1. Helps to separate out primary, secondary and tertiary.◦ Universal primary schooling (100% enrollment) is a generally

accepted goal◦ Secondary education may or may not be "essential", ◦ Tertiary (university and other post-secondary) is generally a

rare privilege

2. Economists like to think of schooling as a production process.

◦ Inputs: are the time the student spends in school, innate ability of students, quality of school and teachers, and parental assistance.

◦ Outputs: Total years of schooling attained, Enrollment rates (net or gross), Skills obtained (literacy, numeracy, social skills, scientific knowledge, etc.).

3. There are several indicators of problems in education:◦ Enrollment rates are not as expected (gross or net) ◦ Low daily attendance◦ High rates of repetition◦ Low learning per year of schooling◦ Unemployment of school graduates

Net vs Gross Enrollment: Gross enrollment Rate:

◦ The number of students enrolled at a certain level of education as a percentage of the population of the age group that officially corresponds to that level.

◦ Can be above 100% if some enrolled students are older/younger than the age group that officially corresponds to that level of education.

◦ Suggests there may be repeaters Net Enrollment Rate:

◦ The ratio of children of official school age (based on the International Standard Classification of Education 1997) who are enrolled in school to the population of the corresponding official school age

◦ Can be more meaningful because they focus on kids in the appropriate age group.

Source: WDI

Country Name 2000 2009 2000 2009Sub-Saharan Africa (all income levels) 80 100 59 75South Asia 89 110 75 86Middle East & North Africa (all income levels) 98 102 85 90Latin America & Caribbean (all income levels) 120 116 93 94Europe & Central Asia (all income levels) 103 102 96 95East Asia & Pacific (all income levels) 109 111 93 94

gross netSchool enrollment, primary (% gross)

Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education  ◦ Target 2.A. Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere,

boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling    2.1 Net enrolment ratio in primary education

2.2 Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach last grade of primary2.3 Literacy rate of 15-24 year-olds, women and men

http://www.mdgmonitor.org/index.cfm

Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education  ◦ Target 2.A. Ensure that,

by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling    2.1 Net enrolment ratio

in primary education2.2 Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach last grade of primary2.3 Literacy rate of 15-24 year-olds, women and men

Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education  ◦ Target 2.A. Ensure that,

by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling    2.1 Net enrolment ratio

in primary education2.2 Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach last grade of primary2.3 Literacy rate of 15-24 year-olds, women and men

Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education  ◦ Target 2.A. Ensure that,

by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling    2.1 Net enrolment ratio

in primary education2.2 Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach last grade of primary2.3 Literacy rate of 15-24 year-olds, women and men

Two related problems◦ While access to school is important for achieving

universal primary education, children must also complete primary school to master: basic literacy and numeracy Early school leaving rate: of the children who enter 1st

grade, what % are likely to leave early? Early school leaving rate: 25% in 2000 and still 25% in

2011 Biggest problem in Sub Saharan Africa and Southern Asia

◦ Starting school late. 38% of primary school children are 2 years older than official

age Children in poorer households will delay the start of schooling Worry about those who start late and leave early.

http://www.mdgmonitor.org/index.cfm

Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education  ◦ Target 2.A. Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere,

boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling    2.1 Net enrolment ratio in primary education

2.2 Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach last grade of primary2.3 Literacy rate of 15-24 year-olds, women and men

Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women  ◦ Target 3.A Eliminate gender disparity in primary and

secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015    3.1 Ratios of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary

education 3.2 Share of women in wage employment in the non-

agricultural sector 3.3 Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament

http://www.mdgmonitor.org/index.cfm

Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women  ◦ Target 3.A Eliminate

gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015    3.1 Ratios of girls to

boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education

3.2 Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector

3.3 Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament

Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women  ◦ Target 3.A Eliminate

gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015    3.1 Ratios of girls to

boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education

3.2 Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector

3.3 Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament

Rosenzweig (1995): Why are there returns to schooling? ◦ Under what circumstances will schooling improve

productivity in the market and in the household?

◦ Model: describes two channels through which schooling enhances work productivity: 1. access to information sources (ability to read, for

example allows one to acquire new information from instruction manuals)

2. improves the ability to process or decipher new information (education teaches people how to learn)

Rosenzweig (1995): Why are there returns to schooling? ◦ Under what circumstances will schooling improve

productivity in the market and in the household?◦ 2 Implications of the model:

1. The greater the gains from getting the input use "right“, the greater the effect of schooling on output If work tasks are more complex, there is greater scope for misuse

of technology, substantial learning effort is needed to perform a new tasks ⇒ High returns to schooling

If tasks are simple ⇒ Low returns to schooling Ex: Traditional Agriculture vs Green Revolution Point: returns to schooling increase when production technology

increases the scope of learning

Rosenzweig (1995): Why are there returns to schooling? ◦ Under what circumstances will schooling improve

productivity in the market and in the household?◦ 2 Implications of the model:

2. The returns to schooling depend on the amount of experience with the production process Schooling enhances ability of farmers to learn from observations

about optimal input use. Learning from experience matters!

Of the 3 cases, who do you think had higher profits? No schooling, no experience with high-tech seeds Schooling, no experience with high-tech seeds No schooling, experience with high-tech seeds.

Point: Profitability increases more rapidly with experience for those who have schooling.

Point: Returns to schooling are higher when farmers also have experience.

Other issues regarding returns to education

◦ Education of women◦ Brain Drain◦ Curriculum Relevance◦ Credit Market Failures

Glewwe, Hanushek, Humpage and Ravina (2011) School Resources and Educational Outcomes in Developing Countries: A Review of the Literature from 1990 to 2010 Simple model of school choices Review of the Evidence (empirical tests of the above model) Paper reviews 79 empirical studies (only 43 were considered to

be high quality studies) Findings for impacts on academic test scores:

1. having a fully functioning school appears conducive to student learning.

2. having teachers with greater knowledge of the subjects they teach, having a longer school day, and providing tutoring.

3. having teachers that show up for work; teacher absence has a clear negative effect on learning.

4. Randomized trials arguably provide the most rigorous evidence

5. there is little empirical support for a wide variety of school and teacher characteristics that some observers may view as priorities for school spending

Glewwe, Hanushek, Humpage and Ravina (2011) School Resources and Educational Outcomes in Developing Countries: A Review of the Literature from 1990 to 2010◦ Findings for time spent in school: of the 43 high quality

studies, only 2 findings receive clear support:1. building more schools increases students' time in school2. in-service teacher training reduces student time in school .

Glewwe, Hanushek, Humpage and Ravina (2011) School Resources and Educational Outcomes in Developing Countries: A Review of the Literature from 1990 to 2010 Basic conclusion:

1. review of existing evidence suggests little in the form of "best policies" that can readily be introduced through central provision or through regulatory approaches

2. focus should shift from basic school and teacher characteristics to changing incentives in schools and permitting more local decision making

3. a continued quest for identifying the specific inputs of teachers and schools from cross-sectional analyses of samples of convenience is unlikely to lead to strong policy guidance.

4. For several classes of policy issues -- largely ones involving well-identified programs and specific resources -- obtaining randomized or quasi-randomized observations is key to instilling confidence in research results

Glewwe, Hanushek, Humpage and Ravina (2011) School Resources and Educational Outcomes in Developing Countries: A Review of the Literature from 1990 to 2010◦ final point:

despite a large and increasingly sophisticated literature, remarkably little is known about the impact of education policies on student outcomes in developing countries.

There are 2likely reasons for this.1. What works best may vary considerably across countries and even

within countries, which implies that future research should attempt to understand which policies work best in which settings.

2. Much of the literature has focused on basic school and teacher characteristics, when in fact the ways that schools are organized may matter most.

Such a conclusion implies that future research should focus on how schools are organized and the incentives faced by teachers, administrators, parents and students.

Let's think about supply and demand for education Demand for education:

◦ Would parents send children to school without compulsory education? What constrains them? The need for child labor? School is too expensive? The poor lack economic resources? Social/cultural reasons: For example, a child "needs" to get

married? What do parents think/believe about education? What do they

expect education will get their child? Is it useful? What worries parents about schools?

Supply for education: problems◦ Schools may be missing in remote villages?◦ Transport to schools is difficult (bad/dangerous roads)?◦ Shortage of well trained teachers? ◦ Large class sizes?◦ What else?

Let's think about solutions: Top down/supply side?

Top down or supply driven efforts to improve educational attainment examples:◦ improving infrastructure, building schools, making

education compulsory (many countries have done this) Supply driving results:

◦ Between 2000 and 2011: Net primary enrollment rates increased from 83% to 90% from 60% to 77% Sub-Saharan Africa from 78% to 93% Southern Asia Worldwide, the number of children of school age who were

out of school fell from 102 million in 2000 to 57 million in 2011

Is it worth it? There is a relationship between education and income

3 Top down success stories Case of Indonesia (1974-1978) govt. used oil money

to build 62,000 schools. ◦ Public effort to build more schools in places where education

levels were initially low. Studies in Indonesia showed: Education and wages grew faster in

regions that received more schools. Schools caused an increase in education Schools caused an increase in wages Implication: Roughly 8% increase in wages for each extra year

spent in school: Schools were beneficial in Indonesia Case of Taiwan: instituted compulsory schooling in

1968 for 9 years.◦ led to an increase of schooling of boys and girls. ◦ Infant mortality declined in regions where education increased fastest

due to this reform Case of Nigeria: used oil money to build schools

◦ led to a reduction in fertility in regions where more schools were build.

Top down problems: Easterly (The Elusive Quest for Growth) argues:

◦ Top-down investment in education is not useful.◦ Rich countries chose to be educated because they see a

country growing. ◦ But, internationally-driven investment to education are

waste Why? Why might supply-driven education not

work?◦ Poor teacher quality: If parents/community members do

not care, they won't put pressure on teachers to deliver: A symptom is lots of teacher absence.

◦ Parents don't believe in what children are learning. Parents will not want to send their children to schools if they feel schools are not delivering useful skills.

◦ Children will not study and won't remember anything.

Top down problems: Other top down problems:

◦ Education quality is fairly low in developing countries ( High teacher absence, High student absence, Low achievement): For example ASER survey in India finds that about 35% of

children age 7-14 could not read a grade 1 paragraph, and 60% cannot read a grade 2 story in 2005.

More troublingly, studies have found NO PROGRESS since 2005.

Similar results in Kenya, Pakistan, Uganda, …. What is going on? What is the problem? Is it so

hard to teach children to read? And if not why are schools not delivering?

The illusion of an S-shape education poverty trap ◦ If a household divides resources equally among children, the returns to

learning per child may be too low, keeping the household in a poverty trap.

◦ Put all resources into one child. Parents tend to believe that education is a lottery ticket:

◦ Give the “ticket” to the high potential kid◦ Case of Madagascar:

70% of parents thought that a secondary education could lead to a government job.

In fact, 33% of secondary school graduates get one. Parent tend to believe that returns to primary education

are low, and returns to higher education are higher◦ Case of Madagascar,

parents believe returns to education are: 6% per year for primary education, 12% per year for secondary education, 20% for tertiary education

The illusion of an S-shape education poverty trap Parents tend to believe that a little bit of education may not

be worth the cost◦ Unless the child can get enough education to get a ‘lottery ticket’, it is

not worth it. ◦ If a parent has several children, they may treat them unequally

make sure that one gets enough education, even if this means that the other gets very little.

◦ These beliefs cause an elite bias in education by teachers, parents and students

“The peculiar way in which expectations about what education is supposed to deliver distort what parents

demand, what both public and private schools deliver, and what children achieve – and the colossal waste that ensues.”

An elite bias can cause parents to discriminate between their children◦ Case of Burkina Faso:

a study found that children are more likely to be in school if they do well on a cognitive test, but less likely to be in school if their sibling's do well (conditional on their own cognitive score)

◦ Case of Colombia: a study found that when some kids were given a conditional

cash transfer (CCTs) to stay in school, other kids were less likely to attend.

An elite bias can cause teachers to discriminate◦ Teachers will teach to the top of the class, even when the

majority of the students cannot follow what is going on◦ If teachers feel that the majority of their students are not "up to

the mark" they will tend to blame the students, or the parents, and lose motivation: low effort

◦ It may be difficult to convince teachers to change their practices, even with training

The Pratham experiment (with J-PAL)◦ Pratham (NGO) was established in 1994 to support Indian

education. ◦ In the original program (Balsakhi)

a young woman was partnered with students who were behind in school for 2 hours per day (tutoring).

◦ The Pratham studies: evidence of teacher bias toward the elite. The program was effective in teaching all children But teachers were not very interested in taking it up, except in the

remedial summer camps Teachers can teach the basics, but they are not very interested to do

it

An elite bias can cause students to discriminate themselves◦ Students can easily get discouraged and demotivated

when they stop understanding: "school is not for me". ◦ Students can be particularly sensitive to situations that

reinforce the stereotypes that they are not good at school.

◦ Evidence of this: Huge student absenteeism: up to 30% student absence in

some studies Part of this is due to other reason (work, health) But in many cases, students are just despondent

stereotype threat: Low caste and high caste student were asked to solve mazes. Low caste students did more poorly when they full name (with caste) was announced publicly before starting the maze.