Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]

A Strategic Policy Framework for Advancing U.S. Civilian Nuclear Power as a National

Security Imperative

David K. Gattie, University of Georgia, College of Engineering

1. Introduction

In the ongoing battle of ideas in its electric power sector, the U.S. has reached a

familiar inflection point—it is in the throes of a debate on whether to retain civilian

nuclear power in its energy portfolio, thus as a resource for its industrial base.

Nuclear energy is a unique resource because of its unmatched energy density and

dual-purpose utility for electric power generation and nuclear weaponry. Triple-

purpose if applications in medicine are included. However, the U.S. made critical

policy decisions in the past that have carried forward and compromised America’s

capacity to advance in the civilian nuclear power space.

In 1977 the U.S. made the policy decision to “defer indefinitely the reprocessing of

spent nuclear power reactor fuel” in order to set an example for other nations to

likewise not reprocess spent fuel, with the objective being to protect the world from

the proliferation of nuclear weapons.1 This expectation didn’t transpire as France, the

U.K., Russia, Japan and India currently have nuclear fuel reprocessing capacity.2

Then, in 1993, another energy policy decision weakened the U.S. further in the

advanced nuclear power technology space when President Clinton announced3,4 the

end of nuclear power research and development, characterizing it as a program no

longer needed and effectively bringing to an end U.S. research on integral fast

reactors. With respect to both fuel reprocessing and fast reactor research, the U.S.

Senate held committee meetings in 2017 that addressed the need to look at fuel

reprocessing and fast reactor technologies as necessary advances for America’s

nuclear power future.5, 6, 7 In all, America is facing stiff international competition, not

only with respect to current light-water reactors, but also advanced reactors such as

molten salt reactors, fast reactors and small modular reactors.8 Moreover, several

1Rossin, A.D. 1999. U.S. Reprocessing and Nonproliferation Policy.

http://www.wmsym.org/archives/1999/20/20-1.pdf 2WNA, Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing. http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-

cycle/fuel-recycling/processing-of-used-nuclear-fuel.aspx 3 Clinton Decision. 1993. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47232 4 Gattie, DK. Nuclear power in America requires political resolve. Morning Consult, May 23, 2017.

https://morningconsult.com/opinions/nuclear-power-america-requires-political-resolve/ 5 Senate EPW Hearing, July 25, 2017.

https://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/hearings?ID=B65EC8DE-D144-4109-A469-5B5F77A16540 6 Senate Appropriations Hearing, June 21, 2017. https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/hearings/review-

of-the-fy2018-budget-request-for-the-us-department-of-energy 7 Senate Appropriations Hearing, September 14, 2016.

https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/hearings/hearing-titled-the-future-of-nuclear-power 8 Third Way. 2017. The global race for advanced nuclear. http://www.thirdway.org/infographic/the-global-

race-for-advanced-nuclear

Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]

plants in the existing U.S. nuclear power fleet are facing challenges on a different

front and are struggling to compete with natural gas and renewables.9, 10

The issue of harnessing the energy of the atomic nucleus to generate electricity can

be traced to the days of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1946, and it was

controversial from the beginning.11,12 Some have argued that nuclear power isn’t the

right way forward or that it poses too great of a risk to the general public,13,14,15

while others argue that nuclear power isn’t necessary to meet electricity

demands.16,17,18 Yet, others contend that nuclear power is needed in order to reduce

global carbon emissions and meet climate goals.19,20,21,22,23 Currently, much of the

debate in the U.S. revolves around markets and the extent to which markets should

determine the fate of nuclear power in the U.S. energy portfolio. One argument

being that markets should be allowed to work and, thus, dictate the energy portfolio

for the U.S. electric power sector.24,25,26,27 This is in sharp contrast with efforts to

employ subsidies and zero-emission credits to keep baseload nuclear plants in

9 Proctor, D. Analysis shows U.S. nuclear plants losing $2.9 billion annually. Power Magazine, June 15,

2017. http://www.powermag.com/analysis-shows-u-s-nuclear-plants-losing-2-9-billion-annually/ 10 Polson, J. More than half of America’s nuclear reactors are losing money. Bloomberg, June 14, 2017.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-14/half-of-america-s-nuclear-power-plants-seen-as-

money-losers 11 Oppenheimer, J. Robert. "International control of atomic energy." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 4.2

(1948): 39-48. 12 Rhodes, Richard. "The Making of the Atomic Bomb, 886 pp." (1986). 13 Breyman, Steve. "Critical Masses: Opposition to Nuclear Power in California, 1958-1978." (2001): 141-

143. 14 Lovins, Amory B. "Energy strategy: the road not taken." Foreign Aff. 55 (1976): 65. 15 Ehrlich, Paul R. "An Ecologist's Perspective on Nuclear Power." FAS Public Interest Report 28 (1975):

3-6. 16 Lovins, A. B. (2017). Do coal and nuclear generation deserve above-market prices?. The Electricity

Journal, 30(6), 22-30. 17 Jacobson, M. Z., Delucchi, M. A., Cameron, M. A., & Frew, B. A. (2017). The United States can keep

the grid stable at low cost with 100% clean, renewable energy in all sectors despite inaccurate claims.

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 114(26), E5021-E5023. 18 Jacobson, M. Z., Delucchi, M. A., Bauer, Z. A., Goodman, S. C., Chapman, W. E., Cameron, M. A., ... &

Erwin, J. R. (2017). 100% clean and renewable wind, water, and sunlight all-sector energy roadmaps for

139 countries of the world. Joule, 1(1), 108-121. 19 Begos, K. Experts say nuclear power needed to slow warming. Physics.Org, Nov. 3, 2013.

https://phys.org/news/2013-11-experts-nuclear-power.html 20 Kharecha, Pushker A., and James E. Hansen. "Prevented mortality and greenhouse gas emissions from

historical and projected nuclear power." Environmental science & technology 47.9 (2013): 4889-4895. 21 Vine, Doug, and Timothy Juliant. "Climate solutions: the role of nuclear power." Center for Climate and

Energy Solutions (2014). 22 Shellenberger, Michael. "The Nuclear Option: Renewables Can't Save the Planet-But Uranium Can."

Foreign Aff. 96 (2017): 159. 23 Climate Scientists for Nuclear. http://environmentalprogress.org/climate-scientists-for-nuclear/ 24 Lovins, A. B. (2017). Do coal and nuclear generation deserve above-market prices?. The Electricity

Journal, 30(6), 22-30. 25 Perry, M. Don’t meddle in the energy market. US News, October 11, 2017.

https://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/articles/2017-10-11/rick-perry-shouldnt-prop-up-

coal-and-nuclear-power-in-the-energy-markets 26 Dyson, M. Who needs baseload power: Or, let the markets work. GreenBiz, June 26, 2017.

https://www.greenbiz.com/article/who-needs-baseload-power-or-let-markets-do-their-job 27 Green, M. Let markets work for electricity grid, consumers. Breaking Energy, Nov. 3, 2017.

https://breakingenergy.com/2017/11/03/let-markets-work-for-electricity-grid-consumers/

Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]

operation28 or to explore mechanisms for assigning value to the reliability and

resilience attributes provided by nuclear power.29 These issues of costs, climate,

reliability and resilience are necessary in the discussion of nuclear power, but they

don’t sufficiently encompass all aspects of nuclear power in the U.S. One aspect, in

particular, is the importance of civilian nuclear power to U.S. national security, which

is the focus of this paper.

The objectives of this paper are to:

1. Provide rationale for expanding U.S. civilian nuclear power and its associated

science, engineering and technology based on U.S. national security concerns,

and

2. Present a strategic policy framework for sustaining domestic U.S. nuclear

power and expanding the U.S. civilian nuclear power footprint abroad as a

national security imperative.

Here, national security is broadly characterized as anything that constrains U.S.

options or U.S. capacity to respond to a threat (military, economic, technological,

environmental, climate, etc.). This includes, but isn’t limited to, any policy or policy

deficiency that is complicit in allowing the U.S. to fall behind other nations in a

critical field of science, engineering or technology.

2. Nuclear and National Security: A Brief Background

U.S. national security has been at the forefront of America’s geopolitical interests

since the founding of the country with one of the earliest examples being the Monroe

Doctrine of 1823.30 However, since World War II (WWII) national security is more

globally extensive and retains in its foundation concerns about nuclear energy—

concerns articulated in 1946 by Caryl P. Haskins, then Deputy Executive Officer of

the National Defense Research Committee:

We therefore cannot count on maintaining our security through a monopoly of

fundamental knowledge in the atomic field […]. Further, our monopoly of technical

information and facilities is limited and is diminishing. At present we do have a

monopoly of stockpiles of raw materials and finished atomic bombs, and we are

equipped with gigantic plants for producing these materials. Within something like

ten years, however, our monopoly in technology may have disappeared completely,

whatever the policy we now adopt with respect to international action.31 (Caryl P.

Haskins)

Haskins was clear in his concern regarding the possibility that the U.S. no longer had

a monopoly on nuclear technology. This had been demonstrated throughout the

preceding decades as scientists from across the world and from various nationalities

probed the atom for its secrets. Hailing from countries such as New Zealand (Ernest

28 State of New York Public Service Commission. CASE 15-E-0302 and CASE 16-E-0270. (pp. 5, 19, 20).

http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefId=%7B44C5D5B8-14C3-4F32-

8399-F5487D6D8FE8%7D 29 Dept. of Energy Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule. 2017.

https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/09/f37/Notice%20of%20Proposed%20Rulemaking%20.pdf 30 Office of the Historian. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/monroe 31 Haskins, Caryl P. "Atomic energy and American foreign policy." Foreign Aff. 24 (1946): 591.

Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]

Rutherford), Denmark (Neils Bohr), England (James Chadwick), Hungary (Leo

Szilard), Italy (Enrico Fermi), Germany (Otto Hahn), Austria (Lise Meitner), and the

United States (Robert Oppenheimer), these scientists did what scientists do—

explored the unknown in order to understand the nature of things. In this case it was

the mystery of the atom and the knowledge hidden within the atomic nucleus, and

that knowledge was available to anyone or any country with the wherewithal and

commitment to explore it. The secrets of the atom could not be reserved for U.S.

interests only as scientific discovery cannot be contained by geographical boundaries

nor is it a respecter of geopolitical intentions or ideologies—good or bad.32 This was

true in 1946, it is true in 2017, and it will continue to be true in the future.

Haskins’ warning proved true as the Soviet Union developed its own nuclear

capabilities in pursuit of geopolitical dominance in Europe and Asia. This was followed

by the enactment of the Truman Doctrine33 as the foundation to U.S. foreign policy,

where America became committed to “actively offering assistance to preserve the

political integrity of democratic nations when such an offer was deemed to be in the

best interest of the United States.”34 This was based on the geopolitical reality that

U.S. national security “depended on more than just the physical security of American

territory.”35 Eventually, on July 26, 1947, the National Security Act36 was signed into

law signifying that the U.S. had accepted its responsibility as the global leader in

what was then the new international order.

In the ensuing years, America pursued primacy in nuclear science, engineering and

technology in order to maintain a secure distance between itself and any proto-peer

nation probing the power of the atom and pursuing nuclear capabilities in order to

become a competitor with the U.S.; particularly with respect to military

capabilities.37,38 The pursuit of American primacy remains an issue of heated

debate.39,40

3. America’s Role and Responsibility in the Global Nuclear Energy Cycle

Since President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace speech in 1953, the U.S. has been the

world leader in establishing and maintaining global standards for the nuclear fuel

32 Gattie, DK. U.S. national security and a call for American primacy in civilian nuclear power. Forbes,

Sept. 7, 2017. https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/09/07/u-s-national-security-and-a-call-for-

american-primacy-in-civilian-nuclear-power/#5132b9787938. 33 Office of the Historian. The Truman Doctrine. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/truman-

doctrine 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Office of the Historian. National Security Act. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/national-

security-act 37 Colucci, L. Oct. 23, 2015. National Security Doctrines and National Security Strategy Past, Present and

Future. Presentation to The Institute of World Politics.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5dBcWaUMEuQ&t=2281s 38 Mearsheimer, J. Aug. 4, 2010. The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to U.S. Power in Asia. Presented

at the 4th Annual Michael Hintze Lecture in International Security.

http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/T0008.pdf 39 Brands, H. The era of American primacy is far from over. The National Interest, Aug. 24, 2016.

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/the-era-american-primacy-far-over-17465 40 Sapolsky, H.M. Why primacy is a bad strategy for America. The National Interest, Sept. 5, 2016.

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-primacy-bad-strategy-america-17578

Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]

cycle, with the primary objective being nonproliferation.41,42 At least one of the

institutional foundations for the U.S. role has been Section 123 of the Atomic Energy

Act, which establishes the conditions and outlines the process for major nuclear

cooperation between the United States and other countries.43 In order for a country

to enter into such an agreement with the United States, that country must commit to

a set of nine nonproliferation criteria established in order to control the flow and

exchange of nuclear material supplies and fuel throughout the world.44 Historically,

the U.S. role as global leader in this critical nonproliferation agreement has been due

to its technological capabilities and high standards of excellence in the nuclear supply

chain. Nye has noted that American leadership in the global nuclear fuel chain

slowed the growth in the number of nuclear weapons states from the twenty-five

expected in the 1960s to the nine that exist today.45,46 However, of late, some

countries have penetrated other regions , particularly emerging economies, with

their own reactor designs, construction and services and, in doing so, are challenging

U.S. leadership in the nuclear field.47,48,49,50 In matters of nonproliferation, the

standards, integrity and custody of nuclear materials and fuel are paramount issues

as the U.S. provides leadership in collaborating with other nations toward global

nuclear disarmament while maintaining its long-held stewardship over the global

nuclear fuel cycle and the peaceful use of nuclear power to support economic

development objectives worldwide.

4. Trends in Nuclear Power: U.S. and Global

Nuclear power in the U.S. is facing challenging circumstances with respect to existing

plants and new plant construction. For several years now, particularly since hydraulic

fracturing unlocked abundant, inexpensive natural gas resources in the U.S., the

electric power sector is trending away from coal and toward natural gas. One benefit

of this innovation has been a decline in CO2 emissions from the electric power sector

(Figure 1). At the same time, low natural gas prices are creating issues for existing

nuclear plants, particularly in deregulated markets as markets pursue the next

marginal investment, which currently is natural gas. Consequently, several nuclear

41 IAEA. Atoms for Peace Speech by Mr. Dwight d. Eisenhower.

https://www.iaea.org/about/history/atoms-for-peace-speech 42 US House. https://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/Atomic%20Energy%20Act%20Of%201954.pdf 43National Nuclear Security Administration. 123 Agreements for Peaceful Cooperation.

https://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/nonproliferation/treatiesagreements/123agreementsforpeacef

ulcooperation 44 Atomic Energy Act of 1954. https://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/Atomic Energy Act Of 1954.pdf) 45 Nye, Joseph S. "Maintaining a nonproliferation regime." International Organization 35.1 (1981): 15-38. 46 Nye Jr, Joseph S. Is the American century over?. John Wiley & Sons, 2015. 47Gil, L. How China has become the world’s fastest expanding nuclear power producer. IAEA, Oct. 25,

2017. https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/how-china-has-become-the-worlds-fastest-expanding-

nuclear-power-producer 48Japan Times. Russia unrivaled in nuclear power plant exports. July 27, 2017.

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/07/27/commentary/world-commentary/russia-unrivaled-

nuclear-power-plant-exports/#.Wg7BxXlrzIU 49 Stratfor Worldview. Moscow’s nuclear energy advantage. Sept. 20, 2017.

https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/moscows-nuclear-energy-advantage 50 Gattie, DK. America is sacrificing its leadership role in nuclear energy. The Hill, Oct. 6, 2017.

http://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/354269-america-is-sacrificing-its-leadership-role-in-

nuclear-energy

Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]

power plants are scheduled for early closure51,52,53 representing 15,285 MW of

baseload capacity and 121,640,916 MWhrs of zero-carbon emissions (Table 1).

Figure 1. U.S. power generation profile and CO2 emissions. [Data Source: U.S.

Energy Information Administration]

51Larson, A.U.S. nuclear power plant closures. Power Magazine, 2016. http://www.powermag.com/u-s-

nuclear-power-plant-closures-slideshow/. Power Magazine. 52 Plumer, B. The US keeps shutting down nuclear power plants and replacing them with coal or gas. Vox,

Nov. 3, 2016. https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2016/11/3/13499278/nuclear-retirements-

coal-gas. 53 Anderson, J. You can thank fracking for early closure of NY Nuclear Plant. Forbes, Jan. 17, 2017.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/jaredanderson/2017/01/17/fracking-blamed-for-early-closure-of-ny-nuclear-

plant/#28a26ed3d9e8. Forbes.

Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]

Table 1. U.S. nuclear plants scheduled for possible closure. [Data Source for

Generation: U.S. Energy Information Administration)

In addition, new nuclear projects in Georgia and South Carolina have been

confronted by issues associated with reviving a U.S. industrial sector that, with

respect to new construction, has been dormant for thirty years. Compounding these

new construction efforts were the bankruptcy of Westinghouse and other financial

problems with Toshiba, the parent company of Westinghouse.54,55 In the case of V.C.

Summer in South Carolina, the project was canceled, leaving Plant Vogtle Units 3 & 4

in Georgia as the lone nuclear reactor construction project in the U.S.56

While the U.S. currently leads the world in the number of operable nuclear reactors,

and has since the beginning of the civilian nuclear power age, China, Russia and

India, each, are outpacing the U.S. in the total number of nuclear plants under

construction, planned or proposed. The World Nuclear Association (WNA) reports that

China has 239 reactors57 under construction, planned or proposed, of which 220 are

large reactors and that Russia has 55 reactors58 under construction, planned or

54The Economist. Westinghouse files for bankruptcy. The Economist, April 1, 2017.

https://www.economist.com/news/business/21719836-global-nuclear-power-industry-beset-problems-

westinghouse-files-bankruptcy 55 Hals, T. and Flitter, E. How two cutting edge U.S. nuclear projects bankrupted Westinghouse. Reuters,

May 2, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-toshiba-accounting-westinghouse-nucle/how-two-cutting-

edge-u-s-nuclear-projects-bankrupted-westinghouse-idUSKBN17Y0CQ 56 Plumer, B. U.S. nuclear comeback stalls as two reactors are abandoned. New York Times, July 31, 2017.

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/31/climate/nuclear-power-project-canceled-in-south-carolina.html 57 WNA, China Reactors. http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-

f/china-nuclear-power.aspx (As of September 2017). 58 WNA, Russia Reactors. http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-

s/russia-nuclear-power.aspx (As of September 2017).

Plant

Capacity

(MW) Location

Generation

(MWhrs) Year of Generation

Crystal River 860 Florida 7,000,079 2008

Kewaunee 556 Wisconsin 4,990,254 2010

San Onofre 2,150 California 18,097,173 2011

Vermont Yankee 620 Vermont 5,060,582 2014

FitzPatrick 838 New York 7,382,237 2015

Fort Calhoun 476 Nebraska 3,425,235 2016

Clinton 1,069 Illinois 8,914,453 2016

Pilgrim 688 Massachusetts 5,414,318 2016

Quad Cities 1,871 Illinois 15,655,095 2016

Oyster Creek 625 New Jersey 4,585,091 2016

Diablo Canyon 2,240 California 18,907,578 2016

Three Mile Island 1 981 Pennsylvania 7,082,652 2016

Indian Point 2,311 New York 15,126,169 2016

Total 15,285 121,640,916

Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]

proposed, of which 49 are large reactors. The state-owned enterprise (SOE)

structure of the power generation sectors in China and Russia will likely advance

many of these projects to completion and bolster Chinese and Russian nuclear power

partnerships in developing regions as both countries work to broaden their respective

geopolitical spheres of influence. For example, China and Russia are involved in

planned or proposed reactors in, among other countries, Turkey,59 Jordan,60

Kazakhstan,61 Bangladesh62 and Vietnam.63 Moreover, the WNA recently published

the list of countries actively considering nuclear power programs and in it pointed out

that “State-owned nuclear companies in Russia and China have taken the lead in

offering nuclear power plants to emerging countries, usually with finance and fuel

services.”64 If current trends continue with existing U.S. plants closing and new

plants being constructed in Asia, the U.S. will eventually lag China in domestic

nuclear reactors (Figure 2) and over the long term will find itself lagging Russia and

India as well.

Figure 2. Nuclear reactors in operation, under construction, planned or proposed in

the U.S., China, Russia and India. [Data Source: World Nuclear Association]

59 WNA, Turkey. http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-

z/turkey.aspx (As of September 2017). 60 WNA, Jordan. http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-

n/jordan.aspx (As of September 2017). 61 WNA, Kazakhstan. http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-

n/kazakhstan.aspx (As of September 2017). 62 WNA, Balgladesh. http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-

f/bangladesh.aspx (As of September 2017). 63 WNA, Vietnam. http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-

z/vietnam.aspx (As of September 2017). 64 WNA, Emerging Nuclear Countries. http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-

profiles/others/emerging-nuclear-energy-countries.aspx (As of September 2017).

Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]

5. Potential Implications of a Declining U.S. Nuclear Power Sector

While efforts by Russia and China in developing regions are commendable for

humanitarian and climate change reasons, it should be of concern to U.S.

policymakers that in doing so China and Russia are bolstering their respective

geopolitical spheres of influence through nuclear technology.65 As the U.S. has

historically been the world leader in reactor design, supplies, and manufacturing, and

has been the leading purchaser of nuclear fuel, this meant it was the dominant force

in the global nuclear cycle. However, if U.S. nuclear power plants continue to retire

or are shut down (with little or no new construction) and other countries replace the

U.S. as the dominant market force, America’s role as leader in the global nuclear

cycle will be at risk. In the event that America’s influence over the fuel cycle

diminishes, so too can its stewardship responsibility—a role that would eventually be

assumed by another country.

Clearpath’s Jay Faison has compared the support system for U.S. nuclear reactors to

that of an ecosystem linking U.S. security, the U.S. nuclear power fleet, the U.S.

Navy, international security, and U.S. economic security.66 Commander Kirk S.

Lippold, USN (Ret) recently submitted a report to the Electric Reliability Coordinating

Council entitled, “Nuclear Energy, the Production Tax Credit, and International

Security”.67 In it he echoes Faison’s nuclear ecosystem and speaks to the broader,

institutional, and system-level need for nuclear science, engineering and technology:

In order for the US to be an effective leader on nuclear issues, it must sustain a

robust and diverse ecosystem of education, research and development, scientific

innovation, and industrial capacity in the nuclear field. The domestic and

international market for technology created by the tax credit would attract new

investment in the industry; that investment would spark interest in research,

supporting laboratories, and directing students into a growing and cutting-edge field

of study. This cycle of investment and interest only functions if there is a vibrant

market for nuclear energy to drive it (Lippold).

While Faison and Lippold speak of the U.S. nuclear ecosystem, there is also the

larger global nuclear ecosystem of which the U.S. is the key member. This global

nuclear ecosystem won’t disassemble simply because U.S. electricity markets cannot

sustain nuclear power nor will it dissolve if, by policy, the U.S. mandates a retreat

from the deployment of civilian nuclear power altogether—a retreat that, among the

world’s leading industrial, economic and military powers, would constitute a

unilateral U.S. exit from civilian nuclear power. To the contrary, the global nuclear

ecosystem will remain. However, a U.S. absence from it would constitute an

unprecedented risk since the U.S. will not be positioned at the top of the supply

chain, and thus will not necessarily have the influence it has held since the discovery

of nuclear energy and the peaceful use of civilian nuclear power via the U.S. Atomic

Energy Act. Moreover, if America abandons civilian nuclear power altogether, it will

65 Williams, D. China invites Rosatom to build nuclear power plant. Power Engineering International, Aug.

8, 2017. http://www.powerengineeringint.com/articles/2017/08/china-invites-rosatom-to-build-nuclear-

power-plant.html 66 Faison, J. Nuclear, the ecosystem. Clearpath, December 1, 2016. https://clearpath.org/jays-take/nuclear-

the-ecosystem 67 Lippold, K. Nuclear Energy, the Production Tax Credit, and International Security. July 31, 2017.

http://www.electricreliability.org/sites/default/files/Nuclear%20Energy%2C%20The%20Production%20Ta

x%20Credit%2C%20and%20International%20Security.pdf

Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]

very likely result in an exodus of expertise from the U.S. as scientists and engineers

pursue opportunities where nuclear power is advancing and the expertise is in

demand (e.g., China, Russia, India)68.

In a 2013 report, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) raise

several critical points regarding the traditional role of the U.S. in the global nuclear

cycle and how that role is diminishing due to decreased U.S. nuclear power activity

compared with competing nations.69 The following excerpt highlights the rationale for

why U.S. energy policy, as pertains to nuclear power, must be globally circumspect:

Today, much of the world’s nuclear manufacturing and supply capability still relies on

designs and technologies developed in the United States. But the firms involved are

largely foreign-owned. Even in the market for conventional light-water reactors,

where the United States led the world for decades, all but one of the U.S.-based

designers and manufacturers have been acquired by non-U.S.-based competitors.

The countries that are currently strengthening their nuclear capabilities and global

market position (i.e., France, Japan, South Korea, and Russia, with China close

behind) have different reasons for pursuing nuclear technology—some are primarily

concerned about energy security or about preserving domestic fossil fuel resources,

while others may be motivated by a mix of nationalistic and geopolitical

considerations. But in all cases they see nuclear technology as offering long-term

benefits that justify a significant near-term sovereign investment, even faced with

the prospect that world natural gas prices may fall if the unconventional gas

production technologies in use in the United States are successfully applied in other

parts of the world. The most aggressive of these new national nuclear programs is

underway in China (CSIS).

More recently, a key finding of a major study by the Energy Futures Initiative, whose

President and CEO is former Secretary of Energy, Ernest Moniz, highlights that “a

robust nuclear energy enterprise is a key enabler of the Nation’s nonproliferation

goals, and that it supports the fleet modernization plans of the U.S. Navy, as well as

the global strategic stability and deterrence value of nuclear.”70 The CNA Military

Advisory Board has also reported on the national security implications of advanced

nuclear technologies.71

68 Gattie, DK. U.S. national security and a call for American primacy in civilian nuclear power. Forbes,

Sept. 7, 2017. https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/09/07/u-s-national-security-and-a-call-for-

american-primacy-in-civilian-nuclear-power/#5132b9787938. 69 CSIS. Restoring U.S. Leadership in Nuclear Energy: A National Security Imperative. June 14, 2013.

https://www.csis.org/analysis/restoring-us-leadership-nuclear-energy 70 Energy Futures Initiative. The U.S. Nuclear Energy Enterprise: A Key National Security Enabler. August

2017.

https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58ec123cb3db2bd94e057628/t/59947949f43b55af66b0684b/1502902

604749/EFI+nuclear+paper+17+Aug+2017.pdf 71 CNA Military Advisory Board. Advanced Energy and U.S. National Security. June 2017.

https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IRM-2017-U-015512.pdf

Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]

6. Nuclear Power in America: Leadership or Isolationism?

In 1947, Henry Stimson, Secretary of War during WWII, wrote an article entitled

“The Challenge to Americans”72 in which he articulated the realities of the world that

America had become a part of, and in which America had assumed a global

leadership role. A few excerpts from Stimson’s article are relevant to the U.S. today,

particularly with respect to America’s disposition toward nuclear power:

We are having our first experience of constant, full-scale activity in world politics.

Other nations have lived for years as principals in the give-and-take of diplomacy.

Until now we have been, except in wartime, on the fringe. It is no wonder that, when

suddenly placed in the center of alarms and excursions of international affairs, we

are abnormally sensitive (Stimson, p. 5).

It is not surprising, then, that many of us are confused and unhappy about our

foreign relations, and that some are tempted to seek refuge from their confusion

either in retreat to isolationism or in suggested solutions whose simplicity is only

matched by their folly. In the main, our difficulties arise from unwillingness to face

reality (Stimson, p. 5).

First, and most important, Americans must now understand that the United States

has become, for better or worse, a wholly committed member of the world

community. This has not happened by conscious choice; but it is a plain fact, and our

only choice is whether or not to face it (Stimson, p. 6).

It is the first condition of effective foreign policy that this nation put away forever

any thought that America can again be an island to herself. No private program and

no public policy, in any sector of our national life, can now escape from the

compelling fact that if it is not framed with reference to the world, it is framed with

perfect futility (Stimson, p. 6).

As a corollary to this first great principle, it follows that we shall be wholly wrong if

we attempt to set a maximum or margin to our activity as members of the world.

The only question we can safely ask today is whether in any of our actions on the

world stage we are doing enough. In American policy toward the world there is no

place for grudging or limited participation, and any attempt to cut our losses by

setting bounds to our policy can only turn us backward onto the deadly road toward

self-defeating isolation (Stimson, p. 6).

It is altogether fitting and proper, of course, that we should not waste our substance

in activity without result. It is also evident that we cannot do everything we would

like to do. But it would be shriveling timidity for America to refuse to play to the full

her present necessary part in the world. And the certain penalty for such timidity

would be failure (Stimson, p. 7).

A second principle, and one which requires emphasis as a necessary complement to

any policy of full participation, is that we are forced to act in the world as it is, and

not in the world as we wish it were, or as we would like it to become. It is a world in

which we are only one of many peoples and in which our basic principles of life are

not shared by all our neighbors. It has been one of the more dangerous aspects of

our internationalism in past years that too often it was accompanied by the curious

72 Stimson, Henry L. "The challenge to Americans." Foreign Aff. 26 (1947): 5.

Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]

assumption that the world overnight become good and clean and peaceful

everywhere if only America would lead the way. The most elementary experience of

human affairs should show us all how naïve and dangerous a view that is. (Stimson,

p. 7-8)

Stimson’s counsel is both prescient and germane with respect to America’s role and

responsibilities in the global nuclear energy space. Will America lead or will America

retreat?

A direct comparison of the prospects for nuclear power in the U.S. and China

illustrates opposite trajectories for the world’s largest economic powers (Figure 3).

The graphs are a projection of future nuclear power generation and capacity under

the scenario that China carries through with its plans for new nuclear construction

and that U.S. nuclear reactors currently in operation are retired after a 60-year life

with no new nuclear construction to replace the retired capacity. This results in a loss

of over 9,521 TWhrs of zero-carbon generation, which is equivalent to about 2.3

years of total annual generation for the entire U.S. Whether the U.S. can backfill this

loss and meet its electricity needs and climate objectives with distributed demand-

side management, renewables and energy efficiency, as some have proposed, can

only be modeled or left to conjecture73, 74 as there is no precedent for doing so at

such a scale. Therefore this loss in baseload, zero-carbon nuclear power generation

is characterized here as an internal threat to the U.S. as the loss of baseload power

will have energy security and grid reliability implications. Moreover, offsetting the

loss of this level of zero-carbon electricity poses concerns about mitigating climate

change, which in and of itself is classified as a national security threat75,76.

However, what doesn’t need to be left to models and conjecture is that this loss in

nuclear capacity is equivalent to an absence of nuclear construction projects,

meaning nuclear science and engineering are not being practiced and applied in the

U.S. This atrophy in the U.S. nuclear sector will result in a steady loss of institutional

knowledge in research and development of advanced nuclear science, engineering

and technology since there will be no demand for such sciences and engineering in

the U.S. Under this scenario, other countries advance and the U.S. declines. In fact,

the decline is such that the U.S. will find itself isolated from competing powers in

nuclear science, engineering and technology, which represents a world that hasn’t

existed since the advent of nuclear power.77 Perhaps even more concerning, it would

create conditions for a potential shift in the current international order, which was

created in large part due to U.S. influence over the past seventy years—a shift with

outcomes that can only be left to conjecture. Therefore, a diminished U.S. presence

in civilian nuclear power wouldn’t represent global leadership. Rather, it would create

a geopolitical vacuum that will be occupied by countries such as China and Russia

73 Lovins, A. B. (2017). Do coal and nuclear generation deserve above-market prices?. The Electricity

Journal, 30(6), 22-30. 74 Jacobson, M. Z., & Delucchi, M. A. (2011). Providing all global energy with wind, water, and solar

power, Part I: Technologies, energy resources, quantities and areas of infrastructure, and materials. Energy

policy, 39(3), 1154-1169. 75 Pumphrey, Carolyn. Global climate change: National security implications. ARMY WAR COLL

STRATEGIC STUDIES INST CARLISLE BARRACKS PA, 2008. 76 Fetzek, S., C.E. Werrell, and F. Femia, Eds. 2016. Military expert panel report: Sea level rise and the

U.S. military’s mission. The Center of Climate and Security. 77 Gattie, DK and Jones, S. An America without nuclear power. Forbes, April 24, 2017.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/04/24/an-america-without-nuclear-power/#72246ccd50d2

Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]

that will leverage civilian nuclear power technologies and services to enhance

relationships with emerging economies. For the U.S. to abandon nuclear power,

domestically and abroad, would constitute an unprecedented form of U.S.

isolationism—isolation from a world moving forward in nuclear power as the U.S.

retreats.

Figure 3. Trajectory of nuclear generation and nuclear capacity in the U.S. and

China through 2056. (Data sources: U.S. Energy Information Administration and

World Nuclear Association)

As such, the U.S. should set its energy policy, as pertains to nuclear power,

according to “the world as it is, and not in the world as we wish it were, or as we

would like it to become”78. Meaning, the U.S. should remain engaged and active in

nuclear science, engineering and technology. This calls for a comprehensive and

strategic energy policy that not only sustains existing U.S. civilian nuclear capacity,

but also expands nuclear power deployment in the U.S., advances nuclear research

and development, and facilitates deployment of U.S. civilian nuclear power

technology and services abroad.

7. Strategic Policy Framework for Advancing U.S. Nuclear Power

The U.S. nuclear power industry is working against at least two headwinds—one

domestic and one global. Domestically, inexpensive natural gas is contributing to the

early closure of nuclear power plants (Table 1), which is particularly problematic in

deregulated markets. Globally, the U.S. nuclear power industry is competing with

state-owned enterprises (SOEs), particularly those from China and Russia, putting

U.S. industry at a competitive disadvantage against entities backed by state

78 Stimson, Henry L. "The challenge to Americans." Foreign Aff. 26 (1947): 5.

Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]

treasuries. Combined, this underscores the need for a comprehensive U.S. energy

policy strategy that is domestic and global in scope and sustains nuclear power as an

energy, climate and national security imperative.

7.1. Discussion of policy framework

The energy policy framework proposed here (Figure 4) is comprised of domestic and

global domains interlinked to meet nine overall policy objectives (Table 2). The

domestic domain is organized to facilitate a more comprehensive cooperative

federalism involving federal, state and industry entities, specifically around the

national security imperative of nuclear power. The global domain is organized by way

of diplomatic international negotiations around the issues of economic development

and climate change with nuclear power as a key technology for addressing both.

Moreover, as nuclear energy is a dual-purpose resource that is being leveraged for

geopolitical purposes by competing powers such as China and Russia, this policy

recommends that U.S. primacy in the full cycle of civilian nuclear power be

established as an objective of U.S. national security strategy with the intention being

for the U.S to remain committed to maintaining its traditional role and responsibility

in the global nuclear supply chain.

Figure 4. Strategic policy framework for advancing U.S. civilian nuclear power as a

national security imperative

Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]

Table 2. Objectives of strategic policy framework.

Objectives of Strategic Energy Policy Framework (Figure 4)

Policy Actions

Policy Objectives

Nuclear Power as a National Security Objective

Establish U.S. primacy in the full cycle of civilian

nuclear power as a national security imperative [Overarching]

1. Establish nuclear power as a strategic issue of U.S. national security

2. Revitalize growth and development of U.S. civilian nuclear power industry along

with research and development in advanced nuclear science, engineering and technology—(e.g., small modular reactors, molten salt reactors, fast breeder reactors, fuel fabrication, fuel reprocessing, and spent fuel storage)

Diplomatic Negotiations

U.S. Departments of State, Energy, and Commerce, in collaboration with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, negotiate favorable investment

conditions for U.S. industry to engage with emerging

regions in the deployment of civilian nuclear power

[Links 1, 2, 3 & 4 in Figure 4]

3. Allow U.S. nuclear power industry to compete with SOEs from countries using

nuclear power as a geopolitical tool 4. Deploy U.S. civilian nuclear power abroad to provide developing economies with

reliable, low-carbon nuclear-generated electricity in support of economic goals 5. Establish a U.S. geopolitical presence in countries where competing nations with

competing interests are establishing their respective geopolitical spheres of

influence 6. Maintain and enhance U.S. influence, leadership and stewardship in the global

nuclear fuel and supply chain

Financial Feedback Direct a portion of returns from international

investment to support U.S. nuclear R & D [Links 5 & 6 in Figure 4]

7. Provide a self-sustaining revenue stream to establish and support strategic U.S.

industry, government and academic partnerships in research and development of advanced nuclear science, engineering and technology

Policy Feedback Incorporate global trends in climate and carbon

emissions into U.S. energy policy [Link 7 in Figure 4]

8. Account for global geopolitical realities in U.S. energy policy as pertains to nuclear power and national security

9. Account for U.S. impact on global carbon reductions via deployment of U.S. nuclear power technology in emerging regions

Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]

7.1.1. Diplomatic Negotiations

U.S. Departments of Energy, State and Commerce, in collaboration with the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, will coordinate diplomatic efforts to cultivate opportunities

for U.S. industry to engage with emerging regions in the development of their

electric power sectors (Links 1-4, Figure 4). These diplomatic efforts include

negotiating investment conditions that afford the U.S. nuclear industry fair terms on

which to compete with state-owned enterprises (SOE’s) from other countries and

extend U.S. engagement with these regions in the peaceful deployment of nuclear

technology as per Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act.79, 80 This will provide

emerging regions with advanced zero-emission power generation technology that is

highly reliable and has a lifespan of 60-plus years. As these regions work towards

developing their economies and keeping carbon emissions low, nuclear power will

afford them a solid baseload of power on which to diversify their portfolio through

the incorporation of higher levels of renewable energy over time. Moreover, this will

bolster U.S. geopolitical presence in these regions and enhance U.S. influence and

stewardship over the global nuclear fuel and supply chain, therefore enhancing

national security.

7.1.2. Financial feedback to U.S. nuclear research and development

A challenge in the U.S. nuclear sector has been the high capital costs of large nuclear

projects. This, combined with the long period of dormancy since the last major

nuclear construction in the U.S. and the federal government’s cancellation of nuclear

research in 1993, has made it difficult to get traction in new nuclear development,

particularly for advanced technologies such as molten salt, small modular and fast

reactors. It will be incumbent upon any energy policy committed to maintaining and

advancing nuclear power to include a funding structure for sustaining the U.S.

nuclear enterprise long-term with minimal financial impact on U.S. taxpayers.

This proposed policy will provide not only substantive economic benefits for emerging

regions but also financial profits for the U.S. nuclear sector engaged with these

regions. However, this engagement isn’t limited to plant construction alone. It will

include ongoing training in operation, maintenance, spent fuel management, safety,

trade, security and proliferation issues, among other areas. This will create

opportunities for educational and cross-cultural collaboration between the U.S. and

emerging nations—collaborations that can serve as platforms for extending U.S.

research and innovation and for establishing goodwill in regions where U.S.

geopolitical influence is of strategic importance.

Since these economic benefits and financial profits are due in part to the diplomatic

efforts of U.S. agencies to create investment opportunities abroad, a portion of these

profits will be earmarked to support additional research and development

collaborations involving federal agencies, U.S. states, research universities and

79 National Nuclear Security Administration. 123 Agreements for Peaceful Cooperation.

https://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/nonproliferation/treatiesagreements/123agreementsforpeacef

ulcooperation 80 U.S. Atomic Energy Act. 1954.

https://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/Atomic%20Energy%20Act%20Of%201954.pdf

Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]

industry (Links 5 & 6, Figure 4). The intention here, once the policy has been

established and matured, is to create a self-sustaining revenue stream to support

and expand nuclear research and development in the U.S. as it pursues primacy in

the nuclear space.

7.1.3. Global feedback to U.S. energy policy

The U.S. is at a different stage in its economic development compared with that of

China, India, and emerging economies such as Brazil, Vietnam, Indonesia and

Cambodia. Therefore, the U.S. has more options and greater latitude in setting its

energy policy. Meaning, while the U.S. can reduce fossil fuel consumption,

incorporate more renewable energy resources and increase energy efficiency

following decades of industrial development using reliable, high density energy

resources, emerging economies are in different stages of economic development and

therefore aren’t at a comparable economic stage that will accommodate a reduction

in fossil fuel consumption or an increase in efficiency. These countries need more

energy, not less, and aren’t in a position to experiment with technologies that

haven’t been tested and proven at large economic scales. While the U.S. has an

established, mature industrial economy on which to steadily integrate renewable

energy, there is no precedent for establishing an industrial economy on an energy

foundation that is predominantly renewable energy resources. As such, with respect

to energy consumption, energy efficiency and the incorporation of renewables, the

U.S. isn’t in a position to simply lead by example alone, because a successful energy

policy in the U.S. doesn’t necessarily translate to a successful, or practical, energy

policy for developing regions.

Since global carbon reduction will likely remain a key policy objective for decades to

come, for the U.S. and the world, carbon reduction strategies should be as

comprehensive and strategic as possible and have a global scope when feasible. For

example, EPA’s Clean Power Plan (CPP) focuses on reducing carbon emissions from

the U.S. electric power sector as an example to the world that the U.S. is committed

to taking action on climate change81. While the CPP is being challenged on the

grounds that it is inconsistent with the Clean Air Act and with the principles of

cooperative federalism82, the CPP also represents a U.S.-centric energy policy

approach to an issue that is global in scope83. In fact, U.S. carbon emissions for 2016

were at 1994 levels whereas emissions for the rest of the world continue to increase

(Figure 5).

81 US EPA. Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants.

https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/clean-power-plan-existing-power-plants_.html 82 US EPA. EPA takes another step to advance President Trump’s America First energy strategy, Proposes

Repeal of “Clean Power Plan”. Oct. 10, 2017. https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-takes-another-step-

advance-president-trumps-america-first-strategy-proposes-repeal 83 Gattie. DK. The US can do better than the Clean Power Plan. The Hill, Oct. 13, 2017.

http://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/355306-the-us-can-do-better-than-the-clean-power-plan

Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]

Figure 5. CO2 emissions for U.S., China, India and the rest of the world.

Gattie (2017) has proposed that U.S. efforts to reduce global carbon emissions would

have a greater impact if those efforts strategically included deployment of low- and

zero-carbon technologies, particularly nuclear power, in emerging economies where

fossil fuel consumption and carbon emissions are expected to increase.84 The policy

framework proposed here embodies this proposition by accounting for global carbon

emissions avoided or reduced via deployment of U.S. nuclear technology in emerging

regions (Link 7, Figure 4). The objective is for this feedback to inform U.S. energy

policy and provide a realistic global scope for carbon management that isn’t

constrained to U.S. industry within U.S. borders where carbon emissions are already

declining. The point being that U.S. industry, particularly the U.S. nuclear industry,

can have a greater impact on mitigating carbon emissions through engagement

beyond U.S. borders rather than limiting its efforts to trying to set an example that

other countries cannot necessarily follow due to their different economic stations. To

reiterate, the objective here is to provide global leadership through engagement, not

by example alone.

With respect to energy policy, the inclusion of this global feedback closes the loop on

an overall policy framework that will inherently require a more innovative approach

to cooperative federalism between federal and state authorities in close collaboration

with the U.S. nuclear power industry. In effect, it will provide U.S. industry with the

freedom and latitude to be innovative on a larger scale and to have a greater impact

on global carbon emissions than it can when confined to U.S. borders. Moreover, it

will simultaneously create economic benefits for the U.S. economy and U.S. research

institutions as well as create collaborative opportunities with developing economies.

84 Gattie, David K. "Incorporating stability and resilience in energy policy for the US power sector:

Recommendations for the Trump administration." The Electricity Journal 30.1 (2017): 47-54.

Strategic Policy for U.S. Nuclear Power: David K. Gattie [Pre-Publication Draft of Manuscript Accepted for The Electricity Journal]

8. Conclusion

While the debate will continue as to the role of nuclear power in the U.S. energy

portfolio and how that role should be determined, the argument presented in this

paper is that the national security implications of nuclear science, engineering and

technology, and nuclear energy itself, are inexorable geopolitical realities of today’s

global society. As such, not only should nuclear power be central to U.S. energy

policy, U.S. primacy in the full cycle of civilian nuclear power should be established

as an objective of U.S. national security strategy. However, national security is a

non-monetized benefit of civilian nuclear power, therefore the role and ultimate fate

of nuclear power must be a strategic policy decision and not simply a market

outcome since markets alone cannot detect these non-monetized benefits.

The policy framework presented here leverages U.S. industrial innovation in the

nuclear power sector along with strategic U.S. diplomacy in an effort to align U.S.

energy policy with the global reality that nuclear technology is being deployed and

leveraged as a geopolitical tool by competing nations. While nations such as China

and Russia are regularly referenced in this paper with respect to their nuclear

ambitions, the national security threat isn’t limited to China and Russia expanding

their civilian nuclear capacity or that they’re developing advanced nuclear

technologies. The threat is that the U.S. is lagging these competing powers in the

single most energy dense dual-purpose energy resource on Earth and, in the

process, creating the risk of America becoming marginalized in the stewardship of

the global nuclear cycle. Therefore, with respect to nuclear science, engineering and

technology, the institutional knowledge gap between the U.S. and some nations is

widening.

Moreover, U.S. engagement in emerging economies by way of nuclear power has

much to offer in the way of reliable, low-carbon electricity for economic

development. But, perhaps more importantly, it establishes a U.S. geopolitical

presence in these regions while sustaining U.S. influence and stewardship in the

global nuclear fuel cycle and supply chain.

In the end, the issue remains: How does the U.S. maintain energy security and

reliability within its power grid, reduce the threat of global climate change, counter

the national security risks of rising global powers seeking to assume America’s

leadership role in nuclear science, engineering and technology, and ultimately

conclude in a world free of nuclear weapons? The scope of this question is global, but

will require domestic U.S. policy decisions based on prudence, wisdom, sound

judgement and foresight grounded in the realities of the world as it is and the

geopolitics that govern the world as it is. As such, this is a geopolitically complex

policy issue, not just an energy issue and not just a market issue. Therefore, the

U.S. response should be globally comprehensive and strategic and not left to U.S.

market forces alone—the national security implications simply are too great.