Gadamer(1975/2006:xxii)這麼說：「…這種詮釋學不會是某種人文科學的方法論，而是拋棄方法的，並試圖把握人文科學上自我意識的事物，並把人文科學與我們整個世界經驗聯在一起。」

最後，Gadamer(1975/2006)也認為，對真理事物的思考，不可一如既往的從傳統去反思，而必須在自身的活動中去握住歷史上所滲透的自我。這並不是依據某規則而來的建構，而是對某種遠古事物的塑造。其不可能使用概念，而是採用概念原初意義的特徵而落實。

在第一部分中3，Gadamer(1975/2006)首先對人文科學傳統受自然科學方法支配，以及唯心主義這兩種取向進行反思。接著回顧了人文主義的傳統，探究四個追求「基本概念：

1.「」(Bildung)

2.「」(Sensus communis )

3.「」(Judgment)4.「」(Taste)。

繼而，Gadamer(1975/2006)導向 Kant把美感經驗置入先驗主體化的想法─「審美意識」(天才和品味)；但 Gademer也繼續從 Kant後繼者等的想法

2 人文科學，就是指人文主義傳統的哲學。

3 《真理與方法》一書，主要由三個部分所構成。在第一部分，Gadamer主張「真理生成於藝

術經驗」的精神科學新方向；第二部分，Gadamer

探討了效果歷史意識(effective-historical

consciousness) 與人文科學中真理理解的關係，與過去的關係是種「歸屬」(belonging)；在第三個部分，Gadamer處理的是「語言學」的詮釋學本體論的轉向。






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中，又開始從先驗普遍性的「天才」概念，轉向一種重視親身經歷的「體驗」概念。這也意味著一種審美概念思想的歷史變遷。

然而，Gadamer(1975/2006)認為，不管是「天才」、「品味」、或是

「體驗」概念的演進，雖然有著相似又不盡然完全相同的意義，但這都是置「審美意識」為一種「抽像」的活動運作，用意在於透過「審美區辨」將作品聚焦於自身來獲的一種「共時性」4，並確保普遍性的提升，並排除所有非審美的要素：目的、功能、內容意義。但是 Gadamer認為，這種「美的主觀化」忽略了客體對象的具體存在意義。Gadamer 驚覺到：

Gadamer(1975/2006)也進而提出反思：「」「

」顯然的，Gadamer認為我們不能忽視作品的具體存在，這是一種作品的「同時性」而非僅存於主體意識中的「共時性」Gadamer也因此認為，在哲學上所尋求的真理，是如同對藝術作品經驗所包含的理解，這種經驗本身就表現了某種詮釋學的現象。Gadamer(1975/2006)引用了 Aristotle的想法，試圖證明在審美意識中以為的普遍性其實都只是一種個別的殊性：

Gadamer也從前人(應該是 Hegel)的想法中發現：

於是，Gadamer提出了一個對人文科學真理探求的主張：

4Gadamer指出：「『同時性』構成了認同的本質，它並不只是審美意識的『共同性』。因為，『共同性』是指同時存在以及在意識中略去審美對象中對象的不同。『同時性』則與此

相反，它是指：某個向我們表現出來的在起源上又是如此遙遠的獨特事物，在表現中展現了完滿的現在性。因而，『同時性』並不是意識中某個被給愚的方式，而是意識的任務，及意識要求的某種成就 (引自吳文勇，1988：18)。」






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整體而言， Gadamer《真理與方法》的重點就是：將經驗的焦點，從主體(存在者)的身上轉向了客體作品本身的存有(存在物)，而主體透過對作品的理解和創作，也再回過頭來完成自我的理解，並形塑了自身的存有。同時，也由此達到一種共同性的可能。換言之，Gadamer 將審美經驗從主體自身的局限中透過「作品存在的轉換力」中解放出來，而得以和他者共享。

以下列出第一章的大小表標題，作為導讀時的對照：

Part 1. The question of truth as it emerges in the experience of art

1. Transcending the aesthetic dimension先驗性的美感取向

(1). The significance of the humanist tradition for the human sciences

(一)、人類科學中人文主義傳統的意義。

A. The problem of method方法的論題

B. The guiding concepts of humanism人文主義概念的指引

(A) Bildung (culture)教養和文化。

(B) Sensus communis共感性

(C) Judgment判斷 (D) Taste品味

(2). The subjectivization of aesthetics through the kantian critique透過康德主義批

判的美感主體化 A. Kant’s doctrine of taste and genius康德品味和天才的學說。

(A). The transcendental distinctness of taste先驗性的品味殊性

(B). The doctrine of free and dependent beauty自由與依存美的學說

(C). The doctrine of the ideal of beauty美的理念學說

(D). The interest aroused by natural and artistic beauty

透過自然美與藝術美激發的興趣

(E). The relation between taste and genius品味與天才之間的關係

B. The aesthetics of genius and the concept of experience (Erlebnis)天才的美感與體驗概念






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(A). The dominance of the concept of genius天才概念的

(B). On the history of the word Erlebnis體驗這個字語的歷史。

(C). The concept of Erlebnis體驗的概念。

(D). The limits of Erlebniskunst and the rehabilitation of allegory體驗的限制與諷刺喻言的復興。

(3). Retrieving the question of artistic truth恢復藝術真理的問題

A. The dubiousness of the concept of aesthetic cultivation (Bildung)美感教化概念的猶豫

B. Critique of the abstraction inherent in aesthetic consciousness美感意識中抽象內化的批判

＊

1. David Hume (Treatise)

2. John Stuart Miller (Logic)

人文科學依賴經驗科學的歸納方法─ 精神科學(Geisteswissenschaften)。人文科學(即使是道德科學)被思考為可以像自然科學一樣建立相似性、規則和規律的法則(p3)。

3. Hermann Helmholtz 1862

Helmholtz區分出「邏輯歸納」(logic induction)和「藝術本能歸納」(artistic-

indistinctive induction)，但 Gadamer認為這並不是邏輯的，而是心理學無意識過程的結論(p5)。對 Helmholtz來說，自然科學的方法典範，並不須要一種歷史的引導或方法論的約束(p5)。

4. J.G.Droysen Kant






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The more profoundly grasped idea of history will be the center gravity in which

the chaotic movement of the human science will gain stability and the possibility

of further progress.(p5-p6)

Gadamer認為，Droysen從歷史的角度出發，試圖讓人文科學成為一門自主獨立的科學群。

5. Dilthey

Dilthey scientific knowledge obliges one to server one’s bone with life, to attain

distance from one’s own history, which makes it possible for that history to

become an object.

Dilthey refer to the old Baconian aphorism, “ to be conquered nature must be

obeyed.”

Dilthey defended the epistemological independence of the human sciences, what

is called “ method ” in modern science remains the same every where and is only

displayed in an especially exemplary form in the natural science(p7).

Gadamer認為 Dilthey雖然有古典文化和浪漫主義的信條，試圖建立人文科學的獨立性，但仍還是受到自然科學的重大影響下─ 認識論的獨一性(方法的無所不能)。

6. Gadamer Helmholtz

僅管 Helmholtz主張歷史歸納和自然歸納不同：

History study is different because in its domain there are no natural laws but,

rather voluntarily accepted practical laws-commandments. The world of human

freedom does not manifest the same absence of exceptions as natural laws(p8)

Gadamer認為 Helmholtz援引 Kant自然和自由的概念作為對兩種歸納的區分。然而，Helmholtz只著重於自然的概念，而排除了自由的問題。這既不是 Kant的主張，也不符合邏輯的原理。






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In fact, the human sciences are a long way from regarding themselves as

simply inferior to the natural science. Instead, possessed of the intellectual

heritage of German classicism, they were the true representatives of humanism.

Gadamer Herder

Herder transcended the perfectionism of the Enlightenment with his new

ideal of “ cultivating the human”(Bildung zum Menschen), the concept of self-

formation, education, or cultivation(Bildung) , and thus prepared the ground for

the growth of historical sciences in the 19th

. (p8)

＊

1. (Bildung)

(1).

The concept of Bildung most clearly indicates the profound intellectual change

that still cause us to experience the century of Goethe as contemporary, wheras

the baroque era appears historically remote. (p8)

(2). ：

A (natural form)：自然外在的顯現(external appearance)。(p9)

B. Herder「文化的能力」(cultivating capacity)：行動主體的自由的行動。(p9)

C. (Bild)的雙重關係：「摹本」(Nachbild, image,copy)和「原本」(Vorbild,model)，這是和形式所沒有的。Bild也是從原本到摹本不斷的演化本身。而和希臘語中的「自然」(physis)相近。(p10)

(3). Hegel (Propaedeutic) ： A.

For the being of Geist (spirit) has an essential connection with the idea of

Bildung.(p11)

B. (sacrificing)

Man is characterized by the break with the immediate and the natural that the

intellectual, rational side of his nature demands of him. “ In this sphere he is not,

by nature, what he should be”- and hence he needs Bildung. What Hegel calls

the formal nature of Bildung depends on its universality.(p11)C.






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Even in this description of practical Bildung by Hegel, one can recognize the

basic character of the historical spirit: to reconcile itself with itself, to recognize one

self in other being.(P12)

But it contains at the same time all the exit points and threads of oneself again,but oneself according to the truly universal essence of spirit.(p12)

D.

To recognize one’s own in the alien, to become at returning to itself from what is

other.(P13)

E. (substance)

(OS Gadamer HEGEL )

Bildung as brought to completion through the substance, in the dissolution of all

concrete being, reached only in the absolute knowledge of philosophy.(P13)

The human sciences presuppose that the scholarly consciousness is already

formed and for that very reason possesses the right, unlrarnable, and inimitable tact

that envelops the human science; form of judgment and mode of knowledge as if it

wewe the element in which they move.(P13~14)

Gadamer指出： Bildung is not to be understood only as the process of

historically raising the mind to the universal; its at the same time the element within

which the educated man (Gebildete) move. (P13)

(4). (mind has a special free mobility)，尋求一種(tact)。從 Helmholtz的想法中，Gadamer思考了歷史記憶的選擇性。

A .

Memory must be formed; for memory is not memory for anything and

everything. One has a memory for some things, and not for others; one wants to

preserve one thing in memory and banish another.

B.

Forgetting is closely related to keeping in mind and remembering; forgetting

is not merely an absence or a lack out but, as Nietzsche in particular point out, a

condition of the life of mind.

Only by forgetting does the the mind have the possibility of total renewal,

the capacity to see everything with fresh eyes. So that what is lonf familiar fuses

with the new into a many level unity.

C.「 (Keeping in mind)作為記憶，包含了對回憶的觸及。

“ Keeping in mind ” is ambiguous. As memory (Mneme), it is connected to

remembering(anamnesis).

D. (tact)

For the Tact which functions in the human science is not simpley a feelingand unconscious, but is at the same time a mode of knowing and a mode of being.






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(5) (universal sense)

A.

Keeping oneself open to what is other- to other, more universal points of

view. It embraces a sense of proportion and distance on relation to itself, and henceconsists in rising above itself to university.

B. ,

To distance oneself from oneself and from one’s private purposes means to

look at these in the way what others see them.

C.

The cultivated consciousness has in fact more the character of a sense. For

every sense- the sense of sight – is already universal in that it embraces it sphere,

remains open to a particular field, and grasps the distinctions within what is open to

it in this way. It’s a universal sense.

D.

A universal and common sense- this formulation of the nature of Bildung

suggest an extensive historical context(p16).

2. (sensus communis)

(1). Vico

Vico的著作《論精神教化的本質及途徑》(Denostri temporis studiorum

ratione)提出了「共通感」(sensus communis)的想法，即共同的感覺。其站在耶穌會教育學(Jesuit pedagogical systems)的立場，反對詹森教派(Jansenism)理性歸則的主張和 Descartes的新科學。這是源自於古希臘羅馬「雄辯」(eloquentia)的想法。

A. (Talking well)

「說得好呀！」(Talking well)的想法，總是有兩種意義：不只是「把事情說好」(saying something well)，也更是「說對的事情」(saying the right

thing)(p17)。 B. Aristotle (Intellectual virtue)

不只是一種能力，而是一種道德的存有(moral being)(p20)。

C. 。

D. 。

(2). 18th

(shaftesbury) (p22)。

A.共通感是對普遍愉悅的感覺(common weal)。

B.共通感也是熱愛社會、社群、自然、人性友好。

C.在社會交往中，包含了一種「同情」(sympathy)。 D.日常感覺與社會的聯繫。






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(3). Henri Bergson (le bon sens)(p23)

While the other senses relate us to things, good sense governs our relations

with pearsons.(P23)

(4). 19TH (5). Oetinger (vita)

A.虔敬派(Pietism)的「心」(heart)。P24

B.「生成的方法」(generative method)。P25

C.共同上帝效應：透過聖靈回歸單一

D.「健全的感知」(sensu plenus)「直覺」

E. 對自身的涉及。(P26)

3. (Judgment)

(1).

A.把一個特殊的事物納入普遍之中。

B.判斷力是一種類似於感覺的能力，是種不可能學會的東西。

(2). Baugarten

判斷力所認識的就是感性的特殊事物，也是對完滿性與否的斷定。

(3). Kant

A.對完滿性的感性判斷就是品味。

B.真正的共通感就是品味。

C. 與道德結合的共通感，及 Kant的轉變(無利害性的品味判斷 )。

4. (Taste)

(1). (Kant則排除了道德性)

The concept of taste was originally a moral than an aesthetic idea. It

describes an ideal of genuine humanity and receives its character from the effort

to take a critical stand against the dogmatism of the “school”. It was only later

that use of the idea was limited to the “aesthetic”.

(2).

Balthasar Gracian starts from the view that the sense of taste, this most

animal and most inward of our senses, still contains the beginnings of

intellectual differentiation we make judging things.(P31)

There is cultivation not only of the mind(ingenio) but also of taste(gusto).…His ideal of the cultivated man(the discreto) is that ,as an “hombre en su punto”,

he achieve the proper freedom of distance from all the things of life and society,

so that he is able to make distinctions and choices consciously andreflectively.(P31)






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Taste is not only the ideal created by a new society, but we see the ideal of

“good taste” producing what was subsequently called “ good society”.

The concept of taste undoubtedly implies a mode of knowing. The mark of

good taste is being able to stand back from ourselves and our privatepreferences.(P32)

(3).

Good taste is always sure of its judgment, it is essentially sure taste, an

acceptance and rejection that involves no hesitation, no surreptitious glances at

others, no searching for reason.

Taste is therefore something like a sense. In its operation it has no

knowledge of reasons.

If taste registers a negative reaction to something, its not able to say why.

But it experiences it with the greatest certainty. Surness of taste is therefore safy

from the tasteless,

The contrary of “good taste” actually is not “ bad taste.” Its opposite is rather

to have “ no taste .” Good taste is a sensitivity which so naturally avoids

anything blatant that its reaction is quite incomprehensible to someone who has

no taste.

(4). (fasion)

( )

The element of social generalization implicit in the idea of taste becomes a

determining reality.

But the very distinction from fasion shows that the university of taste has

quite a different basis and is not the same as empirical university.

Taste is defined precisely by the fact that it is offened by what is tasteless

and thus avoids it, like anything else that threatens injury(P33).

(5).

(community)

One maintains one’s own “ style ”- one relates the memands of fasion to a

whole that one’s own taste keeps in view and accepts only what harmonizes with

this whole and fits together as it does.

Taste not only recognizes this or that as beautiful, but has an eye to the

whole, with which everything that is beautiful must harmonize.

Taste is not a social sense- that is, dependent on an empirical university, the

complete unanimity of judgements of others.






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It does not say that everyone will agree with our judgement, but that they

should agree with it.

Against the tyranny exercised by fasion, sure taste preserves a specific

freedom and superiority. This is its special normative power, peculiar to it alone:The knowledge that it is certain of the agreement of an ideal community.

(6).

It follows that taste knows something- though admittedly in a way that

cannot be separated from the concrete moment in which that object occurs and

cannot be reduced to rules and concepts.

Just this is obviously what gives the idea of taste it original breadth: that it

constitute a special way of knowing.

Like reflective judgment, it belongs in the realm of that which grasps, in the

individual object, the universal under which it is to be subsumed.

Both taste and judgment evaluate the object in relation to a whole in order to

see whether it fits in with everything else- that is, whether it is “ fitting.” One

must have a “sense” for it – it cannot be demonstrated.

This kind of sense is obviously needed wherever a whole is intended but not

given as a whole- that is, conceived in purposive concept

Thus taste is in no way limited to what is beautiful in nature and art, judging

it in respect to its decorative quality, but embraces the whole realm of morality

and manners.(34)

(7). Kant

Its clearly not only a matter of logical but of aesthetic judgment.

The individual case on which judgment works is never simply a case; it is

not exhausted by being a particular example of a universal law or concept.

Rather, it is always an “individual case,” and it is significant that we call it a

special case, because the rule does not comprehend it.(p35)

In his critique of aesthetic judgment what Kant sought to and did legitimate

was the subjective universality of aesthetic taste in which there is no longer any

knowledge of the object, and in the area of the “fine arts” the superiority of

genius to any aesthetic based on rules.

(8). 17






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All moral decisions require taste- which does not mean that this most

individual balancing of decision is the only thing that governs them, but it is an

indispensable element.

Its truly an achievement of undemonstrable tact to hit the target and todiscipline the application of the universal, the moral law (Kant), in a way that

reason itself cannot. Thus taste is not the ground but the supreme consummation

of moral judgment.(p35)

(9). Gadamer Kant

The transcendental function that Kant ascribes to the aesthetic judgment is

sufficient to distinguish it from conceptual knowledge and hense to determine

the phenomena of the beautiful and of art.

But is it right to reserve the concept of truth for conceptual knowledge? Must we

not also acknowledge that the work of art possesses truth?(P37)

＊ Kant (aesthetic conscious)

1. (taste)

(1).

No one supposes that questions of taste can be decided by argument and

proof. Just as clear is that good taste will never really attaon empirical

universality, and thus appealing to the prevailing taste misses the real nature of

taste.

(2). Kant

For taste must be one’s very own(p38).

T he judgment of taste possesses universal validity.(3).

If one takes its relationship to Lebensgefuhl (feeling of life) as its own basis,

one can no longer call tasete a “cognition sensitiva”. It imparts no knowledge of

the object, but neither is simply a question of a subjective reaction, as produced

by what is pleasant to the senses. Taste is “reflective”.

(4).

Thus when Kant calls taste the true common sense, he is no longer

considering the great moral and political traition of the concept of sensuscommunis that we outlined above(P35)






14

Two elements; First, the university of taste inasmuch as it is the result of the

free play of all our cognitive powers and is not limited to a specific area like an

external sense; second, the communal quality of taste, inasmuch as, according to

Kant, it abstracts from all subjective, private conditions such as attractivenessand emotion.

2.

(1). (pure) (free)

(intellectualized) (idependent)(p39)

(2).

This imaginative productivity is not richest where it is merely free, however,

as in the convolutions of the arabesque, but rather in a filed of play where the

understanding’s desire for unity does not so much confine it as suggest

incitements.

(3)

3. (Genius)

(1). Kant

(2).

(3).

(4). (communicable)

(5). Kant

We must be able to regard art as if it were nature. Through genius, nature

gives art its rules.

Thus what the concept of genius achieves is only to place the products of art

on a par aesthetically with natural beauty. Art too is looked at aesthetically- i.e.,

its too calls for reflective judgment.(p48)

4.

(1). (necessary discipline) (p47)






15

(2).

(3). ( )

The “ purposiveness of nature for our cognitive faculties ”-which, as the

transcendental principle of aesthetic judgment, pertains only to naturalbeauty (and not to art)- at the same time functions to prepare the

understanding to apply the concept of purpose to nature.

Thus, the critique of taste- i. e., aesthetics- is a preparation for teleology.

Judgement provides the bridge between understanding and reason. The

intelligible towards which taste points, the supersensible substrate in man,

contains at the same time the mediation between the concepts of nature and

of freedom.

# 我們可以發現到，Kant 是比較看重「自然美」的。因為，這是「先驗無利害的自然合目的性」的審美品味判斷。即使是「藝術美」仍需依賴「自然美」透過「天才」的賦予，而得以進行審美判斷，而不會落入理性概念的判斷中。這也是在自由遊戲的過程中進行的。

(4). 18th

Its in fact clear that the concept of taste loses it significance if the

phenomenon of art steps into the foreground. The standpoint of taste is

secondary to the work of art. The sensitivity in selecting that constitutes taste

often has a leveling effect in contrast to the originality of the artistic work of

genius. Taste avoids the unusual and the monstrous. It is original about artistic

production.(P50)

But now thr basis of aesthetics has shifted. Like the concept of taste, the

concept of natural beauty is also devalued, or differently understood. The moral

interest in natural beauty that Kant had portrayed so enthusiastically now

retreats behind the self-encounter of man in works of art.(5). Hegel ( )

Hegel’s magnificent Aesthetic natural beauty exists only as a “reflection of

spirit”. There is in fact no longer any independent element in the systematic

whole of aesthetic.

Obviously the indeterminacy with which natural beauty present itself to the

interpreting and understanding spirit justifies our saying with Hegel that “its

substance is contained in the spirit.”

For judgments on the beauty of a landscape undoubtedly depend on theartistic taste of the time.






16

Thus Hegel’s aesthetic is based squarely on the standpoint of art. In art man

encounter himself, spirit meet spirit.

4. 「體驗」(Erlebnis)：

(1). (Erlebnis) (Goethe)

(Erleben) (to be still alive when

something happens)

(2).

(3). Dilthey (Das

Erlebnis und die Dichtung)

(the experience of early days) (p54)

(4). Dilthey

(5).

The concept of life is conceived teleologically; life, for Dilthey, is productivity.

Since life objectifies itself in structures of meaning, all understanding of meaning

consists in “translating the objectifications of life back into the spiritual life from

which they emerged”。

(6). Dilthey

(experience)(Erlebnis) (result)(Erlebnis)

(speculation) (empiricism) (p56)

These units of experience are themselves units of meaning.

The unity of experience(and not the psychic elements into which it can be analyzed)

represents the true uni of what is given.(P57)

Thus the concept of experience is the epistemological basis for all knowledge of

the objective.

(7). Husserl

Experience becomes the comprehensive name for all acts of consciousness whose

essence is intentionality.

(8). Nietzsche

All experience last a long time in profound people.

(9). Natorp(1988)






17

The concreteness of primal experience- the totality of consciousness-

represents an undifferentiated unity, which is differentiated and determined by the

objectivizing method of knowledge.

But consciousness means life- an indecomposable interrelationship.(8). Bergson (the mode of being of living beings),

(represention to the whole)

If we look more closely at what is here call “life” and which of its aspects affect

the concept of experience, we see that the relationship of life to experience is not

that of a universal to a particular. Rather, the unity of experience as determined by

its intentional content stands in an immediate relationship to the whole, to the

totality of life.

(9). Georg Simmel Schleiermacher (a element of

infinite life) ( )

The objective not pnly becomes an image and idea, as in knowing, but an

element in the life process itself

Every experience has something of an adventure about it.

A adventure is by no means just an episode. An adventure interrupts the

customary course of events, but is positively and significantly related to the context

which it interrupts.

Thus an adventure lets life be flet as a whole, in its breadth and in its strength.

Here lies the fascination of an adventure. It removes the conditions and obligations

of everyday life. It ventures out into the uncertain.(P60)

(10). Gadamer

Since aesthetic experience, as was said above, is an exemplary instance of

the meaning of the concept Erlebis, it is clear that the concept of Erlebnis is a

determing feature of the foundation of art.(P60)

The work of art is understood as the consummation of the symbolic

representation of life, and toward this consummation every experience already tends.

Hence it is itself marked out as the object of aesthetic experience. For

aesthetics the conclusion follows that so-called Erlebniskunst (art based on

experience) is art per se.(P61)

5. (Erlebniskunst) (allegory) (symbol)

(1). (Erlebniskunst)

The concept of Erlebniskunst contains an important ambiguity. Originally

Erlebniskunst obviously meant that art comes from experience and is an expression






18

of experience. But in a derived sense the concept of Erlebniskunst is then used foe

art that is in tended to be aesthetically experienced.

(2). (allegory)

“Allegory” originally belonged to the sphere of talk, of the logos, and ittherefore a rhetorical or hermeneutical figure. Instead of ehat is actually meant,

something else, more tangible, is said, but in such a eay that the former is

understood.

“Allegory” refers not only to the figure of speech and the interpreted sense

(sensus allegoricus) but correlatively to abstract concepts artistically represented in

imadge. ...enable one to present in images something that is imageless.(P64)

Obviously the concept of rhetoric and poetics served as models for

developing aesthetic concepts int the sphere of the plastic art.

(3). (symbol)

“Symbol”, however, is not limited to the sphere of the logos, for a symbol is

not related by its meaning to another meaning, but its own swnsory existence has

“meaning”.

As something shown it ,enables one to recognize something else, as with the

tessera hospitalis and the like. Obviously a symbol is something which has value not

only because it is a document by means of which the members of a community

recognize one another; whether it is a religious symbol or appears in a secular

context- as a badge or a pass or a password- in every case the meaning of the

symbolon depends on its physical presence and acquires a representational fuction

only by being shown or spoken.

The need to procced symbolically by referring to the incommensurability of

the suprasenory being of God with our mind, which are accustomed to the world of

sense.(P63)

It is possible to know the divine in no other way than by starting from the

world of the senses.

Acoording to Solger the symbolic refers to an “existent in which the idea is

recognized in some way or other”- the inward unity of ideal and appearance that is

specific to the work of art. Allegory, however, creates this meaningful unity only by

pointing to something else.(P64)

(4).

The symbol is the coincidence of the sensible and the nonsible; allegory, themeaningful relation of the sensible to the non-sensible.






19

(5). ( )

( )

A. Kant

The symbolic is representation; but symbolic representation does notpresent a concept directly but only in an indirect manner, “through which the

expression does not contain the proper schema for the concept, but merely a

symbol for reflection” (Kant)

“The beauty is the symbol of the morally good”……Taste makes

possible the transition from sensory attractiveness to habitual moral interest

without, as it were, too violent a leap(Kant).

B. Schiler Goethe

“ That they are properly symbolic- as I hardly need to say, they are

eminent examples which stand in a characteristic multiplicity, as

representatives of many others, and embrace a certain totality”- “million-

headed hydra of empiricism.”

“The true relationship at the same time expresses the meaning.”

“Everything that happens is a symbol, and , infully representing itself,

it points towards everything else.”

C. Schelling (language of fantasy)

(Sinnbild, meaning image)

Mythology in general and any piece of methological literature in

particular is not to be understood schematically or allegorically, but

symbolically. For the demand of absolute artistic representation is:

representation with complete indifference, so that the universal is wholly the

particular, and the particular is at the same time wholly the universal, and

does not simply mean it.

Symbol as Sinnbild as concrete, resembling only itself, like an image,

and yet as universal and full of meaning as a concept..

The concept of symbol implies the inner unity of symbol and what is

symbolized, was it possible for the symbol to become a basic concept

universal to aesthetics.

D. Hegelh

( )

The symbol does not simply dissolve the tension between the world

of the idea and the world of sense.: it disproportion between form andessence, expression and content. In particular the religious function of the






20

symbol lives from the apparent with the infinite in a religious ceremony

assumes that what belong together. Thus the religious form of the symbol

corresponds exactly to the original nature of “symbolon”, the dividing of

what is one and reuniting it again.E. F. T. Vischer

Symbol is as one of the fundamental achievements of subjectivity.

The “dark symbolism of the mind” gives soul and significiance to what in

itself lacks a soul (nature or phenomenal appearances).

Since the aesthetic conscious- as opposed to mythical-religious-

knows that it is free, the symbolism it imparts to everything is also “free.”

However ambiguous and indeterminate the symbol still remains, it can no

longer be characterized by its privative relation to the concept. Rather, it has

its own possibility as a creation of the human mind.(P69)

F. Cassirer (image) (meaning)

6.

(1).

Aesthetic consciousness is the experiencing (erlebende) center from

which everything considered art is measured.

7. 藝術作品作為理解的現象的可能。

(2). (simultaneity)

Since aesthetic consciousness claims to embrace everything of artistic

value, it has the character of simultaneity. As aesthetic, it form of reflection

in which it moves is therefore not only present.For inasmuch as aesthetic

conscious makes everything it values simultaneous, it constitute itself as

historical at the same time.(P74)

(3). (Aesthetic differentiation)

The “aesthetic differntiation” performed by aesthetic

consciousnessalso create an external existence for itself.(P75)

(4)

Thus through “aesthetic differentiation” the work loses its place and

the world to which it belongs insofar as it belongs instead to aesthetic

consciousness. Correlatively, the artist too loses his place in the world.(P76)~~~~~~導讀至 P77~~~~ 敬請指教 ̂ ^






21

1. Gadamer 將追尋真理的焦點從主體轉變到藝術作品，再回歸到自身。如此透過媒介就能確保普遍的傳達性嗎？

2.「品味」和「天才」間存在什麼關係，這些都是可以後天教育的嗎？

3. Gadamer的「遊戲主體」、「創作者」、「觀賞者」之間，有怎樣的關係？重視與作品效果歷史境遇的「交互主體性」又要如何被研究所觀察？

4. Kant也認為美感判斷是在知性和想像力間的自由遊戲，Kant的「遊戲」和Gadamer的「遊戲」有何不同意義？

5.「比喻」和「象徵」，和中國六書的「假借」、「轉注」是否有雷同之處？

6. Gadamer

呼籲一種透過作品的「遊戲」真理，這是一種先驗主體化的轉向，追求一種普遍傳達性。這和 Foucaulty「主體客體化」的走向「論述」有何異同？

洪漢鼎 (2002)。。台北市：桂冠出版社。

Gadamer, H. G. (1975/1988)。Truth and method。吳文勇 (譯)。真理與方法。台北：南方叢書出版社。

Gadamer, H.G. (1975/2006). Truth and method . Translation revised by Joel

Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall. New York: Continuum.

Hume, D. (1739/2002). A treatise of human nature.關文遠 (譯)。人性論。香港：商務印書館。






22

Kant

Kant在探討美感經驗時，重視「美感判斷」甚於「美的感受」。Kant也在《判斷力批判》區分為「審美判斷力批判」及「目

的判斷力批判」，具有連結「純粹理性批判」和「實踐理性批判」的

必要性與意義。

1.

Kant指出，「純粹理性批判」處理的是「理論哲學」，而「實

踐理性批判」處理的是「實踐哲學」，並各自展現不同客體特殊性的

原則(p1)。於是，作為感官之物的「自然概念5」和作為超感官之物的

「自由概念」之間就產生一條鴻溝(p6)。但是 Kant認為還有一個處

於知性和理性之間的中間環結，這中間的環節就是「判斷力」(p8)，

而透過判斷力批判可以作為把哲學對立的兩部分結合為一個整體，透

過判斷力也得以和我們表象的能力結合在一起。對 Kant來說「判斷力」也是一種先天立法的能力。

Kant主張我們心靈有三種機能：認識能力、愉快和不愉快的感

覺、欲望能力。對 Kant指出(如表 2-1-1所示)：

5 自然 (nature)具有表示本體的意思。






23

表 2-1-1 Kant所認為的人心的全部能力

人心的全部能力認識能力先天原則應用範圍

認識能力知性合規律性對自然的理解

愉快和不愉快的情感

判斷力合目的性對藝術的鑑賞

欲求能力理性最終目的自由的實踐

資料來源：改自《純粹理性批判》

Kant認為，追求「自然的合目的性」的「判斷力」在自發性的認識活動中，加入愉悅作為協調的角色，並使「自然領域」和「自由

概念」在交互作用的後果中連接起來。基本上，Kant的看法認為美

感判斷是一種擺盪在理性和感性間的遊戲狀態，並讓自然界客觀的

「實然」和人欲求的「應然」兩者間得以獲得對話的「第三空間」。

而這種理性和感性間辨證的「協調一致」也就是 Kant「判斷力」對

於美感經驗的功能了。

2,

既然 Kant講「判斷力」，那麼是否須要有「判斷的依據」或

「判斷的標準」呢？如果需要的話，那又要如何獲得這種「標準」

呢？首先，Kant 將「判斷力」區分為「規定性的判斷」和「反思性的判斷」，而 Kant的美感判斷指的是後者。他這麼說：






24

Kant認為，「反思性的判斷力」的任務是從自然中的特殊上升

到普遍性，所以需要一個原則，但是這個原則不能從經驗中借來，因為這個原則雖然是經驗性的、但還需要更高的原則統一性提供根據。

這種「反思判斷力」的規律只能自己給自己，而不是來自於「自然」6。為了處理這個問題，Kant提出一個概念「自然的形式合目的

性」：

基本上，研究者認為，Kant所提出「自然的形式合目的性」的

想法，認定「美感判斷」為「反思性」而非「規範性」而有別於知性

的概念，但為了在多樣的特殊性中尋求判斷的統一標準，因此他結合

了「形式因」和「目的因」，從多樣中找到統一的可能性，而這種統

一又不是一成不變固定的標準，而是可能有所變化的。

此外，Kant也進一步說明「自然形式的合目的性」是一種特殊

的先天概念，只在反思判斷力中有其根源，並作為反思判斷力的先驗

原則7：

6

因為如果這種規律來自於自然，就變成是「規定性的判斷」了。

7 Kant對「先驗原則」和「形上學原則」作出區別，前者純粹用概念來思考，後者包含了經驗物體的概念。






25

Kant也繼續指出：

研究者認為，Kant這兩段話表達出他將「美感判斷」置於「主觀論」的立場，也就是我們的「判斷力」只在我們的主觀中作用，對於客體本身並不產生任何影響，而同時客體的本質也不會對我們產生影響；這也就是「美在心中」的意思。舉例來說：當我們看到一位美女時，我們在心中進行美感判斷她是「令人愉悅的」只是就她的自然形式來說。事實上這位美女並不會因為我們的判斷而有任何改變她當下的美麗特質，我們自身也不會因為這位美女的美麗而改變我們自身的任何本質。這裡的「形式」，就是 Kant所說的：「自然界對我們知性認識能力的合目的性原則，透過知覺向人類知性呈現出特殊的事物中又發現普遍的東西，在有差異的東西上又重新發現原則統一性的聯結，又將自己普遍

的規律特殊化了…。」這裡的「普遍」指的就是我們對這位美女感受到的「美的形式」，而「美的形式」透過這位美女的存在展現了「特殊」。而這或許也是 Kant的美學理論後來導致 19世紀的主流美學趨向於形式主義的前因。

1000521 gadamer truth and method.(1)

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