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Key Findings (V)

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Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the WarAgainst AI-Qa'ida~

Since II September 200 I, detainee reporting has become a crucial pillar ofUS counterterrorism efforts, aiding intelligence and law enforcementoperations to capture additional terrorist5, helping to thwart terrorist plots,and advancing our analysis of the al-Qa'ida target. Detainee reportingaccounts for more than half of all HUlvilNT re' a - " . ethe program began there ortin is disseminated broad] within the US Governmen_

Detainees have given us a wealth ofuseful_infoffilation onal-Qa lida members and associates; in fact, detainees have -1a 'ed somerol

'n nearly every capture ofal-Qa'ida members andassocIates Sl'lce 2002, including helping us unravel most of the network

, associated with the now detained II September mastermind Khalid ShaykhMuhammad (KSM). KSM provided infonnation that set the stage for thedetention of Hambali, lead contact of Jemaab IsIamiya (Jl) to al-Qa'ida,and most ofhis network.

• Detainee information was also key to wrapping up such importantal.-Qa1ida members and associates a

One of the gains to detaining the additional terrorist5 has 'been thethwarting ofa number ofal-Qa'ida operations in the United States andoverseas. Jose Padilla was detained as he was arriving in Chicago withplans to mount an attack. Similarly, Walid Bin 'Attash, a.k.a. Khallad, wascaptured on the verge ofmouming attacks against the US Consulate inKarachi, Westemers at the Karachi Airport, and Western housing areas.~

Since 11 September, !lIe capture and debriefing ofdetainees also hastransfonned our understanding of al-Qa'ida and affiliated terrorist groups,providing increased avenues for sophisticated anal sis. Before the ca tureof Abu Zubaydah in March 2002,

,

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Within months of his arrest, AbuZubaydah provided details about al-Qa'ida's organizational structure, keyoperatives, and'modus operandi, It alBo was Abu Zubaydah, early in hisdetention, who identified KSM as the mastermind of the I I Septemberattacks.

• In the nearly four years since 11 September 200 I, successive detaineeshave helped us gauge our progress in the tlght against al-Qa',ida byproviding updat·, 'tur a alth ofthe or anization

Despite the unquestionable utility ofdetainee reporting, uncorroboratedinformation from detainees must be regarded with some degree ofsuspicion. Detainees typically are uncooperative early in their detentionand often pass incomplete or intentionally misleading inf011nation,Moreover, we assess that each detainee ve likely has infoffilation that hewill not reveal

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Scope Note (U)

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Detainee Reporting Pivotal for~ Against AI-Qa'ida

originated from CL~-held detainees. I Detaineereporting since early 2003 has been a majorfoundation for much of the IntelligenceCommunity's analysis on al-Qa'ida, both in tennsof current intelligence publications and of morein-depth intelligence assessments. .

'11'1., ••• . - - "-.1'11. t' I

• Approximately half of eTC's disseminatedintelligence reporting in 2004 on al-Qa'ida

Since 11 September 2001, detainee reporting hasbecome a crucial pillar of US counterterrorismefforts, contributing direytly and indirectly tointelligence and law·enforcement operations againstthe al-Qa'ida iarget. In addition, detainees have beenable to clarify and provide context for informationcollected from other sources; they also have providedunique insights into different aspects of the terrorist .organization, including its leadership, attack strategyand tactics, and CBRN capabilities and ambitions.

This assessment was prepared by the DCI Counterterrorist Center's Officeto the Chief,

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Helping Target Other Terrorists~

Detainees have given us a wealth of usefulinfonnation on al-Qa<ida members and associates,including new details on the personalities andactivities ofknown terrorists. Detainees also divulge,either wittingly or unwittingly, details about ten'oristswho are unknown to us. As is infonnation from othercollection streams, detainee reporting- is oftenincomplete or too general to lead directly to arrests;instead. detainees provide critical pieces to thepuzzle, which, when combined \.'1ith other reponing,have helped direct an investigation's focus and led tothe capture of terrorists.

UnraYeling Hambali's NetworkIn March 2003, al-Qa'ida external. operations chiefKhalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) providedinfonnalion about an al-Qa'ida operative, MajidKhan, who he was aware had recently been captured.KSM-possibly believing the detained operative was"talking"-admitted to having tasked Majid withdelivering a large sum of money to individualsworking for another senior al-Qa'ida associate.

• In an example of how infonnation from onedetainee can be used in debriefing another deraineein a "building block" process, Khan-confronted

with KSM's information about the money­acknowledged that he delivered the money to anoperative named "Zubair'l and provided Zubair'sphysical description and contact number. Based onthat infomlatioo, Zubair was captured in June 2003.

• During debriefings, Zubair revealed that he workeddirectly for Hambali, lead. contact of JemaahIslamiya (II t al- aLida. Zubair rovidedinformation

we used theinfonnation Zubair provided tp track down andarrest Hambali.

• Next, KSM~when explicitly queried on theissue-identified Hambali's brother, 'Abd al-Hadi,a,k.a. Rusman Gunawan as a ros ective successorto Hambali.

• Bringing the story full circle, 'Abd al-Hadiidentified a cen of J1 operatives whom Hambali hadsent to Karachi for training. When confronted withhis brother's revelations, Hambali admitted thatsome members of the ceH were eventually to begroomed for US operations~at the behest ofKSM-possiblyas part ofKSM's plot to flyhijacked planes into the tallest building on the USwest coast.' (:PS'I ~

2 See Appendix C: Capture of AI-Qa'ida's SoutheastAsian ChjefHambali~.~

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Bringing New Targets to LightA variety ofdetainee reporting has provided us initialinformation about individuals having links toal~Qa'ida and has given us insight into individualsabout whom we had some reporting but whoseal-Qa'ida involvement was unclear.

• Ja'f.ar sl-Ta:yyar .first Dame to the FBI's attentionw[lcn Abu Zubaydah named him as one of the mostlikely individuals to be used by ul-Qu'ida for

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uncoverim~ Ja'far's bue name.

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Aiding US Law Enforcement Efforts~

Many actionable leads provided by detainee reportinghave assisted the efforts of the FBI, local lawenforcement, and the Department of Defense, Suchinfomlation has led to arrests, helped in questioningsuspects, a~~!:.ly be used in ajudicialprocess.~~J

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Soon after his arrest, KSM described an Ohio-basedtruck driver whom the FBI identified as lyman Faris,and who was already under suspicion for his contactswitil al-Qa'ida operative Majid Khan. The FBI andCIA shared intelligence from interviews of KSM,Khan, and Faris on a near real-time basis and quicklyascertained that Faris had met and acceptedoperational taskillgs from KSM on several occasions.Faris is currently serving a 20-year sentence forconspiracy and ~~?:t_to a terroristorganization.9!~

KSM's revelation in 1tiarch 2003 tllat he was plottingwith Sayf aI-Rahman Paracha-who also used thename Saifullah al-Ralmlan Paracha-to smuggleexplosives into the United States for a planned attackin New York prompted the FBI to investigateParacha's business ties in the United States. TIleinvestigation also involv.ed questioning Paracha'sson. Uzair Paracha, In New York and resulted indesignating in May 2003 Sayfai-Rahman Paracha il11

enemy combatant. Sayfal-Rahman Paracha enteredinto US custody in July 20m, and Uzair was indictedin the Federal Court in Manhattan. Sayfal.Rahman~n~etentionat Guantanamo Bay.

Revealing Plots; Potential Targets~

Detainee reporting has helped thwart a number ofal-Qa'ida plots t.o attack targets in the West and

elsewhere. Not only have detainees repOlted onpotential targets and techniques that al-Qa'idaoperational plaJUlers have considered but arrests alsohave disrupted attack plans in progress.

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TOP

• A key Somali operative working with aI-Qa'ida andal-Ittihad ai-Islam; in East Africa, Hassan AhmedGuleed, tolafter his csptural-Qa'ida leader planned toattack the US military at Camp Lemonier inDjibouti using explosive~ladenwater tankers.

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Debriefings of mid-level al-Qa'ida operatives alsohave shed light on plots against US interests.

• Reporting from Abu Zubaydah has been used as abase1ine for debriefina other senior detainees,

In response to questions about al-Qa'ida's efforts toacquire WMD, KSM also revealed he had met threeindividuals involved in al·Qa'ida's program toproduce anthrax. He apparently calcutated­incorrectly-that we had this information already,given that one ofthe three-II operative andal~Qa'ida assoc~d been inforeign custod_forunrelatedterrorist activity.

US Targets Here- and AbroadAbu Zubaydah was the first of several detainees toreveal a significant quantity of general threatinfonnation against targets abroad and in" tIle UnitedStates-including the \Vhite House and other USsymbols,

• After being confronted with KSM's reporting,Sufaat eventually admitted his principal role in theanthrax program and providedl ll!!information on his at-large assistants. U tlmately,the infonnation from Suf""t and KSM____I~d to lhe capture of~ntsin the anthrax program.

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• In addition, Abu Zubaydah's identifi,cation early inhis detention ofKSM as the mastem1ind of11 September and al-Qa'ida's premier terroristplanner and of'Abd at-Rahim al-Nashiri as anotherkey al-Qa.'ida 0 erationaJ lanner corroboratedinformation

Aiding Our Understnnding of Al-Qa'ida ~)

Since 11. September, the capture and debriefing ofHVDs has significantly advanced our understandingof al-Qa' ida and affiliated terrorist groups. Beforethe capture ofAbu Zubaydah in March 2002, we hadsignifi.cant gaps in knowledge about al-Qa'ida'sorganizatia_·. kev members and associates,capabilities, and its presencearound the globe. Withm months of his arrest, AbuZubaydah provided details about al-Qa'ida'sorganizational structure, key operatives, and. modusoperandi. Early in his detention, his information onal-Qa'ida's Shura Council and its various committees

Since 1t September, successive detainees havehelped us gauge our progress in the fight againstal-Qa'ida by providing updated infonnation on thechan in structure and health of the organization.

• II. II I • ) • I

• Khallad's statements provided leverage indebriefings ofKSM, KSM fleshed out the status ofthe operation, includingidenti~a[t.~I~~dKingdom__(~)

• Debriefers used KSM's and Bin al-Shibh1s·reporting to confront Walid Bin 'Attash: a.k.a.Khallad, and Aromar al-Baluchi; who were caught·two montl" after KSM. Khallid admitted to havingbeen involved in th!iiiilotand reveale.d that he haddirected cell leader to beginlocating pilots who could lJac panes and crash~Khanadsaid he and operative_hadconsidered some 10countries as possible launch sites for the bijacking

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He..athrow Airport PlotShortly after his capture in March 2003, KSMdivulged limited infonnation about his plot to usecommercial airliners to attack Heathrow Airport andother target.') in the United Kingdom. He discussedthe plot probably because he suspected that keyal-Qa'ida 11 September facilitator and HeathrowAirport plotter Ramzi Bin al-Shihh, who had beendetained six months previously) had already revealedthe infonnation.

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_ also provided invaluable insights inreports lhat have aided our analysis of

al-Qa'ida's current organization, the personalities ofits key members, and al-Qa'ida's decisionmakingprocess,

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.~mes found on the computer_a key aI-Qat ida financialoperative and facilitator for the 11 Septemberattacks--seized in March 2003 representedal-Qa'ida members who were to receive funds.Debriefers questioned detainees extensively on thenames to detennille who they were and howimportant the were to the or anization. Theinti nnatioo

IJIuminating Other Collection~

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Challenges of Detainee Reporting~

Detainees; by virtue of their. circumstances, have anadversarial relationship with their debriefers andtypically are uncooperative early in their detention. Ifthey decide to answer questions at the beginning, theyllSilan)' pass incomplete or intentionally misleadinginformation, perhaps hoping that the volume of there ortin will make it difficult to sort out the truth.

admitted outt;ght that there were some

Detainees' information must be corTOborated usingmultiple sourceS ofintelligence; uncorroboratedinfonnation from detainees must be regarded withsome degree of suspicion. When detainees provideuseful information, it is often difficult to detennillethe detainee's motivation for responding to thedebriefer's questions.

• Sometimes the- detainee gives infonnation hecalculates-rightly or wrongly-that the debriefersalready know, Uncharacteristic for most detainees,KSM almost inumidiately following his capture inMarch 2003 elaborated all his plan to crashcommercial airlines into Heathrow Airport; he mayhave assumed that Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, who wascaptured in December 2002, had already divulged

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Refusing To Budge on Certain Topics~

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Detainee Reporting Pivotal forthe War Against AI-Qa'ida

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Key Findings (U)

Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the WarAgainst AI-Qa'ida~_

Since II September 2001, detainee reporting has bccome a clUcial pillar ofUS countel1elTorism eff0I1s, aiding intelligence and law enforcementoperations to capture additional terrorists, hclping to thwart terrorist plots,and advancing our analysis of the al-Qa'ida target. In addition, detaineeshave been able to clarify and provide context for infortllation collectedfrom other sources; they also have provided unique insights into differentaspects of the terrorist organization, including its leadership, anackstrategy and tactics, and CBRN capabilities and ambitions.

the reporting is disseminated broadly within the US(~

Detainees have given us a wealth oruseful_nfOrtllation onal- a'ida members and associates; in fact. dctamees have 11a ed somerole

nnearly every capture 0 al-Qa'ida members andassociates since 2002, including helping us unravel most of the networkassociated with the now dctained II September mastennind Khalid ShaykhMuhammad (KSM). KSM providcd infonnation that set the stage for thedetention of Hambali, lead contact of Jemaah lslamiya (JI) to al-Qa'ida,and most of his network.

• Detainee information was also key to wraal-Qa'ida members and associates as

One of the gains to detaining the additional tenorists has been thethwarting of a number of al-Qa' ida operations in the United States andoverseas. Jose Padilla was detained as he was arriving in Chicago withplans to mount an attack. Similarly, Walid Bin' Attash (a.k.a. Khallad)was captured on the verge of mounting attacks against the US Consulate inKarachi. Westerncrs at thc Karachi Airp0l1, and Western housing areas.

~

Since II Scptember, the capture and debriefing of detainees also hastransfornled our understanding of al-Qa' ida and affiliatcd terrorist groups,providing increased avenues ror sophisticated analysis. Before the capture

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Within months of his arrest, Abu Zubaydah provideddetails about al-Qa'ida's organizational structure, key operatives, andmodus operandi. It also was Abu Zubaydah, early in his detention, whoidentified KS\1 as the mastennind of the I I September a\taeks.

• In the nearly four years since I I September 200 I, successive detaineeshave helped us gauge our progress in the fight against al-Qa'ida byproviding updated infomlation on the chan in structure and health of

n

ts(JDespite the unquestionable utility of detainee reponing, uncorroboratedinformation from detainees must be regarded with some degree ofsuspicion. Detainees have been known to pass incomplete or intentionallymisleading information; moreover, \\'e assess that each detainee very likelyhas infomlation that he will not reveal .

•

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High and medium value detainees have given us awealth ofuseful_nfonnation on al-Qa'idamembers and associates, Including new details on thepersonalities and activities of known terrorists.Detainees also divulge, either wittingly orunwiuingly, details abom terrorists who are unknownto llS. Delainee reponing is often incomplete or toogeneral to lead directly to arrests; instead, detaineesprovide critical pieces to the puzzle, which, whencombined with olher rep0l1ing, have helped direct allinvestigation's focus and led to the capture ofterrorists.

Helping Target Other Terrorists~

• Low Value Detainee (LVD): A detainee whomay have provided some infOimation on a specificissue, but whose overall reportin has not advancedour knowledge of aJ-Qa' ida.

• High Value Detainee (HVD): A detainee who-inlarge part due to his having held a position in or inassociation with al-Qa'ida before detention thatafforded him significant information about thegroup-has ad,'anced our understanding ofterrorism on multiple fronts.

• Medium Value Detainee (MVD): A detaineewhose reporting advanced our knowledge ofal-Qa'ida, but only on a limited range of issues.

Defining al-Qa'ida Detainees tst_Detained members and associates ofal-Qa'ida fallinto three basic categories, based on their position andaccess and the reponing they hav_e provided.

Detainee Reporting Pivotal forthe War Against Al-Qa'ida

~

• Detainee reponing since early 2003 has been amajor foundation for much of lhe IntelligenceCommunity's analysis on al-Qa'ida, both in lennsofcurrent intelligence publications and of morein-depth intelligence assessmems.

Since 11 September 200 I, reporting from high valueal-Qa'ida detainees has become a cmcial pillar of UScounterterrorism efforts, contributing directly andindirectly to intelligence and law-enforcementoperations against the al-Qa'ida target. In addition,detainees have been able lO clarify and providecontext for infonnation collected from other sources;they also have provided unique insights into difTerentaspects of the terrorist organization, including itsleadership, attack strategy and tactics, and CORNcapabilities and ambitions.

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Unraveling Hambali's NetworkIn March 2003, al-Qa'ida extemal operations chiefKhalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) providedinfonnation about an al-Qa'ida operative, MajidKhan, who he was aware had recently been captured.KSM-possibly believing the detained operative was"talking"-admitted to having tasked Majid withdelivering a large sum of money to individualsworking for another senior al-Qa'ida associate.

• In an example of how infonnation from onedetainee can be used in debriefing another detaineein a "building block" process, Khan--<:onfrontedwith KSM's infonnation about the moncy­acknowledged lhat he delivered the money to anoperative named "Zubair" and provided Zubair'sphysical description and COnlact number. Based onthat infonllation, Zubair was captured in June 2003.

• During debriefings, Zubair revealed thai he workeddirectly for Hambali, who was the principle JemaahIslamiya (11) conduit to al-Qa'ida. Zubair rovided

\Ve used the infonllation Zubair provided to trackdown and arrest Hambali.

• Next, KSM-when explicitly queried on theissue-identified Hambali's brOlher, 'Abd al-Hadi

• Bringing the story full circle, 'Abd al-Hadiidentified a cell of JI operatives whol11 Hambali hadsent to Karachi for training. \Vhen confronted withhis hrother's revelations, Hambali admitted thatsome members of the cell were eventually to begroomed for US operations-at the behest ofKSM-possibly as part ofKSM's plot to flyhijacked planes into the tallest building on the USwest coast. tsd' Ii

Bringing ~ew Targets to LightA variety of detainee reporting has provided us initialillfommtion about individuals having links (0

al-Qa'ida and has given us insight into individuals

about whom we had some reporting but whoseaJ-Qa'ida involvement was unclear.

eta I st lat~ uncovenng

la'far's tme name.~~

Aiding US Law Enforcement Efforts~_

Many actionable leads provided by detainee reportinghave assisted the efforts of law enforcement. Suchinfonnation has led to arreSlS, helped in questioningsuspects~~~imatelybe used in a judicialprocess.(~

Soon after his arrest, KSM described an Ohio-basedtruck driver whom the FBI identified as lyman Faris,and who was already under suspicion for his contactswilh al-Qn 'ida operative Majid Khan. Interviews ofKSM, Khan, and Faris were shared with lawenforcement on a ncar real-time basis and theyquickly ascertained that Faris had met and acceptedoperational taskings from KSM on several occasions.Faris is currently serving a 20-year sentence forconspiracy and material support [Q a terroristorganization. ~ KSM's revelation inMarch 2003 that he was plotting with Sayf al­Rahman Paracha-who also used the nameSaifullah ai-Rahman Paracha-to smuggle explosivesinto the United States for a planned attack in NewYork prompted the FBI to investigate Paracha'sbusiness lies in thc Unitcd States. The investigationalso involved questioning Paracha's son, UzairParacha, in New York and resulted in designating inMay 2003 Sayf ai-Rahman Paracha an enemycombalalH. Sayfal-Rahman Paracha entered into UScustody in July 2003, and Uzair was indicted in theFederal Court in Manhattan. Soyfai-Rahman Paracha re~etentionatGuantanamo Bay.'ts.(_

Revc~lling Plots, Potential Targets~

Detainee reporting has helped thwart a number ofal-Qa'ida plots to attack targets in the \Vest andelsewhere. Not only have detainees reported on

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potential targets and techniques that al-Qa'idaoperational planners have considered but arrests alsohave disrupted attack plans in progress.

In response to questions about al·Qa'ida's efforts toacquire WMD, KSM also revealed he had met threeindividuals involved in al-Qa'ida's program toproduce amhrax. He apparently calculated-

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• Khallad's statements provided leverage indebriefings of KSM. KSM fleshed out the status ofthe operation, includingident~altar~United Kingdom_'tSZ_

• Debriders used KSM's and Bin al-Shibh'sreporting to confront Walid Bin 'Attash (a.k.a.Khallad) and Ammar al-Baluchi, who were caughttwo months after KSM. Khallad admitted to havingbeen involved inth~ed that he haddirected cell leader_to beginlocating pilots who could hijack planes and crash~Khallad said he and operative_adconsidered some 10countries as possible launch sites for the hijackingaltern ts and that they narrowed the 0 lions to the

Heathrow Airport PlotShortly after his capture in March 2003, KSMdivulged limited infonnation about his plot to usecommercial airliners to attack Heathrow Airport andother targets in the United Kingdom. He discussedthe plot probably because he suspected that keyal-Qa'ida I I September facilitator and HeathrowAirport plotter Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, who had beendetained six months previously, had already revealedthe infonnalion.

• A key Somali operative working with al-Qa'ida andal-Ittih d a· hmedGuleedafter his caprureal-Qa'ida leader planned toattack the US military at Camp Lemonier inDjibouti using explosive-laden waler tankers.

• After being confronted with KSM's repurting,Sufaal eventually admittedhi.-· in theanthrax program and provideinfonnalion on his at·large assistants. umatcly,the infonnation from Sufaa' and KSM••••

led to the eapture ofSufaat's (wo assistants in lhe anthrax program.

~

• Reporting from Abu Zubaydah has been used as abaseline for debriefin other senior detainees

US Targets Here and AbroadAbu Zubaydah was the first of several detainees 10

reveal a significant quantity of general threatinfomlation against targets abroad and in the UnitedStates-including the While House and olher USsymbols.

incorrectly-Ihat we had Ihis infomlation already,given that one of the Ihree-JI operative andal-Qa'ida associate Yazid Sufaat-had been inforeign custod) for unrelatedterrorist activity.

~~_sfor attack

Debriefings of mid-level al-Qa'ida operatives alsohave reported on specific plols against US interests.

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Aiding Our Underslanding of AI-Qa'ida~

Since II September, the capture and debriefing ofHVDs has significantly advanced our understandingof al-Qa'ida and affiliated terrorist groups. Beforethe capture of Abu Zubaydah in March 2002, we hadlittle information about al·Qa'ida's organizational~lbers and associates, capabilities,_ and liS presence around lhe globe.

Within months of his arrest, Abu Zubaydah provideddetails about al·Qa'ida's organizational structure, keyoperatives, and modus operandi. Early in hisdetention, his infonnation on al-Qa'ida's SllUraCouncil and its various committees added to what we

• In addition, Abu Zubaydah's identification early inhis detention of KSM as the mastennind of11 September and al-Qa'ida's premier terroristplanner and of' Abd aI-Rahim al-Nashiri as anotherkey al-Qa'ida 0 erational lanner corroboratedinformation-Since II September, successive detainees have

helped us gauge our progress in the fight againstal-Qa'ida by providing updated information on thechanging structure and health of the organization.

Iso provided invaluable insights thaIlave 31 e our analysis of al-Qa'ida's currentorganization, the personalities of its key members,and al-Qa'ida's decisionmaking process. Hisreporting has contributed" to our understanding of Ihe

enemy, how al-Qa'ida members interact with eachother, how they are organized, and what theirpersonal networks are like.

Ahmed Khalfam Ghailani (a.k.a. Haytham al-Kini,a.k.a. Fupi) a Tanzanian al-Qa'ida member who wasindicted for his role in the 1998 East Africa USEmbassy bombings, has provided new insights intoal·Qa'ida's skills and networks. As a facilitator andone of al-Qa'ida's top documentllforgers since theI I September allacks, with access to individualsacross the organizations until his arrest in July 2004,he has reported on how he forged passpol1s and towhom he supplied them.

The same compuler contained a list of e~mailaddresses for individuals KSM helped deployabroad who he ho )cd would execute 0 erations:

Challenges of Detainee Reporting~

Detainees, by virlue of their circumstanccs, have anadvcrsarial relationship with Iheir debricfers; theyoften lry pass incomplete or intentionally misleadinginfol111ution, perhaps hoping Ihat the volume of there onin will make it difficult to sort out the truth.

ldmittcd oUlri hi that there were some

Illuminating Other Collection~_

Delainees have been particularly useful in sorting oulthe large volumes of documents and computer dataseized in raids. Such information gotentially can beused m legal proeeedmg II I.....lIIi.1I1111111 Some also can be used inconfronting detainees to persuade them to talk abouttopics they would otherwise not reveal.

.~mes found on Ihe computer_-akey al-Qu'ida financialoperative and facilitator for the 11 Septemberatlacks~seized in March 2003 representedal-Qa'ida members who were to receive funds.Debriefers questioned detainees extensively on thenames to detemline who they were and howimportant the were to Ihe or anizalion. Tl1einfonnution

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Detainees' infonnation must be corroborated;uncorroborated information from detainees must beregarded with some degree of suspicion. Sometimesthe detainee gives infonnatioll he calculates~rightly

or wrongly-that the debriefers already know.

• Uncharacteristic for mas I detainees, KSM almostimmediately following his capture in March 2003elaborated on his plan to crash commercial airlinesinto Heathrow Airport; he may have assumed thaiRamzi Bin al-Shibh, who was caprured inDecember 2002, had already divulged this plan.

~-Refusing To Budge on Certain Topics~.)

We assess that each detainee very likely hasinfonnation that he will not reveal

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