1

Safety Study of Hydrogen Supply Stations for the

Review of High Pressure Gas Safety Law in Japan

International Conference on Hydrogen SafetySeptember 10, 2005

Japan Petroleum Energy Center (JPEC)Hydrogen Technology Group

Shigeki Kikukawa

2

In Japan, regulations for gaseous hydrogen

supply stations were revised in April 2005.

We made drafts of the regulations.

3

Topics

Introduction Background of the project

Safety Study Risk Assessment Basic Approach Risk Matrix Consequence Estimation and Likelihood Estimation Review of Regulations

Safety Requirements for High Pressure Gas Safety Law Setback Distance and others

4

Japan Petroleum Energy Center (JPEC)

JPECEstablished in 1986Affiliated with the Ministry of Economy, Trade and

Industries of Japan (METI) Carries out a range of activities, which are mainly

related to petroleum industry.http://www.pecj.or.jp/

5

Governmental Leadership of FCV & H2 Infrastructure Japanese government is strongly promoting the wide spread

of fuel cells. Anticipated market size

Setting R&D Target Review of codes & Standards Financial help for R&D and Demonstration projects

2010 2020 2030

FCV (vehicles) 50,000 5M 15M

Hydrogen Fueling Station (stations) 500 3,500 8,500

Driving Force

6

Concerns with Regulation

A task force formed by the government in Oct. 2002. Released the Road Map. Identified 28 concerns with regulation which should be

reviewed for market introduction of Fuel Cells.

5 items To be clarified before Dec. 2002

3 items FCV

To be clarified before FY2005

4 items High Pressure H2 Tank of FCV

7 items

Setback distance etc.

H2 Infrastructure

5 items Stationary FC

7

Key Issue 2: Setback Distance

H2

17m11.3m8m

17m : Hospital, school, etc.

11.3m : Dwellings

8m : Fire sources

Setback distance for general high pressured equipment

H2

We have to add some safety requirements to reduce the setback distance.

High Pressure Gas Safety Law

Hydrogen stations must FREE from DANGER!

8

Key Issue 2 : Permission to set up H2 stations with Gasoline stations

H2Gas

Separately

Same areaGas

H2

Fire Protection Law

Key Issue 3 : Permission to build in an urban area

Residential area

H2

Commercialarea

H2 H2

Industrialarea

H2Residential areaCommercial area

Industrial area

Building Standard Law

9

Scope of JPEC’s project Mission: Developing drafts of revised safety C&S of H2 stations

Focused on H2 station Pipelines, Transportation and FCV are out of scope Relevant regulations

High Pressure Gas Safety Law Fire Protection Law Building Standards Law

Schedule We should prepare drafts of review by Sep. 2004. Government would review the regulations by the end of Mar. 2005.

Funds New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO)

10

Japan Steel WorksMaterial Test (Stainless steels, Chromium Molybdenum steels )Reliability of compressor

Japan Steel WorksMaterial Test (Stainless steels, Chromium Molybdenum steels )Reliability of compressor

Project Partners

Japan Petroleum Energy Center (JPEC)General administrationRisk assessment

Japan Petroleum Energy Center (JPEC)General administrationRisk assessment

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. (MHI)H2 Diffusion & Explosion Experiments/CFD

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. (MHI)H2 Diffusion & Explosion Experiments/CFD

Tatsuno CorporationReliability of H2 gas dispenser

Tatsuno CorporationReliability of H2 gas dispenser

Japan Industrial Gas Association Reliability of piping materials, valves, etc.

Japan Industrial Gas Association Reliability of piping materials, valves, etc.

Iwatani International Corp.Reliability of liquid H2 system

Iwatani International Corp.Reliability of liquid H2 system

11

Safety Study

Risk AssessmentPopular and highly experienced measure is used

for our study.

12

Basic Approach

Definition of H2 station model

Hazard Identification

Risk Estimation

Risk EvaluationRisk Reduction

Tolerable Risk?N

Y

Output of the study : Safety requirements for H2 station

Experiments, Simulations,Surveys, etc.

By Project Partners

END

START

13

Definition of H2 Station model

The model should be concrete enough for risk assessment.

The model should keep generality to be used for the review of C&S.

On-site type H2 station H2 Demand : 300Nm3/hr (30Nm3/vehicle * 10vehicles/hr) H2 Generation : 300Nm3/hr Compressor : 300Nm3/hr, 40MPa H2 Cylinders : 250L * 14 = 3500L (40MPa, 1400Nm3) Dispenser : 35MPa (supply pressure)

14

Types of H2 Stations

1) On-site type

3) Liquid hydrogen type

2) Off-site type

Material tank

Reformer

PSA

CompressorDispenser

Heat Exchanger

Gas Dispenser

Liquid Dispenser

Cylinders

Liquid H2 storage

Liquid H2 pump

Study was finished

Study is on progress

15

Hazard Identification

Applied Methods : HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Studies) FMEA (Failure Mode and Effect Analysis)

233 accident scenarios were identified for the on-site type H2 station model Failure and deterioration Human Error Natural Disasters

16

Risk Matrix (Risk Acceptance Criteria)

H (High):Risk cannot be acceptable. Remedial actions should be considered to reduce the risk to acceptable level.

M (Medium):In principle, risk cannot be acceptable. It can be accepted only when risk reduction cannot be achieved by reasonably practical action

L (Low):Acceptable. Further risk reduction is not necessarily required.

Likelihood

Consequence

severity

AImprobable

BRemote

COccasional

DProbable

1 Extremely Severe Damage H H H H

2 Severe Damage M H H H3 Damage M M H H4 Small Damage L L M H5 Minor Damage L L L M

17

Examples of Risk Evaluation

(1) Risk rank of no safety requirements

800Nm3 of hydrogen leakage from D=10mm, 40MPa

Consequence Level 1: Extremely Severe Damage

Likelihood Level C: Occasional

Likelihood

　 Consequence

A B C D

1 Extremely Severe H H H H

2 Severe Damage M H H H

3 Damage M M H H

4 Small Damage L L M H

5 Miner Damage L L L M

Scenario : Rupture of pipeScenario : Rupture of pipe

　　 Earthquake – Fall of Cylinder Unit – Rupture of pipe – H2 Earthquake – Fall of Cylinder Unit – Rupture of pipe – H2 leakage – Explosion or Jet Fireleakage – Explosion or Jet Fire

Can not be acceptable

18

(2) Applied Safety Requirements(2) Applied Safety Requirements + To Lower the Consequence+ To Lower the Consequence

- Install Earthquake detector and Emergency Isolation Valve with fail close type- Install Earthquake detector and Emergency Isolation Valve with fail close type + To Lower the Likelihood+ To Lower the Likelihood

- Fix the cylinder unit on hard concrete base - Fix the cylinder unit on hard concrete base - Establish the Emergency Isolation Valve within the cylinder unit

Acceptable!

Likelihood

　 Consequence

A B C D

1 Extremely Severe H H H H

2 Severe Damage M H H H

3 Damage M M H H

4 Small Damage L L M H

5 Miner Damage L L L M

Examples of Risk Evaluation Cont.

H2

STOP

Cylinder Unit

19

Consequence Estimation

Basic data for consequence estimation was provided by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.

MHI carried out Experiments and Computational Simulations of H2 Diffusion, Explosion, and Jet Fire.

20 10mmΦ 　 40→1MPa

Experiments of Jet Fire (video)

Same as left, with wall (h=3m, w=6m)

21

Likelihood Estimation

Experiments & Surveys by our Project Partners Material : The Japan Steel Works Compressor : The Japan Steel Works Dispenser : Tatsuno Corporation General piping materials & instrument:

Japan Industrial Gas Association

22

Dispenser

Durability Tests for Filling hose & Joint Hand valve Breakaway device Etc.

23

Compressor

Durability Tests Hydrogen leakage Noise Control Vibration Etc.

24

Material (Stainless Steels and Chromium Molybdenum Steels)

Tests for Hydrogen Embrittlement in pressurized hydrogen environment are necessary.

Tensile test Deep notch test Fracture toughness test Fatigue test Etc.

25

Review of Regulations

The result of the study was reported to the competent authorities, then examined, and basically accepted by them.

The competent authorities revised relevant regulations.

The new regulations have been effective since April 2005. High Pressure Gas Safety Law Fire Protection Law Building Standard Law

26

Safety Requirementsfor High Pressure Gas Safety Law

Road

H2 Dispenser

Office

CT

Compressor Storage

Gasoline Dispenser

Reformer

Ｒ

PSA

Ａ

Ａ

Ａ

ＡＰ

Tank

Setback Distance 6 mWall h=2m

Setback Distance can be shortened with appropriatefire protection wall

27

Road

H2 Dispenser

Office

CT

Compressor Storage

Gasoline Dispenser

Reformer

Ｒ

PSA

Ａ

Ａ

Ａ

ＡＰ

Tank

H2 leak detector

Flame detector

Earthquake detector

28

Road

H2 Dispenser

Office

CT

Compressor Storage

Gasoline Dispenser

Reformer

Ｒ

PSA

Ａ

Ａ

Ａ

ＡＰ

Tank

Emergency isolation valve

Excess flow valve

29

Breakaway Device

Guardrail Piping in Trench

Flame Detector

Emergency Stop Button

Pressure releaseafter refueling

30 Frame Structure

H2 Leak Detector

Emergency Isolation Valve,Check Valve

Water SprinklerFlame Detector

Fire Protection Wall

Pressure Indicator, Safety Valve

31

•Compressor should be placed in an enclosure.•Ventilation with Interlock System

H2 Leak Detector

32

Conclusions We made drafts of revised safety codes and standards

of Hydrogen supply stations. Government reviewed the regulations based on our

drafts and new regulations have been in force now. High pressure gas safety law Fire Protection Law Building Standard Law

It was permitted to build H2 supply station in an urban area and to install them in the premise of a gasoline station.

33

END

34

Likelihood LevelsLevel Description Definition

A Improbable Possible, but the probability is extremely low.

About once in several thousands years or less.

B Remote Unlikely to occur in lifetime of one H2 station.

About once in several hundreds years.

C Occasional Likely to occur once in lifetime of one H2 station.

About once in several decades.

D Probable Likely to occur several times in lifetime of one H2 station. About once in several years or more.

Likelihood Estimation Qualitative Evaluation

Based on engineering judgment Not enough data available for quantitative evaluation

35

Consequence LevelsLevel Description Material Damage Human Damage

1 Extremely Severe Damage

Collapse of nearby dwelling houses

One or more fatalities of pedestrians or dwellers

2 Severe Damage Major damage of nearby dwelling houses

One or more fatalities of customers or station workers

3 Damage Minor damage of nearby dwelling houses

Injury of hospitalization

4 Small Damage Windows broken Injury of medical treatment

5 Minor Damage No damage to nearby dwelling houses

Minor injury