Notes

1 Introduction

1. In much of the peacekeeping literature, ‘peace operation’ has replaced‘peacekeeping operation’. I follow this usage because the former term bettercaptures the range of activities undertaken in the context of contemporaryoperations.

2. Other than in the case of East Timor, and different from many othermultidimensional peace operations, the UN was barely involved in the run-upto the Security Council decision on Kosovo. It was not the UN and its Secu-rity Council but the Bosnia Contact Group, NATO and the Group of Eightthat dealt with the political and security crisis in Kosovo (Heinbecker 2004).The UN was tasked with administering Kosovo ‘unexpectedly and at regret-tably short notice’ (Griffin and Jones 2000: 78). In addition, three non-UNorganisations also played substantial roles in the field: the EU was responsiblefor the economic reconstruction, the Organization for Security and Cooper-ation in Europe was responsible for institution-building, and the NATO-ledinternational Kosovo-Force provided security.

2 The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Towards theEmergence of a 21st-Century Peacekeeping Model

1. Today the operation is called UNEF I because it had a successor operationnamed UNEF II, deployed after the 1973 Yom Kippur War (Ghali 1993b).

2. The League of Nations had deployed civilian and military personnel in theSaar Basin, in Vilna, in Danzig and Upper Silesia in accordance with theTreaty of Versailles (Chesterman 2004: 18–25). The UN began to experimentas early as 1947 with sending fact-finders and unarmed observers to theBalkans, later the Middle East, and India (Durch 1993b).

3. See interviews with the key actors, UN Oral History project, http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/dag/oralhist.htm, accessed 08.08.2012.

4. Not only was the Secretariat requested to propose a plan for the force, includ-ing its functions, composition and guiding principles, but it was also asked tonegotiate with member states about force contributions, to advise the forcecommander in the field, and to issue regulations and instructions essentialto the functioning of the force – for instance, with regard to the financialmodalities or legal liabilities. The General Assembly furthermore authorisedthe Secretary-General to pave the way for the deployment of the force, tonegotiate with the conflict parties in order to reach a ceasefire and with-drawal of troops, and to enter into agreements with regard to the status offorce (Cohen 1957).

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5. The UN peace operation deployed in the Congo (ONUC, 1960–4) was anexception. After the Congo’s independence in 1960, almost immediatelywidespread civil unrest occurred, followed by a collapse of civil services,the attempt of the secession of the resource-rich Katanga province and amilitary intervention by the former colonial power, Belgium. ONUC wasestablished to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist the gov-ernment in maintaining law and order, and to provide technical assistance.Initially a traditional peace operation, ONUC later used considerable force(including a UN air force provided by India and Sweden). It basically tookover a country that had collapsed (Durch 1993f ; Urquhart 1991: 145–70).It evolved into the ‘UN’s Vietnam’ (Durch 1993b: 8), not only because of thelarge number of casualties but also because of the political rifts that it createdamong the Western allies, and between the West and the Soviet Union.

6. In the early 1990s the UN and member states experimented with peaceenforcement under UN command. In Somalia (1993–5) and in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1994–5), blue helmets engaged in war-fighting operations andlost their impartiality. These experiments led to widely acknowledged andanalysed failures, and a broad consensus emerged that UN peace opera-tions were not suitable for high-intensity warfare. For an excellent studyof the evolution of the use of force in UN peacekeeping, see Findlay(2002).

7. Chapter VII of the UN Charter contains the provisions relevant to enforce-ment actions by the Security Council. If the Security Council authorises apeace operation under Chapter VII, it usually specifies the conditions. Themission-specific rules of engagement determine when, where and how forceshould be used.

8. While regular civilian police officers are individually recruited and deployed,and they perform monitoring, training and advisory tasks, formed or stabil-ity police units are robust, armed police units that are capable of performingspecialised law-enforcement and public-order functions, and are contributedbymember states in larger units, similar to military forces (Dziedzic and Stark2006; Hansen 2002: 70–3).

9. After the end of the Cold War, industrialised states initially became heav-ily involved as troop contributors, particularly but not exclusively to theUN operation in the Former Yugoslavia. Their contingents made up roughly41 per cent of troops and police in the largest UN operations outside Europe(1993) and for Europe itself (1995) (Durch and Berkman 2006b: 41).

10. As of June 2013, only Italy (19) is among the top-20 contributors to peaceoperations. The United Kingdom holds position 44, before Germany (47).The United States is in position 62 (see UN DPKO homepage, accessed18.07.2013).

11. Already by 1961 the International Court of Justice had confirmed thatpeacekeeping was consistent with the goals of the organisation, and thatits costs therefore should be borne by all member states. In spite of this deci-sion a group of countries led by France and the Soviet Union did not to paytheir share for selected operations. In 1965 the United States attempted toevoke Article 19 of the UN Charter, which entails the loss of voting powerin the General Assembly should a country accumulate high arrearages. Thecrisis brought about a lame-duck session of the General Assembly in 1964–5

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when all votes had to be avoided. The acute crisis was eventually dissolvedwhen the United States backed down from its demands, yet disagreementson how to finance peace operations continued (Durch 1993e).

12. Six operations involved fewer than 1,000 soldiers, two operations fewerthan 2,000, and four operations had a maximum deployment of between6,000 and 7,000 uniformed personnel. The operation in the Congo (roughly20,000) serves as the only exception (Jacobsen 2005: Appendix 3).

13. After the success of UNEF I, establishing a UN standing army became apopular idea. The purpose of this army was peacekeeping, not peace enforce-ment, as foreseen in the Charter (Kinloch-Pinat 2004: 72–100). Proposalsranged from standing forces of varying sizes, through permanent, rapidlydeployable headquarters, to standby forces earmarked for UN peacekeeping,at the service of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General or the SecurityCouncil. In the light of the Congo experiences in 1960, the Secretary-General, Hammarskjöld, explicitly rejected the idea of a standing force as an‘unnecessary and impractical measure’. His successor, U Thant, confirmedthis position in 1963, yet highlighted that ‘the world should eventually havean international police force’ (Kinloch-Pinat 2004: 93, 95, emphasis added).

14. In 2004 the Secretariat developed proposals for a strategic reserve force andpresented it to member states. Acting as crisis response force to temporarilystrengthen already operating peace operations, the strategic reserve wouldhave consisted of a number of taskforces of some 1,250 troops, each con-tributed by a range of countries. To enable a speedy dispatch, each of thetroop contributors would have secured prior political and legislative agree-ment to deploy its forces for predetermined missions. Upon completion thetaskforces would return to their countries of origin (UN Secretary-General2004a: §13–18). The strategic reserve concept did not receive the blessing ofheads of states and government at the World Summit in 2005.

3 The Influence of International Bureaucracies:A Framework for Analysis

1. At a later stage, Ernst and Peter Haas attempted to reconceptualise inter-national bureaucracies as creators and administrators of knowledge, andexplored their role in organisational change and learning (Haas 1990; Haasand Haas 1995).

2. Cox (1969: 207) provided a taxonomy of enabling or constraining fac-tors for executive heads of international organisations. He distinguishedbetween idiosyncratic, legal-institutional, ethical-normative and otherfactors. Idiosyncratic aspects include the personality, leadership style, pro-fessional background or even the intelligence of the incumbent. Legal-institutional factors consist of the legal powers entrusted to an executivehead, their formal standing in the organisation, and the like. Ethical-normative factors comprise the moral authority, the impersonation ofneutrality and the international values credibly embodied by the executivehead. In addition, other factors carry weight, such as the relations that anexecutive head maintains with key member states, his or her standing withinthe international bureaucracy, the material resources that he does or does not

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command, his or her control over information and knowledge, or situationalfactors such as (un)animity between member states in a given situation.

3. Be it for reasons of linguistic elegance, simplification or the focus on pre-ventive diplomacy, many scholars working on the UN still do not botherto differentiate between the Secretariat, higher-ranking UN officials and theSecretary-General.

4. In 1922, Max Weber wrote about the peculiar character of bureaucratic rulethat is based on a special form of authority – namely, rational-legal authority.Instead of obeying a leader because of their charisma or because of traditionsthat put them in a position of power, people follow the rules of bureaucraciesbecause they seem rational, formally correct and therefore legitimate (Weber1972: 124–30).

5. The P-A model is also applied to courts or regulatory agencies (Alter 1998;Büthe 2008; Goldstein and Steinberg 2008).

6. Their definition of authority is the following: ‘By authority we understandthe ability of one actor to use institutional and discursive resources to inducedeference from others’ (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 5).

7. Their definition of power reads as follows: ‘the production, in and throughsocial relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determinetheir circumstances and fate’ (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 29).

8. For scholars of regime effectiveness, by contrast, to have international offi-cials only do what states want them to do can be an interesting object ofstudy (Miles et al. 2002; Young 1999).

9. Even states possess highly different degrees of autonomy, although – atleast in theory – they meet on an equal footing: they are all sovereign,dispose of territory and are protected by international law’s guarantee ofnon-interference (Krasner 1999).

10. For variations in the autonomy, see Pollack (1997), who makes this point forthe European Commission, or Haftel and Thompson (2006), who develop aframework for measuring the independence of international organisations.

11. Haftel and Thompson (2006) conceptualise the independence of interna-tional organisations to be made up by three elements: autonomy – insulationfrom the control of other actors; neutrality – preferences that are neu-tral or impartial with respect to other actors; delegation – the degree ofauthority and discretion that an international bureaucracy possesses. Theauthors focus on international organisations, and their understanding ofindependence comes close to what I consider to be the influence of inter-national organisations. According to these authors, the mere existence ofan international bureaucracy is already an indicator of the independenceof international organisations. Therefore their conceptualisation is onlypartially helpful here.

12. In line with the debate in the 1970s, Cox et al. (1973) furthermore consid-ered power to refer to capabilities – that is, to material resources, but alsoauthority. Power in this sense may thus be converted into influence, butthere may also be situations in which this will not be the case.

13. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change initiated by bureaucratsat the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) and the World MeteorologicalOrganisation helped to make existing knowledge accessible to policy-makersand external stakeholders. This knowledge on the state of global warming

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was in turn disseminated by the international bureaucracies of the UN EPand the Secretariat of the Climate Convention through websites, brochures,information packages and workshops, especially in developing countries(Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009c: 320).

14. Biermann et al. (2009: 41) also suggest differentiating between the output,the outcome and the impact. Their take on the categorisation differs frommine in one important respect: they see the international bureaucracy itselfas source of output, outcome and impact, while I use the term in referenceto the respective international organisation.

15. That international bureaucracies may exert influence on state actors is basedupon the assumption that the preferences of states may be altered in inter-actions at the international level. I do not take sides in the debate whethersuch a modification is strategically motivated or whether it mirrors a morefundamental change of the state identity and in turn its interests andpreferences.

16. According to Anderson (1975: 3), the complete policy cycle consists ofagenda-setting, policy formulation, adoption, implementation and evalua-tion. Because the study is merely interested in the influence of the Secre-tariat within the international organisation itself, the last two phases areomitted.

17. The policy cycle model has been challenged on various accounts (for a goodoverview, see Héritier 1994; Jann and Wegrich 2003). At a conceptual level,criticism was raised with regard to the theoretical status of the model thatdid not provide for an explaining variable concerning the transition fromone phase to the other. At a descriptive level, the empirical validity of themodel was questioned; it was argued that the application of such a modelleads to an oversimplified and unrealistic understanding of policy-making.In addition, the inherent logic of consecutiveness is challenged, for instance,by proponents of the garbage-can model which assume a more or less inde-pendent coexistence of so-called streams of problems, solutions, participantsand situations (March and Olsen 1986; for an application to the UN andpeacekeeping, see Lipson 2007). Notwithstanding the policy cycle model’sshortcomings, its value for research on policy processes remains high (Jannand Wegrich 2003: 97–9).

4 The UN Secretariat’s Capacities for Autonomous Action

1. There is a general service track (clerical, administrative) and a professionaltrack in the Secretariat. The professional track comprises five grades (P-1 toP-5), namely two director levels (D-1 and D-2), as well as the levels of Assis-tant Secretary-General and Under-Secretary-General. For details, see Göthel(2002) and the homepage of the international civil service commission.

2. Author’s interviews with UN officials, April 2204 and July 2006, UN Head-quarters, New York; Author’s interviews with state representatives, June2006, Permanent Missions, New York.

3. To equip peace operations with risk-assessment and field-intelligence capac-ities gained more acceptance after the bombing of UN premises in Iraq in2003 (Shetler-Jones 2008: 518–20).

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4. The Soviet Union contended that there were neutral countries, but no neu-tral men, forcing its employees to live in a special compound and handover aconsiderable portion of their salary. The Secretariat reacted by building a par-allel structure that essentially circumvented some of the departments headedby Soviet officials. However, it was not only the East that infringed the Sec-retariat’s independence: for 33 years until 1986, the US Federal Bureau ofInvestigation scrutinised the political loyalties of American candidates andpresented the result to the Secretary-General, who, for mid-level positionsupwards, ‘would do well to ignore certain candidates and respond favourablyto others’ (Gordenker 2005: 24).

5. Gordenker (2005: 24) notes many reasons for governments to exert pressurefor appointments, or motives of individuals to ask for such a favour:

capping a diplomatic career with an attractive post in New York, Genevaor Vienna; getting out from under a dictatorial regime; a successful ployfor getting rid of a now useless national servant or politician; providingfor a feckless relative; waiting with a good salary until a better post innational service comes free; spying; rewards by the home government forgood service in otherwise nasty circumstances; rescuing a colleague froma national ‘reduction-in-force’; and just plainly getting a better salarythan the home economy offers.

6. Only a few Secretariat officials were involved in the UN’s biggest scandalconcerning the Oil-for-Food Programme that the UN administered between1995 and 2003 to alleviate the hardship of the Iraqi people caused by UN-imposed sanctions. The Secretariat’s misdoings were marginal comparedwith those of some of the other actors involved (J. Gordon 2007).

7. Article 7 establishes the Secretariat as one of the six primary organs of theorganisation, and articles 97–101 lay out the duties, the regulations for theselection of staff, and themodalities for the election of the Secretary-General.See also the comprehensive Charter commentary edited by Simma (2002).

8. In 2006, in the wake of the World Summit, the Secretariat initiated amandate-review process with the intention of reducing the overall num-ber of mandates. It compiled an electronic inventory that contained about9,000 mandates, over 6,900 of which were older than five years. The GeneralAssembly was responsible for about 80 per cent of the total mandates. TheGeneral Assembly and the ECOSOC often specified neither a date nor a con-dition under which a delegated task could be considered fulfilled; overlapsand duplications within and between their mandates existed. The debatebecame highly politicised between the North and the South. In the end,states agreed only on the termination of very few mandates (Swart 2010:90–2).

9. See the homepage of the Global Public Policy Forum and Hüfner (2003a) forexact figures.

10. For the biennium 2012–13, the general budget amounted to USD 5,152billion (UN Department of Management 2012a).

11. The UN’s modest incomes include earnings from the post service, gift shopsand fees for renting out assets to specialised agencies. For an introductionto the complex UN budget procedures, see Gordenker (2005: 28–34), Hüfner(2003a; b) and Laurentidi (2004).

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12. Under heavy pressure from the United States, which had unilaterallydecreased its share of the budget to 25 per cent in 1995, the assessmentscale was formalised in 2000 and the American share was reduced from 31to 27 per cent (Hüfner 2003b; Laurentidi 2004: 298–9).

13. The ACABQ is a standing committee of the General Assembly that is com-posed of 16 individual experts chosen on the basis of personal qualificationsand broad geographical representation.

14. As proposed by Boutros-Ghali in the ‘Agenda for Peace’, in 1992 apeacekeeping reserve fund was established at a level of USD 150 million as acashflow mechanism to ensure a rapid response for peace operations. How-ever, faced with increased demands for peacekeeping as well as peacemakingand other diplomatic activities, this sum was quickly used up and again lim-ited the Secretariat’s means for independent action or reaction (Salomonsand Dijkzeul 2001).

15. While in the past only the Soviet Union had enjoyed this sort of special treat-ment, after the end of the Cold War, other permanent members developed aclaim over offices. France has been in charge of peacekeeping since the mid-1990s; the United Kingdom held the top position in the UN DPA but lost itnot long ago to the United States, which has claims over the Department ofManagement (Cunliffe 2009: 328–29; Myint-U and Scott 2007: 122).

16. Author’s interview with a UN official, June 2006, UN Headquarters,New York.

17. While the Security Council, dominated by Western interests – and, someargue, by the United States – has greatly enlarged its competences and pow-ers since the end of the Cold War (Wallensteen and Johansson 2004), theGeneral Assembly has been on the decline since the 1980s (Smouts 2000:46–8). Attempts to revitalise it have so far not been crowned with success(Peterson 2006: 122–47).

18. For the most part, the People’s Republic of China remained passive through-out the 1990s, playing a supine role on the Security Council. It protectedits own national interests where necessary and did not stand in the wayof other developments. Since the beginning of the 21st century, China hasplayed a more proactive peacekeeping role. It has voted in favour of most ofthe resolutions that authorised new missions and has begun to significantlycontribute personnel (He 2007). In a similar vein, Russia has rarely played aproactive role in the Security Council unless its direct national interests havebeen at stake.

19. Initially, the Special Committee was authorised ‘to undertake . . . a compre-hensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all theiraspects, including ways of overcoming the present financial difficulties ofthe Organization’, and to report thereupon to the General Assembly (UNGeneral Assembly 1965).

20. The Special Committee produces an annual report that includes recom-mendations directed towards the Secretary-General and the Secretariat. Thissection has become longer and increasingly detailed over the last ten years –a reason for concern and reform of the working methods of the commit-tee (see IPI and CIC 2011). The committee meets for a few weeks in Februaryand March. After a general debate where member states articulate their prior-ities and positions, the committee breaks into a ‘working group format’ – the

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same actors, yet less formal – to negotiate a consensus report. It thenreconvenes and adopts the report; its chairman presents the report to theFourth Committee, which debates peacekeeping, usually in the autumn. TheFourth Committee usually endorses the report and renews the committee’smandate.

21. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN Headquarters,New York.

22. The power asymmetries and struggles in the international system affect thedynamics between the UN organs. In the 1950s, for example, a more power-ful General Assembly was in the interest of the United States becauseWesternstates held the majority there, while the Security Council was paralysed bythe great power antagonism. The United States also favoured a more pow-erful Secretary-General, which went together well with Dag Hammerskjöld’svision of his office. The decolonisation waves that shifted the power in theGeneral Assembly in favour of the developing world changed the UnitedStates’ attitude towards this UN body (Prantl 2006: 45–69).

5 The Operational Dimension: The Peace Operationin East Timor

1. The UN’s engagement in East Timor continued until 2012. The succeedingpeace operation, UNMISET, was mandated to assist the newly indepen-dent East Timor until all operational responsibilities were fully devolvedto the East Timor authorities, and to permit the new nation to attain self-sufficiency. After the withdrawal of UMISET (May 2005), a political mission,the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) remained in the coun-try to support the development of critical state institutions and the police,and to provide democratic governance and human rights training. In spring2006 a political, humanitarian and security crisis erupted and ultimately ledto the establishment of the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT).This was drawn down at the end of 2012.

2. The Secretary-General’s personal representative, Marker (2003), offers adetailed account of the mediation process. Samuel (2003) gives a pointedanalysis from a UN insider’s perspective. Martin (2001), head of UNAMET,complements this with a view from the field, as do Smith and Dee (2003);Smith was deputy force commander for INTERFET and later UNTAET. Thediplomatic process in the Security Council was covered by the former Britishambassador, Eldon (2004).

3. With hindsight, observers attribute Habibie’s sudden change of mind mostlyto his personality; the mounting international reform pressure on Indonesiaby the United States, the World Bank and the IMF allegedly also played arole (Smith and Dee 2006: 395). In addition, Indonesia lost the support ofAustralia. In a letter, the Australian prime minister, Howard, proposed thatHabibie should allow an act of self-determination in East Timor. The text ofthe famous ‘Howard Letter’ is included in Fischer (2000: 10–13).

4. While his whole cabinet supported Habibie in his decision, the military,which continued to be a powerful force in Indonesia and in East Timor,opposed his initiative. They feared that other provinces would follow the

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East Timorese example. Both the military and the Indonesian police wantedto retain the province; they had suffered many casualties over the years thereand East Timor was the source of considerable economic benefits for somesenior leaders (Lloyd 2003: 85).

5. The Indonesian view was that since East Timor had already been integratedinto Indonesia in 1978 by the decision of the Indonesian People’s Consulta-tive Assembly, any changes to its status would necessitate another decisionby that assembly.

6. A group of friends can be described as an ‘ad hoc, informal, issue-specificmini-coalition of states or intergovernmental organizations that becomeinvolved in and provide support for resolving conflicts and implementingpeace agreements’ (Whitfield 2007: 9).

7. At the reiterated insistence of the Indonesian government, the maintenanceof law and order, including the responsibility for the security of UN person-nel, was made the sole responsibility of the Indonesian police and military.Several of those involved argue that further insistence on the part of theUN or member states that Indonesia should accept a peacekeeping forcewould have made the Indonesians walk out, and the window of opportunityfor East Timorese self-determination would have been closed (Eldon 2004;Marker 2003; Samuel 2003).

8. Author’s interviews with a UN official, February 2007, Berlin, and with a staterepresentative, September 2008, Brussels.

9. As the Dutch diplomat van Walsum (2002) described, there was a sense ofa ‘Kosovo hangover’ in the Security Council stemming from the unautho-rised military air strikes four months earlier: ‘All countries wanted to avoidanother humanitarian intervention without a Security Council mandate, butall of them also knew full well that such an intervention had taken place andcould eventually take place again.’

10. Author’s interview with a UN official, February 2007, Berlin.11. The building of the momentum for intervention is covered in numerous

publications. See Greenlees and Garran 2002: 232–50; Jago 2010; Martin2001: 103–12; Pour 1999; Quarterman 2003; Wheeler and Dunne 2001.

12. The Secretary-General alone made 111 phone calls between 3 and 15September 1999 concerning East Timor, just less than a quarter of whichwere to Habibie (Pour 1999).

13. Negotiating the INTERFET resolution proved highly controversial. Eventhough all countries – even Indonesia’s staunchest friends – consented toauthorise a multinational force, there was much debate with regard to thewording, the degree (or lack) of criticism towards Indonesia and the ques-tion of whether INTERFET should have a Chapter VI or Chapter VII mandate(Martin 2001: 112–13).

14. Already in 1983 the East Timorese had proposed a set of measures to theIndonesian government that included a UN peacekeeping force. At that time,Indonesia did not want the conflict to become internationalised and the ideawas rejected (Dunn 2002: 295).

15. The initial plans prepared by the Secretariat and tabled in April 1999 pro-posed verifiable disarmament of both pro- and anti-independence paramil-itary and militia forces before the preparations for the referendum were tobegin; a verifiable reduction of the Indonesian military presence, as well as

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confinement of Indonesians military and fighters of the Armed Forces forthe National Liberation of East Timor to designated areas one month beforethe ballot (Martin 2001: 29–35).

16. There were several proponents to establish a neutral force. In June 1998a meeting of East Timorese in Dili had formulated the demand that theIndonesian military should withdraw and be replaced by a UN peace oper-ation (ETAN 1998). In November 1998 the UN-sponsored all-inclusive EastTimorese dialogue forum also requested the deployment of a UN peace oper-ation with peacekeeping functions. In the Australian press, as early as March1999, experts advocated pressure on Indonesia to accept a neutral securityforce as part of any agreement (Maley 2000: 70).

17. While some actors in the American State Department were in principle opento the idea of a UN force, Australia was apparently much more reluctant. SeeConflict, Security and Development Group (2003, FN 13).

18. Author’s interview with a UN official, February 2007, Berlin.19. The only military contingency planning that took place concerned the evac-

uation of UN personnel. In the run-up to the ballot, the UN DPKO heldtalks mainly with Australia and the United States about the evacuation ofUNAMET mission personnel (Breen 2003: 208).

20. Author’s interview with a UN official, February 2007, Berlin.21. In the context of INTERFET, Australia deployed about one-third of its entire

ground force to East Timor, and paid operational costs equivalent to its entireannual defence budget of the previous year (Durch and Berkman 2006b:77–80).

22. At that time the UN DPKO had a heavy workload. The department wasinvolved in deploying a mission to Sierra Leone and planning for a mis-sion to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. On top of this it had not yetrecovered from the loss of gratis personnel seconded by Western memberstates, a practice that was brought to an end in 1997.

23. Precisely at the time when the Secretariat was finalising its own plans, theWorld Bank together with East Timorese representatives, UN agencies anddonors undertook a joint mission to assess the situation in East Timor.The IMF undertook a concurrent mission to assess the macroeconomicframework. The UNDP prepared a conceptual framework for reconstruction,recovery and development. The UN DPKO actors did not participate in themission, nor did they initially incorporate these findings into their own plan(Cliffe and Rohland 2003; Conflict, Security and Development Group 2003:§142–3).

24. Author’s interviews with a UN official, February 2007, Berlin, and with a staterepresentative, September 2008, Brussels.

25. Author’s interviews with a UN official, February 2007, Berlin.26. At the end of October 1999, more than 8,200 INTERFET troops were

deployed in East Timor; the maximum deployment number totalled almost10,000 troops from 22 states, with Australia’s share being around 5,400(Smith and Dee 2006: 417). For a detailed assessment of INTERFET, see Dee(2001); Smith and Dee (2006: 409–22).

27. The Secretary-General subsequently asked another member of the UN’s‘A-team’ (Traub 2000: 82), the Brazilian Vieira de Mello, who not onlyspoke fluent Portuguese and had experience in Asia, but had also gained

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the support of the US administration after his work in Kosovo (Power2008: 301).

28. Also author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters.29. Initial peacebuilding ideas had included plans to earmark posts for World

Bank staff who were to generate ideas about how to implement sustainabledevelopment programmes within UNTAET (Conflict, Security and Develop-ment Group 2003: §26–8).

30. The United States wanted to keep the costs of the assessed budget forUNTAET as low as possible. Therefore a voluntary trust fund was to coverthe expenses for socioeconomic rehabilitation and other reconstructionmeasures, as well as training measures and part of the institution-buildingmeasures.

31. For instance, it was proposed to recognise the CNRT as a legitimate partnerand grant this umbrella organisation of political forces for independencea role alongside UNTAET. In addition, the establishment of consultationmechanisms between UNTAET and the East Timorese organisations, as wellas a dual-desk structure, were contemplated. Such a structure would havematched international officials with East Timorese staff to allow on-the-jobtraining and co-decision-making (Conflict, Security and Development Group2003: 25–7).

32. Author’s interview with a state representative, September 2008, Brussels.33. There had been diverging opinions about the timeframe within which the

transition should take place. Among East Timorese leaders, views rangedfrom a decade or longer to a very short time (Goldstone 2004: 87–8). In fact,East Timor became a sovereign state not more than two-and-a-half years afterUNTAET began its operation.

34. Members of the Security Council, especially the American delegation, madeit clear that the mission was to be of short duration (Steele 2002: 76).

35. A cursory analysis of the budget documents reveals that for the first sevenmonths the Secretariat received nearly all of the money it deemed neces-sary, a substantial sum of USD 350 million. The Secretariat had requestedan additional USD 30 million but had already reduced its own estimates byUSD 20 million because of slippages in deployment (UN General Assembly1999b: 21). In total, over its two-and-a-half years of existence, UNTAET’sbudget amounted to approximately USD 1,280 million. This was roughly70 per cent of the total international funding for East Timor. The moneywas primarily used for expenses related to peacekeeping troops and civilianUN staff. Humanitarian and reconstruction aid was channelled through fiveother funding streams. In general, East Timor received an unusually largeamount of aid per capita; a wider range of governments than usual madecontributions (Cliffe and Rohland 2003: 109–10).

36. Brazil, Canada, France, Namibia, the Netherlands, Slovenia, the UnitedKingdom and the United States submitted the draft resolution and werejoined by Argentina, France, Portugal and the Russian Federation as sponsors(UN Security Council 1999a).

37. The 15-day notification requirement was introduced by the republican-controlled Congress in the second Clinton administration. It forced thegovernment to brief key congressional committees and identify the fundingsources (Holt and Mackinnon 2008: 21–2).

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38. Author’s interview with a state representative, September 2008, Brussels.39. According to Security Council standard practices, the resolution did not

authorise the size of the UNTAET civil governance administration. Thespecification of the size (and the costs) of the civilian components tookplace in the General Assembly at a later stage of the decision-makingprocess.

40. At that time the US administration was fighting with Congress over therelease of accumulated arrears in assessed contributions mainly to the UNpeacekeeping budgets. There was a risk that at the end of 1999 the UnitedStates would lose its vote in the General Assembly. In fact, regardless of theAmerican vote in the Security Council, Congress would later withhold pay-ment also for the operation in East Timor (Holt and Mackinnon 2008: 23).Already in May 2000 the American ambassador would call for a reductionin the peacekeeping force that had taken over from INTERFET only threemonths earlier.

41. Author’s interview with a state representative, September 2008, Brussels.42. Indonesia and its allies had made it very clear that they wanted non-Western

candidates especially for the position of force commander, and they hadlobbied the international bureaucracy to choose a Southeast Asian candi-date. Western countries preferred the force commander to be Australianbecause the country continued to provide the largest component of troopsand because the trust in Australia was greater than in an Asian comman-der (Richardson 1999b). When Malaysia made known its aspirations for thepost, the East Timorese leaders informed the Secretary-General of their oppo-sition. In the end, the Secretary-General settled the dispute by convincingthe reluctant Philippines to staff the post of the force commander, havingan Australian as a deputy (Dupont 2000: 169).

43. In INTERFET the United States deliberately played the junior partner toAustralia: it did not provide combat troops but helped with intelligence,logistics and other support functions. Furthermore, it stationed a warshipon the Timorese coastline (Orr 2001).

44. See also Ian Martin (2004: 571–4), who based his assessment on the analy-sis of the Security Council’s decision-making on East Timor, including theearly downsizing of UNTAET, the early independence of what became TimorLeste, as well as the neglect of following up on the requested human-rightsinvestigations.

45. In the early days of UNTAET which are analysed in this chapter, memberstates were generous and the Secretariat received nearly all of the resourcesthat it requested. This support should quickly wane.

6 The Conceptual Dimension: The Decisions to Reform UNPeacekeeping and Instigate Doctrine Development

1. Between 1995 and 1999 the Security Council authorised one robust opera-tion in eastern Croatia and a police mission in Bosnia; all other missions weresmall military observer missions (in Georgia, Tajikistan, Liberia and SierraLeone) or political missions.

2. Beginning in 1996 the US Congress refused to authorise the full paymentof the United States’ dues in order to force UN compliance with American

Notes 249

reform requests, as well as a reduction in the American share of peacekeepingcosts from more than 30 to 25 per cent. At the end of 1999 the United Stateshad lost its seat in the financial watchdog ACABQ and was under threat oflosing its vote in the General Assembly.

3. Jamaica, for instance, argued in the Special Committee’s general debatethat peacekeeping operations were under threat of extinction, given theirgradual reduction over the years, and that it was paradoxical that theUN’s capacity had been underutilised. Every effort should be made torevive the political will to mount peacekeeping operations (United Nations1999c).

4. By February 1999 the UN DPKO hat lost most of its institutional memoryfor military and logistic planning. Gratis officers had previously made upapproximately 85 per cent of the logistic and military planning staff andnearly a quarter of the UN DPKO’s total staffing. Even before the numberof missions increased, the Secretariat had presented a plan to manage thetransition from gratis personnel to international civil servants funded bythe UN’s regular and peacekeeping budget. In the light of the fallen num-ber of peacekeepers, governments were reluctant to authorise the necessaryresources and approve the UNDPKO’s new organisational structure (McClureand Orlov 1999; UN Secretary-General 1996).

5. In December 1999 the General Assembly approved 67 additional posts thatdue to the UN’s complicated administrative procedures were only beginningto be filled by spring 2000 (Durch et al. 2003: 52).

6. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters.7. The MillenniumDevelopment Goals are eight specific, measurable objectives

that range from the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger over, throughthe reduction of child mortality and the improvement of maternal health tothe development of a global partnership for development. The internationalcommunity has vowed to implement these goals, which are operationalisedby various subgoals and targets, by 2015 (Hulme 2009).

8. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters.9. In addition to Brahimi, the members of the panel were Brian Atwood (United

States), former head of the US Agency for International Development; ColinGranderson (Trinidad and Tobago), former head of the Organisation ofAmerican States/UN International Civilian Mission in Haiti; Ann Hercus(New Zealand), former Special Representative of the Secretary-General toCyprus; Richard Monk (United Kingdom), former Police Commissioner ofthe International Police Task Force; Klaus Naumann (Germany), formerChief of the German defence staff and former Chairman of the MilitaryCommittee of NATO; Hisako Shimura (Japan), President of Tsuda Collegein Japan and former official in the UN DPKO; Vladimir Shustov (RussianFederation), former Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federa-tion to the UN; Philip Sibanda (Zimbabwe), former Force Commander of theUnited Nations Angola Verification Mission III; and Cornelio Sommaruga(Switzerland), former President of the International Committee of the RedCross (UN Secretary-General 2000a).

10. The report ‘We the Nations’ elaborates with regard to the high-level panel:

To bring greater clarity to where we stand and how we can hopeto progress with regard to United Nations peace operations, I haveestablished a high-level panel, which will review all aspects of peace

250 Notes

operations, from the doctrinal to the logistical. It will suggest waysforward that are acceptable politically and make sense operationally.I expect that the panel’s report will be completed in time to enable theMillennium Assembly to consider its recommendations.

(UN Secretary-General 2000d: §227)

11. Author’s interviews with state officials, July 2007, UN headquarters,New York, and September 2008, Brussels; author’s interview with a UNofficial, June 2007, Konstanz.

12. This demand echoed the calls for more specific, time-bound and measurablegoals in the area of development (Hulme 2007).

13. The mandate was ‘to undertake a thorough review of United Nations peaceand security activities, and to present a clear set of specific, concrete andpractical recommendations to assist the United Nations in conducting suchactivities better in the future’ (UN Secretary-General 2000a: 1).

14. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquar-ters, New York; author’s interview with a UN expert, February 2007,Washington, DC.

15. Author’s interview with a UN expert, February 2007, Washington, DC.16. Author’s interview with a UN expert, February 2007, Washington, DC.17. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquar-

ters, New York; author’s interview with a UN expert, February 2007,Washington, DC.

18. Author’s interview with a UN expert, February 2007, Washington, DC.19. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters,

New York.20. For a more in-depth analysis and assessment of the Brahimi Report’s

recommendation, see Bratt and Gionet 2001; Gray 2001; and Kühne 2003.21. Author’s interview with a state representative, July 2006, New York.22. Author’s interview with a state representative, July 2006, New York.23. The Security Council encouraged the Secretary-General to begin consulta-

tions with potential troop contributors ‘well in advance of the establishmentof peacekeeping operations’; it agreed to ‘assist the Secretary-General, wher-ever appropriate, with specific planning mandates’; and promised to ‘requestformally that the Secretary-General proceed to the implementation phase ofthe mandate’ after receipt of ‘sufficient numbers of adequately trained andequipped troops and other critical mission support elements’ (UN SecurityCouncil 2000b).

24. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters,New York.

25. See FN 20, Chapter 4.26. The Fifth Committee is very labour-intensive; it meets more frequently than

other committees, and the delegates are faced with a large number of issuesthat not only need to be dealt with simultaneously but also are highly tech-nical and require detailed documentation. Its session usually culminates innegotiation marathons that are infamous for the amount of haggling andhorse-trading done behind the scenes (Swart and Martinetti 2007). In addi-tion, many of the Fifth Committee’s members consist of junior diplomatswith little management experience; ambassadors usually only get involved

Notes 251

when important issues, such as the scale of assessment or the deletion ofbudgetary items, are at stake.

27. The external management consultants highlighted that ‘over 30 per cent or161 of the Department’s staff work on average of 50 to 60 hours per week,and 60 staff average a work week of 60 hours or more’, and argued thatthe UN DPKO should consist of roughly 650 staff, meaning approximately150 officials more given the level of operations at that time (UN Secretary-General 2001: §187, 185).

28. Strengthening the General Assembly remains an important concern. In June2010 it held its first-ever thematic debate on peacekeeping. The debate wasorganised on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Brahimi Report.

29. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters,New York.

30. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters,New York.

7 The Institutional Dimension: The Creation of theStanding Police Capacity

1. Formed police units are robust, paramilitary-like forces that are deployedwith their own equipment (Dziedzic and Stark 2006; Hansen 2002: 70–3).

2. Only formed police units are provided by member states as a group (Perito2004).

3. The Netherlands proposed establishing a standing international all-volunteer ‘fire brigade’ made up of individually recruited soldiers. Thebrigade would be under the direct control of the Security Council. It wouldbe used for preventive deployment, to be sent in advance of, and in prepara-tion for, a peace operation. Its purpose would also be to undertake stop-gapmeasures when a crisis was imminent, hence possibly preventing the repe-tition of a Rwanda-like situation where governments were not prepared tointervene (Kinloch-Pinat 2004: 152–6). The ambitious proposal promptedan international debate but overall it was met with opposition. Only a fewmember states supported the Dutch initiative; ‘the majority were opposed toany standing UN force, and even the modest expenditures outlined’ (Langille2000: 223).

4. The Danish proposal built on supporting the UNSAS, which had been intro-duced shortly before. Denmark, together with 13 other states, explored thecreation of a common multinational rapid deployment force that would beavailable for deployment at short notice and for a limited timeframe. Thisled to the establishment of the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG)in 1996, which was declared operational in 2000. The focus of SHIRBRIG hasbeen purely on military resources (Varwick and Koops 2008).

5. While several governments had pledged money and promised to supply per-sonnel for the RDMHs, the planned trust fund did not attract sufficientfunding. The idea to rely partly on gratis personnel brought up the ques-tion of the equitable representation of developing countries (Langille 2000:234, FN 74). In addition, the NAM countries were suspicious of the friendsof rapid deployment who were accused of ‘operating without legitimacy,

252 Notes

and having half-baked ideas developed without broad consultations withthe countries most concerned’ (Pakistani Ambassador Kamal 1996, cited inLangille 2000: 226).

6. As in many other areas, the report’s recommendation on police recruit-ment and training were not absolute novelties. Between 1998 and 2000,the UN DPKO had convened three seminars with police-contributing statesthat ended in similar recommendations with regard to the recruitment andtraining of UN police; see Serafino (2004: 11–12).

7. A similar on-call list for military personnel and a roster of civilian expertswho were deployable at short notice should complement the police on-calllist. In essence, once implemented, the on-call lists and the roster wouldput the UN in a position to assemble mission-specific, rapidly deployableheadquarters similar to the ones proposed in the Canadian vanguard con-cept. This would provide the Secretary-General with a dependable supply ofmilitary and police forces, and enable a more rapid and effective start-up ofpeace operations. The ambitious goal of the Brahimi panel was to put theUN in a position to deploy a traditional peace operation within 30 days, anda complex one within 60 days.

8. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters,New York.

9. The IraqWar began on 20March 2003 with the invasion of Iraq by amultina-tional force led by troops from the United States and the United Kingdom.Prior to the invasion the United States and the United Kingdom assertedthat the possibility of Iraq employing weapons of mass destruction threat-ened their security and that of their regional allies. They did not succeedin their attempt to have the Security Council approve a resolution thatauthorised the use of force (Einsiedel and Chesterman 2003; Zacklin 2010:135–54).

10. For instance, the United States withheld its support for the French-backedpeace operation to Côte d’Ivoire for several weeks, seemingly to pay Franceback for its stand on the Iraq issue.

11. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters,New York.

12. In 2007 only Argentina, Australia, Jordan, Nigeria, Norway, Spain andSweden had police advisors based at their permanent missions. This numberwas dwarfed by at least 85 countries that had military advisers (and usuallydeputy advisers) based in New York (Greener 2009: 109).

13. This indifference at the UN stands somewhat in contrast with developmentsat the national and European levels where states dedicated more atten-tion to bolstering their capacity for international police deployments. Forinstance, at the Feira Summit in 2000, European member states commit-ted to being able to deploy up to 5,000 police to international operationsby 2003 (Weinlich 2003); in early 2004, Australia established the Interna-tional Development Group, a standing unit of 500 police officers who wereavailable at short notice (Peake and Brown 2005).

14. Zimbabwe, Croatia, Australia, Switzerland, Brazil, Poland and Mozambique,as well as New Zealand, Greece (speaking on behalf of the EU), Ukraine,Malaysia, Pakistan and Nepal made reference to policing issues in the Special

Notes 253

Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and in the Fourth Committee(United Nations 2003b;c; UN General Assembly 2003b; c).

15. In February 2004 it became known that the Oil-for-Food programme hadbeen corrupted by the Iraqi regime. The alleged beneficiaries included asenior UN official who oversaw the programme. Annan asked the Secu-rity Council to establish an investigative body, which became the VolckerCommission named after its chairman, the former chairman of the FederalReserve, Paul Volcker (J. Gordon 2007).

16. In the 18 months between September 2003 and March 2005, the SecurityCouncil authorised roughly 3,000 individual civilian police officers and adozen formed police units (Smith et al. 2007a: Annex II, xvi).

17. Three months after the peace operation to Liberia had been authorised, lessthan 10 per cent of civilian police officers were deployed; similarly, only14 per cent had been deployed to Côte d’Ivoire, 26 per cent to Haiti, 29per cent to Burundi and less than 10 per cent to Sudan (Smith et al. 2007a:Annex II).

18. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters,New York.

19. Ahmed had been part of the Brahimi team; already during the preparationsof the Brahimi Report, the idea had been contemplated to create a stand-ing unit of 500 civilian police officers available for immediate deployment.At that time the idea was set aside because it was considered too expensive(Lewis et al. 2002: 8).

20. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters,New York.

21. Instead the HLP settled on recommending improvements with regard to thestandby arrangements. Member states, especially developed countries, wereurged to establish feasible rapid-reaction capabilities and place them at thedisposal of the UN (UN Secretary-General 2004b: §218).

22. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters,New York.

23. Ibid.24. Ibid.25. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters,

New York; Author’s interview with a state representative, March 2007,New York.

26. Author’s interview with a state representative, March 2007, New York.27. Author’s interview with a state representative, January 2009, by telephone.28. Ibid.29. The Secretariat undertook minor changes and translated the concept into

internal doctrine and guidance documents for the members of the SPC andtheir activities (Rotmann 2007: 66). In May 2006, Under-Secretary-GeneralGuéhenno approved the revised version as an internal document on the‘Establishment, Functions, and Organisation of the United Nations StandingPolice Capacity (SPC)’ (UN DPKO 2006).

30. While Germany as part of the ‘gang of four’ together with Japan, India andBrazil aspired to a permanent seat on the Security Council, Italy was a keymember of the counter-movement ‘Uniting for Consensus’ that opted to

254 Notes

create a new class of longer-term members instead of new permanent ones(Traub 2006: 314).

31. Author’s interview with state representatives, March 2007, New York;author’s interview with a UN official, UN headquarters, March 2007.

32. Author’s interview with a state representative, March 2007.33. Author’s interview with state representatives, September 2009, by telephone.34. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007.35. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters;

Author’s interview with a state representative, March 2007, New York.36. In fact, already in October 2006, before the SPC had received its financial

authorisation, when the recruitment was only just under way, the interna-tional bureaucracy floated the idea among states to expand the SPC’s initialoperating capacity (Guéhenno 2006). In February 2007, Under-Secretary-General Guéhenno repeated this proposal in front of the Special Committeeon Peacekeeping Operations; the police advisor followed with a letter tomembers, explaining in more detail the need for an initial operating capacityof 50 (UN DPKO 2007). The proposal ran into opposition and was rejectedin the budgetary process.

37. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters,New York.

38. The Italian Foreign Ministry commented on the selection of Brindisi byissuing the following statement on 3 November 2006:

The choice of Brindisi is a major success for Italy, following only a fewdays upon its election to the Security Council, and a significant acknowl-edgement of our country’s commitment to maintaining peace. As a resultof our growing role in peacekeeping operations, one of Italy’s prioritieswill be to foster the reinforcement and expansion of the Brindisi base,which performs a function essential to the preparation and logisticalmanagement of all the UN’s peacekeeping operations.

(Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006)

39. Author’s interview with a state delegate, April 2007, New York.40. The draft outcome documents can be accessed at http://www.globalpolicy.

org/msummit/millenni/m5outcomedocindex.htm, accessed 05.02.2013. Inall places, emphasis is added by the author.

41. The Secretary-General proposed the creation of 27 new posts, financed bythe support account, and requested an initial sum of USD2,122,700 for theperiod from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006, the already running financial periodfor the peacekeeping budgets (UN Secretary-General 2005a: §147–56).

42. Author’s interview with a state representative, March 2007, New York.43. Author’s interview with a UN official, March 2007, UN headquarters,

New York.44. Ibid.45. The SPC’s cousin, the strategic military reserve, offers an interesting lesson.

Here, the Secretariat followed the ‘old’ model. After some informal consul-tations beforehand, a more or less elaborate proposal was presented to theSpecial Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. It immediately came underfire from various corners; the majority of member states did not back the pro-posal in the summit negotiations. When asked, member state respondents

Notes 255

independently assessed that it was more the way of presenting the proposalthat caused concern than the actual idea of establishing a military strategicreserve, which in principle was thought to be worth considering by the EU,NAM and CANZ.

8 The Shaping Powers of the UN Secretariat: Conclusionsand Future Prospects for Studying the Role of InternationalBureaucracies

1. Author’s interview with a UN expert, July 2006, New York.2. Author’s interview with a UN official, July 2006, New York.3. Author’s interview with a UN official, July 2006, UN headquarters, New York.4. In recent years it has arguably been only the new operation in the Middle East

that has been of greater interest to many countries, including Western coun-tries. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL II) was established as a meansto end the war between Israel and the Hezbollah in 2006. At the insistenceof Lebanon, an already existing UN peace operation was modified. In turn,European states insisted on establishing and staffing a strategic military cellwithin the UN DPKO to increase their oversight and control. For the first timein the new century, they contributed troops to a UN-led operation on a largescale and made their participation contingent upon working around existingUN structures (Mattelaer 2009).

5. Of course, the superimposition of extraneous issues can also obstruct the real-isation of the Secretariat’s policy recommendations. The Brahimi case studyshows that policy issues easily become politicised and fall hostage to theomnipresent North–South dynamics. The intervention in Kosovo and the sub-sequent debate on humanitarian interventions both had a great impact on theclimate in which the General Assembly discussed recommendations such asthe establishment of the ISAS.

6. Author’s interview with a UN expert, July 2006, New York.7. Author’s interview with a UN official, July 2007, New York.

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Index

Africaand peace operations, 22, 24, 25,

129, 139, 140and peacekeeping structures, 24,

139, 150, 185, 205Ahmed, Salman, 147, 148, 153,

154, 190Annan, Kofi, 168, 203and East Timor, 92, 96, 104, 107,

108, 132, 134and peacekeeping 72, 143,

145–50, 164Agenda for Peace, 28, 147, 180ASEAN states, see East Timor, ASEAN

Statesassessed contributions, 20, 77–8, 81–2Australiaand conflict over East Timor,

90–2, 95and referendum preparations,

102–3, 105, 109–10and SPC, 195, 201, 208and UNTAET decision–making, 125,

126, 130, 131and UNTAET planning, 114–8,

120–1see also International Force East

Timor (INTERFET)authority, 49, 53–4, 233–4autonomyand East Timor, see East Timor, and

tripartite talksand international bureaucracies, 3,

4, 10, 12, 43, 46, 50, 52–3, 54,55–7, 68, 76, 79, 124, 176,179, 230

see also UN Secretariat, andautonomy

Ban, Ki–Moon, 33, 85Barnett, Michael, 49, 50, 51, 52–3, 56,

73, 233

Bolton, John, 1, 202–3, 210Boutros–Ghali, Boutros, 28, 46,

80, 180Brahimi, Lakhdar, 29, 121, 136, 147–8,

152–4, 159, 162, 166, 175Brahimi Panel, 6–7, 29, 136, 147–9,

152, 154Brahimi Reportcontents of, 155–8, 182implementation of, 29, 136–8,

149–50, 154–60, 161–72origins of, 145–8writing of, 147–9, 152–4

China, 78, 149, 227and East Timor, 90, 93, 94, 106, 108,

112, 123, 127–8Cox, Robert, 40–1, 57–8constructivism, 9–10, 11, 45–7, 50–1,

232–3

Durch, William, 148Department of Peacekeeping

Operations (DPKO), see UNDepartment of PeacekeepingOperations (UN DPKO)

East Timorand ASEAN states, 91, 94, 95–6conflict over, 90–3and core group, see and group of

friendsand group of friends, 93, 99, 102–4,

108, 116, 118, 126and human rights, 92, 94–6, 98,

107, 108–9, 127–8, 133–4, 225and independence movement, 93,

117, 121, 123and May 5 agreements, 104–5, 108,

111–16, 126and referendum, 98–9, 101–2,

104–7, 110–11, 132, 134

286

Index 287

and self–determination, 90, 91, 95,96, 101, 102

and tripartite talks, 91–2, 96, 98–9,100–5, 109–11

and UN peacekeeping, see UNAssistance Mission in EastTimor (UNAMET); UNTransitional Administration inEast Timor (UNTAET)

and violence, 92, 99, 105, 106, 107,127, 133

see also Australia, Indonesia,International Force East Timor(INTERFET); Portugal

Finnemore, Martha, 49, 50, 51, 52–3,56, 233

framework of analysis, integrated, 11,55–61

application of, 62–7Franceand East Timor, 95and peacekeeping, 27, 72, 81, 83,

84, 139, 149, 195and Suez Crisis, 18–9

Group of 77 (G-77), 86, 162, 203, 226Guéhenno, Jean–Marie, 154, 155, 163,

174, 189, 191, 193, 194, 198,208–9

Gusmão, Xanana, 92, 101, 107

Habibie, Bacharuddin Jusuf, 98–102,108–9, 132, 134, 223

see also East Timor, IndonesiaHammarskjöld, Dag, 5, 19–20, 34, 71High–Level Panel on Threats,

Challenges and Change (HLP),188–9, 190–1, 193, 194, 198, 201,211, 212, 214, 233

India, 19, 20, 25, 78, 86, 139, 141,164, 167, 169, 175, 226, 236

Indonesiaand conflict over East Timor, 90–3,

98, 99, 126and INTERFET, 108–9, 117, 223and tripartite talks, 92, 100–2, 104,

113, 116, 123

and Security Council, 112, 116,126–7

and UN Assistance Mission in EastTimor (UNAMET), 110–11, 223

see also East Timor, Habibie,Bacharuddin Jusuf; Suharto,Haji Mohamed

influenceand autonomy, 10, 12, 40–1, 51–2,

55–7, 234definition, 57–60pathways of influence, 13–4, 226–9

international bureaucraciesand executive head, 4, 40–1, 43–4ideals of, 71–2influence of, see influencetasks of, 1–2, 20–1see also UN Secretariat

institutionalism, sociological, 9–10,11, 45–8, 50, 54, 232–3

international organisation 45–6, 48–9and international bureaucracies,

1–5, 9–11, 12, 39, 49–51International Force East Timor

(INTERFET), 99, 109, 112, 115,117, 129

and UNTAET, 117, 118, 120–1, 130Iraq War, 183–6

Kroeker, Mark, 179, 193, 194, 200

Managers of Global Change Project,46, 58–9

Martin, Ian, 105, 106Marker, Jamsheed, 92, 101, 104,

105, 106May 5 Agreements, see East Timor, and

May 5 AgreementsMillennium Development Goals,

146–7, 189Millennium Summit, 136, 145–7,

149–50, 174–5, 188, 222, 224, 233

National Council of Timor Resistance(CNRT), 93, 101, 117, 123

see also East Timor, andindependence movement

288 Index

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation(NATO), 43, 70, 122, 139,140, 234

neoliberal institutionalism, 41–2neorealism, 41–2, 56Non–aligned Movement (NAM), 64,

85, 91, 93, 106, 126, 129, 147,162, 169, 181, 197, 226

non–governmental organisations(NGOs), 45, 54, 92–3, 95, 96, 107,133–4, 160, 200, 219, 225

North–South divide, 85–6, 88, 165,170, 175–6, 184–5, 211, 217–18,220, 231, 236

ONUC (Opération des Nations Uniesau Congo), 27, 33, 35, 83, 179

Panel on UN Peace Operations, seeBrahimi Panel

peacebuilding, 8, 26, 29, 137, 157,164, 172, 220, 221, 234

peace enforcement, 8, 18, 24, 27, 29,30, 107, 108, 143, 180

peacekeepingcivilian personnel in, 35–6doctrine, 8, 26–30, 136–7, 138–43,

148, 157, 159, 161, 164, 171,172, 173, 175–7, 220

force generation, 33–35functions, 23–5institutional structures, 9, 31–3,

69–71, 76, 178–83, see also UNDepartment of PeacekeepingOperations (UN DPKO)

models of, 6, 18and Nordic states, 27, 34, 170, 229objectives of, 7, 23, 25origins of, 18–20and police, 25, 36, 179–80,

182–3, 189and robust mandates, 7, 24, 29, 31,

86, 136, 137, 138, 143, 157,159, 164, 171–2

and seconded personnel, 32, 69–70,72, 179

Pearson, Lester, 19

Portugaland conflict over East Timor,

90–5,126and tripartite talks, 92, 100–2,

104–5, 107, 110, 113process tracing, 63–4principal–agent approach (P–A

approach), 10–11, 47–50, 52, 54,79, 230–2

policy–cycle model, 64

regime theory, 42–3, 54Russian Federation, 106, 108, 112,

123, 140, 149, 227see also Soviet Union

Rwanda, 28–9, 73, 96, 107, 138,140, 146

Samuel, Tamrat, 92, 114Sierra Leone, 86, 129, 139, 148, 164Soviet Union, 19, 20, 27, 32, 71–2,

81, 90Standing Police Capacity (SPC)characteristics of, 9, 36, 178,

197–200establishment of, 188–24origins of, 186–92

Suharto, Haji Mohamed, 93, 100, 132

transitional administration, 7, 18, 26,121, 157, 159, 172

see also UN Mission in Kosovo(UNMIK), UN TransitionalAdministration in East Timor(UNTAET)

triangulation, 12Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs),

20, 23, 25, 34–5, 85–6, 141–2,163, 167, 176

see also peacekeeping

UN Advisory Committee onAdministrative and BudgetaryQuestions (ACABQ)

and budget process, 78–9, 80, 84and peacekeeping reforms, 142, 161,

167, 168, 181, 208–10UN Assistance Mission in East Timor

(UNAMET), 99, 105–6, 110–11

Index 289

UN Charterand peacekeeping, 20, 30, 33, 82,

121, 142, 184and UN Secretariat, 71, 72, 74–5

UN Department of Field Support(UNDFS), 33, 70

see also UN SecretariatUN Department of Peacekeeping

Operations (UN DPKO)and East Timor, 114–18, 120–4,

131–5institutional characteristics of, 33,

69–70, 72, 75–76, 171, 178,181, 186, 217, 230

and peacekeeping reforms, 28, 29,35, 36, 136, 137, 141, 142, 160,163, 169, 188, 189

and SPC, 178, 183, 186, 190–1,193–7, 199–200, 208–9,211–14

see also UN SecretariatUN Department of Political Affairs

(UN DPA), 33, 70, 190and East Timor, 92, 103, 115–17,

131–5see also UN Secretariat

UN Emergency Force (UNEF), 18–21,26, 32, 76

UN General Assemblycontrol and oversight by, 21, 64, 72,

75, 76, 78, 79–82, 84–6, 88,169, 208

and East Timor, 90, 91and peacekeeping reforms, 136–7,

142, 147–9, 154, 161–2, 164–8,172, 175

and SPC, 187, 190, 194, 199,209–10

and Suez Crisis, 19, 20and World Summit negotiations

201–4see also Millennium Summit, UN

Special Committee onPeacekeeping, World Summit(2005)

UN Information and Strategic AnalysisSecretariat (ISAS), 158–9, 160,169–70, 223

UN Secretariatand autonomy, 6, 62, 76, 87–8, 134,

161, 214, 216–18, 231as a bureaucracy, 73, 232–3and control mechanisms, 79–86, 88,

235–6and financial resources, 76–9,

142, 216as a hard case, 5, 6, 87and independence, 71–3, 74,

87, 218and influence, 62–6, 218–29and mandate, 62, 74–6, 87, 116,

216, 229–30, 234size of, 68–71, 87staffing of, 69–73, 80, 87, 217–18,

see also peacekeeping, andseconded personnel

see also peacekeeping, institutionalstructures; UN Department ofPeacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO); UN Department ofPolitical Affairs (UN DPA)

UN Secretary–General, 4, 20–1, 43–4,74–6

see also Annan, Kofi, Ban, Ki–Moon,Boutros–Ghali, Boutros,Hammarskjöld, Dag

UN Security Counciland Brahimi Report, 149–50, 153,

156, 162–4, 169, 173control and oversight by, 80, 83–4,

88, 235and East Timor, 90, 105–6, 108–9,

112, 125–31, 132and peacekeeping reform, 27, 136–7permanent members of, 72, 83, 88,

157–8, 217and SPC, 197, 227, 229and Suez crisis 19–20

UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 7,121–2, 125, 140, 153

UN Special Committee onPeacekeeping Operations

mandate of, 27, 85–6, 209and peacekeeping reforms, 138, 141,

142–3, 153, 165, 166, 169–72and rapid deployment, 181, 183

290 Index

UN Special Committeeon PeacekeepingOperations – continued

and SPC, 189, 184–5, 192, 194,196–7, 200

UN Transitional Administration inEast Timor (UNTAET)

establishment of, 6, 63, 98–131mandate of, 7, 119–20, 125–31planning for, 114–25, 221, 222and robust mandate, 112, 128,

129, 130United Kingdomand Brahimi Report, 149, 162,

170, 175and East Timor, 95–6, 101, 103–4,

123, 125, 127, 131and peacekeeping, 64, 72, 83, 84,

139, 148and SPC, 195and Suez Crisis, 18–19and World Summit, 203

United States, 86and Brahimi Report, 149, 157–8,

175, 161and East Timor, 90, 91, 95, 101,

103–4, 106, 108, 110, 112, 122,123, 126, 129–30, 134

and Iraq War, 184–6and peacekeeping, 27, 72, 83,

139–40, 170, 175, 185, 222,226, 229

and SPC, 195, 196and Suez crisis, 19–20and UN funding, 27, 78, 82, 139,

156, 169and World Summit, 202–4

Vendrell, Francis, 92, 103

World Bank, 4, 43, 93, 108, 118, 223World Summit (2005), 178, 187,

188–9, 201–4, 208, 221, 226, 229,233–4