10 transparency at home: how well do governments share ... · political rights, 16 december 1966,...

C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/4121465/WORKINGFOLDER/BIHI/9781107021389C10.3D 239 [239–268] 4.6.2013 6:27PM

10

Transparency at Home: How Well DoGovernments Share Human Rights Information

with Citizens?

cosette creamer and beth a. simmons*

1. Introduction

Over the past few decades, an increasing number of States have adoptedaccess-to-information laws or other institutions designed to make avail-able information about government decisions and activities.1 A numberof factors have made possible this trend toward greater governmentaltransparency. The spread of democratic government worldwide, theemergence of a global civil society, the proliferation of internationalregimes requiring States to disclose information, and the widespreadavailability of information and communication technologies have alllikely contributed to the global transparency trend.2 Underlying thesepressures is a strong belief that transparency influences, among otherthings, the quality and efficiency of governance.

The purpose of this chapter is to contribute to our knowledge aboutthe role of transparency in safeguarding and improving human rights, as

* Alexander Noonan and Ashley DiSilvestro provided invaluable research assistance. Wealso benefited from discussions of an earlier version of this chapter at the authors’ retreatfor ‘Transparency in International Law’ and at the International Law-InternationalRelations Workshop at Harvard University. All errors remain ours alone.

1 John M. Ackerman/Irma E. Sandoval-Ballesteros, ‘The Global Explosion of Freedom ofInformation Laws’, Administrative Law Review 58 (2006), 85–130.

2 There is no commonly agreed upon definition of transparency. Some scholars andinternational organizations employ a definition that focuses on ensuring public accessto information. For Ann Florini, transparency refers to the ‘degree to which informationis available to outsiders that enables them to have informed voice in decisions and/or toassess the decisions made by insiders’. Ann Florini, ‘Introduction: The Battle OverTransparency’, in Ann Florini (ed.), The Right to Know: Transparency for an OpenWorld (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 1–16, 5. Others employ definitionsthat reference, in addition, the scope, accuracy and timeliness of information provided.

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one element of governance. We define transparency as the disseminationof regular and useful information.3 Many studies assume that informa-tion about government policies and practices helps improve compliancewith international and domestic human rights law,4 but they have notdocumented how and to what extent information-enhancing institutionsand practices have been ensconced at the international and especially thedomestic levels. We argue that one critical window into this matter is theestablishment of national human rights institutions (NHRIs). NHRIs areindependent governmental bodies specifically mandated to protect andpromote human rights, and represent focal institutions for the provisionof transparency about rights law and practice at the national level. Weargue that the efficaciousness of these institutions depends on how andwhether they actually inform people about the nature of human rightslaw and how individuals can act on this knowledge if they think theirrights have been violated. Nowadays, websites represent the main tool bywhich NHRIs inform citizens of these matters. We show that NHRIwebsites are now commonplace, but recognize they are only potentiallyuseful if they work, are navigable, and provide information that citizenscan use to hold their governments and private actors accountable.

Not all NHRI websites rate highly in this regard and display consid-erable differences in the quality and quantity of information provided.We find that internet penetration within a country is a very strongpredictor of a useful and user-friendly NHRI human rights website.Unsurprisingly, however, it is impossible to attribute better rights prac-tices to this ‘window’ per se. Internet penetration itself is stronglyassociated with better rights practices across countries. We think it likelythat NHRIs contribute in a small way to transparency in the humanrights domain, but that their effects cannot be disentangled from thetransparency effects of the internet more generally.

This chapter proceeds as follows. In the second section, we discusstheories of compliance with international human rights obligations, andthe potential role of transparency in encouraging improved humanrights practices. The third section discusses the role of NHRIs in mon-itoring, promoting, and educating people about their rights. We show

3 Ronald B. Mitchell, ‘Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in InternationalRegimes’, International Studies Quarterly 42 (1998), 109–130, 109.

4 Xinyuan Dai, International Institutions and National Policies (New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2007); Beth A. Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: InternationalLaw in Domestic Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

240 cosette creamer and beth a. simmons


they have spread over time, that most now have websites, and that manyof these websites are operable and in fact do contain information aboutlocal and international law in a form comprehensible to laypersons. Thefourth section employs statistical analyses to assess the conditions asso-ciated with the existence of highly transparent websites, and the fifthsection explores correlations between these sites and human rightspractices. We are far from providing a causalmodel linking transparencywith better human rights, but note that both internet penetration andmore transparent NHRI websites are associated with better rights prac-tices in countries around the world. While we think it highly likely thatgovernments that respect human rights are more willing to be moretransparent about their human rights obligations, practices and availableremedies, we also conclude that a better window on government practi-ces may reinforce positive developments by enhancing the ability ofindividuals and groups to stay informed and hold governments andother actors accountable for their actions.

2. Transparency and Human Rights: The State of the Art

In the context of human rights, transparency refers to the provision andaccessibility of information about: (a) the specific human rights guaran-teed, both internationally and nationally, to citizens, and what theserights mean in practice; (b) the procedures and legal processes availableto ensure realization of their rights; and (c) a government’s policies andpractices of human rights protection.5 Under this definition, humanrights transparency is viewed not as an end in itself but as an instrumentfor improving States’ human rights practices. The consumers of thisinformation are both citizens affected by a government’s human rightspractices, and international treaty bodies and NGOs tasked with mon-itoring these practices.

Transparency is often cited as the solution to a host of developmentand governance problems. The claimed benefits of greater transparencyare many: it can improve investment climates and financial marketperformance more generally; it can promote public debate and improvepolicy-making; and it can increase the ability of legislatures, the mediaand civil society to hold policy-makers accountable, thereby increasing

5 These are similar to the elements of transparency identified by Abraham Chayes/AntoniaHandler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International RegulatoryAgreements (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 135–153.

transparency of human rights institutions 241


public trust and confidence in government. There are thus a number oftheoretical reasons to expect greater transparency to improve States’compliance with human rights obligations, as transparency is oftenviewed as contributing to increased accountability of governments toboth international and domestic actors. More specifically, most theoriesof compliance with international law rely explicitly or implicitly onthe availability of information about government activities and legalobligations.

Still, international human rights treaties do not establish a legalobligation on States to be transparent about their human rights practices.None of the nine major human rights treaties, or their optional proto-cols, mention transparency in relation to States.6 The only use of theword ‘transparent’ is found within article 35(4) of the Convention on theRights of Persons with Disabilities, which provides that ‘[w]hen prepar-ing reports to the Committee, States Parties are invited to consider doingso in an open and transparent process’.7 In particular, States ‘shall closelyconsult with and actively involve persons with disabilities, includingchildren with disabilities, through their representative organizations’.8

In contrast, the Convention against Torture explicitly provides for theabsence of transparency, in the form of confidential inquiries underarticle 20 into the systematic practice of torture within a country.9 Interms of dissemination of information about human rights, theConvention on the Rights of the Child is the only treaty to providethat State parties are to ‘undertake to make the principles and provisionsof the Convention widely known, by appropriate and active means, toadults and children alike’.10

6 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment orPunishment, 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85; Convention on the Elimination of AllForms of Discrimination against Women, 18 December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13;Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3;International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 195; Convention on the Rights of Persons withDisabilities, 13 December 2006, 2515 UNTS 3; UNGA, Resolution Adopted by theGeneral Assembly: International Convention for the Protection of All Persons fromEnforced Disappearance, A/RES/61/177, 12 January 2007, annex; InternationalConvention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members oftheir Families, 18 December 1990, 2220 UNTS 93; International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171; International Covenant onEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3.

7 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2006 (n 6), art. 35(4).8 Ibid., art. 4(3). 9 Convention against Torture, 1984 (n 6), art. 20.10 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 (n 6), art. 42.



Much of the early human rights scholarship implicitly viewed trans-parency at the international level as a key mechanism to encouragecompliance with human rights obligations. By ratifying internationalhuman rights treaties, States became legally obligated to be open abouttheir human rights practices as well as their efforts to implement treatyobligations. Every major human rights convention establishes an inde-pendent oversight committee to which States are required to submitperiodic reports on the legislative, judicial, administrative or othermeasures adopted to give effect to human rights obligations. Mosthuman rights conventions, though, do not require States to otherwisedisseminate these periodic reports. The Convention on the Rights of theChild and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rightsof All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families are exceptions,as they provide that ‘States Parties shall make their reports widelyavailable to the public in their own countries’.11 After consideringperiodic State reports, each committee then typically provides conclud-ing observations and often requests additional information. Each com-mittee is also permitted to transmit its concluding observations and theState reports themselves to other relevant international agencies.12

Through these periodic reports, governments are required to provideinformation to the treaty committees on their human rights practices andefforts to comply. If States fall short in this regard, the committee – throughits concluding observations – often publicly identifies non-compliantStates, thereby engaging in a practice of ‘naming and shaming’ – that ispublicizing a country’s human rights violations and calling for reform.Similarly, the Human Rights Council (as previously the United NationsCommission on Human Rights) provides an international forum in whichother governments (as opposed to independent treaty bodies) ‘name andshame’ through yearly resolutions. Within these resolutions, individualcountries are singled out and publicly criticized for failing to upholdinternational human rights standards.13 This strategy of ‘naming andshaming’ perpetrators of human rights abuses is often employed byNGOs and the news media as well. Theoretically, this strategy isbelieved to negatively affect a State’s reputation for ‘good behavior’

11 Ibid., art. 44(6); Migrant Workers Convention, 1990 (n 6), art. 73(4).12 See, for example, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 (n 6), art. 45(b).13 James Lebovic/Erik Voeten, ‘The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country

Human Rights Practices in the UNCHR’, International Studies Quarterly 50 (2006),861–888.



internationally14 or increase social pressures to comply with human rightstreaties.15 However, its effectiveness in improving compliance is question-able. For example, Emilie Hafner-Burton found that global ‘naming andshaming’ is often followed by a continuation of or increase in some humanrights violations, even as other types of violations (typically those mostvisible) are reduced.16

Just as transparency and human rights appear to be mutually reinforc-ing at the international level, at the domestic level they seem to go handin hand as synergetic means to promote democratic consolidation,development and good governance generally. And in fact, over the pastthree decades, the adoption of access-to-information laws has increaseddramatically,17 matched if not surpassed by the proliferation of humanrights legislation and institutions.18 Most domestic theories of compli-ance with international law also rely on the availability of informationabout government activities and legal obligations. For example, BethSimmons argues that knowledge that one’s government is publiclycommitted to comply with an international human rights treaty raisesthe expectations of domestic groups that they can legitimately demandcompliance with such treaties.19 Xinyuan Dai hypothesizes that infor-mation produced by international bodies can inform domestic audiencesabout the activities of their governments, and inform judgments aboutwhether a government has complied with its international legal obliga-tions. This information allows domestic constituencies to apply electoralpressure to their government in order to hold them accountable tothe law.20

We recognize that there are a number of ways to measure humanrights transparency, both domestically and internationally. Nevertheless,

14 Robert Keohane, ‘International Relations and International Law: Two Optics’, HarvardInternational Law Journal 38 (1997), 487–502; Andrew Guzman, ‘A Compliance-BasedTheory of International Law’, California Law Review 90 (2002), 1823–1887.

15 Thomas Risse/Kathryn Sikkink, ‘The Socialization of International Human RightsNorms into Domestic Practices: Introduction’, in Thomas Risse/Stephen Ropp/Kathryn Sikkinkn (eds.), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms andDomestic Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1–38, 15; RyanGoodman/Derek Jinks, ‘How to Influence States: Socialization and InternationalHuman Rights Law’, Duke Law Journal 54 (2004), 621–703.

16 Emilie Hafner-Burton, ‘Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human RightsEnforcement Problem’, International Organization 62 (2008), 689–716.

17 Ackerman/Sandoval-Ballesteros, ‘Freedom of Information Laws’ 2006 (n 1).18 Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights 2009 (n 4), 57–64.19 Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights 2009 (n 4).20 Dai, International Institutions and National Policies 2007 (n 4).



the ultimate goal of international human rights treaties is and should behuman rights transparency to a State’s population, so that citizensthemselves may be provided with the means to further their ownhuman rights. While transparency to international organizations ortreaty bodies may be important in encouraging compliance, this chapterfocuses on the provision of human rights information to a State’s pop-ulation. A number of institutions may be responsible for providing suchinformation, but this responsibility increasingly has fallen to NHRIs,which we argue have the potential to contribute significantly to trans-parency regarding human rights law, policies, practices and remedies.Our empirical focus in this chapter is therefore on the diffusion of theseinstitutions around the world, as well as their potential to shed light onthese policies to a broad audience, both at home and abroad.

3. The Role of NHRIs in Human Rights Compliance

A ‘national human rights institution’ refers broadly to ‘a body which isestablished by a government under the constitution, or by law or decree,the functions of which are specifically designed in terms of the promo-tion and protection of human rights’.21 Originating in western Europeanand Commonwealth countries, NHRIs spread throughout southernEurope, Latin America, central and eastern Europe during the 1980sand 1990s. More recently, these institutional forms have proliferatedthroughout Asia and the Middle East. According to our estimates, 144countries have established some type of a national human rights insti-tution (see Figure 10.1).22

The term ‘national human rights institution’ encompasses a range ofgovernmental bodies with human rights mandates, and in fact there isstill considerable debate over the definition of an NHRI.23 The threeprimary ‘models’ of an NHRI are the classical ombudsman model; the

21 UN, National Human Rights Institutions: A Handbook on the Establishment andStrengthening of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of HumanRights (New York: United Nations, 1995), 6.

22 These estimates are based on lists of NHRIs found within existing scholarship orprovided by the International Coordinating Committee of NHRIs. In addition, foreach of the 199 countries we examined, we independently conducted extensive websearches for any mention of an NHRI not included within the above lists.

23 Ryan Goodman/Thomas Pegram, ‘National Human Rights Institutions, StateConformity, and Social Change’, in Ryan Goodman/Thomas Pegram (eds.), HumanRights, State Compliance and Social Change: Assessing National Human RightsInstitutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1–28, 6–11.



national human rights commission model; and a hybrid model. Theombudsman model consists of a single member (the ombudsman) andstaff, with a mandate typically covering procedural irregularities inpublic administration, ethnic and gender discrimination and children’srights. The national human rights commission model is a multi-memberinstitution with a broad mandate to monitor and promote human rights,and in some countries includes the authority to investigative individualcomplaints. Lastly, the hybrid model, often in the form of a HumanRights Ombudsman Office, combines aspects of the ombudsman andcommission models and deals with both human rights and publicadministration.24

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

pre-

1980

1980

–198

4

1985

–198

9

1990

–199

4

1995

–199

9

2000

–200

4

2005

–200

9

East Asia, Pacific Europe, Central Asia Americas, Caribbean

Mid East, North Africa South Asia Sub-Sahara Africa

Figure 10.1 Number of National Human Rights Institutes World-wide by Region

24 Jeong-Woo Koo/Francisco O. Ramirez, ‘National Incorporation of Global HumanRights: Worldwide Expansion of National Human Rights Institutions, 1966–2004’,Social Forces 87 (2009), 1321–1354; International Council on Human Rights Policy,Performance and Legitimacy: National Human Rights Institutions (Versoix:International Council for Human Rights Policy, 2nd edn, 2004); but see Leonard F.M.Besselink, ‘Types of National Institutions for the Protection of Human Rights andOmbudsman Institutions: An Overview of Legal and Institutional Issues’, in KamalHossain et al. (eds.), Human Rights Commissions and Ombudsman Offices (London:Kluwer Law International, 2001), 157–165.



Serious international cooperation regarding NHRIs really began in the1990s, with the adoption of the Paris Principles by a group of NHRIs in1991. The Paris Principles establish general international standards onthe mandate and structure of NHRIs, and were later endorsed by the UNOffice of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and theUN General Assembly.25 In 1994, NHRIs established their own networkin the form of the International Coordinating Committee of NationalHuman Rights Institutions, charged with organizing and overseeing allinternational and regional connections. The International CoordinatingCommittee and the OHCHR have provided some definitional conver-gence by establishing an accreditation process for NHRIs, based on theinstitution’s compliance with the Paris Principles.26 Although States areoften encouraged to establish an NHRI, there currently exists no interna-tional legal obligation for them to do so.

According to the Paris Principles, NHRIs are government-initiatedand financed institutions that are supposed to remain independent of thegovernment and other actors. While all are ostensibly designed to pro-mote human rights, NHRIs display considerable variation in their offi-cial functions. These functions typically include: reviewing proposed andexisting legislation for compliance with ‘fundamental principles ofhuman rights’;27 monitoring international treaty implementation; pro-ducing reports on a government’s human rights practices; providingtraining and research opportunities to various governmental and non-governmental actors; and assisting with individual complaints.

Not all NHRIs have explicit jurisdiction over international humanrights, particularly within countries that have historically enjoyed strongdomestic protections or that prefer domestic to international mecha-nisms. Yet even for those that do not have an explicit internationalmandate, NHRIs are often tasked with helping to ensure implementationof and compliance with the human rights conventions a State hasratified. In fact, the UN encourages the establishment of NHRIs preciselybecause these institutions are believed to provide a central mechanism

25 UNGA, National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,A/RES/48/134, 20 December 1993, annex: Principles Relating to the Status of NationalInstitutions (Paris Principles).

26 The Paris Principles include, inter alia: operation independent from government;membership that broadly reflects societal composition; incorporation into legislation;and cooperation with civil society. For a description of the accreditation procedure, see:http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/ICCAccreditation/Pages/default.aspx.

27 UNGA, Paris Principles, 1993 (n 25), art. 3(i).



through which international human rights norms can be implemented atthe domestic level.28 They are viewed as providing the ‘practical linkbetween international standards and their concrete application’29 andhave even been permitted to participate in relevant meetings of the UNCommission on Human Rights and the Human Rights Council.30

One way in which NHRIs contribute to the implementation of inter-national human rights is by influencing the content of domestic humanrights legislation, itself often inspired by ratification of internationalhuman rights conventions.31 The majority of NHRIs are mandated toadvise governments on the compatibility of proposed or existing legis-lation with international standards. In addition, NHRIs often applyinternational human rights standards in their monitoring activities,particularly in the drafting of annual reports and in their handling ofindividual complaints and cases. They are also increasingly viewed asimportant sources of information regarding States’ periodic reportssubmitted to international treaty bodies, and many even submit theirown ‘shadow reports’ to these bodies.

The promotion and education function of NHRIs is perhaps mostrelevant to a government’s human rights transparency. The educationalwork of NHRIs covers a broad range of activities, such as public educa-tion on human rights, public awareness campaigns, media work, andtraining State officials about the human rights standards with which theymust comply. This public education and awareness function is funda-mentally about communicating to the public in simple terms whathuman rights are and what mechanisms are available to protect them.It also entails publicizing the steps a country has taken to implement and

28 UNGA, National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights:Report of the Secretary-General, A/64/320, 24 August 2009; UNGA, The Role of theOmbudsman, Mediator and Other National Human Rights Institutions in thePromotion and Protection of Human Rights, A/RES/63/169, 20 March 2009; UNGA,National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, A/RES/63/172, 20 March 2009; Goodman/Pegram, ‘National Human Rights Institutions’ 2012 (n23), 16–18.

29 UN, Economic and Social Council, Further Promotion and Encouragement of HumanRights and Fundamental Freedoms, Including the Question of the Programme andMethods of Work of the Commission: National Institutions for the Promotion andProtection of Human Rights: Report of the Secretary General Submitted in Accordancewith Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1996/50, E/CN.4/1997/41, 5 February1997.

30 Julie A. Mertus, Human Rights Matters: Local Politics and National Human RightsInstitutions (Stanford University Press, 2009), 8.

31 Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights 2009 (n 4).



comply with international human rights obligations. In this way NHRIsremain a central locus for transparency regarding government humanrights practices, although many NHRIs face significant challenges inmaking their services accessible to as many people as possible.

A growing body of scholarship has sought to identify the conditionsfacilitating the transnational spread of NHRIs. A number of studies findthat international institutions – specifically the OHCHR and UN treatybodies – play an important role in persuading government actors toestablish NHRIs.32 Global and regional NHRI networks have also beenidentified as significant actors in explaining the particular form of anNHRI.33 Apart from these influential actors, cross-national studies havefound some evidence supporting a world polity explanation, accordingto which countries that are ‘more embedded’ in ‘world culture’ are morelikely to create an NHRI.34 A State’s membership in international gov-ernmental and NGOs, the number of international human rights con-ventions it has ratified, and the regional and global density of NHRIshave all been found to help explain the decision to set up this institution.Predictably, democratic countries with few human rights violations aremore likely to create an NHRI, though an increasing number of ‘partlyfree’ and ‘not free’ countries are setting up these institutions as well.Income, based on World Bank Gross Domestic Product per capitacategories, on the other hand, does not seem to be correlated withNHRI creation.35

4. NHRI Transparency

The formal establishment of an NHRI does not in and of itself guaranteethat this institution will provide information or enhance knowledgeabout a country’s human rights practices and processes. Yet as one of

32 Sonia Cardenas, ‘Emerging Global Actors: The United Nations and National HumanRights Institutions’, Global Governance 9 (2003), 23–42; Thomas Pegram, ‘DiffusionAcross Political Systems: The Global Spread of National Human Rights Institutions’,Human Rights Quarterly 32 (2010), 729–760; Peter Rosenblum, ‘Tainted Origins andUncertain Outcomes: Evaluating NHRIs’, in Goodman/Pegram, Human Rights, StateCompliance and Social Change 2012 (n 23), 297–323.

33 Goodman/Pegram, Human Rights, State Compliance and Social Change 2012 (n 23);Linda C. Reif, ‘The Shifting Boundaries of NHRI Definition in the International System’,in Goodman/Pegram, Human Rights, State Compliance and Social Change 2012 (n 23),52–73.

34 Koo/Ramirez, ‘National Incorporation of Global Human Rights’ 2009 (n 24).35 Ibid.; Pegram, ‘Diffusion Across Political Systems’ 2010 (n 32).



the few governmental institutions explicitly charged with human rightspromotion and protection, an NHRI is the institution where we wouldexpect to see the most transparency regarding a State’s human rightspractices. Perhaps more importantly, the explicit human rights mandateof an NHRI implies that it is the body to which citizens themselves wouldfirst look when seeking information about their human rights and themechanisms available to ensure their realization. And in fact, the extentto which an NHRI makes itself accessible to those most vulnerable tohuman rights violations has been recognized as a critical element inevaluating the performance and legitimacy of the institution.36

Over the past few decades, advances in information and communica-tion technologies have fundamentally changed how governments pro-vide information and services to their citizens. The broader globalmovement toward e-government37 suggests that one measure of agovernment’s transparency is the amount of information it provideson its own websites. And with the dramatic increase over the past decadein internet penetration worldwide, one of the primary methods throughwhich citizens now access information is through the internet, whichmany claim has enhanced the power of non-State actors.38 Admittedly,improvements in telecommunication infrastructure and e-governmentdepend considerably on sufficient resources to provide affordableaccess. While developed countries would be expected to rely more one-government, developing countries have also recognized the centralityof information technology infrastructure and e-government, particularlyfor attracting economic investment.39 Empirical assessments of levels ofe-government have confirmed that the dissemination of governmentinformation via the internet is not simply a developed countryphenomenon.40

36 International Council on Human Rights Policy, Performance and Legitimacy 2004(n 24).

37 Darrell M. West, ‘Global E-Government, 2007’, August 2007, available at: www.insidepolitics.org.

38 Ronald Deibert, ‘International Plug’n’Play? Citizen Activism, the Internet, and GlobalPublic Policy’, International Studies Perspectives 1 (2004), 255–272; Craig Warkentin/KarenMingst, ‘International Institutions, the State and Global Civil Society in the Age ofthe World Wide Web’, Global Governance 6 (2000), 237–257.

39 Pippa Norris, Digital Divide: Civic Engagement, Information Poverty and the InternetWorldwide (Cambridge University Press, 2001).

40 Darrel M.West, ‘E-Government and the Transformation of Service Delivery and CitizenAttitudes’, Public Administration Review 64 (2004), 15–27; West, ‘Global E-Government’ 2007 (n 37).



As of 2011, most NHRIs do have websites (see Table 10.1). South Asiahas the highest proportion of NHRIs of any region in the world, and allhave working websites. East Asia has the smallest proportion of NHRIs(slightly less than half of the countries in the region at this point), butmost do have working websites. In absolute numbers, Europe andcentral Asia have the largest number of working NHRI websites, withforty-two. In sub-Saharan Africa, on the other hand, operative NHRIwebsites were much less common: fourteen countries with NHRIs hadno web-presence at all, and another five had web-addresses that lednowhere.

Table 10.2 is a more systematic effort to analyze the correlates oftransparency as indicated by the existence of a working website. Itpresents the findings of a multivariate logit model, which expresses thecorrelation (if any) between various explanatory variables (listed in thefirst column on the left of the table) and whether a country has a workingwebsite, a non-functioning web address or no website at all. The poten-tial correlates we test are proxies for governance arrangements andcapacities, human rights practices, income per capita and internet tech-nical capacity. The results are quite strong and striking. They are also justas one might expect. Countries that are well and transparently governed

Table 10.1 National Human Rights Institutes (NHRIs) and NHRIs withWorking Websites, by Region

NHRIs Working Websites

Region Number% countriesin region Number

% NHRIsin region

Americas,Caribbean

25 67.57 21 84.00

East Asia, Pacific 15 48.39 12 80.00Europe, Central Asia 46 85.19 42 91.30Middle East, North

Africa13 61.91 9 69.23

South Asia 7 87.50 7 100.00Sub-Saharan Africa 34 72.34 15 44.12

Source: Authors’ database, based on accessing each website duringAugust–September 2011.



according to a variety of measures are also more likely to have workingNHRI websites. (The sample here covers only those countries withNHRIs; those without are dropped.) Working NHRI websites are corre-lated with government effectiveness and rule of law (as measured by theWorld Governance Indicators and the World Bank). Note however thatwe do not include these variables in the same models because they arehighly correlated (with a Pearson’s correlation coefficient of .88).Furthermore, countries that were more democratic on average between2005 and 2010 were much more likely to have NHRIs with working

Table 10.2 NHRIs and Transparency: Correlates of a Working Website(ordered logit coefficients; probabilities)

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5

Government Effectiveness(2000)

1.105***(p=.001)

– – – –

Rule of Law – .964***(p=.007)

1.59***(p=.000)

1.16**(p=.015)

.972**(p=.042)

Democracy (2005–10average)

.099**(p=.024)

.118***(p=.010)

.159***(p=.000)

.176***(p=.000)

.164***(p=.001)

NHRI age (logged) 1.04*(p=.075)

1.15**(p=.05)

1.32**(p=.011)

1.29**(p=.017)

1.32**(p=.017)

Physical integrity index(2000)

– – −.512**(p=.032)

−.597**(p=.015)

−.600**(p=.035)

Income level (World Bank) – – – .751**(p=.015)

.622*(p=.051)

Internet penetrationin country

– – – – .026(p=.420)

Observations 112 112 112 112 112Pseudo R2 .17 .17 .22 .26 .26

Note:* =significant at .10 level;

** =significant at .05 level;*** =significant at .01 level.Dependent variable: 0=no website; 1=web address, but link does not work or doesnot lead to an operative NHRI website; 2=web address leads to an operative NHRIwebsiteSource of dependent variable: Authors’ database, based on accessing each websiteduring August–September 2011.



websites. The older the NHRI (as measured by the number of years,logged), the more likely it was to have a working website. Also unsur-prisingly, NHRIs in wealthier countries were more likely to have workingNHRI websites. There are, however, two surprising results in this table.Once we control for other governance factors, it appears to be the casethat the better a countries human rights practices,41 the less likely it is tohave an NHRI website. This may reflect a calculation that good rightspractices make this form of transparency somewhat unnecessary. It isalso surprising that our proxy for technical capacity – average internetpenetration (internet connections per 1000 population) – has practicallyno relationship to the existence of a working NHRI website. It seemsmore likely that transparency with respect to human rights as measuredby the existence of a website is correlated with governance indicatorsrather than technical information technology capacity.

Of course it is not enough just to have a website. E-government has thepotential to increase transparency only to the extent that citizens andinternational governmental and NGOs are able to access information ona State’s human rights practices on a timely basis.42 And a website onlyenhances transparency to the extent that it helps a rights holder knowwhat his or her rights are and how to go about ensuring their realization.This points to a number of specific elements we would expect NHRIwebsites to provide if they were fully transparent. First, we would expectan NHRI to help citizens understand their legal rights under interna-tional and domestic law. Second, a fully transparent NHRI wouldpresent clear and unbiased information on a State’s human rights prac-tices, including not only the good news about efforts being made, but alsothe bad news about continuing problems and weaknesses.43 Third, atransparent NHRI should provide instructions on how citizens cansubmit complaints or communications to domestic or internationaltreaty bodies, or offer to help in this regard.

41 Human rights practices are measured by the Physical Integrity Index within theCingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project, which summarizes govern-ment compliance with human rights relating to torture, extrajudicial killing, politicalimprisonment and disappearance.

42 Thomas Barnebeck Andersen, ‘E-Government as an Anti-Corruption Strategy’,Information Economics and Policy 21 (2009), 201–210.

43 While we recognize the importance of accuracy of information provided by NHRIs, ourmeasures of transparency only capture the amount and to some extent the quality ofinformation provided, without evaluating accuracy. We believe this constitutes a suffi-cient first step in measuring NHRI transparency.



4.1 Transparency about the Law

In terms of international human rights, actual NHRI websites displaysome interesting patterns. Of the 106 NHRIs with working websites, only19 make no reference to international law at all. Thirty-two provide aspecial section devoted to explaining international legal obligations, withthe remaining fifty-five making at least some reference to internationallaw. Surprisingly only nine NHRI websites provide what can be consid-ered a ‘lay definition’ of the protections afforded by international humanrights law.

In contrast to general references to international human rights, forty-four NHRI websites provide no indication of the specific conventions theState has ratified. Of those that do, thirty-four provide a list of ratifiedtreaties that appears exhaustive, while twenty-eight mention some rati-fied treaties but do not provide a systematic list. Fifty-nine NHRIwebsites provide no working links to treaty texts, while forty-seven do.

Why are some NHRIs so clear about the nature of international legalobligations, while others barely mention international human rightslaw? One possibility is that NHRIs rely more explicitly on internationallegal instruments when domestic legal structures and protections areweak. However, there appears to be very little evidence for this‘substitution’ proposition. There is very little difference among countriesthat have been stable democracies since World War II (or independ-ence), countries that have never been democratic, and all others invarious stages and directions of regime transition in this regard. Wecreated an index (ranging from 0 to 8) that combines the above trans-parency dimensions to capture the extent to which NHRI websites aretransparent about international legal obligations, but find very littledifference on this measure across regime types (see Table 10.3).

By comparison, many more NHRIs focus on domestic human rightslaw. Of the 106 NHRIs with working websites, all of them mentiondomestic human rights law (statutory or constitutional) though only47 provide an accessible layperson explanation of these protections.Eighty NHRIs provide working links to the actual texts of these laws.Surprisingly, transparency regarding domestic law is not correlated inany straightforward way with regime type. We created a measure ofdomestic legal transparency analogous to the international measureabove, and Table 10.4 shows that there is practically no relationshipbetween the regime type of the country that is home to the NHRI and theextent to which their website is clear about domestic human rights law.



Table10.3

TransparencywithRespectto

Internationa

lHum

anRightsLa

w

0(no

reference)

Polity:7.9

1 Polity:3.7

2 Polity:5.2

3 Polity:2.5

4 Polity:3.0

5 Polity:6.1

6 Polity:7.1

7 Polity:7.3

8 Polity:3.5

Ando

rra

Antigu

a&

Barbu

daBermud

aBotsw

ana

Greenland

Hun

gary

Iceland

Israel

Malta

Mauritius

Nam

ibia

Netherland

sPakistan

Papua

New

Guinea

Bolivia

Ecuador

Fiji

Haiti

India

Kenya

Kosovo

Maldives

Morocco

Nepal

Oman

Peru

Rom

ania

So.Sud

anTan

zania

Ukraine

Albania

Austria

Colom

bia

Costa

Rica

Indo

nesia

Nicaragua

Palestine

Portugal

Senegal

Togo

Ugand

aUzbekistan

Zam

bia

Ban

gladesh

Jordan

Kazakhstan

Paraguay

Argentina

Australia

Azerbaijan

Bosnia&

Herzegovina

Canada

Croatia

Cyp

rus

Czech

Repub

licElSalvado

rFinland

Georgia

Hon

duras

Luxembo

urg

Macedon

iaMalaw

i

Arm

enia

Denmark

Egypt

Eston

iaEthiopia

Guatemala

Lithuania

Moldo

vaSerbia&

Mon

tenegro

SriL

anka

Algeria

Cam

eroo

nFran

ceGerman

yGreece

Hon

gKon

gMon

golia

Nigeria

Norway

Panam

aSlovakia

South

Africa

Afghanistan

Belgium

Chile

Irelan

dKorea

(Sou

th)

Mexico

N.Ireland,

UK

New Zealand

Slovenia

Thailand

United

Kingd

om

Kyrgyz

Repub

lic


PuertoRico

Samoa

Spain

Trinidad

&Tob

ago

Venezuela

Malaysia

Philip

pines

Poland

Sweden

Tun

isia

Note:‘Polity’refers

totheaveragepo

lityscorefrom

2005–2010

forthecoun

triesin

each

category.

Note:the0–

8scaleiscreatedby

summingthefollo

wingsub-indices:

*DoestheNHRIwebsitemention

internationallaw?(2=yes,aspecificsectionclearlyabou

tILob

ligations;1=somereferencesbu

tno

tadedicatedsection;0=no

,non

e.)

*DoestheNHRIindicatewhichifan

yinternationalhu

man

righ

tsagreem

entsthecoun

tryhasratified?(2=yes,appearsexhaustive;

1=yes,somebu

tdo

esno

tlistallsystematically;0=no.)

*DoestheNHRIpo

stor

providelin

ksto

thehu

man

righ

tstreaty

textsthatthecoun

tryhasratified?(2=yes,an

dlin

k(s)isworking

;1=

yes,bu

tlin

k(s)

does

notwork;

0=no

.)*

IftheNHRImention

sinternationallaw,d

oesitprovidea‘layp

ersons’explan

ationof

itsmeaning

?(1=yes;0=

no.)

*DoestheNHRIprovideinform

ationon

filin

g,processand/or

outcom

esof

internationallegalcases?(1=yes;0=

no.)

Source:A

utho

rs’d

atabase,basedon

accessingeach

website

duringAug

ust–Septem

ber2011.


Table10.4

TransparencywithRespectto

Dom

esticHum

anRightsLa

w

0(no

reference)

Polity:10

1 Polity:8.1

2 Polity4.2

3 Polity5.4

4 Polity:4.4

5 Polity1.3

6(M

ax.reference)

Polity6.8

Cyp

rus

And

orra

Mon

golia

Nicaragua

Norway

Papua

New

Guinea

Samoa

Southern

Sudan

Ethiopia

Greenland

Palestine

Puerto

Rico

Senegal

Antigua

and

Barbu

daArgentina

Cam

eroo

nIrelan

dIsrael

Kazakhstan

Malaw

iMalta

New

Zealand

SouthAfrica

Alban

iaBotsw

ana

Fiji

Fran

ceHaiti

Indo

nesia

Kenya

Kosovo

Luxembo

urg

Oman

Pakistan

Panam

aPolan

dRom

ania

Trinidadan

dTob

ago

Tun

isia

Uzbekistan

Zam

bia

Afghanistan

Algeria

Austria

Azerbaijan

Bermud

aBosnia&

Herzegov.

Can

ada

Chile

Costa

Rica

Croatia

Czech

Repub

licDenmark

Egypt

ElSalvado

rEston

iaGeorgia

Greece

Hon

duras

Hun

gary

Icelan

d

Arm

enia

Australia

Ban

gladesh

Belgium

Bolivia

Colom

bia

Ecuador

Finland

German

yGuatemala

Hon

gKon

gMacedon

iaMalaysia

Maldives

Mexico

Moldo

vaMorocco

Netherlan

dsNigeria

NorthernIreland,

UK


India

Jordan

Korea

(Sou

th)

KyrgyzRepub

licLithuania

Mauritius

Nam

ibia

Nepal

Paraguay

Portugal

Tanzania

Thailand

Togo

Peru

Philip

pines

Serbia&

Mon

tenegro

Slovakia

Slovenia

Spain

SriL

anka

Sweden

Uganda

Ukraine

United

Kingd

omVenezuela

Note:‘Polity’refers

totheaveragepo

lityscorefrom

2005–2010

forthecoun

triesin

each

category.

Note:the0–

6scaleiscreatedby

summingthefollo

wingsub-indices:

*DoestheNHRImention

domestichu

man

righ

tslaw(con

stitutionalor

statutory)?(1=yes;0=

no)

*IftheNHRImention

sdo

mesticlaw,d

oesitprovidea‘layp

ersons’explanationof

itsmeaning?

(1=yes;0=

no.)

*DoestheNHRIw

ebsiteprovidelin

ksto

specificdo

mesticlaws/legislation?(3=yes,an

dalllink(s)working;2=yes,an

dsomelin

ksworking;1=yes,bu

tlin

k(s)

notworking;0=

no.)

*DoestheNHRIprovideinform

ationon

filin

g,processan

d/or

outcom

esof

domesticlegalcases?(1=yes;0=

no.)

Source:A

utho

rs’d

atabase,basedon

accessingeach

website

duringAug

ust–Septem

ber2011.


A more systematic analysis of the data confirms that the democraticnature of the regime that is home to the NHRI does not predict a highdegree of transparency with respect to either international or domesticlaw. Table 10.5 displays the results of a regression analysis of the corre-lates of legal transparency. The dependent variables in this table are thedomestic law transparency score, the international law transparencyscore, the ratio of the latter to the former, and the total (the sum of thetwo scores). The average degree of democracy between 2005 and 2010 isnot correlated with any of these. Similarly, transparency is not correlatedwith a country’s democracy score for 2010, the variance in democraticgovernance between 2005 and 2010, or whether a country has been astable democracy, in transition or a stable autocracy since World War II.

The two factors that seem most consistently associated with legaltransparency are the age of the NHRI and the income level of the countryin which it is situated. Older NHRIs are much less likely to be trans-parent about international legal obligations, and legal obligations ingeneral. The younger the NHRI, the more likely it is to provide clear,accessible and thorough information about international legal obliga-tions. Note that there is no relationship between NHRI age and domesticlegal transparency alone, however. Furthermore, the higher the incomelevel of the country home to the NHRI, the more likely the it is tothoroughly and transparently discuss human rights law, particularlyinternational human rights law.

4.2 Transparency about Practices

A key aspect of transparency is that citizens are able to access informa-tion about their government’s policies, and – even more essential – theiractual practices. In the human rights area, access to information aboutthe measures governments are taking to improve rights, as well as theirshortcomings, is important if citizens are to effectively hold their govern-ment accountable. Since one of the primary purposes of NHRIs is topromote human rights, transparency should facilitate access to informa-tion about how well a government implements laws and respects therights of its people in practice.

Transparent NHRIs should be willing to post neutral and accuratereports of their human rights record on their website. But in contrast tothe large number of NHRIs that are reasonably transparent about thelaw, few offer performance-based information on their websites. Wefound that 92 of the 106 NHRIs with working websites do not mention



Table 10.5 Correlates of Legal TransparencySample: NHRIs with websitesRegression Coefficients (probability)

Domesticlawtransparency

Internationallawtransparency

Ratio ofinternational todomestictransparency

Total legaltransparency

InternationallegalTransparency

.209**(p=.011)

– – –

Domestic legalTransparency

– .328**(p=.011)

– –

Income level .442(p=.102)

−.009(p=.980)

.005(p=.963)

.620(p=.214)

Physicalintegrityindex (2009)

−.377***(p=.003)

−.164(p=.305)

−.011(p=.825)

−.751***(p=.001)

Internetpenetration

.030**(p=.015)

.005(p=.808)

−.003(p=.592)

.049*(p=.080)

Rule of law −.434(p=.213)

.662(p=.129)

.161(p=.260)

.241(p=.705)

Averagedemocracylevel(2005–2010)

.005(p=.917)

.031(p=.487)

−.007(p=.689)

.048(p=.577)

Ratification ofhuman rightstreaties

2.60*(p=.072)

2.20(p=.226)

.383(p=.514)

6.56***(p=.013)

NHRI age (log) .475(p=.267)

−1.36***(p=.001)

−.378**(p=.022)

−1.09(p=.157)

Number of Obs 101 101 86 101Adjusted R2 .30 .17 .09 .20

Note:* = significant at .10 level;** = significant at .05 level;*** = significant at .01 level.Source of dependent variables: Authors’ database, based on accessing each websiteduring August–September 2011. (See notes to Tables 10.2 and 10.3 above.)



their periodic reports to international human rights bodies. Six men-tioned these reports, but did not provide working links so that privatecitizens could access them. Eight NHRIs do post these reports, and thelinks work (Germany, Sweden, France, Greece, Ireland, New Zealand,Maldives and South Korea). This kind of transparency does seem to bethe special preserve of the most democratic countries: the average polityscore for those that provided working access to their country reports was9.5, while that for those with broken links was significantly lower (–2.8).Countries that do not mention the reports at all had an averagepolity score of 4.4. The eight countries that posted country reports arealso the only ones that provide links to the oversight committees’responses to these reports. And only Northern Ireland, Denmark,Germany, Sweden, New Zealand and the Maldives post ‘shadow reports’by non-governmental groups that provide an independent assessment ofgovernment policies and practices. Furthermore, only seventeen coun-tries provide information on international legal challenges to a State’shuman rights practices.

4.3 Transparency about How to Lodge a Violation Complaint

One of the primary reasons transparency is important is that it enhancesthe possibility that people will be able to act to protect their rights andinterests. NHRIs are not only valuable institutions for promoting knowl-edge about rights and practices, but also for assisting citizens in under-standing their options if they feel their rights have been somehowviolated. This can include instructions on how to lodge a complaintwith the NHRI or other appropriate national bodies, as well as how tosubmit individual communications to international treaty bodies. Wetherefore examined all NHRI websites in search of evidence that theyinformed citizens of available steps – both domestic and international –to have the (alleged) violation addressed, considering both legal (judi-cial) as well as non-legal (mediation, investigation) options. We foundthat seventy-one NHRI websites made some mention of steps individu-als could take if they felt their rights had been violated; thirty-five gave noguidance whatsoever.

It is clear that NHRIs are much more focused on domestic rather thaninternational options for addressing alleged rights violations. Fully sixty-nine NHRI websites explain (with varying degree of clarity and com-pleteness) what non-judicial steps individuals can take to have rights’issues addressed. Another thirty explain what citizens can do to pursue



their rights through the courts or other legal means. Few NHRIs refer-ence international options, however. Only the websites of Cameroon andThailand mention non-legal international options, such as contactinginternational NGOs or the UN OHCHR, while only Slovakia’s NHRImentions international legal options individuals may pursue on itswebsite.

No matter how clear an NHRI tries to be in explaining availableoptions for lodging complaints about rights violations, in many casescitizens will need further clarification or seek assistance in this process.As a final test of transparency in pursuing remedies for rights violations,we e-mailed every NHRI that had an e-mail contact address with thesubject heading ‘rights question’ and the following message from aYahoo! domain: ‘[i]f I feel my rights have been violated, how does thecomplaint process proceed? [signed] C.s.D’. First and foremost, wecoded whether the NHRI answered this simple but vague question.Only thirty-three NHRIs answered within two months; sixty-four didnot. Figure 10.2 shows that capacity of the NHRI might explain thelikelihood of receiving an answer: the higher the income category ofthe country, the higher the proportion of e-mails sent resulted in somekind of answer.

Of the thirty-three that responded, seventeen gave a complete andfairly useful answer. Eight said we should have contacted another personor office; four NHRIs responded with an automatic message of a general

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Upper Income Upper Middle Lower Middle Lower Income

Nu

mb

er o

f N

HR

IsAnswered e-mail Did not answer e-mail

Figure 10.2 NHRI E-mail Responsiveness, by Country’s Income Level



nature; and eight provided us with a personal but very vague answer. Toour knowledge, none forwarded our message to another destination; nordid any discourage us from further contact.

5. Is Transparency Correlated with Better Rights Practices?

Our final question is whether transparency as measured by the existenceand quality of information to which citizens have access matters foractual rights practices. Unfortunately our current data do not allow us toanswer this question since we cannot sort out cause and effect. This isespecially the case since all of our explanatory variables relating totransparency were measured in the summer and autumn of 2011,while most of the measures available on human rights practices are forthe year 2009 at the latest. On the one hand, we cannot explain some-thing observed in 2009 with a ‘cause’ observed in 2011. On the otherhand, many of the websites explored in this research have been up andrunning for years, and it is at least possible if not likely that some of ourmeasures of legal transparency were in place well before we collected outdata. In the absence of a longer time series of data measuring trans-parency, the most we can do at this point is explore relationshipsbetween changes in practices over the past decade and recent measuresof transparency. We do this by reporting correlations between recenttransparency measures and recent human rights practices, controllingfor practices in 2000. It is also important to admit that even in the best ofcircumstances, transparency – and especially the fairly narrow indicatorsof transparency we explore in this chapter – is likely to explain only asmall fraction of any variance we see in rights practices over the pastdecade. Compounded with quite crude measures of rights practicesthemselves, we should not be surprised to see extremely weak correla-tions between transparency and rights improvements.

This is in fact what we find. Table 10.6 reports a series of models thatregress 2009 rights measures on rights measures in 2000 and our variousmeasures of transparency.44 For all of these measures, we found noevidence of a positive correlation between the mere existence of anNHRI and a rights improvement. In one case – using a measure ofgeneral ‘empowerment’ that taps into the extent to which citizens are

44 These measures include: the existence of an NHRI; existence of a website; the quality oflegal transparency, reporting on government practices and providing an e-mail answeradvising about ‘what to do if my rights have been violated’.



empowered vis-à-vis their governments – there is even a negative, albeitweak, correlation. In two cases involving physical integrity and torture(which are highly correlated with a Pearson’s correlation coefficient of.81) the presence of a website is associated weakly with improved out-comes. In the case of torture, legal transparency might be weakly corre-lated with a slight reduction in torture. NHRIs whose websites posthuman rights reports (and responses) and those that answer e-mailrequests for information on what to do about a potential rights violationare associated with improved workers’ rights. As one might expect, theWorld Governance Indicator of ‘voice and accountability’, which meas-ures perceptions of the extent to which a country protects certain civiland political rights such as freedom of expression and a free media, issomewhat higher for NHRIs that bother to answer e-mail inquiries. Wereiterate our caution about these findings. But they do seem to point to

Table 10.6 Is Transparency Correlated with Better Rights Practices?Results of OLS regression (‘No’=less that 15% probability that theestimated coefficient is different than zero).

PhysicalIntegrity Torture

Workers’rights

Empowerment(CIRI)

Voice andAccountability(World Bank)

NHRI No No No −.467*(p=.071)

No

Given anNHRI:website

.225*(p=.070)

.084(p=.124)

No No No

Given NHRIwebsite:Legaltransparency

No .011(p=.144)

No No No

Given NHRIwebsite:reporting

No No .052(p=.129)

.187(p=.142)

No

Given NHRIwebsite:answering

No No .220*(p=.055)

No .119(p=.109)

Note: all models include a control for the rights practice in 2000.



the possibility that NHRIs alone are not enough. While it may bemarginally useful to encourage transparency by explaining the law, byreporting on government practices, and by responding to requests forinformation about options in the case of possible violation, this type ofhuman rights transparency may not be sufficient in and of itself to bringabout short-term improvements in human rights practices. Futureresearch should monitor the extent of transparency offered by NHRIs,to track whether in fact these weak results can be fortified over time.

6. Conclusion

Notably, most countries have now established some type of a nationalhuman rights institution, and a large proportion of these NHRIs employwebsites to disseminate human rights information. This in itself isstriking, and in this respect NHRIs have followed the general trendtoward e-government adopted by many regulatory and other govern-mental agencies. And as with other forms of e-government, wealthierand more democratic countries with a strong rule of law or high qualitycivil service agencies are more likely to set up an NHRI website.Intuitively we might also expect countries with more internet users toexpend more resources and effort in setting up government websites andproviding more information on these sites, but we find this is only partlythe case for NHRIs. Internet penetration of a country is not associatedwith the existence of an NHRI website, although countries with a higherpercentage of internet users do tend to have NHRI websites that are moretransparent, particularly with respect to domestic human rights law.

While there seems to be a clear pattern in the setting up of NHRIwebsites, the quality and accessibility of these websites vary tremen-dously. NHRIs display significant differences in both the level and typeof human rights transparency found on their websites. In contrast to the‘isomorphism’ in NHRI structures identified by some studies, thereappears to be no analogous ‘isomorphism’ with respect to NHRI web-sites. Governments may decide to establish an NHRI for any number ofreasons, and the powers and independence given to an NHRI (and thusthe extent to which it is permitted to be transparent) are often related tothe original motive or purpose for supporting its initial creation. Webelieve it likely that only States already committed to improving theirhuman rights practices will support greater NHRI transparency. And infact, countries with better human rights practices that have ratified moreinternational human rights conventions are slightly more likely to have



NHRIs which provide greater legal transparency on their websites.Interestingly though, democratic governance per se does not seem tobe related to the quality and accessibility of these websites. Additionally,we recognize that in some contexts NHRIs may be subject to significantgovernment pressure to dissuade criticism of its practices, and thus ameasure of NHRI independence from the government might well be animportant factor in explaining the extent to which it is able to be trans-parent. One useful avenue for further research would be to examine thisrelationship between NHRI independence and transparency.

As mentioned earlier, the UN OHCHR and other international andregional organizations have been at the forefront of the recent push forNHRI creation worldwide, largely because of the belief that these insti-tutions are key to ensuring domestic implementation and promotion ofinternational human rights obligations. Yet, as demonstrated above, arelatively small proportion of these institutions actually reference orprovide information about international human rights obligations andprocesses. While this might be a bit disappointing, it is notable that thoseNHRIs that do rate high on international human rights transparency areinstitutions that have been established more recently. One possiblereason that newly-established NHRIs are more likely to highlight inter-national human rights is the fact that they may have been created inresponse to recent pressure from the UN OHCHR and other interna-tional bodies, who might be expected to emphasize these internationalobligations.

While greater transparency by an NHRI of a government’s humanrights practices may be desirable in and of itself, the more interestingquestion is whether NHRI transparency affects government compliancewith a State’s human rights obligations. If, as advocates of transparencyargue, transparency improves governance by providing disenfranchisedcitizens and groups with more information to push for political change,then we would expect increased human rights transparency to providecivil society with more information around which to organize andmobilize, providing leverage to increase pressure on governments.Greater transparency would thus encourage more organization andmobilization by civil society groups, who use this information to putpressure on the government to change its human rights practices. At thistime, it is impossible to empirically assess this causal argument, but as wehave shown NHRI transparency is only weakly correlated with humanrights improvements over the past decade. We suspect this partly may bebecause the existence of an NHRI – even one that provides high quality



and accessible information about human rights law, practices andremedies – is not enough to guarantee short-term improvements inactual rights practices. While this type of transparency may be margin-ally useful and inherently desirable, its utility in changing governmentpractices may also depend on a number of other factors, such as time, thepresence of a strong civil society, a free press, or other political and civilliberties. Future research should continue to monitor the extent of trans-parency offered by NHRIs, to track whether in fact such transparencyhelps bring about longer-term improvements in human rights.


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