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Case No. 3:13-cv-00644-L-KSC MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PRELIMINARY APPROVAL

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KLAFTER OLSEN & LESSER LLP SETH R. LESSER FRAN L. RUDICH MICHAEL H. REED CHRISTOPHER M. TIMMEL Two International Drive, Suite 350 Rye Brook, New York 10573 Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Collective [ADDITIONAL COUNSEL LISTED ON NEXT PAGE]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIK KELLGREN, THERESE KOPCHINSKI, and CHRISTINE LEE, Individually and on Behalf of All Other Persons Similarly Situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PETCO ANIMAL SUPPLIES, INC.; PETCO HOLDINGS, INC.; and DOES 1 to 100, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 3:13-cv-00644-L-KSC MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT, PRELIMINARY CERTIFICATION OF A SETTLEMENT CLASS, APPOINTING CLASS REPRESENTATIVES AND CLAIMS ADMINISTRATOR, APPROVING NOTICE AND SETTING FINAL FAIRNESS HEARING [No Oral Argument Pursuant to Local Rule] Date: October 2, 2017 Complaint Filed: March 19, 2013 District Judge: Hon. M. James Lorenz Courtroom: 5B (Schwartz) Magistrate Judge: Karen S. Crawford Trial Date: Not Set

Case 3:13-cv-00644-L-KSC Document 280-1 Filed 09/01/17 PageID.7275 of 31

Case No. 3:13-cv-00644-L-KSC MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PRELIMINARY APPROVAL

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MARIA COTE, Individually and on Behalf of All Other Persons Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs,

v. PETCO ANIMAL SUPPLIES, INC.; PETCO HOLDINGS, INC., Defendants.

Case No. 3:17-cv-00898-L-KSC Complaint Filed: January 31, 2017 (D. Mass.) Transferred to SDCA: May 4, 2017

DESERIE MICHEL, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v. PETCO ANIMAL SUPPLIES, INC. and PETCO HOLDINGS, INC., Defendants.

Case No. 3:17-cv-01092-L-KSC Complaint Filed: April 14, 2016 (E.D.N.Y.) Transferred to SDCA: May 30, 2017

HEATHER VARGAS, Individually and on Behalf of All Other Persons Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs,

v. PETCO ANIMAL SUPPLIES, INC.; PETCO HOLDINGS, INC., Defendants.

Case No. 3:17-cv-01561-L-KSC Complaint Filed: April 6, 2017 (D.N.J.) Transferred to SDCA: August 3, 2017


Case No. 13-CV-00644-L-KSC MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PRELIMINARY APPROVAL

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JAMES HECKER, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v. PETCO ANIMAL SUPPLIES, INC., PETCO ANIMAL SUPPLIES STORES, INC., PETCO HOLDINGS, INC. LLC, and DOES 1 to 100, inclusive, Defendants.

Case No. 3:17-cv-01169-L-KSC Complaint Filed: November 23, 2016 (N.D. Ill.) Transferred to SDCA: June 7, 2017

ADDITIONAL LIST OF COUNSEL HEPWORTH GERSHBAUM & ROTH, PLLC MARC S. HEPWORTH CHARLES GERSHBAUM DAVID A. ROTH REBECCA S. PREDOVAN 192 Lexington Avenue, Suite 802 New York, NY 10016 Telephone (212) 545-1199 Facsimile: (212) 532-3801 LAW OFFICES OF KEVIN T. BARNES KEVIN T. BARNES GREGG LANDER 5670 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1460 Los Angeles, CA 90036 Telephone: (323) 549-9100 Facsimile: (323) 549-0101 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] COHELAN KHOURY & SINGER MICHAEL D. SINGER 605 C Street, Suite 200 San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: (619) 595-3001


Case No. 13-CV-00644-L-KSC MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PRELIMINARY APPROVAL

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Fax: (619) 595-3000 E-mail: [email protected] Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs and the Collective


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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 1

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ....................................................................... 2

A. Kellgren ................................................................................................. 3

B. The State Law Cases .............................................................................. 4

C. The Mediation ....................................................................................... 4

III. THE SETTLEMENT ...................................................................................... 5

IV. CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT APPROVAL PROCEDURE ............... 6

V. THE COURT SHOULD PRELIMINARILY APPROVE THE SETTLEMENT ............................................................................................... 7

A. The Standards and Procedures for Preliminary Approval .......... 7

B. There is a Strong Basis to Believe that the Settlement is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and Free of Collusion ..................... 8

1. The Complexity, Expense and Duration of the Litigation Weigh in Favor of Preliminary Approval .......... 8

2. The Strength of the Plaintiffs’ Case and The Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status Throughout the Trial Weigh in Favor of Preliminary Approval ............................ 9

3. The Experience and Views of Counsel Weigh in Favor of Preliminary Approval .......................................... 10

4. The Amount Offered in Settlement Weighs in Favor of Preliminary Approval ...................................................... 11

5. The Remaining Considerations Are Either Neutral or Weigh in Favor of Preliminary Approval .................... 12

VI. THE COURT SHOULD PRELIMINARILY CERTIFY A SETTLEMENT CLASS ............................................................................... 13

1. The Elements of Rule 23(a) Are Met ................................... 13

2. Adequacy Under Rules 23(a)(4) And Rule 23(g) Is Met ............................................................................................ 15

3. The Requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) Are Met ...................... 16

VII. THE PROPOSED CLASS NOTICE AND CLAIM FORM SHOULD ISSUE ............................................................................................................ 17

A. The Class Notice Satisfies Due Process ......................................... 17


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B. The Proposed Class Notices Are Accurate and Informative ........................................................................................ 17

VIII. THE REQUESTED FEES, EXPENSES, AND INCENTIVE AWARDS WILL BE REASONABLE ........................................................................... 18

IX. A FINAL APPROVAL HEARING SHOULD BE SCHEDULED ......... 20

X. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 21


iii Case No. 13-CV-00644-L-KSC MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PRELIMINARY APPROVAL

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

Acosta v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 243 F.R.D. 377 (C.D. Cal. 2007) ........................... 14

Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) ............................................... 13, 16

Benedict v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 13-cv-00119-BLF, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91139 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2016) ................................ 9

Bond v. Ferguson Enters., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6976 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2011) ........................... 15, 17

Brooks v. Am. Exp. Indus., Inc., 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17313 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 1977) ............................... 11

Cagan v. Anchor Sav. Bank F.S.B., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11450 (E.D.N.Y. May 17, 1990) .............................. 11

Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979) ............................................................... 14

Class Plaintiffs v. Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268 (9th Cir. 1992) ...................................... 7, 8

Clements v. Serco, Inc., 530 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2008) .................................... 11, 12

Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1977) ..................................................... 10

Craig v. Rite Aid Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2658 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2013) .................................... 12

Damassia v. Duane Reade, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ........................... 16

Desmond v. PNGI Charles Town Gaming, L.L.C., 630 F.3d 351 (4th Cir. 2011) .......................................................................... 11

Driver v. Appleillinois, L.L.C., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27659 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2012) ................................. 16

Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) ................................................... 17

Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs., No. C-06-4068 MMC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2007) ................................. 12

Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998) ................................ passim

Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1992) ............................. 14-15

Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16 (9th Cir. 1994) ...................................................... 20


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In re Lupron(R) Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig. , 345 F. Supp. 2d 135 (D. Mass. Nov. 24, 2004) ............................................ 13

Jordan v. Cty. of L.A., 669 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1982) .............................................. 13

Lewis v. Vision Value, L.L.C., No. 1:11-cv-01055-LJO-BAM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99854, 2012 WL 2930867 (E.D. Cal. July 18, 2012) ................................................... 8

McPhail v. First Command Fin. Planning, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26544 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2009) .............................. 20

Miller v. CEVA Logistics USA, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-01321-TLN-CKD, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104704 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2015) ............................. 18

Molina v. Pacer Cartage, Inc., No. 13-cv-2344-LAB (JMA), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142142 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2016) ............................. 20

Murillo v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 266 F.R.D. 468 (E.D. Cal. 2010) .............. 11, 15, 16

Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Com., 688 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1982) ................. 8, 11

Ontiveros v. Zamora, 303 F.R.D. 356 (E.D. Cal. 2014) ............................................. 9

Principe v. Ukropina (In re Pac. Enters. Sec. Litig.), 47 F.3d 373 (9th Cir. 1995) ............................................................................ 19

Ross v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 667 F.3d 900 (7th Cir. 2012) ................................ 14, 16

Ruiz Torres v. Mercer Canyons Inc., 835 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016) ................. 13-14

Salim Shahriar v. Smith & Wollensky Rest. Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 234 (2d Cir. Sept. 26, 2011) ............................................................ 20

Stillman v. Staples, Inc., No. 07-849 (KSH), 2009 WL 1437817 (D.N.J. May 11, 2009) ....................................................... 9

Urnikis-Negro v. Am. Family Prop. Servs., 616 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 2010) ........ 11, 12

Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., Inc., 173 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 1999) ............................ 11, 12

Van Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp., 529 F.2d 943 (9th Cir. 1976) .................................. 7

Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2002) .................................... 19

Williams v. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co., 129 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 1997) ............... 19

Youngblood v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115389 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2011) ............................... 16


v Case No. 13-CV-00644-L-KSC MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PRELIMINARY APPROVAL

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Codes, Statutes and Other Regulations Page

28 U.S.C. § 1715 ............................................................................................... 1, 20, 21

29 U.S.C. § 201 ............................................................................................................. 3

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 ................................................................................................ passim

Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) ............................................................................................... 3

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 ..................................................................................................... 3, 9

Secondary Source Page

3 Newberg & Conte, Newberg on Class Actions 3d (1992) ................................... 18

4 Newberg & Conte, Newberg on Class Actions 4th (2002) .................................... 7

Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth (Fed. Judicial Center 2006) .................................................................... passim


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I. INTRODUCTION

The Plaintiffs in in the various actions being proposed for settlement,

Erik Kellgren, Maria Cote, James Hecker, Therese Kopchinski, Christine Lee,

Deserie Michel, Heather Vargas, Robert Wagner (together “Plaintiffs”), by and

through their counsel (“Settlement Class Counsel”), hereby seek preliminary

approval of the $7.995 million settlement (“Settlement”) set forth in their

Settlement Agreement (“Settlement Agreement”). See Exhibit A to the

Declaration of Seth R. Lesser (“Lesser Decl.”). The Settlement provides some

900 Petco Assistant Managers (“AMs”) with a gross average recovery of

nearly $8,800 each—a recovery of approximately 93% of their damages under

the most commonly applicable damages model, as is discussed below.

Defendants Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., Petco Holdings, Inc., Petco Holdings,

Inc., LLC, and Petco Animal Supplies Stores, Inc. (together “Petco”) do not

oppose this motion in order to effectuate the resolution of this litigation.

Plaintiffs, with Defendants’ agreement, respectfully request that the

Court enter an Order:

1. granting Preliminary Approval of the Settlement;

2. provisionally certifying, for settlement purposes only, a class pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;

3. appointing the principal law firms representing Plaintiffs in these consolidated actions as Settlement Class Counsel;

4. appointing JND Legal Administration as the Claims Administrator;

5. approving the form of and directing distribution of the proposed Notice and Claim Form, which are attached to the Settlement Agreement as Exhibit 3; and

6. setting the Final Approval hearing for a date no earlier than 90 days, or as soon thereafter as practicable, after entry of the Preliminary Approval Order, to account for the time period required by 28 U.S.C. § 1715.



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Separately, the Parties have moved to consolidate the various cases for the

Court’s consideration of the Settlement.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Having vigorously litigated for four years, from motions to dismiss to

conditional certification and well into second stage discovery, the Parties were

in a strong position to evaluate their respective positions and resolve the case.

On July 20, 2017, following a full arms-length mediation before JAMS

mediator Diane Welsh, a former United States Magistrate Judge, the Parties

agreed to a settlement amount of $7.995 million on behalf of roughly 900 Petco

AMs. The Settlement will provide a recovery for a class (the “Settlement

Class”) composed of the following AMs:

Individuals who filed with the Court consents to join the Kellgren action and who, as of the date of entry of the Preliminary Approval Order had not withdrawn their consent or had their claims dismissed;

Individuals who worked for Petco in Colorado as an AM at any time between January 15, 2014 and June 18, 2016;

Individuals who worked for Petco in Illinois as an AM at any time between November 23, 2013 and June 18, 2016;

Individuals who worked for Petco in Massachusetts as an AM at any time between January 31, 2014 and June 18, 2016;

Individuals who worked for Petco in New Jersey as an AM at any time between April 6, 2015 and June 18, 2016;

Individuals who worked for Petco in New York as an AM at any time between April 14, 2010 and June 18, 2016;

Individuals who worked for Petco in Oregon as an AM at any time between October 21, 2014 and June 18, 2016; and

Individuals who worked for Petco in Pennsylvania as an AM at any time between July 14, 2014 and June 18, 2016.

The background of the litigation giving rise to the Settlement is set forth

below and more fully in the Declaration of Seth R. Lesser.



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A. Kellgren

Kellgren was filed on March 19, 2013. The Complaint alleged that Petco

misclassified AMs as exempt from overtime, in violation of the provisions of

the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq. (“FLSA”). Mr. Kellgren

claimed AMs’ primary duty was not management. E.g., Compl. ¶¶ 23-26,

Dkt. No. 1.

After Petco twice moved to dismiss, the case proceeded to first stage

discovery, during which the parties produced written discovery, Petco

deposed the named Plaintiff and two Opt-Ins, and Plaintiffs deposed Petco’s

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) witness. Lesser Decl. ¶ 8. On

September 3, 2015, the Court granted conditional certification. Dkt. No. 78.

After notice issued, 475 AMs filed consents to join the case. Before the

notice period ended, second stage discovery began. During the second stage,

additional depositions were taken (Petco deposed six Opt-Ins, and Plaintiffs

deposed one Petco District Manager) and there was substantial written and

discovery specific to Electronically Stored Information (“ESI”). Lesser Decl. ¶

17. Plaintiffs provided written responses from over 100 Opt-Ins and Petco

produced documents totaling over 335,000 pages. Id. ¶ 18. As the Court is

undoubtedly aware, and as the docket amply demonstrates, the discovery was

highly contentious with extensive meet and confers and complex motions to

compel, several of which remained sub judice and others of which were about

to be filed at the time of the mediation. Id. ¶ 19. There had also been a motion

relating to ESI search terms that had led to a Rule 72 motion which was

granted; the remand remained sub judice at the time of the mediation. Id. ¶ 20.

If the case does not settle, Petco would have been entitled to depose an

additional 24 AMs, thousands more documents might have been produced,



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and there would have been extensive discovery of Petco corporate employees.

Id. ¶ 20-21.

B. The State Law Cases

In addition to Kellgren, Plaintiffs also filed opt-out class actions (the

“State Law Cases”) in Colorado, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New

York, Oregon, and Pennsylvania under each jurisdiction’s state law.1 Petco

moved to dismiss or transfer all of these actions (except Kopchinski, which was

filed shortly before the mediation). Id. ¶ 28. At the time of the mediation,

transfers had been granted in Cote, Hecker, and Michel. Id. ¶ 28. Following the

mediation, Vargas was transferred (and Wagner is anticipated to be transferred

imminently). Plaintiffs have filed a Second Amended Complaint including

Kopchinski and Lee as Named Plaintiffs that asserts claims under

Pennsylvania and Oregon law. (Plaintiffs have agreed to dismiss the

Kopchinski and Lee state court actions.).

C. The Mediation

On June 9, 2017, the Parties approached this Court seeking a stay

pending mediation. Dkt. No. 261. The Court granted a stay on June 13, 2017.

Dkt. No. 264. The mediation took place on July 20, 2017 before former

Magistrate Judge Diane Welsh. In advance of the mediation, Petco provided

1 These actions at the time of filing were styled as follows: Maria Cote v. Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-10171-FDS (D. Mass.); James Hecker v. Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-10857 (N.D. Ill.); Therese Kopchinski v. Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., No. TMP496142 (Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County Pennsylvania); Christine Lee v. Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., No. 16CV34943 (Circuit Court of the State of Oregon, Multinomah County); Deserie Michel v. Petco Animal Supplies Stores, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-01838 (E.D.N.Y.); Heather Vargas v. Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-02320 (D.N.J.); Robert Wagner v. Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-00133-PAB-MJW (D. Colo.).



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pay data that allowed Plaintiffs to formulate a damages demand. Lesser Decl.

¶ 36.

With Judge Welsh’s efforts and after a hotly negotiated mediation

session, the Parties agreed to resolve Kellgren and the State Law Cases for

$7.995 million. Id. ¶ 37. At the close of the mediation, the Parties entered into

a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”). Id. ¶ 37. Following additional

negotiation, the Parties finalized a Settlement Agreement on August 31, 2017.

III. THE SETTLEMENT

The Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and it was arrived at

through arms-length negotiation. If approved, it will require Petco to pay

$7,995,000 (the “Settlement Sum”) to fully and finally resolve Kellgren and the

State Law Cases in their entirety. Unlike other wage and hour settlements

commonplace in other parts of the country, this is a non-reversionary

settlement. The entirety of the Settlement Sum will benefit the Settlement

Class by providing them with payment for their claims and representation.

As noted, the average gross Settlement amount is just under $8,800 per

person, which is, Plaintiffs’ counsel would submit, a substantial sum,

particularly when compared with similar retail misclassification settlements.

See Lesser Decl. ¶ 45; see also page 11, below.

Settlement Class Members who do not opt out will provide Petco with

wage and hour releases.2 In exchange for Incentive Awards of $10,000 (subject

to approval), the Named Plaintiffs will sign general releases. The Settlement

2 Specifically, and in accordance with FLSA jurisprudence, if a Settlement Class Member returns a claim form, they will release both their FLSA and state law claims. In accordance with Rule 23 settlements, whether or not the Settlement Class Member returns a claim form, they will release their state law claims.



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provides that Settlement Class Counsel may seek reasonable expenses, as well

as fees not to exceed 33 1/3% of the Settlement Sum.

The Settlement also provides that each Settlement Class Member will

receive a Notice and a Claim Form, id. ¶ 43, which are attached as Exhibit 3 to

the Settlement Agreement. Each Notice will identify the settlement allocation

for the Notice recipient. It will further present the request for fees, expenses,

and Incentive Awards. The Notice will provide instructions on how to object

and to opt-out.

The amount distributed to the Settlement Class Members will be

allocated pro rata based on weeks worked during the relevant period (which is

four years and 37 weeks for those individuals who joined Kellgren as a result

of the Court’s decision concerning tolling and otherwise three years under the

FLSA and which is two, three or six years depending on the relevant state law

claim). Settlement Class Members will receive payment if they return a Claim

Form; the amounts that were allocated to Settlement Class Members who do

not return Claim Forms will be distributed to those who do.

Using Petco’s payroll data and subsequent computerized address searches

when needed, the Claims Administrator will make all reasonable efforts to

ensure that each Settlement Class Member receives the Court approved

Notices of the Settlement. In the event final approval is granted, the Claims

Administrator will prepare tax forms and ensure distribution of the

Settlement funds.

IV. CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT APPROVAL PROCEDURE

The Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth (Fed. Judicial Center 2006)

(“Manual Fourth”) § 21.63 sets forth the procedure governing class action

settlements under Rule 23: (1) preliminary fairness review of the proposed

settlement; (2) dissemination of mailed and/or published notice; and (3) a



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“formal fairness hearing,” at which class members may be heard and evidence

and argument concerning the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of the

settlement may be presented. This procedure safeguards class members’

procedural due process rights and enables the Court to fulfill its role as the

guardian of class interests. See 4 Newberg on Class Actions 4th (2002) § 11.2.

In deciding whether to grant preliminary approval, the Court evaluates the

reasonableness of the settlement and the content of the notice.

V. THE COURT SHOULD PRELIMINARILY APPROVE THE SETTLEMENT

The law favors settlement, particularly in class actions and other

complex cases where substantial resources can be conserved by avoiding the

time, cost, and rigors of formal litigation. See 4 Newberg § 11.41, at pp. 87-88

(and cases cited therein); Class Plaintiffs v. Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir.

1992); Van Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp., 529 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1976). These

concerns apply with particular force in this case, where some 900 employees

are seeking redress for an allegedly illegal practice.

A. The Standards and Procedures for Preliminary Approval

Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides the

mechanism for settling a class action, including, as here, through a class

certified for settlement purposes.

In deciding whether a settlement should be preliminarily approved

under Rule 23, courts ask if there is a basis to believe that the more rigorous

final approval standard will be satisfied. See Manual Fourth at § 21.633, at 321

(“Once the judge is satisfied as to the certifiability of the class and the results

of the initial inquiry into the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the

settlement, notice of a formal Rule 23(e) fairness hearing is given to the class

members.”). The standard for final approval of a settlement consists of



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showing that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and free of

collusion. Class Plaintiffs, 955 F.2d at 1276; Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Com.,

688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982).

To determine whether a settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate,

courts balance several factors including:

the strength of the plaintiffs’ case; the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; the amount offered in settlement; the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; the experience and views of counsel; the presence of a governmental participant; and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.

Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998).

There is a strong basis to conclude that the Settlement should be

preliminarily approved; indeed, as the somewhat full explication of the

standards below shows, final approval will no less be appropriate.3

B. There is a Strong Basis to Believe that the Settlement is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and Free of Collusion

1. The Complexity, Expense and Duration of the Litigation Weigh in Favor of Preliminary Approval

This case has been lengthy and expensive. Absent settlement, litigation

costs will rise and payment, if it is to come, will be delayed. Filed in 2013,

3 Were the Court to analyze the Settlement under what is often considered to be a FLSA-specific standard, the Court would ask whether the Settlement is “a fair and reasonable resolution of a bona fide dispute.” Lewis v. Vision Value, L.L.C., No. 1:11-cv-01055-LJO-BAM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99854, 2012 WL 2930867, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 18, 2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Inasmuch as the FLSA standard is, if anything, less strenuous than that required for Rule 23 approval, courts routinely have looked to the Rule 23(e) factors in determining whether the FLSA standard is satisfied. Id. Plaintiffs submit that the Settlement satisfies the more lenient FLSA standard for the same reasons that it satisfies the Rule 23(e) standard.



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Kellgren has featured a substantial amount of motion practice over discovery,

including motions to compel and Rule 72 motions. Well into the case, there

remain unresolved disputes, motions that are sub judice, and motions that

were going to be filed at the time of mediation. A substantial amount of

discovery was still to be undertaken. If the State Law Cases progress, they

will be equally hard-fought.

Class action trials in wage and hour cases, while rare, are long, complex,

and expensive. For instance, Klafter Olsen & Lesser LLP, one of the

Settlement Class Counsel here, tried an FLSA collective action to a plaintiffs’

jury verdict in 2009. See Stillman v. Staples, Inc., No. 07-849 (KSH), 2009 WL

1437817 (D.N.J. May 11, 2009). That trial took six weeks and cost both parties

hundreds of thousands of dollars. See Lesser Decl. ¶ 61. The trial was

followed by motion practice addressing, inter alia the proper method of

calculating damages and decertification.

2. The Strength of the Plaintiffs’ Case and The Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status Throughout the Trial Weigh in Favor of Preliminary Approval

The strength of the Plaintiffs’ case factor “examines the strength of a

plaintiff’s case on the merits balanced against the amount offered in the

settlement.” Ontiveros v. Zamora, 303 F.R.D. 356, 369 (E.D. Cal. 2014). The

Settlement provides more than 100% of Plaintiffs’ unliquidated damages, and

almost 93% of liquidated damages, using Petco’s half-time methodology.

As for the risk of maintaining a class or collective through trial, final

certification is never guaranteed. See, e.g., Benedict v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No.

13-cv-00119-BLF, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91139 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2016)

(granting motion to decertify in FLSA misclassification case). It is by no

means certain that the State Law Cases would get certified. But it is certain,

Plaintiffs submit, that Kellgren would not get certified given Plaintiffs’



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announced intention to voluntarily decertify. If approved, the Settlement will

spare both sides the risks associated with to Plaintiffs’ novel decertification

approach (generating up to hundreds of individual actions) and motions for

certification of the State Law Cases. The Settlement allows for a certain,

efficient, global resolution.

3. The Experience and Views of Counsel Weigh in Favor of Preliminary Approval

The experience and reputation of counsel is a paramount consideration

when the court evaluates a settlement’s reasonableness. See, e.g., Cotton v.

Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cir. 1977). Settlement Class Counsel are, we

believe it is fair to say, nationally recognized members of the plaintiffs’ bar,

specializing in complex class litigation, including wage and hour claims. See

Lesser Decl. at Exhibits B (Klafter Olsen & Lesser LLP Firm Resume) and C

(Hepworth Gershbaum & Roth, PLLC Firm Resume). They include, as noted,

attorneys who prevailed in one of the few wage and hour cases that have

proceeded to a collective trial (also involving retail chain store assistant store

managers. Lesser Decl. ¶ 50, and who have obtained the most substantial

FLSA wage and hour settlements in numerous courts. See id. ¶ 61 & Exhibits

B and C.

In turn, Petco’s counsel are prominent leaders in their respective areas.

Meryl Maneker and Lois Kosch, the principal lawyers in this case, and their

other colleagues at Wilson Turner Kosmo LLP are recognized for their wage

and hour, including FLSA, defense practice.

Counsel for both sides were able to draw on their experience and their

detailed knowledge of this case when they advised their clients about

settlement. The Settlement also benefited from the assistance of a highly

respected mediator. Courts have recognized that the use of an experienced



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mediator supports settlement approval. Murillo v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 266

F.R.D. 468, 479 (E.D. Cal. 2010).

4. The Amount Offered in Settlement Weighs in Favor of Preliminary Approval

“It is well-settled law that a cash settlement amounting to only a

fraction of the potential recovery will not per se render the settlement

inadequate or unfair.” Officers for Justice, 688 F.2d at 628; see also Cagan v.

Anchor Sav. Bank F.S.B., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11450, at *34-35 (E.D.N.Y. May

17, 1990) (approving $2.3 million class settlement over objections that the

“best possible recovery would be approximately $121 million”); Brooks v.

Am. Exp. Indus., Inc., 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17313, at *16-18 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17,

1977) (approving settlement of less than 1% of the best possible recovery)

(approving settlement of less than 1% of the best possible recovery). The

$7,995,000 Settlement Sum provides far more than a fraction of the potential

recovery; indeed, it provides an average gross recovery of $8,778 per person.

That figure is roughly 93% of the Settlement Class’s liquidated damages when

applying the damages methodology that has been adopted by all federal

courts of appeal that have addressed the matter4 and assuming that Plaintiffs

4 Determining wage and hour damages depends on the method for calculating damages. The methods range from full time and one-half damages (rarely obtained in retail chain misclassification cases), to “regular rate” analysis, to half-time “FWW” analysis. The circuit courts that have approved FWW are: Desmond v. PNGI Charles Town Gaming, L.L.C., 630 F.3d 351 (4th Cir. 2011); Urnikis-Negro v. Am. Family Prop. Servs., 616 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 2010); Clements v. Serco, Inc., 530 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2008); Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., Inc., 173 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 1999). Here, the 93% figure assumes Plaintiffs prevailing on the factual adjudications and application of the fluctuating work week analysis (which Plaintiffs would have opposed). The uncertainty in the damages calculation



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would prevail on such issues as willfulness, a lack of good faith by Petco, and

a likely number of hours worked by the Settlement Class Members. Lesser

Decl. ¶ 45.

5. The Remaining Considerations Are Either Neutral or Weigh in Favor of Preliminary Approval

The stage of proceedings and the amount of discovery completed

support preliminary approval. As discussed supra, discovery in Kellgren has

been extensive and hard-fought. The discovery has allowed counsel to

realistically assess the value of the case and litigation risk. There can be no

suggestion that the Settlement—which was reached only after a successful

mediation before a former federal judge—was the product of collusion. As for

the reaction of the Class to the Settlement, this factor can only be evaluated

after the notice period. However, Plaintiffs are all quite pleased with the

result. Finally, the presence of a governmental participant factor is neutral.

Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs., No. C-06-4068 MMC 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476, at *15

(N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2007).

In sum, the $7.995 Settlement million is a fair, reasonable and adequate

result that was the product of arms-length negotiation. The Settlement should

be preliminarily approved and the Notice should issue.

warrants approval. See Craig v. Rite Aid Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2658, at *38 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2013) (method of damage calculations was a crucial unresolved issue that weighed in favor of settlement approval of similar retail chain store managerial misclassification case).; Urnikis-Negro v. Am. Family Prop. Servs., 616 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 2010); Clements v. Serco, Inc., 530 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2008); Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., Inc., 173 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 1999).



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VI. THE COURT SHOULD PRELIMINARILY CERTIFY A SETTLEMENT CLASS

Both the Supreme Court and various circuit courts have recognized that

the benefits of a proposed settlement can only be realized through the

certification of a settlement class. See, e.g., Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.

591 (1997); see generally Hanlon, 150 F.3d 1011; In re Lupron Mktg. and Sales

Practices Litig., 345 F. Supp. 2d 135, 137 (D. Mass. Nov. 24, 2004) (citing

Manual Fourth). Plaintiffs will establish that all the elements of Rule 23 are

met with respect to the proposed Settlement at the final approval stage. At

the preliminary approval stage, the Court need not make formal findings as to

the Rule 23(a) and (b) elements since the Court is providing only for notice. It

bears noting, though, that the requirements are preliminarily met.

1. The Elements of Rule 23(a) Are Met

For a lawsuit to proceed as a class action under Rule 23, a named

plaintiff must satisfy numerosity, typicality, commonality, and adequacy of

representation. Fed. R Civ. P. 23(a). All four elements are satisfied here.

a. Numerosity Under Rule 23(a)(1)

Rule 23(a)(1) requires that the class be “so numerous that joinder of all

members is impracticable.” While courts have not established a precise

threshold for determining numerosity, the Ninth Circuit has found that

numerosity was met for classes involving as few as 39 class members. See, e.g.,

Jordan v. Cty. of L.A., 669 F.2d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated on other

grounds, 459 U.S. 810 (1982). The Settlement provides a recovery for some 900

Petco AMs. Lesser Decl. ¶ 45. Thus, Rule 23(a)(1) is satisfied.

b. Commonality Under Rule 23(a)(2)

Rule 23(a)(2) requires that there be “questions of law or fact common to

the class.” Commonality is not a high bar. “To satisfy Rule 23(a)(2)

commonality, [e]ven a single [common] question will do.” Ruiz Torres v.



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Mercer Canyons Inc., 835 F.3d 1125, 1133 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations

and citations omitted). “The existence of shared legal issues with divergent

factual predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts coupled

with disparate legal remedies within the class.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019;

accord, e.g., Ross v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 667 F.3d 900, 908 (7th Cir. 2012).

Here, commonality is met insofar as the claims of Plaintiffs and all

members of the Settlement Class are predicated on the same core common

issues: whether Petco misclassified its AMs as exempt from overtime and

whether Petco acted willfully and in the absence of good faith. Additionally,

the question of the proper method for computing damages presents a

common question that can be resolved on an aggregate basis. Where, as here,

all Settlement Class members were subject to the same method of overtime

calculation and had similar pay structures, courts have found commonality

because the same alleged conduct of defendant would “form[] the basis of

each of the plaintiff’s claims,” Acosta v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 243 F.R.D. 377, 384

(C.D. Cal. 2007); see also Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979) (holding

that commonality issues of the class “turn on questions of law applicable in

the same manner to each member of the class”). Rule 23(a)(2) is satisfied.

c. Typicality Under Rule 23(a)(3)

Rule 23(a)(3) requires that a representative plaintiff’s claims be “typical”

of those of other class members. Typicality requires that named plaintiffs

have claims that are “reasonably coextensive with those of absent class

members,” but that are not necessarily “substantially identical.” Hanlon, 150

F.3d at 1020. The test for typicality “is whether other members have the same

or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not unique

to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members have been injured

by the same course of conduct.” Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508



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(9th Cir. 1992). In Bond v. Ferguson Enters., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6976 (E.D.

Cal. Jan. 24, 2011), the court held that typicality was satisfied because “every

class member was paid under the same pay practices as every other class

member.” The same is true here. As such, there is no concern that Plaintiffs

will become “preoccupied with defenses unique to [themselves].” Murillo, 266

F.R.D. at 475. Therefore, Rule 23(a)(3) is satisfied.

2. Adequacy Under Rules 23(a)(4) And Rule 23(g) Is Met

Rule 23(a)(4) requires that “the representative parties will fairly and

adequately protect the interests of the class.” This requirement is akin to the

requirements of Rule 23(g), which are also met here.5 To resolve the question

of adequacy, “the court must answer two questions: (1) do the named plaintiff

and his counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class members and (2)

has the named plaintiff and her counsel vigorously prosecuted the action on

behalf of the class?” Murillo, 266 F.R.D. at 475 (citing Hanlon, 150 F.3d at

1020).

Adequacy is easily met here. Settlement Class Counsel are experienced

and competent in complex including wage and hour cases. See Lesser Decl. ¶

50 & Exhibits B & C. Neither Plaintiffs nor Settlement Class Counsel have

interests antagonistic to Settlement Class, as demonstrated by their

participation in the litigation to date.

5 Rule 23(g) provides that “[a]n attorney appointed to serve as class counsel must fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.” Rule 23(g)(2) further states that “[t]he court may designate interim counsel to act on behalf of the putative class before determining whether to certify the action as a class action.” Here, Settlement Class Counsel seek appointment as lead counsel for purposes of pursuing the final approval process.



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3. The Requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) Are Met

The Class also meets the predominance and superiority requirements of

Rule 23(b)(3). “The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether

proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by

representation.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623. Although Rule 23(b)(3) requires

that common issues of law and fact predominate, it does not require that there

be an absence of any individual issues. Id. (“The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance

inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant

adjudication by representation.”); Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022.

This case turns on the legality of Petco’s classification of its AMs as

exempt. That classification was uniform throughout the country (with the

exception of California, whose AMs are not included in this case). Because

this common question predominates, class wide adjudication is appropriate

even though individualized damages calculations may be necessary. Murillo,

266 F.R.D. at 476.

A host of decisions underscore how predominance is met in wage and

hour cases based on comprehensive corporate policies. See, e.g., Ross, 667 F.3d

at 910; Driver v. Appleillinois, L.L.C., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27659, at *9 (N.D. Ill.

Mar. 2, 2012); Youngblood v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

115389, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2011); Damassia v. Duane Reade, Inc., 250 F.R.D.

152, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).

Superiority is likewise met because this settlement will resolve the

Kellgren case, as well as seven state law class actions, in a single proceeding. A

classwide resolution makes particular sense here, given that the alternative is

multiple class actions and potentially hundreds of individual cases filed

across the country. Accordingly, the Settlement Class should be certified for

settlement purposes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).



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VII. THE PROPOSED CLASS NOTICE AND CLAIM FORM SHOULD ISSUE

A. The Class Notice Satisfies Due Process

Due process requires that notice be provided to class members by the

best reasonable method available. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156,

176 (1974); Bond, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6976, at *20-21 (2011). The notice plan

here entails mailing notices to the last known addresses of all class members

based on Petco’s payroll records. Individualized mailing to each class

member has been recognized as satisfying the “best practicable notice”

requirement. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 175.

Petco will provide the Settlement Administrator a database containing

contact information for all Settlement Class Members, as well as the number

of compensable weeks work during the relevant period for each Settlement

Class Member. The Settlement Administrator will then finalize and mail the

Notice. The Settlement Administrator will endeavor to determine current

addresses for individuals whose notices are returned undelivered, and it will

re-send Notices to them as appropriate. It will also send a reminder postcard.

This process satisfies all due process requirements. See Eisen, 417 U.S. 156;

Bond v. Ferguson Enters., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6976, at *20-23 (2011).

B. The Proposed Class Notices Are Accurate and Informative

The proposed Notice provides clear and accurate information as to the

nature and principal terms of the Settlement, including the monetary and

other relief the settlement will provide Settlement Class Members. It will

explain how to participate in the Settlement by signing a Claim Form, how to

opt out, and how to object. It will also provide the date, time and place of the

Final Approval hearing. See Manual Fourth at § 21.312. Pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 23(h), the proposed class notice will set forth the maximum amount of

attorneys’ fees and expenses, as well as the Incentive Awards being sought for



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the Plaintiffs.

The Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality. See 3 Newberg §

8.39. The Notice summarizes the proceedings to date and the terms and

conditions of the Settlement in an informative and coherent manner. This

comports with the Manual’s statement that the notice should state essential

terms “concisely and clearly . . . in plain, easily understood language.” See

Manual Fourth § 21.31. The Notice clearly states that the Settlement does not

constitute an admission of liability by Petco, and it recognizes that the Court

has not ruled on the merits. The Notice also states that the final settlement

approval decision has yet to be made. Accordingly, the Notice complies with

the standards of clarity, fairness, completeness, and objectivity required of a

settlement class notice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2), 23(e); 3 Newberg, §§ 8.21,

8.39; Manual Fourth §§ 21.311, 21.312.

VIII. THE REQUESTED FEES, EXPENSES, AND INCENTIVE AWARDS WILL BE REASONABLE

While not strictly a topic for preliminary approval, Settlement Class

Counsel believe that the Court will benefit from a brief discussion of the

requests for fees and expenses, and also for Incentive Awards.

“California district courts usually award attorneys’ fees in the range of

30-40% in wage and hour class actions that result in the recovery of a common

fund under $10 million.” Miller v. CEVA Logistics USA, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-

01321-TLN-CKD, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104704, at *18-19 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 7,

2015) (citing cases).6 Settlement Class Counsel will be seeking fees in the

6 Beyond doubt, one third fees are also the norm for wage and hour settlements in the other federal circuits. Plaintiffs can provide full citation of literally scores of cases recognizing as such should the Court wish confirmation of this.



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amount of 33 1/3% of the Settlement Amount, or $2,665,000. This information

will be included in the Notice, and any Settlement Class Members who wishes

will be given the opportunity to object.

As Settlement Class Counsel will set forth more fully in their final

approval papers, the requested fee is appropriate under either of the two

methods used in the Ninth Circuit: the percentage of the fund method and the

lodestar method. Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir.

2002). While there is a 25% fee benchmark under the former method, the

Ninth Circuit allows departures from this benchmark “when special

circumstances indicate a higher or lower percentage would be appropriate.”

Principe v. Ukropina (In re Pac. Enters. Sec. Litig.), 47 F.3d 373, 378-79 (9th Cir.

1995) (approving 33% fee); see also Williams v. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co., 129

F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 1997) (approving 33% fee).

Plaintiffs submit that “special circumstances” will warrant a 33 1/3% fee

here. The $7.995 million Settlement is an exceptional result considering

comparable cases and considering that it approximates the maximum

liquidated damages that could be received if Petco prevailed on its half-time

argument; the risks were high; and the case has proceeded for four years,

during which counsel have expended more than 7,200 hours vigorously

litigating in eight different fora. See Lesser Decl. ¶ 52; see also Vizcaino, 290

F.3d at 1048-50. As for the lodestar method, the 33 1/3% recovery results in a

high negative multiplier of 0.67 against time. Lesser Decl. ¶ 56. Accordingly,

the fee request is reasonable.

The Court should award reasonable expenses. See Harris v. Marhoefer, 24

F.3d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1994) (allowing recovery of―out of pocket expenses that

would normally be charged to a fee paying client). Thus far, Settlement Class

Counsel’s expenses are $161,901.14. Lesser Decl. ¶ 60. The amount of



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expenses sought will be identified in the Notice. The categories of expenses

for which Settlement Class Counsel seek reimbursement here are the type of

expenses routinely charged to hourly clients and, therefore, the full requested

amount should be reimbursed. See, e.g., McPhail v. First Command Fin.

Planning, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26544, at *23-24 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2009)

(awarded $815,850.17 in costs to counsel).

Finally, the Court should approve Incentive Awards to the Named

Plaintiffs in the amount of $10,000. Incentive Awards are warranted because

the Named Plaintiffs were willing to put their names on a Complaint, despite

the publicity and risk of potential retaliation. They also assisted Settlement

Class Counsel’s investigation of the case. See Salim Shahriar v. Smith &

Wollensky Rest. Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 234 (2d Cir. Sept. 26, 2011). The amount of

the requested Incentive Awards will be identified in the Notice. The amount

is in line with other incentive awards that have been approved. See, e.g.,

Molina v. Pacer Cartage, Inc., No. 13-cv-2344-LAB (JMA), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

142142 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2016) (approving $10,000 incentive award).

IX. A FINAL APPROVAL HEARING SHOULD BE SCHEDULED

The Court should schedule a final fairness hearing to determine that

final approval of the Settlement is proper. The fairness hearing will provide a

forum to explain, describe or challenge the terms and conditions of the

Settlement, including the fairness, adequacy and reasonableness of the

Settlement. During the hearing, Settlement Class Counsel will present their

application for their fees and expenses pursuant to Rule 23(h) as well as for

Incentive Awards to Plaintiffs. Accordingly, the Parties request that the Court

schedule the final fairness hearing for a date no earlier than 90 days, or as

soon thereafter as practicable, after entry of the Preliminary Approval Order,

to account for the time required by 28 U.S.C. § 1715 and per the terms of the



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Settlement Agreement.

X. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court

enter the Preliminary Approval Order, which, inter alia: (1) certifies the

Settlement Class for settlement purposes only; (2) grants preliminary approval

of the Settlement; (3) appoints Klafter Olsen & Lesser LLP and Hepworth

Gershbaum & Roth PLLC as interim Settlement Class Counsel; (4) appoints

Plaintiffs as Settlement Class Representative; (5) directs distribution of the

proposed Notice and Claim Form; and (6) sets a date for the final fairness

hearing for a date no earlier than 90 days, or as soon thereafter as practicable,

after entry of the Preliminary Approval Order, to account for the time

required by 28 U.S.C. § 1715 and per the terms of the Settlement Agreement at

the Southern District of California. Dated: September 1, 2017 KLAFTER OLSEN & LESSER LLP

By: /s/ Seth R. Lesser Seth R. Lesser Fran L. Rudich Michael H. Reed Christopher Timmel KLAFTER OLSEN & LESSER LLP Two International Drive, Suite 350 Rye Brook, NY 10573 Telephone: (914) 934-9200 Facsimile: (914) 934-9220 www.klafterolsen.com

Marc S. Hepworth David A. Roth Charles Gershbaum Rebecca S. Predovan HEPWORTH GERSHBAUM & ROTH, PLLC



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192 Lexington Avenue, Suite 802 New York, NY 10016 Telephone: (212) 545-1199 Facsimile: (212) 532-3801 www.hgrlawyers.com

Gregg Lander, Esq. Kevin T. Barnes, Esq. LAW OFFICES OF KEVIN T. BARNES

5670 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1460 Los Angeles, CA 90036-5664 Telephone: (323) 549-9100 Facsimile: (323) 549-0101 www.kbarnes.com

Michael D. Singer, Esq. COHELAN KHOURY & SINGER 605 C Street, Suite 200 San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: (619) 595-3001 Fax: (619) 595-3000 E-mail: [email protected]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Collective


1 klafter olsen & lesser llp seth r. lesser 2 fran l ... › archive › flsa534.pdf · case...

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