1 honeypot, botnet, security measurement, email spam cliff c. zou cda6938 02/01/07

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1 Honeypot, Botnet, Security Measurement, Email Spam Cliff C. Zou CDA6938 02/01/07

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Honeypot, Botnet, Security Measurement, Email Spam

Cliff C. ZouCDA693802/01/07

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What Is a Honeypot?

“A honeypot is a faked vulnerable system used for the purpose of being attacked, probed, exploited and compromised.”

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Example of a Simple Honeypot

Install vulnerable OS and software on a machine

Install monitor or IDS software Connect to the Internet (with global IP) Wait & monitor being scanned,

attacked, compromised Finish analysis, clean the machine

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Benefit of Deploying Honeypots

Risk mitigation: A deployed honeypot may lure an attacker away

from the real production systems (“easy target“). IDS-like functionality:

Since no legitimate traffic should take place to or from the honeypot, any traffic appearing is evil and can initiate further actions.

Attack analysis: Binary code analysis of captured attack codes Spying attacker’s ongoing actions Find out reasons, and strategies why and how you

are attacked.

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Honeypot Classification

High-interaction honeypots A full and working OS is provided for being

attacked VMware virtual environment

Several VMware virtual hosts in one physical machine

Low-interaction honeypots Only emulate specific network services No real interaction or OS

Honeyd

Honeynet/honeyfarm A network of honeypots

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Low-Interaction Honeypots

Pros: Easy to install (simple program) No risk (no vulnerable software to be

attacked) One machine supports hundreds of honeypots

Cons: No real interaction to be captured

Limited logging/monitor function Easily detectable by attackers

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High-Interaction Honeypots

Pros: Real OS, capture all attack traffic/actions Can discover unknown

attacks/vulnerabilities

Cons: Time-consuming to build/maintain/analysis Risk of being used as stepping stone

Must have a firewall blocking all outgoing traffic High computer resource requirement

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Honeynet A network of honeypots High-interaction honeynet

A distributed network composing many honeypots Low-interaction honeynet

Emulate a virtual network in one physical machine

Example: honeyd Mixed honeynet

“Scalability, Fidelity and Containment in the Potemkin Virtual Honeyfarm”, presented next week

Reference: http://www.ccc.de/congress/2004/fahrplan/files/135-honeypot-forensics-slides.ppt

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What Is a Botnet?

A network of compromised computers controlled by their attacker Users on zombie machines do not know Most home computers with broadband

The main source for many attacks now Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS)

Extortion Email spam, phishing Ad-fraud User information: document, keylogger, …

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How to Build a Botnet?

Infect machines via: Internet worms, viruses Email virus Backdoor left by previous malware Trojan programs hidden in free download

software, games …

Bots phone back to receive command

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Botnet Architecture Bot controller

Usually using IRC server (Internet relay chat) Dozen of controllers for robustness

bot bot

botcontroller

attacker

bot

botcontroller

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Botnet Monitoring

Hijack one of the bot controller DNS provider redirects domain name to

the monitor Still cannot cut off a botnet (dozen of

controller) Can obtain most/all bots IP addresses

Let honeypots join in a botnet Can monitor all communications No complete picture of a botnet

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Security Measurement

Monitor network traffic to understand/track Internet attack activities

Monitor incoming traffic to unused IP space

TCP connection requests UDP packets

Unused IP space

Monitoredtraffic

Internet

Local network

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Refining Monitoring

TCP/SYN not enough (IP, port only) Distinguish different attacks

Low-interaction honeypots (honeyd) Obtain the first attack payload by replying

SYN/ACK Used by the “Internet Motion Sensor” in U.

Michigan Paper presented next…

High-interaction honeypots

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Remote fingerprinting

Actively probe remote hosts to identify remote hosts’ OS, physical devices, etc OSes service responses are different Hardware responses are different

Purposes: Understand Internet computers Remove DHCP issue in monitored data Paper presented later

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Data Sharing: Traffic Anonymization

Sharing monitored network traffic is important Collaborative attack detection Academic research

Privacy and security exposure in data sharing Packet header: IP address, service port exposure Packet content: more serious

Data anonymization Change packet header: preserve IP prefix, and … Change packet content

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Why So Many Email Spam?

No authentication/authorization in email Receive unsolicited email by design Sending fake email is so easy

Shown in next slide Profit:

Takes a dime to send out millions email spam A few effective spam give back good profit No penalty in spam (law, out-of-country spam)

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Sample fake email sending Telnet longwood.cs.ucf.edu 25 S: 220 longwood.cs.ucf.edu ESMTP Sendmail 8.13.8/8.13.8; … C: HELO fake.domain S: 250 Hello crepes.fr, pleased to meet you C: MAIL FROM: [email protected] S: 250 [email protected]... Sender ok C: RCPT TO: [email protected] S: 250 [email protected] ... Recipient ok C: DATA S: 354 Enter mail, end with "." on a line by itself C: subject: who am I? C: Do you like ketchup? C: . S: 250 Message accepted for delivery C: QUIT S: 221 longwood.cs.ucf.edu closing connection

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Current Major Spam Defense

Signature-based filtering Spamassasin, etc: based on keywords, rules on

header…

Blacklisting-based filtering DNS black list, dynamically updated (Spamhaus)

Sender authentication Caller ID (Microsoft) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caller_ID

Sender Policy Framework (SPF) http://www.openspf.org/