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Tod, 2008). In their review of nearly 50 studies, Tod, Hardy, andOliver (2011) found that positive, instructional and motivationalself-talk can improve performance on a wide variety of tasks. Theyalso found no evidence that negative self-talk is associated withperformance decrements in these domains.

Although its self-regulatory functions are well-documented,Leary (2004) took a markedly negative view of self-talk, noting thatmany unpleasant emotions are largely due to how and how often

Consistent with research supporting the self-regulatory aspectsof self-talk, Brinthaupt et al. (2009) identied social-assessment,self-criticism, self-reinforcement, and self-management functions.The social-assessment function refers to self-talk related to a per-sons social interactions (e.g., replaying something said to anotherperson or imagining how other people responded to things onesaid). The self-reinforcement function reects self-talk that focuseson positive events (e.g., feeling proud of something one has done orwhen something good has happened). Self-criticism refers to self-talk regarding negative events (e.g., feeling discouraged aboutoneself or criticizing oneself for something one has said or done).

Corresponding author. Fax: +1 615 898 5027.

Journal of Research in Personality 46 (2012) 326333

Contents lists available at

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w.E-mail address: tom.brinthaupt@mtsu.edu (T.M. Brinthaupt).Montero, 2009). Mischel, Cantor, and Feldman (1996) discussedthe self-control aspects of self-talk, including its role in inhibitingimpulses and monitoring progress toward goals. Similarly, Carverand Scheier (1998) view self-talk as serving a metamonitoringrole, providing individuals with information about their goalprogress and inuencing their emotional reactions and responsesto behavioral decits.

An extensive literature on self-talk also exists in the area ofsport and exercise psychology (see Hardy, 2006; Hardy, Oliver, &

and Hurlburt (2008) found that self-talk is a frequent naturallyoccurring inner experience, with large differences across individu-als. The development and initial validation of the Self-Talk Scale(STS; Brinthaupt et al., 2009) makes it possible to examine differ-ences in self-talk frequency. In their STS development and valida-tion work, Brinthaupt et al. showed that frequent self-talkers (a)tended to be inwardly self-focused, (b) showed obsessivecompul-sive tendencies, (c) had higher levels of need for cognition, and (d)used more verbal compared to visual information processing.1. Introduction

Researchers have examined the nacross a variety of domains. For examonstrated that self-talk (in the forspeech) serves important cognitivefor children and adults (Diaz & Berk1992). Among the functions servedof information, the internalization oand self-guidance (e.g., Lee, 2010092-6566/$ - see front matter 2012 Elsevier Inc. Ahttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2012.03.003nd functions of self-talksychologists have dem-ither private or innerlf-regulatory functions; Luria, 1969; MacKay,f-talk are the rehearsal, executive functioning,insler, Fernyhough, &

people talk to themselves. A large research literature focuses onthe role of negative self-talk in depression, anxiety, and otherforms of dysfunction (Beck, 1976; Kendall, Howard, & Hays,1989). For example, a tendency to use excessively positive self-talkis related to manic and narcissistic tendencies, whereas a tendencytoward primarily negative self-talk is associated with depressionand anxiety (Schwartz & Garamoni, 1989).

Despite much interest in the self-regulatory aspects of self-talk,little research has been conducted on the kinds of factors thatmight be associated with low or high frequency of self-talk. Heavey 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Differences in self-talk frequency as a funand imaginary childhood companion stat

Thomas M. Brinthaupt , Christian T. DoveDepartment of Psychology, Middle Tennessee State University, Murfreesboro, TN 37132,

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Available online 22 March 2012

Keywords:Self-talk frequencySelf-Talk ScaleAge differencesOnly childImaginary childhood companionSelf-regulation

a b s t r a c t

In three studies, we examselves. Using a standardizemer, 2009), we collectedconguration (i.e., only orIn Study 1, signicant diffchildren without siblings rdents who reported havingtalk than those who did nand developmental implica

Journal of Resea

journal homepage: wwll rights reserved.tion of age, only-child,s

differences in the frequency with which people report talking to them-easure of self-talk frequency, the Self-Talk Scale (Brinthaupt, Hein, & Kra-formation about college student participants age, sex, and familyling child), and whether they had an imaginary companion in childhood.ces in self-talk were found between different age groupings. In Study 2,rted more self-talk than children with siblings. Finally, in Study 3, respon-imaginary companion in childhood also reported signicantly more self-

have an imaginary childhood companion. We discuss the self-regulatoryns of these results.

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Because the age data were skewed toward the 18- and 19-year-

eseaThe STS (Brinthaupt et al., 2009) consists of 16 items reectingcommon situations when or where people might talk to them-selves either silently or out loud. Respondents use the same framefor rating each item: I talk to myself when. . . Items are ratedusing a 5-point Likert format (1 = never, 5 = very often). There arefour items for each of the four STS subtypes: (a) social assessment;(b) self-criticism; (c) self-reinforcement; and (d) self-management.Example items include I want to replay something that Ive said toanother person (social-assessment), something good has hap-pened to me (self-reinforcement), I feel ashamed of somethingIve done (self-criticism), and I want to remind myself of what Ineed to do (self-management).

Subtype scores are calculated by summing the ratings of thefour items within each category or subtype (range = 420). A totalscore (for overall self-talk) is calculated by summing the ratings ofthe 16 items (range = 1680). Higher scores indicate higher levelsof self-talk frequency. The STS shows good psychometric proper-ties, with acceptable long-term stability (r = .69 over a 3-month2.2. Procedure

As part of the pretesting sessions, participants completed theSTS (Brinthaupt et al., 2009), along with a wide variety of demo-graphic items that changed from semester to semester. Partici-pants completed the materials in groups of 1530 students. Thetypical session lasted between 20 and 30 min. Students receivedcourse credit for their participation. No participant appears morethan once in the studies reported in this paper.

2.3. Measures2.1. Overview

Each of the studies reported in this paper utilized a similarmethodology. All participants were drawn from a psychologydepartment data archive. It contains demographic and self-re-ported behavioral and attitudinal data collected from pretestingsessions conducted early each semester with General Psychologystudents. Brinthaupt and Pennington (2005) provide more detailsabout the structure and operation of this archive.Finally, the self-management function assesses general self-regula-tory self-talk (e.g., giving oneself instructions or directions aboutwhat to do or say or needing to gure out what to do or say). Brin-thaupt et al. found that individuals with higher levels of social-assessment and critical self-talk reported lower self-esteem andmore frequent automatic negative self-statements. Alternatively,people with higher levels of self-reinforcing self-talk reportedmore positive self-esteem and more frequent automatic positiveself-statements.

Despite these initial ndings, other factors might be related todifferences in self-talk frequency. In the present research, weexamine some of these factors. In particular, it is possible thatthe frequency of self-talk might differ between younger and olderadults. In addition, from a developmental perspective, a personsfamily structure (i.e., number of siblings) and other childhoodexperiences (i.e., having an imaginary childhood companion)might be associated with variations in the tendency to engage inself-talk.

2. General method

T.M. Brinthaupt, C.T. Dove / Journal of Rperiod), internal consistency (i.e., alpha coefcients for the foursubtypes ranging between .79 and .89), and congruent validity(e.g., positively related to private self-consciousness, r = .37, andold participants taking the General Psychology course, we used theSpearmans rho statistic to assess the relationship between age andverbally-oriented information processing strategies, r = .47) (seeBrinthaupt et al., 2009).

3. Study 1: age differences in self-talk frequency

With the publication of Lurias (1969) and Vygotskys (1987)treatises on private speech, a great deal of research has examinedits operation and functions in children. Developmental psycholo-gists (Diaz & Berk, 1992; Piaget, 1924/1959; Winsler et al., 2009;Zivin, 1979) have been particularly interested in the tendency forchildren to externalize (and eventually internalize) conversationswith themselves as an important regulatory function of normaldevelopment. Whereas the self-regulatory approach to inner andprivate speech has received good support in research on children(for reviews see Berk, 1992 & Winsler et al., 2009), self-talk inadulthood has received much less attention. Duncan and Tarulli(2009) summarized research on private speech (overt self-talk)based primarily on young adult college students. They documentedthat private speech is a relatively common phenomenon, at leastunder certain conditions (e.g., when participants work alone orare not aware of being recorded). Although this research is sugges-tive, there are no studies of age differences in self-talk frequency.In part, this is due to the lack of a standardized measure of self-talkfrequency. The STS (Brinthaupt et al., 2009) allows age differencesto be examined in a more systematic manner.

Using an adult sample, we expected that overall self-talk, aswell as subtypes of self-talk (e.g., self-criticism, self-management),would increase with age. Research from a variety of areas supportsthis possibility. First, with increasing age, adults may be morelikely to rely on self-talk for executive function purposes such asplanning and goal-setting (Kray, Eber, & Karbach, 2008; Kray, Eber,& Lindenberger, 2004; MacKay, 1992). Second, lifestyle factors thatcould make self-talk more frequent, necessary, or useful (e.g., in-creases in life stressors or responsibilities; changes in work, rela-tionship, or living status) may increase with age (Miller, 2010).Third, as they enter adulthood, individuals may become less self-conscious about or concerned with their self-talk and may be lesslikely to inhibit or ignore it than when they are younger (e.g., Stein-berg & Monahan, 2007). Fourth, evidence suggests that from child-hood to early adulthood, people use less private speech and moreinner speech (Duncan & Tarulli, 2009; Winsler & Naglieri, 2003).

3.1. Participants

Participants were 380 (237 women, 143 men) undergraduatestudents. In terms of ethnicity, 68% were White, 18% were Black,and 14% were some other ethnicity (i.e., Hispanic, Asian-American,American Indian, or other). With regard to year in school, 65% werefreshmen, 21% were sophomores, 8% were juniors, and 2% were se-niors. In order to obtain a larger age range of participants, we se-lected nontraditional students (i.e., those over age 24) fromseveral semesters of pretest data. Those participants were com-bined with the traditional age (i.e., 1824 years) students from asingle pretest session to create the nal data set, which showed amean age of 23.5 years (SD = 7.50) and a range from 18 to 54 years.Thirty-seven percent of the sample was over age 24.

3.2. Results and discussion

rch in Personality 46 (2012) 326333 327self-talk frequency. This analysis showed that age was positivelycorrelated with overall self-talk, r(378) = .265, p < .001, self-critical self-talk, r(378) = .291, p < .001, self-reinforcing self-talk,

r(378) = .244, p < .001, and self-managing self-talk, r(378) = .256,p < .001. The age and social-assessment self-talk relationship, how-ever, did not reach statistical signicance, r(378) = .092, p = .073.

In order to assess possible curvilinear relationships, we alsoexamined self-talk tendencies across different age categories. Inparticular, we created four age groups: (a) 1820 years (n = 221;147 women, 74 men); (b) 2130 years (n = 92; 50 women, 42men); (c) 3140 years (n = 49; 29 women, 20 men); and (d) 4154 years (n = 18; 11 women, 7 men). Fig. 1 shows the pattern ofoverall self-talk frequency for these four age categories. One-wayANOVAs showed signicant age group effects for overall self-talk,as well as for all subtype STS scores (all ps < .05). Bonferronipost-hoc comparisons indicated that the 18- to 20-year-old groupwas signicantly lower than the 21- to 30-year-old group for over-

than female students. Additional research is warranted that exam-ines the possible reasons why men might engage in more frequent

328 T.M. Brinthaupt, C.T. Dove / Journal of Reseaall self-talk and social-assessment self-talk frequency. For the sub-types, the 18- to 20-year-old group was signicantly lower thanthe other groups on self-critical self-talk; the 21- to 30-year-oldgroup was signicantly higher than both the 18- to 20- and 31-to 40-year-old groups on self-reinforcing self-talk; and the 18- to20-year-old group was signicantly lower than both the 21- to30- and 41- to 54-year-old groups on self-managing self-talk (allps < .05). In other words, lower self-talk frequency scores amongthe youngest members of the sample accounted for most of theage differences.

Sex comparisons of mean overall self-talk and STS subtypescores found that male respondents (M = 9.59, SD = 3.95) reportedmore frequent self-reinforcing self-talk than did female respon-dents (M = 8.42, SD = 4.32), t (378) = 2.63, p = .009. Men(M = 41.62, SD = 13.71) also tended to report greater overall self-talk than women (M = 39.19, SD = 13.70), but not signicantly so(p = .096). Analyzing the age and self-talk relationships (usingSpearmans rho) separately by sex revealed similar patterns formen and women. In particular, for men, age was signicantly cor-related with overall self-talk, r (141) = .213, p = .01, self-critical,r(141) = .245, p = .003, and self-managing self-talk, r(141) = .244,p = .003. For women, age was signicantly correlated (allps < .001) with overall self-talk, r (235) = .268, and self-critical,r(235) = .308, self-reinforcing, r(235) = .261, and self-managingself-talk, r(235) = .267. Analyses of the signicance of the differ-ence between two correlation coefcients from independent sam-ples found that men and women did not differ in the strength ofthe relationship between age and self-talk frequency for any ofthe measures. Finally, sex X age group ANOVAs for the total andsubtype scores revealed signicant age group effects but no signif-icant sex or interactions effects.

Why should age be associated with changes in self-talk fre-quency? The largest self-talk differences occurred between thetwo youngest age groups. Although we had no data to assess thesepossibilities, it seems reasonable to assume that the differencesFig. 1. Overall self-talk frequency by age group.self-reinforcing self-talk than women.

4. Study 2: family conguration and self-talk frequency

Early childhood experiences, such as the amount of time a childspends alone or with others, also might be associated with self-talkfrequency. With regard to family conguration, one would expectthat only children have more frequent and longer-lasting periodsof alone time when growing up compared to sibling (non-only)children. One possible cumulative result of these experiences isthat the child becomes more dependent on or comfortable withself-talk as a form of self-socialization or companionship (e.g.,Newman & Newman, 2009; Roberts & Blanton, 2001).

The stereotypical only child is thought to have social skills def-icits, such as high levels of loneliness and being socially estranged,spoiled, and egocentric (Mttus, Indus, & Allik, 2008; Nyman,1995). Research results, however, are mixed with regard to thisperception. For example, studies nd that, compared to siblingchildren, only children are more egocentric but not more narcissis-tic (Jiao, Ji, & Jing, 1986; Watson & Biderman, 1989). In addition,only children have been shown to have more difculties than sib-ling children in managing interpersonal conict (Kitzmann, Cohen,& Lockwood, 2002). On the other hand, only children also scorehigher on academic achievement and intelligence compared to sib-ling children (Falbo & Polit, 1986; Falbo & Poston, 1993). Further-more, they score higher than sibling children on measures ofautonomy, leadership, and maturity (Falbo, 1987).

Because of a longstanding governmental policy regarding familysize in China, an extensive literature exists on the characteristics ofonly children in that country. For example, Liu, Munakata, andOnuoha (2005) found that among urban high school students, onlybetween the two youngest age groups might be due to several fac-tors. The period of adolescence into emerging adulthood is charac-terized by several differences in experiences, perceptions, identity,and behavior (Arnett, 2000). Compared to adolescents, youngadults show improvements in frontal lobe action monitoring (Ho-gan, Vargha-Khadem, Kirkham, & Baldeweg, 2005), cognitive con-trol (Eigsti et al., 2006), and executive function (Crone, 2009).Research examining whether these changes are associated withthe differences in self-talk frequency shown between the 18 to19 and 20 to 29 year old groups would be interesting.

It is also conceivable that changes in life circumstances or situa-tions might correspond to differences in self-talk frequency amongthe two youngest age groups. A great deal of research has docu-mented a wide variety of life transitions and their effects on thedeveloping person (e.g., Miller, 2010). In addition, perception orunderstanding of self-talk might change with age. For example,early adolescents have greater imaginary audience sensitivity thanolder adolescents or adults (e.g., Pesce &Harding, 1986; Vartanian &Powlishta, 2001), which might suppress self-talk or the willingnessto admit to using it. Differences in the perceived social appropriate-ness or usefulness of self-talk may be reected in respondents rat-ings of their self-talk frequency (see also Duncan & Tarulli, 2009).

The other major nding in Study 1 was that men reported sig-nicantly more self-reinforcing self-talk than women. This ndingis important because there is very limited published research onsex differences in adult self-talk frequency. Brinthaupt et al.(2009) reported no signicant sex differences in STS scores. How-ever, Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) reported a tendency for malecollege students to report more naturally occurring inner speech

rch in Personality 46 (2012) 326333children reported a greater number of negative mental healthoutcomes (such as anxiety, depression, and interpersonaldependency), compared to their sibling children peers. Using

4.3. Results and discussion

Comparison of the ages of the two groups showed no signicantdifference between the only children (M = 20.20, SD = 5.66) andsibling children (M = 19.73, SD = 5.01), t(301) = .67, p = .50. Thesedata did not permit as thorough a test of the age and self-talk rela-tionship as in Study 1, because only 4% of the sample was abovethe age of 30. Therefore, we compared the two age groupings thatshowed the largest differences in Study 1. These were the 18- to20-year-olds (n = 259) and the 21- to 30-year olds (n = 32). Inde-pendent samples t-tests showed one signicant relationship, withthe older group (M = 9.72, SD = 3.72) showing greater frequency ofself-reinforcing self-talk than the younger group (M = 9.13,SD = 3.82), t(289) = 2.53, p = .012, d = .17. This nding was consis-tent with the self-reinforcement self-talk data from Study 1.Although the 18- to 20-year-old group (M = 37.58, SD = 12.57)was somewhat lower than the 21- to 30-year-old group

esearch in Personality 46 (2012) 326333 329self-descriptive and autobiographical measures of Chinese youngadults, Wang, Leichtman, and White (1998) found that onlychildren reported a more self-focused orientation than did siblingchildren. In particular, only children generated more individualand fewer collective self-descriptions, and they reported moreself-oriented memories pertaining to personal experiences, ratherthan social interactions and family. Such a pattern suggests thatonly children might show more frequent self-talk than siblingchildren.

Finally, in a study using extensive interviews with US youngadult only children (ages 2029 years), Roberts and Blanton(2001) assessed the subjective advantages and disadvantages ofgrowing up without siblings. Most of their sample enjoyed theexperience of being alone and entertaining themselves. Some re-ported valuing their alone time and having had more creative soloplay as a child that was not subject to compromise or negotiationwith others. Only children, however, also reported difculties inpeer relations in childhood and adolescence, in part because theyspent more time around adults than with their same-aged peers.

In summary, research suggests that, compared to sibling chil-dren, only children may be more likely to engage in self-socializa-tion, more autonomous and self-focused, and more comfortablebeing alone. These results suggest that only children should alsoshow greater self-talk frequency compared to sibling children.We hypothesized that adult only children would report greateroverall self-talk frequency than adult sibling children. In addition,based on the results of related research on social skills and self-perceptions, we expected that only children would report greaterfrequencies of self-critical and social-assessment self-talk com-pared to sibling children. Having had a more direct and sustainedparent-child relationship (Falbo & Polit, 1986; Roberts & Blanton,2001) could lead an only child to experience more achievementand success pressures. Such pressures should translate into moreself-critical self-talk. Additionally, only children should be morelikely to engage in social-assessing self-talk that is specically re-lated to their social relationships. Such a nding could be explainedby only childrens tendencies toward shyness, social isolation, orspending more time alone.

4.1. Participants

Participants were 303 (198 women, 105 men) undergraduatestudents, with a mean age of 19.83 years (SD = 5.16; range 1869). Of these, 69% were White, 19% were Black, and 12% were otherethnicities. With regard to year in school, participants included73% freshmen, 20% sophomores, 6% juniors, and 1% seniors.

4.2. Procedure

Participants answered two items on the pretest survey abouttheir family conguration while growing up (dened as from birthto starting college). On one item, respondents indicated whetherthey (a) were an only child (i.e., had no siblings or step-siblings),(b) had older siblings/step-siblings only, (c) had younger siblings/step-siblings only, or (d) had both older and younger siblings/step-siblings. On the second item, respondents indicated on a 9-point scale how close they were in age to the sibling/step-siblingwho was closest to their own age (e.g., 0 = less than 1 year, 1 = 1year, 7 = 7 years, 8 = greater than 7 years).

Those who reported that they had younger or older siblings/step-siblings (n = 233; 154 women, 79 men) were categorized assibling children. Those who reported having had no biological orstep-siblings (n = 70; 44 women, 26 men) were categorized as only

T.M. Brinthaupt, C.T. Dove / Journal of Rchildren. The two groups did not differ signicantly on the demo-graphic measures of age, sex, ethnicity, or year in school (allps > .30).(M = 39.59, SD = 12.12) for overall self-talk, this difference did notreach statistical signicance, t(289) = 0.86, p = .39.

Independent samples t-tests showed that, as predicted, onlychildren reported more frequent overall self-talk (M = 40.51,SD = 14.10) than did sibling children (M = 36.86, SD = 11.99),t(301) = 2.145, p = .03, d = .28. In addition, as we expected, onlychildren reported signicantly higher levels of self-critical self-talk(M = 10.56, SD = 3.96) than did sibling children (M = 8.79,SD = 3.67), t(301) = 3.47, p < .001, d = .46. Although they were alsohigher for only children, differences in the other self-talk subtypesdid not reach statistical signicance. Fig. 2 shows the mean scoresfor the four types of self-talk by sibling group. Thus, the social-assessment self-talk prediction was not supported.

Analyses of variance with sex included as a factor revealed nosignicant interactions for sex and family conguration. As in Study1, therewas a sexmain effect, withmale participants (M = 8.82, SD =3.65) reporting signicantly more self-reinforcing self-talk than fe-male participants (M = 7.72, SD = 3.76), F(1,299) = 6.79, p = .01.

Next,weexaminedwhether havingolder or younger siblingswasassociated with differences in self-talk frequency. Using 2-way AN-OVAs with sex and family conguration (only child, older only,younger only, both older and younger), we found the previously re-ported sexmain effect for self-reinforcing self-talk and amain effectof family conguration for self-critical self-talk, F(3,299) = 4.02,p = .008. Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons showed that only chil-dren reported signicantly more self-critical self-talk than did par-ticipants in each of the other family congurations (all ps < .05).

Finally, in order to assess the possibility that having siblingswho are not close to the participant in age is psychologically orFig. 2. Self-talk frequencies for only and sibling children.

An additional childhood variable that might be related to self-

eseasocially similar to being an only child, we conducted additionalanalyses for closeness in age. Using sibling children only, we rstexamined the correlations between the distance in years fromthe closest-aged sibling and self-talk scores. None of these correla-tions were statistically signicant (all ps > .38). Then, excluding theonly children, we created two groups from the remaining siblingchildren congurations: (a) participants with siblings/step-siblingswho were fewer than four years older or younger (n = 161); and (b)those with siblings/step-siblings who were more than six yearsolder or younger (n = 23). Independent samples t-tests indicatedno signicant differences between these two groups on any ofthe self-talk scores (all ps > .20).

Why might growing up as an only child be associated with agreater frequency of overall self-talk compared to growing up withsiblings, regardless of closeness in age? One possible explanation isthat, if they spend relatively more time alone, only children maynd self-talk to be more necessary or they may be more comfort-able using it compared to children with siblings. Only childrenmight also rely on self-talk more than sibling children for self-reg-ulation in general, with older siblings potentially providing moreself-regulatory guidance for sibling children. However, the absenceof self-management self-talk differences between the two groupscasts some doubt on this explanation. Only childrens greaterself-talk frequency is consistent with the ndings of Wang et al.(1998), who found a more self- than other-focused orientationamong only children in their open-ended self-descriptions andearly childhood memories compared to sibling children.

The results also suggest that only children may utilize self-talkspecically for the regulation of negative events or outcomes. Thegreater self-critical self-talk tendency shown by only childrenaligns with the research of Liu et al. (2005) that found greater anx-iety and depression among only children, compared to sibling chil-dren. If only children perceive themselves to be under morepressure to meet their parents expectations than sibling children,this could account for the self-critical nding. There is some evi-dence that mother-infant attachment patterns and childrenssocialization and play patterns (e.g., McElwain, Cox, Burchinal, &Mace, 2003; Roberts & Blanton, 2001) might be relevant to so-cially-related self-talk tendencies. In our sample, however, differ-ences in social-assessment self-talk between only and siblingchildren did not reach statistical signicance.

We found no evidence that being a psychological only child(dened as having a large age difference between oneself andones closest-aged sibling) was similar to being a literal only childwhen it came to self-talk frequency; however, the small numberof participants with much-older or -younger siblings may haveprevented a strong test of this possibility. It is also possible thatsimply considering oneself to be essentially an only child (regard-less of the number or closeness in age of siblings) might generatea self-talk pattern similar to the literal only children in oursample.

If only children tend to have higher levels of intelligence orachievement than non-only (sibling) children (Falbo & Polit,1986), then these factors might account for the differences in bothoverall self-talk and self-critical self-talk frequency we found inthis study. Research assessing this possibility appears to be war-ranted and would be relatively easy to conduct. Another interest-ing research approach would be to study only and siblingchildren during their childhood years to see when this patternmight begin. For example, researchers could assess self- and par-ent-reports of self-talk frequency (both private speech and innerspeech), as well as childrens perceptions and comfort levelsregarding talking to themselves. It is conceivable that there are dif-

330 T.M. Brinthaupt, C.T. Dove / Journal of Rferences between only and sibling children in private speech(which we would expect), but not in inner speech (if the majorinternalization of inner speech has not yet occurred).talk tendencies is the experience of having had an imaginary com-panion (IC) or friend. Children and their parents frequently reportthe existence of ICs, with sometimes elaborate and vivid descrip-tions of those companions (Taylor, 1999). Researchers have foundthat, from early childhood into early adolescence, it is commonfor children to report having a companion with whom they talkand who also responds to them (Pearson et al., 2001; Taylor,Shawber, & Mannering, 2009).

Research on individuals who have or had ICs has identied sev-eral characteristics that are potentially related to self-talk fre-quency. For example, in a study of children 48 years of age,Fernyhough, Bland, Meins, and Coltheart (2007) found that chil-dren with ICs (corroborated by their parents) were more likelythan those without such companions to misidentify the presenceof words in response to meaningless and ambiguous auditory stim-uli. The authors interpret this result as evidence that children withICs have a general susceptibility to imaginary verbal experiences(p. 1095). This susceptibility might be associated with high levelsof actual or perceived self-talk.

Research also suggests that having an IC is associated with agreater tendency toward a vivid fantasy life and stronger imagina-tive abilities compared to not having such a companion (e.g., Boul-din, 2006). Berk, Mann, and Ogan (2006) reported a positiverelationship betweenmake-believe play and private speech and ar-gued that such play is crucial for the development of self-regula-tion. If ICs are the result of such fantasy play, it is reasonable toexpect that they will be associated with greater self-talk frequency.There is additional evidence that having an IC improves childrenscommunication skills (Roby & Kidd, 2008; Trion & Reese, 2009)and is associated with positive adjustment and coping in youngadulthood (Seiffge-Krenke, 1997; Taylor, Hulette, & Dishion, 2010).

Research on the characteristics of adults who had ICs in child-hood shows several patterns consistent with the prediction thatself-talk frequency should be more frequent in such adults. Forexample, Gleason, Jarudi, and Cheek (2003) found that female col-lege students who had imaginary childhood companions scoredhigher on the use of imagery, dependent interpersonal styles, andawareness of their internal states than those without such com-panions. Other research suggests that both children and adultswho had an IC tend to be more creative and show higher levelsof absorption than those who did not (e.g., Hoff, 2005; Kidd, Rogers,& Rogers, 2010; Taylor, Hodges, & Kohanyi, 2003).

In summary, several lines of research evidence support the pre-diction that having had an IC in childhood should be associatedwith increased self-talk frequency compared to not having hadan IC. More specically, in addition to greater overall self-talk fre-quency, we expected that having had an IC in childhood would beassociated with greater tendencies to engage in self-managementand social-assessment self-talk. These specic types of self-talk re-fer to the management of daily activities and ones social relationsand presumably reect an enhanced self-regulatory and socialorientation. Based on the IC research evidence, there is little reasonto think that the phenomenon should be associated with greatertendencies to use more affectively laden self-critical or self-rein-forcing self-talk.

5.1. Participants5. Study 3: childhood imaginary companions and self-talkfrequency

rch in Personality 46 (2012) 326333Participants were 675 (383 women, 292 men) undergraduatestudents, with a mean age of 19.28 (SD = 2.84; range 18-45 years).Of these, 75% were White, 16% were Black, and 9% were other

ethnicities. With regard to year in school, 71% were freshmen, 20%were sophomores, 6% were juniors, and 3% were seniors. Respon-dents indicated on the pretest survey that they either had an imag-inary friend/companion/playmate as a child (n = 181; 130 women,51 men) or that they did not (n = 494; 253 women, 241 men).

5.2. Results and Discussion

The two groups (IC, no IC) did not differ signicantly on thedemographic measures of age, ethnicity, or year in school (all ps >.33); however, female students (34%) were twice as likely to reporthaving had an IC than were male students (17%), X2(1) = 22.91,p = .000. Once again, these data did not permit as thorough a testof the age and self-talk relationship as in Study 1, because only 1%of the sample was above the age of 30. Therefore, we comparedthe two age groupings that showed the largest differences in Study1. These were the 18- to 20-year-olds (n = 572) and the 21- to 30-year olds (n = 95). Independent samples t-tests showed no signi-cant differences in self-talk frequency between the two age groups.

Independent samples t-tests showed that adults who had ICs inchildhood reported more frequent overall self-talk (M = 48.59,

interesting. In this study, even though women were more likelyto report an IC, their self-talk tendencies were similar to those

T.M. Brinthaupt, C.T. Dove / Journal of ReseaSD = 14.35) than did adults who did not have an IC (M = 46.29,SD = 13.82), t(673) = 1.899, p = .05, d = .16. In addition, those withICs reported signicantly higher levels of self-reinforcing self-talk(M = 11.33, SD = 4.08) than did those without ICs (M = 10.42,SD = 3.95), t(673) = 2.61, p = .009, d = .23. Those with ICs also re-ported signicantly higher levels of self-managing self-talk(M = 13.51, SD = 3.91) than did those without ICs (M = 12.86,SD = 3.88), t(673) = 1.91, p = .05, d = .17. When participants sexwas included in the analyses, there were no signicant sex main ef-fects and no sex IC status interactions for self-talk frequency.Fig. 3 shows the mean scores for the four types of self-talk for par-ticipants with and without ICs while growing up.

Why might having had an IC while growing up be positivelyassociated with adult self-talk frequency? Similar to having beenan only child, it is possible that having an IC creates an enhanced le-vel of comfort in talking to oneself (Roberts & Blanton, 2001). An-other possibility is that individual characteristics that increase thelikelihood of an IC also increase self-talk frequency. For example,self-talk frequency may be inuenced by how imaginative or crea-tive a child is (e.g., Bouldin, 2006), ones susceptibility to verbalexperiences (Fernyhough et al., 2007), and ones social skills (e.g.,Fig. 3. Self-talk frequencies for adults with and without a childhood imaginarycompanion.men who reported having had one in childhood.

6. Summary and concluding discussion

The purpose of this research was to investigate factors thatmight be associated with differences in self-talk frequency. The re-sults of three studies showed that differences in self-talk frequencyare related to both demographic and childhood variables. In partic-ular, self-talk frequency appears to be enhanced (a) with age (atleast into early adulthood), (b) with having grown up as an onlychild, and (c) with having had an imaginary companion in child-hood. We have indicated how the results of each of these studiessuggest multiple directions for future research. In this concludingsection, we discuss more general research implications.

In two of the three studies, men showed more self-reinforcingself-talk than women. The self-reinforcing STS (Brinthaupt et al.,2009) items include talking to oneself when (a) something goodhas happened, (b) one is happy for oneself, (c) one is proud ofsomething one has done, or (d) reinforcing oneself for doing well.Some research suggests that men are more likely than women tomake internal attributions for both successes and failures (Swee-ney, Moreland, & Gruber, 1982). If causal attributions are relatedto self-talk tendencies, then this internality bias might accountfor greater levels of self-reinforcing self-talk among men. Alterna-tively, if women seek more social support than men (e.g., Felsten,1998), they may rely more on feedback from others than fromthemselves when good things happen.

Because our sample did not include younger children and ado-lescents or older adults (i.e., older than 54 years), it is unclearwhether the age/self-talk relationship is linear or nonlinear. Inaddition, because the sample consisted entirely of college students,Roby & Kidd, 2008). Research on differences in private and innerspeech frequency in childhood could provide important insightsinto the role such factors play in a childs self-regulatory tendencies.

If having had an IC in childhood is associated with creativity inadulthood (Hoff, 2005; Taylor et al., 2003), then it is conceivablethat self-reinforcing and self-managing self-talk reects that crea-tivity. It would be interesting for researchers to assess the self-talkpatterns of children with ICs in order to determine whether thesecompanions are helpful to children in these ways. To the extentthat children use ICs to provide themselves with comfort, positivefeedback, or behavioral guides, this could result in greater self-talktendencies in those areas in adulthood. Additionally, although wedid not include family conguration items with this sample, itwould be interesting to see if only children are more likely to re-port an IC or if those who reported both show higher self-talk lev-els than those who report only one of those characteristics.

The nding that female college students reported a greater like-lihood of having had an IC is consistent with other research exam-ining IC sex differences (e.g., Hoff, 2005). A self-talk perspectivesuggests some ways that might account for this difference. Forexample, if girls use more frequent or different types of self-talkthan boys in childhood, this might be associated with a greater ten-dency to create imaginary companions so that the girls can con-verse with them. Another possibility is that the type of play ofyoung girls and boys is associated with the creation of imaginarycompanions. Children whose imaginative play is more social (e.g.,playing and conversing with stuffed animals) might increase thelikelihood of creating imaginary companions, which might in turnaffect self-talk rates. Research on these possibilities would be

rch in Personality 46 (2012) 326333 331there may be self-talk related characteristics of the nontraditionalstudents that distinguish them from the non-student population.We should also note that, although we did not nd age differences

gued that internal self-regulation is likely to become more impor-

and the nature of its frequency.

eseaWith regard to the STS (Brinthaupt et al., 2009) facets, the lackof any signicant differences on social-assessment self-talk is note-worthy. We expected that both being an only child and having hadan IC would predict social-related self-talk, but found little supportfor this prediction. It is possible that this kind of self-talk may bemore frequent among those who have higher levels of social anxi-ety, loneliness, or other-oriented perfectionism. We are currentlyconducting research with adults that examines these possibilities.There is some research evidence for increased frequency of nega-tive self-talk among socially anxious or phobic children and ado-lescents (Sood & Kendall, 2007; Spence, Donovan, & Brechman-Toussaint, 1999), but it is unclear whether the content of thatself-talk is specically social in nature. Studies of self-talk fre-quency in older adults also would be interesting, particularly withregard to the role of self-talk in coping with life events, the loss ofsocial support, and general behavioral self-management.

It is important to note that the results of the present researchare limited by the self-reported nature of the data. An obvious nextstep for research would be to examine naturalistic situationswhere self-talk (either private or inner speech) might differ for old-er/younger children, only/sibling children, and those who do/donot have an imaginary companion in childhood.

The present research provides additional construct validationevidence for the Self-Talk Scale (Brinthaupt et al., 2009). The factthat theoretically interesting and meaningful differences havebeen found using the measure suggests that it can be usefully ap-plied to other personality domains. To date, however, there is verylittle research on the long-term development of self-talk (particu-larly inner speech) and on differences in self-talk frequency inchildhood. In order for longitudinal studies to be conducted, a mea-sure of self-talk frequency is needed that is appropriate forchildren.

In conclusion, this research shows that the Self-Talk Scale (Brin-thaupt et al., 2009), a measure of differences in self-talk frequency,can be used to address several interesting research questions per-taining to self-regulation in children and adults. These studiesillustrate the value of the STS and its potential for such research.

Acknowledgements

We wish to thank Minsoo Kang, Janet Belsky, Michelle Boyer-Pennington, Teresa Davis, the anonymous reviewers, and the editorfor their very helpful comments and suggestions.

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Differences in self-talk frequency as a function of age, only-child, and imaginary childhood companion status1 Introduction2 General method2.1 Overview2.2 Procedure2.3 Measures

3 Study 1: age differences in self-talk frequency3.1 Participants3.2 Results and discussion

4 Study 2: family configuration and self-talk frequency4.1 Participants4.2 Procedure4.3 Results and discussion

5 Study 3: childhood imaginary companions and self-talk frequency5.1 Participants5.2 Results and Discussion

6 Summary and concluding discussionAcknowledgementsReferences